



Feinstein International Famine Center

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Darfur – Livelihoods under Siege

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Feinstein International Famine Center

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Executive Summary

Purpose

The purpose of the research study was to investigate the effects of the current conflict and humanitarian crisis on the livelihoods of selected communities in Darfur, in order to refine strategic humanitarian interventions. The study focused on labour migration, livestock production and trade, and on communities' links with Central and Eastern Sudan and with Libya.

Study approach

The study included a background review of literature and liaison with partners. Field work was undertaken in Tripoli, Benghazi and Kufra in Libya and in Khartoum, Gederaf and North, West and South Darfur in Sudan. The study used a range of qualitative field methods to collect primary data, and its analysis was based on a review of impacts on livelihood strategies, assets and goals at the local level. In addition, the history and origins of the conflict were reviewed in order to better understand their relation to livelihoods, and their implications for subsequent recommendations.

Livelihoods in crisis

Never before in the history of Darfur has there been such a combination of factors causing the failure of livelihood strategies and the loss of assets. These factors include systematic asset-stripping, production failures, market failures, failures of access to natural resources and constraints on the remittances of migrant workers. Under these circumstances, region-wide famine appears inevitable. While the provision of food aid can partially redress production failures, a much wider raft of interventions is needed to begin to address the other issues.

Conflict and peoples' livelihoods are inextricably linked. Livelihoods are integral to the causes of the conflict and the impact it has had, and therefore will be central to any lasting solutions to the conflict. Moves to find a peaceful solution must take account of livelihoods, while efforts to support livelihoods must consider the political economy of conflict and the implications for livelihoods and livelihood interventions.

Recommendations

Major structural changes need to be addressed at the international, national and State levels. These changes include processes of land restitution and compensation; livestock restitution, reconciliation and compensation; and the opening up of transport routes to provide safe passage for people, livestock and goods. Ideally, the wider processes of reconciliation should be linked with livelihood support. Extensive and detailed recommendations cover six broad areas: security, land, livestock, markets, labour migration and international humanitarian response (see below).



History and origins of the conflict

The sources of the conflict date back to the nineteenth century. The report traces the evolution of trade routes, tribal territories, systems of administration, land rights and relations between Darfur and the central Sudanese authorities, from the period of the Fur Sultanate to the present day. It identifies a number of national and local processes that have directly contributed to the conflict. At national level these include:

- a. the economic and political marginalisation of Darfur by the central government, since the nineteenth century
- b. wider regional conflicts, which have contributed to the development and deployment of ethnically distinct armed militias, and also to the increased numbers of firearms owned by Darfurians generally. These conflicts include the north–south civil war in Sudan, long-running conflicts within Chad, disputes between Chad and Libya, and the relationships between these countries and Sudan
- c. the tactical manipulation of ethnic identities within Darfur by the Government of Sudan (GoS) and political parties, including the mobilisation of armed militias and political mobilisation based on religious and ethnic identity (i.e. Mahdism and later Islamisation and Arabism).

At a local level, the marginalisation and neglect of Darfur have contributed to:

- a. failing institutions, including the Native Administration, judicial systems and policing, which latterly appear to have favoured certain groups
- b. failing development, including that of education, health care, transport and veterinary and other services, which have affected different ethnic groups to varying degrees.

Other local-level processes include competition for, and pressures on, natural resources within Darfur, partly due to a history of drought and famine. These pressures have led to clear ethnic rivalries and have contributed to local-level conflict. In addition, external influences from Libyan-affiliated popular committees and some political parties (e.g. the Muslim Brotherhood and Umma Party) have contributed to political polarisation between Arab and non-Arab groups in Darfur.

Effects on livelihoods

Rural livelihoods in Darfur are relatively simple to understand, in that all tribes, Arab and non-Arab, cultivate crops and raise livestock to varying degrees. The livelihoods of farmers and herders have converged, although factors such as access to land, differing soil types, rainfall and altitude have all influenced the precise patterns of rural production. Most groups supplement their farming and livestock-rearing activities with strategies such as labour migration and remittances, collection of natural resources (firewood, fodder and wild foods) and trade. Other livelihood strategies are specific to certain groups, including, for example, the production of *tombac* (chewing tobacco), artisanry (leatherwork, metalwork, etc.), membership of the military and a range of illegal activities (smuggling, banditry, brewing, prostitution etc.).

Five case studies were conducted, covering all three states of Darfur, in the areas of Kebkabiya, Mellit, Disa, Seraif and Geneina. The case studies reflected a diverse range of ethnic groups, both large and small and reflecting different political viewpoints and experiences of the conflict (including groups supporting the rebels/opposition, pro-government groups and those who were ambivalent).

The case studies conducted in Kebkabiya, Disa and Geneina give detailed accounts of the attacks carried out on villages by government forces, with support from armed militias, throughout 2003 and into 2004. In all cases, there were direct asset-stripping and destruction of household and community



assets. This is in breach of international humanitarian law, which prohibits the use of starvation as a method of warfare and specifies that parties to a conflict must not attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable for the survival of civilian populations.

Beyond the direct impact of the crisis caused by asset-stripping are the continuing processes that indirectly cause the systematic destruction of livelihoods. These processes are attributable to the actions of key players, including the GoS and rebel groups, and are due also to the failures of international humanitarian assistance.

The most fundamental problem affecting livelihoods in Darfur is insecurity, which restricts the mobility of all groups. Insecurity is widespread as a result of continued ceasefire violations on the part of both the GoS and rebel groups. Consequently, the towns of Darfur are in a state of siege and internally displaced persons (IDPs) within them have become cut off from their normal livelihood strategies. For rural-based populations the situation is little better, with people fearing to travel or even to cultivate their fields for risk of attack. Although there is local security in Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)-controlled areas, all services and markets are located in areas controlled by the government (for example in Kutum), which cannot be reached without risk of rape or attack.

Limited mobility resulting from insecurity has seriously limited the core livelihood strategies of all groups in Darfur, including cultivation; seasonal livestock migration; trade and access to markets for buyers and sellers; labour migration and remittances; and travel to rural areas for the collection of firewood, fodder and wild foods.

While the Government of Sudan has manipulated and eroded the Native Administration, local interests in Darfur have sought to gain authority and power through the tribal systems, thereby increasing the politicisation of tribal administrations. Certain groups clearly feel that they have been marginalised within Darfur, in that they have had less access than others to the limited resources that exist, including land, health care, education and even international aid. Although their situation is very different from that of IDPs, their livelihoods too are under threat and their humanitarian needs will also have to be addressed urgently in the coming months.

Pressure on labour migrants and the blocking of remittances

Until the recent conflict, remittances from internal and external labour migrants, in cash and in kind, were a regular and stable source of income for Darfurian families and made a substantial contribution to livelihoods. The conflict has caused the sending of remittances to dwindle dramatically: for example, at a conservative estimate, lost income from workers in Libya amounts to roughly US\$15 million per annum. Substantial sums are remitted from other destinations beyond Darfur's borders, and in recent years Libya has ranked only third or fourth in terms of the numbers of Darfurian labour migrants attracted there. However, given Darfur's proximity to Libya, combined with the recent lifting of international sanctions against that country and the likely upturn in its economy, Libya represents a potentially rich future source of income for Darfurians.

Labour migration and commerce along the trans-Saharan desert routes to Libya have long been a feature of livelihoods in Darfur. The oil boom of the 1970s and 1980s intensified these existing patterns of migration, as did Colonel Gaddafi's relatively open-door policies. This changed in 1995, however, with a crackdown on migrant workers (including raids and forced repatriation), which has continued intermittently to the present day.



x

The population of Libya is estimated at five million, but there are also thought to be two million foreign workers in the country. Official estimates of the numbers of Darfurian migrant workers in Libya were unavailable but were estimated to be between 150,000 and 250,000. A rapid assessment survey conducted in the Libyan town of Kufra indicated that Darfurian labour migrants constituted a relatively mature and skilled labour force, and that most had family responsibilities in Darfur. More than half were over 30 years of age, about 75 per cent were married and the literacy rate was double that found in Darfur itself.

Migration to Libya is a reflection of both 'pull' and 'push' factors. The push factors include conscription and compulsory recruitment into the Popular Defence Forces at home in Darfur, limited work opportunities and failing livelihoods as a result of recurrent drought and insecurity. The pull factors include opportunities for better-paid work, the relative proximity of Libya to Darfur, the relative ease of working there illegally and, most importantly, the Darfurian contacts and support networks to be found there.

In 2004 further restrictions were imposed on migrant workers, including the need to obtain a 'health certificate' that requires a series of health tests. The tests cost Libyan Dinars (LD) 70 (US\$50), are only available to legal immigrants and must be repeated every six or 12 months. A positive HIV/AIDS result, for example, risks the forfeiture of identity papers, imprisonment and deportation.

Before the crisis, remittances sent back to Darfur ranged from US\$40 to US\$900 per worker per annum, though most were thought to be in the range of US\$40–US\$400. Migrant workers in Libya estimated that skilled workers could afford to send back about LD 90 (US\$68) per month, while unskilled labourers could send about LD 30 (US\$23).

Closure of the Libyan border and insecurity in North Darfur

The closure of the national border between Sudan and Libya in May 2003, which was associated with insecurity in the northern deserts of North Darfur, has perhaps had the most serious implications for the economy of Darfur and for the well-being of its traders and labour migrants. The closure has stopped the traffic of migrant workers between North Darfur and southern Libya (effectively trapping several thousand in Kufra), and has blocked well-established and critically important trade routes.

Communications and remittances have been seriously affected, as there is no longer the possibility of sending hand-carried messages or remittances back to Darfur. Communications between Darfurian workers in Libya and their families in Darfur are vital for the transfer of remittances and the recovery of livelihoods.

Kufra is a trans-national trade hub, linking Sudan and Chad with Libya and other Arab states, and is an important transit point for migrant workers of many nationalities. Consequently, the border closure has had a significant impact on economic activity in Kufra itself as well as on the livelihoods of migrant workers.

The currently limited prospects for migrant workers in Libya, combined with the threat of detention, the difficulties of return to Sudan, and the loss of contact with their families in Darfur and uncertainty about their fate, have created a sense of despair among many migrant Darfurians in Libya. Thousands wait in Kufra for the chance to return to Darfur, while watching the value of their capital erode. Suicide is reportedly on the increase. Elsewhere, along the Libyan coast, many are prepared to risk the dangerous boat journey across the Mediterranean to Italy.

Labour migration to Eastern Sudan

Darfur also has a long history of labour migration to Eastern Sudan. The vast majority of the Darfurian labour migrants in Gedaref, near the Ethiopian border, have migrated there for economic reasons, in



search of work opportunities and cash income that would allow them to support their relatives and communities in Darfur. More than half of them have lived there for more than three years.

Distress migration to Khartoum

In contrast, the study found that Darfurian migrants to Khartoum were people recently displaced by the conflict in Darfur, and were principally women and children (there was one man for every three women). Displaced Darfurians in Khartoum were facing difficulties because of fierce competition for limited job opportunities, difficulties in the IDP camps and problems with the local authorities.

The importance of livestock

Sudan is the leading livestock-exporting country in the region, and livestock used to generate 20 per cent of national foreign exchange earnings before the discovery of oil. Darfur's contribution, both to the livestock export trade and to the domestic market for meat, has always been significant. For example, before the conflict the region was exporting 30,000 camels to Libya and about 50,000 camels to Egypt each year. In economic terms, livestock has been the primary target of the current conflict. Various sources suggest that the non-Arab population of Darfur has lost between 50 per cent and 90 per cent of its livestock to the government's armed forces. The issue of livestock is central if lasting solutions to the problems in Darfur are to be found. Darfur's economy has been seriously eroded and livestock trade, the traditional backbone of its economy, is failing fast.

Livestock migration routes

A visible outcome of the conflict is changes in livestock migration patterns, which potentially have disastrous consequences. Increasing hostility between Arabs and non-Arabs, and control by the SLM/A of some critical areas along the traditional migratory routes, have resulted in the restriction of access to the wet-season grazing reserves in the north (at Gisou, Wadi Hawar and El Atrun) for the camel-herding (Abbala) Arabs. During the study team's visit camels and sheep belonging to these Arab groups were confined in specific areas, in Dar Zayadia, Dar Seraif, around Kebkabiya, and south of the Jebel Mara mountains. Similarly, cattle belonging to the Baggara cattle-herding groups have been confined to areas around the railway line close to Nyala town (the furthest point north they could reach) and to the Nyala–Kas Zalingi road in the west. Concentrations of livestock in confined areas in the dry-season grazing reserves will deplete pasture and water resources and increase the risk of disease, leading to increased livestock mortality.

The collapse of the livestock trade

The disruption of livestock trade both within Darfur and beyond its borders has signalled a downward spiral of the region's economy. The repercussions of this disruption are felt, in varying degrees, in almost all households and in all segments of the population (pastoralists, agro-pastoralists, traders, middlemen, drovers, etc.). Important secondary markets such as Mellit, where previously some 20,000 camels and 25,000 sheep were processed to Libya annually, have been closed since late 2003. Since then, of the 50 local *toujar* (traders) in Mellit, about 40 have left for El Fasher or Khartoum.

In April 2003, insecurity on the livestock trade routes through North Darfur worsened, with the murder of 10 camel drovers and the 'confiscation' of 3,000 camels. Shortly afterwards, the border was closed by the GoS. The total value of business lost since the route was closed amounts to over US\$14 million. At least 300 lead drovers and 1,280 assistant drovers have lost their jobs, as well as the possibility of finding employment as migrant workers in Libya. The volume of livestock exported to Chad through Tina, in north-west Darfur on the Chadian border, is far smaller, due to its inconvenient location, difficult terrain and insecurity locally.



Trade to Muwheli (in Omdurman) and Egypt

The northern route through El Fasher is insecure and a substantial reduction is expected in the volume of sheep traveling to Muwheli, both for export and local consumption. Annual traffic on this route before the conflict was estimated at approximately 450,000 sheep, 48,000 camels and 3,500 head of cattle. The southern route through Nyala and Ed Daein is out of bounds because of insecurity following the capture of some parts of Ed Daein locality by the SLM/A, together with attacks and counter-attacks between tribal groups, and banditry. Recent security incidents on this route include the interception of some 1,300 sheep by the SLM/A at Labado, 60km east of Nyala.

Crisis trade routes

Some Arab livestock traders in El Geneina are attempting to establish new trade routes to bypass the security-affected areas in the south. These routes are longer, increasing the number of days' trekking by an additional 20–40 days, and therefore putting greater stress on the animals. These routes were on trial at the time of the study and traders were not certain whether they would be successful (i.e. profitable).

The rise in consumer commodity prices

Total and partial closures of strategic trade routes have increased the prices of basic commodities. This is due to increased transport costs, the risk of bandit attack, the need to obtain commodity supplies from new sources, and also to government embargoes. Price increases are felt all over Darfur but are more pronounced in parts of northern Darfur, which used to get most of their supplies from Libya (via Kufra) and from Omdurman. In addition, large commodity traders, who used to distribute consumer goods on credit to village-level traders, have stopped practising this system.

I. Introduction

It is almost two years since the beginning of the rebel insurgency in Darfur, but the conflict continues, the ceasefire has been frequently violated, and the world's worst humanitarian crisis continues to deepen. At the last estimate, more than 1.6 million people had been displaced as a result of systematic attacks on villages, with associated violence, killings, burning of homes, looting of livestock, and theft and destruction of material assets.

It does not need research to demonstrate that the conflict in Darfur has destroyed livelihoods. This study attempts to go beyond the obvious and immediate impacts of the attacks, to consider the medium- and long-term consequences for people's survival, and their longer-term future. Its purpose is to investigate the effects of the humanitarian crisis on the livelihoods of selected communities in Darfur, in order to help refine strategic humanitarian interventions. It pays particular attention to the impact on remittances sent back to Darfur by migrant workers in Libya, and in Khartoum and Gederaf in Sudan; and also to the role of livestock production and livestock trade between Darfur and Libya, and between Darfur and Khartoum. It takes a strategic, long-term view of how the conflict is affecting Darfur, beyond the initial shock and the immediate needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Methodology

Research undertaken in the midst of complex emergencies must adapt to the constant challenges of insecurity, shifting access to different parts of the population, and highly charged political contexts where few actors are neutral, let alone objective. The analytical tool applied for investigating livelihoods is the adapted livelihoods framework used by the Feinstein International Famine Center (FIFC), which is based on the UK Government's Department for International Development (DFID)'s Sustainable Livelihoods Framework¹ and the Collinson framework.² A diagram of the adapted livelihoods framework is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Humanitarian livelihoods framework

This study fills a gap that is widely recognised by both the international community and the Sudanese authorities, in that it is not limited to IDPs, but employs conflict analysis and considers the impact of macro factors (such as markets, trade, tribal affiliation and political economy) on the livelihoods of different groups in Darfur.



The core elements of the FIFC framework used in the analysis include:

1. **livelihood goals**, many of which may be competing, which means that households must constantly re-prioritise and make trade-offs between one goal and another;
2. **the assets or resources** available to households, which may be either directly owned or otherwise accessed. These include:
 - **natural**: land, water (including rights of access to grazing land, water points, common natural resources)
 - **physical**: livestock, stores and stocks, equipment
 - **financial**: money, debt, credit, claims/obligations, investments
 - **human**: health and nutritional status, adult labour and care providers, skills and level of education
 - **social**: household social networks, social institutions, social exclusion, norms, trust, values and attitudes
 - **political**: appropriate in the context of conflict.
3. **livelihood strategies**, which are what people actually do, or the means by which they achieve their goals. Livelihoods usually comprise multiple strategies.
4. **the policies, institutions and processes** that affect the way in which households maintain or gain access to their assets and keep control over them. The manner in which households use their assets is shaped or influenced by 'transforming structures and processes' – which in Darfur may include, for example, the processes of climatic and environmental change, rural–urban migration, Arabisation and Islamisation, and wider economic pressures such as inflation or fluctuations in exchange rates. The term 'institutions' is used to refer to customs, rules or common law that have been an important feature of a particular group or society for a long time: the Native Administration in Sudan is a good example. The term is also used to mean established body or organisation.

The study analyses livelihood goals, strategies and assets at the micro level – the level of the household and local community. Livelihood goals are in a sense the objectives of the household, which influence the combination of assets and strategies that are subsequently mobilised. The household's resources must be managed to reduce risk, prevent erosion of assets, and promote further accumulation of assets where this is desired. Household assets can be both a resource and a source of risk or vulnerability – for example, when assets are deficient (such as a lack of adult labour), or there is no access to credit or a lack of social networks, or when the accumulation of assets gives rise to the risk of robbery with violence or communal conflict. There may also be a significant cost to the household in terms of maintaining assets – for example, in maintaining residence on the land to ensure land rights, or in long-distance migration with livestock to ensure access to water and pasture.

Policies, institutions and processes, on the other hand, are identified and analysed more at the macro level. In the context of Darfur, this means reviewing the salient political, social and economic features of the evolving conflict and looking at how these have affected livelihoods. This approach to the conflict is based on elements of a political economy analysis¹, and is vital if the more strategic and longer-term impacts on livelihoods are to be understood.

¹ According to Collinson, political economy analysis 'is concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time. When applied to situations of conflict and crisis, political economy analysis seeks to understand both the political and the economic aspects of conflict, and how these combine to affect patterns of power and vulnerability. According to a political economy approach, vulnerability should be understood in terms of powerlessness rather than simply material need'.



Commodity chain analysis has been applied in relation to livestock production and trade, and also to labour migration and remittances. It has been used to consider how these areas have been affected by the war economy, and in order to identify governance structures and exchange relationships within commercial networks, beginning with primary production and moving up from the local to the international level.

Phased approach

The study included a background review of literature and liaison with partners (June–July 2004); field work in Libya (July 2004); field work in Darfur, Khartoum and Gederaf (September–October 2004); and briefings and preparation of the final report (October–December 2004).

Independent research in Libya has not been possible for US-based academics since the imposition of sanctions in the early 1990s, and to our knowledge this is the first study of its kind to investigate Sudanese labour migration. An invitation from the Libyan Red Crescent enabled three members of the Tufts University team to visit Tripoli, Benghazi and El Kufra in the south-east of the country. During the visit, the team was able to meet with:

- representatives of relevant Libyan government offices (including a local governor, customs officials, immigration and veterinary offices)
- Libyan Red Crescent staff, including medical staff responsible for health certification of Sudanese migrants
- Libyan agricultural projects employing Sudanese workers
- Sudanese associations (formal and informal)
- Darfurian traders
- Focus Groups of selected Darfurians (different ethnic groups, livelihood groups, recent arrivals, long-term established workers, etc.)
- faculty members at the University of Benghazi and the University of El Kufra.

To coincide with the visit to Libya, four professors from the University of El Kufra conducted a rapid assessment survey on the social and economic status of Sudanese migrants living in Kufra. A non-random sample of 385 Sudanese were interviewed at a range of locations in the Kufra area; the results are included in this report.

Study team

The field study team included four members from Tufts University (one faculty member, two experienced practitioners with research experience and an expert in livestock production and trade), three from Ahfad University for Women in Omdurman, Sudan (one faculty member and two research assistants) and one expert local consultant from Darfur. Of the six core team members, three were Sudanese, although four team members had previous experience of living and working in Darfur.

Selection of study sites

Within the limitations imposed by issues of security and access, case-study sites in Darfur were selected to provide a wide geographical distribution and thereby diversity in livelihoods based on natural resources. They were also chosen to provide a balanced range of ethnic groups, both large and small and reflecting different political viewpoints. The team travelled from El Fasher to Mellit, Kutum, Disa, Kebkabiya, Seraif (Beni Hussein), Seraf Umra, Assernei, El Geneina, Gokur and Nyala. Case studies are included of the following locations:

- North Darfur: Kebkabiya, Mellit, Disa and Seraif
- West Darfur: El Geneina (including settlements outside of El Geneina).



The study used qualitative research methods for collecting primary data during field work, including key informant interviews, Focus Group discussions and a range of participatory rural appraisal techniques (including semi-structured interviewing, proportional piling, historic timelines, mapping migration routes, ranking and scoring, transect walks, 'chapatti' or Venn diagrams, and direct observation).

The team identified and sought out a range of key informants in each location, including local leaders within the tribal administration², traders, and local experts in livelihood-related issues (e.g. government and NGO workers). These key informant interviews were complemented by a range of Focus Group interviews, with groups representing different ethnic groups in each of the case-study areas. The Focus Groups included IDPs, pro-government groups, groups based in areas controlled by the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and displaced people living in abandoned villages.

Numbers have been substituted for all names of key informants and Focus Group members, in order to protect their privacy. The interviewers are identified in the references by their initials (HY – Helen Young; BB – Babiker Badri; AO – Abdal Monim Osman; RD – Rebecca Dale; YA – Yacob Aklilu).

Background: livelihoods in Darfur

This section provides some background context to livelihoods in Darfur, focusing on the environmental and climatic factors that determine food security, and briefly reviewing the standard approaches to food security monitoring and early warning in the region. The history of conflict and its inter-relationship with failing livelihoods is taken up in Chapter 2.

The three states of North, West and South Darfur make up Darfur region and cover a vast area of 510,000 km² (one-fifth of Sudan), stretching from the Sahara Desert in the north to the equatorial forest in the south. Darfur shares borders with the Sudanese states of North and West Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal and with the neighbouring countries of Egypt, Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic (see Figure 2).

The region's ecological diversity in part results from its wide-ranging zones of rainfall:³

1. a desert zone north of 16°N, with less than 100mm of annual rainfall and variability in rainfall of 35–60 per cent;
2. a Sahelian zone 12–16°N, with 100mm–150mm of annual rainfall, 9.5–12 arid months and 25–35 per cent variability;
3. a Sudanic zone, 9–12°N, with 6.5–9 arid months, 500mm–900mm annual rainfall and 25–30 per cent variability.

The region's location in the transitional zone between the Sahelian and the desert zones means that its natural resource base is fragile, especially in its northern areas, and this exposes it to environmental and production hazards. There is a single rainy season (mostly July–September), during which rainfall variability is more important in relation to food production than the total amount of rainfall.

The region consists of upland and lowland areas. Volcanic mountains, basement plateaux and outcrops of Nubian sandstone occur, especially in Jebel Meidob in the north-east and Jebel Mara in the centre of Darfur. The altitude of Jebel Mara, at up to 3,000 metres above sea level, has a significant effect on the

² The tribal administration, formerly the Native Administration (*idara ahlia*), was adopted by the Anglo-Egyptian colonial government in the 1920s and 1930s as a form of indirect rule throughout Sudan.



Figure 2. Darfur Region, Sudan

Source: Humanitarian Information Center for Darfur, Khartoum, Sudan, 2004



amount of rainfall in that area and its reliability. The lowlands include the northern desert, stabilised *goz* sand sheets in most of eastern Darfur and part of the south, important alluvial soils in the north and the west (including the wadi networks) and extensive drainage basins in the south.³

Population density varies according to these ecological and climatic zones. North of 16°N, population density is very sparse, while the State of West Darfur is densely populated. The last official population census was carried out in 1993, but this is generally considered to be outdated. Most publications from United Nations (UN) agencies cite the population figures published by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS, 2001), which assume a population growth rate of between 2.38% (for West Darfur) and 2.48% (for South Darfur). Their mid-year 2004 estimate for the total population of Darfur was 6,556,000. Substantial numbers of people have left the region as a result of the crisis, either as refugees to Chad (approximately 190,000), or as labour migrants or displaced people to other parts of Sudan or to neighbouring countries, including Egypt and Libya, other Arab states, or Europe. The actual numbers of displaced people and labour migrants are unknown.

Darfur is geographically remote from the rest of the country (El Fasher is more than 1,000km from Khartoum), and is especially distant from the areas of highest grain production in Central and Eastern Sudan. This remoteness contributes to a relative lack of access to markets outside the region. Transport costs from Central Sudan to Darfur were estimated to be upwards of 33% of the final selling price of grain in 1987. According to one study: *'Within Darfur, the poor infrastructure similarly affects the regional grain market network. Although in good harvest years the regional marketing system appears to be well integrated, in poor years supplies to remote markets in North Darfur quickly dry up. Markets such as Cuma and Malha were particularly badly served in previous periods of drought. Costly and difficult transport discouraged local traders from serving these small markets, particularly during the rainy season when market supplies were most needed.'*⁴

A study in the late 1980s found that 53–65% of households' total budget was spent on food.⁵ More recent work by Save the Children UK (SCUK)'s Household Economy unit shows that this trend varies in different food economy zones within Darfur but that, generally, poor households rely less on purchased food sources than on their own production, as compared with better-off groups (see Table 1).

Table 1. Food purchases as a percentage of households' sources of food

Food economy zone	Poor	Middle
Agro-migrant zone	35–45%	45–50%
Mixed cash crop	30–35%	–
Pastoral	20–25%	45–50%
<i>Tombac</i> (chewing tobacco)	50–60%	30–35%

Critical elements of rural livelihoods and the food security of the region include the annual grain harvest, livestock production and market systems. Rural production systems are a function of altitude, rainfall and soil type, which are obviously inter-related. The soils cultivated in Darfur include the sandy *goz* soils and the more fertile and therefore important alluvial soils (including wadis). Poor households tend to have less or no access to wadi or alluvial soils.

Swift and Gray (1989) identify five main rural production systems across the region, with local variants (see Box 1).³ The food economy profiles compiled by SCUK go a step further and take into account



Box 1. Five categories of rural production system in Darfur³

1. Ğoz/wadi farming in North Darfur (31.6 per cent of all farmers)

The staple crop is millet planted on large areas of sandy *ğoz* soil, as well as on smaller areas of alluvial wadi soils. Households grow part of their annual consumption requirements. Watermelon is the main intercrop, which provides a useful cash income. Ğoz soils predominate in the north-east, while in Kebkabiya alluvial soils are common. Livestock has traditionally been part of this production system, with camels, sheep, cattle and goats all owned in small numbers by farming households.

2. Ğoz/wadi farming in South Darfur (34.5 per cent)

This follows the same pattern as in the north except, because of higher rainfall, there are higher and more stable yields and more varied crops. In the past, the practice of shifting cultivation, with movement of residence, was common. However, local population growth and immigration from North Darfur has led to continued cultivation of the same area. Millet is the dominant crop, while minor crops include sorghum and groundnuts (an important cash crop). On alluvial soils millet is less widespread. Gum arabic has remained a resource for about one in three households. Livestock production is important, especially of cattle and goats. Hired herdsman are used.

3. Jebel Mara mixed farming (7.2 per cent)

The high altitude of Jebel Mara has an effect on its rainfall, which averages 450mm–500mm a year. As a result, the area produces a grain surplus, except for particularly dry years. Farmers have a mixed agricultural economy, with extensive millet and sorghum cultivation at lower altitudes combined with irrigated citrus cultivation on the Jebel itself. Groundnuts and wheat are also grown, and there are vegetable gardens in the valleys (onion, chillies, okra). Livestock is widely owned, although ownership is precarious because of civil disturbance. Terracing and the concentration of water run-off, as well as some permanent streams, allow simple irrigation to be carried out.

4. Camel, sheep and goat pastoralists (5.7 per cent)

Camel, sheep and goat pastoralists are concentrated mainly in North Darfur: the Zaghawa tribe in the north-west and the Meidob in the north-east. The famine in the 1980s caused much greater livestock losses in North Darfur than in South Darfur.

5. Cattle pastoralists (8.6 per cent)

Cattle pastoralism is common in South Darfur, and was previously significantly nomadic, practised mainly by Arab Rizeigat groups. Small stock, i.e. sheep and goats, is also kept. A significant number of herders are hired in the pastoral system, which therefore becomes a livelihood strategy in itself. Cattle pastoralists in South Darfur used to migrate long distances, trekking north with the rains from the Bahr el Arab river to wet-season pastures and cultivation areas, followed by a return some months later to dry-season wells and pastures along the Bahr. Widely and increasingly, cattle pastoralists also cultivate crops (millet, sorghum, groundnuts, okra).

the full range of food and income sources that characterise each food economy zone in North Darfur (see Box 2). These include markets, trade, labour migration and artisanry, as well as the coping and crisis strategies that people use during times of drought and political instability. As well as farmers, there is also a significant urban population of traders, government officials and other professionals in the region.

While these household economy zone classifications are extremely useful in relation to food security monitoring, they tend to suggest that there is a certain homogeneity within food economy zones and



heterogeneity between them. While there are distinguishing characteristics (cattle herding is confined to the south of the region, for example, and camel herding to the north), it is important to understand that farming and herding are practised throughout Darfur, and are rarely undertaken as separate activities. In other words, nearly all farmers rear livestock, while nearly all herders cultivate crops.

Box 2. The six food economy zones (FEZs) in North Darfur (SCUK) (summary descriptions apply to baseline years, pre-conflict)

The goz food economy zone⁶

Location: A wide area including Um Kedada, Mellit, Sayah and most of El Fasher and northern Dar Al Salam administrative units. El Fasher, Mellit and Um Kedada towns are the main urban centres and the main markets for this FEZ.

Ecology: Flat to undulating goz is the predominant soil, with scattered mountains and short-lived seasonal streams (*chor*). Annual rainfall ranges from below 150mm to 250mm, with high variability locally and from year to year.

Livelihood strategies: Rainfed cultivation of millet and watermelon in goz sandy soil, supplemented by small to medium herds of sheep and goats. In poor households it is common to seek agricultural labour, while for middle-income households the main sources of income are trade, money sent from family members abroad and the sale of livestock. Herding is one method of acquiring livestock, as herders are often paid in kind.

Total annual income: For a poor household, about Sudanese Dinars (SD) 43,900 (US\$300); for a middle-income household, about SD 100,000 (US\$667).

The pastoral food economy zone⁷

Location: The northern part of North Darfur State.

Ecology: This area is dominated by a semi-desert climate. Annual rainfall is less than 200mm, with a declining pattern northwards.

Livelihood strategies: Livestock herding is the core livelihood in this FEZ. Sheep and camels are traded in Mellit, Kutum and El Fasher markets. Seraf Umra has also become an important market for animals. Direct export of camels from Darfur to Libya and Egypt is common. Goats are sold mainly in local Darfur markets for local consumption. In a poor rainfall year, wild foods make a significant contribution to the diet of poor and middle-income households.

Total annual income: In Malha, for a typical poor household SD 30,000 (US\$230); for a middle-income household SD 80,000 (US\$615).

The agro-migrant food economy zone⁸

Location: This zone extends from the non-wadi areas of Kutum and Fata Barno administrative units in Kutum Locality to the Jebel Si/Kebkabiya administrative units in Kebkabiya Locality.

Ecology: The dominant soil types are stony hills and hard, sandy clay soils. The annual rainfall is 200mm–250mm. This FEZ forms a transition area between the wadi, goz and pastoral FEZs.

Livelihood strategies: Most farmers grow millet, with limited land holdings and small to medium-sized herds of mainly sheep and goats, and a few cattle. Men also migrate to Central Sudan or (less commonly) to the Gulf States in search of work. Women tend to migrate to South or West Darfur in search of agricultural employment. Consumption of wild foods is common. Livestock sales represent the most important source of income for middle-income households, because of their relatively better holdings. Remittances are the second most important source of income for middle-income households.

Total annual income: South Kutum: poor households SD 33,000 (US\$226); and for Jebel Si, SD 19,700 (US\$135).



Box 2 (continued)

Mixed cash crops food economy zone⁹

Location: Covers southern Um Kedada (Tewaisha and El Laeit administrative units) and southern Dar Al Salam. The dominant tribes are the Berti, Hamar and Zaghawa. Other tribes are the Tunjur, Ga'al, Fur, Gawama'a, Beni Omran, Beni Hussein, Burgo and Meidob. There are also Dinka IDPs who were displaced from Bahr el Ghazal in 1992.

Ecology: Poor savannah with relatively dense vegetation dominated by *hashab* (*Acacia senegalensis*). Annual rainfall is between 300mm and 400mm.

Livelihood strategies: Groundnuts, watermelon and sesame are the main cash crops, with sesame being grown mainly in Dar Al Salam. Other crops are *karkadeh* (hibiscus) and *lubia*. Family members of poor households work on the farms of better-off households. The Dinka IDPs have no access to land and are involved in an exploitative sharecropping system. Livestock holdings are sheep, goats, cattle and a few riding camels. Tawesish, El Laeit and Dar Al Salam are the main small market towns. The area also has market linkages with Ed Daein in South Darfur and Ghebaish in West Kordofan.

Total annual income: For a typical poor household about SD 78,500 (US\$396); for a typical IDP family about SD 55,388 (US\$281).

Tombac food economy zone¹⁰

Location: Includes Taweila, Korma, western parts of El Fasher and the southern parts of Dar Al Salam.

Ecology: The annual rainfall varies from 200mm–350mm, with a declining trend moving northwards. Fertile clay soil around seasonal riverbeds, known locally as wadis, is the most common soil for the cultivation of *tombac* (a type of chewing tobacco).

Livelihood strategies: This area produces most of Sudan's supply of *tombac*. The main food source for most poor households is food purchase, supplemented by their own crop production (millet) and agricultural labour (paid for in food), wild food and milk. Major income sources are the sale of *tombac*, agricultural labour on *tombac* farms, renting of land and donkeys to better-off households and livestock sales. The main *tombac* markets are El Fasher, Taweila, Korma, Tabit and Shangil Tobia.

Total annual income: For poor households, about SD 71,515 (US\$447); for middle-income households SD 166,250 (US\$1,039). Better-off households are among the wealthier households in North Darfur.

Wadi food economy zone¹¹

Location: Crosses Kutum, Fata Borno, Kebkabiya and Seraf Umra, and covers the people who cultivate crops along the banks of Wadi Kutum, Wadi Bari and Wadi Borgo and their branches.

Ecology: The wadi soil consists of alluvial silt, clay and/or loamy soil. The depth of soil and its composition varies between the upper and lower parts of a wadi, and from one wadi to another. The depth at which ground water is found varies from 3–6 metres. The annual rainfall is 300mm–400mm for the Kebkabiya area and 200mm–300mm for the Kutum area.

Livelihood strategies: These depend on wadi landholdings, which are inherited and which vary by wealth group. Millet and sorghum are grown as a staple food and groundnuts (mainly in Kebkabiya) as a cash crop. In winter (mid-November to February), irrigated vegetables and beans are grown for sale in the local markets and then exported to other markets, mainly in El Fasher. Fruit trees, such as mango, guava and lemon, are also owned by some households. The main sources of income in the wadi food economy are cash crops and livestock sales, and for poor households also local employment.

Total annual income: For poor households SD 66,200 (US\$454); for middle-income households SD 85,200 (US\$585); and for better-off households SD 248,800 (US\$1,709).



The distinction between farmer and herder is usually one between sedentary agro-pastoralists and more mobile pastoralists, with roots that lie in ethnic identity or tribal origin. It is this critical aspect of livelihoods that until recently has been consistently missed or ignored in the assessments and monitoring of food security. For example, the existing food economy profiles make passing reference to the tribes in a particular zone, but do not explain the distinction between sedentary farmers on the one hand and pastoralists on the other.

This level of analysis has not improved during the recent crisis, and now the passing reference by the international community is to the 'most affected' groups (Fur, Zaghawa, Masalit and possibly Tunjur) and a listing of Arab groups, with no mention of their relative size or their social, economic or political importance. In the context of the current crisis it is imperative that identity is reintroduced as a critical dimension in the analysis of livelihoods. For this reason, this study uses ethnic identity as a key variable for investigation.

A number of conclusions can be drawn from this very brief review of livelihoods:

1. Sedentary farming is traditionally practised in juxtaposition with pastoralism. The two activities are traditionally associated with different tribal groups and have defined their relationship to land use.
2. Over the course of time the farming communities – for example, the Fur – have aspired to produce livestock as a means of acquiring wealth, while the nomadic communities have expanded into cultivation with mixed success. In the marginal areas of the north and north-east, agricultural cultivation is a high-risk activity, due to the low levels and variability of rainfall. Those pastoralist communities that moved south early enough have acquired land, and their livelihoods reflect the local patterns of cultivation and livestock herding. Hence, currently nearly all farmers raise livestock, while nearly all pastoralists cultivate crops. The numbers of true nomads are very small indeed.
3. The recent and current systems used to monitor food security in the region have deliberately excluded tribal identity and conflict as a factor in their analyses. As a result, complex interactions, including conflict between tribes related to the use of natural resources, have received relatively little attention until now.

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2. The History and Origins of the Current Conflict in Darfur

This chapter reviews some of the history behind the causes of the current conflict. This is vital in order to understand the origins of the crisis. There have been many different approaches to analysing and understanding the conflict in Darfur. Some have attributed it to what they call the inherent warring nature of tribalism and bedowism.¹⁻³ Others have focused on the pressures of ecological degradation, highlighting issues such as land use and the limited natural resource base.^{4,5} However, such approaches gloss over the political economy involved in the use of natural resources and tend to suggest technical fixes for what are essentially political problems. Moreover, their focus tends to be on individual parts of the problem, and at only one level. Others provide a 'shopping list' in which all the causal factors are given equal importance. Approaches of this sort fail to differentiate the immediate factors from the root causes or to identify the ways in which they interact with one another.

To inform any intervention strategy, a more systematic analysis is required. An alternative approach to understanding the nature of the conflict and its impact on livelihoods should try to identify and analyse the local, national, regional and international factors and processes operating at each level, and the role of each in the conflict.

For the past 200 years, three critically important factors have shaped the political, social and economic life of Darfur and of neighbouring states: Islamism, trade and tribal identity. These factors have contributed to the social dominance of religious leaders, tribal leaders and merchants in the region; combined with its diverse ecology, they shed light on the distribution and use of agricultural and pastoral resources in Darfur.

This chapter shows how these factors have been critical elements in the evolution of the current crisis. It reviews the history of Darfur, focusing first on the Fur Sultanate, followed by Turco-Egyptian rule, the Mahadiya, Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule and post-Independence. The Fur Sultanate laid the foundations for the current patterns of tribal territories, systems of administration, land rights and trade networks, which evolved under subsequent administrations. Other factors have come into play, including repeated episodes of drought and famine and the impact of wider regional conflict, including the Chadian civil war, the Libyan–Chadian war and the North–South civil conflict in Sudan itself.

The origins of the economic and political marginalisation of Darfur as a whole, and of different groups within it, date back to the nineteenth century. Before this the Kingdom of Darfur was at least as powerful and important as its neighbours. At this time, however, the Turkish empire strengthened the central Nile riverain groups at the expense of the peripheral regions. This pattern was continued during Condominium rule, and post-Independence.

Historically, Darfur was an important independent centre for both trade and religion. Three different dynasties were decisive in its development:⁶

- Daju dynasty, whose political centre lay in the south-east of Jebel Mara. It ruled from about the thirteenth century to the sixteenth century
- Tunjur dynasty, whose centre of power lay north of Jebel Mara. It ruled over Darfur until the seventeenth century
- Keira dynasty, whose centre of power was in Turra in Jebel Mara and later in El Fasher. The core group in the Keira dynasty were the Fur, but it also sought to assimilate other groups.⁷



Historical background to Darfur

The Fur Sultanate

The Fur Sultanate was established by Sulayman Solongdongo (1650–1680). Before this, the history of the kingdom in its earlier Tunjur and Daju eras remains obscure. Following the sultanate's emergence from Jebel Mara into central areas of the region (the richest and most stable in terms of soil and water), it expanded through incorporations, both peaceful and coercive, of other territorial and ethnic groups.⁸ In 1787 the seventh Sultan, Mohammed Tayrab, extended the Fur Sultanate as far east as the Nile by conquering the Funj province of Kordofan. This opened the region up to the expanding commerce of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁹

Migration and ethnic diversity

With its strategic location between the White Nile and West Africa, the region attracted a constant flow of migrants from both east and west. A central strategy of the Fur Sultanate was to encourage immigrants, in order to meet a pressing need for manpower. Immigrants from West Africa, the Nile Valley and other locations included holy men (*fuqara*), scholars (*ulama*) and travelling merchants (*jallaba*), as well as poorer immigrants. Many of these groups were encouraged to settle, with the granting of land and positions by the sultans. At the same time, a process of cultural assimilation was set in motion to incorporate other groups and territories. Such groups included the Berti, Marariet, Mima, Daju, Bergid, Tunjur and Dading who, along with the Fur and Masalit and other smaller tribes, inhabited the central part of the region, where they traditionally practised sedentary farming.

The Zaghawa and the closely related Bideyat, tribes speaking Nilo-Saharan languages, have occupied the north-western part of the region, a semi-arid arc of territory stretching across Darfur and north of Weddai in present-day Chad, since the sixteenth century. The Meidob and the Bergid, Nubian language speakers from the Nile Valley, migrated to the north-east. Other groups emerged from the Fazara, an amalgam of various camel-herding (*Abbala*) groups, probably located earlier in Upper Egypt. These included the Zayadia (the largest camel-owning group in the north) and the group known collectively as the Northern Rizeigat, which included the Nuweiba, Mahamid, Ireycat and Mahariya.

The expansion of the Keira dynasty's influence westwards brought it into contact with the Gimir (of Jaali origin, on the Nile) and the Tama (Daju in origin). The Gimir were conquered by the Fur, although they kept their own sultan. The rulers of Dar Tama were not subject to the Fur Sultanate but paid tributes when territories were disputed. The wetter savannah land in the south of the region was occupied by nomadic cattle-herding groups: from west to east, the Ta'aisha, Beni Helba, Fellata, Habbaniya, Ma'alyia and Southern Rizeigat.

Throughout the region, tribes were distributed broadly according to ecology and livelihoods, with camel-based nomadism being practised in the arid northern areas, agriculture in the central rainland areas and cattle-based nomadism in the wet southern savannah area. The current ethnic distribution of Darfur has not changed substantially from this sketch, although there have been movements of particular groups. Figure 3 shows one of the first known maps of the tribal '*dar*', or homelands, dating from 1928. Annex 1 lists the current *dar*, their locations and the names given to their leaders.

Trade, regional development and ethnic integration in the nineteenth century

Another important factor in the expansion and internal consolidation of the Fur Sultanate was trade. Three major routes converged on the region:

1. the route from the state of Kanem in western Bilad al Sudan, just north of Lake Chad (in present-day Chad), which passed through Barnu, Weddai, Darfur and the Funj Kingdom on its way to the Red Sea ports and Hijaz, a province in Saudi Arabia.¹⁰




Figure 3. Extract from 1928 Anglo-Egyptian Sudan – Tribal areas (*dar*) of Darfur

Source: Sudan Archive, Durham University, 2004



2. the famous Darb El Arbaein or 'Forty Days' Road' to Egypt, which began at Kobbei, 25 miles north of El Fasher in Darfur. This route passed through Jebel Meidob, crossed the Libyan desert at Bir Natrun, and continued via Laqiyya, Salima, Al Shaff and Kharja to Asyut in Egypt. In total, it traversed nearly 1,100 miles of desert and required 40 days' march to complete. It was used by slave and ivory traders from Chad and Darfur for more than 1,000 years;⁹
3. a north-westerly route to Tripoli and Tunisia on the Mediterranean coast, via Fezzan.¹⁰

Arab traveling merchants, or *jallaba*, first came to Darfur because of these important trade routes. Around 1810, as the caravan routes in the west declined, a fourth route opened up to the north, largely to service the trade in firearms and slaves.⁹ This trans-Saharan route ran from Benghazi in northern Libya, through the Kufra oasis in south-east Libya, to Weddai in Chad. The Grand Sanusi, the Islamic reformer and entrepreneur, established religious hostels and sanctuaries along the route, between Kufra and Weddai, for merchants and pilgrims. It flourished from 1875–1900 as a result of a commercial (if not religious) alliance with the Sanusiyya of southern Libya.

These trans-Saharan and regional trade routes were well connected with local trade networks. Although the Darb El Arbaein was closed after 1881, due to the intervention of the Mahdist State, this network had a profound political, economic and cultural impact on the Sultanate and its development as a state.^{8,10} Since that time, trade has been integral to livelihoods in Darfur. In particular local trade, especially in the decades following the annexation of Darfur to Sudan in 1916, provided a forum through which the different ethnic groups interacted. Today there are more than 300 marketplaces of various sizes all over Darfur.¹¹

The hakura land system

Once the Keira Sultanate had established itself in the central areas of the region, it began allocating land through the *hakura* system ('concession' or 'estate'). The granting of a *hakura* included rights over both the territory itself and the people living within it. *Hakura* were granted by the sultan to reward notables for maintaining control over certain areas, or as a means of attracting newcomers to the sparsely populated kingdom. They were also granted to members of the royal clan, to provide them with an income.

At the discretion of the sultan, the grant might include absolute rights over the ownership of the land. However, the holder of the *hakura* took neither *zakat* (alms) nor taxes from the estate, as these were reserved for the sultan. The main benefits derived by owners were the labour of their tenants, various taxes that included *awaaid* (customs taxes), proceeds from the sale of stray slaves and animals, fees and fines from rendering justice and a share of the blood money paid to the families of subjects to settle disputes.⁸

The administrative system under the Fur Sultanate

The Fur Sultanate adopted a three-tier system of administration, under which people were ruled largely through their own chiefs. The system was based upon four provinces, each divided into a number of district chiefdoms or *shartaya*, ruled by a *shartay*. The *shartay* was the sultan's representative and was concerned mainly with administering justice and taxation. *Shartay* were usually chosen from among the brothers of the previous holder, and the appointment was either made or confirmed by the sultan.

Each *shartaya* was further divided into a varying number of local chiefdoms, or *dimlijiyya*, which were administered by a *dimlij*. Some of the larger *shartaya* had chiefs called *sembi*, who acted as agents through whom the *shartay* controlled the *dimlij*. The third layer of the system was the village sheikh. These were responsible for the direct administration of land, the settlement of small disputes, tax collection and all ceremonial activities concerning the upper level of the administrative system.



Turco–Egyptian rule, 1874–1883

The Keira Sultanate maintained its independence until it was overthrown in 1874 by the Ottoman empire, which had invaded and occupied the northern part of Sudan by 1821. The Turco-Egyptians remained in Darfur until they in turn were defeated by Mahadiya forces in 1883. The brief period of Turco-Egyptian rule was marked by sporadic revolts by the Fur and also by the turbulent *Baggara* (cattle-herding) tribesmen in the south of the region, for whom the coming of the Mahdi promised the destruction of a hated foreign regime.¹² Under the sultanate, the *Baggara* had been subject to an exploitative system of taxation best described as ‘catch-as-catch-can’.¹³

Under Ottoman rule, both Arab and European traders exploited the lucrative slave trade with southern Sudan, often with the support of Turco-Egyptian officials. The *Baggara* were part of this commercial enterprise, moving south to trade slaves with the small-scale travelling merchants, the *jallaba*. This was the beginning of the north–south divide in Sudan, associated with commercial exploitation of the south by European, Egyptian and northern Sudanese merchants.¹⁴ This shift also reduced the significance of the Darfur region’s trading links, marking the beginning of its ‘marginalisation’ by the centre.

The Mahadiya, 1883–1898

In 1883 Muhammad Ahmad declared himself the Mahdi, ‘the awaited one’, who had come to restore Islam to its initial purity. His followers, known as the Ansar, gathered from all over Sudan. There were various unsuccessful attempts to put down this movement, and in 1885 Mahdist forces overran Khartoum, overthrowing the Turco-Egyptian regime.

The Mahdi was succeeded by the Khalifa Abdullahi, from the Ta’aisha tribe in Darfur. He did not command the support of all the Ta’aisha, and certainly not that of the Fur and other groups. From 1885–88 there was a series of revolts against Mahdist rule, first by the Rizeigat and then by the Fur.¹⁵ There was also opposition to the Mahdists on the western frontier, led by a *faqi*, or holy man, from Dar Tama.⁹

The Khalifa imposed a policy of enforced migration on the *Baggara*, from their homeland in Darfur to Omdurman. This policy, which turned the nomads into a standing tribal army, coincided with a devastating famine and associated epidemics of disease in 1889–92. The *Baggara* did not respond willingly, but by 1888, under the threat of destruction and dispersal by the Khalifa’s military power, they began their great tribal migrations. By the early months of 1889, the first contingents of the *Baggara* reached Omdurman.¹⁶

These two periods, rule by the Turco-Egyptian empire and the Mahdist years, came to be known as *umm kwakiyya* – years of misery, burning and banditry.¹⁵ However, they were relatively short in comparison with the rule of the independent sultanates, and had little lasting effect on the institutions and processes established by the Fur Sultanate.

Darfur – an independent sultanate under Ali Dinar, 1898–1916

In 1898 Darfur was the first region to liberate itself from the Mahadiya, led by Ali Dinar, a prominent Fur loyalist who served the Khalifa in Khartoum until British troops captured Omdurman in 1898. He returned to Darfur and appointed himself Sultan, intending to restore the Fur Sultanate, which meant imposing his rule on the southern Arabs. By 1916, Darfur was just emerging from a very severe famine, characterised by massive depopulation and localised civil unrest. Compared with a century earlier, it was a shattered economy.¹⁵

The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1899–1955

Although in 1898 an Anglo-Egyptian army under Kitchener re-conquered Khartoum, it was not until 1916 that the British annexed Darfur by force, defeating and killing Ali Dinar. As with other countries

under colonial rule, economic development in Sudan was geared towards serving the needs of the colonial economy.^{17,18} Production of cotton was one of the main interests of British rule, in order to supply the flourishing textile industry in Great Britain. This reinforced the trade routes previously established between Darfur and the Nile region in Sudan and Egypt.

To satisfy the demands of the British market, the Condominium (British-Egyptian joint authority rule) focused mainly on establishing and expanding cotton-growing on large, centrally managed schemes or estates. Such a policy did little to improve conditions for the many millions of small-scale farmers outside the schemes. It also meant that development efforts were concentrated in a triangular area that came to be known as the ‘three Ks’ – **K**osti, **K**assala and **K**hartoum. This area covered the Nile Valley to the north of Khartoum, the Blue Nile and White Nile areas immediately south of Khartoum, central Kordofan and the southern parts of Kassala province. These areas benefited most from the spread of education and health services.

Peripheral provinces like Darfur were neglected completely. For example, by 1955, out of around 1,170 schemes that had been implemented, none was in Darfur. In 1947, Darfur had no provincial judge, education officer or provincial agriculturalist.

Table 2. Distribution of agricultural irrigation schemes in 1955

Province	Type of scheme	Number of Schemes
Blue Nile	Gravity	1
	Pump	581
Northern	Pump	430
Kassala	Gravity	2
	Pump	4
Upper Nile	Pump	34
Khartoum	Pump	117
Total		1,169

As a prerequisite for imposing a colonial economy in Sudan, condominium rule required the pacification of local tribes and the consolidation of power. In Darfur, this involved a ‘soft landing’ policy, under which the different tribes were reorganised and managed by means of defining their territories and retaining tribal leaders wherever possible.

Post-Independence, 1956

Since Independence in 1956, Sudan has had a succession of military and democratic regimes (see Box 3). Two major parties emerged, both deeply committed to Islam: the Umma Party (UP), whose followers were largely Mahdist, and the National Unionist Party (NUP), largely with *Khatmiya*¹ followers and with historical links to Egypt.

Although the policies of condominium rule resulted in regional disparities that disadvantaged Darfur, they left the Sudanese government in 1956 with a valuable flow of income.¹⁷ This provided a good basis from which a post-Independence government could have launched development programmes

³⁵ A traditional Islamic order or brotherhood important in the practice of Sudanese Islam.

**Box 3. Military regimes and democratic governments in Sudan since Independence**

Date	Government
1 January 1956	Sudan becomes an independent republic based on a democracy of sectarian parties
November 1958	Coup d'état resulting in the military regime of General Ibrahim Aboud
October 1964	Transitional government led by Khattam al-Khalifa, intended to prepare the country for democratic elections and devise a constitution
June 1965	A general election results in an Umma Party (UP) and National Unionist Party (NUP) coalition. Umma politician Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub becomes Prime Minister
July 1966	Coalition government of Sadiq al-Mahdi, winner of the parliamentary vote
May 1967	Mohamed Ahmed Maghoub replaces Sadiq al-Mahdi
April 1968	Elections return Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub leading the newly formed Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the result of a merger between the NUP and the Popular Democratic Party. A coalition government is formed between the DUP and UP
May 1969	Coup d'état led by Colonel Jaafar Numayri
May 1983	Numayri re-elected, claiming 99.6 per cent of the vote
April 1985	Numayri overthrown by the Transitional Military Council (TMC), led by General Swar al-Dahab
14 April 1985	Sadiq al-Mahdi re-elected, winning 99 of the 301 seats
30 June 1989	Military takeover by the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), led by Brigadier Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir. Umar al-Bashir rules with the National Islamic Front (NIF), led by Hasan el-Turabi
1999	Split in the Popular National Congress (PNC), and breakaway group formed by Turabi, known as the National Popular Congress.

to address the inherited disparities, had it chosen to do so. However, instead of this, the national administration intensified the same processes that had been set in motion before 1956.

The expansion of irrigation pump schemes proceeded at an even higher rate but, of the 2,280 schemes that had been implemented by the mid-1960s, again none was in Darfur. This is perhaps not surprising, given the fact that governments between 1956 and 1969 were dominated by social groups that had a natural interest in maintaining the economic and social framework from which they benefited.¹⁷ Therefore little was done to dismantle the pattern of society and economy created or maintained by colonial rule. After 1969, other processes came into play that increased the marginalisation of Darfur.

The NIF regime – National Congress Party, 1989

On 30 June 1989, 15 army officers of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) led by Brigadier Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir, overthrew the civilian government of Sadiq al-Mahdi. The new Islamic state of Sudan, directed by Umar al-Bashir, was to follow an Islamic model espoused by Hasan el-Turabi, leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF), a direction it has maintained until the present day. The army, civil service and police force were reorganised and senior positions filled by NIF members. The Popular Defence Force (PDF) was established, which in some localities consisted of existing militias formed under Sadiq al-Mahdi's rule.

With the NIF taking power in Khartoum, a whole set of structural changes and processes was set into motion to secure the new Islamic model. These processes included Islamisation, Arabism and the mobilisation of armed militias. Darfur became one of the recruiting areas for *murahaleen* fighters to



join the Islamic *jihad* in southern Sudan, against the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Many of the tribal leaders, and some of the leaders of the current opposition groups, were involved in this recruitment process. Meanwhile, Darfur fell prey to armed banditry by *Janjaweed* and other armed groups, Darfurian society became militarised and tribal conflicts intensified. This led to the formation of many armed groups opposing the government, such as the Daud Bolad movement in the 1990s.

The current conflict

This section discusses processes that have contributed to the current conflict at different levels – regional, national and local. Often these processes are intricately linked, particularly the local processes, which in turn are shaped by what is happening at the wider regional and national levels. The section is divided into two parts, dealing first with the national and regional processes, followed by the local processes. The national and regional processes include:

- political and economic marginalisation of Darfur in the twentieth century
- Islamisation and Arabism
- the North–South civil war peace process
- the mobilisation of armed militias
- regional relations with Chad and Libya and their implications for Darfur.

National and regional processes contributing to the conflict

Political and economic marginalisation of Darfur in the twentieth century

During their colonial regime, the British adopted a deliberate policy of enhancing the business interests of certain influential families from the central Nile Valley area, with the objective of minimising resistance to their rule. This was done through the preferential allocation of productive assets (mostly land), business contracts and bank loans (converted into grants). The groups to benefit included religious leaders, tribal leaders and merchants. Their emergence was due in large part to the historical domination of religious life in northern society by Muslim Sufi religious orders and to the colonial state's policy of indirect rule.¹⁹ Authority and political influence in the post-Independence era rested in the hands of these social groupings. This aggravated disparities in development that already existed within the northern part of Sudan, as well as between North and South.¹⁴

The first step towards planning development in Darfur was a 1956 survey that recommended that the region, like Southern Sudan, should strive for self-sufficiency.²⁰ The imbalance in regional investment, however, was to blame for a serious neglect of services in Darfur, such as health and education provision (see Box 4).

The colonial administration devised its education policy with a view to strengthening the social groupings whose support it required. Inequality within the region was evident in the limited availability of educational opportunities. Entry to schools was very strictly controlled and largely limited to the sons of tribal chiefs. P. Ingleton, the British Governor of Darfur from 1934 to 1941, said at the time: *'We have been able to limit education to the sons of chiefs and native administration personnel and can confidently look forward to keeping the ruling classes at the top of the education tree for many years to come.'*²⁰

Under British rule, Darfur suffered both political marginalisation and economic neglect and stagnation. The region was ruled by commissioners, who neglected the basic needs of its people and merely fulfilled the interests of the central government.⁶ A further problem was the phenomenon of 'exported

**Box 4. Disparities in health and development in Darfur, 1956**

In 1939, of 17 maternity clinics in Sudan, there was only one in Juba and none at all in Darfur. By 1941 there were 73 licensed midwives in Khartoum province, 59 in Gezira, four in Upper Nile and none in Darfur. Major epidemics of disease occurred: in 1926, for instance, an outbreak of relapsing fever led to more than 1,000 deaths in Darfur. Outbreaks of cerebro-meningitis were reported in the mid-1930s, with 7,000 people dying in Darfur between June 1935 and spring 1936. There was another outbreak in 1940–45, with the peak in 1944, when almost 2,300 cases were reported. Case fatality in Darfur was 9.9 per cent, the highest in the country. In 1948–49, amid the cotton boom, famine conditions prevailed and in August 1949 *dokhon* (sorghum) cost twice as much in Darfur as in Omdurman. Free grain was distributed in El Fasher and other towns, while many people in rural areas were reduced to eating wild foods. There were several outbreaks of smallpox in Sudan from 1951–55, and as usual Darfur was hard hit, with incidence peaking in 1952 (3,653 cases and 578 fatalities). By Independence in 1956, Darfur had the least-developed medical services in the country, with 0.57 hospital beds per 1,000 people (compared with 2.9 in Khartoum).

Of the 23 government intermediate schools operating in 1951, three were in Southern Sudan, two in Kordofan, one in Darfur, and 15 in Blue Nile, Northern and Khartoum provinces combined. In 1935 there was just one elementary school (described as a finishing school for sons of the more important chiefs), one tribal elementary school and two sub-grade schools for a population of at least 500,000.

*Source: Daly, 1991*²⁰

members' – parliamentarians from Khartoum who represented Darfur in the National Assembly but who had little or no concern for the region.

After Independence, religious and tribal leaders and merchants came to hold great influence in political, social and economic life throughout Sudan. They dominated the first parliament and senate, the legislative body and the central council. Of the eleven Darfurian representatives in the first Sudanese Parliament, eight were tribal leaders, one a merchant and two were government officers.

In direct response to this poor representation and the economic imbalances in Sudan, in 1965 a number of educated Darfurians formed the Darfur Front. The head of this committee was Ahmad Dereij, who was later to become governor of North Darfur. Other members included Dr Ali El Haj, Professor Abdul Rahman Dosa and Dr Mohammed Adam Showa, all prominent Darfurians and (with the exception of Dr Ali al Haj) members of the Umma Party.

Although the two decades after Independence saw a number of positive economic developments in Darfur, this trend was soon to be reversed. By 1978, national economic crisis and mismanagement led to dramatic falls in exports and widespread corruption. This affected Darfur's nascent economic growth. Cash crops in particular suffered, due to problems of the cost and supply of inputs, and difficulties with local credit systems. This had a serious knock-on effect on agricultural labour.¹⁵

One example of economic neglect was the limited development that occurred in the region. The only two development projects in Darfur to be financed by international organisations, the Western Savannah Development Project and the Jebel Mara Rural Development Project, came to a complete halt when their administration was transferred from the central government to state governments in the late 1980s.²¹ Out of a total fund of US\$13.4 billion for development projects extended to Sudan by the international community between 1958 and 2003, Darfur accounted for only 10 projects, which constituted a share of 2 per cent.²² As a result, poverty in the region has increased, both in its prevalence and its intensity.



This marginalisation of the region is the subject of the Black Book of Sudan, whose anonymous authors seek to describe how regional differences in access to power since 1956 have resulted in large differentials in development. Part One was produced in 2000, and Part Two in 2002. English translations are now available on the website of the rebel opposition group, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).²³ Part One describes the disparities in educational services: ‘Pupils in the marginalised areas have been grounded at the primary level... In the State of West Darfur, primary schools remained closed for two years for lack of books and staff pay’.²³ According to the translator, ‘Some of the activists involved in the preparation of the Book took arms against the government... [this is] referred to as the Darfur Conflict’. It is clear from this that the political and economic marginalisation of Darfur is widely recognised as a root cause of the conflict.

Islamisation and Arabism

The development of modern-day Islamism in Sudan is strongly associated with Hasan el-Turabi and his followers. A former academic, Turabi entered politics in 1964 and was active in the Islamic Charter Front. This organisation – which, like the Islamic party the Muslim Brotherhood, was dominated by Nile riverine Arabs as well as Darfurians – was the first to propose an Islamic constitution for Sudan. This would effectively have made second-class citizens of the non-Muslim two-thirds majority. Turabi’s followers ‘perceived their duty [as] not only to consolidate the Islamic kingdom in Sudan but to reform by subversion if necessary its citizens as part of the global renewal of Islam and one mission, to bring Islam to the Africans’.⁹

Turabi was not alone in seeking an Islamic constitution for Sudan. This aim was also supported by Sadiq al-Mahdi, grandson of the Mahdi and leader of the democratic governments of 1966–67 and 1985–89. While Turabi represented modern militant Islam, al-Mahdi represented the historic traditions of Mahdism. Turabi’s marriage to al-Mahdi’s sister helped to ease the transfer of Mahdist loyalty to the Muslim Brotherhood.⁹

The Ansar (‘followers of the Mahdi’) and the UP fared badly under the military regime of Colonel Jaafar Numayri, who took power in a coup d’état in May 1969. In 1970, some 12,000 Ansar along with their imam were killed in a fierce engagement with the Sudanese army at Aba Island (the birthplace of the Mahadiya movement in 1883). As a result of this crushing defeat and the imprisonment of al-Mahdi, Darfur, as a stronghold of the Ansar, became increasingly frustrated and disillusioned with the Khartoum government.

After more than a decade in power, Numayri introduced Islamic *Shari’a* law in 1983. This was imposed on all Sudanese, though it was seen as intolerable by the majority. Although Darfurians in particular have always been extremely devout Muslims, Numayri was unpopular and ultimately was overthrown by popular consensus.

In the elections that followed in 1985, Sadiq al-Mahdi won by a comfortable majority, claiming 99 out of 301 seats in parliament. However, Turabi’s National Islamic Front won 51 seats, and 40 per cent of the vote in Khartoum, indicating growing support for this new brand of Islamism.⁹ Al-Mahdi formed a coalition government that included the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which won the second largest number of seats, but excluded the communists and the Muslim Brotherhood. The latter party was soon to be absorbed within the NIF, a new party established after the overthrow of Numayri, and which remains in power today.

The NIF organised conferences that appealed for Arab purity and the creation of an Islamic belt stretching from the west to the east of Sudan. In Darfur this idea aroused some hostility among non-Arabs, including the Fur, Berti and Zaghawa. Nevertheless, many people in western Sudan saw Islam as a means of forging links with the central government and thus of enfranchisement.²⁴



The mobilisation of armed militias

The central riverain Arabs have a long history of mobilising tribes to support various causes, dating back to the call of the Mahdi in the nineteenth century. More recently, the large-scale mobilisation and arming of tribal militias was seen in the 1980s, when President Numayri mobilised *muraheleen* militias to fight rebels in Southern Sudan. These *muraheleen* were composed largely of the armed Southern Rizeigat tribes from southern Darfur and the Misiriya from southern Kordofan.

Sadiq al-Mahdi also made use of these Arab militias in 1986, after he succeeded Numayri. They were responsible for a number of atrocities, not limited to the war areas but extending also into central Darfur. In 1986, Southern Rizeigat militia massacred more than 1,000 Dinka, who had been displaced by the war in the south to Ed Daein in South Darfur. No-one was prosecuted by the government, which reflected wider failures in the police and judicial systems, but also helped to give the Arabs a sense of impunity.²⁵

After taking power in a coup in 1989, the NIF, now renamed the National Congress Party (NCP), incorporated many of the *muraheleen* militias into the Popular Defence Force (PDF).²⁶ In 1991 Daud Bolad, a former member of the NIF, led an incursion into Darfur under the banner of the rebel SPLA. Instead of mobilising the army or Darfurians generally, the government mobilised the Fursan militias (Southern Rizeigat, Beni Helba, Fellata and Ta'aisha). With the support of the government, these groups gained the upper hand in Darfur. In the same year, President Bashir and the RCC rearmed Idriss Deby, the rebel Zaghawa general from Chad who was later to take power in that country, and his insurgents with weapons from Libya. What is important to recognise is that the war in Darfur in the late 1980s and early 1990s '*was more than a conflict over land: it was the first step in constructing a new Arab ideology in Sudan*'.²⁷

The more recent mobilisation of armed forces to put down the rebel insurgency in Darfur, which started in 2003, was set in motion by a government appeal to all tribal leaders in the region to mobilise men to join the 'additional armed forces'. These additional armed forces are widely known as the *Janjaweed*, although this term is somewhat misleading (see Box 5).

The North–South Civil War and the peace process

It is hoped that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on 9 January 2005 will conclude the current phase of conflict between the North and South of Sudan, which has been lasted for 21 years. This section considers how this conflict, and the associated peace process, have contributed to the current situation in Darfur by influencing the actions of major stakeholders.

The North–South conflict has contributed directly and indirectly to the current insecurity in Darfur in a numbers of ways, including the GoS's recruitment of militia from Darfur to fight in the South; its use of similar tactics to deal with conflict in Darfur, which has led to increasing militarisation there; and a drain on development resources, leading to further marginalisation of Darfur.

There is a history of different tribes being mobilised and militia recruited from Darfur to fight in the South. Those with militia experience include the current head of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Dr Khileel Ibrahim, and members of the Southern Rizeigat. During the 1980s, Numayri mobilised *muraheleen* militias, including the *Baggara* Rizeigat from southern Darfur and the Misiriya from southern Kordofan. This resulted in increased militarisation in Darfur, with many Darfurians being trained in warfare and becoming accustomed to operating in a war economy. It may, conversely, have also contributed to the reluctance of the Southern Rizeigat to become involved in the current conflict, given their past direct experience of militias.



Box 5. Who are the *Janjaweed*?

The label '*Janjaweed*' is misleading, as it is used differently in Darfur according to tribal affiliation and political viewpoint. The term is generally used to describe 'additional armed forces', the militias mobilised by the government to address the counter-insurgency, whose methods and violations of human rights are infamous. Among the popular media and even in some circles of the international community, however, there is the wrong and dangerous assumption that *Janjaweed* = Arabs = perpetrators of human rights violations.

Among pro-government groups, the term '*Janjaweed*' is used to describe bandit gangs, whose activities are frowned upon and who are considered to be criminals and outlaws, not under the authority or control of any tribe.²⁸⁻³⁰ The 'additional armed forces', by contrast, are men mobilised by their tribes to receive military training, who are paid, and who come under the direct control of the government. In the words of Musa Hilal, Nazir of the Mahamid tribe and a prominent figure in the current conflict, '*this is not like the Fursan*'².³¹ It is apparent, however, that these groups have participated alongside the regular armed forces in perpetrating gross violations of human rights.

The Gimir, for example, responded to the government's call to fight the rebellion. They see their position as similar to that of the Fur and Zaghawa, who in the past answered the government's call for *jihad* against the rebellion in the south and east of Sudan (two prominent *omda*, a Fur and a Zaghawa, joined the *mu-rahaleen*).³⁰

Once the war had started, however, many of the *Janjaweed* bandit gangs returned to their own ethnic groups in order to join the 'additional armed forces' recruited by the government. Once recruited, many subsequently resumed their illegal banditry activities. In addition, the government's call for additional armed forces extended as far as West Africa, and thus a large proportion of those who have joined up are from outside the region.

Apart from the two categories of 'additional armed forces' and 'bandits', there are also armed Arab groups that provide protection – for a price – to villages e.g. to Fur villages in Wadi Bari³² and to Tama and Gimir villages around Kebkabiya,³³ and to lorries travelling on the trade routes from El Fasher to the border with Kordofan (on the way to Omdurman).³⁴ Other armed protection forces are also thought to exist.

If the situation in Darfur is to be stabilised, it is critically important to recognise the different and not necessarily related elements of the '*Janjaweed*', their various purposes and the lines of authority that exert control over them. In most cases, their purpose has a clear link with livelihoods – i.e. membership of the military and opportunities to loot, occupy land or operate protection rackets are all sources of income in an otherwise very depressed economy in a marginalised area of Sudan. These livelihood linkages form part of the rapidly emerging war economy, which extends beyond the *Janjaweed* elements considered here. If 'additional armed forces' are to be decommissioned, therefore, there is an urgent need for their members to find alternative livelihood strategies

Southern Darfur's border with the province of Bahr el Ghazal means there has been a degree of over-spill of the North–South conflict into Darfur itself, and some overlap in the deployment of Darfurian militias. Examples include the 1986 Ed Daein massacre by Southern Rizeigat; the incursion by Daud Bolad, a Darfurian with SPLA support, in 1991; and the government response of mobilising Arab tribes into Fursan militia.

The war with the South has also drained government resources, leaving little for development in the peripheral regions of the North. In turn, this has led to development aid being severely curtailed, with

² Traditionally in Darfur, the Fursan are tribal horsemen. More recently groups of tribal horsemen from the Southern Rizeigat, Beni Halba, Fellata and Ta'aisha were armed by the government to fight as militia against the rebellion in the South, and are also referred to as the Fursan.



many donors allowing only relief aid to Sudan. For Darfur, this has meant humanitarian assistance for drought relief, but little else.

The North–South peace process, which has stretched over two-and-a-half years, may itself have influenced the Darfur conflict, both directly and indirectly. The peace process has been exclusive and is seen by many as an agreement between elites, both in the North and the South. It has oversimplified the conflict in Sudan into differences between North and South, and has not considered the claims of the East, West or the North outside of Khartoum. If the peace process is to have any impact on other conflicts in Sudan, it will be critical that the way it is implemented is much more inclusive than the way it has been negotiated.

Furthermore, the peace process has sent a clear message that the reward for armed struggle is negotiation, and this may have encouraged other rebel groups. Some argue that the government has been so focused on the North–South peace process that it has not been able to respond strategically or effectively to the situation in Darfur. According to some diplomats in Khartoum, the fact that in Darfur the GoS has fallen back on its usual strategy of using tribal militias can be explained by the difficulties of pursuing peace on two fronts. Now that the peace has been signed, however, this argument is even less credible than before.

The GoS has pursued a strategy of parallel negotiating processes, rather than trying to make the North–South process more inclusive. Managing three separate processes – North–South, the Abuja talks on Darfur and GoS dialogue with the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) opposition in Cairo – has inevitably been difficult for all the parties concerned, including the international community [for example, the African Union (AU) and the UN]. Human resources have been overstretched, and there have been critical information gaps between the processes. For example, neither the AU nor the rebels working on Abuja are well-versed on the CPA or its possible implications for Darfur. The situation has also allowed the government to pursue a policy of divide-and-rule.

The peace process and the oil revenue that promises to flow from it (to be divided by the GoS and the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) under the current agreement) have made the government less reliant on the livestock revenue from Darfur that has previously contributed much to Sudan's balance of payments, and this will reduce the region's economic importance. However, the GoS potentially stands to lose more in the future if the power-sharing agreements in the North are widened. The North–South peace process may have destabilised the regime in Khartoum, and it is not clear what impact its implementation will have. There is a sense among some hardliners that the government has given away too much and, as a consequence, this may have affected its method and degree of response in Darfur.

The North–South peace process has also influenced the international response to Darfur. Until early 2004, the international community was so focused on this process that it was unable to respond strategically or effectively to the situation in Darfur. There has been a high level of debate within the international community on how the peace processes should be sequenced. So many resources have been sunk into the North–South process that there has been reluctance to engage in Darfur, beyond responding to the immediate humanitarian emergency, for fear it will jeopardise the North–South negotiations. Some have cited the push for North–South peace as the reason why Darfur has been neglected for so long and why the situation there has been allowed to fester.

Regional relations with Chad and Libya, and their implications for Darfur

Darfur's borders with Chad and Libya have brought it benefits in terms of trade and jobs for migrant workers, but they have also exposed it to the effects of long-running regional conflicts between its



two neighbours, as well as the Chadian civil war and the wider pan-Arabist ambitions of Libya. Since the 1960s, there have been numerous movements of Sudanese or Chadian groups across national borders, either as they sought refuge in a neighbouring territory or while they prepared for retaliation and insurgency (with or without support from the government in Khartoum). This has been one of the major factors in the rapid increase in the availability of armaments in Darfur and the arming of ordinary citizens. It has also seen increasing numbers of Chadian Arabs settling in Darfur, especially western Darfur.

The GoS has not been a neutral bystander, either in the Chadian civil war or in the conflict between Libya and Chad over the Aouzou strip. Various Sudanese governments and opposition groups have sought support and alliances with their wealthier Libyan neighbours, or have provided arms and refuge to Chadian insurgents. During Numayri's rule in the 1970s, Sadiq al-Mahdi's Ansar leadership, in exile in Ethiopia, was expelled from there and so moved its headquarters to Libya. Subsequently, armed opposition to Numayri was attempted from Libya, including the invasion of 1976.³⁵ In 1977, al-Mahdi and many Ansar supporters returned from exile under Numayri's policy of 'national reconciliation'. The returning Ansar were settled on mechanised farming schemes in southern Darfur and Kordofan. Many of them, however, remained in exile, to return after the overthrow of Numayri in 1985, and many of these returnees were involved in the murahaleen militias.

In 1985 the TMC of Swar al-Dahab approached Libya, seeking weapons to tackle the SPLA insurgency in Southern Sudan. In return for Libyan weapons, the TMC stopped supplying arms to Hissein Habre's regime in Chad and closed the western border with its neighbour. Libya's Colonel Gaddafi ended his military assistance to the SPLA and offered to train Sudanese army units. Libyan agents began actively recruiting in Khartoum, mostly among men displaced from Darfur, and within six months more than 2,000 Sudanese had joined the Islamic Legion (which was largely made up of mercenaries from West Africa and the Middle East). According to one account, '*Everywhere on the frontier were bandits and Islamic Legionnaires supported by the Libyan military to spread insecurity.*'⁹ Sudan's assistance to Gaddafi continued under the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi.

The Arab *Baggara* were attracted to the Islamic Legion to a greater extent than the non-Arab groups, although they were probably drawn more by the prospect of loot than by the ideological principles of pan-Arabism. There was a massive influx of arms over a short period. The weapons were concentrated among Arab groups, especially the *Baggara*, a situation that was deeply disturbing to the Fur, who started forming their own militia in response.⁹ There was similar patronage from Chad under the presidency of Idriss Deby, a Zaghawa. The Zaghawa, whose homelands straddle the border with Chad and who have been aligned with both the Ansar and with Deby, have also obtained modern weapons.³⁶

Darfur today remains closely tied with the people and governments of both Chad and Libya. Deby's Zaghawa background indicates where his loyalties lie, while the friendship and support of Libya continue to be actively sought by the government in Khartoum. Even during the study team's visit in July 2004, senior members of the Khartoum government were visiting El Kufra and Tripoli in Libya. Other Libyans have also been present in Darfur, including the Libyan Red Crescent, which in the past has delivered drought relief.

Local processes

The effects of processes at the national level have been exacerbated by local-level processes. These local processes include:



- drought and famine, leading to the depletion of assets, loss of livestock and increased competition for scarce resources, such as land and water
- drought-induced North–South migration and localised tribal conflicts
- failing local governance, in particular the demise of the Native Administration, and evolving tribal conflicts
- the formation of an ‘Arab alliance’, and the Fur–Arab conflict of the late 1980s
- the local mobilisation of armed militias.

Drought and famine

The effects on Darfur of economic stagnation and the neglect of successive Khartoum governments have been exacerbated by drought and famine. Famine and food insecurity are an integral feature of livelihoods in Darfur, shaping the way people manage their resources, livelihood goals and livelihood strategies. However, a review of the major causes of famine in Darfur since the nineteenth century indicates that, although drought has played a major part, in all cases its localised effects have been exacerbated by conflict (see Box 6).

The most severe famines in Darfur have been associated with war – particularly the border conflicts along the frontier with Chad caused by the Chadian civil war, the effects of which have spilled over into Darfur,⁹ and the Fur–Arab conflicts of the late 1980s. Local-level insecurity and civil conflict have increasingly affected systems of production. The direct link between civil insecurity and food insecurity was apparent even in the late 1980s: *‘Assets are lost or destroyed, including livestock, grain stores and people’s homes. Livelihood systems are disrupted. And displacement causes concentrations of people in camps and makeshift dwellings around towns, with associated health and hygiene risks.’*³⁸

Box 6. Famine in Darfur

In 1873–74 there was a major famine known as Karo Fata (‘white bone’). The years that followed saw a succession of famines caused by drought conditions, poor harvests and conflicts along the frontier between Darfur and Weddai in Chad, sparked by pillaging and disputes over trade.¹⁵ The famine of 1888–92 was possibly the worst ever, and was caused largely by fighting between Mahdist forces under the governor of Darfur and a religiously inspired rebel army.¹⁵ This was the time of the *Baggara’s* forced migration to Omdurman, which saw great impoverishment and destruction.

The third region-wide ‘famine that killed’ – and the only one whose major cause was a drought – occurred in 1913–14. In south-eastern Darfur, it was exacerbated by fighting between the Rizeigat and the forces of Ali Dinar. This famine contributed to instability in the region, the breakdown of local government, raiding for food and enormous migrations of people (the Zayadia left for Kordofan, many Berti moved southwards, and the Zaghawa came down as far as southern Darfur).¹⁵

In 1973 rainfall in Darfur was the lowest on record, but this did not result in region-wide famine. Those living in Dar Masalit and in the north-east considered it to be a ‘mild’ famine.¹⁵ Though animals did not die in great numbers, herds were subsequently restructured to favour more drought-resistant species, particularly in the north and the north-east. The more severe regional famine of 1983–84 contributed to significant North–South population movements, the loss of large numbers of livestock and the depletion of assets. One result was an increase in goz cultivation by herders further north.

According to local observers in North Darfur, there have been 16 drought years since 1972.³⁴ Those that stand out include 1983–85, 1987–88, 1990–91, and 2000–01. The biggest loss of life was caused by the famine of 1984–86, when it was estimated that death rates were three times higher than normal (a total of 176,900 actual deaths, including 95,000 excess deaths).³⁷



The displacement of people due to conflict is not a new phenomenon in the region. In 1987 there was an influx of Dinka into southern Darfur; as seasonal migrant workers, they would normally return to Bahr el Ghazal at the end of the agricultural season, but on this occasion were unable to do so because of the war in the South. People have also been displaced as a result of tribal conflict within the region. In September 1991, for example, there were at least 86,000 IDPs in Darfur, including 17,000 from Southern Sudan. Of these, 30,000 in South Darfur had been displaced because of tribal conflict, and 21,000 in South Darfur and 18,000 in North Darfur mainly because of famine.³⁸ Many others went unrecorded.

During 1991, large parts of South Darfur and areas of the north were out of bounds for food security monitors, due to the dangers involved in travelling. This meant that local people in insecure areas, who were most in need of assistance, tended to be the least well served, either by information monitoring systems or by relief operations.³⁸

Depletion of assets and loss of livestock

Repeated droughts have contributed to the depletion of assets and impoverishment of people in Darfur.³⁸ Throughout the region, during drought and famine years livestock has perished or the owners of animals have been forced to sell them at rock-bottom prices. Groups who were principally pastoralists, such as the Southern Rizeigat, saw their wealth evaporate as their livestock died. To the south, by contrast, the herds of the Dinka in Bahr el Ghazal were not hit to the same extent. Cattle raiding in Bahr el Ghazal therefore became an attractive option for impoverished herders from southern Darfur. Stolen animals were sold cheaply to buy grain, as Dinka cattle were not hardy enough to thrive in Darfur.

Depletion of the natural resource base has also occurred as a result of drought and desertification. Rainfall statistics show that, overall, rainfall in the region has declined, and its pattern has changed to a shorter and more unreliable wet season. As long ago as 1986, both farmers and herders recognised that ecological deterioration was occurring as a result of declining rainfall, which forced them to apply land use practices that were not sustainable.¹⁵ These included cutting down trees and over-cultivating fragile soils, leading to deforestation, desertification (when stabilised *goz* degenerates into windblown sand) and declining yields. Over-grazing has contributed to the degradation of pasture.

Migrations caused by famine were already common in Darfur before the major famine of 1984–86, although the patterns of migration varied according to how different groups were affected and the options open to them. One analyst compared the migration behaviour of two groups from North Darfur, the Meidob and the Zaghawa, who suffered as a result of drought in the 1970s and 1980s. More than half of each group migrated southwards and to the towns. Despite the similarity of their livelihoods, which were based on agro-pastoralism, the Zaghawa migrants were considered more economically successful than their Meidob counterparts, for a number of reasons:

- *The Zaghawa started their out-migration earlier than the [Meidob]. Thus, they could establish ethnically based networks in Libya and the Gulf countries, to which Zaghawa migrants can resort to make a good start in their destination areas. By the time the [Meidob] started their migration in the 1980s, the conditions of employment in the Arab oil countries had worsened. . . .*
- *The Zaghawa show a strong clan solidarity. They readily lend money to young members of their clan to cover the high costs of travelling to the Arab oil countries for work, where many of them have already established themselves. . . .*
- *The [Meidob], both in the Sudan and abroad, have much fewer resources available. The only country open for them outside Sudan is Libya. Lacking capital, the [Meidob] go there on camels, mostly illegally.*³⁹

It is clear from this that tribal affiliation has a strong influence on the varying fortunes of people in Darfur.



Newly arrived migrants were not always welcome in southern Darfur. As far back as 1935, Wilfred Thesiger (then assistant to the District Commissioner in Kutum) noted conflicts between the Southern Rizeigat and the newly arrived Zaghawa.⁴⁰ The Zaghawa who migrated southwards settled not only in rural areas, but also in the major towns (El Fasher, Omdurman and Nyala). Today the Zaghawa living in these towns outnumber those living in Dar Zaghawa itself. The Zaghawa are reputed to be good traders: *'They control the markets of all towns in Darfur today and compete with the Ja'ali traders in Omdurman'*.⁴¹ A great part of their capital has been earned not in Sudan, but in the oil-rich Arab countries.

Another commentator describes how the processes of drought and desertification have disturbed the moral geography of the Fur: *'With the desert have come the people of the desert; feared Bideyat camelmen and others come south and prey on settled communities, and pastoralists bring their animals to cultivated places. They have penetrated further south than physical evidence of the desert. With ecological change has come an insecurity of community identity and relations.'*¹⁵

Failing local governance – the demise of the Native Administration

The Anglo-Egyptian colonial government of the early twentieth century abolished the Fur Sultanate but retained many of its institutions, under the newly created Native Administration (*idara ahlia*). The Native Administration was adopted throughout Sudan, but Darfur, and Dar Masalit in particular, were used as a laboratory for the experiment. The system was a form of indirect rule based on a model developed by Frederick Lugard, the British High Commissioner in Nigeria. The Lugardian model was a practical form of administration and control designed to leave local populations free to manage their own affairs through their own rulers, though under the guidance of the British and subject to the laws and policy of the administration.⁴²

It was based on the following fundamentals:

- a political hierarchy of local chiefs, who would derive their power from the central government and would take charge of maintaining law and order, organising labour and collecting local taxes
- a parallel hierarchy of native courts, which would deal with minor criminal, civil and personal cases, in terms of customary law and general principles of justice
- a native treasury, which would manage local revenues and pay out expenses needed for local authorities and social services
- a team of local staff, which would carry out its duties under the guidance of British field officers, subject to the laws and policy of the administration.

The application of this model in Sudan saw the British opt for the incorporation of traditional tribal and village leaders into the structure of government. The native or tribal administration was based on the pre-existing institutions of native administration. In Darfur the development of such a structure was based on the earlier system of the eastern Sudanic states, such as the Fur and Masalit sultanates.

Accordingly, *nazir*, *omda* and sheikhs were entrusted with administrative, judicial and police matters in their respective territorial domains. The system was gradually developed and finally legalised after a series of ordinances in 1922, 1925, 1927 and 1928. It was eventually consolidated in the Native Courts Ordinance of 1932, which regulated the administrative and police powers of tribal sheikhs and established a hierarchy of local courts in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.^{42–44} Such a system provided security, with the added advantage of requiring minimal staff and finances to run it.

The roles of the Native Administration were to:

- assure good management of tribal and local community affairs
- maintain security



- allocate land for agriculture and grazing (under the hakura system)
- settle conflicts over land tenure
- provide communication, at local council and provincial and state levels
- collect taxes and other levies
- mobilise communities, and
- chair tribal/sub-tribal local courts (*judiyya*).⁴⁵

The model was modified over time: the local government framework was introduced in 1932 and municipalities, townships and rural areas and councils were created in 1937. However, traditional tribal leaders, with their executive, financial and legislative powers, remained an integral part of the system. In 1951 a new Local Government Ordinance was introduced, under which *nazir* assumed an honorary role in the newly established local councils, which took over the financial and executive powers given to the tribal sheikhs and *omda*.

Some groups gained under this system, while others lost out. In the case of the Fur, for example, the Native Administration reduced their status to that of just another ethnic group or tribe, and abolished their particular economic and administrative privileges. For many other ethnic groups, it increased their influence and authority. Nonetheless, the Native Administration provided a system of local governance that managed the use of natural resources and allowed various groups to live in relative peace and stability.

For example, it implemented a policy of resource allocation, regulating the grazing activities of different tribes (and outsiders) to avert conflicts between farmers and pastoralists. This included the enforcement of boundaries demarcating grazing and farming areas; regulation of the seasonal movement of pastoralists, in terms of timing and routes, from the dry-season grazing areas to those used in the wet season; containment of tribal intermingling in the grazing areas; and the management of water points.⁴⁶

However, despite the vital role played by the Native Administration, it remained a contentious issue in Sudan.⁴⁴ One aspect of the debate was the claim that the Administration created an unhealthy dichotomy between educated Sudanese and tribal leaders. There was tension between these two groups, with the former stereotyping the latter as tools of the colonial regime. The tribal leaders, on the other hand, viewed the educated elite as a potential threat that might undermine their own power and prestige. Another criticism made by Sudanese scholars was that the Native Administration differed from the indirect model of governance adopted in Nigeria and other British dependencies in Africa, and was instead a more centralised and bureaucratic system that enabled direct control.

Changes to the Native Administration after Independence

In 1971 Numayri's military regime passed the Local Government Act, which divided Darfur into regional, district and area councils. This system of local administration replaced the Native Administration and abolished the jurisdiction and administrative authority of the tribal leaders. The creation of multiple administrative units, bound together by a single political party approved by Numayri, the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU), '*created a bureaucracy controlled by insensitive officials from the Nile. It infuriated the traditional authorities.*'⁹

Some say this reorganisation was the prime factor in triggering tribal conflicts on a wider scale in Darfur, as it meant that a locality belonging to one tribe could be controlled by another. Up to 16 different rural council border disputes and conflicts occurred in southern Darfur alone soon after it was implemented – for example, between the Fellata and the Gimir, and the Mahariya and the Rizeigat. All



were over the right to own tribal land, or *hakura*.²¹ The government established additional rural police stations to help enforce the new system, but did not provide adequate coverage or resources.¹

The critical weakness in the modernising act lay in the change of emphasis in the role of the tribal leaders, from a judicial role to a purely administrative one. In practice, tribal leaders continued to be acknowledged as heads of their group, and the tribe now became a political base that aimed to promote its members to senior positions in local councils, as well as to regional and national assemblies.²¹ There was increasing polarisation along ethnic lines throughout government, as representatives worked for the interests of their own tribes. This process, described as 'vertical ethnic expansion', ran from the local level to the regional and even national levels.²¹

Numayri's 1980 Regional Government Act joined North and South Darfur together as a single region, with its own assembly and a governor based in El Fasher. Numayri's first appointee as regional governor was rejected by the Darfurians and, in his place, he appointed Ahmad Dereij, a senior and influential Fur politician who had been a minister in earlier governments.

At the local level, a new social and political force emerged – the SSU, which by then was the only political party to be recognised by the government. Under the SSU, local administrations were led by members of the rural elite, such as teachers, small traders and government employees, and this new leadership played a critical role in shaping the political scene in Darfur in the years after the regional governments were established.⁴⁷ It was given responsibility for services in the region, albeit with a wholly inadequate budget.

In 1987, during the second democratic era under Sadiq al-Mahdi, the Native Administration was re-established. This period was short-lived, however, and by 1989 the NIF had taken power in Sudan through a military coup. Since then, the administration has been subject to structural and mandatory changes to conform with the Islamic orientation of the State. For example, the Islamic title of Amir (Islamic monarch) is now used instead of Sultan or Nazir; Amir are considered to be Mujahid, or tribal leaders protecting the Islamic religion in line with Shari'a values.

In 1994, the government again intervened in the administration of Darfur by re-dividing it into three separate states (North, South and West Darfur), despite fierce opposition from its people.²¹ This move is widely held to have weakened the social infrastructure and integrity of the region. At the same time, the government introduced 'emirates', or principalities, in every dar, appointing its own supporters as emirs and essentially creating a parallel Native Administration. As one source explained, '*The objective behind appointing "princes" is to weaken the structure of the native administration because the regime failed to mobilise [its] support and loyalty.*'²¹

This has led to conflict. For example, in 1995 the governor of West Darfur issued a decree that divided the traditional homeland of the Masalit into 13 new emirates, nine of which were allocated to Arab groups.^{10, 43} This resulted in the devastating Masalit–Arab conflicts of the late 1990s (see the El Geneina case study, Appendix 6)).

The allocation of tribal homelands thus introduces two inter-connected processes: conflicts over the land itself (including tribal territories and access for other groups, including pastoralists), and conflicts over local governance, or local power struggles.

Electoral representation of tribal groups and competition for power

According to one commentator, '*The post-independence system, particularly the democratic system, has tended... to turn the tribes into competing groups: competing for political status, for allocations of rationed goods and so on.*'¹



Thus electoral processes inevitably see the larger tribes seeking to exploit their greater voting power, while the smaller tribes are marginalised.

The case of the Berti in North Darfur provides a good example of these processes in action. In the mid-1990s, the Berti developed a comprehensive plan for taking possession of the local government administrative offices in Darfur i.e. those of the governors, ministers, executive administrators, etc., at the state and provincial levels. Their first practical step was to increase the number of their *omda* from three to twenty-three. This meant increasing the number of constituencies in elections for political and legislative office, in their interests. At the same time, the Berti elite published a number of documents – Berti and Land, Berti and Geography and Berti and History – that were intended to prove their rights in the ownership of land and in their participation in authority.⁵ It has been argued that the present Berti identity is a conscious reflection of the group's subordinate position vis-à-vis the kingdoms and states that have dominated Sudan over the past few centuries.⁴⁸

The Berti have clearly been successful in realising their aims: the current governor of North Darfur is Berti, and the group has the majority of National Assembly MPs for the state, with six out of the 16 seats (see Table 3). For the first year of the current conflict at least, the Berti homeland appears to have suffered fewer GoS attacks than other areas. At the same time, other, smaller tribes in the area recognise how their minority status limits their opportunities to gain electoral representation.

Table 3. Tribal affiliation of Darfur MPs in the National Assembly

Tribe	North Darfur	South Darfur	West Darfur	Total	%
Fur	3	5	10	18	29
Zaghawa	3	2	–	5	8
Berti	6	–	–	6	10
Arab groups	1	15	1	16	26
Masalit	–	1	5	6	10
Fellata	2	2	1	5	8
Gimir	–	1	1	2	3
Tunjur	1	–	–	1	1.6
Burgo	–	1	–	1	1.6
Birgid	–	1	–	1	1.6
Total	16	28	18	62	100

Total number of MPs in the National Assembly.	360
Total number of Darfur MPs	62
% of Darfur MPs	17

Conflict over tribal territories

As mentioned earlier, when the British colonised Darfur they opted for a system that would stabilise and pacify the region: indirect rule and tribal land holdings of *dar*, or homelands, based on the existing system of the Fur Sultanate. Describing a *dar* as a tribal homeland, however, is misleading, as this implies an ethnically homogenous territory, which is rarely the case. Members of other groups, and even entire tribal communities with their own sheikhs, are frequently found in the homelands of



Box 7. Changes in land tenure since the Fur Sultanate

The land laws of Sudan are a combination of legislation, rules introduced by the judiciary, customary laws and Shari'a law. The major division in land ownership according to law is between land owned by the State and that which is privately owned. Since 1899 there have been three main land laws.

The colonial administration issued its first Titles to Land Ordinance in 1899. According to this law, the rangelands of Central, Eastern and Western Sudan, previously labelled as being not being settled, were categorically classified as government-owned, divided into two classes:

- government land subject to no rights, and
- government land subject to rights vested in a community, such as a tribe, section, or village.

This law pertained until 6 April 1970, when the Registered Land Act declared all land of any kind that was not registered to be the property of the Government of Sudan. Under this law, the right of access to rangeland etc. may also be established by customary law and depends entirely on community membership. The right to fence or enclose land is not recognised and, when settled cultivators have attempted to do this, bitter disputes have arisen.

In 1984 the Civil Transactions Act (CTA) was passed. This is the major source of Sudanese land legislation today, governing the possession and ownership of land and rights regarding it.⁴⁹ The CTA provides that 'land belongs to God'. However, the State is declared responsible for its control and owns all land that was not registered in the name of a private party prior to 6 April 1970.

This means in effect that almost all land (99 per cent) is owned by the State, although the right to use such land may belong to a private party through 'usufruct' rights (i.e. the right to use property that belongs to another person). Local, regional and national authorities organise procedures for granting usufruct rights to private persons, through the establishment of committees – although these committees can produce conflicting interpretations of the relevant legislation.

The State can reclaim property from the holder of usufruct rights if the latter has failed to exploit the property according to the conditions of the grant. These conditions are explained as follows: *'The rights and obligations arising from usufruct are governed by the conditions imposed in the instrument creating it. The grantee is entitled to the products resulting from the use, including all crops, buildings and construction undertaken by the grantee on the property, unless contrary to the granting instrument, and the proprietor of the usufruct is entitled to court protection from the attempted encroachment of others.'*⁴⁹

Usufruct rights terminate if the obligations incumbent on the holder are breached at the expiration of the usufruct period granted, or upon the total destruction or expropriation of the property. However, there is often little relationship between formal legislation and what takes place on the ground. This is particularly the case in Darfur, where land holdings are largely governed by tribal customs and practices. This poses problems that have never been formally recognised in Sudanese land law.

other tribes. For example, a Gimir settlement can be found in Kebkabiya, which is far from the tribe's traditional homeland around Kulbus.

The tribal homeland policy favoured the larger tribes, who appointed a *nazir* or sultan to be responsible for the land as well as the people. For a tribe to have an independent administration, it needed its own *dar*; this applied to the Native Administration and still applies today to representation in local, regional and national institutions.

Small tribal groupings and their chiefs, on the other hand, came under the administration of the larger chiefdoms, with or without their consent – the Ma'alyia tribe, for example, were under the jurisdiction of the Rizeigat. Many of the small tribes have struggled for their own identity and land but, inevitably, their claims for a separate *dar*, and separate administration, have been resisted by the majority tribes,



as this would lead to fragmentation of existing territories. This type of situation has been a major source of tribal conflict in the region – as indeed was the case with the Ma’alyia–Rizeigat conflict of 1968.²¹

In some cases, local conflict has been fuelled by government support for the division of a *dar*. For example, the decision in 1995 to divide Dar Masalit into 13 emirates, which saw the Masalit sultan lose authority, led to devastating ethnic conflict and widespread insecurity in the area. It also created an administrative vacuum at the grassroots level, which had a profound impact on resource management in Habila and Geneina provinces.⁵⁰ As a result, a state of emergency was declared in West Darfur between 1995 and 1999.

Another important issue is that the Northern Rizeigat, who are camel-herding pastoralists (*Abbala*), do not have their own *dar*. This is partly because the granting of land historically favoured larger tribes, and partly because at the time it was allocated, land was not an issue for the Arab tribes – there was no shortage of it and, in any case, their prosperity depended on pastoralism and trade, not on land ownership. Although old maps show particular areas as the homelands of pastoralist tribes (e.g. the Mahamid), the herders’ seasonal patterns of livestock migration, ranging from north to south across the region, meant that *access* to land was of much greater importance to them than ownership.

In West Darfur, already badly damaged by conflict, additional pressures were caused by the influx of Arab groups from Chad, many of whom had close ties with Sudanese nomadic groups. Across Darfur, the issue of *dar* has become more critical due to pressures on the natural resource base, including both ecological degradation and the impact of expanding rainfed and wadi cultivation.

Political polarisation within Darfur – the Fur–Arab conflict of the late 1980s

Through the Mahdist movement, Darfur had strong connections with the UP – connections that the Darfur Arabs sought to exploit in order to gain advantage over the Fur.¹ A number of prominent Arab leaders from Darfur were awarded national ministries in Sadiq al-Mahdi’s government.

An ‘Arab Gathering’ in 1986 proved to be a key event in Fur–Arab relations. Elites from Arab tribes claimed that they represented the majority in Darfur but that, as Arabs, they were being marginalised. In a famous ‘Arab letter’ they called on the central authorities to address this issue. There was no formal response from the government, which was taken as an implicit endorsement. Meanwhile the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit felt that the ultimate target of the Arab Alliance was to undermine their position and create ethnic division. According to one commentator: *‘At one level, the Alliance was simply a political coalition that aimed to protect the interests of a disadvantaged group in western Sudan, but it also became a vehicle for a new racist ideology.’*²⁴

As a result, conflict erupted between the Fur and the Arabs, and this conflict dominated Darfur up until 1989. Losses on both sides were substantial: the Fur lost 2,500 people, 40,000 head of livestock and 400 villages, home to some 10,000 people. The Arab groups saw some 500 dead, 3,000 head of cattle lost and about 700 tents and residences destroyed. Mosques, schools and dispensaries were burned down.⁵¹ Sadiq al-Mahdi’s government favoured the Arabs until 1988, but then appointed a Fur governor in Darfur, Eltigani Sisei Ateem. There were local peace initiatives in 1988 and 1989, the last of which coincided with the change in government and the arrival of the current NIF regime in June 1989.⁵¹

The Fur argued that the Arabs’ aim was to eradicate them totally from their own land. The Arabs, on the other hand, claimed that the current problems dated back to the late 1970s, when the Fur started to claim ‘*Darfur for the Fur*’ and describe Arabs as foreigners who should leave.⁴ As a result of fierce fighting, hundreds of Fur fled their villages in the Wadi Saleh area, which were soon occupied by ‘soldiers’ crossing the border from Chad.⁹ Changes in land law, including recent land legislation, are briefly reviewed in Box 7.



Arab groups in Darfur also emphasise the political agenda of the Zaghawa and how this has long contributed to the political polarisation of Arab and non-Arab in the region.³¹ According to Musa Hilal, Nazir of the Mahamid tribe (who has been linked with the mobilisation of Arab tribes to join the pro-government counter-insurgency), this dates back to the 1970s, when the northern opposition forces led by Sadiq al-Mahdi were hosted by Libya. At that time, the Libyan Popular Committees were advocating Colonel Gaddafi's pan-Arabist vision, and in turn ideologies that supported racial divide in Darfur between Arabs and non-Arabs (*Zurga*). The key person responsible for promoting Gaddafi's ideologies among the Sudanese in Libya at the time was a Zaghawa, an irony that illustrates the complexities of tribal alliances.³¹

Links between local, national and regional processes

There were many important external influences on the Arab–Fur war of the 1980s, in addition to that of the Khartoum government, in particular the war in the South and links with Libya and Chad, including Gaddafi's brand of pan-Arabism.

Links with national politics

Many Darfurians saw the new Islam of the NIF as a route to building links with the central government and thus of gaining enfranchisement for themselves. The NIF leader Hasan el-Turabi saw Islam as a means of building a constituency in Darfur. The Arab Alliance, on the other hand, espoused the very different Arabism of the Nile Valley, which was the dominant ideology of the Sudanese state in former times.²⁴

Many of the Darfurians who obtained government positions in the NCP found themselves out of government following the split of 1999. Relations between Turabi and President Umar al-Bashir had been uneasy, and a power struggle between the two finally led to Turabi leaving to form the breakaway Popular National Congress (PNC). The split had a discernible ethnic dimension, with Vice President Ali Osman Taha and his group representing the Nile Arabs, and Turabi representing the non-Arab groups of the west.

One former member of the NIF is now the leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Dr Khalil Ibrahim Muhammad, a prominent Zaghawa, was the Minister of Health before Turabi's split with the government, and is also said to have been a *murahaleen* leader who fought in the South. After the split, Dr Khalil did not align himself with either the NCP or the PNC, but instead went to Europe to build the foundations of his new party (see Box 8). Nonetheless, he has personal ties with Turabi and the JEM is widely considered to be a sister organisation to the PNC, though he and his followers refuse to either confirm or deny this.⁵²

In 2001, Turabi and some of his colleagues were arrested on charges of undermining the State. He was released in October 2003 after the government pledged to free political detainees during peace talks with the southern rebels, but was detained again in 2004 over an alleged coup plot. In November 2003, Vice President Ali Osman accused Turabi of encouraging sedition in Darfur.

Regional relations and trade

Relations with Chad and Libya have had a significant impact on trade in Darfur. Insecurity and civil war in Chad from the 1960s onwards have led to the expansion of markets just inside Sudan, at the expense of those in Chad. From 1979 until 1982, Hissein Habre's rebel coalition embargoed trade into Chad through the southern part of Darfur, but chronic insecurity made trade difficult even after



Box 8. Rebel/opposition groups in Darfur

The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)

The JEM was formed by Dr Khalil Ibrahim Muhammad, who is a member of the Kube sub-tribe of the Zaghawa and has strong former links with Hasan el-Turabi. The Kube dominate the leadership of the JEM, but it also includes other tribes. For example, in the Mellit area, the JEM is said to be a coalition between the western Meidob and the Zaghawa. There are even some Arab members, including Misiriya.

The strategy of the JEM, influenced to some extent by Turabi and the PNC, is to highlight the problems of marginalised areas, especially in Darfur. Initial talks between the government and rebel groups, held in Paris in mid-2004, did not include the JEM, although subsequently it has been included. The JEM is weak militarily compared with the SLM/A, but the two organisations act together as a single military force on the ground. Politically, however, they have different agendas.

The National Movement for Reform and Development

The JEM split into two factions in May 2004, with one group, under the leadership of Dr Khalil Ibrahim, retaining the name JEM and the other calling itself *al Haraka al Watania lel Islah u Tanmia* (National Movement for Reform and Development). This is led by the former general commander of the JEM military force, Colonel Gibril Abdul Kareem Barey. The new movement is made up mainly of Kobera Zaghawa, a distinct clan of the Wagi Zaghawa, who are also part of the SLM/A.

The split in the JEM was due to a rift between its field commanders and its political leaders. The latter controlled all political decisions and channels of support and refused to allow the field commanders to participate in these processes. Colonel Gibril served in the Chadian Army from 1990 until 2001, and disgruntled Kobera Zaghawa officers from the Chadian Army are reportedly joining his movement.

The National Movement for Reform and Development was not party to the ceasefire agreement concluded between the Government of Sudan and the SLM/A and JEM in April 2004, and announced it would continue to fight against the government.

The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)

The Darfur Liberation Front (DLF) emerged as a fighting force in February 2003 in response to the failure of the government and the traditional leadership to address the problems of the region. Soon afterwards, the DLF changed its name to the SLM/A. On 13 March 2003, the SLM/A announced the launch of an armed rebellion to 'create a united democratic Sudan on a new basis of equality, complete restructuring and devolution of power, even development and cultural and political pluralism'. It accused the Khartoum government of fuelling ethnic strife in the region, and called on tribes with an 'Arab background' to join its struggle against the government.

Its President is a Fur lawyer, Abdul Wahid Muhammed Ahmad Nur, while its Secretary General is a Zaghawa, Mini Arkowi Minawi Domi. The membership of the SLM/A is predominantly Fur and Zaghawa but also includes Masalit, Birgid, Meidob and other tribes. Small numbers of the Southern Rizeigat have joined the SLM/A, and a member of the Southern Rizeigat heads its forces in South Darfur.⁵³ In order to achieve a broader base across the tribes in Darfur, the SLM/A is actively recruiting Arabs.⁵⁴ Most of its members are younger than 40 years of age, and tend not to trust the traditional tribal leaders (membership of the JEM is also young).

There is no real documentary evidence as to which areas are under the control of the SLM/A. It is said to be strongest east and north of Jebel Mara and in Jebel Si, which are predominantly Fur areas. It also controls areas between Nyala and Ed Daein, in Dar Zaghawa (outside Tina and Kornoi), and also north of Kutum and around Mellit. In Dar Masalit it has a presence in the Geneina area and in Mornay.

**Box 8.** (continued)

The SLM/A joined the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in March 2004. According to its representatives, its main aim is to build a 'New Sudan', which includes:

- liberal democracy, with a separation of religion and state
- democratisation and human rights
- freedoms
- devolution of power within a federal system i.e. the regions control power (as in the US), with their own police forces and judiciaries, within a wider constitution
- Darfur to be included in a sharing of power
- Sudan to be a model country of citizenship.

Its political programme, however, is criticised as 'very rudimentary'.

The SLM/A and JEM work together militarily, but they have very different political agendas. The main differences, according to SLM/A representatives, are as follows:

- The JEM is considered to be part of the regime, as it has links with Turabi (it is a breakaway group of the NIF, formed after Turabi's split with the government). In contrast, the SLM/A's sympathies lie with the South and it has no problems cooperating with the SPLA.
- The JEM is essentially a political movement, which does not undertake military training and has a very small military capability (no more than 80 men).
- The JEM has little power and is scattered. The SLM/A, on the other hand, claims greater support from the people of Darfur.
- The JEM is not focused on Darfur, as it feels it does not have to localise the issue of marginalisation.
- The SLM/A wants state and religion to be separate (i.e. a secular state), while the JEM is essentially an Islamist group for whom state and religion are one and the same thing.

the embargo was lifted. This particularly affected larger traders, for whom it became less profitable to run commercial vehicles on routes into Chad; smaller traders, however, most of them farmers and herders in rural areas, benefited from the situation.⁵⁵

Trade (and labour migration) between Libya and Sudan increased after Libyan-supported units of the Islamic Legion opened a truck route from Kufra oasis through Ounianga Kebir and Fada and on to Kutum in Darfur.⁹ Another desert route started at Ma'tan as-Sarra, then skirted east to continue south to the Meidob hills. The 1980s saw a period of intense trade with Libya. The market at Mellit in particular was awash with imported goods, including vehicle spare parts, which were otherwise difficult to obtain in Darfur and in Sudan generally.

Conclusion

This discussion shows clearly that there is a long history behind the current conflict, with roots dating back in many cases to the nineteenth century or even earlier. Many of its features have echoes of former times, including brutal inter-tribal conflicts manipulated by the central Sudanese authorities. As the roots of the current conflict are so intricate and intertwined, it is impossible to separate them out without taking into account their dynamic and shifting inter-relationships. With this difficulty in mind, the study identifies the following as the major contributing factors:



At the national level:

1. The marginalisation and neglect of Darfur by the central government since the nineteenth century. This has contributed at a local level to:
 - a. failing institutions, including the judicial systems and policing, which latterly appear to have favoured certain groups. This has been in part due to the fragmented approach to administration, particularly the Native Administration.
 - b. failing development, including education, health care, transport, veterinary and other services, which affect all of Darfur, but historically have affected different ethnic groups to different extents.
2. Wider regional conflicts, which have contributed to the development and use of ethnically distinct armed militias, and also to the increased numbers of firearms owned by Darfurians generally. These conflicts include the North–South civil war, as well as the long-running conflicts within Chad and between Chad and Libya over the Aouzou strip, which have affected the relationship between these countries and Sudan.
3. The tactical manipulation of ethnic identities within Darfur (including through racism) by the Government of Sudan and by political parties. This includes the mobilisation of armed militias and political mobilisation based on religious and ethnic identity (Mahdism, and later Islamisation and Arabism).

At a local level:

4. The competition and pressures on natural resources within Darfur – in part a result of a history of drought and famine, but exacerbated by clear ethnic rivalries and ethnically distinct approaches to addressing the problem. However, it is generally recognised that disputes over natural resources cannot be considered the main trigger of the current conflict.
5. Local political polarisation between Arabs and non-Arabs, with external influences from popular committees affiliated to Libya and certain political parties (e.g. the Muslim Brotherhood and the UP).

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3. Impact of Conflict on Livelihoods in Darfur

In recent years, the simple distinction between farmers and herders in Darfur has no longer applied, as the livelihoods of the two groups have converged. Before the conflict, nearly all farmers reared livestock, while nearly all herders farmed. Most groups also supplemented their farming and livestock-rearing activities with labour migration and remittances, the collection of natural resources and trade. Other activities featured too, of course, but were specific to certain groups – including, for example, *tombac* production, artisanry, serving in the military and a range of illegal activities (banditry, smuggling, brewing, prostitution, etc.).

However, the distinction between farmer and herder is still relevant, because pressure on natural resources has contributed to conflicts locally between neighbouring groups, and these are often played out between pastoralists and farmers. Chapter 2 explains how the current conflict has come about as the result of processes related to the marginalisation and neglect of Darfur since the nineteenth century, regional conflicts involving Darfur's neighbours Chad and Libya, and the tactical manipulation of ethnic identity by the central authorities. Although these national- and international-level processes have been critical in the evolution of the conflict, processes and grievances at the local level have also come into play.

This chapter presents the main findings of the study in terms of the impact the conflict has had on livelihoods in Darfur. It first provides an overview of the five case study areas:

- Kebkabiya (including Fur, Zaghawa and Tunjur IDPs, Tama and Gimir IDPs and residents, and rurally based Arab groups)
- Mellit (Berti and Zayadia)
- Disa (Fur, Tunjur and Zaghawa groups in SLM/A-controlled rural areas)
- Seraif (Beni Hussein)
- Geneina (IDPs, and two Masalit rural settlements).

The case studies, presented in detail in Annexes 2–6, represent a diverse range of ethnic groups, both large and small and reflecting different political viewpoints and experiences of the conflict. They illustrate the diversity of the population of Darfur: not just diversity between areas, but more significantly diversity within each area. This cannot be generalised as pastoralist versus farmer, or even Arab versus non-Arab. For example, the situation between the non-Arab Berti and the Arab Zayadia in Mellit is quite different from the situations of Arabs and non-Arabs elsewhere. For some groups (e.g. the Fur and Northern Rizeigat), the alliances they have formed with either government forces or the rebel opposition have clearly been a livelihood issue, while for others it has been a matter of political pressures (e.g. the Tama in Kebkabiya).

Profiles of the case-study areas

Kebkabiya

The town of Kebkabiya is the capital of Kebkabiya Province and is home to more than 40,000 IDPs, who sought refuge there following the government counter-offensive against the rebel opposition and the *Janjaweed* attacks on villages in 2003. The original tribes in Kebkabiya were the Fur and Tama. The Northern Rizeigat Arabs (including the Ireygat, Iteyfah and Mahamid, Zabalad, Owlad Zeid and



Owlad Rashid) moved here from the Kutum area.¹ Zaghawa groups moved south from Dar Zaghawa in the 1970s and 1980s,^{2,3} including the 'blacksmith' group, the Haddahate, who are a sub-tribe of the Zaghawa.⁴ The Gimir moved to Kebkabiya from the west (some from Chad), while other tribes here include the Berti and the Tunjur.

The head of the Native Administration in Kebkabiya is a Fur *omda* and there are sub-*omda* of other tribes under him, including representatives of the Zabalad, Zaghawa, Gimir, Tama and Crowbat (part of the Fur). Not all of Kebkabiya Province has been affected to the same extent by conflict. Most of the IDPs are Fur and Zaghawa; for safety's sake, they are forced to stay within Kebkabiya town. Arab groups in rural areas west of Kebkabiya, and also Gimir and Tama residents and IDPs in Kebkabiya town, are pro-government.

Mellit

Mellit town is the capital of Mellit Province and, before the conflict, was an important and vibrant commercial centre with strong links with Libya. The major tribal groups include the Berti, Meidob and Zayadia, and there are also Zaghawa, Fellata, Fur and other smaller groups. All these groups come under the administration of the King of the Berti, who resides in Mellit. In the current conflict, the Zayadia belong to the pro-government alliance, while there is broad support for the opposition among the other groups. It is not entirely clear where the Berti stand, as their leadership is strongly represented in local government, and includes the Governor of North Darfur. However, the ethnic polarisation between the Arab Zayadia on one side and the Berti, Fur and Zaghawa on the other is palpable.

Mellit town has become a shadow of its former self, with the majority of shops closed and boarded up, the markets empty and few people around, in stark contrast to the way it used to be. This is largely due to the cessation of trade with Libya following the closure of the national border in 2003, combined with insecurity, which restricts access to markets. The opposition groups, the SLM/A and the JEM, are based close to Mellit, and there have been rebel attacks on Zayadia communities outside the town. For example, armed opposition groups attacked Mellit on 15 May 2003, resulting in the closure of its banks and customs office. There are no camps for displaced people in the town.

Disa

Disa lies about 45km north of Kutum, in North Darfur. It is located within the opposition-held areas of the state and is the local headquarters of the SLM/A. A mix of tribes is found in the area, including Zaghawa, Fur, Berti, Tunjur, Meidob, Fellata and Birgo.⁵ There was previously a Northern Rizeigat group (Owlad Hamid and Mahariya) living in the area, but they have left since the conflict began. Disa was attacked in 2003 by GoS troops, supported by armed militia, who used aerial bombings, trucks with machine guns, etc. There were three major battles between government troops and the SLA, after which government troops withdrew to Kutum. People fled their villages during the conflict, and only returned in October 2003 after the first round of talks in Abeche (which were mediated by Chad) produced a ceasefire agreement between the GoS and the SLM/A. There were also reports of displaced people coming to the area from elsewhere.

People interviewed strongly supported the rebels, who have secured the area and provide 'protection'. At the time of the team's visit, the delivery of humanitarian assistance had begun to rural, SLM/A-controlled areas. The security situation appeared far better than elsewhere, but this was before the landmine incident that killed two international relief workers in October 2004. Since then, humanitarian access has deteriorated.



Seraif, Beni Hussein

Seraif town is situated in the north of Seraif Locality, in the west of Kebkabiya Province in North Darfur. The Beni Hussein are the majority tribe, while other tribes include Fur, Zaghawa, Tama, Gimir, Masalit and Arab groups. Approximately 25 per cent of the Beni Hussein are pastoralists, while the other three-quarters are sedentary. The Beni Hussein are an Arab group who have their own *dar* – Dar Seraif – and Nazirate (Native Administration). The location of the *dar* has shifted eastwards since 1928, when it was located closer to El Fasher. The Nazir of the Beni Hussein has taken part in all the reconciliation conferences held in Darfur.

At the time of the study, the Beni Hussein Native Administration in Seraif Beni Hussein (the capital) was adamant that it was not supporting either the rebel groups or the government, despite having been approached by both sides for its support. It was striving to maintain security and stability in the tribal homeland. Traditional security systems were still intact, but the local administration was not equipped to deal with the wider level of conflict that was now occurring. For example, it could no longer negotiate local agreements with neighbouring tribes, as these tribes now represent wider rebel movements and any agreement struck with them risks provoking conflict with neighbouring pro-government groups. There are also differences of opinion between the traditional leadership in Seraif and individual members of the Beni Hussein who hold important government positions in Khartoum.

Geneina

El Geneina is the capital of West Darfur State. The Masalit, who are sedentary farmers, are the largest tribe and are concentrated in Dar Masalit in the southern half of the state. To the south are the Sinyar, and to the north are the Erenga, Jabal and Gimir. Other significant farming groups include the Maba, Tama, Zaghawa, Daju, Burgo and Marariet. Arab groups include the Turgem, Hottiyya, Otryya, Mahadi and Darok to the north-east of El Geneina. In addition, the northern *Abbala* camel herders have long used the numerous wadis that cross the state for their dry-season grazing.

The flow of movement and resettlement in the region has increased in the past 20 years, because of the drought in the north and the conflicts in Chad. Banditry and insecurity have long been characteristic of the borderlands between Chad and Sudan, and have gradually spread throughout Dar Masalit. In part this is a result of drought and economic hardship, but it is also partly due to the Chadian civil war and the support given by the Sudanese authorities to the Chadian opposition in exile in Dar Masalit.

The movement of pastoralists into farming areas has been a constant source of conflict between Arab herders and non-Arab farmers. Other conflicts in North Darfur have made the grazing in the far north areas inaccessible for *Abbala* Arabs, restricting their migratory routes to the Seraif and Kebkabiya areas and leaving them dependent on grazing in West Darfur. A local-level conflict, fought around issues of local power, tribal territories and natural resources, escalated between 1995 and 1999, leading to the declaration of a state of emergency and a period of devastating losses for the Masalit.

This conflict was made worse by the interference of the central government. In March 1995, the Governor of West Darfur issued a decree that divided the traditional homeland of the Masalit into 13 emirates, nine of which were allocated to Arab groups.^{6,7} This was done without regard for local tribal customs or tradition and without any consultation with the tribal leaders of the Masalit,⁸ even though it meant the fragmentation of Dar Masalit. A new independent Native Administration was created, with the result that the authority of the Masalit Sultan was diminished. In accordance with the decree, Dar Erenga and Dar Jebel in Kulbus Province became two separate administrative entities outside the Sultanate of Dar Masalit, though the Gimir Sultanate managed to preserve its status with only minor modifications. These changes, which ignored a longstanding heritage of tribal administration in the

area, were motivated by political interests. Consequently, the area became increasingly insecure, with frequent banditry and looting.

In the current conflict, attacks on villages as part of the counter-insurgency started in 2003, and large numbers of Masalit fled to Chad as refugees, or to towns in the region that sheltered displaced people. Those who could afford to do so left for Khartoum or Omdurman. Scattered remnants of Masalit communities were left behind in rural areas, consisting of older women, women and children and men desperately trying to cultivate whatever crops they could, to supplement the meagre humanitarian relief they had received.

Effects of conflict on livelihoods

The case studies are a useful means of illustrating important local causes, effects and reactions to conflict. The systematic attacks on villages by government forces, with armed militia support, throughout 2003 and into 2004 represented the blatant and systematic destruction of people's livelihoods and livelihood systems. The case studies give detailed accounts of these attacks, including instances of direct asset-stripping and the destruction of assets. In some cases, villages were attacked repeatedly, while in others property was looted in different locations: first everything in the village and then all the livestock along the migratory routes. One case study describes how Antonov aircraft and helicopters would *'bomb everything that moved'*, including water points, markets and herds/flocks of animals.⁹ Lorries were used to transport looted household contents – radios, clothes, pots and pans, mattresses and furniture. Once emptied, houses were burned down. The armed militia looted livestock in the surrounding areas, and there were also many cases of rape.⁹

Asset-stripping

Direct attacks on villages and livelihood resources have drastically diminished the livelihood assets of IDPs, including:

- **financial assets**, which for Darfurians are predominantly in the form of livestock, and have been lost as a result of looting
- **physical assets**, including the loss of farms, destruction of homesteads and looting or destruction of possessions (furniture, mattresses, blankets, clothes, cooking pans, utensils, seed stocks)
- **human capital**, which has been dramatically undermined by the violent deaths that have occurred during the attacks, sexual violence against women and the separation of families
- **social capital**, which has been undermined by the attacks on groups, villages and families, causing displacement and the undermining of social support networks
- **natural resources**, which were lost when wells were destroyed, surface water was contaminated, fruit trees were destroyed, and land became inaccessible or was occupied.

Failure of livelihood strategies

The livelihood strategies of *all* groups in the case studies, both Arab and non-Arab, have been affected either directly or indirectly by conflict. Consequences include:

- production failures
- market failures
- inability to access natural resources (wild foods, fodder and firewood) and
- inability of migrant workers to send back remittances.

The failure of livelihoods on this scale is unprecedented in Darfur. Even during previous region-wide famines, failures of livelihood were principally in production (farming and livestock); in nearly all



cases, the collection of natural resources, migration and the sending back of remittances continued to support rural livelihoods.

The core livelihood strategies applied by IDPs in their original homes are no longer available, in particular *goz* and wadi cultivation and rearing livestock. In their new locations, large numbers of IDPs are competing for the very few job opportunities or sources of income that are available. In Kebkabiya, for example, the only work is for construction labourers and domestic servants. IDPs frequently rely on being able to sell some of their food aid ration, to buy essential goods and in some cases to pay rent. Profits are being made by those able to exploit the situation. Rents for houses and plots of land have increased by up to five-fold, and a building boom is visibly occurring.

As well as the attacks by the government, there have also been reports of rebel attacks, particularly against Zayadia communities near Mellit, which have resulted in the displacement of entire groups (although at the time of the study these people had not been formally recognised as IDPs by the international community). Traders in Kufra in Libya and Mellit in Darfur have reported very serious incidents on the livestock trade routes that run to Kufra, via Aweinat. For instance, a camel caravan of more than 1,000 animals, which was organised by a group of traders, was raided and the herders and guides kidnapped. The value of such a caravan at Libyan livestock market prices is in excess of US\$1m. Since then, all livestock trade to Libya through northern Sudan has ceased. Even for those who have not been displaced, livelihoods are restricted by limited mobility and by insecurity.

Protection of livelihoods is both a human rights and a humanitarian issue

The violations of human rights in Darfur extend beyond the immediate effects of violence. They include violations of the right to adequate food and freedom from hunger, rights that are protected under human rights law¹ and under international humanitarian law.² International humanitarian law prohibits the use of starvation as a method of warfare – which means that parties to a conflict must not attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects that are indispensable for the survival of civilian populations.

Furthermore, livelihoods are a critical component of the humanitarian imperative – ‘life with dignity’.³ Therefore, the systematic destruction of livelihoods is not only a critical human rights issue, but also a fundamental humanitarian one. Livelihood issues such as means of primary production, access to markets, and access to income and employment, for example, are covered by the Sphere Project’s Minimum Standards in Disaster Response.¹⁰ Protecting and supporting livelihoods is a recognised strategy for preventing and alleviating human suffering.

Continuing processes of systematic destruction

The impact of direct attacks on livelihood assets is fairly clear, but less obvious and potentially even more serious for the medium and longer terms is the continued systematic destruction of all types

¹ Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); Articles 24 and 27 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); Article 12 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

² Protocol I, Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 1977. Part IV: Civilian Population, Article 54, paras 1–2. ‘1. Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. 2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.’

³ The humanitarian imperative is not limited to ‘saving lives’ but also includes protecting dignity, as described in the Sphere Project Handbook. In protecting human dignity, agencies seek to address not only the immediate life-threatening nature of complex emergencies, but also attempt to protect and support people’s livelihoods.



of livelihood strategy and the erosion of livelihood resources. This is happening as a result of various ongoing processes, institutions and policies (PIPS). Some of these are structural, while others are more immediate to the current conflict. Examples include:

- marginalisation, both of Darfur and within Darfur itself
- continued erosion of the capacity of the Native Administration
- insecurity, which restricts mobility and access
- the GoS's closure of the national border with Libya
- the role of the international community.

This analysis builds on that of the national and local processes that have contributed to the conflict, as presented in Chapter 2.

Marginalisation of Darfur, and marginalisation within Darfur

Since the nineteenth century, Darfur has been marginal to the interests of Sudan's central government. The region has made a major contribution to the national economy, yet it has had a minimal share in development and political decision making. This is despite the fact that a number of senior government and ruling party officials originate from Darfur.

The most basic of public services have been lacking, and there has been a continual decline in the quality of what does exist, including the judiciary and police, transport, health and education. Even though Darfur is well represented in the National Assembly, and even in the central government NCP, the individuals active in these bodies do not appear to adequately represent or secure Darfur's interests. With the growth in the region's population, the demand for public services is rising rapidly, thus highlighting even more vividly the problems. This is illustrated, for example, by the decline in literacy: between 1993 and 2002, male literacy in Darfur fell by more than one-third, compared with a drop of 2.9 per cent in northern Sudan as a whole.¹¹

The growing sense of marginalisation and injustice felt among Darfurian communities has contributed directly to the development of opposition groups. Back in the 1960s these organisations were politically oriented but immature, and were thus easily absorbed into the main political groupings, such as the UP and NUP. However, these political parties were unable to satisfy the ambitions of the Darfurian organisations.

Although all groups, both Arab and non-Arab, agree that Darfur has been marginalised by the central government, certain groups clearly feel that they have been further marginalised within Darfur itself, in that they have been denied access to the limited resources that exist, including land, health, education and even international aid. Pro-government groups, particularly in North and West Darfur,⁴ complain that they are inadequately represented in local government and in the National Assembly; this is in part because Arab groups here are in the minority (before the crisis, they made up about 20 per cent of the population at most). Few Arab tribes have their own *dar* (the exceptions being the Zayadia and the Beni Hussein), and this means that they have little or no authority locally, but fall instead under the tribal administration of other groups. Their relatively small numbers also mean that they are unable to return MPs to the National Assembly, although each state does have a 'pastoralist' MP, who is usually an Arab.⁵

⁴ The situation is somewhat different in southern Darfur, where there is a much higher proportion of Arabs, including the Southern Rizeigat.

⁵ Recently the Meidob (non-Arabs) and the Zayadia (Arabs), have been planning to jointly support an MP from one of their tribes, so that together they can defeat the Berti, who dominate politics in North Darfur.



Arabs attribute their marginalisation in part to their relative lack of education, and point out their relatively higher rates of illiteracy (only 20 per cent of Arab herders are literate, compared with 50 per cent of agro-pastoralists as a whole). A recent example illustrating the lack of education was given by the Beni Hussein, who explained that they were offered a scholarship to enable a young woman to attend Ahfad University for Women in Omdurman, but among their entire group they could find no-one who could meet the entry criteria. Education was clearly expressed as a top priority by several Arab groups, as they recognise that a weak educational base denies them access to important jobs and to representation.

It is also important for the international community to recognise that, since the first major international relief programmes of the 1980s, Arab groups have been at the back of the queue for relief, in that they are usually considered last and receive less than their fair share.¹² Several Arab groups commented that international organisations rarely employ Arabs; this is seen as part of their wider marginalisation in Darfur, and as a strategy on the part of non-Arab groups to dominate these external resources. It is clear from the case studies that, although their situation is very different from that of IDPs, the livelihoods of these groups are also under threat, as all of their core livelihood strategies are severely restricted, if they have not failed completely. Their humanitarian needs too will have to be addressed urgently in the coming months.

Mistrust of, and lack of faith in, the central and state governments were also encountered across groups in Darfur, and amongst Darfurian migrants in Central and Eastern Sudan. The central and state governments are facing a very large credibility gap, and are seen as being directly implicated in both causing and prolonging the current crisis.

Continued erosion of Native Administration capacity

The central government has been responsible for the erosion of the Native Administration's authority and capacity; it has undertaken various initiatives to re-organise local administrations, including the 1971 Local Government Act and the 1995 re-division of Darfur Region into three states. There were also dramatic changes to the existing systems in West Darfur in 1995, when the governor reorganised the state into 34 emirates, each one headed by an *amir* appointed by the government. As already mentioned, the homeland of the Masalit group was divided into 13 emirates, six of which were allocated to the Arab tribes of the area, including groups from Chad. This led to a devastating ethnic conflict.

As a result of changes such as these, the Native Administration has been politicised and there has been increasing polarisation between tribal groups. To regain their lost authority and power, tribal administrations have become closely linked with the political processes of government – in particular, election to the regional and national assemblies. More recently, the Native Administration has been further undermined by the opposition groups, whose leadership is drawn from amongst young, university-educated intellectuals. The rebel leaders are often at odds with the traditional leadership and tribal systems, in part because the traditional leadership is perceived as being close to the government.

Where groups have been displaced, they have often become separated from their tribal leadership, either because leaders have been killed or because they have fled (for example, to Chad). In some places, leaders have misused their authority to manipulate and profit from aid distributions. The conflict has also meant the loss of existing inter-tribal agreements and mutually beneficial arrangements. This continual erosion of the Native Administration raises doubts about its legitimacy and authority.

Mobility and access restricted by insecurity

The most fundamental problem currently affecting lives and livelihoods in Darfur is insecurity, which limits the mobility of all groups and represents the single greatest threat to people's lives and



livelihoods. This insecurity continues as a result of continued ceasefire violations on the part of both the GoS and the rebel groups.

As a result, the towns of Darfur have come under siege. In rural areas the situation is little better, with people fearing attack, or fearing to travel for risk of attack beyond a very restricted area. For example, within Dar Beni Hussein the inhabitants are able to move around and go to places such as local markets, but they are facing increasing difficulties in travelling to Kebkabiya or beyond. In SLM/A-controlled areas the situation is no better: although there is security locally, all the services and markets lie in government-controlled areas (e.g. Kutum). At the time of the team's visit, there were no health provision and no schools in these areas, and access to markets was very difficult.

The fear of travel is not limited to rural dwellers – even the national workers of NGOs are afraid to move far from towns, unless they have a white face to accompany them, and are afraid to stop their vehicles when they pass through villages. This was true even before the fatal attack on SCUUK personnel in October 2004. As a result, the activities of NGOs are increasingly limited to urban areas.

The limited mobility resulting from insecurity has seriously limited:

- the cultivation of fields
- seasonal livestock migration, which threatens to cause environmental degradation through over-grazing of dry-season pastures
- trade and access to markets, for both buyers and sellers
- labour migration and the return of remittances
- travel to rural areas for the collection of firewood, fodder and wild foods.

This means that the core livelihood strategies of all groups in Darfur have been drastically affected. The lack of mobility arising from insecurity is the key factor in the loss of livelihoods, and in people's extreme vulnerability.

The situation of IDPs appears to be even worse, as they are trapped within the besieged towns. In all the towns visited where IDPs were present, they risked attack or rape if they ventured beyond the town boundary to look for firewood, collect fodder or forage for wild foods. This presents them with very particular difficulties and hard decisions. Who are they prepared to put at risk in order to gain access to these essential needs? The women who risk sexual violence, or the men who might risk a fatal beating? Cases were found where older women and children were undertaking these tasks.

Until the conflict in 2003, labour migration to other parts of Darfur, to Central and Eastern Sudan, and to Libya, Egypt and other Arab states was a major source of remittances and income, particularly for groups in North and West Darfur. Remittances have now all but ceased, first because of the disruption and relocation of entire villages, which has made communications extremely difficult, if not impossible; second, because of the insecurity that continues to hamper mobility; and, third, because of the closure of the national border with Libya. Few, if any, labour migrants in Libya have had contact with their relatives in Darfur once they have been displaced. This means that people have become cut off from one another.

GoS closure of the national border with Libya

Libya is Darfur's neighbour to the north and is linked to it by historic trade routes, which continued to operate right up to the beginning of the conflict in 2003. Libya was an important destination for labour migrants from Sudan, and provided a significant export market for camels and sheep from Darfur. Darfur in turn imported a wide range of basic household goods, including foodstuffs, plastic goods and bed-



ding from Libya. In May 2003 the GoS closed the national border, effectively stopping the traffic of all migrant workers between Darfur and southern Libya (as well as between Libya and Central Sudan), and blocking the well-established livestock and commodity trade routes.

For many poorer Darfurians already in Libya, the border closure prevents them returning home, as alternative routes are costly and incur taxation or involve security risks. The closure has cut off communication routes, and has had a disastrous affect on remittance flows. It has also had a devastating effect on local and transnational trade (between Sudan, Libya and other Arab countries) and on the livelihoods of those engaged in livestock and other trade, on travel and on other services for migrant workers, both in Libya and in Darfur.

The GoS's decision to close the border is almost certainly linked to the ongoing conflict in Darfur. It may serve two purposes: first, to prevent recruitment by rebel groups of large numbers of male labour migrants, and second, by stopping the livestock export trade, to limit the ability of the rebel groups in the northern desert areas of Darfur to accrue taxation and other benefits from the control of trade routes.

GoS restrictions on food purchases and movements

Kutum is an important market town in North Darfur which, before the closure of the border, had significant trading links with Libya. Kutum market still serves the rural areas, including those controlled by the SLM/A, and there is now a large IDP camp (Kasab) on the outskirts of the town. Access to the market by residents living outside the town boundaries, including IDPs from the camp, is carefully controlled by the offices of the Military Intelligence and Security. People must apply for a permit, which allows them to buy a limited quota of goods and transport them beyond the town boundary. The permit costs SP 2,000 (US\$0.78) and is only valid for one day. Only the items listed on the permit may be bought, and only in the specified amounts. Purchased goods are inspected at the military checkpoints, and if any additional items are found, all the goods are confiscated.

In Disa in the SLM/A-controlled area north of Kutum, the market no longer functions and people in the area depend on the market in Kutum. Women and girls from Disa risk harassment, rape and attack to travel to Kutum market by donkey, to buy cereals and other essential foodstuffs. It is considered too dangerous for men to make this journey.

The role of the international community

Darfur has not benefited from major development aid since sanctions were imposed on Sudan in 1993, and even before then, which arguably reflects the same pattern of marginalisation and neglect. As explained in Chapter 2, up until early 2004 the international community was so focused on the North–South peace process that it was unable to respond strategically or effectively to the situation in Darfur.

As the North–South peace process progressed towards its final stages, it was frequently cited as a solution for Darfur and great hopes were placed in it by the international community. There was a rather naïve belief that once the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, the conflicts in Darfur and in Eastern Sudan could easily be resolved.⁶ However, as often happens in the period

⁶ As evidenced at the extraordinary session of the UN Security Council in Nairobi on 18–19 November 2004, which met for discussions with representatives of the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. The subsequent Resolution (1574) stated that the Security Council: '9. *Emphasises that a Comprehensive Peace Agreement will contribute towards sustainable peace and stability throughout Sudan and to the efforts to address the crisis in Darfur, and underlines the need for a national and inclusive approach, including the role of women, towards reconciliation and peace-building.*'



following a peace agreement, things have in fact got worse. The situation in Darfur deteriorated markedly in the weeks following the signing of the CPA, and the situation in the East has also flared into further violence.

Furthermore, the attention of the international community appears now to be far from focused on Darfur and the GoS's policies towards it. Rather, attention has been focused on normalising relations with Sudan as quickly as possible and on ensuring that both the North and the South are rewarded by a 'peace dividend', to ensure that the peace holds. The World Bank, for instance, is rushing forward to open trust funds in both North and South Sudan. The draft guidelines for these funds contain no mention of conditionality linked to an improvement in the situation in Darfur, or indeed to whether the CPA is meaningfully implemented on the ground. The European Community (EC) has signed a letter of engagement with the GoS, while participants at the Oslo Donor's Conference held in April 2005 pledged more than US\$ 4.5 billion for 2005–2007, including contributions towards the needs of the AU Mission in Sudan¹³. At least USD 2 billion is reported as development assistance in response to the needs documented in the GoS/GoSS/UN/World Bank Joint Assessment Mission.

It will be extremely important that UN agencies in particular are not seen to be 'following the money' and suddenly losing focus on Darfur in the process. It is also important that donors impose strict conditionality on the GoS with regards to Darfur – particularly the international financial institutions (IFIs), which will have a high level of leverage. Other donors, such as the UK, are beginning to talk about debt relief for Sudan, but this would have a disproportionately positive effect on the GoS and no effect at all on the rebels in Darfur. This provides an interesting counterweight to the stance of some donors on sanctions against the GoS, which has been that only sanctions that affect both sides in the Darfur conflict equally can be imposed. It must be ensured that any sanctions do not further deprive and marginalise the people of Sudan, including the population of Darfur. Any sanctions must therefore be designed very carefully, and targeted to penalise the perpetrators, and not the victims, of the conflict.

Darfur is once again in danger of being relegated and marginalised, while abuses continue. Of course, there is a careful balancing act to be achieved, particularly for Southern Sudan, which does not want to see its own aid put in jeopardy because of conditions relating to Darfur imposed on the GoS. However, it should be possible to ensure a peace dividend for the South, while also placing conditionality on the GoS. Similarly, it is essential that Eastern Sudan does not continue to be a victim of the current over-simplification of the conflicts in Sudan into North-South and Darfur. Furthermore, oil interests – particularly of countries on the UN Security Council – have made it impossible until now to raise any credible threat of sanctions against Sudan in response to the situation in Darfur.

There are two ways in which the North–South peace talks in Naivasha can provide a framework for Darfur:

1. As a model for the negotiating process between the GoS and rebel groups in Sudan.
2. By applying and adapting the contents of its protocols as quickly as possible in Darfur. In particular, there are elements of the protocols that contain additional provisions for the transition areas, which could be adapted.

As the deterioration in the situation since the signing of the CPA has shown, the peace agreement and its protocols do not offer a panacea for Darfur. It remains unclear how, or even if, the protocols will be implemented at the local level, now that the CPA has been signed. Additionally, there are important elements missing from the protocols that are critical for the resolution of the Darfur crisis. For example, the protocols do not outline in detail how they are to be applied at the level below that



of the state. Nor are the role of traditional administrations and their relationship to local government articulated.

Although there are lessons to be learned from Naivasha, such as the importance of the involvement of external players in a process of long-term engagement [Intergovernmental Authority on development (IGAD) and the European troika⁷ in particular], the situation in Darfur differs in a number of crucial ways. It is argued that one of the reasons why it was possible to bring the North–South peace process to resolution was that there were only two parties involved. The rebels in Darfur are at an earlier stage of their struggle and are much less unified and coherent than the SPLA in Southern Sudan, and this may make it more difficult to apply the same model for negotiations. The other critical differences between the North–South conflict and the situation in Darfur lie in the roots of the conflict and the way it has evolved. These have implications for the processes of conflict resolution, peace building and the restoration of livelihoods.

Conclusions

The conclusions to this review of the impact of conflict on livelihoods in Darfur are considered in Chapter 6.

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⁷ Includes the Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires in Khartoum, the British Ambassador to Sudan and the Head of the European Commission in Khartoum.

4. The Livestock Sector in the Darfur Crisis

The livestock resource in Sudan

Livestock production provides livelihoods for some 20 per cent of the population¹ and remains one of the major resource bases in Sudan. The country's total livestock populations in 2002 were estimated to be 39,479,000 head of cattle, 48,136,000 sheep, 41,485,000 goats and 3,342,000 camels.² These figures are equivalent to 52,504,000 tropical livestock units (TLU).¹ The Ministry of Animal Resources (MoAR) projects the annual growth rate in livestock populations at 3.2 per cent for cattle, 3.3 per cent for sheep, 2.5 per cent for goats and 2.3 per cent for camels² – considerably higher than in other countries in the region, despite estimated annual off-take rates of 20 per cent, 45.7 per cent, 37 per cent and 16 per cent respectively for the different species. The projected annual growth estimate shows Sudan as having the highest livestock population in Africa. The growth trend in the past five years is represented in Figure 4.




Figure 4. Growth trend of livestock population in Sudan

Source: MoAR, 2002²

Livestock is reared in all 26 states of Sudan, although camels are not reared in some of the southern states. Greater Darfur accounts for 18 per cent of the country's total TLU. Livestock used to generate 20 per cent of national foreign exchange earnings.¹ However, since the discovery of oil, this contribu-

¹ 1 Tropical Livestock Unit (TLU) = 250kg live weight = approximately 1 head of cattle. 1 camel = 1.3 TLU; 1 sheep = 0.12 TLU; 1 goat = 0.07 TLU.

tion has declined to below 8 per cent.³ Livestock production in Sudan is predominantly pastoral¹ and a significant proportion of the livestock population is owned and managed by the pastoral sector. However, production led by export demand, particularly of sheep, and growth in demand for local consumption of red meat² are gradually gaining importance in the agro-pastoral sector and for those who invest in livestock.

Sudan has probably been the leading livestock-exporting country in the region over the past few years. Livestock and meat exports are channelled through four routes. Nearly all live sheep and goats (and occasionally racing camels) are exported through Port Sudan on the Red Sea. Chilled red meat is exported by air from Khartoum, and occasionally from Nyala in Darfur, to various destinations. Exports via these two routes are formal and follow international trade procedures. The export of live camels to Egypt is a cross-border operation (through Dongola, on the Nile). Usually only part of the export proceeds (which amount to around US\$175/head) is paid in foreign currency and the balance is paid in Egyptian pounds, which traders then use to import goods into Sudan. Camel exports to Libya are also a cross-border operation, but this is considered unofficial. Traders import goods from Libya using the proceeds of their sales.

On average, Sudan has exported over 1m live sheep and about 150,000 camels (including via the unofficial Libyan route) and about 10,000 tonnes of red meat annually over the past decade, except in 2001, when a ban was imposed due to an outbreak of Rift Valley fever (RVF). Sudan has also served as a cross-border outlet for camels and sheep from Chad and also to some extent for cattle, camels and sheep from Ethiopia and Eritrea. The volume and value of the livestock trade for 2000–2004 are summarised in Figure 5 (2001 is omitted due to the RVF ban on live animals).




Figure 5. Live animal exports from Sudan

Source: Bank of Sudan³

² The preference is for mutton, but beef is cheaper.

Sudan's annual export earnings from live animals are between US\$100m and US\$125m. The bulk of these earnings come from live sheep exports to Saudi Arabia, where there are about one million Sudanese migrant workers.⁴ Despite the conflict in Darfur, export earnings from livestock for the first two quarters of 2004 were close to the 2003 figures. Livestock authorities in Sudan are continuously searching for new markets, and recent agreements with Egypt² promise to boost exports of chilled/frozen beef and live cattle. The annual value of chilled red meat exports is estimated to be over US\$20m (see Figure 6).




Figure 6. Value of live animal exports




Figure 7. Volume and value of chilled meat exports

Livestock resources and migration patterns in Darfur

MoAR figures show that 18 per cent of Sudan's TLU originate from the Greater Darfur region. Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan account for one-third of Sudan's total livestock resources. The bulk of the country's live sheep and camel exports, and most cattle and sheep for domestic consumption, are sourced from these two regions. Livestock species raised in Darfur include camels, cattle, donkeys, goats, horses and sheep. According to the MoAR (Table 4), in 2002 Darfur accounted for 21 per cent of the cattle, 22 per cent of the sheep and goats, 24 per cent of the camels, 31 per cent of the donkeys and 63 per cent of the horses in Sudan² (these figures reflect actual numbers of livestock, and not TLU).

**Table 4. Estimates of livestock populations in Darfur³**

	Cattle	Sheep	Goats	Camels	Donkeys	Horses
North Darfur	628,530	3,396,505	2,656,808	397,172	700,293	16,907
South Darfur	3,851,663	3,471,773	2,756,688	74,950	535,129	233,986
West Darfur	3,702,195	3,528,225	3,236,112	286,989	805,997	175,828
Total	8,182,388	10,396,503	8,649,608	759,111	2,041,419	426,721
Percentage of national herd population	21%	22%	22%	24%	31%	63%

Source: MoAR (2002)²

In Darfur, the rearing of livestock is interspersed with crop production, resulting in systems of pastoralism, agro-pastoralism and crop farming. Economic activities differ between the various agro-ecological zones (in some cases overlapping), as explained in Chapter 1.

The *Baggara* (cattle-rearing) and the *Abbala* (camel-rearing) are the two main pastoral groups of Darfur. They are traditionally nomadic but are increasingly becoming agro-pastoralists. The majority of these groups claim to be of Arab descent, but they also include non-Arabs who, by adopting similar livelihoods, have assimilated with them over time. Such groups include the Fellata and the Gimir in the *Baggara* group and the Zaghawa and Meidob of the *Abbala*. The distribution of the *Baggara* and *Abbala*, both within Darfur and outside its borders, relates to a large extent to the particular needs of the livestock they rear. Thus the *Abbala*, with their camels, inhabit the semi-arid north while the *Baggara*, with their cattle, occupy the areas of higher rainfall in the centre and south of the region. The major *Abbala* groups in the north of Darfur are the Meidob and Zaghawa, while the dominant *Baggara* groups in the south are the Beni Halba, Habbaniya and Rizeigat.

The livestock migratory routes of both groups follow a general north–south/south-west (wet season–dry season) direction. A few groups also move from the north-west to the north-east. The *Baggara* move south to the Bahr El Arab river and, in some cases, enter the Central African Republic during the dry season. In the wet season, they return to Adila, Ed Daein and Nyala, with some groups moving as far north as El Fasher town (Parallel 13.5) or eastwards into North and West Kordofan.

The dry-season migration of the *Abbala* is towards areas west or east of the Jebel Mara Mountains. Some of the *Abbala* groups move to the Kubum and Rahaid El Birdi areas of Sudan, or as far south as the Central African Republic. Others move into the northern fringes of West Darfur or Dar Rizeigat, or into Chad. During the wet season, the *Abbala* return north, some towards Wadi Hawa and others as far north as the oasis of El Altrun in the Sahara Desert.

Cattle and camels swap grazing areas during the dry and wet seasons. The dry-season grazing areas for camels become the wet-season grazing areas for cattle when the camels migrate further north. The wet-season grazing areas for cattle become the dry-season grazing reserves for camels, as cattle move further south in the dry season.⁵

³ Livestock figures obtained from the MoAR in Khartoum differ from those of the Directorate of Animal Resources in Greater Darfur.

There are well-established, traditional stock routes in Darfur, which have been in use for many years and generally run in a north–south direction (Table 5). Within the national boundaries, they extend south into some areas of Kordofan, West and South Darfur and into the northern, southern and western parts of Bahr el Ghazal State. These routes are officially gazetted, are about 100–120 metres wide and extend for hundreds of kilometres. Cultivation and campfires are illegal along the stock routes. However, some of the routes have been altered due to weak law enforcement, the expansion of farmland and various other gradual changes.

Table 5. Officially recognised stock routes⁵

Northern end	Southern end	Total length (km)
El Wakhaim	Um Dafoug	606
El Wakhaim	Fora Boranga	588
El Wakhaim	Garsilla	380
Wadi Hawar	Dar El Ta'aisha	673
El Ba'ashim	Dar Fellata	467
Um Siddir	Dar Rizeigat	386
Um Sayala	Dar Fellata	357
Birka Jowro	Towal	371
Um Sayala	Dar Rizeigat	400
Khazan Kulkul	Dar Rizeigat	252
Tabous	Dar Rizeigat	391

Flock and herd structure in North and South Darfur

The traditional system of flock and herd structure is related mainly to meat production, with an early off-take of males for sale and for domestic consumption. A study undertaken by Dr Abdal Jabbar Fuddle in the Dar Al Salam area⁶ of North Darfur indicates that the off-take rate for sheep (90 females and 10 males) at the agro-pastoral household level could be around 40 per cent. This figure concurs with the findings of a 1997 FAO field study⁷ for a flock of sheep comprising 52 breeding females in South Darfur. This study also found that the off-take rate for a herd of 43 breeding cows in South Darfur was around 8 per cent per annum. Males were sold at 3.5 years old. Figure 8 shows productivity and off-take models for both sheep and cattle in the traditional Darfur system.

The FAO study in South Darfur further indicated that:

- Sheep and goat flocks averaged about 43 head
- Females accounted for more than three animals out of four in sheep and goat flocks collectively; in sheep, females accounted for 77.8 per cent of the flock (breeding 55.8 per cent) and males 22.2 per cent (4.2 per cent older than 15 months)
- Flock structures were related to milk and meat production and were dominated by females, especially in age groups over six months; females thus accounted for 75.9 per cent of the flock, with 49.8 per cent being breeding females over the age of 10 months
- In the agro-pastoral sedentary system, 38 per cent of the animals were less than six months old; 15.7 per cent were 6–12 months old (with females in this group accounting for 11.6 per cent of the total flock and males for 4.1 per cent); 32.7 per cent were 13–24 months old (females accounting

for 30.6 per cent and males for 2.5 per cent); and 13.2 per cent were older than 24 months (no males), with 55.4 per cent of the flock being breeding females

- Sheep flocks in North Darfur comprised 90 per cent females.⁸

The study showed the following figures for cattle:

- An average of 106 head of cattle per herding unit, with 80 per cent of herds having 50–150 head
- Only 6 per cent of the herds had less than 50 head of cattle, 39 per cent had 51–100, 39 per cent had 101–150, 14 per cent were in the range 151–200 and 2 per cent comprised more than 200 head
- Herd structure was related to the dual functions of milk production and transport: males accounted for 31.2 per cent and females 68.8 per cent of all animals (Table 6). Males over 30 months old and raised for pack use slightly outnumbered those kept for breeding, but only a few animals were castrated. Males over 30 months were in the ratio 1:6 to females of the same age in more mobile herds, and in the ratio 1:7 in sedentary herds.

Table 6. Cattle herd structure in the *Baggara* system (%)

Age (months)	Breeding	Males pack	Total	Females	Combined sexes
<7	–	–	8.7	10.7	19.4
7–24	–	–	8.4	10.1	18.5
22–30	–	–	4.4	5.2	9.6
31–39	1.8	1.3	3.1	5.2	8.3
40–48	1.4	1.3	2.7	6.3	9.0
>48	1.5	2.4	3.9	31.3	35.2
Total	4.7	5.0	31.2	68.8	100.0

Source: FAO (1997)⁷ citing Wilson and Clarke (1975)⁹

Livestock trade in Darfur

Major livestock production areas are scattered across the region, in the range of 600–1,200km from Sudan's terminal markets, the most distant production area being West Darfur. Migration patterns bring herders close to the primary and secondary markets during the wet season, while during the dry season they move further away. The efficiency of the marketing system correlates to the distance from markets of production areas and the seasonality of livestock supply; these factors have led to the development of a unique internal livestock marketing system.

The livestock markets of Darfur, as in the rest of western Sudan, are highly broker-dominated. Some of these brokers may work as independent small-scale traders (*jallaba*) and others as agents (*wakil*) or sub-agents for the big traders. The brokers collect cattle, camels, sheep and goats from the scattered villages (through guarantors) and sell them to other brokers in the primary markets. The second broker may sell to a third broker in the same market or in a secondary market, and this process continues until the livestock are bulked into larger lots and reach the terminal markets. The final transaction in the terminal markets is also processed through brokers. Figure 9 shows a diagram of the livestock marketing chain. The main agent of a livestock trading company in Nyala explains that his company (*Hadub*) operates through ten *wakil*, who receive direct money transfers for their services. He estimates that three to four middlemen operate between the producer and each main agent.¹⁰




Figure 8. Cattle and sheep productivity and off-take models in a Darfur traditional system⁷

Agents also organise the trekking of livestock to the terminal markets for the big traders. Animals are said to change hands, if not actual ownership, a minimum of two and a maximum of six times between the point of purchase and the final point of sale. Terminal market prices may double, and in extreme cases increase to four times as much as the price paid to the producer.¹¹ Animals for export are selected on the basis of weight and appearance, after reaching the terminal market.

The livestock marketing system is fraught with a shortage of working capital, or cash flow, from the bottom to the top, because there are too many traders/brokers operating in a confined market and because the turn-around time required to complete a transaction between points of purchase and the terminal markets is too long. Despite operating largely on the 'trust system',⁴ most traders in Darfur who export camels to Egypt and Libya, or sheep and cattle to Muweli (Omdurman) and Port Sudan, cannot manage more than two shipments per year, due to the lengthy process of purchasing, collecting, assembling (fattening) and finally trekking the livestock for 45–70 days, depending on the season, from the point of origin to the destination markets. Keeping animals on feedlots for 60–90

⁴ A system by which only partial payment is made to the producer/middleman/traders for animals purchased. The balance is paid after the animals have been sold at terminal or export markets.




Figure 9. Schematic diagram of the livestock marketing chain in Sudan

Source: FAO, 1997⁷ adapted by Akililu, 2001⁴

days is also common, even after reaching the terminal market of Muweli, if animals appear weak or if prices are depressed because of excess supplies.

The seasonality of livestock supplies has led to the purchasing of cattle in bulk (mostly under trust transactions) and keeping them mainly in communal grazing areas and also on ranches before shipment. Livestock from Darfur mainly treks to terminal markets in the following seasons:

- Between July and September (sometimes up to October) during the rainy season, to take advantage of the available pasture and water. Animals trek at leisure during this time (cattle for about 60 days and sheep for 70 days) to allow grazing and fattening by the time they reach terminal markets.
- The trek during the winter season takes place between January and February, when temperatures are lower. For the rainy-season shipment, trade stocks are collected and assembled locally between April and June, and between October and December for the winter shipment. Stock that is trekked in summer moves faster to reach the terminal markets in 45 days, to minimise the risk of mortality. Occasionally, large traders may use trucks for the final leg of the journey – for example, from El Obeid to Muweli when transferring stock on the railway at Kadero (Omdurman), if the final destination is Port Sudan.

High transportation costs by truck or railway have deterred traders from using such services since the collapse of the subsidised railway service (a World Bank-financed project that ceased to operate in the late 1980s). This service used specialised block wagons to transport mainly cattle, but also sheep, from Nyala in the 1970s and 1980s. Traders now mainly use the following trade routes from Darfur to various destinations. Camel and donkey trade routes are illustrated in Figure 10.

Cattle and sheep – Muweli terminal market (Omdurman)

- The northern route: sheep from Kebkabiya, Seraf Umra and West Darfur are trekked through El Fasher, Um Keddada and Foja to Muweli, Omdurman. Small numbers of cattle are also trekked on this route through North Darfur (about 3,500 each year). Sheep from Mellit are trekked through Wadi Ousher and Maraya to Umbitetih, Jabra and then to Muweli. From Malha, trekkers pass



through Hamrat and Al Sheikh to reach Jabra. Trekking from El Fasher to Muweli takes about 45–50 days.

- The southern route: sheep and cattle from Fora Boranga, Raheid El Bedri, Bhar Al Arab and Tulus converge at Nyala. They then follow the 'early rain' route north of the railway line to Mahartya and El Lait, reaching Muweli through Foja or El Obeid. Foja serves as the final stopping point, where traders monitor the market situation in Muweli. If this is not to their advantage, they advise the drovers to keep the animals at Foja (since there is no pasture from this point onwards) until the market improves. Up to Foja, stock is trekked for 7–8 hours a day, but from this point onwards it is driven at an accelerated rate of 14 hours a day. The distance between Foja and Muweli has to be covered in 15 days (± 1 day). Drovers receive extra pay for the last stretch from Foja. Some traders transport their stock by truck from El Obeid to Muweli and/or Port Sudan.
- The 'late rain' route runs south of the railway line, crossing it at Ed Daein. The route then runs towards Guebesh and branches either to Foja or El Obeid, before proceeding to Muweli.
- Mortality rates are estimated at 1 per cent for sheep and 4 per cent for cattle (some also get lost along the way). More camels are lost due to raiding – about 5 per cent.
- The Nyala abattoir exports chilled mutton, chevron (goat-meat) and beef by air intermittently to Kufra in Libya, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Camels to Egypt

- Id Ahmed serves as the converging point for camels from Darfur that are destined for Egypt. From Mellit in North Darfur, trekkers heading for Id Ahmed travel through Mareiga or Umbitetih. Camels from West Darfur are herded through Kebkabiya and Seraf Umra to El Fasher, and then proceed to Id Ahmed. Camels from South Darfur require armed escorts up to Umbitetih, due to the presence of camel bandits. The animals then pass to Id Ahmed through El Fasher. It takes about seven days from Id Ahmed to Dongola (where official documents are processed) and a further 10 days to reach Wadi Halfa, the border point. In total, it may take about 30–35 days from North Darfur to reach Wadi Halfa. Donkey traders from Dongola use this route in the reverse direction. The route from South Darfur to El Fasher was not secure during the study team's visit. Some areas along this route, north and east of El Fasher, are not secure at all.
- The famous Forty Days route (Darb El Arbaein) through El Altrun has been abandoned, because wells have dried up and because of the government's directive that all camels exported to Egypt should be processed through Dongola for customs purposes.

Routes to Libya (Kufra)

- Mellit serves as a merging point for camels coming from West Darfur (through Kutum), South Darfur (through El Fasher) and North Darfur. From Mellit, trekkers proceed to Kufra through Qarab village, the last converging point for camels coming from points further north, such as Malha. Trekking from Mellit to Kufra takes about 17 days, often with no water or feed for the herd. By truck, it only takes five days (mainly for sheep during the Id season). At times, Libyan traders come with feed and water to meet the trekkers at the border point at Aweinat. This route crosses the Sahara, so trekking is only undertaken at night-time and up until mid-morning. Both camels and drovers sometimes perish in the desert. Experienced lead drovers are required on this route to deliver the animals and the crew safely to their destination.
- To a lesser extent, camels from West Darfur are trekked through Tina on the Chadian border and through Chad to Kufra.
- Prospective migrants from Darfur are employed as assistant drovers on the routes to Kufra, where they work for a year or two before they return home. Hence, these routes double as a migrant labour supply channel to Libya. Remittances from migrant workers in Libya are sent back via traders using the routes (see Chapter 5).

- Before the crisis, mercantile traders imported most of the basic consumer commodities required in the northern part of North Darfur from Libya.

Traders of Arab origin dominate the livestock trade between Darfur and Muweli, Egypt and Libya, although they do not have a monopoly. Producers and small-scale traders sometimes also combine their herds to trek them to the terminal market. The Berti, Meidob and Zaghawa tribes practise this system for stock originating from the northern part of North Darfur (Mellit, Malha, etc.). Drivers, by and large, tend to belong to the same ethnic groups as the traders. Cattle and camels from South and West Darfur and camels from North Darfur are trekked to destination markets by Arab drovers. Sheep are trekked by both Arabs and non-Arabs.



Figure 10. Camel and donkey trade routes to and from Darfur



Trekking costs

Livestock trekking provides a reliable livelihood for many people in Darfur. The art of trekking requires memorising all the alternative routes for the particular season, planning and decision-making against the elements, skills in herd management and animal behaviour, knowledge of all the water points and available pasture en route, some level of veterinary knowledge, negotiation skills to deal with authorities and bandits, and proper planning of provisions. Trekking crews include the lead drover, who is in charge of the operation, assistant drovers whose numbers may vary depending on the herd size, and cooks.

Payment for trekking is based on standard trade herd/flock sizes, which vary according to species. The size of a trade herd/flock (for each species) may also vary slightly across the three regions of Darfur. Trade herds/flocks belonging to various traders are bulked together for trekking purposes, to reduce costs. One lead drover is responsible for a number of herds/flocks belonging to various traders, but the number of assistant drovers for each herd/flock is usually fixed. The average number of livestock per trade herd consists of 50 head of cattle or camels and per trade flock, 300–350 sheep. A lead drover is usually responsible for up to four trade herds/flocks (200 head of cattle or camels, or 1,200 sheep), which require eight assistant drovers (two per trade herd). Payment for trekking depends on the point of origin and the route to be negotiated. Costs in Table 7 are calculated in US dollars.

Off-take

Off-take in Darfur is channelled through eight primary and four secondary markets (Table 8). The primary markets supply the secondary markets, which in turn supply the terminal markets of Muweli, Egypt and Libya. The specialisation of the secondary markets is determined by the dominant species in the market share and their relative proximity to the terminal markets.

Table 8. Primary and secondary markets in Darfur

Primary markets	Secondary markets
El Geneina	Nyala (a)
Kebkabiya	El Fasher
Kutum	Ed Daein
Buram	Mellit
Fora Boranga	
Zalingi	
Rihad El Burdi	
Gimalaya	

Source: Interviews with livestock traders

a. Nyala could also be considered as a terminal market since chilled red meat is exported from there by air.

In the absence of reliable data, it is difficult to estimate the total off-take. The only plausible approach is to combine the estimates of various informed sources (livestock traders, regional veterinary staff and MoAR sources). A review of such estimates indicates the following:

- Darfur supplies 25 per cent of the live sheep exported through Port Sudan (amounting to 250,000 head) and a further 25,000 sheep to Kufra, during the Id season. Each batch of sheep exported

Table 7. Trekking and other costs for various destinations from Darfur (US\$)

From – to	Species	Trade herd size	Payment to lead drover	Payment to asst. drovers	Other miscellaneous costs (a)	Taxes, vaccination, levies, etc.	Average cost/head (b)	Remarks
Mellit – Kufra	Camels	100	586	781	475	12.57/head	30.99	Asst. drovers are paid low wages on this route, as potential immigrant labourers.
El Fasher – Muweli	Cattle	200	586	1,250	1,172	9.7/head	24.74	
El Fasher – Muweli	Sheep	1,200	585	1,718	1,367 (c)	2.54/head	5.59	Excluding income tax and <i>zakhāt</i> (alms)
Nyala– Muweli	Cattle	200	628	2,531	781	13/head	32.7	The lead drover is given the profit from five cattle additionally.
Nyala – Al Huwey (d)	Sheep	1,200	313	1,250	390	3.71/head	5.33	Sheep are trucked from Al Huwey.
Nyala – Dongola	Camels	100	1,367 (e)	1,562	391	15.6/head	48.4	
Geneina – Dongola	Camels	120	586	1,406	390	28.9/head	48.75	
Geneina – Kufra	Camels	120	923	781	808	14.3/head	35.24	Tax is low because of the cross-border operation.

a. For water, feed, road taxes, etc.

b. The cost does not include 10 per cent income tax or 2.5 per cent *zakhāt* (alms), paid on a yearly basis.

c. 1,562 for dry season and 1,171 for winter season.

d. 60km west of El Obeid.

e. Includes payments for three armed escorts up to Umbititih.

Source: Livestock traders in Darfur ^{12–14, 24, 26}

to the Middle East from Sudan contains a proportion of 30 per cent originating from Darfur. However, it is estimated that about 5 per cent of these 'Darfurian' sheep come from Kordofan.

- An additional 300,000 sheep are estimated as being shipped from Darfur to Muweli for local consumption; together with 50,000 head of cattle and 80,000 camels (60 per cent to Egypt and 40 per cent to Libya). It should be noted that some of these animals originate from Chad. Numbers are difficult to estimate.

The financial value of this trade can be estimated by combining informed estimates and available data at each level of transaction. For the purpose of this approximation, Save the Children UK (SCUK) market data were used for primary and secondary markets and producers' estimates were averaged for prices at the producer level. Similarly, traders' estimates were combined for the particular export markets (Table 7).

Data on local consumption within Darfur are hard to come by, as slaughtering in rural areas and outside the designated areas in major towns such as El Fasher, El Geneina and Nyala, is not recorded. On the other hand, experts (including the FAO) doubt the MoAR estimate of 24kg per capita meat consumption, on the basis of differing assumptions of carcass weight, total livestock population and off-take. The MoAR's estimate of per capita meat consumption is considerably higher than estimates for the neighbouring countries of Kenya (which has a higher per capita income) and Ethiopia (which has an equivalent number of livestock, if not more).

By taking an average carcass weight for each species and considering the livestock population and assumed off-take, an FAO mission has suggested a per capita consumption level of 12.3kg for Sudan, consisting of 65 per cent beef, 30 per cent mutton and chevron and 5 per cent camel meat. This assumption, though still higher than for the neighbouring countries, seems plausible, particularly for urban centres. Total meat consumption in urban areas of Darfur may, therefore, be about 9,000 tonnes per year (given that 15 per cent of the Darfur population, or about 750,000 people, are urban), giving a per capita figure of 12kg/year. Levels of meat consumption in rural areas are difficult to estimate in the absence of plausible data.

Livestock marketing is one of the mainstays of the economy in Darfur. It plays the following roles:

- provides direct livelihoods for an estimated 575,000 pastoralists⁵ and additional substantial income for agro-pastoralists
- offers jobs for numerous middlemen, wakil, sub-wakil and drovers
- attracts investment to the region from livestock traders and others
- is the main source of revenue for the State
- has a multiplier effect that is felt in almost every household.

However, the continuing conflict has put this major economic resource in jeopardy, threatening the livelihoods of the many people who depend on it.

Effects of drought and conflict on production

Shifting livelihood trends

Factors such as recurring droughts (leading to desertification), growth in human and livestock populations and market demand have fuelled competition for resources that are steadily shrinking. The compound effects of this phenomenon are seen in the changing nature of species distribution and in continually shifting livelihood systems in Darfur. Export-led demand and the rise in domestic

Table 9. Value chain for livestock from Darfur (US\$)

Type	Market	Quantity	Value at producer level	Value at primary market level	Value at secondary market level (a)	Value at Muweli (Omdurman)	Value at Wadi Halifa (Egypt) (b)	Value at Kufra (Libya) (c)
Export-quality sheep	Muweli	250,000	3,906,250	5,371,093	7,324,219	14,423,000	–	–
	Libya	25,000	390,625	488,281	634,766	–	–	1,250,000
Sheep for local consumption	Muweli	300,000	3,515,625	4,101,562	7,031,250	12,807,692	–	–
Cattle	Muweli	50,000	6,835,937	7,812,500	8,007,812	13,671,875 (d)	–	–
Export camels	Egypt	48,000	13,440,000	14,400,000	16,320,000	–	24,000,000	–
	Libya	32,000	8,750,000	9,375,000	10,625,000	–	–	13,600,000
Total (e)			36,838,437	41,548,436	49,943,047	41,941,029	24,000,000	14,850,000

a. Significant trekking costs are incurred between primary, secondary and terminal markets.

b. Camels destined for Egypt are larger in size than those bound for Libya. Prices are also better in Egypt. The National Camel Research Centre of Sudan records a mean price of US\$500/head

c. It should be noted that the National Bank of Sudan does not account for exports to Libya. Camels exported to Libya are smaller in size compared with those exported to Egypt. Prices for camels in Libya average about US\$425/head.

d. Cattle are fattened for 3–4 months on ranches or for about 1–2 months on feedlots before being sold.

e. Only one-quarter of the value of the camels exported to Egypt is recorded by the National Bank of Sudan on this route.



consumption of red meat since the 1970s have influenced changes in herd mixture in the livestock production system, by turning a significant proportion of the cultivating population into agro-pastoralists and creating a new class of wealthy groups that have invested in livestock production.

Conversely, despite continuing to practise pastoralism, pastoral groups (especially the *Baggara*) have also taken up farming,⁵ in a bid to secure land that is increasingly being fragmented, but also to increase their income by catering for the rising demand for export crops. In recent years, the tribal conflict in West Darfur, which dates back to the early 1990s, and the current conflict between government and rebel forces in other parts of the region have significantly altered production, migration and trade patterns, including the ownership of livestock resources.

Oral accounts of elders^{12–14} indicate that cattle and camels were once the dominant species in North Darfur, until climatic changes – resulting in the depletion of resources – pushed cattle herders from North to South Darfur. Consequently, cattle production became important in South Darfur, encouraged by the relatively higher levels of rainfall there and a reduction in the tsetse population due to the clearing of vegetation.⁶

The same oral accounts reveal that the production of sheep, one of the major species raised before the 1960s, gained dominance in North Darfur from the early 1970s, as a result of export-led demand.⁸ Sheep provided an alternative livelihood for farmers whose harvests were repeatedly affected by drought. The *Abbala* Arabs, who raised mainly camels as recently as 40 years ago, were also persuaded to include sheep in their herds, due to the readily available market but also to compensate for the loss of income as donkeys, donkey carts and motor vehicles replaced camels as the main means of transporting farm produce.¹⁵

Similarly, sheep production intensified in South Darfur following the 1984–86 drought, when large numbers of the Birgid, Ma'alyia and Zaghawa tribes from North Darfur and Kordofan moved into South Darfur with their flocks.¹⁶ Some of the camel-rearing tribes of North Darfur and Chad (the Zaghawa, Gimir and Misiriya), who switched to sheep production after the 1984–86 drought, also migrated to West Darfur as a result of the conflict that began in 2000. Market demand has led to changes in the herd composition, resulting in the domination of high-value species over lower-value ones.

Pastoral and agro-pastoral communities living in harsh and fragile environments in Darfur have always had to cope with drought, or the threat of drought, as a central feature of their existence, and this has influenced their patterns of production. Droughts in the 1970s and 1980s, which affected the entire Sahelian zone, contributed to starvation, death, loss of animals, labour migration and migration to refugee camps. According to official data, the mean average rainfall in Sudan declined by 6.7 per cent between 1960–69 and 1970–79 and by 17.7 per cent from 1970–79 to 1980–86.¹⁷ Ten-year rainfall data collected by SCUK for El Fasher indicate wide fluctuations from year to year, with the annual amount ranging from as high as 314mm in 1994 and 377mm in 1998 to 155mm in 1997 and 152mm in 2003. In the four years since 2001, rainfall rates in El Fasher have dropped sharply (Figure 11).¹⁸

At a minimum, the impacts of drought are crop failure and a decline in livestock outputs. Adopting new coping mechanisms becomes a necessity but this leads, in many cases, to over-exploitation of fragile resources. There is over-grazing, new farm land is cleared, community-owned land passes into private ownership, farmers try their luck in livestock production and pastoralists in crop farming, and

⁵ Some documents state that only 10–15 per cent of the *Baggara* are pure nomads at present.

⁶ Tsetse is still prevalent in the southern part of South Darfur, where precipitation levels are higher.




Figure 11. El Fasher rainfall record¹⁸

families split up to earn a living as labourers and migrant workers, both within Sudan and abroad. When governments fail to realise early enough the root causes of such problems and fail to take appropriate courses of action (either deliberately or due to mistaken perceptions), tensions that have been building between communities over the years erupt into violence, as is the case in Darfur today.

Trade-induced production expansion

Despite recurrent droughts, the livestock population in Darfur has been on the increase, in response to market demand. Using the MoAR's projection of annual livestock growth (of 3.2 per cent for cattle, 3.3 per cent for sheep, 2.5 per cent for goats and 2.3 per cent for camels) as an indicator, the growth in livestock numbers can be approximated.

Although pastoralists own most of the livestock resources, the increase in livestock numbers is partly attributed to the traditionally non-pastoral population, which is increasingly engaged in livestock rearing as a secondary source of income or as an investment. The contribution of this sector to the growth in livestock populations in Darfur (and perhaps in other parts of Sudan), particularly of sheep and goats and to some extent of cattle, has always been underestimated.

Firstly, many small-scale farmers have ventured into production of sheep and goats due to the smaller amounts of capital required, the readily available market, the short reproductive cycle of the animals and a quick return on investment. The number of sheep and goats or other species of livestock owned by farmers turned agro-pastoralists correlates with the relative fertility of the soil (goz or wadi) and the area under cultivation (in other words, with the relative status of the family).




Figure 12. Livestock growth trends in Darfur²

Farmers in all five of the crop-dependent food economy zones (FEZs) identified by SCUK in North Darfur (excluding pastoralists) are involved in livestock production. Given the relatively high proportion of the total population accounted for by those living in these FEZs (see Table 10) the significance of this sector in contributing to the increase in the livestock population becomes apparent. While the SCUK study is limited to North Darfur, the picture is likely to be similar for West and South Darfur. There is evidence that ownership of livestock by small-scale farmers in the other two states could even be higher, due to the relatively better rainfall and pasture. Despite the common view that North Darfur has more sheep than the other two states (which is probably due to the routing of sheep from West Darfur through North Darfur to terminal markets), figures from the regional livestock offices and the MoAR indicate an almost equivalent number of sheep in all three states (a little under 4 million on average in each).

The significant difference between the states is that South and West Darfur have larger cattle populations, while North Darfur has a larger camel population. Table 10 details the average herd size for poor, medium and better-off households in the farming and pastoral communities of North Darfur (with the exception of the *tombac* FEZ, for which figures were unavailable).

Secondly, wealthy and influential people, town dwellers, government employees – and self-employed people have increasingly invested in livestock. Some of them raise animals on privately owned ranches. In South Darfur, four private investors own ranches extending over some 20,000 hectares, which were once communal grazing areas.¹⁰ Others raise flocks running into thousands of sheep and herds of hundreds of cattle or camels on communal grazing land, without the need to establish ranches.

Thirdly, large-scale traders double as livestock producers and livestock traders. In Mellit, for example, each of the fifty locally based *jallaba* raises more than 1,000 ewes and over 100 camels.²⁴ In addition, livestock traders assemble huge trade herds running into tens of thousands of cattle and camels and hundreds of thousands of sheep, which are usually kept on communal grazing land (for 3–5 months for cattle and about two months for sheep) for assembling or fattening before shipment. Most traders manage only

Table 10. Average land and livestock holdings by small-scale farmers in North Darfur^{19–23}

FEZ	Poor household	Medium household	Better-off household	FEZ population	Percentage of total population
Agro-migrant	1–2 <i>mukhamas</i> (a) 0–10 sheep/goats	1–3 <i>mukhamas</i> 5–20 sheep/goats 0–5 cattle		118,587	46%
Goz	5–10 <i>mukhamas</i> 5–10 sheep/goats	20–30 <i>mukhamas</i> 10–20 sheep/goats 0–1 camel 0–3 cattle		248,137	68%
Mixed cash crop	1.5–14 <i>mukhamas</i> 7–16 sheep/goats	5.3–32 <i>mukhamas</i> 25–45 sheep/goats 1–4 cattle 0–1 camel	20–125 <i>mukhamas</i> 78–175 sheep/goats 5–15 cattle 2 camels	207,378	78% (b)
Wadi	0–1.6 <i>mukhamas</i> 20–25 sheep/goats 0–2 cattle	1.6–3.2 <i>mukhamas</i> 40–50 sheep/goats 10–15 cattle	2.4–8 <i>mukhamas</i> 80–100 sheep/goats 8–20 cattle	167,463	46%
Pastoral	Household size 4–8: 5–15 sheep/goats	Household size 5–9: 25–60 sheep/goats 0–15 camels	Household size 6–9: 60–200 sheep/goats 5–150 camels	339,911	81.25%

(a) A *mukhamas* is an area of land equivalent to one hectare

(b) Excluding IDPs

two shipments per year (to Khartoum, Egypt or Libya), which means that trade herds share the available communal pasture with pastoral and agro-pastoral herds for 4–10 months of the year. The pressure on pasture and on water resources becomes apparent when considering that the annual volume of trade herds/flocks from Darfur amounts to some 550,000 sheep, 80,000 camels and 50,000 head of cattle.

Pasture and water sources are over-exploited by livestock belonging to pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, and by livestock traders and investors aiming to convert communal wealth into individual wealth. A United Nations Children's Fund/United Nations Student Organization (UNICEF/UNSO) study (1992) coined a term for the latter two groups – 'absentee non-herders'.¹⁷ Absentee non-herders employ herders to manage their production systems for them. Middle-income and wealthier agro-pastoralists also employ herders, as their herd size increases beyond what family members can manage. This prompts poor families to send young boys to work as herders to earn additional income for the family, which means that herding has become a steadily growing occupation for teenagers in Darfur.

Common herders are paid either in food and cash or in food and newly born lambs (usually eight lambs for a herder looking after 200 sheep). Cash payments go to the herder's family and payments in lambs are used to build up the family stock, from which the young herder will have a share when he starts a family. The success of this commercial system of production depends on the expertise of



experienced herders, who are employed for herd management and, for example, during the mating season to ensure that the entire flock lambs during the same two-week period.⁷

The commercialisation of livestock production has seen the adoption of certain characteristics of the pastoral mode of production. For absentee non-herders, livestock production is purely an investment, with no social value. The ownership and management of herds are completely separated. Herds are kept in one place, at a short distance from the owners' residential areas, thus reducing the migratory movements of herders and aggravating environmental degradation. Hired herders are unable to make decisions concerning the herds they manage but do not own.

In addition, commercialisation has altered the traditional and ecologically balanced herd mix. High-value species now dominate over low-value species, and this has a negative impact on the equilibrium of the ecosystem, due to the selective grazing habits and varying water needs of the different species. For example, the dominance of cattle in South and West Darfur has led to a rapid depletion of water sources, as cattle require frequent watering. Meanwhile, the dominance of sheep in North Darfur impedes the regeneration of pasture, as the land is grazed continuously.

As pressure on pasture resources increases, pastoralists are taking new initiatives to protect and utilise common resources, either individually or as a group. Many, particularly in the central belt of Darfur, have taken up farming in addition to pastoralism (by splitting households) and produce millet on the goz land or sorghum on alluvial wadis. Wealthier pastoralists have invested in groundnut production, for which they employ cheap labour from further south. A few have gone into large-scale, mechanised sorghum production on the clay plains between Bahr el Ghazal and the goz zone, assisted by the communal system of land tenure, which has allowed them to expand the areas they cultivate considerably. For family units taking this type of initiative, the income they get from growing crops is probably as important as their income from livestock, depending on the scale of the farm.

The use of enclosed pasture is increasing for certain, well-defined groups. This practice is more pronounced in the savannah ranges of South Darfur than in the semi-arid north. MONEC states that the owners of large herds are wealthy, command social standing and dominate local politics, particularly those who have erected the biggest enclosures.⁵ Currently, the high cost of fencing prohibits most pastoralists from copying this trend. However, some pastoralists, such as the Beni Helba of South Darfur, have taken steps at the community level by extending perimeter fences around their farms to include large areas of pasture as a dry-season reserve.²⁵ Individual farmers extend thorn bush fences around their farms to include parcels of less-used pastureland, either for grazing purposes or simply to expand their holdings.

Sizable tracts of rangeland in Sanam al-Naga, about 85km south of Nyala, have been enclosed for the resettlement of IDPs. Plots that have remained unoccupied have attracted outsiders, who have set up grazing enclosures.⁵ Initiatives of this sort generally take place between Parallels 11 and 14 North, where the population density is high, due to favourable environmental factors.²⁵

Commercialisation has altered the century-old tradition of farmers allowing pastoralists to graze their livestock on crop residues. Instead, crop-stalks are now harvested and sold. This has created resentment amongst pastoral communities, and has sometimes led to localised conflict when pastoralists have let their animals onto farms. Such conflicts can become serious if this happens before harvest.

⁷ The heat period in sheep lasts for only 19 hours every 21 days. Experienced herders are required to time mating for the whole flock within this short period, so that lambing is synchronised. The gestation period is about five months.



In addition, the expansion of farmland has blocked some of the migration routes, forcing pastoralists to take longer and more circuitous routes. Seasonal water points have also become a source of conflict between pastoralists and farmers during the dry season.

Stock theft or cattle rustling is common in Darfur. It has led to the organisation of armed groups whose stated purpose is to return stolen animals, although some also have ulterior motives. Banditry is common along some of the trade routes – for example, between Nyala and Umbiteth, where on average traders concede losses of 5 per cent of trade camels en route to terminal markets, despite employing armed escorts.²⁶ Camels are targeted largely because they are sold in Egypt or Libya, where they cannot be traced.

Chapter 2 considers in more detail the local and national processes contributing to the current conflict in Darfur. The following section considers causes of conflict related specifically to the increasing commercialisation of livestock production, involving all ethnic groups and patterns of seasonal migration.

The impact of the conflict on the livestock sector in Darfur

The livestock economy of Darfur has been hugely affected by the current conflict. The decline in livestock production that has been seen is not surprising, given the deaths of tens of thousands of people, the displacement of an estimated 1.6 million and a further 420,000 residents affected (according to the United Nations Office of the Commission for Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), in October 2004).²⁷ However, in conflicts such as this, political motives are often driven by economic interests. Easily transferable assets such as livestock ('assets on the hoof') provide the economic incentive to deepen and widen conflicts in pastoral and agro-pastoral settings. The impact of this resource-based conflict, in which the GoS has been implicated by international agencies,²⁸ on the lives and livelihoods of the civilian population of the region has been enormous. Its implications for the livestock economy have been disastrous.

Forcible transfer of assets

In economic terms, livestock has been the primary target of the conflict (as detailed in the individual case studies). It is difficult to estimate the total value of assets (livestock and otherwise) looted by pro-government forces from the non-Arab population of Darfur. However, the level of impoverishment inflicted upon the non-Arab population (quite aside from the psychological and physical trauma) is apparent. Even if peace prevails, rehabilitating the communities that have suffered will not be easy, partly because the victims, rightfully, are requesting the return of stolen animals and/or some kind of compensation from the government.⁸ The wanton destruction that has occurred has critically affected the livestock economy in terms of ownership, production, marketing and migration patterns.

Changes in livestock migration patterns

One visible outcome of the conflict is changes in livestock migration patterns, which have potentially disastrous consequences. Increasing hostility between Arabs and non-Arabs, and the SLM/A's control over some critical areas along the traditional migratory routes, have meant that the pastoral population's access to wet-season grazing reserves has been restricted. During the study team's visit, camels and sheep belonging to the *Abbala* groups were confined south of the Jebel Mara Mountains. During the wet season (July to October), camel herds and sheep used to migrate further north up to Giza, Wadi Hawar and El Altrun, on the southern fringes of the Sahara Desert. Similarly, cattle belonging

⁸ 'Compensation by the government' was what was wanted by many IDPs and affected residents interviewed in various places in Darfur.

**Table 11. Risks associated with pastoral migration routes**

Route	Length (km)	From	Via	To	Type of FEZ crossed	Main tribes	Risks associated
El Wakhaim to Um Dafoug	606	El Wakhaim/ Kutum, North Darfur	Kebkabiya and Wadi Bari	Um Dafoug, West Darfur	Pastoral and wadi	Nomad: Arab (Um Jalloul) Resident: Fur, Zaghawa	Pastoral FEZ; Arab–Zaghawa conflict over water sources; Kebkabiya/wadi area: destruction of farms by pastoralists
El Wakhaim to Fora Boranga	588	El Wakhaim/ Kutum, North Darfur	Karnoi, Abu Geddad, El Seraif, Seraf Umra	Fora Boranga, West Darfur	Pastoral	Nomad: Arab (Beni Hussein and Um Jalloul) Resident: Zaghawa, Fur, Gimir, Beni Hussain	Conflict between Arabs and Zaghawa of Kutum; destruction of farms by pastoralists; expansion of farmland blocking nomads' routes
Wadi Hawar to Dar El Ta'isha	673	Wadi Hawar/ Kutum, North Darfur	Kutum, El Fasher, Dar Al Salam	Rehaid El Berdi, South Darfur	Pastoral, goz and <i>tombac</i>	Nomad: Arab (Mahariya) Resident: Tunjur, Zaghawa	Unusual seasonal movements damage farms; conflict with goz farmers (Tunjur); expansion of farms blocking nomads' routes
Al Basheem to Dar Fellata	380	El Wakhaim/ Kutum	Anka Kutum, El Fasher, Jebel Si, Bardey Eid, El Nabag, Wadi Bari, Maylo	Garsilla, West Darfur	Pastoral, agro-migrant and wadi	Nomad: Arab (Mahariya and Irevgat) Resident: Fur	Competition over water and pasture resources between Kutum Arab and Zaghawa pastoral groups; conflict between agro-migrants of Jebel Si area (destruction of farms by nomads' animals); conflict between wadi farmers and nomads.
El Wakhaim to Garsilla	400	Um Sayala/ Kutum, North Darfur	Kutum, Abu Sakeen, El Fasher, Shangil Tobia	Dar Rizeigat, South Darfur	Goz and <i>tombac</i>	Nomad: Arab (Iteyfat) Resident: Tunjur, Zaghawa	Unusual seasonal movements, destruction of farms (rare conflicts)

Source: SCUİK 2004.^{2,3}



to *Baggara* groups have been confined around the railway line close to Nyala town (the furthest point north they have been able to reach) and to the Nyala–Kas Zalingi road in the west. Normally, the *Baggara* would travel further north, up to Parallel 13.5 close to El Fasher town, and to Kordofan in the north-easterly direction.

While most of the restricted areas are under SLM/A control, some have become inaccessible to pastoralists because of banditry, or because of attacks and counter-attacks between various ethnic groups. Lawlessness is spreading in areas that do not fall under the control of either the government or the SLM/A, further restricting wet-season grazing access for pastoralists. The restrictions could potentially extend into some of the dry-season grazing reserves if the conflict intensifies. The situation has resulted in the concentration of pastoral livestock in the dry-season grazing reserves, at a time when animals should have been in the wet-season reserves.

Ironically, animals looted from the non-pastoral population, which were normally grazed around farm plots by their owners, have now been added to the pastoral stock and kept in dry-season grazing reserves. Normally, calving and lambing take place in the wet-season reserves (usually from July to October, with a few groups staying on until December). Newborns are raised in the wet-season reserves, until they gain strength for the migration to the south in the dry season.

However, the conflict has thrown this time-tested livestock management system into disarray. The concentration of livestock in the dry-season grazing reserves during the wet season means that there will not be enough pasture for livestock in the coming dry season. This will also increase the risk of disease, with potential threats to newborns and some of the adult population. Water sources in the dry-season reserve will be depleted and may not last the length of the dry season. Livestock will not only die of thirst, but also of water-borne diseases. Desperation may persuade pastoralists to move further south than they used to (deep into the Central African Republic or the Bahr el Ghazal area), towards the middle or tail end of the dry season. This could spark new conflicts with other tribes.

Similarly, production and grazing patterns in the SLM/A-held areas of the north have been affected, largely due to government attacks. Villagers in Disa report that helicopters have shelled flocks of sheep that could not be looted by soldiers.²⁹ Elders in Mellit reported that water points north of the town – consisting of surface dams and wells in Abuhila, Abugemera, Amboru, Disa, Farawaja, Karo Karwoy, Musbat, Orshi, Shige and Tina – have been destroyed by aerial bombardments, intentionally buried by soldiers or poisoned.²⁴ As a result, livestock that should have grazed north of Mellit and Dar Zaghawa between August and October has been moved to eastern parts of Mellit and El Fasher. There is fear that water sources and pasture in these areas will be depleted at the start or by the middle of the dry season.

The conflict in Darfur has significantly affected the most critical element of any pastoral production system – mobility, or seasonal migration. In a pastoral system, humans, livestock and natural resources are balanced through mobility. When mobility is compromised on the scale seen in Darfur, its impact on livestock production is potentially enormous. The depletion of pasture and water resources in dry-season grazing reserves, coupled with the outbreak of disease due to the concentration of animals in confined areas, is likely to increase livestock mortality in the coming seasons.

Animal health

The consequences of the current crisis for animal health services and the spread of disease among livestock are potentially catastrophic. Experience from Iraq in 1990, Rwanda in 1994 and from Southern Sudan throughout the conflict there indicate a strong association between political upheaval and civil strife and an increase in the incidence of livestock diseases.³⁰ On the other hand, experience has also




Figure 13. Limits of normal and crisis migration routes for Abbala and Baggara pastoralists

accumulated in supporting animal health through professionally guided, community-based animal health programmes. Since the 1980s there has been a history of such programmes in Southern, Eastern and Western Sudan, and future animal health interventions in Darfur could build upon these.^{31, 32}

Before the current crisis, animal health services in the region were for the most part provided privately. The private sector provided almost all drugs (although shortages were the norm), while the public sector provided only limited disease prevention services (vaccination and associated services). Since the conflict began in 2003, the price of drugs has increased, and public-sector vaccination services can no longer access SLM/A-controlled areas or rural areas that are insecure. Livestock owners in these areas find it extremely difficult to get to markets where they can buy drugs.

Therefore, measures responding to animal health needs and to potential outbreaks of disease must depend on consultation and cooperation between the international relief agencies and the SLM/A,



with animal health being considered as part of any emergency operations. Such a strategy would allow the authorities to provide preventive and treatment services to the livestock sector in Darfur.

The team did not undertake a full assessment of animal health during its visit; however, Focus Group interviews with *Abbala* camel-herding groups revealed high morbidity and mortality in camels in Wadi Shoba and Wadi Shallal, around Kebkabiya and in Seraif Locality. The respiratory symptoms displayed by the animals were a relatively new disease for camel herders in the area, and informants reported death rates of around 25–30 per cent. These symptoms could have been caused by many diseases, including pneumonia or pasteuriosis (*P. multocia*), and there is a critical need for routine vaccination against bacterial diseases such as pasteuriosis, anthrax and black leg (a disease of cattle, and less frequently sheep).

Another priority for camels is vaccination against *Peste des petits ruminants* (PPR). The Soba Veterinary Laboratory in Eastern Sudan recently confirmed an outbreak of PPR, and conditions in Darfur are conducive to the spread of the disease. These conditions include the movement and gathering together of large numbers of different species, and animals of different ages, in confined areas; changes in feeding patterns; the introduction of new animals into the herds; and climatic changes. Antibodies against the PPR virus have already been found in the sera of camels in Darfur, as well as in other species.³³

Among cattle, tick burdens were noticeably high and, although no definitive diagnosis can be given, the diseases described during Focus Group interviews appeared to be the clinical signs of tick-borne diseases.

Apart from their importance in the treatment and control of livestock diseases, animal health interventions have in the past provided opportunities for local-level conflict resolution in Southern Sudan and in neighbouring countries.^{31, 34} Opportunities of this kind could be explored in Darfur and could contribute to bridging the ‘trust gap’ between the nomadic Arab groups and the international community. Bridging this gap is critical for future peace initiatives and other interventions in the area.

The collapse of the livestock trade

The disruption of livestock trade within Darfur and beyond its borders has signalled a downward spiral in the region’s economy. The repercussions of this disruption are felt, in varying degrees, in almost every household throughout the population (pastoral, agro-pastoral, traders, middlemen, drovers, etc). During the study team’s visit to Darfur, the disruption of trade was most pronounced in the areas described below.

Trade to Libya

This route was closed following the murder of 10 camel drovers and the confiscation of 3,000 camels in April 2003, near Wadi Hawar, en route to Libya. In September 2003, a further 3,500 camels were intercepted on the route and taken to Chad by the SLM/A.³⁵ Since then the border has officially been closed. In the past, some 32,000 camels and 25,000 sheep were exported annually along this route, with a total value amounting to almost US\$15 million.

As a result of the closure, at least 300 lead drovers and 1,280 assistant drovers⁹ have lost their jobs, and the latter have lost the possibility of employment as migrant workers. Individual traders, who were allowed to import goods from Libya up to a value of US\$3,759 each, have lost this opportunity. Darfurian migrant workers, who used to send trade goods through Libya to avoid taxes, are now unable

⁹ This figure is arrived at by dividing the total export volume of trade herds/flocks.



to do so, and migrant workers find it difficult to send remittances to relatives. Trade camels, which used to be routed from Chad through Darfur, are now going via the reverse route to Libya through Chad (especially camels from West Darfur). However, the volume of camels exported through Tina is far smaller, due to its inconvenient location, insecurity and the difficult terrain.

Trade to Muweli (Omdurman) and Egypt

The northern route is insecure, and a substantial reduction is expected in the volume of sheep being sent to Muweli, Omdurman, both for export and for local consumption. Previously, the northern route served Egypt for camels and Muweli for sheep and some cattle, with annual traffic amounting to approximately 450,000 sheep, 48,000 camels and 3,500 head of cattle. Some 50,000 head of cattle and 100,000 sheep were trekked along the southern route annually, but this route is now out of bounds because of insecurity.

The southern route was closed after the capture of parts of Ed Daein by the SLM/A and attacks and counter-attacks between tribal groups, and due to the widespread presence of bandits. The SLM/A recently intercepted 1,300 sheep, owned by a Saudi company (Al Merdi) and being transported by truck, at Labado, 60km east of Nyala. The SLM/A demanded a fine of SD 100,000 per truckload and also confiscated seven sheep from each truck. The company obliged, but was forced to airlift the remaining flock (5,700 sheep) from Nyala, using relief cargo planes.³⁶ It is also reported that the SLM/A intercepted some 3,400 sheep on this route in October 2003.

The Nyala abattoir had a throughput capacity of 2,000 sheep and goats and 350 head of cattle a day, although its actual output was subject to contractual commitments. The abattoir used to export chilled meat, chevron and mutton directly from Nyala to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the Gulf States. In April 2004, it was contracted to supply 3,000 tonnes of chilled red meat to Libya on a weekly basis, at the rate of 60 tonnes of mutton and 35 tonnes of beef a week.³⁶ It could not honour the contract because of price hikes and shortages of supplies, and production stopped in June 2004, with workers laid off indefinitely.

There are some indications in Khartoum that the price of meat and live animals is on the rise, but not to the levels expected. The increase cannot be attributed entirely to the decline in supplies from Darfur, as there are other inflationary factors to consider also, including for example a 20 per cent increase in the price of oil. Despite the interruption of supplies from Darfur, Sudan exported nearly the same volume of sheep in the first two quarters of 2004 as it did in the whole of 2003. This indicates that other livestock-producing states, mainly Kordofan but also White Nile, Blue Nile, El Gezira, Sennar and El Gedaref, are increasingly filling the supply gap. Informants state that sheep and camel owners are moving from Darfur to Kordofan, boosting the supply volume from that state. Some speculate that the movement of resources from Darfur to Kordofan is linked with the recent attack on Kordofan by the SLM/A i.e. they are targeting livestock.

Establishment of crisis trade routes

Some Arab livestock traders, based in El Geneina, are attempting to establish new trade routes to bypass security-affected areas in the south (see Figure 14). One of them stated that they had been persuaded to use a new route after trade herds consisting of some 10,000 head of cattle, on their way to El Fasher and belonging to 50 different traders, were stranded in Kebkabiya for about a month.³⁷ The cattle were then moved back south, first to Seraf Umra and Zalingi then on to Buram, before turning east to Oadela, bypassing the SLM/A-controlled Ed Daein area, with the intention of joining Guebesh after crossing the railway line. The traders estimate that trekking from Seraf Umra to Muweli via Buram will take 100–120 days, and from Nyala about 80–90¹⁰ days. Depending on the point of origin, this

¹⁰ Drivers and sub-drivers charge SD 1,500 per day for treks that take more than 80 days.

increases the duration of the trek by 20–40 days, putting much greater stress on the animals. At the time of the study team’s visit, this route was on trial: traders were not yet certain whether it would work or, vitally, whether it would be profitable.

The success or otherwise of this route depends to a large extent on whether the area around Buram stays under government control (Buram was controlled by the SLM/A for some time before it was recaptured). Even if Buram were to be controlled by the government, the SLM/A may be tempted to intercept trade stocks at some point either before or after the town, to disrupt the flow of trade.

In addition, the route passes through a tsetse-infested area, with a particularly high prevalence of infection during the rainy season. Coupled with the stress of the longer trek, livestock mortality could be much higher than usual on this new route. Moreover, the Buram route will be able to accommodate far fewer animals than the previous routes, for the following reasons:

- it cannot replace both the northern and southern routes totally
- the turn-around time for return on investment is far longer, due to the greater length of the trek




Figure 14. Normal and crisis trade routes

Source: Livestock traders in Darfur ^{12–14, 24, 26}



- traders' working capital will be tied up in inventories for longer
- the jallaba and the big traders from Khartoum have stopped coming to Darfur because of the risks involved
- the volume of animals that can be purchased and trekked by local-level toujar (traders) in El Geneina, with their smaller capital bases, cannot match those of the big jallaba in Khartoum.

Parallel perceptions

The perceptions of traders regarding the conflict, the conditions for trade and the security situation are divided along ethnic lines. Livestock traders of Arab origin in El Geneina emphasise that the security situation has greatly improved in the past 11 months – since the government took control of the surrounding areas – compared with what it was in 2002 and 2003. They complain bitterly about the SLM/A attacks on trade herds, traders and drovers in Seraf Umra and the surrounding areas in 2002 and 2003. They emphasise that the recent improvement has enabled them to trek (or truck) livestock from Seraf Umra and Beda (in Chad) to El Geneina and ultimately to ship animals to Libya (through Tina) or to Muweli (through Buram). One outcome of this is that locally based jallaba in Geneina are now trying to trek cattle and sheep directly through Buram to Muweli. Before the conflict, they supplied the secondary markets of Nyala and El Fasher.

Small-scale local livestock traders of Arab origin in South Darfur share a similar view. Three traders interviewed in the Nyala livestock market insisted that the security situation had improved since the government took control of the area.³⁸ These traders buy sheep from Fora Boranga and from the south-western and western parts of the Jebel Mara area. On average, they visit the Nyala market three times a month. However, they complained that the jallaba from Khartoum were not coming any more, and said that demand was much lower than the supply available. The livestock market clerk confirmed this, saying: *'You see the same animals week after week in the market, as there are not many buyers.'* It is rumoured that some of the animals brought to market have been looted from the non-Arab population.

Totally different views are heard from livestock traders of non-Arab origin. These conflicting views are more pronounced in North Darfur, but also prevail in South Darfur. The decline in supplies to important secondary markets, such as El Fasher, is attributed to the closure of primary markets, security problems along trade routes and the fact that IDPs have identified stolen animals at market. Important secondary markets such as Mellit, where some 20,000 camels and 25,000 sheep used to be processed to Libya annually, in addition to 25–50,000 sheep for Muweli, have been closed for the past ten months. Since then, of the fifty local toujar in Mellit, about forty have left for El Fasher and Khartoum,²⁴ and Mellit is no more than a ghost town at present. Kutum too is suffering from capital flight, and only two local toujar are left there of the original twenty before the conflict.³⁹

The price of meat in El Fasher and Kutum has doubled (from SD 500 to SD 1,000 per kg between January and June 2004), because of security problems on the supply route. While previously it cost SD 2,000 per head to trek cattle from Nyala to El Fasher, the cost is now SD 10,000 per head, since transporting them by truck is the only available option. A trader who supplies cattle to Kutum from Nyala stated that it took two to three weeks to sell 15 head of stock for local consumption, because the population's purchasing power had fallen so low.

According to another trader, the collapse of the livestock trade in North Darfur has put many middlemen out of business, and they are currently 'eating their assets'. Of the thirty local livestock traders in Gure village (in Disa), only five are still active. While before the conflict, better-off traders based in Gure were capable of buying 75–100 goats, the capital base of those who remain in the area does not allow them to buy more than 15.²⁹ The story is the same for Birmaza village, further north. In Nyala,



local non-Arab toujar have been reluctant to trade in animals since the start of the crisis, because of suspicions that some of the animals brought to market have been stolen from fellow Darfurians.

The rise in consumer commodity prices

The total and partial closures of strategic trade routes have increased the prices for basic commodities, due to increased transport costs, risks from bandits, the need to obtain supplies from new sources and also as a result of government embargoes. Price increases are felt all over Darfur, but are more pronounced in northern areas of the region such as Disa, Kutum and Mellit (see Figure 15). Mellit used to get most of its supplies from Libya (Kufra) before the conflict. Kutum and Disa, in turn, got their supplies either from Mellit or directly from Libya, and to some extent from Omdurman.

Traders brought back approximately 30 per cent of the money they made from livestock sales in Omdurman in the form of commodities and, in addition, large commodity traders used to distribute consumer goods to village-level traders on credit. In Birmaza (Disa), which contains 15 villages and 5,700 individuals, there were around thirty commodity traders who relied on this credit system before the conflict. Now only three or four are still in business. They buy their supplies from Tina in Chad, which involves a one-month round trip. Since the closure of the Libyan route, Mellit and Kutum also obtain supplies from Omdurman.

Adding to the difficulties is the unofficial government embargo, which restricts the supply of commodities to areas held by the SLM/A, or sympathetic to its cause. People from the SLM/A-held area of Gure, for example, are allowed to purchase only 5 kora (8kg) of grain at a time in Kutum. They have to pay SD 200 to soldiers to obtain a paper permit that lasts for only a day, despite the fact that the round trip between Gure and Kutum takes five days. Animals being taken for sale from Gure to Kutum have to be driven on a circuitous route, to give the impression that they have originated from government-held areas, south of Kutum. Middlemen in the IDP camps are entrusted to sell the animals in the market, while the animals' owners stay hidden in the camp.

The effect of all this is that prices of basic commodities brought from Tina or Omdurman – such as sugar, tea, wheat flour, rice and pasta – have doubled in Birmiza, Gure and Mellit. Oil prices have gone up by over 400 per cent in the SLM/A-held areas of Birmiza and Gure, while the price of millet has increased by over 700 per cent (Figure 15). Increases in prices have also been observed in Nyala and El Geneina, since trucks have to be re-routed through El Fasher to reach these two destinations, after the road and railway services to Nyala through El Obeid were disrupted.

Increases in livestock prices

Growing levels of banditry and insecurity have reduced the quantities of supplies from primary to secondary markets, pushing up the price of meat and livestock in the latter. It is also said that livestock prices are on the decline in some of the primary markets that are cut off from secondary markets, such as Kebkabiya. SCUk's livestock market price data indicate a significant increase in the price of livestock in 2004, compared with 2003 (see Figure 16)¹¹. The increase is most pronounced in El Fasher, followed by Nyala. However, price increases were observed for all species in all markets, except for camels in Mellit.

The graph shown in Figure 17 masks the temporary sharp drop in livestock prices that occurred at the peak of the crisis in January and February 2004, when people fled their homes to escape pro-

¹¹ Comparisons for the two years were made for the months up to September, as price data had not been collected for the months after September 2004 at the time of the study team's visit.




Figure 15. Price fluctuations before and after the conflict (North Darfur)

Standard quantities of commodities are as follows: sugar = 1/2 kg in all places except in Mellit where it was measured in 50 kgs; oil = 750 ml except in Mellit where it was measured in 20 kgs; tea = 28 grams; soap = 4 or 5 bars; wheat flour = 50 kgs; macaroni = 20 kgs

Source: Focus Groups 24, 29




Figure 16. Livestock price trends in selected markets (in Sudanese Dinars, SD)

Source: compiled from SCUk livestock market data. NB: No camel transactions in Dar Al Salam

government forces. Secondary markets such as El Fasher were flooded with livestock that escaped the looting. Prices hit rock-bottom for a short while during this period before picking up again: this was because the supply volume dwindled as the livestock resources of the fleeing population were exhausted. People who fled attacks on villages were forced to part with their livestock for salvage value before they entered the IDP camps.




Figure 17. Immediate impact of the conflict on livestock prices at El Fasher

Source: Key Informants at El Fasher

Tobacco production and trade

Tobacco (chewing tobacco) is a major cash crop, produced in Taweila and Korma and in the western parts of Dar Al Salam and El Fasher. Though labour-intensive, *tobacco* production previously provided better incomes for the population whose livelihoods depended on it. The annual volume of trade in the Tabit market was 130–145 tonnes of *tobacco*. The Tabit market, held on Fridays, used to attract twenty exporters and some 50–60 small traders and middlemen. Middlemen earned between SD 3,000 and SD 5,000 on each market day and labourers SD 2,000–3,000.

The World Food Programme (WFP) and SCUUK studies show that households in *tobacco* production zones attained more than 50 per cent of their food requirements and 75–80 per cent of their other requirements from the crop. However, following attacks by pro-government forces in May 2004, the areas under *tobacco* cultivation have declined by 20 per cent. As a result, none of the exporters come any longer to the market in Tabit, and fewer than 10 per cent of the middlemen are operating there. Most of the tobacco farmers now live as IDPs in El Fasher.

Inefficiency of grain and commodities markets

The inefficiency of the urban, and particularly the rural, markets of Darfur is directly associated with their distance from the major production areas and with poor roads, among other things. A market study indicates that: 'Darfur grain markets are not integrated with central Sudan grain markets because of the high transportation costs, which represent 60 per cent of the market price in Darfur.'⁴⁰ The same study estimates current grain and transportation prices at SD 35,000 per tonne from El Obeid to Nyala and El Fasher and SD 45,000 per tonne for El Geneina. The cost of transport for locally produced grain is estimated at SD 100 from the farm to the nearest market, for each 10kg of grain.

This already inefficient market system has been worsened by the closure, or partial closure, of some of Darfur's most important markets. Of the total 154 village-level, primary and secondary markets



that used to operate in the region, 61 are operating partially and 49 are totally closed,⁴⁰ eroding the coping capacity of rural households.

Conclusion

Livestock has been a critical resource and form of investment for virtually all livelihood groups in Darfur. Livestock has also been central to the many local tribal conflicts, in terms of migration routes, grazing rights and looting. Consequently, there has also been a long history of inter-tribal conferences and meetings aimed at settling disputes and reaching agreements relating to livestock.

However, the conflict between pro-government forces and opposition groups has been on an altogether different scale from anything that has happened in the recent past. While large sections of society have been 'asset-stripped', other groups associated with the looting of livestock have enriched themselves. However, the latter have also become victims of their own making. They can neither access the wet-season grazing reserves, nor sell their animals (including those that have been looted) as they wish, as trade routes are no longer secure.

This conflict has had a direct impact on productivity, in terms of farming and livestock production, both of which have spiralled downwards. Livestock trading, in which Darfur previously excelled, has collapsed. Migration and trade routes are no longer secure, due to violations of the humanitarian ceasefire and the increase in banditry. Mobility, the key element in pastoral production systems, is severely curtailed.

While the future economic development of Darfur depends on an efficiently functioning livestock sector, including livestock trade, this will not be possible in the absence of security and mobility for all groups. This is perhaps an obvious point, but less obvious is the fact that, to be successful, peace and reconciliation initiatives must incorporate livestock issues as a central pillar of response. To put it simply, there can be no real reconciliation or development unless grievances relating to livestock are fully addressed.

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5. Labour Migration and Remittances: a Mainstay of Livelihoods in Darfur

Introduction

Migration across national boundaries in search of work has long been a feature of peoples' livelihoods in Darfur, although there has always been considerable uncertainty about the number of migrants involved, the nature of their employment and their behaviour in sending back remittances to their home communities. Globally, estimates of remittances sent back by migrants to the developing world are generally rising, to levels that are on a par with the amounts received in development assistance and foreign direct investment.¹ Choucri (1986) estimated that remittances contributed more than US\$3 billion annually to the Sudanese economy. However, such estimates are difficult to obtain, given that formally recorded remittances generated by migration across national borders represent only the tip of the iceberg of the hidden economy.² Clearly, the 'formal economy' of a country such as Sudan does not adequately reflect its 'true' economy.

Studies have frequently remarked on the large scale of labour migration from Darfur, and the significance of the remittances sent back to the region.³ Surveys carried out in north-eastern Darfur in 1988 revealed that 20 per cent of households had a member working in Libya and sending back remittances. Wealth-ranking exercises showed that the receipt of remittances was a feature of better-off groups; the top wealth group often had a family member legally employed in Libya, while the migrant workers of medium-wealth groups were more likely to be working without proper papers. Poorer groups did not receive remittances.⁴ The Food Economy profiles developed by SCUK indicate the importance of labour migration as a livelihood strategy in all FEZs. One of the zones it identifies is even titled 'Agro-migrant zone'; in this zone, remittances were the second most important source of income for middle-income groups.⁵

There are essentially three broad categories of labour migration:

1. Internal migration within Darfur for seasonal agricultural work, work as herders or drovers, or to find work in the main towns.
2. Internal migration to Central and Eastern Sudan, including Omdurman and Khartoum in the central region and Gedaref in the east.
3. External migration to other countries, including Libya, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states. Relatively few Darfurians reach Europe.

This chapter focuses on external migration to Libya, followed by internal migration to Khartoum in Central Sudan and Gedaref in Eastern Sudan. The individual case studies in Annexes 2–6 provide specific details of labour migration from each of the areas visited, and also examine the impact of the crisis on communications and the receipt of remittances.

Labour migration to Libya

Labour migration and commerce across the desert via the trans-Saharan routes and oases to Libya have been a historic feature of livelihoods in Darfur. The discovery of oil in Libya and the subsequent boom of the 1970s and 1980s intensified existing patterns of migration and cemented their place in the regional economy. The journey from Darfur to Libya on foot and by camel traditionally took



around 30–35 days. The caravans, each led by a desert expert, travelled by night and rested during the day. The introduction of trucks and four-wheel-drive vehicles accelerated the processes of migration and trade.

Little is known about the impact of the economic sanctions imposed on Libya by the UN and US on economic opportunities for Sudanese workers. For certain, high inflation in Libya and a contracting economy during the 1990s significantly affected their prospects. Declining exchange rates in the mid- to late 1990s also affected the interests of the Sudanese.

More recently, Libya has attracted world attention with the lifting of commercial sanctions. On 23 April 2004, the United States lifted the majority of the sanctions that had been imposed under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, thus opening up opportunities for political and economic dialogue. Far more importantly than sanctions, however, Libya's economy is bound up with the price of crude petroleum and the export quotas agreed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). With the lifting of sanctions, a significant increase in foreign investment is to be expected and this, combined with the increase in export quotas of crude petroleum (as compared with the 1990s) bodes well for Libya. However, these positive effects will take some time to increase demand for migrant labour, which will be a critical input for economic performance.

Box 9. Oil and the economy of Libya

The Libyan economy still depends on oil exports for 95 per cent of its hard currency. Libya is said to have about 36 billion barrels of known oil reserves (3 per cent of the world total), but only 25 per cent of its reserves have been explored. The country also has plentiful reserves of natural gas. Many multinational oil companies have shifted their focus from Iraq to Libya since the lifting of sanctions, driven also by growing security fears and uncertainty over the investment climate in Iraq.

According to oil industry analysts (quoted in the *New York Times*), Libya produces about 1.5 million barrels of oil a day, but is thought to have the capacity to double that to 3 million barrels a day in a decade with foreign, particularly American, investment and the introduction of new technologies.⁶ Another reason for the interest in Libya is that the crude oil produced there is low in sulphur, and thus is relatively easy and cheap to refine for consumption in the US and Europe. In addition, Libya's location on the Mediterranean provides relatively easy access to southern Europe and to the US.

Although the focus of American companies re-entering Libya is overwhelmingly on oil and gas, there are also expected to be developments in tourism, business-class hotels and sales of technical equipment that were previously unavailable to Libyans.⁶

Libya's foreign workforce

As a result of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's ideals of African Unity and Pan-Arabism, Libya pursued a relatively open-door policy with regards to most other African nations in the 1970s and 1980s. By the mid-1990s, however, the open-door policy was changing, as the numbers of migrants increased, inflation reached a record high and the economy contracted (in part due to sanctions). A once welcoming environment started to become increasingly hostile.

In 1995, Libya announced that it was ending its dependence on foreign workers in order to open up jobs for Libyans (among whom rates of unemployment were running at 30 per cent) and to reduce illegal immigration. As a result, over 335,000 foreigners were sent home in 1995: 200,000 were deported



and the remainder left voluntarily.⁷ The crackdown by the authorities included intensive raids (known as *kasha*) and forced repatriation. Sudanese migrants were forcibly transported in trucks to Kufra and then across the Sahara to El Fasher and Mellit in North Darfur. Sudanese interviewed in Kufra reported that people were given a seven-day warning to allow them the chance to leave, but after that they were rounded up and put in detention centres.

The *kasha* were also prompted by the increasing security concerns of the Libyan government over the infiltration into the country of fundamentalist Islamic groups, who were thought to have been trained as *mujahedeen* [holy warriors or participants in *jihad* (holy war)] in Afghanistan. It was claimed that the infiltration of these groups into Libya was facilitated by the Sudanese government.^a

In 1996, an estimated 4,000 Sudanese migrants broke out of a detention centre in Hawza Elenab and marched to the Sudanese embassy. Interviewees claimed that around 300 to 400 of them were shot and killed. Mounting international pressure and criticism of the Libyan authorities over this incident prompted the Libyan government to relax its clampdown, especially on the Sudanese. New waves of migrants quickly followed, smuggled by truck from Tina, Mellit and Kornoï in North Darfur to Kufra, or from Chad to Sebha in Libya.

By 2000 the number of immigrants in Libya was estimated to be more than 2.5 million – one immigrant for every two Libyans. In Libya's closed society, where it is unusual to openly discuss issues such as democracy and economic policy, the open-door policy and the increased number of migrants provided a vent for complaints from Libyans, which quickly spilled over into expressions of general dissatisfaction. Immigrants were blamed for threatening the social fabric of Libya and for a wide variety of social problems, such as crime, prostitution, drugs, etc.

The withdrawal of both the official and unofficial welcome for immigrants in Libya led to an increase in the number of migrants expanding their horizons to Europe, just across the Mediterranean. 'We are trapped. Life here is not going to get better, and no-one wants to go back across the Sahara to his home. I think Africans may try to take any risk to get to Italy,' said one Somali immigrant. However, the trip to Europe is expensive, costing between US\$1,000 and US\$1,800. The financing for such a trip is usually provided by relatives already in Europe or in the US. Money from these sources has to be transferred between Europe and Libya via the *hawala* system, for both Sudanese and non-Sudanese migrants (see Box 10).

Press reports describe an order by the Libyan authorities to crack down on the employment of foreign workers, with the aim of 'the Libyanisation of employment'. By August/September 2000 simmering resentment and tensions boiled over into violence in Zawiya, Zahrah and other locations in Libya. Press reports of the number of people killed ranged from 50 to 500, among them many Sudanese. It was reported that 130 people died in the town of Zawiya, west of Tripoli, in fighting in September, though Libyan officials later claimed that only four had died. In Benghazi, the violence against migrants was said by interviewees to be more limited, as a result of government intervention. According to Agence France-Presse (AFP), an estimated 6,000 Sudanese were either deported or fled following these attacks.

Recent migration trends

Since the rebellion erupted in Darfur in 2003, the flow of Sudanese immigrants into Libya has almost ceased. There are three reasons for this: first, insecurity makes travel more hazardous, especially on the routes through the desert in North Darfur; second, the national border between Sudan and Libya has been closed; and third, many groups of prospective young labour migrants are absorbed instead into the different tribal militia and warring factions in Darfur.

**Box 10. Onward travel to Italy from northern Libya**

Concerns about the smuggling of illegal immigrants to Europe from Libya have long been raised, especially by Italy. In the light of Libya's recent moves to improve its relations with Europe, this might mean that it has to adopt a stricter policy on migration to limit trafficking gangs and people smuggling.

The summer months of June to September are the main season for smuggling activity. The smugglers are reportedly Libyan, but there are also many Sudanese involved. Corruption among officials allows them to continue.

According to one source (deemed reliable), of the 20–30 boats leaving northern Libya for Italy, only two or three actually reach their destination. The others are either caught by the Libyan authorities, carried off-course by currents to Tunisia or Malta, or capsize. There are many stories of drowning among the Sudanese. The source estimated the number of people who have died on their way to Europe after leaving from the Benghazi area to be 100 since 2002. It is to be noted that Benghazi is not a major area for immigration to Europe: Tripoli is the main point of departure for trafficking.

One Darfuri youth association tries to warn young Darfurians of the risks of travelling to Italy and the detention and deportation that awaits them even if they are able to get there. If they are still determined to leave, the association gives them a leaflet that explains that the holder speaks Arabic and requests the Italian authorities to help them because they are from Darfur.

The *New York Times* reported in July 2004 that more than 400 illegal immigrants trying to reach Italy by sea from Libya had arrived on the Sicilian island of Lampedusa over a period of three days⁸. In late July 2004, the Italian Interior Minister, Giuseppe Pisanu, warned parliament that two million people were waiting to depart Libya for Italy.⁸ In early August 2004, more than a dozen Africans, and possibly as many as 28 or 29, reportedly died trying to reach Italy in a boat from Libya.⁹

Border closure between Sudan and Libya

Two recent developments have dramatically affected the situation of Sudanese migrant workers. The first was the closure of the national border between Sudan and Libya in May 2003, which effectively stopped the traffic of migrant workers between Darfur and southern Libya. This was accompanied by the closure of the well-established trade routes between Sudan and Libya, via Darfur. Communications have also been seriously affected.

The closure of these routes has meant that Darfurians have not been able to escape from the conflict to Libya as a place of refuge, although many arrived in Kufra just before the closure and some have since arrived via the route from Chad, which is still open. A few families have arrived by air from El Fasher.

The border closure has had a significant impact on both the livelihoods and well-being of the Sudanese community in Libya, and also on economic activity in Kufra. This is remarked upon at the highest level, with the governor of Kufra stressing that it has affected work opportunities and the volume of trade of both livestock and general goods, not just between Kufra and Darfur, but extending to the whole of Sudan and to other Arab countries (particularly Egypt, but also to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia).

Official requirement for health certificates

The second major development came in February 2004, when the Libyan General People's Congress approved laws to restrict immigration and to expatriate Africans and other migrants who lived in Libya but who had no steady jobs. Proper identity papers are now required of every migrant worker. In addition, foreign workers – including Sudanese – are required to obtain a health certificate, showing that



they have successfully passed a series of clinical health tests,¹ including one for HIV.¹⁰ The certificate must be renewed every six months for restaurant workers and every year for other workers.

However, the health tests are available only to legal immigrants, i.e. those with identity papers, and those who can pay the fee of LD 70 (US\$50). Failing the test risks the forfeiture of identity papers, imprisonment and deportation. Interviewees estimated that the proportion of Sudanese with legal papers and health certificates was approximately three in every ten. As one woman, the wife of a trader, said, *'Even if you have money, you are under pressure to go [back to Sudan]'*.

Push and pull factors for migration

Darfurian labour migration to Libya is a reflection of both 'push' and 'pull' factors. The push factors include conscription and compulsory recruitment into the Popular Defence Force (PDF) in Sudan; limited work opportunities in Darfur; and failing livelihoods as a result of recurrent drought and insecurity. The pull factors used to be the Libyan government's 'open-door' policies; the opportunities for better-paid work; the relative ease with which Libya could be reached (in terms of low cost and limited procedures, as compared with other Arab countries); and the availability of contacts through friends, relatives and tribal clans in Libya (for example, it was common for new arrivals to receive a loan of approximately LD 50 from such contacts to get started).

Since 2003 and the rebel insurgency, the push factors have changed. As one young Darfurian in Benghazi, who arrived in July 2003, put it: *'In Darfur we had three options: join the rebels, go to the camps or get out.'*¹¹ Many older Darfurians tend to look on it differently, and consider it shameful for Darfurian men to be leaving Darfur at such a time.¹²

Numbers of Sudanese in Libya

The team found no official estimates of the numbers of Sudanese in Libya, let alone estimates of numbers of Darfurians. The International Labor Organization's International Labor Migration Database has no statistics for either Sudan or Libya. In 1995, reports estimated the total population of Sudanese in Libya to be 500,000, of whom 70,000 have subsequently left as a result of the deportations.⁷ At the time of the team's visit in 2004, Sudanese interviewees quoted the Sudanese Embassy's official estimate of 250,000 registered legal Darfurian workers in Libya.

The embassy is also reported to estimate that there are 70,000 Darfurians in Libya illegally, who have crossed through the desert. This would make a total of 320,000 – or 5 per cent of Darfur's total population of 6.26 million. Assuming that an average household in Darfur consists of six people, this would mean that 30 per cent of all households have a migrant worker in Libya. However, this average figure seems high and probably reflects previous years, when numbers were greater. A more realistic estimate is considered to be in the range of 150,000 to 250,000 people, which includes both legal and illegal immigrants.

Libyan prisons are said to contain high concentrations of Darfurians. One source, for example, believed that 400 Darfurians were being held in Queffi prison in Benghazi. Many of these detainees have been caught trying to travel to Benghazi illegally.

Kufra – a hub for Darfurian migrants

Kufra in south-eastern Libya is the main transit point for Sudanese coming to the country via Darfur. Many pass through here on their way to the agricultural areas of Sebha or to the coast, including

¹ The following tests are required for the health certificate: HIV, hepatitis B, hepatitis C, urine complete, blood grouping, malaria, blood sugar in urine, ketones and complete blood tests, X-ray and physical examination.

the major coastal cities of Benghazi and Tripoli. Representatives of the Sudanese Popular Congress (SPC)² described recent trends in labour migration for Kufra, which are shown in Figure 18.¹³ The graph reflects the major trends in Sudanese labour migration, including:

- the 1995 deportations, and the subsequent fall in numbers arriving;
- the 2000 deportations, and the further fall in numbers;
- the impact of the border closure in 2004 and, indirectly, the loss of trade and the implications for livelihoods.




Figure 18. Annual number of Sudanese arriving and departing from Kufra, south-eastern Libya²¹

Darfurians in Kufra

In Kufra the majority of Sudanese are Darfurians – up to 80 per cent, according to one source. In Benghazi a smaller proportion of Sudanese are from Darfur (less than 30 per cent), yet they still form a very large community. Most Sudanese in Kufra live in Jincia – an outlying village populated by migrants about 10km from the main town. The name ‘Jincia’ means ‘nationalities’, and the village is home to people from Chad, Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon, Morocco, Egypt and Syria, as well as Palestinians.

Jincia is remarkable for its well-developed and extensive marketplace, which closely resembles Souk Libya in Omdurman (Khartoum). This market mainly serves migrants who wish to buy goods to take or send back home. Sudanese and Chadians are the largest groups. Concentrations of Sudanese are also found elsewhere in Kufra – on the town’s large agricultural project, in the livestock market, on private farms or working in the main town as traders or for organisations. One group interviewed said that ‘Thousands [of men in Darfur] want to come to Libya, but only a few have the money to come’.

Migration routes

The routes to and from Sudan have changed over the years. Until 1993, the main transit route was from Mellit in North Darfur to Kufra by truck, via the Libyan border town of Aweinat. This took about seven days in total. Some trucks also went from Kutum, Tina and Kornoï in Darfur and from El Hamra in North Kordofan.

² A Sudanese group formally recognised by the Libyan authorities in Kufra.



In 1993 a new customs point opened in Dongola, requiring travellers to pass that way, though they still transited through North Darfur. At the same time, a new bus service started operating, which opened Libya up to many Sudanese living in central and eastern parts of the country. The 1993–94 period was associated with a ‘rush’ of Sudanese migrants.

Since the border closure, there have been four options for Darfurians travelling to and from Libya:

1. via Tina on the Darfur/Chad border and through Chad and up to Kufra
2. via Tina on the Darfur/Chad border, through Chad and up to Sebha in south-western Libya
3. through the desert (smuggled illegally)
4. bi-weekly flights from El Fasher to Kufra. These cost LD 250 (US\$88) one way and LD 350 (US\$263) return, and are only really an option for the rich and for those with legal identity papers. However, nowadays this option is not commonly used even by rich Darfurians, and many of the flights are cancelled because there are not enough travellers. People are concerned that they might be interrogated by security forces when they arrive and also that they may not be able to leave El Fasher.

There are two small towns called Tina, one either side of the Sudan/Chad national border. There is a refugee camp about 15km from the Chadian Tina, and the town is an important hub for migrants, with large numbers of men reportedly trying to get from here to Libya. However, few can afford the fare so there are few trucks making the journey, and buses on this route are also apparently rare.

The truck journey from Tina to Kufra takes about 15 days. Water supplies are carefully rationed out to three cups of water per person per day. Although sparse, this is considered ‘*better than dying in Darfur*’. The journey costs between SP 250,000 and SP 750,000 (about US\$100–US\$300). The return journey from Kufra to Tina is also very expensive, as each passenger must pay fees at three main customs points and also at many smaller points. Each passenger must pay LD 170 (US\$128) for the journey, and about SP 400,000 (US\$156) in fees, which is considerably more than was previously paid on the route through the North Darfur desert, where a single passage and taxes together cost about LD 80–90 (US\$60–US\$70). Some truck drivers were clearly concerned about the security of this road and the situation in Tina, which reportedly has been bombed by Antonovs.

The third option of travelling illegally – being smuggled through the desert – is extremely arduous and risky, both because of the insecurity on the Darfurian side of the border and because vehicles cannot stop for provisions at the border checkpoints. According to the SPC (and later verified with customs officials), the week before the team’s visit a Sudanese land cruiser was picked up by police patrols inside Libya’s borders with 35 passengers, of whom 28 had died.¹³

Between 1997 and 2004, the SPC recorded the deaths of 486 travellers on routes from the Sudanese border into Libya. This figure represents only those who died after crossing the Libyan border, and who were buried inside Libya. The most hazardous part of the journey is the stretch through the desert in North Darfur. Several sources confirmed that it was not uncommon for land cruisers to carry up to 40 passengers, which beggars belief but illustrates the pressure on transport.

The onward journey in Libya depends on whether or not migrants have the appropriate identity papers (passport or travel documents), including a health certificate. If they have papers, they may take a normal Libyan bus to the coast, which costs LD 13. Without a passport or health certificate, they must pay to be smuggled from Kufra to Benghazi on routes that bypass the security points. This costs more than LD 100 (US\$75, or 2–3 months’ work).¹⁴

The social and economic situation of Sudanese migrant workers in Kufra

As a transit point for migrant workers, Kufra has a fluid population of migrants. According to the town's governor, on average 10,000–12,000 people pass through Kufra every month.¹⁵ At peak levels of immigration, up to 90,000 could be expected, although currently immigration is at its lowest point for some time.¹⁶

Table 12 provides a snapshot of Sudanese migrant workers living in Kufra, based on a survey undertaken by the University of Kufra. All of those in the sample were men. A small number of Sudanese women are found in Kufra, most of them the wives of established workers or tradesmen. It is rare for women to come to Libya unless it is to join their husbands, although households are found where the man is no longer able to work and therefore the woman is the main provider.¹⁷ In Benghazi, for example, there are a few women working as teachers and nursing assistants.

Table 12. Profile of Sudanese labour migrants in Kufra, south-eastern Libya (July 2004)¹⁹

Age	15–30 years	42.5%
	31–50 years	48.5%
	>50 years of age	9%
Marital status	Married	75.5%
	Unmarried	24.5%
Level of education	Primary and secondary	71.3%
	Illiterate	26.4%
	University graduate	2.3%
Date of arrival in Kufra	After 2000	70.0%
	1990–2000	23.2%
	Before 1990	6.8%

Total sample of 385 Sudanese men, of whom 300 (78 per cent) came from Darfur.

It might be expected that labour migrants would be predominantly young, unmarried men seeking their fortunes, but in fact most are married and a high proportion of them are aged 30 years and above. This profile suggests a relatively mature and skilled labour force, with relatively high rates of education and literacy. Data from 2001 indicated that adult literacy rates in Darfur and Kordofan were around 38 per cent of the population over the age of 15 years;¹⁸ at 71 per cent, the rate among migrants to Libya is nearly twice as high. (How this profile has been influenced by the recruitment of young men to fight on either side in the conflict is unclear.)

Social organisation

There is a Sudanese consulate in Benghazi, with a new sub-office opened in Kufra in July/August 2004. A number of Sudanese associations are recognised by the Libyan authorities and are therefore permitted to operate openly, in collaboration with groups such as the Libyan Red Crescent. The SPC in Kufra is one such group; the SPC stresses the strong social and economic linkages between Kufra and Darfur and North Kordofan, in times both of stability and of crisis. Some Libyans also have strong contacts with Sudan – for example, members of the Libyan Red Crescent worked with their Sudanese counterparts in Darfur during the 1985 famine.



The SPC was established in 1981, essentially for purposes of political and military coordination by followers of Sadiq al-Mahdi, who left Sudan and regrouped in south-eastern Libya during the regime of Colonel Numayri. Among its roles were assisting newly arrived migrants from Sudan, including raising contributions from other Sudanese, and organising the burials of those who perished on the journey.

In addition, there are a number of informal groups (i.e. without official recognition from the Libyan authorities or the Sudanese consulate) who organise support for Sudanese communities in Libya, including supporting new arrivals by giving advice and information, helping with accommodation, finding work, and sometimes providing credit and skills-based training.

There are well-developed and strong tribal and family networks, through which established migrants assist new arrivals, particularly during their first two months in the country. Many Sudanese small businessmen, including tailors, shoe-cleaners and cobblers, described how their contacts had supported them initially in helping them to set up their businesses, providing them with both capital and skills training (i.e. working with other Sudanese).

However, these networks are coming under increasing strain with the decline in economic opportunities in Libya, combined with the polarising effects of the conflict in Darfur. There is increasing anxiety among migrants as news comes through of atrocities or personal losses, or contact is lost altogether. Although the Darfur conflict is widely understood not to be tribal in nature, it is sufficient to sharpen the division between tribes and to cause ethnic groups to band together more closely. There have been tensions, and a limited amount of conflict, between Zaghawa and Arab Darfurians in Benghazi.

The leaders of the SPC in Kufra, on the other hand, are from North Kordofan and are not from ethnic groups specifically associated either with rebel factions or with government supporters. Most of them have been living in Libya for more than 20 years, and a strong sense of Sudanese identity (rather than tribal identity) was evident in all discussions with them.

Before the closure of the Sudan–Libya border, the rebels were actively recruiting in Libya: Darfurian men in Tripoli were given LD 200 for the journey back to Darfur, and another LD 200 to buy a weapon once they arrived.¹² The same source claimed that the GoS was also actively recruiting Arabs from other countries to join the *Janjaweed*, although this could not be verified.

Employment

The survey of Sudanese migrants undertaken by Kufra University found that 71 per cent of respondents had completed primary and secondary education, while 2.3 per cent were university graduates, and 26 per cent were illiterate.¹⁹ Sudanese who had lived and worked in Libya through the 1990s commented on the difficulties experienced after 1995, due to the government restrictions and deportations. Combined with the economic decline in Libya, these restrictions have affected work opportunities for Sudanese migrant workers.

In 1995 the total numbers of foreigners working in Libya included 8,000 hotel employees, 26,000 truck drivers, 70,000 masons, 300,000 factory workers and 500,000 agricultural workers.²⁰ This shows the predominance of agricultural workers among the foreign workforce, but does not reflect the more skilled workers, including artisans (e.g. tailors, skilled construction workers), professionals (e.g. technicians, doctors, engineers) and small businessmen (e.g. restaurant owners).

Kufra generally serves as a transit point for labour migrants, rather than as a main destination for work. The work that is available here ranges from unskilled labour on farms, construction sites,

loading trucks, etc. to the often highly skilled, including government workers, technicians, artisans (e.g. self-employed tailors), restaurant owners, trans-border truck drivers, caravan guides, traders and middlemen.²¹ Truck drivers and mechanics must be experienced in order to make the extremely arduous journey between Sudan and Libya, and possibly onwards to Alexandria, and they command high fees (see Table 13). The opening of an aid corridor taking food aid to refugee camps in Chad will depend on Sudanese drivers and mechanics.

Table 13. Foreign workers employed by the Kufra Agricultural Project and Flour Mill

	Sudanese	Other foreign workers	All
Skilled	22 (41%)	34	56
Unskilled seasonal workers	32		
Total	54 (39%)	86	140

A variety of merchants specialise in particular trades, including livestock (camels and sheep), goods (household items and food), vehicle spare parts and agricultural seeds. The livestock trade is a major employer and source of livelihood for Darfurians, both in Darfur itself and in Kufra. Those involved include:

- livestock owners in Darfur
- livestock traders
- the *sababit*, or middlemen between traders and livestock owners
- herders and drovers (usually young men aged 20–30)
- the *habir*, guides and lead herders, who are usually older and very experienced.

There are two types of camel herder: those who work within Sudan and who travel as far as Mellit, and those who take over the herding from Mellit to Kufra. The former are paid on a daily rate, while the latter are paid a sum of LD 250 (US\$188) for the journey, plus their food, which amounts to around LD 60 (US\$45). The journey takes approximately 30–35 days to complete. A herd of 500–600 camels requires around 16 herders, at a ratio of 3–4 herders per 100 camels, with just one *habir* for the group. Herding camels to Libya provides young men with a good opportunity to migrate, and some might stay on and work in Libya.

Figure 19 shows the distribution of Sudanese migrants in different occupations before the border closure and in July 2004. The closure of the border has had a strongly negative impact on drivers and mechanics, livestock traders, other traders and restaurant workers – all those whose work depends on border trade and the traffic of migrants. Conversely, it has led to an increase in those describing themselves as daily labourers, who have no fixed work and will take whatever jobs they can. Sudanese in Libya do not admit to being unemployed, as this might risk them being detained, and daily labouring work is relatively easy to come by.

*Workers at the Kufra Agricultural Project and Flour Mill*²²

Kufra Agricultural Project is a large mechanised and irrigated farm that was established with US assistance before the sanctions era. Much of the machinery is American, and the project has since suffered as it has been unable to obtain American spare parts. Crop production is organised around 35 circular fields, each 1km in diameter and 50 hectares in area. In addition, the project rears livestock (Libyan sheep), and in the past has fattened camels.



Figure 19. Livelihoods of Sudanese before the border closure and currently (excludes those in transit)¹³

The project's foreign workforce is dominated by Sudanese: 54 out of 140 foreign workers, or 41 per cent. Seasonal workers are employed for 3–4 months, depending on the needs of the project. Of the skilled workers who are employed year-round, 39 per cent are Sudanese. These employees tend to be long-term, and two of the men had worked there for 24 and 26 years respectively. One skilled worker the team interviewed had previously worked at the Gezira agricultural scheme in Central Sudan.

The manager of the project explained that five years previously it had employed up to 150 Sudanese workers, but the numbers had declined partly because of the government's drive to 'Libyanise' skilled jobs and partly because production had fallen by an estimated 50 per cent, due to the lack of spare parts for US-made machinery. However, the manager was hopeful that the lifting of sanctions would mean renewed access to spare parts and to foreign investment.

Rates of pay

Salaries are generally higher on the coast than in Kufra, as shown in Table 13. The range of pay for unskilled daily labourers in Kufra is LD 2–3 per day, while in Benghazi the rate is LD 3–5 per day. There is a sharp contrast between unskilled jobs and the more highly skilled jobs. Caravan leaders command the highest wage rates, followed closely by experienced lorry drivers (Table 14) – which illustrates the importance of the camel caravans and trade traffic between Libya and Sudan. Even professional technicians employed by the agricultural project are not paid as much as they are. Technicians are often employed on a 'foreign contract', which means that a proportion of their earnings is transferred through the banking system.

Costs of living for Sudanese migrant workers in Kufra

Basic foodstuffs, including wheat flour, oil and sugar, are subsidised by the Libyan government. Wheat flour, for example, costs the Kufra Agricultural Project LD 385 (US\$289) per tonne to produce, and is sold to Libyan consumers for LD 50 (US\$38) per tonne. These food subsidies were designed to lessen the impact of high inflation on Libyan consumers, and to guarantee their basic food needs. However, they are only enjoyed by Libyan citizens; migrants have to pay the full market price. Some Libyans sell part of their own quotas to migrants.

Table 14. Examples of wage rates for foreign workers in Kufra and Benghazi

	Kufra	Benghazi
Experienced lorry driver	LD 600 per journey to Darfur (US\$450)	
Experienced cook	LD 600 per month (US\$450)	
Less experienced cook	LD 300 per month (US\$226)	
Grocery shop worker	LD 150–200 per month (US\$113–US\$150)	LD 150 (US\$113)
Unskilled agricultural worker	Up to LD 120 per month (US\$90)	LD 120–150 per month (US\$90–US\$113)
Skilled worker e.g. tailor	LD 250–500 per month (US\$188–US\$376)	LD 500–600 per month (US\$376–US\$450)
Caravan leader/guide	LD 1,500 (US\$1,128) per journey, plus food	
Caravan herder, Mellit to Kufra	LD 250 (US\$188) per journey	
Daily labourer	LD 2–3 per day (US\$2)	LD 3–5 per day (US\$4)
Government and private sector	LD 200–250 per month (US\$150–US\$188)	
Kufra Agricultural Project		
Technician	LD 700 per month (US\$526)	
Seasonal labourer	LD 150–190 per month (US\$113–US\$143)	
Unskilled contract worker – local contract	LD 190–300 per month (US\$143–US\$226)	
Unskilled contract worker – foreign contract	LD 450–500 per month (US\$338–US\$376)	
Daily labourer (no contract)	Varies according to work done	

The biggest costs for migrant families are house rentals and health expenditure. Rentals for houses vary according to size but are in the range of LD 85 (US\$64) per month. Stays in hospital cost LD 30 (US\$23) per day, plus an additional fee of LD 6, although medicines are free. Maternity charges are LD 50 (US\$38) for deliveries, plus LD 30 (US\$23) for each day spent in hospital. A Caesarian section costs LD 500 (US\$376).¹⁷

Small business concerns, such as tailors, tea shops and restaurants, incur a wide range of associated costs. Shop rental in Kufra, for example, costs about LD 120 (US\$90) per month, although a shop could house up to four tailors, who would each have an average monthly income of LD 250–500 (US\$188–US\$376).

Sudanese women in Libya

Some Sudanese women are to be found working in Libya and some women accompany their husbands. In Benghazi, a group of women who had been living in Libya for between four and 15 years described their work and their lives³. Previously some women were able to get jobs as assistant teachers and nurses but since 2000 such jobs have become scarce. They described how their salaries have decreased

³ For example, one woman first came to Libya in 1989 to join her husband, who was working in the construction industry as a plasterer. She started work in 1996 after her husband fell sick and became too ill to work. First she worked as an assistant nurse on night shifts in the Benghazi hospital, for LD 230 per month. In 2004, she left and established her own tea stall in Ougadougou market in Benghazi.



by half since 1996, in terms of the foreign exchange equivalent.¹⁷ Exchange rates against the dollar have declined markedly: in 1996, LD 100 was equivalent to US\$350, while in 2004 it bought only US\$133.

During a Focus Group interview in Kufra, five Darfurian women married to traders described how things had deteriorated since 1995 and how they were now considered to be at an all-time low. Their hopes were that: *'Life will settle and peace will come, and all people can go back [to Darfur] and development will be good'*.²³

Loans are available from friends and family when migrant workers first arrive – usually up to about LD 50 (US\$38). Loans can also be organised through travel agents who are prepared to help with travel to other parts of Darfur.² The Sudanese women in Benghazi explained that they faced particular difficulties in paying school fees for their children. To help with this, they have set up a savings scheme known as the '*Sondook* system', whereby a group of women each contributes a small sum, and the total collected is given to one of the members.¹⁷

Remittances from Libya

The majority of Darfurian labour migrants have left Darfur for economic reasons – to support both their immediate and more extended families. More than 70 per cent of those surveyed were married, and their families would have remained in Darfur, thus requiring substantial financial support. Remittances are more than just a form of 'insurance' against temporary shocks such as drought: rather, they are a core livelihood strategy for rural communities throughout Darfur. This is indicated by the nature of remittances: a large proportion of them are sent in kind, in the form of basic household commodities, including food. There are other reasons, too, for sending back remittances. These include paying for big occasions such as weddings, funerals and feasts, and supporting the education of children.

Mechanisms for transfer

Sudanese migrant workers in Libya remit money and/or goods back to their families using the following mechanisms:

- hand-carried, either personally or sent with a close friend or relative travelling by truck, land cruiser or plane (planes are only used by the better-off and are suited only to small items and messages)
- through the *hawala* system, which is used mainly by Darfurians in the coastal towns.

However, since the closure of the national border between Sudan and Libya, remittances from Libya to Darfur have almost ceased.

Amounts

Focus Groups estimated how much cash migrant workers used to remit to Darfur before the crisis. The value and type of the remittance (cash or kind) depended on many factors: the income of the worker; their family ties and responsibilities at home in Darfur; the system of transferring the remittance; the planned duration of the worker's stay in Libya; and the proximity of the recipients to urban centres.

Incomes obviously determined how much was available to send back (see Table 15). Higher-paid workers were able to send more, and were also able to send a higher proportion of their salary. This is presumably because basic living expenses in Libya fall within a limited range, which thus leaves a higher proportion of disposable income.

The different Focus Groups' estimates of annual remittances were remarkably similar (between US\$271 and US\$319 for unskilled workers, and US\$812–US\$958 for skilled workers), and were supported by

**Table 15. Cash value of remittances sent by Sudanese migrant workers in Libya, by income group²⁴**

Monthly income	Annual income	Remittance	Per annum		Percentage of income
LD 250–350	LD 3,000–4,200 (US\$2,256–3,258)	LD 60 per month	LD 720	US\$958	30–42
LD 150–250	LD 1,800–3,000 (US\$1,353–2,256)	LD 60 every 3 months	LD 240	US\$319	14–24
Less than LD 150	Less than US\$1,353	Unable to remit regularly			

Table 16. Cash value of remittances sent by Sudanese skilled and unskilled migrant workers in Libya

Income group	Remittance	Annual income	Remittances per annum	Percentage of income
Skilled workers	LD 90 per month	LD 3,392 (US\$4,511)	US\$812	18
Unskilled workers	LD 30 per month	LD 1800 (US\$1,353)	US\$271	20

data from other interviewees (Table 16). The most commonly cited amounts to be sent at any one time ranged between LD 30 and LD 90 (US\$23–US\$68).

The amounts remitted also depended on the nature and strength of the family ties back in Darfur. Married men, whose wives and children were in Darfur, naturally sent back a higher proportion of their earnings than single men with fewer dependents. One Focus Group in Darfur estimated that married men sent back between SP 300,000 and SP 400,000 every six months (US\$230–US\$312 per annum), while single men sent about SP 100,000–200,000 every year (US\$39–US\$78 per annum).²⁵

Apart from money, it was very common for Darfurians to send back goods, including clothes, rice, sugar, infant formula and oil, all of which are more expensive in Darfur. The option of sending goods rather than cash was preferred by those Darfurians who lived with their immediate families in Libya. It was also more common in Kufra than in the coastal towns of Libya, which are several hundred miles further away from Darfur. For example, one young man described how every month he sent one sack of sugar and one of flour to his parents in Mellit.

The amount sent also depended partly on whether friends and family were travelling back home, and if they were able to carry goods or cash. Mellit was particularly well served in this respect, as many Sudanese truck drivers came from there, and would willingly carry cash and goods.

The remittance of goods has now stopped because of the border closure, but there are examples of men still trying to send cash – one man, for example, had recently sent US\$200 hand-carried by a friend. However, in the current context there are problems associated with sending cash rather than goods: first, the very high rate of inflation in Darfur and shortages of some commodities as a result of the crisis (before the conflict and the closure of the border, prices in Darfur were lower than in other

parts of Sudan, but they are now much higher); second, the state of insecurity and the risk of being robbed, or worse; and third, poor communications.

There is an entire trade industry in Jincia that supplies goods to individual migrant workers for sending back to Darfur. Many of the shops in the souk are run by Darfurians of a particular ethnic group or geographic origin. Traders in general goods reported that, since the border closure, demand has dropped significantly. People are not going back, as few can afford the more expensive alternative route through Chad (which costs about US\$300, as compared with US\$60–US\$70 for the more direct route). When individuals did travel with their own goods, they took a much wider range of household items.

Box 11. Example of remittances from Libya received in Darfur

Wadi Shoba (Kebkabiya)²⁶

Arab groups who worked as herders and agricultural labourers:

- cash remittance sent every three months, around LD 50–100
- sent every 3–6 months, around LD 200–300
- sent every 6–9 months, around LD 700.

Range: US\$38 to US\$900 per annum

Gowej, Disa

The average frequency was said to be every 1.5–3 months, and the average amount SP 50,000–100,000.

Range: US\$78 to US\$350 per annum

Jary, Disa²⁷

Remittances were sent at frequencies ranging from every month to every three months. Monthly amounts varied between SP 10,000 and SP 50,000, equivalent to US\$47–US\$234 per annum. Quarterly amounts varied between SP 800,000 and SP 1.2 million (US\$312–US\$470 per annum).

Range: US\$47 to US\$470 per annum

Serai²⁸

The amounts of money sent back varied between SP 100,000 and SP 150,000 per year.

Range: US\$39 to US\$58 per annum

El Geneina²⁵

The amounts sent back varied between SP 200,000 and SP 300,000, two or three times a year.

Range: US\$150 to US\$350 per annum

Zayadia Focus Group (men), Mellit²⁹

Four out of 10 families have a male family member working in Libya. Remittances sent back ranged between US\$100 and US\$150 every 3–6 months.

Range: US\$200 to US\$ 600 per annum

The *hawala* system

The *hawala* system is based on a network of *hawaldar*, or local financial intermediaries. It is available to those who want to send remittances to people living in the main towns in Darfur (or who have contacts there) including, for example, El Fasher, Mellit, Kutum, Geneina and Nyala. One Darfurian migrant said that the *hawala* system was only used in an emergency, as it had the advantage of speed. *Hawaldar* are now making use of satellite phones, which greatly improve communications.

When sending a *hawala* (which can be either a money or a goods transfer), the worker in Libya approaches a local *hawaldar*, who phones a *hawaldar* in the destination town in Sudan. He then contacts the recipient and asks them to come to the phone to speak with the sender. The sender confirms to the *hawaldar* in Sudan that the recipient is indeed the right person, and the *hawaldar* hands over the agreed sum. Only then is the *hawaldar* in Libya paid by the sender (Figure 20).



Figure 20. The Hawala mechanism

Sending a *hawala* incurs costs, which is why Darfurians try to hand-carry their remittances whenever possible. In Kufra, the *hawala* system is less commonly used by Darfurian migrants than by Sudanese from other parts of Sudan. The *hawaldar* make their money from the differential in exchange rates between the two currencies. For example, a cobbler described how he sends his wife in Gezira money every six months – currently, for every LD 60 (US\$45) he gives the *hawaldar*, his wife receives SP 100,000 (US\$39). The difference (US\$6) is the profit for the *hawaldar*.

Darfurian traders and *hawaldar* in Benghazi explained that the *hawala* system functions across the Gulf and as far afield as Europe, serving all nationalities. This means that people in other parts of the world have been able to support their relatives and friends in Libya, especially those using Libya as a transit point to other countries. Traders unable to use the banking system in Benghazi use the *hawala* system to transfer sums of about SP 2 million (US\$800) at a time to the Gulf and to Saudi Arabia to buy goods. These goods are then sent from Saudi Arabia directly to Sudan.

One *hawaldar* in Benghazi explained that he served around 300 people of all nationalities, sending monthly *hawala* worldwide. Around 48 of these (16 per cent) were thought to be from Darfur. The amounts sent varied from LD 60 to LD 240 per person (US\$45–US\$180), with an average of LD 150 (US\$113).

Communications

For people living in Kufra, communications with Darfur have become more difficult since the May 2003 closure of the border. Before that, they could send hand-carried messages, recorded cassettes and letters. According to one interviewee: ‘Before June 2003 contact was good, letters were hand-carried by relatives, but there has been no news since then’. Many others report no direct news since that time, but have learned indirectly (in part through television reports) that their villages have been attacked and the inhabitants moved to IDP camps. No-one, without exception, had had any contact with relatives or friends in the camps.

It is possible to make phone calls to family and friends living in the main towns in Sudan; the traders’ wives, for example, reported phoning relatives in Mellit. The better-off can also send messages and money by plane, hand-carried by people they know. However, for most Darfurians phone calls are generally considered prohibitively expensive. Phone calls between Benghazi and Darfur cost LD 1.5 (US\$1) per minute.

Labour migration to Libya: concluding remarks

The situation in Darfur has dramatically affected labour migration to Libya. First, the insecurity in North Darfur, principally as a result of rebel activity, has rendered the trade and migration routes



unsafe. Second, the closure of the border has stopped all trans-border trade and labour migration and has cut off the usual channels of communication (hand-carried messages and remittances). For many poorer Darfurians (especially those in the Kufra area), this effectively prevents them returning to Darfur.

The closure of the border has created very specific problems among the large numbers of stranded migrant workers. The Libyan Red Crescent has responded to localised health problems, with a distribution of medicines to the Sudanese community in May 2003. The long wait in Kufra, without any opportunity for employment, erodes the assets and savings that men wish to carry back with them, puts pressure on their food supplies and stretches support networks to the limit. There were reportedly six suicides among the Sudanese living in Jincia in the first half of 2004. Many Darfurians have reportedly put their belongings (which in large part are the goods they wish to take back to Sudan) into storage, and gone back to look for work in other parts of Libya. The cost of storage is LD 500 (US\$376) per month for a volume of goods that would fill one lorry.

The current limited prospects for migrant workers in Libya, combined with the threat of detention and the difficulties involved in returning to Sudan, mean that many migrant workers are desperate. Many younger men have set their sights on Europe – hence the increase in illegal smuggling of migrants in boats from Libya to Italy, and the fatalities associated with this trafficking.

In the longer term, the economic situation in Libya is expected to improve, as the lifting of sanctions and new investment begin to take effect. Libya relies heavily on the foreign migrant workforce, with the Sudanese being a particularly skilled and therefore welcome group, and they will be needed more than ever. The question is, however, how long it will take for these positive developments to trickle down and have an effect on the situation of foreign workers.

The border closure has also had a devastating effect on local and trans-national trade (between Sudan, Libya and other Arab countries) and on the livelihoods of those engaged in livestock and other trade, and in travel and other services for migrant workers. The trade of livestock and other commodities between Darfur and Libya has all but stopped, and this has severely affected the livelihoods of all those connected with this trade, including producers, middlemen, herders and guides. The dwindling supply of camels is causing prices in Kufra to rise, while prices of camels in Darfur have fallen. The prices of basic foodstuffs, usually imported from Libya, have also risen in Darfur.

Internal migration to Khartoum and Gedaref

Darfur has strong links with Central Sudan, in part because Darfurians have played a significant role in shaping national politics (for example, they were the driving force during the Mahadiya in the nineteenth century) and also because of the long history of trade and migration. In more recent years Khartoum, as the capital and main urban centre of Sudan, has attracted millions of people – those displaced by both natural and man-made disasters, as well as economic migrants seeking a means of survival for themselves and the resources to send back remittances to support their rural home communities.

Gedaref in Eastern Sudan is one of the country's richest states, as it produces most of Sudan's sorghum and sesame crops. Gedaref has long attracted labour migrants, particularly farmers from Darfur and Kordofan. When mechanised, rainfed agriculture was introduced in the 1960s, the Sudanese government called upon farmers to migrate towards places with high production potential.



A survey in 1986, which looked at the drought years of 1984–85, found that 2.3 per cent of Darfurians had left for Central and Eastern Sudan during the previous two years, implying a total of 76,000 migrants.³⁰ During the famine years, the labour markets in Gedaref and Gezira (Central Sudan) slumped severely. This meant there was less money to remit, it was difficult to send, fewer people could afford to travel, and money was more likely to be stolen by the carrier. The survey found that only 16 per cent of the households sampled received remittances at this time. However, it also concluded that ‘no more Darfurians than normal came to Dar Sabah [Eastern Sudan] during the famine.’ This implies that, largely because of the distances involved, migration to Eastern Sudan is not a short-term crisis strategy, but instead is viewed as a longer-term livelihood strategy.

The Darfurian groups currently living in Gedaref are following a longstanding tradition of labour migration to Eastern Sudan, and have been established longer than the groups interviewed by the team in Khartoum. More than 40 per cent of those interviewed in Gedaref had lived there for more than three years, while about 15 per cent had been there for more than seven years, having arrived before 1997 (see Figure 21). There are established communities of Darfurians, with certain areas of the town inhabited exclusively by them, and even named after villages or towns in Darfur – for example, Geneina and Ardamatta.




Figure 21. Arrival of Darfurian migrants in Khartoum and Gedaref

By contrast, the majority of Darfurians interviewed in Khartoum had gone there principally as a result of the conflict, and had arrived relatively recently. About half of them (48 per cent) had arrived in the previous year, and the rest in the past three years. Obviously, there are Darfurian residents of longer standing in Khartoum, but the study did not include these, as it concentrated on IDP camps in Omdurman and Khartoum. Only 12 per cent of the Darfurians interviewed had come in search of work. Another 10 per cent cited the lack of services in Darfur (education, health, etc.) as their reason for coming to Khartoum.

Reasons for migration

There is a long tradition of young men migrating from Darfur, particularly from Dar Masalit, to Eastern Sudan to work and send back remittances. Remittances provide financial support for their relatives



(parents, brothers and extended families) and their local communities, including the poor, in times of hardship, such as drought. Workers in Gedaref claimed that about 20 per cent of the remittances sent back to Darfur were for 'the poor and needy'. As almost all migrant workers were from rural communities, this must provide a vitally important source of income in times of drought and insecurity. Remittances are sent annually in the form of cash, at the end of the agricultural season. Workers either hand-carry the money themselves on their annual visit home, or send it through friends and relatives from the same village.

In Khartoum, most of the Darfurians interviewed had been displaced by the conflict and were finding it difficult to adapt to their new conditions, particularly the temporary IDP camps and the problems they were experiencing with the local authorities in Khartoum. The Khartoum state government has issued a directive that prohibits Darfurians from building and residing in new camps, so they must either live in old camps or with relatives in Khartoum, or go back to Darfur.

There is fierce competition to find jobs and wage rates are low, which limits the cash income of Darfurians in the city and means they are unable to send back remittances to their families. Many said they had lost contact with their families after the militia attacks that had dispersed their original communities. All agreed that migration had affected them negatively: they had lost their livelihoods, and could not identify any positive aspects of their displacement to Khartoum. In contrast, more than half of the migrants in Gedaref (54 per cent) believed that migration had provided them with better job opportunities.

Characteristics of Darfurian migrants

Gender and age distribution

In Khartoum, the gender distribution of Darfurian migrants was almost three females for every male. This is explained by extended family obligations where, as well as his own wife and children, the male head of a household is also responsible for numerous other household members. It is customary in Darfur for the support role of extended family networks to be enforced in times of hardship.

In Gedaref, the ratio of men to women was almost equal. This suggests a much more stable and established community, whose people have settled in Gedaref for economic reasons rather than because they have fled conflict. A pattern of labour migration has developed whereby young men from Darfur who have been successful in finding work have settled down and started their own families, often bringing a young wife from Darfur, and then encouraged their close relatives to join them. This has perpetuated the flow of young Darfurian workers to Eastern Sudan and has helped to provide essential support networks to help new migrants establish themselves.

The Darfurians in Khartoum included a higher proportion of older people (6 per cent) and children, compared with those in Gedaref. The largest group of households claimed to have between ten and thirteen household members, although a fifth had as many as seventeen (see Table 17). In Gedaref, however, the Darfurian community reflected the typical demographic profile of the Sudanese urban family (two parents and four children).

Differences in age and gender distribution can be explained by the nature of the migration. In the case of the Darfurians in Gedaref, migration was essentially voluntary and for economic reasons, and was not associated with the conflict. By contrast, those in Khartoum had migrated to escape the conflict and all family members were involved, including vulnerable children and older people.


Table 17. Household size of Darfurian migrants in Khartoum

Number of household members	Percentage of households
14–17	20
0–13	45
6–9	35

Ethnic composition

More than 70 per cent of the migrants interviewed in Khartoum and Gedaref came from just three tribes: the Fur (35 per cent), Masalit (25 per cent) and Zaghawa (12 per cent) (Figure 22). These are the larger tribes of north-western Darfur (Zaghawa and Fur) and western Darfur (Masalit). Tribes from South Darfur (such as the Rizeigat, Habbaniya, Beni Halba, Marariet etc.) were more sparsely represented.

Out-migration from North Darfur has been greater partly because the state has lower and more unreliable levels of rainfall than South Darfur, and this makes agriculture a higher-risk activity, with lower productivity. This has been exacerbated by recurrent periods of drought and famine. The Masalit from West Darfur are traditionally farmers, and their experience has stood them in good stead in Eastern Sudan (see the Geneina case-study in Annex 6). Most of the migrants in Eastern Sudan are of rural origin.


Figure 22. Distribution of Darfurian migrants in Central and Eastern Sudan, by ethnic group

Relations between different ethnic groups from Darfur have been negatively affected by the current conflict, especially in the case of those living in Khartoum. There appear to be better relations between different Darfurian ethnic groups in Gedaref: half of the Darfurians there felt that relations were either strong or very strong, whereas in Khartoum only one quarter felt this (see Figure 23).




Figure 23. Interaction between different Darfurian tribes in Gedaref and Khartoum

There was general agreement among all interviewees that, historically, tribal inter-relations had been good and that the many local disputes in the past over access to natural resources had not left any lasting damage. Interviewees were keen to highlight how the traditional tribal administration had been able to hold the social fabric in place.

In Khartoum, however, it appears that relations and the level of interaction between ethnic groups has since deteriorated: 25 per cent of Darfurian interviewees in Khartoum rated the current level of interaction as weak. Darfurians in Khartoum, especially IDPs, have been directly affected by the conflict, and this has widened the gap between the different ethnic groups, including those who live outside of the region.

Internal migration routes from Darfur

Migrants from North Darfur to Khartoum travelled by bus or lorry, but about 30 per cent claimed that they had walked, following the livestock trade route from Darfur to Omdurman. This was the usual route, pre-crisis, for seasonal labour from El Fasher to Khartoum; the journey takes 40 days.³¹

Very few people from West or South Darfur claimed to have travelled on foot. Migrants from West Darfur travelled mostly by truck, which was cheaper than bus travel. Few Darfurians can afford the bus fare, let alone the price of an air ticket to Khartoum. Lorries delivering goods from Omdurman to Geneina would take migrants on their return journey. The majority of those from South Darfur took the train from Nyala to Khartoum. Previously this was a weekly service, but it gradually deteriorated, first to fortnightly and then monthly, and has subsequently ceased altogether as a result of the insecurity and conflict in the state.

Accommodation

For reasons of safety and community support, the majority of Darfurians interviewed in Khartoum (74 per cent, mostly women and children), were living in groups in IDP camps. The other 26 per cent were



dispersed within local communities, as they had been forced by the Khartoum state government to evacuate the camps and live with relatives.

In Gedaref, more than 60 per cent of the Darfurians interviewed were living in long-established Darfurian neighbourhoods and considered themselves to be part of the local community. The other 40 per cent were more recent newcomers, who were still in the process of adjustment and were more likely to be living in obvious groups.

Employment

In Khartoum, opportunities for unskilled work were few compared with the vast numbers of unskilled migrant workers and displaced people seeking work. The Darfurians interviewed commented on the lack of work opportunities, the fierce competition for work and, as a result of this, the low wage rates. Most were engaged in marginal income-earning activities: selling water or vegetables and other small trade (see Table 18). Some Darfurians were employed by the army.

Work opportunities in Gedaref, on the other hand, were mostly agricultural and therefore more suited to the skills of Darfurians. No-one here was engaged in the types of marginal activities described in Khartoum, and the percentage of Darfurians working in construction was also smaller than in Khartoum (this might be either because there is more construction activity in Khartoum or more limited opportunities in Gedaref).

Generally, wage rates were higher in Gedaref: for example, construction workers earned almost twice as much as those in Khartoum. Agricultural work in Gedaref also paid more than the marginal activities in Khartoum. The only activity in Khartoum that generated more income than the minimum wage rate was small trade, which tended to be favoured by younger men (the minimum wage in Sudan is SP 300,000 a month (US\$115), which is about US\$4 per day, assuming 30 days are worked).

Most of the displaced women in Khartoum (about 60 per cent) were unable to find jobs, because of their lack of skills, language barriers and strong competition for work (see Table 19). The majority of displaced women in Khartoum who were working were engaged in small restaurants, running tea stalls and selling vegetables. Women selling food and tea were able to make more money than men, although they risked harassment from male customers and, as most did not have the necessary licenses from the health and tax authorities, also from government officials. In Gedaref, Darfurian women who worked were mostly engaged in agricultural activities.

Table 18. Type of work and wage rates for Darfurian migrants: men

Location	Type of work	Percentage	Wage per day (SP)
Khartoum	Small trade	20	9,000
	Water vendor	40	5,500
	Vegetable vendor	20	5,500
	Construction worker	16	4,000
	Army	4	4,000
Gedaref	Small trade (<i>tombac</i>)	30	10,000
	Construction worker	10	9,000
	Agricultural work	60	7,000

Table 19. Type of work and wage rates for Darfurian migrants: women

Location	Type of work	Percentage	Wage per day (SP)
Khartoum	Food processing	43 (17)	13,000
	Tea-making	37 (15)	11,000
	Vegetable vending	20 (8)	6,000
	Not working	60	
Gedaref (per season) (does not include those not working)	Harvesting	40	750,000
	Crop cleaning	30	540,000
	Cultivating	30	540,000

Challenges

The challenges currently facing Darfurians in Khartoum included limited work opportunities, instability, poor housing and continuous harassment by government officials – who, they claimed, were trying to make them return to Darfur by making their stay in Khartoum as uncomfortable as possible (see Table 20).

In Gedaref, Darfurians identified the seasonality of agricultural work as their major challenge, as work opportunities are limited to a single short season, mostly for sorghum and sesame. Other problems included a lack of home ownership and the need to rent housing, and limited access to quality education. Interviewees thought that the public education available for their children was very poor (understaffed and generally under-resourced), while private education was too costly for them. Those working in food processing and the vending of vegetables and other perishable goods, both men and women, also identified difficulties with government officials, and the need for licences as problems.

Table 20. Challenges facing Darfurians in Khartoum and Gedaref

Location	Challenge	Percentage
Khartoum	Limited work opportunities	47
	Instability	24
	Poor housing	22
	Problems with government	7
Gedaref	Seasonality of work	40
	Instability linked with housing	30
	Lack of good education	20
	Problems with government	10

In Khartoum, the short-term goal of Darfurian communities was to find better job opportunities, which would provide them with more freedom in choosing what to do with their lives. They were not pleased with the temporary camps they were forced to live in, or with the many restrictions placed on their movement. Their other short-term goals were better housing and services and better understanding from the local and national authorities. The majority were not optimistic about their situation or about their future. Their comments included: *'We just need to adjust and adapt ourselves to the new life'* and *'Only alsabr (patience) will see us through'*. All IDPs thought of their stay in the camps as temporary, and



their goal was to return to Darfur. However, this was conditional on a settlement of the Darfur conflict being reached.

In Gedaref, people shared this long-term goal, but they discussed the problem more broadly and were vocal about the causes of the conflict and ways forward towards peace. They attributed the conflict to injustices in wealth distribution and the development priorities of the government. They were not optimistic about the actions taken by the GoS, the opposition or the international community, and believed that the Darfurian community had been victimised by all parties.

All the communities recognised that collective efforts at all levels were required to rebuild infrastructure and to stabilise Darfur. However, the majority had very little trust in the GoS, which they claimed had never previously kept its promises in Darfur, and which had also contributed to the eruption of the current crisis by pursuing policies biased towards pro-government groups rather than for the benefit of the community at large. Consequently, very few (5 per cent) believed that the current government would support the rehabilitation of Darfur. Interviewees further argued that if the government was not interested in protecting communities in Darfur, why should it be trusted in putting right the damage it had contributed to creating?

They argued too that, if peace is to be achieved, the tribal system of administration must be restored, and given additional authority. It would also mean greater equity in development and in wealth distribution. Capacity building and improvement of services were considered to be major factors in reaching peace. Several expressed the opinion: *'We got nothing from being dependent on government promises; this time it should be action by us Darfurians taking things in our own hands'*. They added: *'With hard work, good will and struggle, Darfur will be rebuilt'*.

Conclusions

Sudanese migrant workers in Libya are being squeezed hard on two sides. First, the Sudanese government's closure of the national border has cut off the main route for migrant workers to enter Libya or return to Sudan and has also cut off communications and remittances, in both cash and in kind. Second, Darfurian migrants have been affected both directly and indirectly by the US/UN sanctions, suffering the effects of inflation (without the protection of the subsidies that are available to Libyans) and the contraction of the economy and the labour market. The shrinking economy was a major factor in the crackdown by the Libyan authorities on migrant labour, which started in 1995 and continues intermittently to this day. Migrants are also suffering from the imposition of requirements for health certificates; as workers cannot meet these requirements, this will inevitably lead to increasing numbers of illegal immigrants and to more detentions of foreign workers.

The closed border has drastically reduced trade between Libya and Sudan, with significant negative effects on livelihoods, especially in Darfur, and on Libyans and foreign workers in Kufra. It is vital that the border is re-opened as soon as possible. However, given the length of the closure, the build-up of migrants on both sides of the border and the state of insecurity in North Darfur, this must be done in a careful and controlled manner and with the full involvement and agreement of all parties (including the Libyan authorities, the GoS and the rebel opposition in Darfur). Negotiations and agreements on the opening of the border and the protection of trade routes will require commitments and actions by the opposition parties as well as by the GoS. An information campaign is needed to inform Darfurians of the hardships they are likely to face in Libya and the shortage of work there; however, until there is peace in Darfur, Libya will remain an attractive option to Darfurians.

There are increasing numbers of Sudanese workers in Libya without legal papers and without regular work. This situation, combined with the insecurity and lack of opportunity in Darfur, puts pressures on workers to seek opportunities to reach Europe, hence the increase in boat traffic. Every consideration should be given to granting an amnesty for all Sudanese currently in Libya without identity papers or health certificates, which (assuming the conflict in Darfur is resolved) would allow them the options of either returning to Sudan or of taking the health test and applying for identity papers so that they could work legally in Libya.

Internal labour migration to Gedaref is undertaken mostly for economic reasons, linked with protecting livelihoods in Darfur by sending back remittances. However, migration from Darfur, particularly to Khartoum, is increasingly driven by the desire to escape the conflict. This has changed the demographic profile of migrants, from groups that were principally made up of men to groups that consist predominantly of women and children. Darfurian communities in both Khartoum and Gedaref but especially in Khartoum, are facing many hardships related to instability, the collapse of communication systems, the sudden change of social environment and loss of their previous livelihoods, and the political tension created by the current conflict in Darfur.

Immediate steps should be taken to improve communications between Darfurian migrant workers and their families in Darfur, and to provide mechanisms for family tracing. This will automatically contribute to improving the flow of remittances back to Darfur. At the same time, the security of routes and public transport, including bus routes to and from Darfur, must be secured. A series of recommendations relating to labour migration and remittances is outlined in Chapter 6.

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6. Conclusions and Recommendations

In Darfur, all aspects of the conflict are inextricably linked with people's livelihoods. The study has shown how livelihoods are integral to the causes of the conflict and to the impact it has had on people, and that therefore they will be central to any lasting solutions. The two greatest challenges to protecting and supporting livelihoods in Darfur are, first, tackling insecurity and, second, tackling outstanding grievances, including the loss of lives, sexual violence and the loss of livelihoods – particularly the major losses of livestock. Moves to find a peaceful solution must take account of livelihoods, while efforts to support livelihoods must consider the political economy of the conflict and the implications of this for livelihoods and livelihood interventions.

The traditional symbiosis between herder and farmer has been eroded in recent decades as people's livelihoods have converged, shifting the moral geography of herder and farmer and bringing them into conflict with one another. Declining rainfall and encroaching desertification have contributed to North–South migration which, combined with increasing population pressures, has created more direct competition for access to natural resources. Meanwhile the traditional systems of land tenure and the Native Administration, which in the past have managed and protected common law rights, have been eroded and, in part, replaced by the individual drive for profits.

These local pressures must be seen in the wider national and regional contexts, which have contributed to the marginalisation of Darfur, the formation and arming of militia groups, and the supply of arms generally. Actions on the part of both the Government of Sudan and the opposition movements have had a crippling effect on livelihoods, including hindering trade, access to markets, labour migration and the flow of remittances.

Both the short- and medium-term outlooks for livelihoods are bleak indeed. For those IDPs who are receiving humanitarian assistance, their survival (but not their livelihoods) is assured as long as the humanitarian aid continues to flow. This makes this type of humanitarian assistance a priority.

The livelihoods of those who remain in rural areas are seriously threatened. Never in the history of Darfur has there been such a combination of factors causing the failure of livelihood strategies, including:

- production failures
- market failures
- failures to access natural resources
- inability of migrant workers to send back remittances.

Under these circumstances, region-wide famine is inevitable. While food aid can partially redress the production failures, a much wider raft of interventions is needed to begin to address the other failures.

Major structural changes need to be addressed at the international, national and state levels. These changes include processes of land restitution and compensation; livestock restitution, reconciliation and compensation; and the opening up of transport routes to provide safe passage for people, livestock and goods. Ideally, these wider processes of reconciliation should be linked with support for livelihoods and development inputs, particularly education, which is one of the most sorely missed of public services.



However, these major structural changes will have the most impact on livelihoods and, while the conflict continues to rage, will require the commitment and support of all levels of administration.

Programming to support livelihoods will not be easy in Darfur. Since livelihoods are also so integral to the conflict and to the war economy, it is imperative that implementing agencies understand and consider fully the implications that any livelihood interventions may have on the dynamics of the conflict. Any peace-building or conflict resolution must also understand, take account of, and be linked with livelihoods.

The international humanitarian response in Darfur will be long-term, and the question arises as to how it can be used to support livelihoods, as well as save lives. There are several points to be made here. First, the provision of humanitarian assistance to save lives must be continued. Second, there are very limited opportunities to support the livelihoods of IDPs, because their livelihood strategies are rurally based and depend on access to natural and physical resources. Third, certain livelihood interventions in IDP camps could serve as a 'pull factor' for other rural dwellers, or could contribute to further polarisation, as access to such interventions is likely to be unequal.

Solving the issues that concern livestock is central to finding lasting solutions to the problems in Darfur. The region's economy has been seriously eroded and the traditional backbone of its economy – livestock trade – is failing fast. Given the wide-ranging interests in livestock production and trade among all tribal groups, and among both government and opposition factions, it is highly likely that very soon this will become part of an alternative 'war economy', in which certain groups will have a vested interest in sustaining the conflict and maintaining their control over the relatively lucrative livestock trade.

The primary interest of those who have lost their livestock through looting is to get their animals back. They insist on being compensated by the government, but no-one is certain when or how this will happen. Restocking through donor funding could be problematic, for four reasons. First, the scale of the restocking programme will be unprecedented, involving more than 250,000 households, each requiring a foundation stock of some 20 sheep and goats. Funding and organisational capacity may not be available on this scale. Second, the fact of donors sponsoring restocking would send the wrong signal to the perpetrators. During restocking, there is a danger that donors may inadvertently buy stolen animals for distribution (even, perhaps, to their rightful owners), thereby rewarding those who looted them. This may in turn encourage further looting. Third, an externally funded process of restocking would not allow for reconciliation processes to occur between the various parties through resolution of the livestock issue. Fourth, replenishing looted and lost assets will not solve the issues of mobility and safe access to trade and migration routes, which are an essential part of the livestock livelihood system for all groups. Until free and unhindered access and mobility can be achieved, rural livelihoods in Darfur will remain under siege.

Recommendations

Recommendations are made relating to six broad areas:

- security, stabilisation and governance
- land
- livestock
- markets
- labour migration, communications and remittances
- international humanitarian response.



All of these are considered immediate priorities, but clearly the time needed to achieve the goals varies.

Security, stabilisation and local governance

1. Peace and security were the universal goal of all those interviewed. Humanitarian access and the currently very limited security of humanitarian interventions are not enough. Security must be extended to all aspects of daily life and livelihoods, including livelihood strategies, mobility, markets and the protection of assets. These aspects of security must be incorporated within the expanded mission of the African Union in Darfur.
2. The study recognises the overriding importance of reaching a political solution to the conflict through the international processes of conflict resolution at Abuja. Any settlement must address the underlying issue of marginalisation.
3. There are two ways in which the Naivasha process can provide a framework for Darfur:
 - a. as a model for the negotiating process between the GoS and rebel groups in Sudan;
 - b. by applying and adapting the contents of the protocols as quickly as possible in Darfur. In particular, there are elements of the protocols where additional provisions for transition areas could be adapted.
4. The North–South peace process and its protocols are not a panacea for peace in Darfur. It remains unclear how the protocols will be implemented once the peace agreement has been signed. There are also important elements missing from the protocols that are critical for the resolution of the Darfur crisis. For example, the protocols do not outline in detail how they are to be applied at the level below that of the State. Neither are the role of the Native Administration nor its relationship to local government articulated. In the context of Darfur, these issues must be addressed.
5. All groups must be aware of, and must understand, the protocols within Darfur, as they apply to all groups, including the Native Administration, civil society groups, citizens (including IDPs) and international actors. This will require the raising of awareness.
6. While the Abuja talks address conflict resolution at the national and international levels, the participation of the tribal leadership and the relevant sections of civil society is needed to address conflict resolution and compensation at the local level and to support the decisions taken at Abuja. There is a critical need to understand and learn lessons from the failures of past reconciliation conferences, including the role of central government. This nuanced understanding is important for the international community, which might also have a role to play in these processes.
7. Talks at the international level should recognise and seek to enhance the function of the tribal leadership, while understanding the fragile and limited capacity of the Native Administration in many areas. It is also important to recognise that the Native Administration is not free from the political influence of the central government, and also that it has its own political agenda. For this reason, it is essential that its functions are de-politicised, clearly articulated, locally specific, authorised by local governing authorities (GoS or rebel) and agreed to locally by all groups.
8. Local governance in Darfur is not uniform, and there is an urgent need to learn lessons from different local approaches to reconciliation and security. This report has identified some lo-

calised conflict resolution initiatives, together with examples of good local governance, which are likely to have wider resonance. For example:

- Local-level dialogue is currently ongoing between the Zayadia (an Arab tribe) and the Meidob in north-east Darfur, regarding disputes over access to pastures and boundaries. The Kawahla from western Kordofan are mediating in this process. The state government of North Darfur has tried to halt the process, but this has been resisted by the negotiating parties. Local-level dialogues of this sort should be encouraged and allowed to proceed unhindered.
 - The Beni Hussein, which have strong local governance, including local security arrangements. Groups like the Beni Hussein which have endeavoured to insulate themselves from the conflict are struggling to maintain this stance. Their efforts must be better understood and supported, where appropriate and where possible.
9. Although the study did not explicitly consider violence against women, such violence was frequently encountered, with women putting themselves at risk for the sake of their livelihoods (e.g. gathering firewood, going to market). This raises issues of how violence against women should be addressed, together with the associated potential for an epidemic of HIV/AIDS. At the very least, local capacities to deal with these two co-epidemics need to be assessed, with a view to identifying local networks and institutions through which interventions may be directed. The issue of compensation must be addressed and included in local compensation and restitution processes.

Land commission

10. The study recommends the setting up of a Land Commission covering all three states of Darfur, with representation from relevant parties. This action is in line with the Protocol on Southern Kordofan/Blue Nile. The Land Commission should be responsible for:
- mapping the existing hakura (land tenure system) and mass'arat (livestock migration routes), through local consultation and based on local agreement within all strata of the Native Administration. The mapping work on livestock migration routes should be conducted in close association with the LRRCC (see below)
 - administration of land tenure, based on traditional systems
 - ensuring that all groups, including minority groups, are consulted even where they may no longer be represented in their original home area. This includes both Arab and non-Arab groups who have migrated as a result of the conflict but who are not necessarily classed as IDPs
 - rehabilitation of water points in rural areas. This should be addressed on a case-by-case basis for existing rural dwellers or as people return (i.e. it should not be a blanket rehabilitation strategy)
 - overseeing restitution and compensation in the case of land disputes.

Livestock

Livestock reconciliation, restitution and compensation

11. The study recommends the creation of a Livestock Reconciliation, Restitution and Compensation Commission (LRRCC), which should cover all three states of Darfur, and all groups within the region. The LRRCC should adopt four complementary approaches to reconciliation and compensation. It should:
- oversee procedures for registration and verification of livestock losses
 - oversee the taxation of livestock sold and ensure that all export taxation revenue is used to compensate those who have had livestock looted, including traders who have lost camel caravans and who have had drovers kidnapped by rebel groups



- encourage the voluntary return of looted livestock by providing a process for this to take place as part of the local reconciliation process
 - provide certificates of ownership for all livestock, and allow export markets to accept only certified livestock.
12. All livestock taxation revenues should be reserved for the process of restitution and reconciliation, and taxation should even be raised in the first year to allow the process to go forward.
 - a. The Government of Sudan should be seen to be one of the major financial contributors to this process, given its failures to protect the livestock resources of rural people in Darfur.
 - b. The work of the LRRCC should be implemented locally through the Native Administration Council system, which ensures that all relevant groups are represented, plus mutually acceptable neutral third party groups. The LRRCC should start with pilot schemes at primary and secondary markets, and ensure that all species of livestock are dealt with.
 - c. In addition, the markets in Dongola (Sudan) and in Aweinat and Kufra (Libya) should be monitored for looted camels by Sudanese groups, reporting to the LRRCC.
 - d. The closed customs points in Darfur should be reopened and should be involved in monitoring for certificates of ownership.
 - e. A joint UN/AU International Monitoring Committee should be created to oversee these processes.

Livestock migration

13. The opening up of livestock migration routes needs to be addressed at a political level, with agreement between the local authorities that govern the different sections of the routes, and at a local level. This makes livestock migration an important point of negotiation for reconciliation between groups. Conflicts over migration routes occur not only between farmers and herders, but even between herders who have similar political leanings e.g. the Zaghawa and the Meidob. The opening of the routes will only come with local peace and reconciliation processes and the work of the proposed LRRCC and Land Commission. At present, different groups control different sections of the migration routes. The SLM/A currently controls the wet-season reserves in the North, while the dry-season reserves in the South are controlled by Arabs. There needs to be recognition of the grazing rights of pastoralists for both the wet and dry seasons, with similar provisions to those of the Abyei Protocol.

Livestock health and feed

14. Sudan has well-developed veterinary services and therefore any interventions must be coordinated, managed and implemented through veterinary departments at federal and State level.
15. There is a shortage of veterinary drug supplies, both through the GoS and from the private sector. The GoS should make supplies available through the veterinary services. Regular vaccination programmes must be carried out, especially where livestock are being kept in confined areas and are unable to access the usual livestock migration routes.
16. There is a high risk of an outbreak of PPR (*Peste des petits ruminants*) among camels in Darfur. The Soba Veterinary Department in Eastern Sudan has recently confirmed an outbreak of the disease, and conditions are conducive for its spread to Darfur. PPR vaccination is therefore a high priority for camel herds in Darfur. Clearly, a vaccination programme would have to take account of the issue of looted livestock (through the LRRCC) and would also have to reach the herds of all groups. Livestock vaccination has provided opportunities for local-level conflict resolution in neighbouring countries, and this could be explored in Darfur.



17. The coverage of veterinary services and access to them should be reviewed in all areas and for all groups, with a view to expanding coverage through mobile units or community-based animal health workers, who would get their supplies from their local units.
18. The SLM/A should allow mobile veterinary services to pass through their areas and provide services. Equally, Arab pastoralists should allow mobile veterinary services to pass through and work in their areas.
19. Some IDPs, particularly women and children, are putting themselves at extreme risk in order to collect fodder for their donkeys and other livestock. This urgently needs to be addressed as a security and protection issue. The general distribution of livestock fodder for IDPs is considered inappropriate at this time, because few IDPs have livestock (except donkeys) and to do so would encourage local market interests in the continued presence of IDPs. Donkeys are a special case, as every rural household in Darfur needs one to go about its daily life and donkeys will be an essential part of the return and reintegration process. Where there are large concentrations of donkeys in IDP camps, feasibility studies on provision should be conducted, linked with pilot distributions of concentrates (molasses, sugarcane tops, briquettes) and fodder.

Trade and markets

Livestock trade routes

20. The study recommends the controlled opening of all livestock trade routes, including the opening of the national border between Libya and Sudan, the route to Dongola, and the northern and southern livestock routes to Muwheli (in Omdurman). This must be agreed by all parties at the international (Abuja), national and local levels.
21. The extreme southern route (from South Darfur through Buram) should be discouraged or closed, because it is physically longer and more costly and will reduce the prices obtained by producers. There is also a high prevalence of tsetse in this area, and large trade herds risk increasing the transmission of disease, as well as having a negative impact on the environment through over-grazing.
22. There are a number of related issues that must be taken into account:
 - It is recognised that looted livestock will pass through these routes and therefore there must be controls linked with this, through the LRRCC.
 - Livestock is the primary source of taxation revenues for the states of Darfur. Given the present circumstances, taxation should be used to benefit Darfurians, in particular in the form of payments through the LRRCC.

Markets: commodity trade routes

23. There needs to be agreement at Abuja from all parties to protect the main transport routes, to allow the safe passage of goods and people and to minimise taxation. This protection must not be in contravention of the ceasefire.
24. The African Union should patrol key transport routes. Local security incidents linked with looting along transport routes should be monitored and reported by the AU.

Free access to markets for buyers and sellers

25. All restrictions on individuals buying, selling or transporting basic goods must be removed. This includes removing the GoS permit system in Kutum, which restricts and taxes purchases



made by anyone coming to market from outside the boundary of the town, including people from the IDP camp. Livestock taxation is a special case and is dealt with above.

26. As the situation stabilises, a number of market interventions may be appropriate, including for example:
- seed and tool fairs, where buyers and sellers are brought together
 - increasing the size of the food basket (general ration), to allow for the trade and purchase of other essential commodities, especially firewood
 - purchasing local seed varieties to protect local species and to secure local seed supply for the next growing season
 - seed multiplication programmes
 - providing credits to small traders whose capital has been eroded, particularly those whose caravans have been attacked and looted. Livestock trade with Libya is dominated by traders whose capital is small in comparison with those working in the livestock trade and exporting to other countries in the Arab world. Support for these traders will have a multiplier effect.

Labour migration, remittances and communications

Communications and tracing

27. To improve communications between the diaspora of migrant workers and their families in Darfur, which will facilitate the flow of remittances into Darfur, the following immediate steps should be taken:
- mobile telephone networks and land lines in Darfur should be kept open at all times (at present the networks are frequently closed)
 - mobile networks should be extended to cover IDP camps in adjacent areas
 - more landline communication centres should be opened in urban centres hosting IDPs, and in established IDP camps e.g. in Kutum and El Fasher
 - all groups should have access to these centres.
28. Mechanisms should be provided for migrant worker family tracing. For example, the tracing operations of the International Committee of the Red Cross should be extended to include Darfurians located in all parts of Sudan and in the refugee camps in Chad. The Red Crescent in Libya and Sudan should support family tracing and reunification schemes, with the support of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (or vice versa).

Libya

29. The national border between Sudan and Libya should be opened in a careful and controlled manner, and with the full involvement and agreement of all parties (including the Libyan authorities, the GoS, the opposition groups and the Native Administration of affected tribes in Darfur). Negotiations and agreements on the opening of the border and the protection of trade routes will require commitments and actions by the opposition parties, as well as by the GoS, to ensure security of access for labour migrants. This also relates to the above recommendations on trade routes.
30. Efforts must be made to discourage all military recruitment of Sudanese migrant workers in Libya. Sudanese groups already in Libya should be actively supported with training and skills development to equip them for skilled work opportunities in Libya and for their return to Sudan.
31. There are increasing numbers of Sudanese workers in Libya without legal papers and without regular work (in part because of the recent requirement for foreign workers in Libya to pay for



health tests and also because workers are unable to return to Sudan due to the border closure). This situation, combined with the insecurity and lack of opportunity in Darfur, puts pressures on workers to seek opportunities to travel to Europe. Immediate steps should be taken by the Libyan authorities to legalise Sudanese migrant workers in Libya who lack identity papers or a valid health certificate. This would allow them the options of returning to Sudan or of taking the health test and applying for identity papers so that they can work in Libya legally.

32. There should be an end to discrimination against labour migrants in Libya in the provision of services, including the provision of food subsidies, health care and education. Health tests for Sudanese migrants should be provided free of charge, at least until the Sudan/Libya border is reopened and the security situation has stabilised.

Supporting remittance flows and support to migrant workers and IDPs outside Darfur

33. Remittances are potentially a critical source of income for Darfurians, particularly given the collective failure of other sources of income. Before the conflict, remitted cash and goods were usually either hand-carried or sent through traders and *hawaldar*. These mechanisms have all but ceased to operate. Every effort must be made to support both remittance flows and the employment of migrant workers outside of Darfur. The first step is to ensure freedom of movement and an improvement in the security of routes and of public transport, including bus routes throughout Darfur.
34. A joint UN/GoS needs assessment of the Darfurians displaced in Khartoum is a priority, followed by activities to address these needs through humanitarian interventions, protection and policy change. In addition to responding to immediate humanitarian needs, the international community should work with local groups to develop livelihood resources and strategies, including education and training opportunities, agricultural skills, access to micro-finance services, etc. Activities should be carefully targeted, and should not be on such a scale that they encourage migration from Darfur.

International humanitarian response

35. It is imperative that the international humanitarian community makes all efforts to demonstrate impartiality by responding to the needs of all groups. While the difficulties involved in separating civilians and combatants in rural locations are greater than in the context of refugee camps, it is nevertheless vital that the international community seeks out the views and experiences of all groups and attempts to address their needs in order to prevent further marginalisation, of Arab groups in particular. Furthermore, if humanitarian aid fails to reach affected Arab groups, this will almost certainly inflame tensions, and could even contribute to harassment or reprisals against humanitarian workers.
36. Humanitarian assessment exercises and interventions should be directed towards all groups where possible. It is especially important to include areas and groups that have not previously been included, rather than limiting surveys and assessments to groups who are already receiving assistance.
37. International organisations should be aware of the ethnic distribution of their staff and should seek to ensure ethnic representation, while remaining sensitive to any specific security concerns. Fielding ethnically representative teams may be impractical and risky from a security point of view. Nevertheless, agencies must ensure that they consider the potential ethnic biases of their teams.



38. Minimum standards can rarely be achieved at the height of an emergency and pragmatic decisions must be made as to the best strategy to achieve the progressive realisation of rights for all affected groups. The strategy among some international groups interviewed has been to expand their operations only when minimum standards have been achieved in their current programme. However, this is a strategy for humanitarian containment, not humanitarian action. This type of strategy may be linked with the plethora of evaluations that are currently under way, and therefore it may be helpful to review the purposes of these evaluations to ensure that they are not contributing to the strategy of 'risk-free' programming (in other words, the possibility that agencies might play safe and keep their programmes small, manageable and risk-free in order to ensure that they receive the best possible evaluation).
39. The study therefore recommends a careful review of standards, in order to achieve wider coverage and greater general impact. This does not necessarily mean reducing inputs – rather, it may mean simplifying logistics and distribution. In relation to food distribution, for example, this might include simplifying the ration (single or dual commodities, instead of a full food basket) or undertaking blanket rather than targeted distribution. Such decisions would require a cost-benefits analysis and a feasibility study.
40. The risks to IDPs of rape, attack and abduction while they collect firewood represent a serious protection issue that must be addressed, given the critical importance of fuel for cooking. There is clearly a problem with sourcing supplies of firewood, charcoal or briquettes and there is also the issue of sustainability. However, these problems must not preclude the humanitarian imperative of providing appropriate inputs and protection. This is an opportunity for collaboration between the Forestry Department of the GoS Ministry of Agriculture, which has plantations and experience, and agencies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which have encountered similar problems among refugees worldwide. The limited work so far undertaken by agencies with fuel-efficient stoves and cooking techniques is useful, but needs to be expanded and complemented by other initiatives. This action is also urgently needed to prevent the rapid deforestation that is taking place around towns.
41. While it is recognised that the number of NGOs with experience of working in Darfur is very small, nevertheless the international humanitarian community should visibly demonstrate a better knowledge and understanding of local Arab and non-Arab groups, their history, livelihoods and systems of administration and conflict resolution. There is a role for collaboration between experienced NGOs in Darfur and local educational organisations, in terms of providing induction and training for national and international staff working in Darfur. It is important for experienced institutions in Khartoum to work closely with relevant institutions and international NGOs in Darfur. This would serve to link local institutions with international organisations, for mutual support and capacity development.
42. Conditions will almost certainly deteriorate rapidly in Darfur, particularly as the limited benefits of the latest harvest had begun to wear off by early 2005. It is imperative that emergency preparedness starts now. One of the single greatest challenges will be the distribution system, particularly in ensuring that this is sufficiently decentralised to prevent drought-induced distress migration. It will be important to establish regional stockpiles on Darfur's borders, including at Kufra in south-east Libya. Systems of distribution that minimise security risks will also be important.
43. Emergency preparedness on Darfur's southern border with Bahr el Ghazal is urgently needed, in preparation for a likely influx of displaced people from South Darfur. Arrivals have been



reported recently. The implications of distress migration into Bahr el Ghazal on the fragile relations between tribes in this area should also be taken into consideration, and the needs of those tribes considered.

A livelihood strategy for Darfur

44. In preparation for the time when security conditions improve and mobility is possible, a Livelihoods Task Force should be created under the auspices of the UN and the AU, and reporting to the highest office in the Sudanese government. The role of this Task Force should be to monitor the conditions affecting livelihoods in Darfur that have been identified in this study, with a view to developing a national strategy for protecting, supporting and rehabilitating livelihoods in the region. This strategy should be developed through participatory processes that involve taking representatives of the GoS, the UN, the AU, and possibly donors, into the field to see local conditions and to seek local solutions with civil society and relevant local institutions. A similar process should be organised for the leadership of the opposition groups. The work of the Task Force should be closely linked with ongoing protection work, and should ensure that critical livelihood issues are considered as part of the relevant political processes.

Annex I. Notes on the Tribes of Darfur Region

The background and history of the many tribes in Darfur is complex, and for many groups remains largely uninvestigated. These notes are brief summaries of the information available to the team during the study. They are not exhaustive and large gaps remain. Nevertheless given the lack of comprehensive sources on the tribal diversity of Darfur, it was considered worthwhile to present the some of the available material.

Tribal *Dar* or homelands

Land in Darfur is tribal property that was originally inherited or allocated by the Fur Sultanate (see Chapter 2). Within Darfur there are approximately 35 major tribes, and a total of about 90 major and sub-tribes. Not every major tribe has their own *dar* or tribal homeland, some have *omodiyah* that fall within another ‘tribes’ *dar*. The *dar* and their boundaries have changed with time. For example, the 1928 Anglo-Egyptian tribal map of Sudan, the only map available showing the boundaries of the tribal *dar*, does not show Dar Zayadia.

Dar are not ethnically homogenous, and most are home to a number of smaller tribal groups and communities. A tribe may have more than one *dar*, for example the Gimir have a *dar* in West Darfur, and another in South Darfur. Local tribal leadership is intricately bound up with the *dar* and *hakura* system of allocating land within the *dar*. The Northern Rizeigat tribes (Mahariya, Iteyfat, Ireygat, Mahamid) have no specific *dar*, though they have their small settlements, which represent the headquarters for the tribes where their leaders could be found.

Table I The tribal homelands – *dar* in Darfur

Tribe	The top leader	The center
Dar Berti	Melik Shertai	Um Keddada Mellit Taweisha Gugojugo Dar Al Salam
Dar Fur (many territories spread throughout Darfur region)	Demangawi Shertai Shertai Shertai Shertai Shertai Shertai Magdum	Kebkabiya Tarna village Tome village Kas, South Darfur Nyala, South Darfur Guldo, West Darfur Zalingi, West Darfur Garsila, West Darfur
Dar Meidob	Melik Omda	Malha Mareiga

Table 1 The tribal homelands – *dar* in Darfur (continued)

Tribe	The top leader	The center
Dar Seraif – Beni Hussein	Nazir	Seraif
Dar Tunjur	Melik Shertai	Kutum Shangil Tobai
Dar Zaghawa	Sultan (Kobe) Melik (Tuer) Shertai (Gala) Melik (Artage) Melik (Kitinya) Melik (Hashaba) Kabka (Melik)	Tina Um Burro Kornoi Muzbad
Dar Zayadiya	Nazir	El Cuma
South Darfur		
Dar Rizeigat	Nazir	Ed Daein
Dar Ma'aliyya	Nazir	Adila
Dar Habbaniya	Nazir	Buram
Dar Fellata	Nazir	Tulus
Dar Beni Halba	Nazir	Eidal Firsan
Dar Ta'aisha	Nazir	Rahaid el Birdi
West Darfur		
Dar Masalit	Sultan	El Geneina
Dar Gimir	Sultan	Kulbus (West Darfur) Katilla(South Darfur)
Dar Erenga		
Dar Jabal		
Dar Sila (Daju)		
Dar Sinyar		

This table is incomplete and shows the information available during the time of the study.

The administrative tiers of the tribal administration

The tiers and titles used within the tribal administration are confusing and have changed much since the collapse of the Fur Sultanate. Certain titles have been dropped, and new titles introduced. When the NIF took over power in 1989, the new title of 'Emir' was introduced as part of a parallel system which undermined the traditional native administration's role (especially in western Sudan – see Annex 6, Geneina case-study).



The tiers of the tribal administration are broadly similar among different tribes, although the different tiers may have different titles. Before colonial rule there were up to five tiers or levels of administration, for example the Masalit Sultanate included; a sultan, *abbo* district chiefs, *firsha* sub-district chiefs, *melik* (head of a number of village sheikhs) and the sheikh village headman. Although the tiers of *abbo* and *melik* within the Masalit Sultanate were abandoned under colonial rule the *melik* continued to play a significant institutional role in the land tenure system.

The title of omda (sub-district leader) came into use during the colonial period, during which time other titles were dropped (*dimlij* in the Fur system, *melik* in the Masalit system). Normally the *omda* administers different tribes or clans within his *omodiya*. The table below shows the hierarchy of the tribal administration in Darfur.

Table 2. The layers of the tribal administration for different groups in Darfur

	Arabs	Fur	Zaghawa	Masalit
Leader or Chief		Maqdum	Sultan	
District leader	Nazir	Shertai	Melik, Shertai	Sultan
Sub-district leader	Omda	Omda	Melik	Firsha
Local or village leader	Sheikh	Sheikh	Sheikh	Sheikh
	Community Members (15–50 persons)	Community Members (50–200 persons)	Community Members (20–50 persons)	Community Members (50–200 persons)



Annex 2. Livelihoods in Kebkabiya

Introduction

Kebkabiya province lies north of the Jebel Mara mountains and includes some of the most fertile agricultural land in Darfur. The province consists of four localities (Seraf Umra and Seraif Beni Hussein in the west and Jebel Si and Kebkabiya to the east). Its capital is Kebkabiya town, the resident population of which is reported to be 21,000, while the number of IDPs there in October 2004 was estimated at 49,264.¹ Increasing numbers of IDPs were reported to be coming into Kebkabiya, people who were reportedly affected by drought rather than by conflict.

The atmosphere inside the town of Kebkabiya at the time of the team's visit was generally extremely tense – at curfew, people visibly fled the streets and were afraid to venture out. Foreigners were treated like welcome rescuers, with IDPs constantly greeting them and thanking them for coming. The overcrowding was visible: compounds were packed with temporary shelters and dwellings and often accommodated up to 20 or more families, where previously there had been only one. In contrast, there were certain areas of town that looked relatively normal and uncrowded.

The original tribes in Kebkabiya were Fur and Tama. The Northern Rizeigat Arabs moved here from Kutum area; they included Ireyygat, Iteyfah, Mahamid, Zabalad, Owwad Zeid and Owwad Rashid.² Zaghawa groups moved south from Dar Zaghawa in the 1970s and 1980s,^{3,4} including the 'blacksmith' group the Haddahate, who are a sub-tribe of the Zaghawa.⁵ The Gimir moved to Kebkabiya from the west, some from Chad. Other tribes in Kebkabiya include the Berti and Tunjur. The head of the Native Administration in Kebkabiya town is a Fur omda, and there are sub-omdas of other tribes under him, including Zabalad, Zaghawa, Gimir, Tama and Crowbat (part of the Fur).⁶

How the conflict has affected the area

Attacks on Fur and Zaghawa villages reportedly took place between July and September 2003. People fled their homes and hid in the neighbouring area, and many made their way to Kebkabiya, where a camp for displaced people formed on the outskirts of the town. This IDP camp was repeatedly attacked in November and December 2003, and people moved into the town itself for safety.⁷

Security in Kebkabiya has reportedly improved with the arrival of AU monitors and more international NGO staff.⁷ However, women still feel they are in danger, and cannot go out of the town to collect firewood as they risk rape.⁸ Pregnant women have been attacked and physically beaten, including being hit in the stomach. On the second day of the team's visit, 10 women were reportedly raped, although the team was not able to interview the victims.

Presence of rebel groups

None of Kebkabiya province is actually held by rebel opposition groups. There are frequent attacks by troops from both sides in the conflict, rebels and government forces. When rebel/opposition groups pass through an area they are frequently followed by armed militia (*Janjaweed*) who attack local residents because they suspect them of supporting the rebels. Conversely, military posts are attacked by rebel groups, and rebels have also reportedly stolen livestock.⁹



Not all of Kebkabiya province has been equally affected. Detailed descriptions are given below for a number of different groups, including IDPs (Fur and Zaghawa in Kebkabiya town), Gimir residents and IDPs in Kebkabiya, and Arab groups in rural areas west of Kebkabiya.

Displaced Fur people in Kebkabiya

Following the attacks on Fur villages in Jebel Si locality, there was almost complete displacement of the people there to either El Fasher or Kebkabiya. There are reportedly 32,000 IDPs from Jebel Si living inside Kebkabiya town.⁶ Estimates of the numbers living in the mountains vary from about 5,000⁸ to about 26,000.⁷ These figures are extremes, and the correct number is somewhere in the middle. Fur are still living in the mountains behind Kowra (on the main road from Kebkabiya to El Fasher). Most are not living in their original villages but are hiding in the nearby mountains. Their omda is living in Kebkabiya.⁸ The original population of Jebel Si locality was 68,000, which indicates that 45 per cent have left the area, or that much larger numbers are unaccounted for within Darfur.

One group of women from Kumomo village in Jebel Si described the attacks that took place in July 2003. Armed men on camels or horseback, supported by government troops directly attacked people in their villages, burned their houses and either stole or destroyed their property, including livestock. Trucks were used to carry away the loot. Girls and women were raped and, in the desperate flight to safety, some left behind children. People were in hiding for one month to 40 days and lived in very tough conditions, living off wild foods and relying on relatives who took them food as best they could. Some lived in the wild for two months or more before arriving in Kebkabiya.⁸

Out-migration from Darfur

Better-off households could afford to travel to Khartoum, El Fasher or Nyala.¹⁰ The costs of travel are considerable; the journey by bus to Khartoum costs SP 100,000 (about US\$40).⁷ Local leaders estimate that approximately 30 per cent of the Fur groups in Jebel Si have left for Khartoum, while the other 70 per cent are in Abou Shouk and Kutum.⁶ Life in Khartoum is reportedly very hard and some have returned, as they could not find a place to stay or the means by which to live.¹⁰

Fur groups in hiding

There reportedly remain a significant number of Fur (about 10 villages) either living in the mountains behind the settlement of Kowra. Because of their topography these areas remain relatively inaccessible and it is difficult to verify numbers. It is not clear whether people are able to live in their original villages or are in hiding in the mountains, but they are reportedly able to cultivate land.² Some relief has been organised by the Sudanese Red Crescent (SRC) and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Livelihoods before the crisis

Fur leaders described how before the crisis in Jebel Si 'life was easy'. People bred livestock (goats, sheep and cattle) and farmed (sorghum, millet and cash crops such as sesame and groundnuts) on terraces built on the rocky hillside.⁶ There was some *goz*, but otherwise terracing was used for all crops. Wild foods were available, but were only eaten in the drought years – for example mukheit, which grows only in the *goz* areas.⁶

Fur women from Kumomo village described how they used to cultivate millet on the sandy *goz* soils and cash crops in the *wadi*, including okra, watermelon, sesame and groundnuts. They also had many fruit trees, including oranges and mangoes. Land holdings varied according to wealth: for example,



a poorer family might have only 3–4 *mukhamas*¹, while a medium family would have 5 *mukhamas* and a better-off family up to 50 *mukhamas*.⁸

Similarly, ownership of livestock differed according to wealth groups. However, even poorer households owned some livestock: for example, 3–4 donkeys, 4–5 cows, 25 goats and 20 sheep. An average or medium household might have owned 5–7 donkeys, 40 cows, 50–60 sheep and 50–60 goats.

Labour migration and remittances

Labour migration was common among these groups. About 30 per cent of households had a male member who travelled in the summer to Khartoum and who returned in the autumn (April–May). In Khartoum they worked as labourers or in ‘traditional trade’ in small shops, or selling cigarettes, soap and local hats.⁶ Fewer men travelled to Libya or to Saudi Arabia (about 5 per cent went overseas). Very few women went, and then only to accompany their husbands.

Both clothes and money used to be sent back from Khartoum. A typical remittance before the crisis might be SP 100,000 monthly,⁶ and this would be used for basic needs, such as meat, sugar, clothes and schooling. From Khartoum, labour migrants were able to send money back either hand-carried, through banks or through the *hawala* system, which was more commonly used and continues to function even now.

The *hawala* system is organised around trade. The *hawaldar* agents are traders who agree on a transfer of goods from Khartoum to Kebkabiya, to the value of the monies being sent. The system depends on the agent knowing the migrant worker personally, while the worker trusts that the money will be handed over to the right people. There is no charge for sending a *hawala* and it is quicker than using the banking system. Sending money through a bank is more difficult as it requires documents (ID or a passport). The *hawala* system continues to work as far as Kebkabiya, where there are *hawaldar* agents, but there were no agents in Jebel Si.

Many young Darfurians went to Libya for a period of a few years, saving their resources and bringing them all back with them on their return, rather than sending remittances periodically.⁶ From Libya, the only way to send goods or cash to rural areas in Jebel Si was to personally hand-carry them.⁶

Livelihoods after the crisis (IDPs in Kebkabiya)

During the attacks there were widespread destruction of homesteads, looting of livestock, burning or looting of grain/food stores, poisoning of wells and destruction of schools.² Some villagers were unable to save anything though others, attacked later, were able to save some possessions.¹⁰ Grain stores were burned and grain stolen, including seeds. Nearly all livestock was stolen by the *Janjaweed* as people ran to save themselves. One person described how the herd of stolen livestock was so big you could not see where it ended.

Clearly, the loss of assets has been considerable. Estimates of livestock losses are difficult to obtain. Local government officials estimate 6,000 head of livestock have been stolen,⁹ but this seems like a gross under-estimate, given that there are at least 7,000 displaced families in Kebkabiya.

The current livelihoods of displaced people in Kebkabiya bear very little resemblance to their previous livelihoods. Many more women are working than men, usually as domestic servants for very low wages, typically SP 1,000 (less than US\$0.5) per day (SP 25,000 a month). There is some work for labourers

¹ A *mukhamas* is a measurement of land area equivalent to one hectare.



constructing buildings (at SP 3,000 per day, or just over US\$1). The high level of unemployment has led to a fall in wages – previously casual labourers received SP 5,000 per day. Since the conflict, the cost of the journey to Libya has increased due to the change in the route, which now runs through Chad. A trip costs SP 300,000 (US\$117); in 1995 it was SP 3,000 via Mellit, although the exchange rate then was lower.⁶ IDP groups in Kebkabiya were able to communicate with their relatives in Abou Shouk IDP camp in El Fasher, via public telephone located in the El Fasher *souq*.

The cost of living for IDPs in Kebkabiya has increased since 2003. The cost of renting a one-room house, for example, has risen from SP 20,000 per month to SP 100,000 (from about US\$8 to US\$39).⁶ Renting a house is only an option for those with some cash resources which, according to one leader, account for about 20 per cent of the IDPs. Another 20 per cent live with relatives, while 60 per cent of IDPs live in the open or in hastily constructed shelters.

Another major household cost is firewood, which is used for cooking, heating and light. One donkeyload of firewood costs SP 7,000–8,000 (US\$2–US\$3), while previously it was SP 2,000–3,000 (about US\$1). People used to have the option of collecting firewood for themselves, but currently this presents huge risks. IDP women cannot venture more than 1 km beyond the periphery of the town because of the risk of attack and rape by armed militia/*Janjaweed*. Only the pro-government groups, such as the Gimir and Tama, can bring in firewood for sale.

Zaghawa IDP women in Kebkabiya

The Zaghawa women interviewed were from Suburna village, near Misteriya, 10–15 km west of Kebkabiya.¹¹ The original population of their village was more than 20,000 and included many sub-tribes.

The Zaghawa moved to this area in the 1970s and 1980s from Korbia Dam, west of Kutum. In Suburna they came under the administration of the Fur omda who gave them new, uncultivated land, for which they had to pay a fee. Those who arrived first, in 1972, were allocated larger farms of around 6–7 *mukhamas*, while those who arrived later got smaller farms of 3–4 *mukhamas*.

Their village was first attacked on 27 July 2003, at 8 am. Armed *Janjaweed* chased them and forced them to flee their homes. They were in hiding in the valleys for three days, before coming to Kebkabiya. The *Janjaweed* took their animals in Saburna and also attacked their livestock herds, which were with their relatives on the livestock migration routes further north at a place called Janga. At first they did not know what had happened to their animals in Janga, but they have since seen them in the market at Kebkabiya, and could do nothing about this. Looting of livestock on the migration routes had happened before, in 2001, when a particular Arab group from Charad Zawia stole their animals.

Livelihoods before the crisis

The livelihood strategies of the Zaghawa before the crisis included:

- *wadi* cultivation, including millet, onions, etc., with the surplus sold in Kebkabiya and El Fasher markets
- fruit trees – lemons, oranges, guava, mangoes
- livestock production and trade (cows, camels, goats and sheep)
- labour migration to Libya, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

The relative importance of these strategies is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Zaghawa in Saburna – sources of food and income before the crisis

This analysis represents the strategies of the better-off households: poorer families would depend to a larger degree on cultivation and less on livestock production. For better-off families, livestock accounted for 46 per cent of livelihood wealth, which from the same as for Arab groups.

The Zaghawa in Kebkabiya followed traditional livestock migration routes:

- in the autumn (July–September), they would drive their animals to Dar Zaghawa, where they would stay for about 15 days to one month
- in the winter (November–March), they went to Janga, west of Kutum, which is a Fur area
- in the summer (April–May/June) they would head south to Wadi Bari.

Livelihoods after the crisis

These IDPs have been in Kebkabiya for 14 months. In one particular compound where the interviews took place there were 25 families, all women and children, with no men present. Women have a chance of finding work as domestic servants and are paid SP 1,000–2,000 per day (about US\$0.5), but for men there is very little chance of finding work.

Their main source of food and income is currently food aid. The first food distribution was in October 2003, and they now receive food assistance every month. They sell a part of the wheat they receive to meet their other needs, and get SP 400 for one kora (US\$0.20 for 1.7 kg). The price of sorghum is SP 250 per kora. They must pay rent for their compound, which is SP 10,000 per month per family (about US\$4). There is one donkey in the compound.

When they first arrived, they tried to collect firewood outside of the town but were chased many times; now they have to buy it from the market. The costs are considerable; one donkeyload costs SP 12,000 (US\$4–US\$5). They try to use very little firewood when they cook, and have decreased the number of times they cook from three times to twice a day.

They are not able to borrow money because, as IDPs, they are deemed uncreditworthy. When they first came to Kebkabiya they brought some goats with them, but these were stolen outside the town.




Figure 2. Sources of food and income for Zaghawa IDPs in Kebkabiya

Relations between the Fur and Arab groups of Wadi Bari

The Arab and Fur groups of the Wadi Bari area, which stretches westwards, south of Girgo, and is administered by a Fur omda, have a unique agreement that allows the Fur to remain in their villages, protected from attack.^{2, 12} This agreement has its origins in earlier Fur/Arab agreements made before the current conflict, which were intended to address individual disputes between farmers and livestock owners and which provided protection against looting.

The Arabs came to the Wadi Bari area from Kutum and settled in Misteriya 40 or 50 years ago. They arrived in small groups seeking pasture for their livestock, and the Fur gave them land. Wadi Bari is currently an important area strategically for the Arabs, as it borders both West Darfur and North Darfur and attracts Arabs from different directions. There is an abundance of water and grass for their livestock.

According to the Fur leaders, the Arab and Fur ‘exchange benefits’. All market traders in Wadi Bari are Fur and the Arabs’ interest in these markets explains why they have made these agreements. Previously, markets were open as far as Golo in Jebel Mara, but currently sales are for local consumption only and market activity is drastically reduced (just 2 per cent of previous levels). Lorries used to come to collect sugarcane grown by Fur farmers, but during the conflict the area where it is grown has become insecure and livestock has been allowed to graze it.

² The Fur omda in Birka Saiyra was also said to have made an agreement with Arabs.



The agreement is with members of the Um Jalloul, Ireyyat, Mahadi, Gimir and Tama groups. Since the rebellion in mid-2003, the nature of the Fur/Arab agreement has changed and the Fur now pay for protection against other Arab tribes. The groups who protect them wear military uniform and are armed with guns, and are considered to be 'an army of the government'.¹² Some members of the Fur in this area have joined the government armed forces themselves, and some have left for Khartoum.

There are approximately 30–40 village councils under this particular Fur omda, and to a large extent they have been 'saved' from attack, although there have been individual disputes. However, the local agreement does not protect their livestock, and other Arab groups who were not party to it have taken their animals. In addition, if individual families cannot pay, they are left unprotected.

The Fur do not work for the Arabs, but they do pay for protection in cash: SP 2,000 per person per month. One village has around 10–20 armed soldiers, who secure its farms and protect the routes to and from other places. The Fur are forced to do this, as otherwise there would be insecurity and they would not be able to farm or rear their livestock. The omda claimed to have been shot 28 times in local conflicts. He knows if his people go to Kebkabiya, their houses will be lost. However, other Fur groups view the agreement with the Arabs as a type of exploitation or slavery.⁶

There are major concerns about the current shortages of rain and an expected drought in the area (some Arab farms have also been affected by drought). With far fewer livestock than neighbouring Arab groups, the Fur depend to a much greater extent on growing crops, and this year they have failed to produce what they need. The major concern is that if they do not receive assistance they will be forced to become displaced and will lose their homes.

Pro-government groups – Arab, Tama and Gimir

Groups that describe themselves as 'pro-government' in Kebkabiya include various Arab groups and the Tama and the Gimir (who do not identify themselves as Arab). The Zabalad are responsible for the Native Administration of several Arab tribes in Kebkabiya, including the Mahariya, Sa'ada, Owlad Zeid, Mima and Shertiya.¹³ Areas in Kebkabiya where Arab groups are found include El Harar, Burjango, Jendama, Shoba Rohal, Johannai and Murgag, but in the past they used to move around all over Darfur.¹³

Tama leaders described to the team how they were drawn reluctantly into the current conflict.¹⁴ Following various incidents of looting in 2002, which included some involving fatalities, they believed they were being targeted by certain Fur and Zaghawa groups. To begin with, they rejected the idea of mobilising their members by arming them and giving them military training. Eventually however, as a result of further incidents, including government/ *Janjaweed* counter-insurgency attacks on their villages, and their exclusion from discussions with groups supporting the rebel opposition, they decided to support the Government and provided both men and money in response to the its call.¹⁴

Tama villages (Um Roota and Endaadi) and Gimir villages on the way to Birka Saiyra were left largely unscathed during the GoS counter-insurgency attacks. However, pro-government groups have been affected by rebel/opposition activity. Many Gimir were displaced to other Gimir villages after their own villages, such as Tairai and El Shallal, were burned.¹⁴ Ori village was not burned but its people were displaced because they were scared of attacks. Those who have been displaced to other Tama villages have been able to farm there.



The local deputy commissioner has sheets of complaints from individuals and groups who complain that, although they remain in their own areas, the crisis leaves them without resources, and therefore they also need support. This includes Arabs whose villages have been burned.

Arab groups also report rebel kidnappings. In one Focus Group, interviewees reported rebel attacks on their *fariq* (family-based herding unit) three months previously, when livestock was stolen.¹⁵ The military provides limited protection, but military posts are spread far apart.¹³

Arab groups in Wadi Shallal and Wadi Shoba area

Arab tribes in the Wadi Shallal area include the Owwad Zeid, the Owwad Rashid, the Um Jalloul, Turgem, Mahadi, Mahariya, Mima and Naweyba. A single sheikh can exercise administrative control over members of many different tribes. In Wadi Shoba, various Arab groups are administrated by the Mahamid group. Generally the groups interviewed felt that support from their own tribes was good – *‘the sheikh and the omdas are always present’*.¹⁰

There are 10 *fariqs* in the Wadi Shallal area. One *fariq* comprises approximately 3–5 families, and one family has 10–12 members. They stay in one place for about a month before moving on. The *fariqs* visited were adjacent to a deserted, burnt-out village, where a number of camels were seen to be grazing. In the *wadi* were many hand-dug wells, where women and children were watering large numbers of livestock (approximately 400–600 head of cattle, and many sheep, donkeys and horses).

Relations with non-Arab groups have become increasingly polarised since the start of the conflict. The Arabs reported insecurity and attacks by rebel groups, and said that in August 2003 around 150 houses were burned and destroyed in Wadi Umsunout.^{10, 15} In the Kutum area, Arab villages that were burned included Girare, Barak Alla and Amo.¹⁰

Livelihoods before the crisis

Before the beginning of the conflict in 2003, those with livestock were mobile and could move freely to pastures and improved grazing, which meant that milk production was high, and they could travel to get the best market prices.¹³ The Owwad Zeid interviewed in the Wadi Shoba area were originally camel herders, who established farms in Kebkabiya and Norgay.¹⁰ They then started to herd cattle and sheep along with the camels.

Before the crisis, livelihood strategies for Arab groups living in the Wadi Shallal area included:

- *goz* cultivation (millet)
- *wadi* cultivation (tomato, onion, millet, sorghum, okra, sesame)
- livestock production and herding (camels, cows, sheep, goats)
- livestock trade (cows, camel, sheep)
- sale of milk, firewood, grass for fodder (tasks carried out by women)
- wild foods (*gidem*, *mukheit*, *laleb*, *koreb*, *nabak*, *difra*, *jirjir*)
- labour migration to Libya, Saudi Arabia, Egypt
- labour migration to Khartoum, Omdurman
- labour migration to Zalingi, Nyala, El Fasher.

Livestock provided the mainstay for several key livelihood strategies, including production, herding, sale via middlemen (agents) and traders, and small-scale trading of animal products (meat and milk). Interestingly, cultivation was listed first in this discussion, because in general everyone in this com-



munity cultivated crops, but not everyone had livestock (about 30 per cent did). Farmers acquired land through inheritance, and some bought it. There were very close relations between Arabs in this area and other non-Arab groups, including the Gimir, Tama, Fur and Burgo.¹³

Herders

Non-Arabs, including Fur, often used to employ Arab herders to look after their livestock. 'Friendly' herding agreements stipulated the terms – for example, in return for looking after 20 cows, the owner paid one cow per year. Before the crisis, agents would also recruit herders to take livestock to market in Kebkabiya, El Fasher or even further afield. Travel to Egypt and Libya was very often related to trade in livestock. On their return, herders would bring back goods, such as clothes, sugar, dates and soap.

Agents and traders

In the past, traders would come to Kebkabiya and send their agents to find the nomads from whom they would buy livestock. In addition to these outside agents, there were local livestock trade agents who worked on behalf of larger livestock traders based in Kebkabiya, and travelled to the *fariqs* to purchase livestock. Traders provided loans to the agents of SP 1–2 million (US\$400–US\$800) to purchase livestock. The agents then received a commission or fee for each animal bought on behalf of the trader. Examples of agents' fees were:¹⁵

- camel SP 10,000 (about US\$4)
- cow SP 5,000 (US\$2)
- sheep SP 1,000 (US\$0.5)
- goat 1,000 (US\$0.5).

Livestock migration routes (before the crisis)

In autumn (July–September), the camel herds were driven north to the El Gisou and Wadi Hawa area (Table 1). In summer (April–May/June), they went west to Um Dokhan near the border with Chad, and then started to move north from there to Wadi Saleh. After this, they moved to El Tiraig, Wadi Azoum, Saga, Um Bari, Kebkabiya, Giar, Abusnuot, El Dor, El Jenag and then on to El Wakhaim and the El Gisou grazing area in August, if the rainy season was good. El Wakhaim provided the best grazing sites for the camels, and here they would gain weight and condition and get pregnant.¹⁰ Access to this grazing land is no longer available, due to insecurity.

There are many routes north and south. Previously, Arab land owners would reach agreement with farmers about crossing their land; a member of the group would go ahead of the main herds to negotiate access and, if conflict arose, agree compensation. This was necessary because of the large size of the herds (200–500 camels at once).¹⁵

Cattle moved south to Um Bari and Wadi Azoum during summer (April–June), and in autumn stayed in the Wadi Shallal area. Sheep and goats stayed with the cows.¹⁵ (Table 1) Camel breeding normally takes place in February (with a gestation period of 12 months) and depends on these traditional migration patterns, as they provide camels with the conditions they prefer.

Labour migration

The most common destinations for Arab labour migrants included Khartoum, Wad Medani, Damezein and El Fao within Sudan, and further afield to Libya, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In addition, some migrants looked for work in El Fasher, Nyala, Ed Daien and El Geneina.¹³

As explained above, in the past young men frequently worked as herders, taking commercial livestock to markets in Libya and Egypt, where they would stay on to work for a period of usually

**Table 1. Livestock migration routes, pre-crisis and current¹⁰**

Season	Month	Area on the migratory route, pre-crisis	
		During the crisis	
Winter – dry season	January	Wadi Azoum – El Tiraig	Area inaccessible
	February	Wadi Saleh	
	March	Kibar	
Summer – hot season	April	Um Dokhan	Wadi Azoum Wadi Azoum/Saga, in an area called Gaili, which used to be a transit point. In 2003 herders had to stay at this point throughout June and July.
	May	Wadi Salih – El Tiraig	
	June	Wadi Azoum – Saga	
Autumn – rainy season	July	Kebkabiya – Baray	Saga
	August	Abusnuot– El Dor	Kebkabiya – Um Bari
	Sep/Oct	El Wakhaim – El Gisou	Jidar and Kebkabiya
Winter – dry season	November	Kebkabiya area	Area inaccessible
	December	Um Bari – Saga	

3–6 months. Most worked as herders or as agricultural labourers, and rates of pay ranged from LD 150–200 (US\$113–US\$150) per month. Most would send back remittances to their families, ranging from LD 150 to LD 900 per annum (US\$113–US\$677). Remittances were previously hand-carried in the form of cash, or in kind as tents or clothes. The cash was used to invest in livestock and to meet daily expenses, especially food. Herders on the routes to Libya and Egypt would also hand-carry messages for their fellow tribesmen.

Livelihoods after the crisis

Livestock previously provided the core of the Arab groups' livelihoods, but the production, herding and trading of livestock have all become extremely difficult due to the situation of insecurity that limits migration and movement to markets. Clearly the Arab groups still own large numbers of livestock, though it is impossible to say to what extent their herds have been supplemented by livestock that has been looted.

Traditional camel migration routes used by the Northern Rizeigat have been problematic since 1997 (due to conflict between Arabs and the Zaghawa). Livestock movements are now confined to less than half of the normal migratory route (see Table 1). Herders may go up to West Darfur, but they cannot go north to El Gizou. There is subsequently a problem of overgrazing, which this season has been particularly bad due to the lack of rain.

The fact that livestock cannot be driven north in the autumn (July–September) affects the health of the animals. Previously, different types of livestock were kept apart from one another, but now they are all together in relatively close proximity (this was visible around the *wadi* area).¹⁵ Herders report that this has affected the condition of animals, leading to high rates of abortion and an increase in livestock diseases, such as tick-borne disease, *Jufar* (Camel trypanosomiasis) and internal parasites.¹⁰



These conditions are particularly unsuitable for camels, ‘which need fresh, clean air and hate bad smells’.¹⁵ One group estimated that two-thirds of its camels had already died, but no evidence was seen of carcasses and this was impossible to verify.

Routes to primary livestock markets are now closed and no outside agents have visited Wadi Shallal for more than a year. Lack of security along the main routes is one reason for this, especially in the case of the journey on foot to El Fasher, which passes through an insecure area between Kowra and Taweila. Currently all livestock sales are for local consumption only.

There are also few communications between labour migrants in Libya and their families and the routes are generally considered closed. The only possible routes currently are by air or through Egypt. The amounts sent back as remittances have decreased substantially.

Rainfed farming of *goz* and *wadi* has decreased dramatically for Arab and Gimir groups (Figures 3, 4, 5) due to insecurity, which has limited their access to land. Herding of commercial livestock to Egypt and Libya has stopped because markets are not functioning, and exports have ceased. Many of the poorer groups previously worked as herders on these routes. They now stay in livestock camps where they depend on other members of their family or tribe.




Figure 3. Changes in Livelihood strategies among Arab groups in the Wadi Shallal area




Figure 4. Changes in livelihood strategies among Arab groups in the Wadi Shoba area of Kebkabiya

Rain shortages have aggravated the situation for all rural groups. This year, drought will particularly affect the food security of those groups trying to cultivate crops and rear livestock. Local government agriculturalists are expecting many people to be displaced because of drought and failing production systems.¹⁶

Livelihood goals

Local Arab leaders particularly wanted to highlight the lack of education and the high rates of illiteracy among Arab groups. Literacy rates, they report, are:

- Arab herders – 20 per cent
- non-Arab agro-pastoralists – 50 per cent
- richest livestock herders – 65 per cent
- traders (livestock and crops) – 85–90 per cent.

They attribute these low rates in part to the relatively limited access of Arab groups to educational resources and their general marginalisation within Darfur.¹³ They have undertaken a feasibility study and have been trying to mobilise support in Khartoum for their own efforts to develop Arab schools in the area. The immediate goals in the Wadi Shallal area included education, security and peace, which underlines the real importance attached to education, alongside resolution of the current conflict.¹⁵ In Wadi Shoba, the immediate goals were security and food, while in the longer term people prioritised education, health and the purchase of farms.¹⁰

Clearly Arab groups feel marginalised within Darfur; they recognise that *'the displaced are numerous [far outnumbering themselves] and they are seeking some kind of strength'*.¹³ Similarly, non-Arab, pro-government groups feel marginalised by the international community, believing that international relief agencies see Darfuri people in rural areas outside the towns as the cause of displacement, with the result that they limit relief to the Fur and Zaghawa and to those who are displaced to the town.

Livestock trade

Prices of livestock in Kebkabiya have fallen during the past year¹⁷, as a result of the increasing difficulties involved in exporting livestock, caused by insecurity on the main route to El Fasher.

Before the crisis there were four or five big traders, and approximately 10 agents or middlemen, operating in Kebkabiya.¹⁷ Outside Kebkabiya, the main livestock markets were El Fasher for goats and sheep, Nyala for camels and Kuda (between Kebkabiya and Nyala) for cattle. Arab herders identified other markets in addition to the primary market in Kebkabiya: Seraf Umra (on the route to Nyala), the *souq el Arab* in Noumou, Misteriya, Kalla, Kasyia, Dir and Kurgul (all in Kebkabiya locality). Agents now tend to use these smaller markets, although they are still buying only for local consumption.¹⁵

The routes to Nyala and El Fasher are now closed to traders because of insecurity, and the only way that is safe is the El Geneina route. There are now reportedly between 5,000 and 15,000 sheep waiting for export in the area. The traders who bought livestock now cannot export them, and have lost substantial capital and are having to take loans from banks to stay afloat.¹⁷ As a result of the insecurity, the 'big' traders are said to have already stopped buying and left.




Figure 5. Changes in livelihood strategies among Gimir groups in Kebkabiya

Conclusions and recommendations

The implications of drought in the area are extremely serious, both in terms of food insecurity among previously food-secure pro-government groups and increasing the risk of distress migration and displacement; and in terms of the impact that limited production will have on market supply and prices.



The international humanitarian response is reaching IDPs in Kebkabiya and is providing urgently needed life-saving assistance. There is no doubt that this relief is mitigating the very worst effects of the crisis.

However, among some groups the response is not considered to be impartial and, given the current scale of the crisis, it is generally felt that many citizens, in addition to IDPs, are in need of assistance. Among some groups, it is widely perceived that some organisations have not clarified real needs but rather have focused only on the displaced. This is obviously a difficult issue and must be dealt with sensitively, but at the very least international NGOs must be seen to be undertaking impartial and objective assessments of all needs, including those resulting from market failures, limited mobility, drought and food insecurity.

The risks facing IDPs as they try to collect firewood present the most pressing protection issues linked with humanitarian response. The issue of firewood further polarises the groups living in Kebkabiya, as pro-government groups are able to fully exploit a livelihood strategy that is lucrative in the current circumstances, while the IDPs have no choice but to buy whatever they can afford. Firewood for cooking fuel is an essential need that the IDPs are unable to secure, both because of the risk of attack if they try to collect it themselves and because of the lack of income to buy it.

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Annex 3. Livelihoods in Disa

Introduction

The Village Council of Disa lies about 45km north of Kutum in North Darfur, within the opposition-held area. It is under the control of the SLM/A which has based its local headquarters in the main village of Disa. There are 15 villages in the village council, with a total population in October 2004 of 5,700 people.¹ In addition, there are reportedly 2,000 displaced people from Kebkabiya, Kornoï, Abu Hamra, Um Burro and Tina in the area.¹

A mix of tribes are found in Disa, including Zaghawa, Fur, Berti, Tunjur, Meidob, Fellata and Burgo.² Local people were keen to describe these groups as '*kulu wahid*' or 'all one' i.e. they do not distinguish between themselves.³ The Fur are said to be the majority. Previously, there was an Arab group living at Khrare (Owlad Hamid and El Mahariya, of the Northern Rizeigat) but, according to current residents, they left the area at the start of the conflict, probably to go to Kebkabiya. Some groups – particularly the Zaghawa pastoralists – reported that they had had good relations with these Arab groups, for example inter-marrying. However, other groups reportedly had no contact with Arab groups except in the market, because '*they are nomads and we are farmers*'.⁴ Relations have polarised even further since the conflict.

How the conflict has affected the area

The GoS military (using Antonov aircraft, helicopters, trucks with machine-guns and lorries), supported by armed militia on horseback and camels, first attacked villages in Disa in July 2003. Aerial bombings continued for two to three months from July to September 2003, and intermittently after that until the last attack in February 2004. During this period the GoS military was encamped in the area and surrounded it, and soldiers/militiamen were reported to go out daily burning villages, looting livestock and killing people. GoS troops also arrested local sheikhs and omdas.²

Antonovs and helicopters would 'bomb everything that moved', including flocks and herds of animals, as well as water points, markets and buildings.¹ Lorries were used to carry off looted household contents – radios, clothes, pots and pans, mattresses and furniture. Once emptied, houses were burned down. The armed militia would loot livestock in the surrounding area. Rape was also practised.¹

Local SLM leaders reported three battles between government troops and the SLM/A in the Disa area, and two battles in Disa itself. Government troops withdrew to Kutum shortly after these battles. The GoS armed militia included the local Northern Rizeigat Arab group, who were recognised by villagers. The other armed militia were said to be Arabs from the Nile region of Sudan. The Nile Arabs were reportedly less aggressive than the local Arabs.² However, there was widespread and systematic destruction of homes and livelihood assets.

During the attacks, people fled their villages, and in some cases were followed and attacked. They travelled up to three hours on foot from Disa and hid out in the hills, in caves and in any crannies in the rocks. They survived by living on wild foods and by sneaking back to their villages to look for



any remains from the burnt grain stores. Some went to Mellit and were able to buy cereals, but they could not travel to Kutum as they risked being identified as with the opposition. No external help was forthcoming at this time.²

People returned to their villages in October 2003, after the first Abeche agreements were signed between the GoS and the SLM/A and the bombings had ceased. Only small numbers reportedly moved out of the area: about 2 per cent of households from Goweij moved to Kutum and to other parts of Darfur as a result of the conflict, but returned to grow crops during the 2004 rainy season.⁵ Some people were reported to be absent during the summer in Firgan, a camp three hours north-east of Disa, where they had small numbers of livestock.²

A number of displaced people from outside the area reportedly arrived between July and October 2003. These were people with relatives in the area, who came from Kebkabiya, Harajuna, Jebel Si, Um Borro, Kornoi, Tina, Fur Awiya and Abu Hamra,^{1,4} and who numbered approximately 2,000.¹ As groups returned to Disa and relatives arrived, there was a strong sense of community as people shared their assets, although the duration of sharing with their relatives was limited to about two months.⁴ For those who still had some resources, making loans to relatives was a means of spreading the risk of further looting by *Janjaweed* and others.⁴

Livelihoods before the crisis

Five Focus Groups in three different villages described their livelihoods before the crisis and in October 2004. Participants distinguished between two principal livelihood groups, farmers and herders, although most farmers had some livestock and some herders cultivated crops. All groups were engaged in the same six broad categories of livelihood strategy: agriculture (*goz* and *wadi* cultivation), livestock rearing, labour migration and sending back of remittances, collection of wild foods, casual labour and trade.

Focus Group 3 consisted predominantly of Zaghawa herders (agro-pastoralists), as illustrated by the relative importance of livestock to them as a source of income before the crisis (Figure 1).¹ The other groups were remarkably similar to one another in the relative importance of different food and income sources.

The proportions shown in Figure 1 represent middle-income groups. Better-off families would depend, in order of importance, on agriculture, livestock and trading, while poorer families would depend more on wild foods, labour migration and working for others locally (casual labour), as they owned far smaller numbers of livestock and had limited access to land.⁴

Cultivation

The majority of farms in the area are situated on *goz* soils and inter-cropping was practised, including the cultivation of millet, okra, broad beans, sesame, watermelon and *karkadeh* (hibiscus). Cultivable land was limited, and not everyone owned land. The size of plots of land for cultivation ranged from 10–50 feddans (1.038 acres).² Far fewer farmers had access to fertile *wadi* land (about 20%). Tomatoes and onions were grown in the *wadi* for sale in local markets.⁵

Land was administered by the sheikhs through the traditional hakura system. Each sheikh (both Fur and Zaghawa) administered a hakura, and was known as the '*Seed el Fass*', or 'Master of Acts'. Land was allocated on a lease system, for as long as the farmer lived. Focus Group members did not consider




Figure 1. Livelihoods in Disa before the crisis: principle sources of food and income for medium-income groups ^{1, 2, 4-6}

that land was a problem and said that generally there was not much trouble over it – unlike further south, where ‘they are very strict’.⁵ Traditionally, farmers must pay ‘*osure*’ (one-tenth of their produce) to the sheikh every year. This was sometimes very little, but normally the sheikh accepted whatever he was given. Inheritance of land was through the *sharia* system: two-thirds to a son and one-third to a daughter.⁵

Water was communally owned. The wells were all located near the *wadi* and their depth varied according to the season (10 metres during summer and 2 metres during the rainy season). The same water sources were used for both people and animals.

Livestock

Livestock production, herding and trade were critical livelihood strategies in this area, especially among the more pastoralist groups (Focus Group 3).¹ This was in part because farm land was limited and rainfall unreliable, but also because pastoralism was the principal livelihood strategy in the northern part of North Darfur. Livestock included goats and sheep, and some cattle. A better-off household might own 50 cows, 100 goats, 30 sheep and 30 camels.³ Among the more pastoralist Focus Group 3, a better-off household might own up to 70 camels.¹ Donkeys and camels were widely used as pack animals, together with a small number of horses.

Wild foods

Wild foods have always been an important source of food and were commonly used in the hungry season before the harvest. Examples include *koreb*, *difra*, *lalob*, *mukheit* and *nabak*.^{1, 5} People were generally very knowledgeable about the different foods available, their use and the preparation processes, which are very specific for each type of food. Wild foods were treated as a common resource, and were collected before animals came to graze. Women were responsible for their collection.



Labour migration and remittances

Before the crisis labour migration was considerable, with most households having one or more members working away from home. For two Focus Groups, labour migration and remittances were the second most important source of food and income, after agriculture.^{4,5} The most common destination for labour migrants was Omdurman (68 per cent), followed by elsewhere in Darfur (25 per cent), and then beyond Sudan's borders to Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq (8 per cent).⁵ The smaller numbers travelling outside Sudan were explained by the fact that only a few could afford the costs of travel (unless they worked their passage as herders).

Most labour migrants were men aged between 18 and 35 years, who were engaged in unskilled work, including tea-making, water collection (using donkeys and jerrycans), shoe polishing, laundry, etc.⁴ Labour migration work within Darfur included seasonal agricultural work and casual labouring work in El Fasher and Kutum (the rainy season is later in Disa than in other parts of the region, and therefore agricultural work continued further south for longer).⁵

Focus Groups identified two types of labour migrant overseas: those with work permits who transmitted money through the bank in El Fasher, and '*silkawei*', who are people with no legal status who purchased goods and sent them back hand-carried by friends.

Previously, remittances included money and some goods that were hand-carried on the various lorries and buses coming to Disa, particularly on market day. Remitted goods could be sold by friends of the remitter in El Fasher, who would then pass on the money to the family in accordance with his instructions. Remittances were sent at periodic intervals, including monthly, quarterly, bi-annually and annually, and the amounts varied accordingly. Every six weeks to three months was the most common, with sums ranging from SP 50,000 to SP 100,000, which amounts to between US\$78 and US\$350 per annum.^{4,6} The chief purpose of the money was to support people in their daily lives – to help pay for their basic needs⁵ and for investments in livestock.⁶

Between Omdurman and towns in Darfur, a *hawala* system based on trade networks used to operate. Cash remittances were sent in the form of goods between two merchants; one in Omdurman and one in Darfur (in this case in Kutum or El Fasher). The traders would agree on what items should be sent, according to what was needed in Darfur.⁵ A similar system used to operate between Libya and Darfur.¹ Traders operating in Libya (in Tagir Shanta) used workers' remittances to buy trading goods, which they then sold in Darfur, paying the remittances to the workers' families. Migrants working in Saudi Arabia and Iraq would sometimes use the banking system in Kutum.

Before the conflict, public transport between Disa and Omdurman meant that most remittances could be hand-carried all the way to Disa by friends or family of the migrant worker.⁵ Some goods and cash were also hand-carried by individuals travelling from Libya.¹ Remittances in kind included clothes, money, sugar, rice, flour, edible oil, biscuits, mats, perfumes, radios and TVs.¹

Trade

Before the crisis there were approximately 10–12 commodity traders in Disa, who brought goods from Kutum to Disa market.¹ They traded mostly in sugar, tomatoes, tea, oil, cloth, fruits and vegetables. There was also a small-scale trade in vegetables, chickens, grains, wild foods and milk in the rainy season.⁵ Traders would combine their capital to pay for a truckload of goods, as they could not afford this individually. In the past, traders in Kutum provided small village traders with commodities on loan, and would be paid after the following market day.¹



Livestock trade

Before the conflict, the villages in Disa between them produced approximately 400 camels (sold by individual producers and traders) and 5,000 sheep per year for sale. Four or five camel traders from Disa Village Council would each buy 40–50 camels, and then combine their herds to send them to market. Focus Group 3 reported that 60 per cent of the camel trade had previously been to Egypt, with only 40 per cent to Libya.¹ The reasons for this were that the Egypt route was generally considered more profitable and the road was more dependable, with access to water, while the route to Libya was riskier, taking 25–30 days, and had no water. Trucks might reduce the journey time to Libya, but the number of animals that could be carried this way was limited and the costs were high. The camel caravan route from Disa to Dongola took 40–45 days.

About 10 sheep traders sold up to 5,000 sheep each year in Omdurman (where trade was most profitable), and also transported sheep to Libya by truck or sold them locally in Mellit, Kutum or Disa markets (possibly to outside traders).¹ Traders would use their income from livestock sales to buy various commodities for sale back in Darfur.

Credit

Before the crisis there were no formal credit systems, and loans were available only from family members or friends. These were usually made in the agricultural season, based on personal agreements. Financial debt was therefore rare.⁵

Access to education and health care

There used to be six schools in Disa, all co-educational. The nearest high school was in Kutum, where pupils would live with friends and family. University was also an option for both boys and girls. However, since July 2003 all the schools have closed.

Even before the crisis, health services were poor – ‘*so poor we would have been better off without them*’, according to one Focus Group.⁵ There were immunisation programmes many years previously, but these had long since stopped. Disa had no trained midwife or traditional birth attendant, and relied on women elders in the villages to assist with deliveries. A number of women had died on their way to hospital in Kutum.⁵

Livelihoods after the crisis

The people currently living in the Disa area are struggling to survive, as the conflict has decimated their livelihoods, both directly and indirectly, in terms of the livelihood strategies that are currently available to them and their livelihood resource base.

Loss of livelihood assets

Months of land and air attacks, and associated looting and destruction of homesteads, have led to a massive loss of core livelihood assets, with a dramatic levelling effect across wealth groups throughout the community. One 65-year-old woman described how her homestead, which was composed of five thatched houses and seven *rakuba* (shelters), was totally burned. She also lost 25 sacks of millet, two boxes of utensils and tools and six trunks that contained all her property since her marriage (clothes, sleeping mats, bed sheets, sacks of seeds, etc.).¹

Almost every house in the area was burned and belongings destroyed, including the village grain stores, which contained an estimated 3,000 sacks of millet.² Mango trees and date palms were destroyed, and even trees and shrubs that provided wild foods were destroyed.



Loss of livestock

As a result of the looting, bombardments and destruction and poisoning of wells there has been a massive loss of livestock capital. Local estimates are that 80 per cent of livestock has been lost. Some of these losses have been caused by disease, including pneumonia, mange and pox.⁶

Dams and *hafirs* (used to catch and store rainwater) were destroyed, and wells were poisoned, killing sheep that drank from them.⁵ Aerial bombardments in 2003 created holes in the ground that subsequently filled with water, which poisoned animals when they drank it (although it is not clear how).⁵ Mills too were destroyed, so people resorted to the traditional *moor haka* stones, which fell out of use more than 30 years ago, to process cereals.²

Shift in livelihood strategies

The impact of the conflict on livelihoods is illustrated by the shift in livelihood strategies shown in Figure 2. Despite heavy losses of livestock, Focus Group 3 still remained heavily dependent on livestock. Indeed, the relative importance of livestock had increased, in part due to a decline in other food sources.¹

In 2003 the cultivation season was completely lost, as it coincided with the attacks on Disa and the battles between SLM/A and GoS forces. While people were hiding in the mountains it was impossible for them to cultivate crops. Seed stores were destroyed, and new stocks were available only from the eastern and northern parts of El Fasher, which are difficult to access. Principally for these reasons, agriculture was no longer a major source of food or income for Focus Groups 1, 2 and 4, as is clearly illustrated in Figure 2.

These groups have increased their reliance on wild foods, which now account for nearly 50 per cent of food and income sources for all three groups. Some wild foods have a resale value and would have been sold in Kutum market. Although it is possible to store certain wild foods, such as *mukheit*, for use throughout the year, their availability is highest during and just after the rainy season.

Focus Group 1 in Goweij were very hesitant about including food aid as one of their sources of food or income, as they had received a food distribution only once and did not trust it would come again.⁵


People in Disa claim to have a strong sense of community, sharing what they have with their displaced relatives.⁵ Those who have no resources of their own depend on their social relationships and on wild food.⁴ The proportion of female-headed households has increased to about 25 per cent as a result of male out-migration and death.

Livelihoods of IDPs in Disa

According to the Focus Groups, 90 per cent of the displaced people from western Dar Zaghawa and Kebkabiya, who were previously cattle owners/breeders, have had their cattle looted and currently have no livestock.¹

Restricted access to markets

The market in Disa no longer functions and people in the area depend mainly on women and girls travelling to Kutum market by donkey to buy cereals and other essential foods. Men do not go because it is feared they will be attacked and perhaps killed by the *Janjaweed*. The journey is hazardous and a longer roundabout route must be taken for reasons of safety, which extends the journey to seven days (2–3 days each way) from what was previously a one-day round trip.^{2,4} Once in Kutum, the women must conceal the fact that they are from Disa.²



*from proportional piling exercises

Figure 2. Livelihoods in Disa area, before the crisis and in October 2004

The women must obtain a permit (Figure 3) from the offices of the 'military intelligence and security' in order to transport goods beyond the checkpoints at the boundaries of Kutum town.^{2,5} For a fee of SP 2,000 (US\$0.78),^{2,4,7} the military and security office issues a permit listing the items they are permitted to purchase and transport on that particular day. Items and amounts are restricted – for example, to 8kg of cereals and in total to not more than one donkeyload. When the women return from the market, the army searches them at the military checkpoints and checks all the items they are carrying against those listed on the permit. If any additional items are found, all the goods are confiscated.⁵

Many consider that these trips to market by the women are responsible for keeping people in Disa alive.² However, because the amounts they can carry are so small, people here also depend on smuggling via Kutum. In recent months, some individuals and groups in Disa have started buying small numbers of livestock, which they can then smuggle to Kutum. They first travel eastwards, so that it appears they are coming from the east or south (rather than from the north where Disa is located). They enter Kasab IDP camp on the outskirts of Kutum at night with about 15–20 head of livestock and sell to middlemen in the camp. It is considered too dangerous to go directly to Kutum market.⁴

The government embargo on access to Kutum market extends to all Sudanese living outside the town's boundaries. This includes IDPs living in Kasab camp, who also need a permit to buy goods in Kutum and take them back to the camp.⁷ IDPs working as petty traders in the camp – selling matches, dried foods, tea, sugar, chillies, etc. – must purchase both a license to trade (which costs SP 1,000 per month) and a permit for all the goods they wish to sell.⁷



Figure 3. Examples of the permits required to take purchased goods outside of Kutum

Loss of livestock trade

Previously there were approximately 20–40 traders operating in the area, the biggest of whom could buy 75–100 head of livestock. Currently, however, the maximum number that can be purchased is only 10–15, in part because of the erosion of traders' capital and also because of the loss of livestock in the area.⁴

Remittances

Labour migration has all but ceased, as the route to Libya is closed and other parts of Darfur are insecure. Omdurman is currently the main destination for labour migration and the main source of remittances, although to a far lesser extent than before.⁶ For Focus Group 3, remittances have actually increased, because of strong kinship ties involving Chad.¹ Their relatives outside of Sudan and Chad transfer money to groups in Chad, which is then collected by the group in Disa. Some people from Disa use these cash remittances to buy goods from Chad and bring them back to sell, and then distribute the cash locally. It is generally felt that it is better to bring back goods rather than cash. If, however, cash is the choice, one person can bring money for many people.

Communications between the Disa area and the outside world have been seriously disrupted and this has severely curtailed the flow of remittances. Before the crisis there were telephone communications between Disa and Kutum, but now communications depend on the regular travel of women to the town. The previously regular transport between Disa and Omdurman has also ceased. This lack of communication



with towns means that those with bank accounts can no longer access them. One group talked of *'all bank accounts being frozen'*,⁵ but this could have been because banks in Kutum were closed.⁶

The group in Goreij⁵ explained that generally communications with people outside Sudan had been cut off and that nothing had been received from either Libya or Chad. Communications with Omdurman were somewhat easier – either through merchants based in Kutum who were in touch with merchants in Omdurman, or by sending hand-carried messages with travellers going to Omdurman from Kutum. There is no direct communication between families in Darfur and their relatives in Omdurman.

It is up to the women who go to Kutum to seek out travellers going on to Omdurman to pass on messages to relatives living and working there. These same travellers may bring back messages and even remittances for people in Disa. However, the women cannot bring back goods that have been sent from Omdurman with them from Kutum, because of the restrictions of the security permit, and also because of the high risk of looting along the route home.

Hawala system of merchant trade

The *hawala* system of merchant trade continues to function, whereby remittances are sent by migrant workers through merchants in Omdurman to merchants in Kutum. The *hawaldar* (intermediary) in Omdurman receives a cash remittance from the migrant worker, and uses it to buy the goods requested by the merchant in Kutum. The goods are then dispatched to Kutum, where the merchant sells them and passes on the money to the women from Disa. There is no charge for this service, as the *hawaldar* in Kutum benefits by receiving goods that he has personally requested. The nature of the goods depends very much on the individual requirements of traders.⁵

Humanitarian response in Disa

By October 2004, the people of Disa had received two food aid distributions – one on 28 August that was sufficient for one month, and another that was under way at that time. It was said that IDPs were not included in this latter distribution, which was targeted at the 5,700 residents of the 15 villages in the area.¹ In addition, there had been an emergency immunisation campaign in August 2004 and a distribution of blankets. The responses of the Focus Groups demonstrate that the people of Disa desperately need humanitarian assistance, yet they clearly have little confidence that it will continue.

Current and longer-term prospects and goals

All Focus Groups and interviewees spoke of their hopes for peace and security. When asked what was needed for peace, they responded that *'the Government should take seriously stopping the war against civilians, stop the Jinjaweed, stop looting and stop bombing by Antonovs'*. They raised the importance of compensation for destroyed and looted belongings and livestock, including the government's responsibility in this, as well as the importance of developing services in rural Darfur.^{4,5} In addition, the importance of reopening routes to Libya, Omdurman and other parts of Sudan was recognised.¹

Conclusions and recommendations

The conflict has contributed not only to a massive loss of livelihood capital, but has also severely constrained all livelihood activities. It has resulted in an economic embargo through tightly restricted



access to markets, which effectively places livelihoods in Disa under siege. Limited mobility and poor communications restrict labour migration and the sending back of remittances. Rebel control has contributed to improving security, as people have been able to return to their villages and are more able to go about their business (assuming that aerial bombardments do not recur).

Women have shouldered a large part of the burden of keeping these communities alive, both in travelling to Kutum to get supplies and also in gathering wild foods. Difficult household decisions have been made that select the strategy of least risk: i.e. it is better to risk being raped than risk being killed.

Even within a relatively small geographic area, there are differences in livelihood along ethnic lines. Some villages rely more on the risky route to Kutum, while others have established contacts in Chad and means of accessing markets there.

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6. Focus Group 4. Focus Group of women in Jary Village with AO. Disa (SLM controlled area), 2004.
7. Key Informant 1. Interview during transect walk HY. Kasab camp, Kutum, 2004.



Annex 4. Livelihoods in El Seraif

El Seraif town, with a population of 39,000 people, is situated in the north of Seraif Locality, in the west of Kebkabiya Province.¹ At the time of the 1993 census, there were 109,000 people in the Seraif Area Council. The Beni Hussein are the majority tribe, while other tribes include the Fur, Zaghawa, Tamir, Gimir and Masalit, and Arab groups. Approximately 25 per cent of the Beni Hussein are pastoralists, while the other 75 per cent are sedentary.²

History of the Beni Hussein

The Beni Hussein are an Arab group that for some time have had their own *dar* or traditional homeland – Dar Seraif – and Nazirate (Native Administration). The location of the *dar* has shifted eastwards since 1928 (Figure 3, Chapter 2), when it was located closer to El Fasher than to its current location. During the Mahdiya era, many Darfurian tribes were forced to move east to Omdurman to support the Mahdi (see Chapter 2). The Beni Hussein refused, however, and instead migrated westwards to Dar Burgo in Chad. They later returned after the defeat of the Mahdi and settled in Jebel Elatasha in North Darfur.¹

Dar Seraif was established as an administrative division during the Turkish era, and confirmed as part of the Native Administration under colonial/British rule. Beni Hussein leaders still proudly display a pair of drums that were a gift from the British administration, and which symbolised their traditional distinction as rulers of a *dar*. They have managed to maintain their tribal administration functions, despite the dissolution of the Native Administration by the government in 1970. The nazir of the Beni Hussein has participated in all the reconciliation conferences that have taken place in Darfur.³

The Beni Hussein's traditional leadership proudly claims that they were one of the first Arab tribes in Darfur to form strong and stable relations with other tribes, including those with the:

- Zaghawa to the north
- Fur and the Tamer to the east
- Gimir and the Masalit to the west
- Fur and the Arab tribes to the south.

They say they have no conflict with any other tribe, and have been careful not to attack or provoke other tribes. They consider their *dar* to be both stable and peaceful,¹ and have achieved this by using traditional systems of control over their own people, which have been maintained up until the onset of the current crisis. Before this, conflicts with neighbouring tribes generally involved isolated incidents that were often connected with looting. These could be dealt with through agreements:¹ for example, if there was any theft of livestock, it was the responsibility of the tribe that had control over the area to return animals to their owners. However, now that neighbouring tribes have become rebels, it is more difficult for the Beni Hussein to make agreements with them, as this would cause problems with other groups. It is beyond the tribe's capacity to address this wider level of conflict on its own.

Local impact of the conflict

The Beni Hussein tribal administration has been approached by both the Government and the opposition, seeking its support in the current conflict.¹ However, the position of the Beni Hussein is



that they have no wish to 'take sides', and they want Dar Seraif to provide a safe haven for different communities and tribes. Their geographic location has enabled them to maintain their neutral position, in that they represent a buffer zone between government troops, especially in Kebkabiya, and the rebel groups to the north.³

The Beni Hussein have suffered looting and the deaths of some of their members, partly because they have no alliance with the rebel Zaghawa/Bideyat groups to the north. Rebels have also targeted them when looting supplies, particularly of meat and other foodstuffs. When they have pursued looters, further conflict and deaths have resulted.¹

Despite this, the conflict has had relatively little impact on Dar Seraif; according to one source, '*they did not attack anyone and no-one attacked them*'.² However, villages on the borders of the *dar* have been affected. For example, in November 2003 at Goz Naieem on the northern border, a quarrel between the Beni Hussein and the Zaghawa led to the Beni Hussein being attacked by rebels, with 14 people killed and 17 wounded.¹ The rebels have now taken control of that area.

Links with GoS, Khartoum

Members of the Beni Hussein have been trained as part of the Popular Defence Force (PDF), but the tribe has an agreement with the government that such men should only be deployed locally within the *dar* i.e. under local control and with the aim of keeping order and providing security locally.¹

Local informants suggested there were disagreements between senior officers and local men.⁴ One important Beni Hussein army official is General El Hadi Hamid, Director of the Border Intelligence Force, who is based in Khartoum but is from Dar Seraif and is the brother of the tribal leader.

In the North–South conflict, individual Beni Hussein members have participated in the *jihad* in the south, although this was not supported by the Beni Hussein tribal administration. Similarly, some individual members have responded to the government's call and joined the government mobilised armed militia. The tribal administration sees this as an individual livelihood choice, and does not support or encourage it.¹

Traditional systems of security and protection

The *Ageet* system is the tribe's traditional system of control and protection.¹ The Beni Hussein are divided into a number of groups each under the command of a leader known as an *Ageet*, whose role is to provide protection and security in a given area. There are many *Ageets* within the tribe, and they function as a kind of security force. These commanders know everyone in their territory – '*who he is and why he came*'. If there is any conflict or looting, the *Ageet* will collect his followers to go after the transgressors. The *Ageet* system is an ancient and traditional one that the Beni Hussein have managed to maintain, but it is facing new pressures caused by the current level of conflict and looting.

Livelihoods before the crisis

Livelihood strategies of the Beni Hussein before the crisis included:

- livestock production (cows, goats, sheep, donkeys, horses, some camels)
- cultivation of crops, including on *goz* or sandy soils (millet, sesame, peanuts, okra, beans) and on alluvial *wadi* soils (sorghum, tomatoes, okra, watermelons, chillies)
- labour migration within Darfur and to Omdurman and to other countries, especially Libya
- small-scale trading, tea stalls, sale of prepared foods [flat bread (*kisra*), beans (*foul*), yoghurt]



- sale of firewood/charcoal (the latter is limited to poorer groups)
- consumption of wild foods (*difra, koreb, mukheit, nabak, lalob, girgedem, gidem*): used mostly by poorer groups but more generally in years of scarcity.

The relative importance of these food sources is shown in Figure 1.

Seasonal migration of livestock

The seasonal migration of livestock involves movement south to summer pastures during the hot summer months, and northwards at the beginning of the rainy season.^{3,5} In summer (the hot season is from April to May/June), herders move their cattle southwards from Zalingi to summer pastures in Um Dokhan and Wadi Saleh. In July, at the beginning of the rainy season, they begin to move north and by August they reach El Seraif and continue to Abusnuot. In October/November they move further north to El Genit and in January they move up to El Gisou, returning south in February. By March they are in Wadi Bari, and in April back in Wadi Saleh once again.⁴ Their movements are dictated by the rainy season and by issues of security.

Table 1. Livestock migration routes for the Beni Hussein, Dar Seraif³

	Month	Area on migration route (pre-crisis)	During the crisis
Winter – dry season	January	El Gisou	Cannot access these areas
	February–March	Wadi Bari and Wadi Azoum	
Summer – hot season	April–June	Wadi Saleh	
Autumn – rainy season	July	Start to move north from the summer pastures	
	August	El Seraif Abusnuot	Currently in Abusnuot
	September	Abusnuot	Cannot access these areas
Winter – dry season	October–December	Move northward to El Genit	

Labour migration and remittances

Labour migration – mostly to Libya, but also to Egypt and Saudi Arabia – was very common before the conflict. According to one Focus Group, every household was said to have had a member living and working in Libya⁵ (out of a population of 39,000, this would mean 6,500 men). The numbers of men going there reached a peak in the drought years of 1973, 1984 and 1991.

Libya was a popular destination as it was easy for men to travel there by lorry or as herders working their passage with the camel caravans. The majority of those in Libya are there illegally, with no identity papers or passport, working as herders, farm labourers, guards, construction workers, etc.¹ The period spent in Libya varies from one to two years, though some '*stay so long their wives ask for divorce*'.⁵ Hardly any women go, except for a very few who are the wives of officials.

In the past, groups of men from Beni Hussein travelled to Libya together and stayed together as a group. Remittances for the entire group were hand-carried back by an individual member returning home. The amounts sent back varied from SP 100,000 to SP 150,000 (US\$39–US\$58) a year.⁵ Apart

from remittances sent to cover basic household needs, money was sometimes sent back to pay for festivals (e.g. Eid) or to pay for marriages or funerals.

The numbers working in Saudi Arabia, by contrast, are very small, with only five men from Seraif known to be working there at present.⁵ Most of those who go to Saudi Arabia do so legally. Remittances from Saudi Arabia were sent through the banking system and collected from banks in El Fasher, Kebkabiya or Zalingi, indicating that the work these labour migrants were undertaking was on a more official basis and was better paid. There is no *hawala* system in Dar Seraif because there are none of the larger traders who are needed to make it work.

Markets

A weekly market continues to operate in El Seraif, which is accessed by people in the surrounding rural areas. The important livestock markets were considered to be those at El Fasher, Kebkabiya, Seraf Umra, El Geneina, Nyala, Zalingi, El Obeid, Gebeish and Omdurman. There were no livestock traders with direct links to Libya in El Seraif. The largest market for camels in North Darfur was considered to be Mellit, though Seraf Umra was the main supplier to Mellit.³ Approximately 2,000 to 3,000 camels were exported annually to Libya.

Livelihoods after the crisis

The Beni Hussein have been among the least affected by the crisis of all tribes in Darfur, yet the indirect impacts of insecurity on access to markets, the availability of goods in local markets and mobility (both of livestock and labour) have significantly affected their livelihoods. Changes in livelihood strategies are shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Livelihood strategies in El Seraif, pre-crisis and currently⁵

Figure 1 shows the importance of the cultivation of crops, on both *goz* and *wadi* soils, which previously accounted for about 50 per cent of household sources of food and income, while livestock contributed 30 per cent.⁵ These proportions were considered to be similar for poorer groups, although the amounts generated were smaller. The poorer groups also relied more heavily on wild foods and on the trading of firewood and charcoal.

The relative importance of cultivation (of both *goz* and *wadi*) has increased as that of livestock has declined. Of all the areas visited by the team, fields in this area appeared to have the best harvest prospects, with fields of millet and sorghum in particular appearing promising.

Curtailment of livestock migration

Currently livestock movements are severely restricted, and herds can move only within the *dar*, as far north as Abusnuot or as far south as Wadi Saleh. In the past, the Beni Hussein provided protection to nomadic members of the tribe. However, now that the level of conflict has escalated beyond individual disputes, the tribe cannot guarantee the safety of nomads, who might not be known to the warring parties. Previously, any theft or looting within the area of an *Ageet* was his own responsibility. The Beni Hussein predict that their inability to move with their livestock will quickly result in over-grazing and water shortages and will increase the potential for outbreaks of disease.^{3,4}

Direct consumption of livestock products

Since the crisis, livestock as a source of food and income has declined from 30 per cent to 23 per cent of the total. Livestock represents a source both of food and income through the production of milk, meat and skins (for own consumption and for sale) and through the sale of live animals. Before the crisis, about one-third of livestock-based food and income came from milk, meat and skins, while the other two-thirds was from livestock sales (Figure 2). This pattern has now been reversed, with less than one-third of livestock revenue coming from sales, while the rest is direct consumption. When livestock production declines, households focus on *wadi* cultivation.




Figure 2. Proportion of food and income provided by livestock sales (live animals) and milk, meat and skins in El Seraif, pre-crisis and currently⁵



Market shortages of basic commodities from Libya

The prices of goods imported from Libya have increased: a sack of millet now costs SP 10,000 compared with SP 100,000 previously, while the price of 0.45 kg of sugar has increased from SP 750 to SP 1,500. The reason for this is that roads are closed, because they are no longer safe.¹ In the past, a very important strategic trade route ran from El Kufra in Libya to Tina and on to Nyala through El Seraif. However, this has been closed since March 2003, which has led to shortages of many basic commodities, such as sugar, flour, oil, wheat, rice, fuel, batteries and clothes. Very few lorries now pass through Tina to El Geneina.

Communications and remittances

Women describe the two main implications of the wider conflict as being an increase in the numbers of IDPs in El Seraif with whom they share resources, and their own inability to travel far, including for potentially life-saving trips to hospital in Kebkabiya or El Fasher. People travelling on these roads are frequently attacked.⁵

IDPs in Dar Seraif

The Beni Hussein Native Administration has allowed IDPs to settle within its *dar*, provided they abide by its systems. This effectively provides the IDPs with protection. The Beni Hussein omdas estimate there are 13,000 IDPs in their area, mostly in small groups rather than in camps. Some IDPs have brought their livestock with them. Displaced people include the Owwad Mann and the Darok tribes, who were forced to move from Abou Jidad (in the Kulbus area) in July 2003, and are now in Octani.¹

Humanitarian assistance

El Seraif town has received food aid once, in July 2004, but many people missed out as they were absent.² Immunisation was also carried out in September 2004.

Goals

The current goals of the Beni Hussein are peace, education, development and the building of proper roads, particularly to Kebkabiya and to Nyala. Education is a particular concern: there are few teachers, and they are leaving as they are afraid to stay. Children cannot travel to town to take their examinations as the road is unsafe. University students returning from El Fasher have been attacked and robbed of their possessions along the way.

Conclusions

Seraif locality is unusual in that the Beni Hussein Native Administration has striven to maintain security and stability within its *dar*. To do this, it has resisted supporting either the rebel opposition movements or the government counter-insurgency. Nevertheless, its traditional security systems have come under increasing pressure and they can no longer guarantee the safety of pastoralist groups in particular.

Unlike in other areas, few households have been attacked directly and therefore people have not suffered the direct loss of livelihood assets. However, the wider economic impacts of the conflict have been felt here, particularly the lack of mobility caused by the general situation of insecurity, which restricts livestock migration and the sale of livestock, and also labour migration, which has led to a loss of income from remittances. While income from livestock sales has declined, the use of livestock



products as a source of food has increased. There are also shortages of basic commodities that were previously imported from Libya. Although the Beni Hussein are still better off than many other tribes, they are fearful of what is to come.

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Annex 5. Livelihoods in Mellit

Introduction

The town of Mellit is the capital of Mellit Province and lies approximately 60km north of El Fasher. Before the current crisis, it was an important and vibrant commercial centre, as it provided a land port at the southern end of the trade route between Libya and North Darfur. From Mellit, commodities imported from Libya were re-directed to other parts of Darfur and Sudan. The town was a major livestock market, from which livestock was exported from North Darfur to Libya.

The major tribal groups in the province include the Berti, the Meidob and the Zayadia. In addition, Zaghawa, Fellata, Fur, Meidob and other small groups co-exist in Mellit town. All these groups come under the tribal administration of the King of the Berti, who resides in Mellit, although the Zayadia have their own independent *omodiya*.^{1, 2} In the past, these groups have lived together largely peacefully, although there have been some tensions between the (non-Arab) Berti and the (Arab) Zayadia, dating back as far as the 1950s. In the 1990s these tensions developed into points of real conflict.³

During the rainy season, livestock used to graze in the area before moving northwards as far as Wadi Hawa in the dry season. However, livestock migration was constrained after the tribal conflict between the Meidob and the Berti in 2000.³

The SLM/A and JEM opposition groups have their headquarters close to Mellit. The SLM/A, which is made up mostly of Fur and Tunjur, is based around the town, while the JEM is based further north, in an area said to be its heartland and dominated by the western Meidob and the Zaghawa.⁴

At the time of the team's visit, the atmosphere inside the town of Mellit was generally tense, and the ethnic polarisation between the Arab Zayadia on one side and the Berti, Fur and Zaghawa on the other was palpable. Social relations between the two groups are currently minimal, whereas in the past they would visit one another for marriages or funerals, and offer reciprocal assistance in times of hardship.

Mellit town has become a shadow of its former self, with the majority of shops closed and boarded up, the markets empty and few people around – in stark contrast to how it used to be. Armed rebel groups attacked the town on 15 May 2003, after which the banks and customs office were closed. This was followed by the closure of the route to Libya and the national border. This (done, according to one Key Informant, because of the war between the GoS and the rebels), combined with insecurity, which restricts access to markets, was largely responsible for the cessation of trade with Libya.

Attacks on the surrounding villages by pro-government groups, who burned houses and looted livestock, have displaced both Berti and Zayadia residents to Mellit. These displaced groups are living with relatives in the town; there are no camps for IDPs.

The Zayadia in Mellit

The Arab Zayadia are organised under three main *omodiya*: the Awlad Hamour, Eldababa and Awlad Madal sub-tribes. The *omodiya* carry out the usual tribal administration roles, including the administration



of land for farming and the resolution of disputes. The Zayadia in and around Mellit, including the Awlad Mafadal and Awlad Gabir sub-tribes, are farming communities. The Zayadia of El Cuma, Sari, Um Heglig, Gebeish and Elmajror (the Awlad Garbou sub-tribe) are nomadic groups. Dar Zayadia – the Zayadia's homeland – lies south of Dar Berti, in the south-east of Mellit Locality and extending approximately 450km in a North–South direction, as far as the border between Darfur and Kordofan.⁵

Attacks by rebels (reportedly based at a camp in the south of Mellit Province) on the Zayadia communities living outside Mellit started in 2004. The Zayadia farmers were unable to cultivate their fields because of the lack of security, and displaced people fled to El Cuma, Sari and Um Heglig.⁴

Zayadia leaders in Mellit claimed that the rebels attacked 42 farming villages, burned 368 huts and stole 350 goats.⁶ One village (Saidia) was reportedly burned by mistake by government troops who were chasing the rebels. According to the Zayadia leadership, 1,501 Zayadia families in Mellit – totaling 9,228 individuals – have been directly affected by the conflict.⁶ In addition, 416 families from El Wakhaim and 446 from Elmajror have since moved to Mellit, leaving behind their livestock to the east of El Cuma. Their access to traditional grazing areas between Mellit and El Wakhaim is now disrupted.⁴ The Zayadia displaced from these villages have been staying with relatives in Mellit.

There are estimated to be around 1,500 people in Mellit who need assistance immediately, as they are suffering from food shortages.⁴ Many of these are from Sennahaya, which was attacked in March 2004 by *Janjaweed* militia. Both Berti and Zayadia were displaced, houses were burned and livestock was looted.

Zayadia livelihoods before the current conflict

The Zayadia include both farming communities and herders (agro-pastoralists), and have been described as nomads in the process of becoming settled.⁵ The northern Zayadia have remained camel-herding nomads, while members of the tribe further south around Mellit and El Cuma have become settled millet farmers since the famine years of the mid 1980s. During the transitional stage, women were responsible for cultivation while the men migrated with their livestock (camels and sheep).⁵ Female-headed households are common (about 25 per cent), in part as a result of the migration of men to Libya and elsewhere. Like many Arab groups, the Zayadia have high rates of illiteracy (about 60–70 per cent).

The livelihoods of the two Zayadia Focus Groups interviewed (one composed of men and one of women), were predominantly agricultural,⁷ with 40 per cent of their annual food and income coming from *goz* (millet and watermelon) and *wadi* cultivation (see Figure 1). Rainfed cultivation of sandy soils is a risky business in this area, with rainfall averaging only 250mm per annum and often being poorly distributed. Farming is therefore combined with other livelihood strategies, including livestock rearing, labour migration, trade and the production of handicrafts. The typical land and livestock holdings for Zayadia families living around Mellit are shown below.

With the first rains in June camels and sheep would be taken to South Darfur until August, after which they migrated northwards to the pastureland around Mareiga (Dar Meidob) for a brief period. They returned to the villages in September and stayed near local boreholes during the dry season. In very wet years, the animals would spend the winter months as far as 500km to the north-west, in the Gisou area near Wadi Hawar.⁵ However, in recent years these routes have been disrupted by tribal conflict.

Trading activities in Mellit included the livestock export trade to Libya and Egypt, the import of goods from Libya and trade with Khartoum and Omdurman, as well as with other parts of Darfur. Many of

Table 1. Typical Zayadia land holdings before the crisis (*mukhama*)⁸

Land holdings	Poor	Average	Rich
Çoz	3	6–7	10
Wadi	1	3–4	5

¹ *mukhamas* = about 1 hectare

Table 2. Typical Zayadia livestock holdings before the crisis (head of livestock)⁸

Livestock holdings	Poor	Average	Rich
Sheep/goats	5–10	50–100	100–150
Camels	0	30–50	50–100
Donkeys	Most families had one donkey		

the large-scale livestock traders doubled as livestock producers: for example, each of the fifty locally based *jelaba* raised more than 1,000 ewes and over 100 camels.⁹

The Zayadia have a long history of links with Libya, for trading purposes and for labour migration. A Focus Group estimated that four out of 10 families have a male family member working in Libya.⁷ The migrants who have wives and families in Darfur may stay in Libya for about 2 years while single men may stay for 5 to 10 years. The Focus Group estimated that approximately 40% of labour migrants did not send remittances, while 20% sent about US\$100 every 6 months (US\$200 annually), and another 40% sent around US\$150 every 3–6 months (US\$300 to US\$600 annually).

Remittances were usually hand-carried by the worker himself or by friends or family travelling back to Mellit. Remittances were also closely connected with trade: traders would use the remittances to buy goods to send to Mellit, which were then exchanged for cash, which was passed on to the end recipient. The cash-based hawala system was hardly ever used, though cash was employed for daily expenses, to pay debts and to invest in livestock.

The Zayadia are known throughout Darfur for their distinctive leatherwork, including handicrafts. These handicrafts were practised mainly by women, and the goods sold in Mellit market. In addition to leatherworking, women also collected firewood and grass.

Zayadia livelihoods since the crisis

Shifts in livelihood strategies as a result of the crisis are shown in Figure 1. The current state of insecurity limits people's movement outside of Mellit town. The Zayadia believe that to move more than 1km outside the town's boundaries is to risk attack by rebel groups. As a result, they are currently unable to cultivate their fields and do not expect a harvest. Cars and lorries are also at risk – for example, recently four vehicles belonging to Zayadia in Mellit were taken by the rebels.

Livestock migration has been seriously affected. Traders in Mellit reported that water points north of the town, consisting of surface dams and wells in Abuhila, Abugemera, Amboru, Disr, Farawaja, Karo

Karwoy, Musbat, Orshi, Shige and Tina, had been destroyed by aerial bombardments, deliberately buried by soldiers, or poisoned.⁹ Because of this, livestock that should have grazed north of Mellit and Dar Zaghawa between August and October had been moved to eastern parts of Mellit and El Fasher. Herders feared that water sources and pasture in these areas could be depleted at the start, or by the middle of, the dry season.




Figure 1. Activities of the Zayadia in Mellit⁷

Labour migration to Libya used to contribute 25 per cent of Zayadia households' food and income sources, of which 18 per cent was contributed directly by labour while 7 per cent related to various trading activities with Libya. This has now been reduced to 20 per cent, due to the closure of the Sudan–Libya border and the looting of commercial herds by rebel groups. One of the consequences of the loss of trade is a loss of capital, and this will hinder the capacity of households to resume these activities when trade routes are eventually reopened.

Livestock herding as a source of household food and income has decreased from 20 per cent to 10 per cent because of livestock looting and the deteriorating condition of animals, as they are trapped within a confined area, with no migratory movements since last year. Winter grazing land, particularly north of El Wakhaim, Wadi Hawar and Gisou, is now out of bounds due to tribal conflicts between the Berti, Meidob and Zaghawa, and also because of rebel activity. Consequently, Zayadia herds are now mostly restricted to Sari, El Cuma, Um Heglig and Gebeish. Some herds are known to have moved north, but the Zayadia cannot keep in touch with them or follow up because of insecurity.

The livestock trade has markedly decreased because:

1. Livestock is trapped in remote and inaccessible areas and is vulnerable to looting by rebels.
2. Access to Mellit market is restricted because of insecurity.
3. There has been a decrease in livestock numbers.
4. The capital of livestock traders has been eroded, as a result of attacks and the looting of camel caravans in North Darfur.



The Zayadia's close links with Libya have been broken as a result of the conflict: firstly, by the closure of the national boundary between Sudan and Libya, which has prevented labour migration and the flow of remittances; secondly, by the general state of insecurity due to the fact that the rebels control the main routes; and, finally, by the large-scale attacks, kidnappings and looting of camel caravans en route to Libya (see Chapter 5). In one incident near Nukheila in early 2004, about 2,100 camels were taken, with a market value of between US\$500,000 (at Darfur prices) and more than US\$1m (at Libyan prices).

Zayadia traders believed they were being selectively targeted by the rebel groups, and many of them have moved to Kebkabiya market. However, in addition to the looting of camel caravans, they have lost some 6,200 head of livestock, looted in the Kebkabiya area on the way to Omdurman. The closure of the routes to Libya, restricted access to market and the erosion of capital have led also to a reduction in general trade.

Migration to towns is a new strategy for the Zayadia. Previously, men used to migrate mainly to Libya, but this is no longer possible. To cope with the current crisis, many of them (about 7 per cent) have moved to towns such as El Fasher and Omdurman. A high proportion of men (40 per cent) are now without any livelihood strategies, for the following reasons:

- inability to farm
- displacement
- trade has all but ceased
- the routes to Libya are closed
- most of the population is now poor, particularly because of livestock losses.

Because of the border closure, remittances from Libya have been very limited. What remittances there have been consist mainly of cash, which is hand-carried by people travelling by air from Kufra in Libya to El Fasher, or sent via the *hawala* system centred on El Fasher.

Income from leatherworking has also decreased. Before the conflict, there were around 200 *rakuba* (temporary shops) in Mellit selling handicrafts; these have been reduced to about 13, as a direct result of the closure of trade routes and the general decline in Mellit market. Nevertheless, leatherwork is still making an important contribution to food security for people in the town. In addition, Zayadia women put themselves at risk of attack by collecting grass, wild fruits and firewood outside the town.⁸ The price of firewood has increased from SP 300–500 per donkey load (about 25 US cents) before the crisis to around SP 1,000 per donkey load (about US\$4).

In general, the town of Mellit is a place of siege for the Zayadia, as they are cut off from all their usual livelihood strategies. Their social support systems are breaking down. Previously, better-off families would be able to support their poorer relatives. Now, as one Zayadia woman put it: *'All people are now the same. All the families' camels and goats are gone. Now we are all poor.'*⁸ According to another informant, *'There is not one single family that is not in debt'*; this is in large part linked to the failing livestock trade and major losses of capital.⁸

The proportion of female-headed households is thought to be increasing but, generally, the tribal administration systems remain intact and strong. This was demonstrated by the recent negotiations between the Zayadia and the Meidob, mediated by the Kawahla (of Kordofan).

Humanitarian assistance

Despite the gravity of the situation, the Zayadia have not received any support from international humanitarian organisations. At the time of the team's visit, no international organisation had offered



assistance or support, and the Zayadia believed that such organisations had influenced the situation.⁶ The only food assistance received by those in Mellit was provided by the GoS (this included 300 sacks of sorghum, 20 sacks of sugar, 25 sacks of pasta, 20 sacks of onions, 20 cartons of soap and 30 cartons of biscuits). The only assistance from the international community was directed to the Zayadia village that was mistakenly attacked by government troops.

The Zayadia perceived that services to Arab villages (education, health, water) were completely lacking and that international aid and assistance were biased. They saw that assistance was going to Berti areas (e.g. El Sayah), while they had received none, despite their sufferings.

Current and longer-term prospects and goals

Food, security and peace were the immediate hopes of the Zayadia people who were interviewed. The Focus Groups agreed that the first step in establishing peace lay in addressing the wider conflict between the rebels and the GoS, while the more local-level conflicts could be addressed through local reconciliation conferences. Improved security meant increasing mobility and access to markets and land. The tribe's leadership expressed the belief that *'The conflict was launched with the purpose of eradicating Arab ethnicity in Darfur.'* Clearly, all sides in this conflict have deeply rooted fears, and it is not for the international community to take sides.

The Berti

Mellit is the northern capital of Dar Berti – the homeland of the Berti tribe, ruled by the King of the Berti. Um Keddada is the southern capital. The non-Arab Berti are the biggest tribe in Mellit and also the majority tribe in North Darfur (since 1995, when the region was split into three states). They have increased the areas under their tribal administration from three omodiya to 23, in a bid to boost their rights in the ownership of land and their participation in authority (see Chapter 2).

In the past, the Berti have had local disagreements and conflicts with other groups, including the Zaghawa and the Zayadia, but these were addressed through local processes and have since settled down. However, since the recent wider conflict began, relations between tribes have become polarised, as members have looked for solidarity within their own groups.¹

According to the King of the Berti, following clashes at the beginning of 2004, people were displaced and sought refuge in Mellit with their relatives and fellow tribesmen. In March 2004, the attack on Sennahaya near Mellit by the *Janjaweed* militia left houses destroyed, livestock looted and both Berti and Zayadia displaced. Both Arab and non-Arab IDPs are now living with residents in the town.¹

Livelihoods before the crisis

The Berti are sedentary farmers who normally practice *goz* cultivation of millet and watermelon and *wadi* cultivation of *karkadeh*, sesame and groundnuts. These, together with livestock production, contribute the majority of their food and income. Figure 2 shows sources of food and income before the conflict for a Focus Group made up of Berti women. This group reported very little labour migration, either to Libya or elsewhere in Darfur.

Before the crisis, there was a hawala system linked with trade. Traders would take cash from remitters in Libya and then buy goods. These goods would be sent to Darfur where they would be sold, and the money passed on to the end recipient. Communications with migrant labourers were therefore maintained through the traders.¹⁰

Berti livelihoods after the crisis

Like the Zayadia, the Berti feel that insecurity limits cultivation and mobility outside of Mellit. According to one leader: *'If you dare to leave, you risk attack from the tribes that you have a problem with.'* For the




Figure 2. Pre-crisis sources of food and income for displaced Berti women in Mellit town

Berti, this means the Arab tribes, including the Zayadia, who some of them perceive to be *Janjaweed*.¹ Berti leaders report shortages of water and many livestock deaths, although the team saw no direct evidence of this. However, the shortage of pasture and the lack of security limiting livestock migration are certainly expected to contribute to livestock deaths.

Many Berti women and children have moved to Mellit for safety and, initially, they received some help from their relatives and from other citizens.¹⁰ However, the only work available to them is as domestic servants to townspeople: rates of pay are about SP 2,000 (less than US\$1) for 3–4 hours' work. Some of the women in the Focus Group also reported collecting grass and firewood, with half a day's work yielding about SP 1,500–2,000 (less than US\$1). They were concerned about security, but the fact that they were able to carry out these activities indicates that they are relatively safe in comparison with Zayadia women, who would not risk venturing out. The women also reported that they had borrowed money from relatives.¹⁰

Generally, the Berti Focus Group did not report labour migration among their kin, or receiving remittances, except for the one man present, who had a brother in Libya. When his mother died, his brother sent money from Libya (SP 500,000, or about US\$200) through a friend, who travelled by plane from Benghazi to El Fasher. This man said the costs of phoning were prohibitively expensive.¹⁰ Although they were displaced, it is likely this group represented the better-off members of the Berti tribe.

Some traders have left to go to Khartoum; as the Berti King put it, *The "haves" leave and the "have-nots" stay*.¹

Humanitarian assistance

The Berti have received some assistance from the Saudi Red Crescent, the ICRC and from the WFP. UNICEF had a cash-for-work project operating at the time of the team's visit, employing Berti men to produce latrine covers. Men were paid SP 5,000–6000 (US\$2) per day, but this was only temporary.¹⁰



One month previously the Berti had received food aid (90kg of sorghum for four people, 2–3kg of salt, 1–1.5kg of lentils).¹⁰

The goals of the Berti are stability, security and peace, so that they can start over again.¹⁰

Conclusions

The livelihoods of the Berti and Zayadia have strong similarities, but also marked differences. While both groups are farmers and rear livestock, the Zayadia have much stronger links with Libya in terms of labour migration and the sending back of remittances. They are also more involved in the livestock export trade and in the import trade of general goods.

The conflict in Darfur between the SLM/A/JEM and the GoS has severely affected the livelihoods of all groups in Mellit, though some more than others. The Arab Zayadia, for instance, seem to be worse-off than the non-Arab Berti, yet they have received little or no humanitarian assistance. All the Zayadia's livelihood strategies have been severely curtailed and they are living under siege in Mellit, yet are not recognised as IDPs. They are cut off from their relatives and other tribe members, and have restricted access to their farms and to their traditional livestock migratory routes in the north. They have become reliant for supplies of firewood and fodder on other tribes who are not afraid of the rebels. These tribes are able to charge them a high price for such commodities.

The closure of the national border between Libya and Sudan, and of trade routes to other parts of the country, has particularly affected groups in Mellit, in terms of huge losses of trade in livestock and general commodities, major losses of capital for traders whose caravans have been looted, the prevention of travel for labour migration and the stopping of remittances. Work for herders has also been affected. Livelihood strategies such as leatherworking and handicrafts, which are linked to both livestock rearing and trade, have also suffered. The Zayadia perceive international organisations to be biased towards the non-Arab groups, and this will serve only to enflame the conflict and create further polarisation.

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7. Focus Group 3. Focus Group – Zayadia men with AO. Mellit, 2004.
8. Focus Group 4. Focus Group Zayadia women with RD. Mellit, 2004:30 September, 2004.
9. Focus Group YA. Focus Group interview with livestock traders. Mellit, 2004.
10. Focus Group 2. Focus Group Berti women with HY. Mellit, 2004.



Annex 6. Livelihoods in El Geneina

Introduction

The state of West Darfur is one of the most geographically remote areas in northern Sudan, located on the country's western border with Chad and the Central African Republic. The state is divided into six localities – El Geneina, Habila, Kulbus, Jebel Mara, Zalingi and Wadi Saleh – with El Geneina as its capital.

Many of the tribes in West Darfur have sub-tribes and/or territories (*dar*) on both sides of the international border, a factor that has eased relocation or resettlement, especially in periods of crisis.^{1, 1} The Masalit, who are primarily sedentary farmers, are the largest tribe and are concentrated in the southern half of the *dar*, including the areas to the east and west of Geneina. To the south of the Masalit, around Fora Boranga, are the Sinyar. North of Geneina (from south to north) are the Erenga, Jabal and Gimir. Other significant sedentary farming populations include the Maba, Tama, Zaghawa, Daju, Burgo and Marariet.

Arab groups include the Turgem, Hottiyya, Otryya, Mahadi and Darok to the north-east of El Geneina. There are also groups of nomadic pastoralists who migrate seasonally to West Darfur from outside the region, including, for example, the Northern Rizeigat, Owiad Rashid, Salamat, Beni Halba, Zayadia and Khuzam.

There are few data available on the relative proportions of Arab to non-Arab groups. The last census to record such details was carried out in 1983. This showed that the proportion of nomads in northern Darfur was highest in Kebkabiya (28 per cent of the population) and Kutum (16 per cent), while in Geneina the proportion was 19 per cent.²

The region has a good rainfall² and relative abundance of groundwater, especially in the southern part of the state, which attracts nomadic groups from North Darfur as well as from across the borders. The northern *Abbala* Arabs have long used the numerous *wadis* that cross West Darfur for their dry-season grazing. The flow of movement and resettlement in the region from across national borders and from North Darfur has increased in the past 20 years, due to the drought in the north and the conflicts in Chad.

The state is characterised by a relatively rich natural resource base, with fertile land suitable for agricultural production, together with grazing pasture, forests and water sources provided by the relatively good rainfall and a number of seasonal rivers (Wadi Kaja, Wadi Azoum and Wadi Bari). Its high productivity is reflected in its higher population density, compared with North Darfur. The areas along the banks of the *wadis* provide the only dry-season grazing (from February to June) for almost all of the agro-pastoralists in the region, as well as the *Abbala* Arabs from northern Darfur and from Chad.

¹ Historically, the boundaries of the tribal *dar* of the Masalit, Gimir and Fur extended beyond the current national border of Sudan into Chad (Figure 3 Chapter 2).

² The ten-year average annual rainfall for El Geneina from 1970 to 1980 was just over 400mm per annum, and the average for 1980 to 1985 was 300mm. For El Fasher, the figures were approximately 200mm and 150mm (Swift and Gray, 1989, quoting J. Morton).

The Masalit and Gimir Sultanates

Historically western Darfur was the home of a number of western Sudanic kingdoms, including the Gimir, the Jabal and the Masalit Sultanates, who had closer economic ties with Chad than with Sudan. The Gimir Sultanate was established in seventeenth century, and the Masalit Sultanate was established following the conquest of the Fur Sultanate in 1874 by Turkish forces. Prior to this date the Masalit were not politically or administratively unified. People lived clan by clan without much contact¹. The Sultanate of the Masalit came to include the Dar of the Erenga, Jabal and several Arab groups apart from that of the Masalit (Figure 1). Part of the latter ceased to belong to the Sultanate after 1912 when Andka; the fourth Sultan; ceded part of his country to the French conquerors of Weddai in the current Chad. By 1924 Dar Masalit came to include part of Dar Sinyar in the south following the delimitation of the Chado-Sudanese boundary².

While the rise of the Masalit Sultanate was triggered by the occupation of the Turko Egyptian rule of Dar Fur, the overthrow of Turko–Egyptian rule by the Mahdist state allowed the founder of the Masalit




Figure 1. Ethnic map of western Darfur and Weddai

Source: Kapteijns, 1985¹



Sultanate Ismail Abd al-Nabi (1884–1888), as an agent of the Mahdist State, to consolidate his Sultanate through diplomacy, political manoeuvring, traditional legitimacy and force of arms.

The establishment of the Sultanate brought the Masalit into wars with the sultans of the Fur and the French to whom they lost part of their area³. Although the ideology of the Sultanate was the Mahdist faith, the years of the Mahadyia like those of the Turks brought much misery and destruction as a result of the forced migration (*tahgir*) policy, tax demands and tax abuse. As a result the Sultanate joined the pan-Western alliance which fought against the Mahadyia.

The internal organization of the Sultanate as in the other Sultanates in the western region was based on the creation of administrative estates and estates of privilege, control over Dar Masalit foreign trade and creation of a new ruling elite and a professional slave army to ensure the military superiority of the Sultanate. This meant that the traditional role of the Sheikh and Firsha (tribal leader equivalent to the Dimlij under the Fur Sultanate) was limited and in contrast to the Fur kingdom the system was more centralised in the Masalit Sultanate.

The Sultanate remained independent until it was brought under the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan in 1922^{4,5}. The British maintained the Sultanate with its tribal administrative system of Sheikhs, and Firsha as the basis of indirect rule. Accordingly Sultan Mohammed Bahr Eldin (Andoka) was confirmed by the Governor General of Sudan in his position as Sultan of Dar Masalit under the advisory and supervisory role of the British Resident in Dar Masalit. The indirect rule or Native Administration model in Dar Masalit served as the first experiment with indirect rule in Sudan^{1,6}. Later after indirect rule was introduced throughout Darfur, the British Residents in Dar Masalit continued to argue that Dar Masalit deserved to be given the right to develop along its own lines. According to Kapteijns (1985) this has led to the belief in the myth of the uniqueness of Dar Masalit status under the Sudan government. Therefore it was not surprising that when Sudan took measures towards independence the new Sultan Abd al Rahman Bahr el Din attempted to regain his independence or at least to obtain special privilege for Dar Masalit.

Historically there were five administrative tiers in the Sudanic Kingdom of the Masalit including; the sultan; *abbo* district chiefs, *firsha* sub-district chiefs, *malik* (head of a number of village sheikhs) and the sheikh village headman. The British worked closely with the Masalit Sultan to gradually develop and modify the model of the Sultanate administration. Among the many changes made was the abolition of the system of allotting *dar* to individuals (usually the Sultan's relatives). Both tribal and central organisation were maintained, and the tribal units were changed into tribal territories administered by *firsha*. Thus, under colonial rule the *abbo* district chief and the *malik* tiers lost much of their power, while the *firshas* and village Sheikh were recognized and their power and role increased. The authority of the Masalit Sultan was significantly curtailed. The Arabs in Dar Masalit were also brought under *omdas* (equivalent to *Firsha*) who were directly responsible to the Sultan⁴.

The tribal administrative systems of the Sultanate continued to exist even after the Native Administration was abolished in other parts of Sudan in 1971.³ At that time, as is elaborated in Chapter 2, it was ruled that it would be wise and practical to gradually replace it with the new political and governmental institutions. The two ethnic groups (indigenous Masalit and the Arab nomads) managed to co-exist, cooperate and regulate the common use of land resources, up to 1995 when the government intervened to introduce a new system of Native Administration.

³ The 1971 Local Government Act divided Darfur into regional, district and area councils. This local administration replaced the Native Administration and abolished the jurisdiction and administrative authority of the tribal leaders.



Customary land rights of access surviving from pre-colonial Masalit culture have been carried on into the present. Land tenure is administered under the *hakura* system, as in other parts of Darfur. The allotment of land for agriculture or other specific purposes is defined at village level, and the ownership is acknowledged by the village sheikh and the malik, who act as trustees of the village land. The malik reports to the Firsha (or Omda) who acts as the custodian of the Hakura and the tribal land under his leadership, but who also has administrative responsibilities to the Sultan. Until recently, the organisation of land tenure by means of these customary traditions has been accepted and respected. However, in some places, especially around the large villages, the system is now being questioned by the newly emerging educated elite of landless groups.⁷ Conflicts arising from land tenure disputes have become more intense.

Dar Masalit's history of conflict

Banditry and insecurity have long characterised the borderlands between Chad and Sudan, and have gradually spread throughout Dar Masalit. Traditional rivalries over the borderlands date back to the nineteenth century, and have led to raiding, skirmishes and *razzia* (raiding parties) by groups on both sides of the border.⁸

In more recent times, drought and economic hardship have prompted further banditry, with the result that the borderlands have rarely been secure. Also, because of the relatively higher amount of rainfall in the region, *Abbala* camel herders have moved between eastern Chad and Darfur in their search for pasture and food. In 1973, as a result of the Chadian civil war and drought, West Darfur hosted more than 200,000 Chadian refugees. Between 1979 and 1982, a second influx of about 16,000 refugees occurred, mostly supporters of the rebel Chadian general Hissein Habre, who sought refuge in Dar Masalit. Many of them were political refugees, and they formed an army in exile, with the political support of the Sudanese authorities.⁹

At a more local level, the movement of pastoralists into irrigated agricultural areas before harvests have been gathered in has been a constant source of conflict between farmers and nomadic groups. The frequency and intensity of these conflicts increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a result of drought and also because of other conflicts in North Darfur, which made the grazing areas in the far north inaccessible to nomads and cut off their migratory routes up to Seraif and Kebkabiya.

In March 1995 the Governor of West Darfur issued a decree that divided the traditional homeland of the Masalit into 13 emirates, nine of which were allocated to Arab groups.^{10, 11} This decree took no account of local tribal customs or traditions, and there was no consultation with Masalit tribal leaders.¹² It led to the territorial fragmentation of Dar Masalit and the creation of a new independent Native Administration, while the authority of the Masalit Sultan was diminished. Dar Erenga and Dar Jebel in Kulbus Locality became separate administrative entities outside the Dar Masalit Sultanate, though the Gimir Sultanate managed to preserve its status with only minor modification. These changes, which ignored the long heritage of tribal administration in the area, were motivated by political interests.

Local-level conflict between the Masalit and Arab pastoralists – fought around issues of local power, tribal territories and natural resources – escalated between 1995 and 1999, leading to the declaration of a state of emergency. Insecurity became widespread, with frequent bandit attacks and looting by *Janjaweed* militia along roads to Geneina and looting of livestock in villages.^{13, 14} This began as individual attacks, followed by reprisals, but became more organised as groups armed themselves.

The period 1995–1999 was one of devastating losses for the Masalit (see Tables 1 and 2). It was characterised by an administrative void and collapse of the traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution.

Table 1. Estimate of Masalit losses in tribal wars with Arab tribes, 1995–1997

Year	People killed	People injured	Villages burned	Huts burned	Livestock looted
1995–96	312	84	13	607	2,743
1996–97	374	85	37	2,226	6,060
Total	686	169	50	2,833	8,803

Source: Figures compiled by Y. Takana (1998) from the documents of the reconciliation conferences held between Arabs and Masalit at Geneina in 1997¹⁵

Reconciliation conferences held in 1995, August 1996 and November 1996 in an attempt to settle disputes were doomed to failure. Meanwhile the different ethnic groups armed and trained militia groups, which formed the basis of the forces in the current war.

Many of the Masalit fled from Darfur to Chad for safety; the current displacement of refugees to Chad is part of a wider history of disruption and dislocation. A Focus Group interviewed by the study team at Chagawa village, near Gokur, south of El Geneina, had spent two years (1996–1998) in Chad. According to the women in this group, relations between the different groups in the area were now so bad that: *'We are only enemies, nothing else'*.¹⁴ Many believe that the whole system of administration in the region needs to be reconsidered if security, resource management, tax assessment and collection and ethnic tensions are to be eased.⁷

Table 2. Livestock looted from the Masalit, 1995–1997

Year	Cattle	Camels	Horses	Donkeys	Goats	Sheep	Total
1995–96	758	142	80	61	1,546	156	2,743
1996–97	1,791	47	36	25	4,011	150	6,060
Total	2,549	189	116	86	5,557	306	8,803

Source: Y. Takana (1998)¹⁵

Masalit livelihoods before the crisis

Four Masalit Focus Groups were interviewed: two in villages about 30km south of Geneina,^{13, 14} and two in the Kirundun IDP camp in El Geneina.^{16, 17} Their livelihoods before the crisis were very similar, so these data have been combined. However, their current livelihoods are considered separately, as they raise different issues.

The Masalit are traditionally sedentary farmers, whose activities include cultivation of *goz* and *wadi* soils, and sedentary livestock production. The sources of food and income of the different Focus Groups are shown in Figure 2.

Agriculture

In the rainfed agricultural areas, sorghum was cultivated on clay soils and millet and groundnuts on sandy *goz* soil. Irrigated agriculture was practised along the banks of the seasonal *wadis* in winter, while the summer season was used mainly for the production of cash crops (millet, sorghum, tomatoes,




Figure 2. Livelihood strategies for the Masalit before the crisis

lubia, cucumbers, chillies, onions, *foul masri*, potatoes, okra, sesame, watermelon, hibiscus (*karkadeh*), green leafy vegetables (*jirjir*, *bunga*) and sugar cane).

Fruits, including mangoes, guava, oranges and watermelons, were an important cash crop for Dar Masalit, and traders would previously take them to other parts of Darfur for sale. Local food processing activities included milling and the processing of vegetable oil.

Livestock

Farmers used to combine agricultural cultivation with livestock production. According to the Focus Groups, livestock included (in order of importance) sheep and goats, cows, camels, horses, chickens and donkeys. Typical livestock holdings before the crisis are shown in Table 3. Only the very rich farmers would employ herders to look after their livestock. Livestock owned by the Masalit generally stayed within the local area and did not migrate far, and herders would stay with their animals. According to the Focus Groups, there were no problems of over-grazing or watering.

Table 3. Typical livestock holdings for Masalit farmers before the crisis

	Poor	Medium	Better-off
Goats	10	100	200
Sheep	5–10	50	200
Cattle	7	20–50	200
Camels	1	2	5
Horses		1–2	1–2
Donkeys	Every adult family member has his/her own donkey		

Source: Focus Group 2, IDPs in Kirundun camp, El Geneina.

Livestock was sold in local markets or taken to the larger livestock markets, such as Geneina, Habila and Fora Boranga. These markets are the primary markets linked to the terminal livestock export markets of Nyala. Fora Boranga is an important centre for cross-border trade, with links to the Central African Republic and Chad to the west. Better-off farmers used to sell about 40–50 goats and sheep in a year, and about 45–50 head of cattle. Animals would be separated from the others and fed up to increase their sale price. In addition, butchers would go to the villages and buy animals for meat for local sale.

Livelihood strategies of the poorer farmers included the collection and sale of wild foods, the collection and sale of firewood, growing grass for fodder, and the hiring out of labour. Medium-income households might also hire out horses to plough *wadi* soils. One of the groups interviewed produced charcoal in their village, which was collected by traders in trucks. In another village, they used to cut wood for sale as building material in El Geneina.

Wild foods grown in the area included *erdeb*, *lalob*, *girdem*, *nabak* and *mukheit*. *Erdeb* and *nabak* were considered to have the best resale value. As famine foods during drought, the most widely used wild foods were *mukheit*, *erdeb* and *nabak*.

Labour migration and remittances

Since as long ago as the 1940s the Masalit have been engaged in both temporary and permanent labour migration outside of their homeland. This has been motivated by increased standards of consump-



tion and the impossibility of making enough money locally to meet those standards, combined with opportunities for waged employment, especially in rainfed mechanised agriculture in eastern Sudan. Early studies and censuses noted a marked deficit of males in Dar Masalit both in the 1950s and in the 1970s as a result of this migration, especially in the 11–50 age group.¹⁸ In the 1970s, there was also a marked increase in female migration, as women were more likely to accompany their husbands or join them where they were working.

Apart from movements within Dar Masalit itself (which are not considered migration by the Masalit), there are three broad categories of migrant destination:

1. Migration within the Darfur region. Movement is usually temporary, or seasonal, to other parts of Darfur during the summer: for example, to El Fasher with the livestock trade, and to Nyala and South Darfur for 3–4 months' seasonal agricultural work. Such work might also provide the opportunity to raise sufficient resources to migrate to other destinations.

2. Migration to other parts of Sudan. Especially to Eastern Sudan; this dates back to the 1940s and the development of rainfed mechanised agriculture.⁴ Gedaref is a common destination point for the Masalit: they have established villages in the area and are engaged mostly in agricultural activities (and to some extent non-agricultural activities) as their primary occupation. This type of labour migration is both temporary and permanent, and some migrants lose touch with their relatives in Dar Masalit.

3. Migration outside Sudan. To Libya, Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, Iraq. The decreasing wage rates in Eastern Sudan and the oil boom in the Middle East in the 1970s and early 1980s made destinations outside of Sudan more attractive. Libya provided the most feasible option, compared with Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Travel to Libya was cheaper, required minimal (if any) processing of travel documents and, most importantly, labour migrants enjoyed strong support from Masalit communities established in Kufra and elsewhere in Libya.

There were two main land routes to Libya: the first from Geneina to Tina in North Darfur, and through the North Darfur desert to the Libyan border town of Aweinat; and the second to El Fasher and onwards to Mellit, from where trucks frequently left for Libya. Most of the Masalit work as farmers in Libya, using their existing skills in agriculture.

Before the crisis, migrants from Dar Masalit sent back both cash and commodities, such as clothing, beds, food, etc. Temporary, short-term migrants usually brought their savings back with them when they returned home at the end of their stay.⁵ The size of the remittances sent back to relatives in Dar Masalit varied according to the migrant's responsibilities at home (single man or family provider).

According to one Focus Group, labour migrants with families in Dar Masalit would be able to send back approximately SP 300,000–400,000 (US\$117–US\$156) every six months. Those who were single would

⁴ The cotton plantations of Gezira and Greater Khartoum, which received many migrants from the west, were not a major destination for the Masalit. Cotton picking was not economically attractive for Masalit men, as waged labour in Gezira was based largely on family groups including women and children.

⁵ This finding is in an agreement with Tully (1988: see ⁴), who studied the savings made by Masalit migrants, especially short-term workers. He pointed out that the relatively small sums of money brought back were not because savings had already been sent back as remittances, but rather because of poor communications and the fact that migrants had little spare income to begin with. This was mainly due to the seasonality of the labour available, with savings being eaten up in expenditure on food and lodging while migrants hoped for another job in the dead season. Yet for many, labour migration was a source of cash and assets that were used as capital in Dar Masalit. Tully also found that families of migrants in Dar Masalit cultivated slightly more land per capita than families without a migrant in the household.



send back around SP 100,000–200,000 (US\$39–US\$78) every year.¹⁶ Another group broadly concurred with this, suggesting that the amount sent back by family providers was around SP 200,000–300,000 (US\$78–US\$120), two or three times a year.¹⁹ Migrant workers in Libya expected to earn in the range of LD 100–150 (US\$75–US\$110) per month (between US\$900 and US\$1,320 a year). These figures are in broad agreement with the team's findings in El Kufra (see Chapter 5).

Like the short-term migrants in Libya, migrants working in Saudi Arabia waited until their return to Dar Masalit to bring back their money. Cash remittances were either hand-carried, sent through the *hawala* system, or very occasionally sent through banks. Only the better-off, including traders and those working legally with a regular income, had bank accounts. Some Masalit migrant workers in Khartoum used to send money back to Darfur through the bank accounts of traders they knew and trusted.

Masalit livelihoods after the crisis

At the time of the team's visit, large numbers of Masalit were living in camps for displaced people around El Geneina, or had fled to refugee camps in Chad. The team visited an IDP camp in El Geneina and two groups of Masalit who were living temporarily in rural areas about 20km south of El Geneina. In the Kirundun IDP camp, two Focus Groups, one for men and a separate one for women, were interviewed.^{16, 17} They represented communities from fifteen Masalit clans from different villages.

Masalit IDPs in Kirundun camp

Kirundun camp in El Geneina is a grim collection of temporary shacks and shelters clinging to the side of a *wadi*. The contrast with the well-ordered and well-constructed shelters in the large IDP camps in Kutum and El Fasher in North Darfur is stark. The IDPs in Kirundun camp are all Masalit. Most arrived in Kirundun in small groups between November 2003 and January 2004. Their villages had been attacked and burned in August 2003, in the early morning. They fled, and hid on farms in neighbouring areas for 2–3 months. After this, they travelled on foot to seek safety, first to Habila, and then southwards to an area north of Khorbanga. During this time, they reported, '*Antonovs were attacking everywhere*'.

These IDPs lost much of their capital, particularly their livestock, during the systematic attacks on their villages. What little was left had by this time been exhausted, and in Geneina, as IDPs, there were few if any livelihood strategies available to them. None of the men or women interviewed from the camp was cultivating land in preparation for the next harvest, although some older family members (who were considered less vulnerable) had returned to their villages, to plant and harvest what they could. Those left behind hoped they would return later with some food.

For the most part, the IDPs depend on food assistance (which provides 85 per cent of their food and income). Some men work in Geneina as casual/daily labourers, for pay of SP 2,000 per day. Day labouring, firewood collection and begging are the only livelihood strategies available to them, but these are extremely restricted, incur risks and produce low returns. IDPs are unable to collect firewood outside the boundaries of the town as they will be attacked by *Janjaweed* militia, who beat men and rape women. It is still safe to collect firewood from the *wadi*, but it is difficult to find. Older women, and some children, continue to gather grass for fodder and firewood, as the risk of them being attacked is smaller.

Young women constantly run the risk of sexual harassment and for that reason they are confined to the camp most of the time. Similarly, men cannot collect firewood or be involved in any activities outside the town because they run the risk of being kidnapped and killed. Day labouring in construction

work reportedly carries a high risk of injury and, given the large supply of workers, is in any case very limited. There is also a limited amount of domestic labour available for women.

Labour migration is not an option for most IDPs, due to insecurity and their lack of funds for travel, although large numbers of Masalit remain outside their *dar*, working as labour migrants. A survey in West Darfur by Concern International in 2004 showed that one in four families had a family member working away from home (Figure 3).²⁰




Figure 3. Geographical distribution of labour migration in Dar Masalit

Source: Concern International, 2004

All the IDPs have their own sheikhs. Some of the previous sheikhs were killed by the *Janjaweed* or have left for Chad, so new sheikhs had to be appointed, particularly to deal with NGO-related administrative issues. Another reason for appointing new sheikhs was that some of the old sheikhs were responsible for more people than they could cope with. However, there was generally little faith in the newly appointed sheikhs, particularly those who were selling ration cards and thus restricting access to food assistance.

IDPs who arrived in Geneina earlier in 2003 had received food assistance on four occasions; this included sorghum, oil, wheat flour, lentils and salt, but there were many complaints about its distribution. There were also many people without ration cards (15–30 people under each sheikh), and this had prompted people to leave for Chad or to return temporarily to their land, despite continued insecurity and the presence of *Janjaweed* militia. Those returning to the land were mainly older people, who were generally considered less vulnerable to attacks by the *Janjaweed*.

The goals for the future of the people in the camp included the guarantee of security, and getting back to their land and their livelihoods. Education was also mentioned.

Masalit ‘squatters’ in Gokur and Chagawa villages, Geneina

The people interviewed in Gokur and Chagawa villages^{14, 19} had been on the move since their own villages were attacked in 2003 by men in military uniform on horses and camels, supported by aeroplanes and armed vehicles. The attackers burnt their villages, and destroyed what they did not loot. The displaced families had split up, some going to Chad and others to IDP camps in Geneina. One Focus Group estimated that most people (about 75 per cent) had gone to Chad, and the rest to Geneina, largely because Chad was safer.

The IDPs in Gokur and Chagawa had suffered continued attacks since this time, and they believed that *Janjaweed* who had attacked them recently were the same men who had previously looted their



livestock and other possessions. One group claimed they had seen their looted livestock grazing in nearby areas.¹⁷ They were surrounded by *Janjaweed*, who were very intimidating – randomly firing their guns in the air, allowing their camels to graze farms, and so on.

The group in Chagawa had returned to Chagwa, their original village after seeking safety in Geneina. About 420 families used to live in the village, but only 10 families had returned five months previously. In Geneina, they said, '*It was very difficult to get food, and we suffered so much we decided to come back to our village, to stay here, and to take grass to Geneina and sell it there.*'¹⁴ They described how only some of them had been able to get ration cards, as this required a payment to the sheikh of SP 2,000–5,000 (about US\$1–US\$2). They had been trying to raise money to pay the sheikh, but his supply of cards had ran out, so this was no longer an option. The young women from this group were currently living in the camp in Geneina, as it was considered too risky for them to be in the village.

Those who had returned to the village were generally the older female members of the poorest families; their clothes were in tatters and they appeared very frail. On their return they had found their land untouched, but the *Janjaweed* were present. The *Janjaweed* had burned the school, looted the clinic and destroyed the village pump. To reach Geneina to sell their grass, the villagers have to travel on foot by hidden back ways to avoid the militiamen. They have tried as best they can to cultivate the surrounding fields, and after the harvest planned to return to Geneina.

In contrast, the group in Gokur were squatting in abandoned houses. Individual men, older people, women and young children had come to the area, seeking the relative security and protection afforded by a nearby military post. The new occupants were living together in the abandoned houses, struggling to cultivate surrounding fields and reap a harvest. Although they formed a group, they were not related to one another; what they had in common was that they were all Masalit and had all suffered attacks. There were noticeably a lot of older people in the area, some of whom were included in the Focus Group. Some older women were suffering from iodine deficiency disorders, indicated by the presence of prominent goitres.

Even though they are still living on the land, most of their former livelihood strategies are now closed to them. All their assets and stores have been stolen or destroyed. They can only cultivate land within the village boundaries and are afraid to go to the fields outside. They risk beatings from the *Janjaweed* if they move outside the village or far from the military post, so they dare not leave the village to collect wild foods or firewood. They have no livestock, not even chickens – reportedly a sign of extreme poverty in rural Darfur.

For firewood, they are using wood from the abandoned houses. They are surviving on the food aid they have received and their limited sales of grass. They have also received some help from their families in Geneina. A few kilometres from their current homes, the *Janjaweed's* camels graze freely in fields of growing millet and sorghum; they have also grazed the wild foods. The Masalit are anxious that soon these camels will come to their fields, and they have no means of stopping them. They have informed the neighbouring military, who come and talk to the camel owners and take information. Meanwhile, the *Janjaweed* are armed and generate fear by firing randomly into the air.

The road to Libya is now closed and no remittances are being sent back from there. Only one young man had reportedly returned to Dar Masalit from Kufra in southern Libya in April 2004, bringing with him SP 800,000 (US\$300). Likewise, no-one reportedly had travelled to or from Omdurman, so help from that source has also stopped. The road to Geneina is unsafe and little news gets through.



These people's sheikhs and *omda* are in Geneina, so they have no local leader and have come to rely on their own resources. They occasionally meet with their sheikh when they travel to Geneina, although he usually has little to do with them and cannot help them. They have received no help or support from the richer members of their tribe. Previously, they would have been able to borrow money from a trader, but there are now no traders visiting the area.

At the time of the visit, all the hopes of the Gokur group were pinned on the coming harvest (*goz* cultivation), though this was threatened by the camels grazing nearby. If there is security they will have a small harvest but, if not, and the harvest fails, they will be forced to leave to find help in Geneina. Security is therefore their most important goal.

For the people of Chagawa, the short-term goal was to try to raise cash to buy ration cards. For the future, they wanted life to return to the way it had been before, except that they saw no prospect of living in peace with the Arabs. They were blunt in their assessment: *'The Janjaweed should go away from here and unless they go far away there will be no peace'*. They had no trust in the government: *'It killed [people] and burned their villages and took their property and animals. There is no justice in Sudan.'*

Conclusions

The systematic attacks and asset-stripping endured by the Masalit have drastically diminished their assets, and left them with very limited livelihood strategies. As a result, their hopes and goals for the future are focused on the immediate and pressing needs of protection, security, justice and food. They dream of getting back to their land and livelihoods, where issues of access to education and health would once more become important.

Households were trying to cope with the collapse in their livelihood strategies and the widespread insecurity. Displacement is not a 'one-time' option. Villages have broken up, with some members of the community going to Chad and others to different parts of Dar Masalit, including Geneina. Among the IDPs in Geneina, some were returning to their land seasonally, despite insecurity and high levels of risk, in order to cultivate crops and to collect grass for fodder. People did this partly because of the inequitable distribution of relief and the corruption associated with it. The sums required to obtain ration cards seem small to outsiders, but they prohibit the poorest from obtaining aid. Therefore, the conflict is disproportionately affecting the poor, who cannot play the system.

The plight of the elderly is particularly severe. They are responsible for collecting firewood and fodder for sale, and returning to the villages to plant crops: these are among the few livelihood strategies available to them. By carrying out these tasks, they protect younger men and women who are vulnerable to attack and sexual violence, but they expose themselves to high levels of risk; nevertheless, this is a price they are prepared to pay. In this context, the particular needs of older people must be specifically assessed and addressed by the international community.

These findings raise questions as to how to monitor and extend security beyond the urban areas where people have sought shelter, and allow freedom of movement in and out of the towns, particularly where livelihood strategies (cultivation of crops and collection of firewood, fodder and wild foods) depend on it. Last year's harvest is long finished, and there is little time left before the next harvest in November to restart the local negotiations needed to ensure that camel herders do not allow their camels to graze farmland. This must be seen as a pressing priority.



Among the relief community, there is a need to recognise the important seasonal dimensions of displacement and relocation linked with livelihoods. In addition, the heavy reliance of communities on older women who risk returning to their villages, and younger women who are working in the towns, needs wider recognition.

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Glossary

<i>Abbala</i>	Camel-herding pastoralists in North Darfur, including Arab (Northern Rizeigat, Beni Hussein, Zayadia) and non-Arab (Zaghawa, Meidob) groups
<i>Ageet</i>	Traditional system of control and protection
<i>Baggara</i>	Cattle-herding pastoralists of south and south-west Darfur, including the Southern Rizeigat, the Ma'aliyya, the Habbaniya, the Fellata, the Beni Halba and the Ta'aisha
<i>Dar</i>	Tribal homeland
<i>Dhamin</i>	A person who acts as a guarantor at a livestock market
<i>Fariq</i>	An Arab family-based herding unit
<i>Foul masri</i>	
<i>Fuqara, Faki</i>	Holy men
<i>Fursan</i>	Traditional tribal horsemen. More recent usage refers to government-armed militias mobilised to fight in southern Sudan (including Southern Rizeigat, Beni Halba, Fellata, Ta'aisha)
<i>Goz</i>	Stabilised sandy soils
<i>Hafir</i>	A construction used to catch and store rainwater
<i>Hakura</i>	Traditional tribal system for allocating and managing land. <i>Hakura</i> is also the term used for the tribal land itself
<i>Hawala system</i>	A financial system for transferring remittances in cash or in kind nationally and internationally, based on a network of <i>hawaldar</i> (financial intermediaries). <i>Hawala</i> is the name for both the system and the individual transaction
<i>Hawaldar</i>	Financial intermediary
<i>Idara ahlia</i>	The Native Administration developed by the British Condominium authorities and based on the traditional tribal administration of the Fur and Masalit Sultanates
<i>Jallaba</i>	Travelling merchants
<i>Janjaweed</i>	Armed militia
<i>Jihad</i>	Holy war
<i>Judiyya</i>	Traditional systems of reconciliation and compensation through tribal/sub-tribal local courts
<i>Jufar</i>	Camel trypanosomiasis
<i>Kasha</i>	The crackdown by the Libyan authorities on foreigners in Libya, which included forced repatriation
<i>Khor</i>	Seasonal stream
<i>Mass'ana</i>	Livestock migration routes
<i>Morhal</i>	Grazing or stock route
<i>Moor haka</i>	Grindstones
<i>Murahaleen</i>	Militias established in the 1980s to fight the SPLA in southern Sudan. They were largely drawn from the Southern Rizeigat and Miseriya tribes of South Darfur and Kordofan. Similar to Fursan
<i>Omodiya</i>	Administrative unit of land within a tribal <i>dar</i>
<i>Osure</i>	Tithe of produce, paid annually to sheikh
<i>Rakuba</i>	Shelter built from local materials, often used for trade or as a shop
<i>Razzia</i>	Raiding parties
<i>Sharia</i>	Muslim law



<i>Shargania</i>	Grass mat for building huts
<i>Silkawei</i>	People of no legal status
<i>Souq</i>	Market
<i>Tahgir</i>	Forced migration
<i>Tombac</i>	Chewing tobacco (<i>Nicotiana tabacum</i> L.)
<i>Toujar</i>	Traders
<i>Ulama</i>	Scholars
<i>Wadi</i>	Seasonal water course
<i>Zakhat</i>	Giving of alms or charitable gifts
<i>Zurga</i>	Dark-skinned, non-Arab African

Wild Foods¹

<i>Bunga</i>	
<i>Difra</i>	Wild grass (<i>Echinochloa colonum</i>)
<i>Diresa</i>	Thorny grass seed, grain (<i>Tribulus terrestris</i> L.)
<i>Erdeb</i>	Fruit (<i>Tamarindus indica</i> L.)
<i>Gidem</i>	Fruit (<i>Grewia tenax</i>)
<i>Girgedem</i>	Fruit (<i>Grewia</i> species)
<i>Jirjir</i>	Rocket (<i>Eruca sativa</i> Mill.)
<i>Karkadeh</i>	Hibiscus
<i>Kawal</i>	Vegetable used for seasoning (<i>Cleome monophylla</i>)
<i>Koreb</i>	Wild rice (<i>Aristida publifolia</i>)
<i>Lalob</i>	Fruit of the <i>hijij</i> tree (<i>Balanites aegyptiaca</i>)
<i>Lubia</i>	Bean or pea, wild and cultivated
<i>Mukheit</i>	A sun-dried pea-like seed (<i>Boscia senegalensis</i>)
<i>Nabak</i>	A cherry-like fruit (<i>Zizyphus spina-christi</i>)

Measures

<i>Mukhamas</i>	Local measurement of land area equivalent to one hectare
<i>Feddan</i>	Official unit used for land measurement. 1 feddan = 4,200 sq m; 1 feddan = 1.038 acre, 1 feddan = 0.42 hectare
<i>Kora</i>	Used in North Darfur. 1 <i>kora</i> millet = about 1.7 kg. 2 <i>kora</i> = 1 <i>malwah</i> ; 2 <i>malwah</i> = 1 <i>roboh</i> ; 15 <i>roboh</i> = 1 sack (100 kg)

Currency

SD	Sudanese Dinar (SD 256 = US\$1). The official currency of Sudan.
SP	Sudanese Pounds (SP 2,560 = US\$1). Sudanese pounds are still widely used in rural areas, and where prices have been quoted in pounds this currency is reported in the text.
LD	Libyan Dinar (LD 1.33 = US\$1)

Levels of Government Administration

Walya	State, ruled by the State Governor (Wali)
Mahalia	Locality
Wahida Adaria	Administrative Unit Village Councils, Town Councils and Nomadic Councils

¹ Robinson J. Desertification and disarray: the threats to plant genetic resources of southern Darfur, western Sudan. *Plant Genetic Resources: characterization and utilization* 2005;3(1):3–11.



Tribal Administration

Emirate/Emir	Government-appointed heads of tribal administration in 1995
Nazir	Head of Arab tribe
Sultan	Head of tribe e.g. Berti and Zaghawa
Melik	Head of tribe e.g. Berti, Zaghawa, Meidob, Tunjur
Maqdam	Head of Fur tribe
Omda	Second-tier tribal leader, usually beneath Nazir (rules an <i>omodiya</i>)
Shertai	Tribal leader beneath Maqdam (rules a <i>shertaya</i>)
Firsha	Masalit tribal leader, beneath Sultan
Sheikh	Village – or other settlement-level leader



Acronyms

AFP	Agence France Presse
AU	African Union
CBS	Central Bureau of Statistics
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CTA	Civil Transactions Act
DLF	Dafur Liberation Front
DUP	Democratic Unionist Part
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GoS	Government of Sudan
GoSS	Government of Southern Sudan
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally displaced person
IFI	International financial institutions
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission of the GoS, GoSS, UN and World Bank 2004/2005
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
LD	Libyan Dinars
LRRCC	Livestock Reconciliation, Restitution and Compensation Commission
MoAR	Ministry of Animal Resources
NCP	National Congress Party
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NDRM	National Democratic Reform Movement
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NIF	National Islamic Front
NUP	National Unionist Party
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
Oxfam GB	Oxfam Great Britain
PDF	Popular Defense Force
PIPs	Processes, institutions and policies
PNC	Popular National Congress
PPR	<i>Peste des petits ruminants</i>
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council
RVF	Rift Valley fever
SCUK	Save the Children UK
SD	Sudanese Dinars
SP	Sudanese Pounds
SLM/A	Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army
SPC	Sudanese Popular Congress
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army



SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SRC	Sudanese Red Crescent
SSU	Sudanese Solidarity Union
TLU	Tropical Livestock Unit
TMC	Transitional Military Council
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSO	United Nations Student Organization
UP	Umma Party
USAID/OFDA	United States Agency for International Development/Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance
WFP	World Food Programme

42. سوف تتدهور الأمور بسرعة في دارفور خاصة مع نفاذ الفوائد المحدودة من الحصاد الأخير في فترة مبكرة من 2005. من الضروري أن تبدأ الاستعدادات للإغاثة الطارئة الآن. إن أحد أكبر التحديات سوف يكون نظام التوزيع وتحديدًا ضمان أن يكون هذا النظام لامركزيا بدرجة كافية لمنع هجرة بسبب الجفاف. ويعتبر هاما إنشاء احتياطي إقليمي على حدود دارفور بما في ذلك الكفرة في جنوب - شرق ليبيا. كما أن أنظمة التوزيع التي تقلل من المخاطر الأمنية سوف تكون أيضا هامة.

43. هناك حاجة عاجلة للاستعداد للإغاثة في حدود دارفور الجنوبية مع بحر الغزال تحوطا لاحتمال تدفق أعداد كبيرة من النازحين من جنوب دارفور. هناك بلاغات عن وصول البعض في الأونة الأخيرة. كما يجب أن يؤخذ في الاعتبار الآثار المترتبة على هجرة نتيجة للضائقة المعيشية إلى بحر الغزال على العلاقات الهشة بين القبائل في هذه المنطقة كما يجب وضع اعتبار لاحتياجاتهم.

استراتيجية معيشية لدارفور

44. استعدادا للوقت الذي تتحسن فيه الظروف الأمنية وتكون فيه الحركة ممكنة يجب تكوين قوة عمل لسبل المعيشة تحت إشراف الأمم المتحدة والاتحاد الأفريقي وترفع تقاريرها لأعلي مرتبه في حكومة السودان. إن مهمة قوة العمل هذه هو مراقبة الظروف التي تؤثر على سبل العيش في دارفور والتي حددتها هذه الدراسة بهدف تطوير استراتيجية قومية لحماية، دعم وتأهيل مصادر العيش في الإقليم. يجب تطوير هذه الاستراتيجية عبر عمليات المشاركة والتي تشمل أخذ ممثلي حكومة السودان، الأمم المتحدة والإتحاد الأفريقي إلى الميدان لمشاهدة الظروف المحلية والبحث عن حلول محلية مع المجتمع المدني المؤسسات المحلية ذات الصلة. كما يجب تنظيم عملية مشابهة لقيادات الأطراف المعارضة. إن العمل في قوة العمل هذه يجب أن يرتبط بصورة لصيقة مع أعمال الحماية التي تجري الآن. وأن يتأكد من أن مسائل المعيشة الهامة ينظر فيها كجزء من العمليات السياسية ذات الصلة.

إلا من هناك ضرورة حيوية لان يحصل المجتمع الدولي على وجهات نظر وتجارب جميع المجموعات وأن يحاول التعامل مع احتياجاتهم لمنع المزيد من التهميش للمجموعات العربية تحديداً. بالإضافة إلى ذلك فإن فشل العون الإنساني في الوصول إلى المجموعات العربية المتأثرة فإن هذا سوف يزيد من حدة التوترات ويمكن حتى أن يساهم في مضايقة وفي توجيه ضربات ضد عمال الإغاثة الإنسانية.

36. إن تمارين التقييم الإنساني يجب أن توجه إلى كافة المجموعات حيث يكون ذلك ممكناً. ويعتبر هاما بصفة خاصة ضم مناطق ومجموعات لم تتم إضافتها في السابق بدلا من قصر المسوحات والتقييم على المجموعات التي حصلت على عون.

37. يجب أن تكون المنظمات الدولية واعية بالتوزيع العرقي لموظفيها ويجب أن تعمل على ضمان تمثيل عرقي مع بقاءها حساسة لأي اعتبارات أمنية محددة. إن إرسال فرق ممثلة عرقيا قد لا يكون عمليا وخطرا من وجهة نظر أمنية. رغم ذلك فإن المنظمات يجب أن تعمل على وضع التحيز العرقي الكامن في فرقها في الاعتبار.

38. من النادر تحقيق حد أدنى من المقاييس في قمة حالة الإغاثة ويجب اتخاذ قرارات عملية حول أفضل استراتيجية لضمان حقوق كافة المجموعات المتأثرة. كانت الاستراتيجية المتبعة لدى بعض المجموعات الدولية التي قابلناها هي توسيع نشاطاتها فقط عندما يتوفر الحد الأدنى من المقاييس في برنامجها الراهن - إلا أن هذه سياسة احتواء إنساني وليس فعل إنساني. وترتبط هذه الاستراتيجية بالعديد من التقييمات التي تجرى الآن ولهذا ربما يكون من الضروري مراجعة أهداف هذه التقييمات لضمان ألا تساهم في " استراتيجية برامج خالية من المخاطرة " (بمعنى آخر احتمال أن تنتهج المنظمات مسارا آمنا وتبقي برامجها صغيرة، سهلة الإدارة وخالية من المخاطر لضمان حصولها على أفضل تقييم ممكن).

39. لهذا توصي الدراسة بمراجعة المقاييس بعناية لضمان تحقيق تغطية واسعة وتأثير عام أكبر. لا يعني هذا بالضرورة تقليص المدخلات ولكنه قد يعني تبسيط المسائل اللوجستية والتوزيع. وبالنسبة لتوزيع الغذاء على سبيل المثال فإن هذا قد يشمل جعل الطعام المقدم ابسط (سلع فردية أو مزدوجة بدلا من سلة غذاء كاملة) أو القيام بتوزيع عام بدلا من توزيع مخصص. وتتطلب هذه القرارات تحليل التكلفة والمزايا ودراسة جدوى.

40. إن مخاطر التي يتعرض لها النازحين كالاغتصاب والاختطاف عند جمع حطب الحريق يمثل مسالة خطيرة من مسائل الحماية يجب معالجتها نظرا لأهمية الوقود لطهي الطعام. إن هذه بالطبع مشكلة مصادر حطب الوقود، الفحم أو مكعبات الوقود كما أن هناك مشكلة الاستدامة. إلا أن هذه المشاكل يجب ألا تمنع الضرورة الإنسانية لتقديم أنواع مناسبة من المدخلات والحماية. وتمثل هذه فرصة للتعاون بين إدارة الغابات بوزارة الزراعة بحكومة السودان والتي لديها غابات وخبرة مع منظمات مثل وكالة غوث اللاجئين والتي واجهت مشاكل شبيهة بهذه بين النازحين في كل أنحاء العالم. إن العمل المحدود الذي قامت به وكالات لديها كانون ذو كفاءة في استخدام الوقود وطرق طبخ مفيد ولكن يجب توسعته وتكاملته بالمبادرات الأخرى. هناك ضرورة عاجلة لتمثل هذا العمل لمنع الإزالة السريعة للغطاء النباتي التي تحدث الآن حول المدن.

41. من المعترف به أن عدد المنظمات التي لديها خبرة في العمل في دارفور قليل للغاية، إلا أنه رغم ذلك فإن المجتمع الدولي الإنساني يجب أن تبرهن بصورة واضحة على معرفة وتفهم أفضل للمجموعات العربية وغير العربية، تاريخها، أنماط معيشتها ونظمها الإدارية وحل النزاعات. وهناك مجال للتعاون بين المنظمات ذات الخبرة والمؤسسات التعليمية المحلية من حيث تقديم جزئيات المعرفة والتدريب للموظفين الوطنيين والدوليين العاملين في دارفور. ومن المهم بالنسبة للمؤسسات الخبيرة في الخرطوم أن تعمل بصورة لصيقة مع المؤسسات المشابهة والمنظمات التطوعية الدولية في دارفور. وسوف يساعد هذا في ربط المؤسسات المحلية مع المنظمات الدولية لدعم متبادل وتطوير القدرات.

تشاد. إن الهلال الأحمر في ليبيا والسودان يجب أن يدعم تتبع مكان وجود أفراد الأسرة ومشاريع جمع الشمل بدعم من اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر والعكس.

ليبيا

29. يجب فتح الحدود بين السودان وليبيا بعناية وبصورة متحكم بها وبمشاركة وموافقة جميع الأطراف (بما في ذلك السلطات الليبية، حكومة السودان، مجموعات المعارضة والإدارة الأهلية للقبائل المتأثرة في دارفور). إن المفاوضات والاتفاقيات على فتح الحدود وحماية طرق التجارة سوف تتطلب التزاما وعملا من جانب قوى المعارضة لضمان استخدامها الآمن للعمال المهاجرين وكذلك حكومة السودان. ويرتبط هذا أيضا بالتوصيات أعلاه حول فتح طرق التجارة.

30. يجب بذل الجهود لمنع أي تجنيد للمواطنين السودانيين في ليبيا. إن المجموعات السودانية الموجودة الآن في ليبيا يجب دعمها بالتدريب وتطوير المهارات حتى تكون جاهزة لفرص العمالة الماهرة في ليبيا وللعودة للسودان.

31. هناك أعداد متزايدة من العمال السودانيين في ليبيا بدون أوراق رسمية وبدون عمل منتظم (جزئيا بسبب المتطلبات التي فرضت مؤخرا على العمال بدفع قيمة الفحوصات الطبية ولعدم قدرة العمال المغتربين على العودة للسودان بسبب إغلاق الحدود). هذا الوضع مقرونا بانعدام الأمن وعدم وجود فرص في دارفور يدفع العمال للبحث عن فرص للسفر إلى أوريا. يجب اتخاذ خطوات فورية من قبل السلطات الليبية لإصدار عفو لكافة السودانيين الموجودين في ليبيا الذي يفتقرون إلى أوراق هوية أو شهادة صحية سارية المفعول. وسوف يفتح ذلك أمامهم خيار العودة للسودان أو إجراء الفحص الطبي والتقديم للحصول على أوراق الهوية حتى يتمكنون من العمل بها في ليبيا بطريقة قانونية.

32. يجب أن تكون هناك نهاية للتمييز ضد العمال المهاجرين في ليبيا في تقديم الخدمات بما في ذلك تقديم الدعم الغذائي، الرعاية الصحية والتعليم. يجب إجراء الفحوصات الطبية للمهاجرين السودانيين مجانا على الأقل حتى فتح الحدود السودانية / الليبية واستقرار الوضع الأمني.

دعم تدفق التحويلات ودعم العمال المهاجرين والنازحين خارج دارفور:

33. تمثل التحويلات مصدرا هاما من مصادر الدخل لسكان دارفور نظرا لفشل مصادر الدخل الأخرى. وكانت التحويلات سواء نقدا أو عينا ترسل إما باليد أو عبر التجار وعبر الحوالات. وقد توقف أغلب هذه الآليات. ويجب أن تبذل كافة الجهود لدعم تدفق التحويلات وتوظيف العمال المهاجرين خارج دارفور. إن الخطوة الأولى هي ضمان حرية الحركة وتحسن في أمن الطرق والمواصلات العامة بما في ذلك طرق البصات في كل دارفور.

34. يمثل القيام بتقييم مشترك للاحتياجات يشترك فيه الأمم المتحدة وحكومة للنازحين من دارفور في الخرطوم أولوية على أن تتبعه نشاطات لمعالجة هذه الاحتياجات عن طريق التدخلات الإنسانية، الحماية وتغيير السياسة. وبالإضافة للاستجابة للاحتياجات الإنسانية العاجلة يجب أن يعمل المجتمع الدولي مع المجموعات المحلية لتطوير موارد وسبل المعيشة واستراتيجياتها ومن بينها التعليم وفرص التدريب، والمهارات الزراعية، والحصول على خدمات التمويل الصغير ... الخ. يجب أن توجه النشاطات نحو أهدافها بعناية ويجب ألا تكون بحجم كبير يشجع الهجرة من دارفور.

الاستجابة الإنسانية الدولية

35. من الضروري أن يبذل المجتمع الدولي كافة الجهود ليرهن على حياده بالاستجابة إلى احتياجات كافة الأطراف. وبالرغم من أن الصعوبات الموجودة في الفصل بين المدنيين والمقاتلين في المناطق الريفية أكبر مما هي في إطار معسكرات اللاجئين،

■ إن الماشية هي المصدر الرئيسي للدخل من الضرائب لولايات دارفور. وفي الظروف الراهنة يجب استخدام الضرائب لفائدة مواطني دارفور وبالتحديد في شكل مبالغ مدفوعة عبر مفوضية الأراضي والتعويضات.

الأسواق: طرق تجارة السلع

23. هناك ضرورة لاتفاق في أوجا بين كل الأطراف لحماية طرق المواصلات الرئيسية وذلك للسماح بالمرور الآمن للسلع والمواطنين ولتقليل الضرائب. يجب ألا تكون هذه الحماية خرقة لوقف إطلاق النار.

24. يجب أن يسير الاتحاد الأفريقي دوريات في طرق المواصلات الرئيسية. يجب مراقبة الحوادث الأمنية المرتبطة بالتهب في طرق المواصلات الرئيسية ويبلغ عنها الإتحاد الأفريقي.

حرية الوصول للأسواق للبائعين والمشتريين

25. يجب إزالة كافة القيود على حرية الأفراد في شراء، بيع ونقل السلع الأساسية. ويشمل هذا إزالة نظام التصاريح الذي تفرضه حكومة السودان في كتم. والذي يقيد ويفرض ضرائب على أي مشتريات يقوم بها شخص يأتي للسوق من خارج حدود المدينة بما في ذلك النازحين بالمعسكر. أما ضرائب القطعان فتتمثل حالة خاصة وتم التعامل معها أعلاه.

26. عندما يستقر الوضع ستكون هناك حاجة لعدد من التدخلات في السوق وتشمل على سبيل المثال:

- معارض للأدوات والبذور يجتمع فيها البائعين والمشتريين.
- زيادة حجم سلة الغذاء (الحصة العامة) للسماح بالتجارة وشراء المنتجات الأساسية الأخرى خاصة حطب الوقود.
- شراء أنواع البذور المحلية لحماية الأصناف ولتأمين إمداد محلي من البذور لموسم الإنبات القادم.
- برامج إكثار البذور.
- تقديم القروض لصغار التجار الذي تدهور رأسمالهم خاصة أولئك الذي هوجمت قوافل الماشية الخاصة بهم المرسله للأسواق ونهبت. ويهيمن على تجارة الماشية مع ليبيا تجار رأسمالهم صغير نسبيا بالمقارنة مع أولئك العاملين في تجارة وتصدير الماشية للدول الأخرى في العالم العربي. إن دعم هؤلاء التجار سوف يكون له تأثير مضاعف.

الهجرة العمالية والتحويلات والاتصالات

الاتصالات والمتابعة

27. يجب اتخاذ الخطوات الآتية لتحسين الاتصال بين شتات العمال المهاجرين وأسرهم في دارفور مما يسهل تدفق التحويلات إلى دارفور:

- إن شبكات التلغون المحمول والخطوط الأرضية يجب أن تبقى مفتوحة في كافة الاوقات (في الوقت الراهن كثيرا ما يتم إغلاق الشبكات).
- توسيع شبكات تليفون محمول لكي تغطي معسكرات النازحين في المناطق المجاورة.
- فتح المزيد من مراكز خطوط الاتصال الأرضي في المناطق الحضرية التي تستضيف النازحين أو التي توجد بها معسكرات نازحين كما في كتم والفاشر مثلا.
- أن يكون لجميع المجموعات حق الوصول إلى هذه المراكز.

28. يجب إنشاء آلية تمكن المغترب من متابعة مكان أسرته. على سبيل المثال فان عمليات المتابعة التي تقوم بها اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر يجب أن توسع لكل تشمل مواطني دارفور المقيمين في جميع أنحاء السودان وفي معسكرات النازحين في

15. هناك نقص في الإمدادات البيطرية سواء لدى حكومة السودان أو القطاع الخاص. يجب أن توفر الحكومة السودانية الإمدادات عبر الخدمات البيطرية. يجب القيام ببرامج التحصين خاصة في المناطق التي بقيت فيها الماشية في مناطق محصورة وغير قادرة على الوصول إلى مساراتها المعتادة.
16. هناك خطر كبير في أن ينتشر مرض (Peste des petits ruminants) PPR بين الجمال في دارفور حيث أن الإدارة البيطرية بسوبا قد أكدت منذ فترة قريبة ظهور المرض في السودان كما أن الظروف ملائمة لانتشاره في دارفور. إن التطعيم ضد PPR ذو أولوية مرتفعة لمراحمات الجمال في دارفور. ومن الواضح أن برنامج التحصين يجب أن يضع في اعتباره مسالة الماشية المنهوبة (عبر مفوضية الأرض والتعويضات) ويجب أن يصل إلى كافة القطعان. وقد وفر تحصين الماشية الفرص لحل النزاعات على المستوى المحلي في الدول المجاورة ويجب استكشاف إمكانية ذلك في دارفور.
17. مراجعة تغطية الخدمات البيطرية وإمكانية الحصول عليها في كافة المناطق والمجموعات بهدف توسعة التغطية عبر وحدات متنقلة أو عبر عمال صحة بيطرية يقيمون في المجتمعات يحصلون على إمداداتهم من وحدات محلية.
18. يجب أن تسمح حركة وجيش تحرير السودان لوحدات بيطرية متحركة بعبور مناطقهم وتقديم خدمات. وبنفس القدر فإن الرعاة العرب يجب أن يسمحوا بالخدمات البيطرية المتنقلة بالمرور عبر مناطقهم والعمل فيها.
19. بعض النازحين خاصة من النساء والأطفال يعرضون أنفسهم لخطر ضخم بغرض جمع العلف لحميرهم والماشية الأخرى. يجب بصورة عاجلة التعامل معهم كموضوع للحماية والأمن. ويعتبر التوزيع العام للعلف للنازحين غير مناسب في الوقت الراهن لأن عدد قليل فقط من النازحين لديهم ماشية (باستثناء الحمير). كما أن القيام بذلك سوف يشجع على البقاء المستمر للنازحين. أما الحمير فهي حالة خاصة لأن كل أسرة ريفية في دارفور تحتاج لواحد في حياتها اليومية وسوف تكون الحمير جزءا جوهريا من عملية العودة وإعادة الاندماج. وعندما توجد تجمعات كبيرة للحمير في معسكرات النازحين، يجب القيام بدراسات جدوى حول توفير الأعلاف وتربط مع مشاريع توزيع للأعلاف المركزة (المولاص، مخلفات قصب السكر، مكعبات) والعلف.

التجارة والأسواق

مسارات الماشية

20. توصي الدراسة بفتح متحكم فيه لكل طرق تجارة الماشية بما في ذلك فتح الحدود بين السودان وليبيا، الطريق إلى دنقلا والطريق الشمالي والجنوبي إلى المويلح بامدرمان. يجب الاتفاق على ذلك من قبل كل الأطراف في المؤتمر الدولي بابوجا وعلى المستويات المحلية والقومية.
21. إغلاق أو عدم تشجيع الطريق الجنوبي (من جنوب دارفور عبر برام) لطوله وارتفاع تكلفته مما يقلل الأسعار التي يحصل عليها المنتجين. كما أن هناك وجود مرتفع لذبابة التسي تسي في هذه المنطقة مما يجعل القطعان التجارية الكبيرة مهددة بانتقال الأمراض بالإضافة إلى الأثر الضار على البيئة نتيجة للرعي الجائر.
22. هناك عدد من القضايا ذات الصلة التي يجب أخذها في الاعتبار:
- يدرك الجميع أن الماشية المنهوبة سوف تمر عبر هذه الطرق ولهذا لا بد من وجود قيود تتصل بذلك عبر مفوضية الأراضي والمصالحة والتعويضات.

الماشية

تسويات وتعويضات وإرجاع الماشية

11. توصي اللجنة بخلق مفوضية للمصالحة وإرجاع وتعويضات الماشية والتي يجب أن تغطي جميع ولايات دارفور الثلاثة وكافة المجموعات داخل الإقليم. يجب أن تتبنى المفوضية أربعة طرق متكاملة للمصالحة والتعويضات.
 - يجب أن تشرف على إجراءات التسجيل والتحقق من خسائر الماشية.
 - الإشراف على ضرائب الماشية المبيعة والتأكد من أن كل العائد من ضرائب صادر الماشية يستخدم لتعويض أولئك الذين نهبت بهائمهم بما في ذلك التجار الذين فقدوا قوافل من الإبل أو الذين اختطف المرافقون للماشية الخاصة بهم بواسطة الجماعات المتمردة.
 - تشجع الإعادة الطوعية للماشية المنهوبة بتوفير آلية يمكن من خلالها القيام بذلك كجزء من عملية المصالحة المحلية.
 - توفير شهادات ملكية لكل الماشية. أن تقبل أسواق الماشية فقط الماشية المصحوبة بشهادات ملكية.
12. يوجه كل الدخل من ضرائب القطعان لعملية المصالحة ورد الحقوق ويجب جمع الضرائب للعام الأول لتمكين العملية من أن تسير للأمام.
 - أ. يجب أن تكون حكومة السودان أحد المساهمين الرئيسيين في العملية بالنظر لفشلها في حماية الموارد الحيوانية لسكان الريف في دارفور.
 - ب. يطبق عمل المفوضية محليا عن طريق نظام مجالس الإدارة الأهلية والذي يضمن تمثيل جميع المجموعات ذات الصلة بالإضافة إلى طرف ثالث محايد مقبول لكافة الأطراف. يجب أن تبدأ مفوضية الأراضي والمصالحة والإرجاع والتعويضات عملها بمشاريع رائدة في الأسواق الرئيسية والثانوية وتتأكد من التعامل مع كافة أنواع الماشية.
 - ج. إضافة إلى ذلك يجب مراقبة أسواق دنقلا والكفرة بحثا عن الجمال المنهوبة من قبل مجموعات سودانية وأن يبلغ عن ذلك لمفوضية الأراضي والمصالحة والتعويضات.
 - د. يجب فتح نقاط الجمارك المغلقة في دارفور وأن يشمل ذلك مراقبة لشهادات الملكية.
 - هـ. تشكيل لجنة مشتركة من الاتحاد الإفريقي / الأمم المتحدة للإشراف على هذه العمليات.

الهجرة الموسمية للماشية

13. إن فتح طرق الماشية يجب معالجته على المستوى السياسي بالاتفاق بين السلطات المحلية التي تسيطر على أقسام مختلفة من المسارات وعلى المستوى المحلي. ويجعل ذلك من مسارات الرحل نقطة هامة في مفاوضات الصلح بين المجموعات. إن النزاع حول المسارات للماشية لا يحدث فقط بين المزارعين والرعاة ولكن حتى بين الرعاة ذوى التوجهات السياسية المتشابهة. إن فتح المسارات سوف يأتي فقط مع عمليات السلام والمصالحة ومع عمل لجان المصالحة والتسويات ومفوضية الأرض. وفي الوقت الراهن فإن مجموعات مختلفة تتحكم في أقسام مختلفة من مسارات الرحل. وتسيطر حركة وجيش تحرير السودان في الوقت الراهن على مناطق الرعي خلال الخريف في الشمال بينما يسيطر العرب على مناطق الرعي خلال فترة الجفاف في الجنوب. يجب أن يكون هناك فهم لحقوق الرعي في كل من موسم الأمطار وفترة الجفاف بترتيبات مشابهة لما هو موجود في بروتوكول أبيي.

صحة الحيوان والعلف

14. لدى السودان خدمات بيطرية متقدمة ولهذا فإن أي تدخلات يجب أن تتسق، وتدار وتطبق عبر الإدارات البيطرية على المستوى الفيدرالي والولائي.

7. إن المفاوضات على المستوى الدولي يجب أن تحاول رفع دور ووظيفة الزعامة القبلية مع تفهمها للطبيعة الهشة والقدرات المحدودة للإدارة الأهلية. من الضروري فهم أن الإدارة الأهلية ليست مستقلة عن التأثير السياسي للحكومة المركزية وأيضاً أن لديها أجندتها الخاصة بها. لهذا السبب فإن من الضروري إزالة البعد السياسي عن وظائفها، وأن تصاغ مهامها بصورة واضحة وأن تكون سلطاتها محددة محلياً وأن تفوض من قبل السلطات الحاكمة محلياً (المتمردين، حكومة السودان) ويوافق عليها محلياً من جميع الفئات.
8. إن الحكم المحلي في دارفور ليس على نسق واحد وهناك حاجة ماسة لتعلم الدروس من السبل المحلية للمصالحة وتحقيق الأمن. وقد تعرف التقرير على بعض المبادرات المحلية لحل الأزمات مع أمثلة لحكم محلي جيد والتي من الممكن أن يكون لها صدى أكبر. على سبيل المثال:
- يدور الحوار المحلي الآن بين الزيدية (قبيلة عربية) وبين الميذوب في شمال شرق دارفور بخصوص النزاعات حول الوصول إلى المرعى وحدودهم. ويتوسط الكواهلة في غرب كردفان في هذا العملية. وقد حاولت حكومة ولاية شمال دارفور إيقاف العملية ولكن الأطراف المتفاوضة قاومت ذلك. يجب تشجيع الحوار على المستوى المحلي ويسمح باستمراره دون عوائق.
 - لدى بني حسين حكم محلي قوى بما في ذلك ترتيبات أمنية محلية. إن مجموعات مثل بني حسين التي حاولت عزل نفسها من النزاع تصارع للمحافظة على موقفها. يجب أن يكون هناك تفهم ودعم أكبر لجهودهم عندما يكون ذلك مناسباً وممكناً.
9. بالرغم من أن الدراسة لم تدرس العنف ضد النساء إلا هذا العنف كثير ما يحدث عند قيام النساء بتعرض أنفسهن للمخاطر لأجل معيشتهم (جمع حطب الوقود، الذهاب للسوق). ويثير هذا السؤال حول كيفية معالجة العنف ضد النساء ومعه الخطر الكامن لوباء الإيدز. وفي الحد الأدنى يجب تقييم القدرات المحلية على التعامل مع هذا الوباء بهدف التعرف على الشبكات المحلية والمؤسسات التي يمكن أن يتم من خلالها توجيه التدخل. إن عملية التعويض يجب معالجتها وأن تضمن في عمليات التعويض ورد الحقوق المحلية.

مفوضية الأراضي

10. توصى الدراسة بإقامة مفوضية للأرض تغطي كل ولايات دارفور الثلاثة وتمثل الجهات ذات الصلة. ويتفق هذا التصرف مع بروتوكول جنوب كردفان / النيل الأزرق. وتكون مفوضية الأراضي مسؤولة عن:
- تحديد خط وحدود الحاكورات الموجودة والمسارات (طرق حركة الماشية) عن طريق التفاوض محلياً وبناء على اتفاق مع كل شرائح الإدارة الأهلية. إن عمل خرائط مسارات الرحل يجب أن يتم بالتعاون للصيق مع لجنة المصالحة وإرجاع وتعويض الماشية (انظر أدناه).
 - إدارة نظام ملكية الأرض في النظم الزراعية التقليدية.
 - ضمان استشارة جميع المجموعات حتى تلك التي لم تعد في منطقتها الأصلية. ويشمل ذلك كل من المجموعات العربية وغير العربية التي هاجرت بسبب النزاع ولكن لا يمكن تصنيفهم كنازحين.
 - تأهيل الدواكي والآبار في المناطق الريفية. يجب معالجة كل حالة على حدة بالنسبة لسكان الريف الموجودين أو مع عودة الناس (يجب أن لا تكون إستراتيجية تأهيل عامة).
 - الإشراف على التعويضات ورد الحقوق في حالة النزاع على الأرض.

التوصيات

قدمنا توصيات في ستة مجالات :

- الأمن، الاستقرار والحكم
- الأرض
- الماشية
- الأسواق
- الهجرة العمالية، الاتصالات والتحويلات
- الاستجابة الدولية الإنسانية

وتعتبر كلها أولويات آنية ولكن من الواضح أن هناك تفاوت في الوقت المطلوب لتحقيق الأهداف.

الأمن، الاستقرار والحكم المحلي

1. إن الأمن والاستقرار هما الهدف المشترك لجميع من قابلناهم . إن العون المقدم للمنظمات الإنسانية والأمن المحدود للغاية الذي توفره التنخلات الإنسانية في الوقت الراهن غير كافية. يجب أن يمتد الأمن لكي يشمل جميع جوانب الحياة اليومية والمعيشية شاملا استراتيجيات الخاصة بالمواشي، الحركة والأسواق وحماية الأصول. ويجب جعل هذه الجوانب من الأمن جزءا من المهمة الموسعة للإتحاد الأفريقي في دارفور.
2. تدرك الدراسة ضرورة الوصول إلى حل سياسي للأزمة عبر الآلية الدولية لحل النزاع في أبوجا. إن أي تسوية يجب أن تعالج مسألة التهميش الكامنة.
3. هناك طريقتان تستطيع بها عملية نفاشا تقديم إطار لدارفور:
 - أ. كنموذج لعملية التفاوض بين حكومة السودان ومجموعات المتمردين في السودان.
 - ب. بتطبيق وتكييف محتويات البروتوكولات بأسرع ما يمكن على دارفور. هناك بالتحديد عناصر في البروتوكولات حول تطبيق أحكام إضافية على المناطق الانتقالية يمكن تكييفها.
4. إن عملية السلام بين الشمال والجنوب وبروتوكولاته ليست علاجاً سحريا للسلام في دارفور. ويظل من غير الواضح كيف ستطبق البروتوكولات. كما أن هناك عناصر مفقودة من البروتوكولات تعتبر هامة لحل أزمة دارفور. على سبيل المثال لا توضح البروتوكولات الطريقة التي تطبق بها على مستوى أقل من مستوى الدولة. كما أن دور الإدارة الأهلية وعلاقتها بالحكومة المحلية غير واضحتين. وبالنسبة لدارفور فإن هذه المسائل لا بد من معالجتها.
5. يجب أن تعي جميع المجموعات وتفهم البروتوكولات داخل دارفور وانطباقها على جميع المجموعات بما في ذلك الإدارة الأهلية، جماعات المجتمع المدني، المواطنين (وتشمل النازحين) واللاعبين الدوليين. ويتطلب ذلك رفع درجة الوعي.
6. وبينما نتناقش مفاوضات أبوجا حل النزاع على المستوى القومي والدولي، فإن مشاركة الزعامة القبلية والمجموعات ذات الصلة من المجتمع المدني لا بد منها لحل النزاع والتعويضات على المستوى المحلي. ولدعم القرارات التي تتخذ في أبوجا. إن هناك ضرورة ماسة لفهم وتعلم الدروس المستفادة من فشل مؤتمرات المصالحة السابقة ودور الحكومة المركزية. إن هذا الفهم العميق هام للمجتمع الدولي الذي ربما يكون له دور يلعبه في هذه العمليات.

دولار أمريكي. كما فقد 300 من السبابة (مرافقي الماشية) و1280 من مساعديهم أعمالهم وكذلك فرص الحصول على العمل كمغتربين في ليبيا. أما كمية الماشية المصدرة إلى تشاد عبر الطينة في شمال غرب دارفور على الحدود السودانية التشادية فهي أقل بكثير بسبب موقعها غير المناسب وصعوبة المنطقة وانعدام الأمن.

التجارة إلى المويلح في أمدرمان

إن الطريق الشمالي عبر الفاشر غير آمن ويتوقع انخفاض كبير في كمية الضان الذي يصل إلى المويلح سواء للتصدير أو للاستهلاك المحلي. وقدرت الحركة السنوية عبر هذا الطريق بحوالي 450.000 رأس من الضأن، و48.000 جمل و3500 رأس من الأبقار. وأصبح الطريق الجنوبي عبر نبالا والضعين غير مطروقا لهم عقب احتلال مناطق من محلية الضعين بواسطة حركة وجيش تحرير السودان بالإضافة إلى الهجمات والهجمات المضادة بين المجموعات القبلية وعصابات النهب المسلحة. وتشمل حوادث الأمانة في المنطقة في الآونة الأخيرة اعتراض 1300 رأس من الضأن بواسطة حركة وجيش تحرير السودان في لبدو 60 كيلو متر من نبالا.

طرق تجارية خلقتها الأزمة

يحاول بعض تجار الماشية العرب في الجنية فتح طريق جديد لتجاوز المناطق المتأثرة بالأمن في الجنوب. وهي طرق أطول وتزيد من الأيام التي يمسيها التجار وحيواناتهم بفترة إضافية قدرها 20 إلى 40 يوم مما يضع الحيوانات تحت إجهاد أكبر. وكانت هذه الطرق تحت التجربة في وقت الدراسة ولم يكن من المؤكد ما إذا كانت ستكون ناجحة (مربحة).

ارتفاع أسعار السلع الاستهلاكية

أدى الإغلاق الكلي والجزئي لطرق التجارة الاستراتيجية إلى ارتفاع أسعار السلع الأساسية. ويعود ذلك إلى زيادة تكاليف النقل، ومخاطر هجمات عصابات النهب والحاجة للحصول على إمدادات من السلع من مصادر جديدة وإلى عمليات حظر من الحكومة. وقد زادت الأسعار في كل دارفور ولكن الزيادة أكثر جلاء في مناطق شمال دارفور التي كانت تحصل على إمداداتها من ليبيا (عبر الكفرة) ومن أمدرمان. كما أن كبار التجار الذين كانوا يوزعون السلع الاستهلاكية بالبيع بالأجل إلى تجار القرى قد توقفوا عن هذه الممارسة.

الهجرة العمالية إلى شرق السودان

لدى دارفور تاريخ طويل من الهجرة إلى شرق السودان. إن الأغلبية الساحقة من العمال المهاجرين من دارفور والموجودين في منطقة القضارف قد هاجروا إلى هناك لأسباب اقتصادية بحثاً عن فرص العمل والدخل النقدي الذي يمكنهم من الصرف على أسرهم وأقاربهم في دارفور. وقد عاش أكثر من نصفهم هناك لفترة تزيد عن ثلاثة عقود.

الهجرة الاضطرارية إلى الخرطوم

على النقيض من ذلك وجدت الدراسة أن العديد من المهاجرين من دارفور للخرطوم كانوا أشخاص نزحوا في الآونة الأخيرة بسبب النزاع في دارفور وجلبهم من النساء والأطفال (كان هناك رجل واحد لكل ثلاثة نساء). ويواجه النازحين من دارفور صعوبات بسبب المنافسة الشرسية على العمل كما يواجهون مصاعب في معسكرات النازحين ومع السلطات المحلية.

أهمية الثروة الحيوانية

السودان هو المصدر الرئيسي للماشية في المنطقة وكانت الثروة الحيوانية تنتج 20% من الدخل القومي من العملة الأجنبية قبل اكتشاف النفط. إن مساهمة دارفور في تصدير الماشية وفي السوق المحلي للحوم كانت دائماً كبيرة. على سبيل المثال كانت دارفور تصدر قبل النزاع 30.000 جمل إلى ليبيا وحوالي 50.000 جمل إلى مصر كل عام. ومن ناحية اقتصادية كانت الماشية هدفاً رئيسياً للحرب في النزاع الراهن. وترى العديد من المصادر أن السكان من غير العرب قد فقدوا ما بين 50% و90% من مواشيهم لقوات الحكومة المسلحة. إن مسالة الثروة الحيوانية تعتبر محورية إذا كان سيتم الوصول إلى حل دائم للمشاكل في دارفور. إن اقتصاد دارفور قد تدهور بشدة وتتهار تجاره الماشية التي تمثل عموده الفقري التقليدي بسرعة.

مسارات الماشية

إن نتيجة جلية للنزاع هو التغيير في مسارات الرحل وهو تحول له نتائج مدمره في المستقبل. إن العداء المتزايد بين العرب وغير العرب وسيطرة حركة وجيش تحرير السودان على بعض المناطق الهامة على طول مسارات الماشية التقليدية قد أدت إلى تقييد وصولها إلى المراعي خلال فترة الخريف في الشمال (مناطق الجزو، وادي هواء والعطرون) بالنسبة لرعاة الإبل العرب. وكانت الجمال والأغنام المملوكة لهذه القبائل محصورة جنوب جبل مرة خلال زيارة فريق الدراسة. وبصورة مشابهة نجد أن الأبقار التي تمتلكها قبائل البقارة قد حصرت في المنطقة المجاورة للسكة حديد بالقرب من مدينة نيالا (أبعد نقطة يستطيعون الوصول إليها) وطريق نيالا - كاس في الغرب. إن تركيز الماشية في المنطقة المحصورة خلال فترة الجفاف سوف يستنزف مصادر المياه والمرعى ويزيد من مخاطر الأمراض مما يرفع معدلات نفوق الحيوانات.

انهيار تجارة الماشية

إن تعطل تجارة الماشية داخل دارفور وما وراء حدودها يشير إلى اتجاه اقتصاد الإقليم للانحدار. أما أثر ذلك فيتم الشعور به بدرجات مختلفة في كل الأسر وفي كل قطاعات السكان (الرعاة، المزارعين - الرعاة، التجار والوسطاء، والسبابة .. الخ). وقد أغلقت أسواقاً ثانوية هامة مثل مليط التي كان يباع فيها في الماضي 20.000 من الجمال و25.000 من الضأن لتصدر إلى ليبيا كل عام، منذ أواخر عام 2003 م. ومن بين 50 تاجراً محلياً بمليط، غادر 40 إلى الفاشر أو الخرطوم.

تدهور الأمن في أبريل 2003 في طرق تجارة الماشية عبر شمال دارفور نتيجة لقتل 10 من الأشخاص الذي يأخذون الإبل إلى ليبيا ومصادرة 3000 رأس من الجمال. وعقب ذلك أغلقت الحكومة السودانية الحدود. وتقدر كمية التجارة المفقودة بحوالي 14 مليون

دارفور. ويزيد عمر أكثر من نصفهم عن 30 عاما كما أن 75% منهم متزوجون ويزيد معدل الإلمام بالقراءة والكتابة عن المعدل الموجود في دارفور.

تعكس الهجرة إلى ليبيا عوامل الجذب والطرْد. تشمل عوامل الطرد التجنيد العسكري والضم القسري لقوات الدفاع الشعبي في بلد الشخص في دارفور، قلة فرص العمل وتداعي مصادر المعيشة كنتيجة للجفاف المتكرر وانعدام الأمن. أما عوامل الجذب فتشمل فرص عمل باجر أفضل، قرب ليبيا من دارفور وسهولة العمل هناك دون إذن عمل قانوني وأهم من ذلك العلاقات وشبكات المساندة والدعم الموجودة هناك.

في عام 2004 م فرضت المزيد من القيود على العمال المهاجرين بما في ذلك ضرورة الحصول على شهادة صحية تتطلب عدد من الفحوصات الطبية. وتكلف الفحوصات 70 ديناراً ليبياياً (حوالي 50 دولاراً). إن نتيجة تظهر الإصابة باللايدز مثلاً تؤدي إلى فقدان أوراق الهوية والسجن والترحيل.

تراوحت تحويلات المغتربين المرسلة إلى دارفور قبل الأزمة بين 40 دولار و900 دولار للمغترب في العام. ولكن الغالبية قدرها في حدود 40-400 دولار. ويقدر العمال المهاجرين إن العمال المهرة يستطيعون تحويل حوالي 90 ديناراً ليبياياً (68 دولار) في الشهر بينما يحول العمال غير المهرة حوالي 30 ديناراً ليبياياً (23 دولار).

إغلاق الحدود الليبية وانعدام الأمن في شمال دارفور

إن إغلاق الحدود بين السودان وليبيا ف مايو 2003 والذي ارتبط مع حالة عدم الأمن في صحارى شمال دارفور كان له أثر سيئ على اقتصاد دارفور وعلى رفاهية سكانها وتجارها وعمالها المهاجرين. أدى الإغلاق إلى توقف حركة العمال المهاجرين بين شمال دارفور وجنوب ليبيا (مما أدى إلى حجز الآلاف في الكفرة) وأوقف إحدى طرق التجارة القائمة والشديدة الأهمية.

تأثرت الاتصالات والتحويلات ولم تعد إمكانية إرسال رسائل باليد أو تحويلات إلى دارفور متوفرة. إن الاتصالات بين العمال المغتربين وأسرة في دارفور له أهمية ماسة في تحويل النقود واستعادة سبل المعيشة لعائقيتها.

تمثل الكفرة مركزاً تجارياً متعدد لعدد من الدول فهي تربط السودان وتشاد مع ليبيا والدول العربية الأخرى وهي نقطة عبور للعمال المهاجرين من العديد من القوميات. لهذا فإن إغلاق الحدود كان له أثره على النشاط في الكفرة نفسها وأيضاً على حياة معيشة العمال المهاجرين.

إن الفرص المحدودة للعمال المهاجرين في ليبيا الآن مقترنة مع التهديد بالاعتقال، وصعوبات العودة للسودان وفقدان الاتصال مع أسرهم في دارفور وعدم التأكد المرتبط بمصيرهم قد خلقت شعوراً باليأس بين المغتربين من دارفور في ليبيا. وينتظر الآلاف في الكفرة فرصة للعودة إلى دارفور وهم يرون قيمة رأسمالهم تتدهور في كل يوم. ويعتقد أن حالات الانتحار في ارتفاع مستمر. وفي أماكن أخرى على طول الساحل الليبي يجازفون برحلة خطيرة بالقرب عبر البحر المتوسط إلى إيطاليا.

بالإضافة إلى الآثار التي يسببها تجريد الممتلكات هناك العمليات المستمرة التي تسبب بصورة غير مباشرة تدميرا لمعيشة السكان. هذه العمليات تعود لنشاطات اللاعبيين الأساسيين وهم حكومة السودان والمتمردين كما تعود أسبابها أيضا إلى فشل عمليات العون الإنساني الدولية.

إن المشكلة الأساسية التي تؤثر على المعيشة في دارفور هي مشكلة انعدام الأمن التي تقيد حركة كافة المجموعات. وهناك انعدام واسع للأمن نظرا للخرق المتكرر لوقف إطلاق النار من قبل كل من حكومة السودان ومجموعات المتمردين. ونتيجة لذلك فإن مدن دارفور في حالة حصار وقد أصبح النازحين داخلها معزولين عن استراتيجياتهم المعيشية المعتادة. وبالنسبة للأسر الريفية فإن الوضع لا يقل سوءا ويخاف الناس من زراعة حقولهم ومن السفر خوفا من مخاطر الهجمات. وبالرغم من وجود بعض الأمن في المناطق التي تسيطر عليها حركة تحرير السودان والعدل والمساواة إلا أن كل الخدمات والأسواق توجد في المناطق التي تسيطر عليها الحكومة (مثلا كتم) والتي لا يمكن الوصول إليها دون التعرض لخطر الاغتصاب أو الهجمات.

إن الحركة المحدودة التي نجمت عن انعدام الأمن قد قصرت من الاستراتيجيات المعيشية الأساسية لكافة المجموعات بما في ذلك الزراعة، الحركة الموسمية للماشية، التجارة والوصول إلى الأسواق بالنسبة للمشتريين والبائعين والهجرة العمالية وتحويلاتهم والخروج للمناطق الريفية لجمع حطب الوقود والعلف والأغذية البرية.

بالرغم من قيام حكومة الخرطوم باستغلال وإضعاف الإدارة الأهلية، إلا أن المصالح المحلية في دارفور قائمة على اكتساب السلطة والقوة عبر النظام القبلي مما زاد من تسييس الإدارات القبلية. وتشعر بعض المجموعات بوضوح بأنها قد همشت في داخل دارفور أي أن لديها إمكانية وصول أقل من المجموعات الأخرى للموارد المحدودة الموجودة بما في ذلك الرعاية الصحية، التعليم والعون الدولي. إن وضعهم مختلف عن النازحين إلا أن معيشتهم أيضا مهددة وسوف تكون هناك حاجة لمعالجة احتياجاتهم الإنسانية بصورة عاجلة في الشهور القادمة.

الضغط على العمال المهاجرين وحجز التحويلات

حتى اندلاع الحرب الأخيرة كانت التحويلات النقدية والعينية من العمال المهاجرين في الداخل والخارج مصدر دخل ثابت لأسر دارفور وساهمت بقدر كبير في معيشتهم. وقد تسببت الحرب في تضائل التحويلات بصورة درامية. وحسب تقدير محافظ فان الدخل المفقود من التحويلات من العمال المغتربين في ليبيا تصل إلى 15 مليون دولار في العام. وتحول مبالغ كبيرة من مناطق بعيدة عن حدود دارفور. وفي الأعوام الأخيرة احتلت ليبيا المرتبة الثالثة أو الرابعة من حيث عدد العمال المهاجرين من دارفور الذين اجتذبوا إلى هناك. ولكن نظرا لقرب دارفور من ليبيا ورفع العقوبات الدولية ضد ذلك البلد واحتمال انتعاش اقتصادها فان ليبيا تمثل مصدرا غنيا محتملا للدخل للدارفوريين.

مثلت الهجرة العمالية والتجارة عبر الطرق العابرة للصحراء الكبرى لوقت طويل سمة من سمات العيش في دارفور. وأدت الطفرة البترولية في عقد السبعينات والثمانينات من القرن العشرين إلى زيادة حجم وكثافة أنماط الهجرة هذه كما ساعد في ذلك أيضا سياسات الباب المفتوح نسبيا التي انتهجها العقيد القذافي. إلا أن ذلك تغير في عام 1995م عندما شنت السلطات هجمة على العمال المهاجرين (وتضمنت غارات والإعادة القسرية) والتي استمرت بصورة متقطعة حتى اليوم.

يقدر سكان ليبيا بخمسة ملايين نسمة ويعتقد بان هناك 2 مليون من العمال الأجانب بالبلاد. ولا يتوفر تقدير رسمي لعدد العمال المهاجرين من دارفور والموجودين بليبيا ولكن يقدر أن عددهم يتراوح بين 150.000 و250.000 شخص. وبدل مسح بالتقييم السريع أجرى في الكفرة أن العمال المهاجرين من دارفور يشكلون قوة عمل ماهرة نسبيا وناضجة وأن لدى أغلبهم مسؤوليات أسرية في

أ- التهميش الاقتصادي والسياسي لدارفور من قبل الحكومة المركزية منذ القرن التاسع عشر.
ب- الصراعات الإقليمية الأوسع والتي ساهمت في تطوير وتجنيد مليشيات عرقية متميزة والعدد المتزايد للأسلحة النارية التي يمتلكها سكان دارفور بصفة عامة. وتشمل هذه الصراعات الحرب الأهلية بين الشمال والجنوب، الصراعات الطويلة التي دارت في تشاد والنزاع بين تشاد وليبيا والعلاقة بين هذه البلدان والسودان.
ج- الاستغلال التكتيكي للولاءات العرقية داخل دارفور من قبل حكومة السودان والأحزاب السياسية بما في ذلك تعبئة المليشيات المسلحة وتعبئة سياسية قائمة على الهوية الدينية والعرقية (المهدية وفيما بعد الاسلامة والعروبة).

على المستوى المحلي فان تهميش وإهمال دارفور قد ساهم في:

أ- انهيار المؤسسات بما في ذلك الإدارة الأهلية، والنظام القضائي والشرطة والتي يبدو لاحقاً أنها قد مالت إلى مجموعات محددة.
ب- فشل عملية التنمية وتشمل التعليم والصحة والموصلات والخدمات البيطرية والخدمات الأخرى مما اثر على المجموعات العرقية المختلفة بدرجات متفاوتة.

تشمل العمليات الأخرى الصراع على والضغوط على الموارد الطبيعية في دارفور ويرجع ذلك جزئياً إلى وجود تاريخ من الجفاف والمجاعات. أدت هذه الصراعات إلى تنافس عرقي واضح ساهم في الصراعات المحلية. إضافة إلى ذلك فان التأثير الخارجي للجنان الشعبية المرتبطة بلبيبا وبعض الأحزاب السياسية (جماعة الإخوان المسلمين، حزب الأمة) قد ساهمت في الاستقطاب السياسي بين المجموعات العربية وغير العربية في دارفور.

التأثير على سبل العيش

إن سبل العيش في أرياف دارفور سهلة الفهم حيث أن كل القبائل عربية أم لا تقوم بزراعة المحاصيل وتربي الماشية بدرجات مختلفة. وقد تلاقت سبل عيش المزارعين والرعاة رغم أنه يمكن القول أن عوامل مثل الحصول على الأرض، اختلاف أنواع التربة، معدلات هطول الأمطار وخطوط العرض والارتفاع قد أثرت في تحديد النمط المعين للإنتاج الريفي. تدعم أغلب الأسر الزراعة وتربية الحيوان باستراتيجيات مثل الهجرة العمالية وتحويلات المهاجرين، وجمع المنتجات الطبيعية (حطب الوقود، العلف والأغذية البرية). كما تشمل أنماط العيش الأخرى استراتيجيات خاصة بمحاصيل معينة وتشمل على سبيل المثال إنتاج التبناك، الحرف (الصناعات الجلدية، الحدادة.. الخ) والعمل في الجيش ومجموعة من الأنشطة غير الشرعية (التهرب، النهب، الخمر والدعارة الخ).

تم القيام بست دراسات حالة غطت كل ولايات دارفور الثلاثة في مناطق ككبائية، مليط، دسر، السريف، نيالا والجنينة. وعكست هذه الدراسات تنوع المجموعات العرقية كبيرة وصغيرة وعكست وجهات نظر سياسية وتجارب نزاع مختلفة (بما في ذلك مجموعات تدعم المتمردين / المعارضة، مجموعات موالية للحكومة ومجموعات مترددة).

إن دراسات الحالات التي أجريت في ككبائية، ديسر، الجنينة ونيالا تعطي روايات مفصلة عن الهجمات التي قامت بها القوات الحكومية على القرى ويدعم من المليشيات المسلحة خلال عام 2003 و2004. وكان هناك في جميع الحالات تجريد للمواطنين من ممتلكاتهم وتدمير ممتلكات المجتمعات والأسر. ويعد هذا خرقاً للقانون الدولي الذي يمنع استخدام الجوع كوسيلة من وسائل الحرب وينص على أن أطراف النزاع يجب ألا تهاجم أو تدمر أو تقوم بإزالة أو تجعل الأشياء الضرورية لبقاء السكان المدنيين غير صالحة للاستعمال.

ملخص تنفيذي

الهدف

هدف البحث والدراسة هو دراسة أثر الصراع الزاهن والأزمة الإنسانية على معيشة مجموعات مختارة في دارفور وتطوير أساليب للتدخل الإنساني الاستراتيجي. ركزت الدراسة على هجرة العمالة، إنتاج وتجارة الماشية وعلى علاقة هذه المجتمعات مع وسط وشرق السودان وليبيا.

منهج الدراسة

شملت الدراسة عرض للدراسات السابقة وعلى التنسيق مع الشركاء. كما تم القيام ببحث ميداني في طرابلس، بنغازي، والكفرة في ليبيا وفي الخرطوم، القضارف وفي شمال، غرب ووسط دارفور. استخدمت الدراسة مجموعة من وسائل البحث الميدانية النوعية لجمع بيانات من مصادر أولية واستند تحليلها على مراجعة التأثير على استراتيجيات العيش، وعلى الأصول والأهداف على المستوى المحلي. كما تمت دراسة أصول النزاع وذلك في محاولة لفهم أفضل لسبل العيش والنتائج المترتبة من ذلك على أي توصيات لاحقة.

أزمة سبل المعيشة

لم يحدث من قبل في تاريخ دارفور أن تجمعت مثل هذه العوامل محدثة فشل الاستراتيجيات المعيشية وفقدان الأصول. وتشمل هذه العوامل التجريد المنتظم من الممتلكات، فشل الإنتاج، فشل السوق والفشل في الوصول إلى الموارد الطبيعية مصحوبة بعقبات أمام تحويلات العمال المهاجرين. وفي مثل هذه الظروف يبدو أن مجاعة تشمل الإقليم كله أمر حتمي. وبالرغم من أن تقديم العون الغذائي يمكن أن يقدم حلاً جزئياً لمشكلة فشل الإنتاج إلا أن هناك حاجة لمجموعة واسعة من التدخلات لمعالجة هذه القضايا الأخرى.

هناك رابطة لا تنفصم بين النزاع وسبل معيشة الناس. إن سبل المعيشة مكتملة لأسباب النزاعات ولهذا فإن آثار النزاع سوف تكون عاملاً محورياً لأي حل دائم. إن التحركات للوصول لحل دائم يجب أن تأخذ في الاعتبار سبل العيش كما أن الجهود الهادفة لدعم سبل العيش يجب أن تضع في الاعتبار الاقتصاد السياسي للصراع وأثره على سبل المعيشة والتدخلات المعيشية.

توصيات

هناك حاجة لمعالجة التغيرات البنوية الرئيسية على مستوى الدولي، القومي والإقليمي. وتشمل هذه العمليات إعادة الأرض، التعويض عن الماشية المنهوبة، المصالحة والتعويض وفتح طرق المواصلات لتوفير مرور آمن للمواطنين والمواشي والسلع. وفي العادة فإن عمليات المصالحة الواسعة يجب أن يشملها دعم سبل المعيشة. وتشمل التوصيات الواسعة والمفصلة مجالات واسعة مثل: الأمن، الأرض، الماشية، الأسواق، هجرة العمالة والاستجابة الإنسانية الدولية (انظر أدناه).

تاريخ ومنشأ النزاع

ترجع أصول النزاع إلى القرن التاسع عشر. يتتبع التقرير تطور طرق التجارة، أراضي القبائل، نظم الإدارة، حقوق ملكية الأرض والعلاقة بين دارفور والسلطات السودانية المركزية من فترة سلطنة الفور إلى اليوم. ويحدد عدد من العمليات القومية والإقليمية التي ساهمت مباشرة في الصراع. على المستوى القومي تشمل هذه العمليات:



دارفور: حصار سبل العيش

ملخص تنفيذي وتوصيات

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