

# Strangers in a Strange Land

YOUNG ADULT ERITREAN MIGRANTS IN KAMPALA, UGANDA

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## Abstract

As northern and western migration routes from Eritrea become less viable and appealing, the number of Eritrean migrants arriving to Uganda each year is growing, even in comparison to other destinations in sub-Saharan Africa. Due to Eritrea's policy of forced military conscription, many of these migrants are teens and young adults traveling on their own. This mixed methods descriptive study seeks to fill knowledge gaps on this topic by exploring the livelihood and protection strategies of young adult Eritrean migrants in Kampala. It will further explore how migrants' different journeys influence their resilience capabilities and overall well-being in Kampala. As part of this effort, this research will explore the exceptional situation of Eritrean migrants who arrived in Uganda through an unofficial Israeli resettlement program as well as the unique close ties between Eritrean communities in Kampala and Juba, South Sudan.

This study concludes that for Eritreans who have yet to find a path to leave Africa for the West, Kampala is seen as the best of bad options in terms of safety and quality of life. However, most people have not made enough income to cover expenses, if any income at all, and depend heavily on remittances. This financial insecurity, coupled with the prevalence of corruption in the asylum-seeking process and protection risks in Kampala, contribute to Eritrean migrants feeling uncomfortable and insecure in Uganda. The data illustrates that migrants from rural areas and oldest siblings are particularly vulnerable. Many of the challenges experienced by Eritrean migrants in Kampala require political solutions; however practitioners can take steps to better support this population and identify young migrants who are most at risk.

**Keywords:** Migration, Eritrea, Kampala, Uganda, Israel, South Sudan, youth migration, livelihoods

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

Eritrean migration is one of largest drivers of global irregular migration, particularly from Africa. As of 2016, an estimated 411,000 Eritreans were living as refugees outside of their home country, equal to almost 8% of Eritrea's population. Roughly 5,000 people flee Eritrea a month, leading Eritrea to be known as "the world's fastest emptying nation" (Anderson 2016). Due to Eritrea's policy of forced military conscription, many of these migrants are teens and young adults traveling on their own to avoid indefinite service.

There is substantial literature regarding Eritrean migrants who traveled north to Israel or west and onward to Europe, the most popular long-distance routes to date; however, significantly less has been written about those who have journeyed south and tried to establish themselves in Uganda specifically. Since migration from Eritrea is not slowing and shifting geopolitical realities and attitudes toward refugees in the West have made the Northern and Western routes more fraught and less appealing, the numbers of Eritreans heading south is increasing.

This study aims to understand how Eritreans who live in Kampala develop livelihood and protection strategies and access informal and formal institutions. It considers what factors in migrants' lives and backgrounds prior to arrival influence their ability to successfully develop these strategies and access institutions. Before beginning fieldwork, the research team hypothesized that migrants' journeys and transit destinations between Uganda and Eritrea would determine their available livelihood assets and shape the livelihood strategies available to them. They further hypothesized that migrants' journeys and transit destinations would contribute to determining their political status and documentation, thereby shaping their protection risks. The study specifically considered if Eritreans who lived in Israel and participated in its "voluntary departure" program faced different challenges and opportunities due to their prior experience of living in a Western country and the characteristics of the departure program.<sup>1</sup>

The research team conducted field work in Kampala during the summer of 2018 and utilized a mixed methods approach. It employed thirty-two semi-structures qualitative respondent interviews, seventy-one respondent surveys, and eight key respondent interviews in addition to a literature review. This approach allowed the researchers to check their findings and increase validity by seeing if the same concepts and patterns emerge when different methods are used.

This study concludes that for Eritreans who have yet to find a path to leave Africa, Kampala is seen as the best of bad options. However, for most people it has not been possible to make enough income to cover their expenses, if any income at all. Unless they own a small business or have significant savings, migrants are dependent on accessing remittances to make ends meet. This financial insecurity, coupled with the prevalence of corruption in the asylum-seeking process and protection risks in Kampala, contribute to most Eritrean migrants feeling insecure and unwelcome in Uganda. Simultaneously, nearly every respondent found it to be preferable to the

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<sup>1</sup> See chapter two for details on Israel's "voluntary departure" program. The author chose to place quotation marks around the name "voluntary departure" because while that is the program's official title, prior literature has called the voluntary nature of it into question. This decision is in line with the practices of these prior studies.

reality they fled in Eritrea and many found Kampala to be a better alternative to refugee camps, war zones, dangerous journeys and other major urban centers in sub-Saharan Africa.

In contrast to the study hypothesis, migrants' lives in Eritrea prior to their departure had a bigger influence on their wellbeing in Kampala than their transit destinations prior to Uganda. Migrants from rural areas and who were the first in their families to leave face disadvantages in developing sustainable livelihood strategies and gaining political security. Although migrants' journeys by in large do not have any measurable impact on their situation in Kampala, people who came from Israel or South Sudan have distinct protection risks, social networks, and perspectives. This report will thus devote space to exploring the unique experiences of these subpopulations.

This study is valuable to the international community, and Eritreans themselves, for three reasons: First, this study can help humanitarian actors develop relevant services and policies for young Eritrean migrants who stay in urban areas in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, by exploring the links between Eritrean migrants' origins, their different journeys to Kampala, and their ongoing livelihood strategies, those invested in their well-being can better understand their decision-making processes and the factors that increase resilience. Finally, since most Eritreans in Uganda live in urban areas, this study can provide useful information on urban youth migrant livelihood strategies in Uganda, particularly as more refugees chose to live in cities.

## A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY

This report uses the word “migrants” as a catch-all term for refugees, asylum-seekers, and people who either have not been able to obtain these statuses or have chosen not to pursue them. Under current political conditions, the word migrant can carry political connotations outside of an academic environment. For example, Eritreans in Israel are often called “economic migrants” by politicians and activists to delegitimize their presence in the country (Berger 2018). It thus feels important to state that the use of this term does not place any claims on whether it was valid, morally or legally, for the respondents in this study to cross borders.

## Chapter 2: Literature Review

### HISTORY OF ERITREAN MIGRATION

For the most of its twenty-five-year long history as an independent state, Eritrea has been one of the largest contributors to irregular global migration. Although emigration from Eritrea has been continuous, it has ebbed and flowed with shifting drivers, which in turn shape migrants' decisions, identities, and behaviors in host countries (Belloni 2018, 3).

The first wave of Eritrean refugees developed during a thirty-year war between armed Eritrean independence movements and Ethiopia, which sought to maintain its post-World War Two control over the former Italian colony. On the eve of Eritrean independence in 1992, as many as one million Eritreans were outside of its borders as refugees and asylum seekers out of a total

population of four million. They primarily stayed in neighboring Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and across the sea in Yemen and many returned to Eritrea post-independence (Thiollet 2011, 2-4).

A second wave of Eritreans began fleeing in 1998 when border skirmishes between Ethiopia and Eritrea erupted into a two-year war that killed approximately 100,000 people. Ethiopia forced 75,000 Eritreans, some of whom were born in Ethiopia, to return to Eritrea (Solomon 2018; Tekleab Araia 2018; Kibreab 2009). The Eritrean government used the looming Ethiopian threat to justify hardening and turning inward. Following increased political activity from reformists and students, President Isaias Afewerki and the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) closed the independent press, and arbitrarily arrested, tortured, and disappeared students, dissidents, and select political leaders (HRW 2001; Tronvoll and Mekonnen 2014; Kibreab 2009). The authoritarian regime, which kicked out international NGOs in 2005, has continued to build a tightly-controlled surveillance state that is ravaged by poverty, hunger, and has one of the lowest human development index scores in the world (Tronvoll and Mekonnen 2014, 8-9). A defining feature of the regime is its mandatory national service, which allows for indefinite conscription, often involving intense and inhumane conditions, justified by the threat of war with Ethiopia (Horwood and Hooper 2016, 14; HRW 2009).

The prolonged combination of political repression, mandatory military service, and crippling poverty sustained Eritrea's migrant flows long after the border war ended. A third migration uptick began around 2004 as people recognized that conditions were not improving after the second active conflict with Ethiopia subsided (RMMS, 14). In 2008, Eritrea was the second largest refugee-producing country in the world. The United States saw a 166% increase in Eritrean asylum applications between 2005-2010 (Tronvoll and Mekonnen 2014, 167).

Eritrea and Ethiopia signed a historic peace agreement in June 2018, which led to an opening of the border. The implications of this are still to be seen as the border opening has led to an increase in Eritreans crossing into Ethiopia and claiming asylum, but it may also eventually lead to reforms in Eritrea that remove some of the largest pull factors (Jeffery 2018; Maclean 2018).

## INSIDE ERITREA

Eritrea is one of the most isolated and authoritarian countries in the world.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, it is difficult to assess the situation within Eritrea today and literature by independent Eritrean academics within the country or external scholars is incredibly limited (Kibreab 2009, 10-12; Tronvoll and Mekonnen 2014, 17-20). Asmara University closed in 2004 and foreign researchers are almost always denied entry. Most of the world's knowledge about modern Eritrea comes from Eritrean migrants, scholars in the diaspora, and regional experts. Scholars and practitioners do not even have an accurate assessment of basic demographics and population numbers (Tronvoll and Mekonnen 2014, 165). Information thus largely comes from those who chose to leave and some seemingly basic information may simply be not well known or be very outdated.

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<sup>2</sup> Freedom House scored Eritrea as the fourth least free nation in 2018 and Reporters without Borders ranking it as having the second least free press.

## Eritrean Demography

Eritrea is a religiously and ethnically diverse nation divided into six regions, or Zobas (CIA Factbook). The Tigrinya, which comprise over half of Eritrea's population, are primarily Christian and concentrated in the urban Zoba Maekel and neighboring but more rural Zoba Debub. The next largest ethnolinguistic group the Tigre, mainly live in Gash Barka, Zoba Anseba, and the Northern Red Sea region. They are primarily Muslim with a Christian minority. The remaining ethnolinguistic groups, Afar, Rashiada, Sahho, Kunama, Nara, Beja, and Bilen are all under 15% of the population total and with the exception of the Kunama, the majority are Muslim (Tronvoll and Mekonnen 2014, x; Immigration & Nationality Directorate Home Office 2002). According to the 2017 Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF 2017), there are no reliable data on Eritrea's religious composition. However, Pew estimates that Christians make up approximately 63 percent and Muslims 37 percent (USCIRF 2017, 39). A study suggested that in 2002 the Christian composition was 58 percent Orthodox, 5 percent Roman Catholic, and less than 1 percent Protestant. (Hsu 2011, 1-3). However, due to persecution of born-again Christians these figures are unlikely to be accurate.

## Eritrean Military and Education Institutions

The Eritrean education system extends from Grade 1-12 (ages 6 to 18). Eighty-one percent attend elementary school, after which school participation diminishes dramatically (UNICEF). According to the Eritrean government, "based on performance in the secondary education certificate examination students join institutions of higher learning (tertiary) or go into technical and vocational education and training (TVET)" (Ministry of Education 2013). In practice, since 2004, the final year of secondary education for students of all genders is completed at Sawa, a military training camp. Although it has been branded as Warsay-Yikealo School, "students are treated as military conscripts and for all practical purposes they are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense (HRW 2009)." Youth who dropped out of school for a variety of reasons are also brought to Sawa and conscripted, often well before they are eighteen (HRW 2009).

After six months of military training and the "completion" of school, youth are conscripted to either civil or military national service, which in theory lasts up to age forty but in reality can extend above age fifty. In addition to military roles, people build roads, serve as clerks for government-owned companies etc. while earning standardized, menial national service pocket-money (HRW 2009). People report working long hours under harsh conditions in extreme heat and being separated from families for extended periods of time. Those who get good grades may be given the opportunity to attend college first to receive training to be a nurse, engineer, or teacher or fill other roles that require further education before they begin their service. However, they are not given any transcript or degree certificate to incentivize educated people to stay in the country (HRW 2009). Due to these conditions, many people try to escape national service, either permanently or simply short-term to see relatives. Those who are caught are imprisoned for long periods of time and often brutally tortured (See HRW 2009 for detailed accounts).



## THE CURRENT WAVE OF ERITREAN MIGRATION

As of 2016, an estimated 411,000 Eritreans were living as refugees outside of their home country, almost 8% of Eritrea's population (Horwood and Coper 2016, 1). Roughly 5,000 people flee Eritrea a month, totaling 60,000 annually; most of these migrants are young men and boys as young as fifteen deserting national service. According to Eritrean laws, people cannot legally leave the country until they have completed their military service, are over the age of fifty, and they must pay large fees to receive a passport and exit visa. Children under the age of six are allowed to leave and it is also easier for married women with children who finished their national service to leave (Zere 2018). Due to these restrictions, most people flee across the border illegally, at risk of being imprisoned and tortured or shot at the border (UNHRC; HRW 2009). For those who do leave illegally, it is very difficult to return (Anderson).

### Types of Migrants

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) describes mixed migration as consisting of complex population movements including refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants and other migrants (IOM, 2004, p. 42). Mixed migration includes:

**“Irregular migrants:** Migrants dislodged by a real and/or perceived inability to thrive (economic migrants) or driven by aspirations, a desire to unite with other family members or some other factor.”

**Refugees and asylum seekers (forced migrants):** Migrants in search of asylum from conflict or persecution in their country of origin.

**Victims of trafficking (involuntary migrants):** Internal and foreign migrants coerced or deceived into servitude, forced labour or sexual exploitation.

**Stateless persons:** Migrants without recognized citizenship, placing them in a limbo between different national borders.

**Unaccompanied minors and separated children and other vulnerable persons on the move:** Migrant children without protection or assistance, in a state of acute vulnerability (RMM, 15).”

As will be discussed in Chapter 5, Eritrean migrants come from all of these often overlapping categories. The most common reasons migrants cite for leaving are national service, persecution of born-again Christians, and seeking a better future themselves and their families (RMMS 2014; HRW 2009). In some instances, countries of asylum debate whether Eritreans' forced military conscription is sufficient grounds for them to receive refugee status. However, about 90% of Eritreans who applied successfully claimed asylum in industrialized countries (RMMS, 19).

Due to these circumstances, Eritrean migration aligns with theories regarding migration flows while also having key distinctions and in many ways straddling the patterns of irregular migrants and forced migrants. Massey describes five features of international migration:

(1) the structural forces in sending nations that create a mobile population prone to migration; (2) the structural forces in receiving nations that generate a persistent demand for migrant workers; (3) the motivations of the people who respond to these structural forces by moving across borders; (4) the social structures and organizations that arise in the course of globalization to perpetuate flows of people over time and across space; (5) and the policies that governments implement in response to these forces and how they function in practice to shape the numbers and characteristics of the migrants who enter and exit a country (3, 2015).

All of these features are at play in Eritrean migration. Eritreans' decision-making aligns with those described in "the new economics of labor migration": sending remittances is an important objective in their migration and their choices and actions are often intended to benefit the extended household rather than the individual alone (Taylor 1999). Although there are not reliable data for today, in 2005 it was estimated that one third of Eritrea's GDP comes from remittances (Harper 2016).

However, Eritreans generally do not identify as labor migrants, but as refugees, due to the previously described political context. Many labor migrants travel seasonally between their work and places of origin, maintaining connections, contributing to local markets, and creating a "circular flow" of workers (Massey 2015). Yet most Eritreans do not intend to go back unless there is a regime change and largely are unable to do so under current conditions. Although Eritrean remittances do support families at home and inject capital into local markets, this is less and less migrant households' objectives; rather, migrants send remittances with the intention of helping household members also leave. This has led to a perception that remittance flows are "plummeting" (Harper 2019). Unlike many countries in the global south with large migration flows, the Eritrean government sees migration as a threat rather than a benefit to the economy (Harper 2019).

## Migration Routes

Eritrean migrants also "stand out for the frequency and distance of their onward movement Ethiopia and Sudan, large numbers migrate much further.<sup>3</sup> While 60,000 people are estimated to leave Eritrea annually, it is impossible to determine the number of people taking each route because of the mixed migration context and an unknown number of people who perish along each route (RMMS 2014, 19-20). The following section describes the most common routes of people who do not remain in refugee camps in neighboring Ethiopia and Sudan: (Hornwood and Coper 2016, 1).

*North.* Until 2013 when Israel sealed its border, the most popular route was north through Sudan and Egypt, concluding with a perilous crossing of the Sinai Peninsula into Israel (Hornwood and Coper 2016, 10). A total of 64,850 migrants arrived to Israel, mostly between 2007-2012, the majority of whom were Eritrean.

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<sup>3</sup> In 2017 there were 164,505 Eritrean refugees and 216 asylum seekers. There were 108,243 Eritrean refugees in Sudan and 4,901 asylum seekers (UNHCR Persons of Concern)

Although non-Jewish migrants in Israel face discrimination, racism, and poverty, they can access well-paying jobs compared to their home countries, largely in restaurants, hotels, and custodial work. Many have enough income to sustain themselves as well as send remittances to relatives (Furst-Nichols and Jacobsen 2011).

The Israeli government views Sudanese, South Sudanese, and Eritrean migrants as “infiltrators” who illegally entered Israel for financial gain (Berger 2018). Since 2013, Israel has not only made a concerted effort to stop migration but also to get those already within its border to leave. Israel reduced its irregular migrant population to 37,288 by the end of 2017 through its “voluntary departure” program, family reunification or asylum claims in other countries, and forced deportation of all South Sudanese migrants. In 2017 alone, the number of asylum seekers in Israel decreased by 7% (Israeli Ministry of Interior 2018). Israel’s “voluntary departure” program encourages asylum seekers to move to a “third country” in exchange for airfare, a \$3,500 grant, and documentation to support their relocation. Between 2013-2017 around 5,000 people have been sent to Uganda or Rwanda through this program (Ministry of Interior 2018).

UNHCR and the Hotline for Refugees and Migrants in Israel published reports with testimonials from migrants who migrated to Europe from Rwanda after leaving Israel (UNHCR 2018; Birger 2017). These reports indicate that migrants felt coerced to leave Israel, were stripped of their identity papers in Rwanda, were forcibly smuggled into Uganda, and found themselves in high-risk situations. These findings were echoed by the International Refugee Rights Initiative and the Hotline for Refugees and Migrants in Israel, which both published reports containing testimonies gathered in Uganda in 2015 (International Refugee Rights Initiative; Rozen 2015). A 2018 Amnesty International Report, which included interviews with participants in the “voluntary departure” program living in Uganda, disclosed that migrants lack documentation, receive no support, are unemployed, and routinely experience extortion and theft (Amnesty International 2018).

Due to political pressure and a rightwing shift, Israel announced a new deportation policy starting in December of 2017: Male asylum seekers would need to choose between “voluntary departure” or indefinite detention. Due to protests and Uganda and Rwanda caving to international pressure, Israel backed down. However, the current administration is actively trying to enact a deportation policy and it has been a campaign promise in the 2019 elections.

*West.* Since 2013, traveling through Sudan and Libya to try to reach Italy and thus mainland Europe by boat has become the most popular choice for migrants from Eritrea. In 2015, 25% of all Mediterranean arrivals to Italy were Eritrean, more than any other nationality, and Europe received 33,100 new asylum claims from Eritreans. However, due to ISIS, traffickers, and a more vigorous effort by Italy and the EU to prevent people from crossing, this route is particularly risky and the number of Eritreans taking it has decreased (Botti 2018; RMMS 2014). Some people try to travel by boat to Europe, mainly through Italy, right away, while others first work to save money in Libya. This route is well documented (see RMMS 2014). Most migrants do not see Italy as their final destination and attempt to travel onward, mainly to Northern Europe. Belloni explores this decision-making process through a gambling framework, in which Eritrean migrants continue to play the odds for the best outcome, even though it is unlikely, due to social pressures, a desire to make the most of their investment, and their exposure to “success stories” (2016).

*East.* A less common alternative is to travel by boat to the Arabian Peninsula through Yemen. Although the war in Yemen has made this route dangerous and less popular, it has not stopped migration flows as people seek well-paying jobs in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (ReliefWeb). There currently are not proper asylum procedures in Yemen and, as of April 2018, Human Rights Watch believes that ninety Eritreans are in a migrant detention center in Aden, which is known to employ brutality (2018). Very little academic research has been conducted on the Eastern Route (Hornwood and Coper 2016 6). Thiollet describes the status of Eritrean migrants in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, but only covered until 2007.

*South.* Although it historically has been a less popular route, as the Eastern, Western, and Northern routes become more dangerous or untenable, more Eritreans are choosing to head south, mainly to Uganda, Kenya, and South Africa. There are multiple pathways a migrant can take to these destinations through a combination of Sudan, Ethiopia, and South Sudan to either Kenya or Rwanda or continuing to South Africa by land or by plane.

There is limited literature on the Southern route. In her research with Eritrean migrants in Johannesburg in 2005 Tekleab Araia found that most people did not originally plan to go to South Africa but decided to head to Johannesburg as a transit destination while they prepared to head to North America and Europe through asylum claims, family reunification, or further irregular migration. They chose Johannesburg because it is a relatively safe city with job opportunities and a place where it was easy to get refugee status. However, most migrants ended up in South Africa for much longer than they had prepared for or expected (Tekleab Araia 2012, 38-42). Tekleab Araia described Uganda as less popular than South Africa and most of the people she interviewed who passed through Kampala stayed less than a week. She argues that this indicates that there were not large numbers of Eritreans in Kampala or robust networks (Tekleab Araia 2012, 45).

In a more recent working paper questioning the value and utility of refugee-status, Cole drew on her research with Eritreans in Kampala in 2016. Echoing Tekleab Araia, she found that for Eritreans, “Uganda was not primarily a place of immediate onward transit for this population. During their time in the capital, Eritreans would therefore be weighing up various longer-term options” (Cole 2018, 8). People chose to continue to Uganda from earlier countries on their journeys because it was considered safe, stable, and relatively comfortable. Additionally, “people had heard that a relatively prosperous Eritrean community existed there, financed by remittances from Juba, and that the government was relatively sympathetic and generous when it came to adjudicating their claims to asylum” (Cole 2018, 8). However, starting in 2012 the amount of accepted Eritrean asylum claims in Uganda plummeted and currently stands at an estimated 15% of applicants (Cole 2018,8; United Nations Persons of Concern Population Statistics).

Similar to the South Africa case, Eritreans stay in Kampala for much longer than they anticipated due to financial limitations and challenges reaching their envisioned destinations, even though most continue to see their time there as temporary (Cole 2018, 12). Eritreans who came from Israel stay for shorter periods of time and many quickly continued onward to the Western Route (Berger 2018; Ziv 2018). According to one estimate, 20% stay in Uganda and concentrate in Kampala (Ziv 2018).

## ERITREAN MIGRANTS IN KAMPALA

Uganda is the largest host of Eritrean migrants in Africa outside of Eritrea's neighbors. It also hosts the most refugees in Africa. As of 2016, 1,162,738 refugees and asylum seekers lived in Uganda. The majority come from South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Somalia, Rwanda, and Eritrea respectively (ReliefWeb 2017). Unlike the largest refugee groups, the majority of Eritreans, Rwandans, and Somalis settle in Kampala (Kaplan and Omata 2013). In 2012, Eritreans constituted the second largest group of the 50,000 refugees in Kampala (Omata 2012).

Although Uganda is widely recognized for being welcoming and for its generous refugee policies, the Ugandan government and humanitarian relief organizations have had a harder time reaching refugees in Kampala than those in refugee camps. Yet, due to increased employment opportunities and autonomy, migrants are increasingly choosing to live in urban areas (ReliefWeb 2017). Corruption is common in Ugandan refugee institutions. Uganda faces accusations of inflating refugee numbers and diverting food (Biryaberema 2018). Migrants allege that bribery is rampant in the Office of the Prime Minister in Kampala, to the point where Eritreans report that it is incredibly difficult to get refugee status without paying hundreds of dollars in bribes (Cole 2018).

Most Eritreans in Uganda are young men with at least some secondary education. Many young married women will also leave Eritrea, sometimes legally by traveling with young children, and wait for their husbands to join them (Zere 2018). Women, single or with children, often experienced significant trauma on their journeys (Van Resisen and Mawere 2017). Two working papers on refugee livelihoods in Uganda indicate that Eritreans have largely developed livelihood assets through petty trade or operating or working in Eritrean-owned businesses like internet cafes, hair salons, and taxi stands (Kaplan, Josiah, and Omata 2013; Omata 2012). However, unemployment rates are high in Kampala among the general population and many Eritreans are unable to find steady work or any income-generating activities. Migrants without refugee status cannot legally work in the formal economy (Cole, 2017; 2018). Remittances from relatives who made it to the West are thus a critical source of financial capital (Horwood and Coper 2016).

The Eritrean community in Kampala is close-knit, live in concentrated areas, and people support each other socially and financially, particularly in times of crisis (United Nations 2018). Cole describes the Eritrean community as "the first and last providers of protection" in the face of Ugandan formal systems failing to meet people's basic needs (2017).

## Chapter 3: Methodology


### KAMPALA CASE STUDY JUSTIFICATION

Eritreans in Kampala serve as a useful case study for organizations seeking to understand the decision-making and well-being of young adult migrants. Eritreans, both youth and adults, comprise a large portion of irregular movement globally, as described in the prior chapter. Additionally, the new Eritrean-Ethiopian peace agreement and shifting policies and attitudes

toward Eritrean migrant in Europe and Israel makes this subject particularly timely. More broadly, nearly half of migration flows are south-south, yet the impact of this movement on host countries and migrants is much less explored than north-south flows (Ratha and Shaw 2007).

The Southern route is not one of the most popular among Eritreans; however, as other routes become more dangerous or untenable, more Eritreans are heading south (United Nations Persons of Concern Data). Yet there is only a small body of literature examining migrants heading south from the Horn of Africa. Most of this research has focused on South Africa and Kenya to a lesser degree, describing South Africa as the primary destination of this route (Cossor 2014, 25). However, based on UN statistics, over the last decade, the number of documented migrants in Kenya has stayed somewhat low and consistent and has risen slightly but recently leveled in South Africa. In sharp contrast, the rates of documented migrants have risen steadily in Uganda.

This surprising increase has not been discussed in literature and requires further exploration. Eritreans who participated in Israel’s voluntary departure program account for some of this rise, but this population has never surpassed 1,000 people annually (Israeli Ministry of Interior, 2018). Additionally, many of these individuals have not applied for asylum in Uganda and thus wouldn’t be counted in these statistics. Therefore, in addition to deportees from Israel, a growing number of other Eritreans are also spending time in Kampala.



These numbers do not include irregular migrants and thus certainly do not include all Eritreans in these countries.


This data contrasts with Tekleab Araia’s assessment that Uganda is not a popular transit destination for Eritreans, which now appears to be outdated. Given these trends, research focusing specifically on young adult Eritrean migrants in Uganda is warranted. As described in the literature review, most organizations supporting the over one million refugees from various countries in Uganda have concentrated their efforts on camps rather than urban areas. This case

study thus aims to examine a less understood but pressing aspect of youth migration from the Horn of Africa and to suggest relevant policies and practices.

## GUIDING FRAMEWORKS

### Sustainable Livelihoods Framework

In order to operationalize abstract concepts like well-being and resilience the study will be rooted in the sustainable livelihoods framework (Figure 2). This framework allows for a holistic examination of a household's assets, strategies, and vulnerabilities, as well as how well it adapts to changing conditions. A sustainable livelihood is "based on capabilities, assets (both material and social resources) and activities required for living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining natural resource bases" (DFID).



**Figure 2. The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (DFID)**

This framework is often utilized in the context of poverty reduction efforts but it is also a useful for understanding how migrants cope and support themselves.<sup>4</sup> Since this study is examining the livelihoods of urban migrants, natural capital is not relevant; the study will not explore natural capital and instead add an examination of political capital, in line with practices in the field.

### Resilience Framework

This study will also utilize the concept of resilience and corresponding frameworks. USAID defines resilience as "the ability of peoples, households, communities, and countries and systems to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from shocks and stressors in a manner that reduce chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth" (Save the Children). Resilience capacities, which include factors from personality traits to various forms of capital, increase a migrant's ability to respond to shocks and stresses, but does not guarantee an effective response. By examining which systems, characteristics, and, resources increase resilience capabilities for young adult migrants, this study can help inform the programming of organizations that support this population.

## STUDY DESIGN

This descriptive study utilizes a mixed method approach by employing qualitative informant and key informant interviews and quantitative surveys with informants in addition to a literature review. The use of both instruments enabled triangulation of data, strengthening its validity and

<sup>4</sup> For examples see Crush and Frayne (2010) and Young and Jacobsen (2013).

providing a more comprehensive picture of life in Kampala among Eritrean migrants. Nearly all of the 32 qualitative respondents first completed the quantitative survey (93%).

*A quantitative survey* interrogated the assets and institutions available to respondents, and their interactions with others, protection challenges, and financial situations. It enabled a comparison of the experiences of Eritreans across different demographic details and characteristics.

*Open-ended semi-structured interviews* facilitated an in-depth exploration of the livelihood and resilience strategies of Eritrean migrants and enabled the use of a constructivist approach to understand how they perceive challenges and opportunities and make decisions accordingly. Semi-structured interviews illuminate the "why" behind some of the survey findings. They also give voice to migrants' lived experiences.

*Key Informant Interviews* with NGO staff, lawyers, researchers, and journalists provided insights into the policies and practices within the humanitarian and legal sectors that shape Eritreans' journeys and time in Uganda. These meetings also illuminated gaps in existing research and what information would be most useful to practitioners. Interviews took place in Israel and Uganda.

In addition to these methods, the lead researcher took extensive field notes regarding her observations. These proved valuable when she was able to observe people's homes, had informal conversations, or reconnected with respondents at later dates.

### **Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria**

Participants with the following characteristics were invited to participate in the study:

- Born in Eritrea
- Between the ages of 18-35
- Lived in Kampala for less than five years

The age criteria were determined by the study's focus on young adults. Due to research ethics considerations minors were not included in the sample. Two individuals who were born in Ethiopia were invited to participate as exceptions to the inclusion criteria. These people hold only Eritrean citizenship and their families were forcibly expelled to Eritrea during the border war.

Informants were recruited using snowball sampling. Three distinct snowballs were developed: one through the project's translator, one through English classes offered at an NGO, and one through an Eritrean-owned barber shop. These three snowballs began in different neighbors, which contributed to sample diversity. Additionally, the research team frequented places popular with the Eritrean population, primarily cafes, pubs, and convenience stores along Ggaba Road (a central artery through an area where many migrants live) and approached random individuals to



see if they would be interested in participating. Throughout the fieldwork, efforts were made to seek out sub-populations of interest, including youth, females, and people who came via Israel.<sup>5</sup>

Due to time and capacity limitations, qualitative interview respondents were almost entirely drawn from people who participated in the survey. Ultimately, seventy-one individuals completed the survey. Thirty-two people participated in qualitative interviews, all but two of whom also took the survey. Key informants were recruited through the researcher's contacts in the NGO sector in Israel and through relevant NGOs and community leaders in Kampala. Eight key informant interviews were conducted.

### Fieldwork


Fieldwork took place in July and August of 2018.<sup>6</sup> The quantitative and qualitative components took place sequentially, with a significant portion of the surveys being completed before the interviews began. Respondents received a numeric code to protect confidentiality. Almost all of the respondents who participated in both the survey and interview took them on separate days. The numeric code on the interview matched that of the corresponding survey.

The surveys were mostly collected in Tigrinya. In a few instances where respondents had excellent English the survey was conducted in English so that the enumerator and lead researcher could work more efficiently. The interviews were mostly conducted by the lead researcher with the support of a Tigrinya translator. In instances where a respondent had excellent English or Hebrew, the lead researcher conducted the interviews on her own. The consent process was always completed in Tigrinya. Respondents were asked if they would consent to being audio recorded. For the seven people who did not consent, the lead researcher typed notes. Before the completion of the fieldwork, the research team held a community discussion to disseminate initial findings to interested respondents and to solicit feedback.

### Data Analysis

*Quantitative Survey.* The raw survey data was cleaned and turned into numerical data using STATA and Excel. Additional variables were generated to divide the population into broader categories, such as employment status and rural or urban origins.

**Figure 3. Sample Sizes**



<sup>5</sup> See Chapter 4 for detailed tables of the sample demographics

<sup>6</sup> This study had approval from the Internal Review Board at Tufts University, MildMay University in Kampala, and the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology.

Next, descriptive statistics were generated and analyzed to provide a better sense of the demographics of the sample. Tabulations and cross-tabulations enabled a basic analysis of the relationships between different variables and exploration of possible correlations and associations. Relevant and interesting cross-tabulations were then tested for statistical significance using t-tests. Finally, regression models were run depending on the type of outcome indicator: a logit (for binary), ordinary least squares (OLS) (for continuous), and an ordered logit (for ordinal data) model. In order to test how robust the findings were, regressions were run with at least two models: the main variable of interest (crude model) and a second regression controlling for a series of key variables: current age, age of departure from Eritrea, length of time in Kampala, gender, and marital status (adjusted model).<sup>7</sup>

*Informant and Key Informant Interviews.* The interviews were transcribed by a transcriber who doesn't speak Tigrinya and thus are transcriptions of the translator's translations. As an exception, the lead interviewer, who speaks Hebrew, transcribed the Hebrew interviews. The transcribed interviews were reviewed for accuracy, completeness, and consistency. During this review, any identifying information was redacted. Thereafter, the data was coded using NVivo qualitative software. An inductive, thematic analysis was employed to permit both description and interpretation of responses. Categories for analysis were developed based on the original interview questions and themes that emerged from field notes and the community discussion.

After conducting distinct qualitative and quantitative analysis, findings were considered holistically. This allowed for patterns to emerge as well as gaps or contradictions in the findings.

## LIMITATIONS

This study worked on a tight timeframe and involved only 73 informants and eight key informants; therefore, findings should be confirmed through further research. Additionally, it relied on snowball sampling, which could contribute to selection bias and may limit the range of perspectives represented by respondents. Since the study only took place in Kampala, it cannot make any statements regarding Eritreans living in other parts of Uganda, including in refugee camps. Language and translation also presented challenges in this research. Since most interviews were conducted in translation, subtleties may have been missed.

Since many of the questions asked in this study are similar to those asked by OPM officials or migration officers and the lead researcher comes from the West, migrants may have thought that their participation would impact their applications or lead to help with migration and thus exaggerated their difficult circumstances on their journeys and in Kampala.<sup>8</sup> Relatedly, key informants describe Eritreans as reluctant to open up to outsiders. Numerous people approached by the research team chose not to participate in the study. Therefore, there is a selection bias of those who were willing to share their stories and give their time to participate.

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<sup>7</sup> See Appendix 1 Figure i for the quantitative conceptual framework

<sup>8</sup> Cite source about this in lit review

Please see the appendices for the study instruments, a detailed operationalization of the variables, and a consideration of possible measurement errors in the survey results.

## Chapter 4: Background

This chapter provides background information on respondents' lives in Eritrea and journeys prior to their arrival in Kampala. This section situates the findings in the context of existing literature and provides information on sample demographics that are relevant to the research findings.

### LIFE IN ERITREA

Although this study did not focus on the sociopolitical situation in Eritrea, it is important to explore respondents' motivations for emigrating. Their reasons for leaving align with those described in previous literature: avoiding brutal military service, pursuing a better life for themselves and for their families, and born-again Christian persecution.

#### Military Service

The most common reason cited for leaving Eritrea was indefinite military service, which prevents most service members from seeing their family or earning a livable income. Kedane explained, "When I see guys in the military they spend like fifteen years, fourteen years, for nothing. So I don't like that life...Everywhere is in prison there, if you do something you go to prison. So I fear for myself."<sup>9</sup> Extreme heat, grueling physical labor, and illness resulting from the conditions in the military, also drove people to desert.

Although military service is not supposed to begin until the age of eighteen, three respondents reported being picked up from their homes and taken to boot camp as young as fifteen. All of them are from rural regions and dropped out of school to farm and support their families.<sup>10</sup> People caught deserting the military or trying to cross the border sometimes spend years in prison; therefore, some respondents emigrated many years after they first tried to flee. Helen, for example, tried to cross the border at sixteen with her father and eighteen-year-old sister. They were caught and jailed twice. Helen, who is now twenty, and her sister were released and succeeded on their third attempt but their father is still in prison.<sup>11</sup>

Effie and his friends also tried to flee but were caught and moved from the border to a different prison: "They took us to some other jail. The mechanism they use in that jail is that if someone is healthy, he can escape. So mostly they give us spoiled food, so it's very normal to have the diarrhea. That's how they treat you. If you have diarrhea and if you are weak you can't escape, so they normally give us spoiled food...We still help each other, but we're all suffering the same diseases. Then from there they took us to, almost we were eighty, to a different jail in a shipping

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<sup>9</sup> Respondent Interview 057. Kampala. 8 August 2018.

<sup>10</sup> Respondent Interview 030. Kampala. 7 August 2018.

<sup>11</sup> Respondent Interview 040. Kampala. 11 August 2018.

container.” After Effie took responsibility for a failed mass prison break attempt he was held in solitary confinement, badly beaten, and water boarded for months.<sup>12</sup>

Mebratu bribed an officer to renew extensions to his approved military leave, opened a store, and became quite wealthy. After being caught, the government seized his family’s assets, placed him in jail, and tortured him. He explained, “The way they treated me, I can’t explain, it’s very hard. They will just hang you upside down and they start beating you under your feet. And other critical places. It was very bad.” He escaped by jumping out of a hospital window into a dumpster filled with medical waste and hid until the dumpster was picked up by a garbage truck.<sup>13</sup>

## Christian Persecution

Born-again Christians described dangerous circumstances pushing them to leave Eritrea in search of safety and freedom of worship. Yonas, an oldest sibling whose parents died in the war, shared that his neighbors tried to steal his family’s land when he was away for military service, using their born-again faith as justification with the Eritrean government: “This neighbor used to accuse me like, ‘He is shouting when he’s praying!’ It’s not easy if you are going to sleep accused of that reason, the government would never let that go.”<sup>14</sup>

A number of born-again respondents or members of their household were imprisoned and tortured. Senait shared, “When I got married, my husband was still in the military. He was a born again, so they [military officials] accused him that they saw we were praying... And they planned to kill him and took him to jail.” After her husband escaped jail and fled Eritrea, they imprisoned her for two months while she was pregnant. She left Eritrea shortly after being released.<sup>15</sup> All of the qualitative respondents who cited religious persecution as their primary motivation were from Asmara. Most of them completed secondary school or higher education and are married.

## Pursuit of a Better life

Some respondents described financial needs and quality of life as being their primary driver for leaving Eritrea. Across age groups and gender, many migrants aimed to join family in the West. Some women also described seeking advanced medical care for themselves or their children. Men aspired to continue their education or felt obligated to send remittances home to their families.

Many people described challenges that pushed them to leave that were distinct, but exacerbated by military service. The boys from rural regions often came from families with divorce or abandonment or became the head of the household at a young age due to the border wars. Most of them dropped out of school to support their families, largely by tending to the family farm. Either independently or with familial guidance, they decided they could better support them if they emigrated. Many of these teens went to Israel because the journey was thought to be the most affordable way to reach a high-income country and the entire trip was on land.

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<sup>12</sup> Respondent Interview 030. Kampala. 7 August 2018.

<sup>13</sup> Respondent Interview 051. Kampala. 5 August 2018.

<sup>14</sup> Respondent Interview 017. Kampala. 1 August 2018.

<sup>15</sup> Respondent Interview 022. Kampala. 8 August 2018.

Tesfay, who lived in Israel for nearly a decade before coming to Kampala, shared his decision-making process and shed light on this emigration pattern:

I was very pushed to move to leave my country, it's because even if I want to drop out of my school and try to help my family in the farming and other business, I couldn't do that. Either I have to be a student or I have to be in the military. It's the only option. And if you are in the military, there is no way you can help your family, you are all the day with them [the military]. The only chance they give you to visit your family is maybe once in a year, and that's probably for one month maximum. So considering all this, I planned to leave the country if I could get some more money, and I will help my family and myself.<sup>16</sup>

The average departure-age of the quantitative respondents from rural regions is 20 compared to 25 for those from Asmara.<sup>17</sup> Migrants from Zoba Maekel (ie. the most urban region) are significantly more likely to have departed at an older age than those from rural regions. Women are also significantly more likely to have left at when they were older than men.<sup>18</sup> Nine of the 11 qualitative respondents who left Eritrea under 20 without older relatives came from rural regions.

An equal number of males came from Zoba Maekel and rural regions but an overwhelming majority of females came from Zoba Maekel. This displays that either more women are emigrating from the capital or that rural females are particularly invisible among Eritrean migrants in Kampala.

**Table 1. Survey Respondent Gender, Geographic, and Age Descriptive Statistics**

	Rural			Urban		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Percentage (frequency out of 71)	32%	6%	38%	32%	29%	62%
Average Departure Age	20	23	21	24	27	25

Like Tesfay, many of the males from rural areas were the first in their families to leave and were expected to send remittances to help their families and fund their sibling's journeys. They articulated the toll that this familial pressure had on their mental health. Desawi dropped out of elementary school to farm and take care of his siblings when his mother left the family and his father remarried. Recalling his time in prison, he shared:

They took me to different jails. When I was moving to the other prison I was having mental problems...and they asked me, 'For what for you are working? Why haven't you entered education or the army?' I was really having mental problems. And I told them, 'I was just looking after my siblings.' I tried to explain I got family problems, all that. But then we were 250 people in just one single small room, 250

<sup>16</sup> Respondent Interview 01. Kampala. 2 August 2018.

<sup>17</sup> In this study, "rural" refers to anyone not from Zoba Maekel, where Asmara is located. "Urban" refers to anyone from Zoba Maekel. See Appendix 1 for more details on the quantitative variables.

<sup>18</sup> See Appendix 4, Table i for the corresponding regression.

people. They start treating us badly. Then I thought, so this is the reason everyone is skipping and fleeing the country.<sup>19</sup>

## JOURNEYS TO KAMPALA

Although many respondents did not have a clear plan when they first left Eritrea, when they came to Kampala it was a planned, strategic decision. Since Uganda does not border Eritrea and is not on the Western or Northern migration routes it is not a place that an Eritrean is likely to end up while journeying to a different destination by land. It is thus not surprising that 82% (58/71) of survey respondents spent at least one month in another country before coming to Kampala.

**Table 2. Migrant Journey Descriptive Statistics**

	Mean Departure Age	Rural N (% frequency out of 71)			Urban N (% frequency out of)			Country Total
		Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	
<b>Sudan</b>	22	11 (48%)	1 (25%)	12 (44%)	12 (52%)	8 (38%)	20 (45%)	32 (45%)
<b>Ethiopia</b>	21	10 (43%)	1 (25%)	11 (40%)	4 (17%)	3 (14%)	7 (16%)	18 (25%)
<b>South Sudan</b>	24	8 (35%)	1 (25%)	9 (33%)	1 (4%)	3 (14%)	4 (9%)	13 (18%)
<b>Israel</b>	19	9 (40%)	0 (0%)	9 (33%)	1 (4%)	0 (0%)	1 (2%)	10 (14%)
<b>Other<sup>20</sup></b>	24	1 (4%)	0 (0%)	1 (4%)	3 (13%)	2 (9%)	5 (11%)	6 (8%)
<b>None</b>	26	1 (4%)	1 (25%)	2 (7%)	4 (17%)	7 (33%)	11 (25%)	13 (18%)
<b>Total</b>	24	23 (32%)	4 (6%)	27 (38%)	23 (32%)	21 (29%)	44 (62%)	N/A*

\*Since some respondents spent over one month in multiple countries this will not add to 100%

As exhibited in Tables 1 and 2, Eritreans from different regions and genders also tended to take different migration routes. Twenty-three survey respondents, or 32 percent, spent more than a month in at least two countries before coming to Uganda.

### Direct to Uganda

All of the qualitative respondents who left Eritrea and came directly to Uganda did so because they already had relatives in Kampala or had heard that it was the closest place that welcomed refugees and had strong medical and education systems. In the quantitative data people who came straight to Kampala were primarily women and older than average (see Table 2). Four qualitative respondents are either women with children who were able to fly directly to Uganda on tourist visa.<sup>21</sup> Their husbands and older children would then try to cross the border by foot and meet them. Alternatively, some of the women who came to Kampala directly have husbands who live and work in South Sudan. These families chose this arrangement because Juba is seen as an easy place to earn a livable income but not a safe place to raise children. Kampala is ideal because it is relatively easy for the men to travel from Juba to visit their families.

<sup>19</sup> Respondent Interview 041. Kampala. 2 August 2018.

<sup>20</sup> Other countries includes United Arab Emirates, Kenya, and Libya in order of frequency

<sup>21</sup> See Chapter 2. Women can leave Eritrea if they completed their military service and have children under the age of six or have children with severe disabilities that required medical experts.

## South Sudan

Fnan had been living in Juba with her husband before she came to Kampala: “It’s better to have a baby in Uganda than South Sudan, so that’s why I came here. So the first time I came here I had my baby and then went back to South Sudan. Back then the baby got some malaria, things like that, so I came back with him.” She gave birth to her second child in Kampala and stayed.<sup>22</sup>

Fnan is one of many Eritreans in Kampala who have deep ties to Juba. Although only 18 percent of survey respondents had spent significant time in South Sudan, this number does not capture people who had, or still have, household members there, most often husbands. This is echoed by Cole, who describes an Eritrean community in Kampala “financed by remittances from Juba” (Cole 2018, 22). Of the 21 qualitative respondents who did not arrive in Kampala from Israel, half had at least one household member who spent a significant time in South Sudan. Additionally, three respondents manage businesses owned by people who split their time between Kampala and Juba or co-own businesses. For instance, Nahum managed an Eritrean café for a man who lived in Juba until he saved up enough money to buy the café from him.<sup>23</sup>

People who lived in South Sudan fondly described how far their money went in Juba and its well-paying jobs and affordable housing. All of the males had jobs, either running convenience stores or working as car and truck drivers and mechanics and felt relatively good about their income. Most respondents who lived in Juba also described a tight-knit Eritrean community, where people supported each other. However, they also found it to be an unsafe and unpleasant place to live: Four respondents cited war in South Sudan as the reason they came to Kampala. Relatedly, some respondents did not find it worthwhile to work in South Sudan when the currency depreciated. Michael, who left Juba with his family two years ago, explained:

The value of the money for SSP, South Sudan pound, now it's like a paper. I can't work there. There is no work either, but if you work, if you change to USD, the SSP is nothing, that's why. Because of that I left... They start war. They start fighting each other so immediately, I didn't get a chance to pack my store. I just close it as it is. We left all our property there, we just skip, we run away immediately. We couldn't find anything, I mean, we didn't have any time.<sup>24</sup>

He noted, “All of my friends are almost from the ones I knew in Juba. They all shift here.”<sup>25</sup>

The presence of a financially-strong Eritrean community in South Sudan that benefited from its young, developing economy and the challenges these individuals faced when civil war began in 2013 have been documented by journalists (IRN 2019; Patinkin 2019). Given the existing literature and data from this study, one could hypothesize that Eritreans leaving South Sudan was a major contributor to the exponential growth in Uganda’s Eritrean population described in Chapter Two.

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<sup>22</sup> Respondent Interview 019. Kampala. 8 August 2018.

<sup>23</sup> Respondent Interview 13. Kampala. 31 July 2018.

<sup>24</sup> Respondent Interview 018. Kampala. 1 August 2018.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid

## Sudan and Ethiopia

Sudan is the most common place where people stayed because it is the first stop on the most common route to exit Eritrea. Sawa, the military camp that many deserters leave, is close to the border with Sudan. Most people who start in Sudan end up spending some time in Kassala or Wad Sherife or Shagarab Refugee Camps, where the only livelihood option is petty trade. Respondents feared for their safety in rural Sudan and the refugee camps, particularly being kidnapped by smugglers from the Rashida tribe (Hayden 2019). This is also the place where people connect with smugglers to head to Khartoum or on to other countries.

Respondents who lived in Khartoum often managed to find work cleaning homes, washing cars, or in restaurants. However, people found that their incomes were not enough to cover expenses. They also felt uncomfortable in a Muslim country, particularly women who felt restricted by the culture and dress code. Livelihoods and safety were cited as the primary reasons for leaving.

Mirroring Sudan, many respondents who lived in Ethiopia spent time in a refugee camp prior to going to Addis Ababa. For this reason, many of them had some form of documentation and status in Ethiopia. Those who described their livelihoods indicated that it was difficult to find consistent work. Most engaged in petty trade or remained without an income and dependent on remittances. The length of time people spent in Ethiopia varied from one month to six years.

A more surprising event that motivated people to move to Kampala was the thawing of relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea in July, 2018. Effie and Mebratu, who both fear that the Eritrean government is pursuing them, left Ethiopia for Uganda when they suspected that a peace deal was imminent. Mebratu explained, “What I was thinking was, by any case if Eritrea and Ethiopia reaches the peace because of the government, like what's happening now, my life is still in danger.”<sup>26</sup> Effie similarly shared why he wouldn't live in Sudan and feared a similar shift in Ethiopia: “In Sudan it is very easy to be caught by Eritrean spies. Our government is very connected government. It happened to some guy who I knew that was a revolutionary. They will just kidnap you in a car and then you will find yourself in Eritrea. At least here [Uganda] they can only use a plane.”<sup>27</sup> Five people who lived in Ethiopia cited the inability for them to be returned to Eritrea or caught by Eritrean forces as a motivator for moving to Uganda. Although these concerns have largely gotten lost in enthusiasm regarding the peace deal, they are articulated in refugee camps in Ethiopia and Cole also observed these fears in Kampala (Riggan 2019).

A few qualitative respondents who had lived in Sudan or Ethiopia also cited failed attempts to claim asylum as a motivator for moving to Uganda. They theorized that they would have an easier time getting asylum in the West if they applied from Uganda because there are considerably less Eritreans than in Ethiopia or Sudan. They also knew of success stories from relatives, friends, or rumors through word-of-mouth that convinced them their prospects in Uganda would be better.

Kedane tried to get refugee sponsorship in Sudan and Ethiopia before coming to Kampala: “Before I came here my sister got sponsorship to Australia. I started to do it in Sudan and it failed. And

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<sup>26</sup> Respondent Interview 051. Kampala. 5 August 2018. Respondent Interview 030.

<sup>27</sup> Respondent Interview 030. Kampala. 7 August 2018.



she asked me to go to another country so I might try again. I left to Ethiopia, I went to the camp, in that camp I tried so many sponsorships to get from there... Before I got there I heard a lot of news and that some people had left to America, the US, a lot of people went to US. But, there is corruption I think, with these things...Through corruption, the Ethiopians, some people from Ethiopia, they use this chance to take Ethiopians as [pretending to be] Eritreans.”<sup>28</sup>

## Israel

Most Eritreans who stayed in Africa spent at most only a few years in Ethiopia, Sudan or South Sudan before coming to Kampala. In contrast, respondents who came through Israel’s “voluntary departure” program spent a minimum of five years during their formative late teens and early twenties in a Western society with a strong formal economy. Six out of the eleven respondents who lived in Israel previously spent over a month in Sudan. Tesfay shared:

I stayed one year in Sudan. I got friends who stayed with me but still I was not able to manage myself, I cannot even afford to live, I can't help my family...Some of my friends went ahead to Israel through this illegal way and once they had been there five months they started giving me information. It's very hard, it's very illegal, you might die on the way, but once you get there at least you can manage your life. Life is somehow fair and you can change your life. So you can have income which helps you to help your family. I left my country just to help my family. So though I knew it was risky and illegal I preferred to take my chance and go to Israel.<sup>29</sup>

There are a few features shared by nearly all Eritreans in Israel who participated in the “voluntary departure program” that differ from other Eritrean migrants in Kampala:

- *A journey across Sinai:* In order to reach Israel, migrants traveled a harrowing route through Sinai, where many people experience kidnapping, torture, and other hazards.
- *Ample livelihood opportunities:* Most Eritreans in Israel are able to find steady work in maintenance, cooking, cleaning, and construction. Although they make the Israeli minimum wage or below, the wages are quite good compared to in Eritrea (Furst-Nichols and Jacobsen 2019). Respondents who lived in Israel all found sustainable livelihoods, mostly working in restaurants. While they worked long hours at low wages by Israeli standards, all of them were able to meet their basic needs and send remittances home.
- *Robust civil society:* Although life in Israel is challenging, Israel has many NGOs supporting migrants. The Eritrean community is somewhat well organized and politically active on issues within Israel and in Eritrea.

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<sup>28</sup> Respondent Interview 057. Kampala. 8 August 2018.

<sup>29</sup> Respondent Interview 01. Kampala. 2 August 2018.

- *Hostile Israeli government:* The Israeli government frequently enacts laws and policies to discourage migrants from becoming too comfortable. It does not review asylum cases individually and has not accepted any Eritreans as refugees.
- *\$3,500 cash transfer and no proper documentation:* All Eritreans who came to Uganda participated in Israel's voluntary departure program. As part of this program, they all received \$3,500. Although they were told they will be given documentation, any temporary travel documents are illegitimate and confiscated in Uganda.<sup>30</sup>

Along with the people who arrived straight to Kampala, respondents who spent time in Israel had the most homogenous background. While the respondents who came straight to Kampala were mostly older, educated married women from Asmara, those who came through Israel were the opposite: young, single men from rural areas. The profile of the Eritreans who came to Kampala through Israel contrast with that of the average Eritrean in Kampala, most of whom are from Asmara and at least completed high school. All of the eleven qualitative respondents who lived in Israel are men and all but one came from either the rural Debub or Gasha Barka region. None of the respondents who lived in Israel attended college and most did not complete secondary school. Additionally, a majority are the oldest male children in their families.

Eritreans' reasons for leaving Israel are more nuanced than has been previously reported. The most recent Amnesty International and Hotline for Refugee and Migrants reports explain that migrants were confronted with the choice of indefinite imprisonment in Holot or Sahronim prisons or departure to a "third country" or back to Eritrea. Migrants reportedly felt coerced and that they didn't have real options (Amnesty International 2018). This was also the case for many respondents in this study.

Marhawi similarly explained his thinking:

I don't have brothers or sisters here, so I have to think for the future life... I was not stable in my mind, I was having many thoughts. But then Israel wouldn't renew my visa and I went to the jail... I was 24 years old. I made up my plan, I have to have my own family and I have to be mature, have to look after myself. So I go to the Ministry of Interior and say, 'you're asking me to go back to Holot [jail]? I'm not going back. I want to go to Africa, I don't want Israel'... I visit my head, there was too much pressure and chaos.<sup>31</sup>

Throughout the interviews, many of the respondents who came from Israel echoed Marhawi's feelings of confusion, instability, and intense stress. They articulated these feelings due to the shock of arriving in Israel as boys on their own, the pressure of

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<sup>30</sup> See the Amnesty International and Hotline reports for more on this topic. This study's findings on Eritrean's arrival in Uganda matches those of these previous reports.

<sup>31</sup> Respondent Interview 058. Kampala. 10 August 2018

expectations to send remittances home, despondency from going in and out of prison, and the disorientation of navigating Israel's bureaucracy and policies pushing them to leave.

However, five of the qualitative respondents elected to leave. They approached the Israeli Ministry of Interior and told officials that they *wanted* to go to a “third country”, even though they did not face an immediate threat of imprisonment. Two of these individuals are political activists who wanted to go back to Africa to continue their work. Three of the respondents had fiancés or wives in Europe and strategically elected to go to Uganda so they could get refugee status or passports in order to make it to Europe.<sup>32</sup> For example, Aaron and Yusef are two close friends who both are married to women with refugee status in Sweden. Both applied for family reunification in Sweden and were rejected because they didn't have a passport.

In contrast to prior reports, all of the respondents who felt coerced to leave or who left voluntarily were warned about the difficulties that they would face in a “third country” by friends or through rumors and the news (Rozen 2015). They likely had more accurate information about the dangers of the “voluntary departure” program than respondents in prior reports because researchers spoke to people from earlier phases of the program: many of them first arrived in Rwanda and didn't have friends who left before them who could give advice. Only two of the eleven respondents were deported to Rwanda. Two told the Israeli Ministry of Interior that they would only leave if they could go to Uganda after first being offered Rwanda. Marhawi shared that his friend who left before warned him not to go to Rwanda: “It is a very hard life there, I was having a clue.”

## ATTEMPTING TO REACH THE WEST

Most of the qualitative respondents were living in Kampala while trying to reach a Western country through formal channels. A small minority intended to build lives in Uganda; those who did had successful businesses or husbands earning a good income in Juba. Before arriving, many respondents believed Kampala would be a comfortable place for them to wait while they moved through the asylum seeker or family reunification process. Kampala developed this reputation due to Uganda's status as a welcoming place for refugees and because people came after being unhappy in neighboring countries. People would be instructed by relatives who made it the West, some of whom also lived in Kampala, to wait there and get their documentation to join them.

The director of Africa Monitors, an Eritrean human rights organization based in Kampala, explained that Eritreans tend to arrive with, “high expectations that are often misplaced.” People anticipate that they will only need to spend a few months in Kampala before they get a visa, refugee sponsorship, family reunification, or an academic scholarship that will enable them to go to the West. However, in the best case scenario the process takes much longer than they

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<sup>32</sup> There is no Eritrean embassy in Israel, which is where Eritreans go for a passport. Migrants in Kampala believed that they needed a passport for their applications to be accepted by the Swedish government.

anticipate and in the worst case scenario they are rejected. Due to these misplaced expectations people do not anticipate all of their expenses and fail to generate sufficient financial capital.<sup>33</sup>

Yonas, who has been in Kampala with his family for nearly two years while applying for asylum in Canada, described his disappointment: “My expectation was very high. The rumors were that Uganda is an opportunity. I used to hear there are many investors here so you can apply and they can hire you for jobs. There are many chance of jobs, that was my expectation. I really suffered in the first four months because everything was just lower than my expectations.”<sup>34</sup>

## Chapter 5: Kampala Livelihoods: Remittances and Businesses

A common and consuming concern among respondents is how difficult it is to develop a sustainable livelihood in Kampala. People who had access to financial capital before arriving in Uganda or who receive remittances have the resources required to develop sustainable livelihood strategies. Those who do not are more likely to be trapped in a cycle of poverty and feel stuck in Kampala, unable to find a path to meet their goals or make future plans.

In addition to experiences described in interviews, this study utilized a monthly wealth variable as a measure of migrants’ financial capital in Kampala.<sup>35</sup> In addition to enabling a comparison of how different situations in migrants’ lives contribute to their financial resources, this variable provides insight into the extent to which financial security shapes their overall wellbeing. Statistically significant results display that people with lower monthly wealth felt happy less frequently than those with higher monthly wealth and felt stressed more frequently (See Table 3 and 4).

Respondents found it difficult to build financial capital because it is difficult to develop livelihood strategies. Due to limited employment opportunities, some Eritrean migrants in Kampala chose to run microenterprises outside of the formal economy and small businesses. Migrants are also highly dependent on remittances and find life in Kampala to be quite challenging without them.

Eritreans living in Kampala operate outside of formal financial institutions. Only one of the respondents has a bank account. Most people shared that they do not have enough money to find it worthwhile to store it outside of their homes. Respondents with greater income articulated that they did not trust institutions run by Ugandans, such as banks.<sup>36</sup> None of the respondents received a loan from a for profit or nonprofit institution. Instead, those who have the option rely on informal loans from friends and family. Given that financial capital is critical to establishing a sustainable livelihood in Kampala, it is not surprising that many people want access to microloans or cash transfers. When asked how NGOs could best help Eritrean migrants in Kampala, eight people expressed the need for support finding steady employment or loans to start businesses.

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<sup>33</sup> Key Informant Interview 1. Kampala. 23 July 2018.

<sup>34</sup> Respondent Interview 017. Kampala. 1 August 2018.

<sup>35</sup> See Appendix 1

<sup>36</sup> Respondent Interview 013. Kampala. 31 July 2018

**Table 3. Logit Regression of Monthly Wealth and Frequency of Happiness (0=Never 4=Always)**

Dependent variable	Model 1: Crude Model	Model 2: Adjusted Model
	Happiness Likert Scale	Happiness Likert Scale
Monthly Wealth	0.5443** (0.385 - 1.104)	0.572** (0.0388 - 1.104)
Urban (vs. rural)		0.389 (-0.862 - 1.642)
Female		-0.115 (-1.175 - 0.945)
Age (in years)		-0.141 (-0.338 - 0.056)
Length of time in Kampala (in months)		0.160 (-0.103 - 0.0423)
Age of Departure (in years)		0.118 (0.958 -1.072)
Married (vs. other relationship status)		0.057 (-0.959 - 1.072)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.032	0.060
N	69	69

Note: \*significant at  $\alpha= 0.1$  \*\*significant at  $\alpha= 0.05$


**Table 4. Logit Regression of Monthly Wealth and Frequency of Stress (0=Never 4=Always)**

Dependent variable	Model 1: Crude Model	Model 2: Adjusted Model
	Stressed Likert Scale	Stressed Likert Scale
Monthly Wealth	-0.466** (-0.879 - -0.053)	-0.660** (-1.185 - -0.136)
Urban (vs. rural)		0.147 (-1.100 - 1.395)
Female		1.080 (-1.100 - 1.395)
Age (in years)		0.198 (-0.006 - 2.219)
Length of time in Kampala (in months)		-0.008 (-0.360 - .0192)
Age of Departure (in years)		-0.202 (-0.382 - -0.022)
Married (vs. other relationship status)		-0.227 (-1.285 - 0.830)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.0241	0.066
N	71	70

Note: \*significant at  $\alpha= 0.1$  \*\*significant at  $\alpha= 0.05$

## Case Studies

The following case studies will be referenced throughout the remainder of the paper. They fulfill archetypes of Eritrean migrants in Kampala, which can facilitate an examination of patterns and the dynamic nature of livelihoods and quality of life.



## Remittances

Of the sample population 34/71, or just under half of respondents, reported receiving remittances.<sup>37</sup> An overwhelming majority of qualitative respondents suggested that the biggest difference between Eritreans who lived comfortably in Uganda and those who do not was whether they were among the half who had access to remittances from relatives in the West or South Sudan. Senait explained, “Before I came to Kampala, I got advice from people who were already here. They told me almost all Eritreans staying in Kampala have people who give them financial support from abroad. When I told them I didn’t have anyone who could help me like that they warned me that I would have a very difficult time here.”<sup>38</sup>

Dawit similarly shared, “Here it is not good because there is not jobs, you need more capital to start up a business. Either you need to have good capital of money to start a business or you have to go share with someone... I don't have anyone to see and depend on. I don't have any older brothers and I don't know anyone who is staying abroad, so I don't have help.”<sup>39</sup>

Kedame, Ginat, and Marhawi all have family in the West supporting them and thus have greater access to predictable financial capital when they need it. This means Kedame could take bigger risks with his micro-enterprises as he always could fall back on support from home, enabling him to gain financial independence. Without initial financial capital it is impossible to purchase the supplies or physical capital required to start a business. Without continued financial capital, entrepreneurs have greater difficulty recovering from shocks like slow business, accidents and theft, such as Senait’s experienced in her convenience store or Aman’s motorbike accident.

Although the qualitative data clearly points to the importance of remittances to living comfortably in Kampala and developing livelihoods, the quantitative findings did not produce any significant results for remittances. This is likely because of the difficulties of measuring remittance patterns through surveys (Brown et. al 2014). In the case of the survey utilized in this study, it asked about current receipt of remittances, meaning that people who no longer need remittances or who are now remittance-senders are not captured. Therefore, the lack of significant quantitative findings should not discount the importance of remittances to financial stability in Kampala or the emphasis that respondents placed on it during interviews.

## WORK IN KAMPALA

### Employment

As displayed in Figure 4, 63 percent of respondents were unemployed. Respondents articulated deep disappointment over the lack of jobs in Kampala, particularly those who arrived with

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<sup>37</sup> It is worth noting that more respondents in the quantitative study refused to answer when asked what country they were receiving remittances from than any other questions. It is possible that respondents were less comfortable speaking about their remittances access than talking about remittances generally because they thought if they were seen as worse-off it may lead to resources or effect their migration processes.

<sup>38</sup> Respondent Interview 022. Kampala. 8 August 2018

<sup>39</sup> Respondent Interview 029. Kampala 8 August 2018.

expectations that they would easily find work. Work provides migrants with income, meaning, and a sense of routine. It also helps remittances-receivers no longer feel dependent on relatives.

Although unemployed qualitative respondents who felt they were in financially precarious situations think they would be in a better position if they had a job, most cited lack of remittances as an even bigger problem. The quantitative findings align with this belief. In an ordered logit regression of the monthly wealth variable and employment status, people who are unemployed are significantly more likely to not have enough money at the end of the day or end of the month than people with any form of job.<sup>40</sup> However, after adding controls this correlation disappeared, indicating the importance of other household characteristics in determining financial security.

## Employment


People found it nearly impossible to find jobs due to high unemployment rates in Kampala, insufficient English language skills, and because it is technically illegal for temporary asylum seekers and people with tourist visas to work.

Some respondents shared that they stopped looking for work or never sought a job because the wages are too low for them to cover the corresponding transportation or childcare costs. A young mother explained, “Let’s say I am a housemaid and I clean all the time, every day. I get paid 80,000 shillings a month (\$22.00). So what can I do with 80,000 shillings in a month...I can’t leave my kids and go for that job.”<sup>41</sup>

Among the few with steady jobs, most work as waiters, cashiers, barbers, hotel staff, and drivers for Eritrean-owned businesses. Workers with refugee status sometimes participate in the formal economy but all people with temporary asylum or without documentation participate in the informal economy. Eritrean business owners interviewed want to hire Eritreans, both because they don’t trust Ugandans, and because they want to help their communities. However, they worry about hiring people without refugee status. One café owner shared, “I want to hire my own people but I have to hire some Ugandans so the police do not disturb me.” He tells his Eritrean workers without refugee status to pretend they are patrons of the café if the authorities visit.

Although it may be counterintuitive, respondents with steady employment are often not more financially secure than those who are unemployed. This may be because people with consistent remittances do not bother to work in jobs with menial income. Two employed respondents shared that while it is nice to have income, most of their money still comes from remittances and that they wouldn’t be able meet their needs with their wages alone. These findings are reflected in the quantitative data. The quantitative data did not display any significant relationships between

**Figure 4. Livelihoods in Kampala**



<sup>40</sup> See Appendix 6 Table ii for corresponding regression

<sup>41</sup> Respondent Interview 02. Kampala. 10 August 2018.



employment and wealth.<sup>42</sup> This may lend itself to the argument that remittances access is a primary determinant of financial wellbeing, even if this is not visible in quantitative data.

### Small Businesses and Microenterprises

Opening a small business or microenterprise is an appealing strategy due to labor restrictions and the weak job market in Kampala, but it can be risky and often does not provide the steady income or financial security that people desire. Those who tried this route depended on selling of assets, primarily in the form of gold from bridewealth, savings, informal loans from friends and family, and remittances in order to finance their business.

There are many reasons why Eritreans with working capital perceive opening a microenterprise to be a wise choice. In addition to being one strategy for working in the informal economy without political documentation, opening a microenterprise also has the possibility of producing much higher income than working as a waiter, driver, or day laborer. However, not all businesses have the same level of infrastructure or success. The most successful businesses observed during the study included cafes, a clothing store, a travel agency, and a car wash. Businesses with more mixed results include convenience stores and hair salons, which were sometimes in a converted living room of a respondent's home. Businesses that generated the most income are generally part of the formal economy, involve high start-up costs, and require multiple employees. In contrast, although some of the microenterprises succeeded, others, like Senait's home-based enterprise, have yet to generate livable income.

Business owners who participated in the qualitative study often expressed disappointment regarding their income and the long hours they worked with little reward; in spite of these frustrations, as a whole, business owners are in better shape financially than those without businesses. As displayed in Table 5, business owners were significantly more likely to have higher monthly wealth than those who do not, even after controlling for gender, region of origin, length of time in Kampala, current age, and departure age. Although this finding offers compelling evidence that business-ownership is a prudent livelihood strategy for Eritrean migrants in Kampala, there are a few caveats that need to be kept in mind: First, qualitative findings indicate that people need remittances or some form of savings to start a business; therefore, this regression may be capturing people being better-off because of remittances access in addition to business ownership. Second, some of the survey respondents with the largest businesses chose not to participate in an interview, citing lack of time. This may be why there is a discrepancy in the utility of business ownership in the qualitative and quantitative data.

Beyond logistical and financial considerations, microenterprises are appealing because they enable the Eritrean entrepreneurs to primarily engage with their own people and avoid Ugandans. In qualitative interviews, respondents expressed very little interest in assimilating and felt very suspicious of Ugandans. Many had bad experiences with theft and believe that Ugandans take advantage of them.<sup>43</sup> Eritreans' ambitions to start their own businesses, coupled with a desire to

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<sup>42</sup> See Appendix 5 Table iii for corresponding regression.

<sup>43</sup> See chapter 5 for a more detailed exploration.

minimize their interactions with Ugandans, contribute to distinct formal and informal Habesha economies in Kampala. One can drive down Ggaba road in Kabalagala and Kansanga or certain neighborhoods in Old Kampala and see rows of shopfronts and restaurants with signs in Tigrinya.

Social capital within the Eritrean community is thus critical for these small businesses. One man explained his process for opening his convenience store and selecting inventory: “We talked to people we know and did research and determined that this business had the greatest chance of being successful.” Although Ugandans also frequent his store, his primarily Eritrean customers both reflect his existing social network and familiarity with the needs of this customer base.<sup>44</sup>

**Table 5: Ordered Logit Regression of Business Ownership and Wealth**

Dependent variable	Model 1: Crude Model	Model 2: Adjusted Model
	Monthly Wealth	Monthly Wealth
<b>Owns Business</b>	3.881*** (0.000)	3.821*** (1.424 – 6.217)
<b>Gender</b>		-0.380 (-1.560 – 0.799)
<b>Urban( vs rural)</b>		3.210*** (1.858 – 4.562)
<b>Length of time in Kampala (in months)</b>		-0.021 (-0.048 – 0.006)
<b>Age of Departure (in years)</b>		-0.244** (-0.434 – -0.054)
<b>Age (in years)</b>		0.325*** (0.111 – 0.540)
<b>Married (vs. other relationship status)</b>		-0.901 (-2.014 – 0.210)
<b>Pseudo R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.089	0.219
<b>N</b>	71	70

Note: significant at  $\alpha= 0.1$  \*\*significant at  $\alpha= 0.05$  \*\*\*significant at  $\alpha= 0.01$

Eritrean social ties not only create a customer base for Eritrean micro-enterprises because of shared language and needs, but also because of communal solidarity and the function that these projects fill in the community. The social function of micro-enterprises can also help explain why Senait keeps running her convenience store even though it is not profitable. The make-shift store has become an improvised community center for her majority-Eritrean apartment building. Although it has not generated much income, Senait’s store has asserted her role as a community leader, which in turn increases her social capital and has led people to pool resources for her family during difficult times. For Eritreans who do not receive remittances, social capital helps them gain resources in times of need. Echoing a UNHCR report, when formal lending and charitable institutions are nonexistent, and people are separated from families, the community

<sup>44</sup> Respondent Interview 040. Kampala. 11 August 2018.

steps up (UNHCR). Although business-ownership is not the only way to generate social capital, it does seem that these individuals are better connected within the Eritrean community in Kampala.

### “JUST TRYING TO GET BY”

Although each of the migrants described in the case studies experienced different challenges and opportunities, some patterns that contributed to successful livelihood strategies and overall wellbeing in Kampala emerged. Limited livelihood assets, institutional access, a weak job market, and poor social ties with Ugandans not only drive Eritrean to depend on Eritrean-owned businesses or create microenterprises, but also shape why some people achieve financial stability when others fail. Respondents face a challenging Catch-22: they need financial capital to start or sustain a business but need a business to generate financial capital. That is why remittances are so essential; they enable respondents to have a steady stream of income to either use in developing a more sustainable livelihood strategy or to help them survive while unemployed or with low wages.

Another key pattern in the case studies and analysis of the employment landscape is the volatility of respondents' livelihoods. Migrants benefit from assets such as free rent, bridewealth or remittances, only to see their business fail or their assets deplete before they can develop a more sustainable livelihood or migrate west. Under circumstances of great fluctuation, two factors helped shape respondents' resilience: ongoing access to financial capital and strong social capital.

Marhawi, for example, has managed in Kampala even after his savings depleted because he receives money from the West consistently. Aman has failed and picked himself up only to fall in a deeper hole due to a combination of bad luck, lack of access to emergency financial capital, and lack of social ties. After his third business-attempt failed, he lived on the streets because he didn't know where else to turn: none of his relatives were able to send him money and he didn't have any friends with enough financial capital that they could help him out. All respondents in the case studies experienced at least one shock or stressor; financial and social capital proved essential in determining who had the easiest path to recovery. Yet without access to formal financial or communal institutions, Eritrean migrants face an uphill battle in their efforts to try to increase their financial and social capital beyond what their previous circumstances provide.

## Chapter 6: Redefining Safety: Protection Challenges in Kampala

In addition to livelihoods, Eritrean migrants' lives in Kampala are largely shaped by the protection risks they experience and fear. These include physical risks like theft, assault, and sexual violence. Under a human security framework, safety also includes “securing political freedoms” like access to a political identity, freedom of movement, and ability to live without fear of refoulement (Gasper 2005). Respondents put concerted efforts into staying safe, be it choosing what neighborhood to live in or ensuring that they have the documentation they need to stay in Uganda. This chapter will outline respondents' perspectives on their physical and political security in Kampala, challenges to their safety, and the steps they take to protect themselves and their families. Respondents often discussed two distinct aspects of protection: physical security and respect for human rights. They felt unsafe in Uganda due to theft, extortion, and lack of

institutional support, and the prevalence of traffic accidents. Twenty-percent of quantitative respondents shared that costs associated with theft and bribes are one of their three biggest monthly expenses in Kampala. Simultaneously, they feel safer in Uganda than Eritrea because they do not feel endangered by the government, do not fear arbitrary arrest, and can live and worship freely. One respondent who left Eritrea at age fourteen explained, “I feel safe because here there is freedom.”<sup>45</sup>

Simultaneously, many qualitative respondents felt greater physical security in their home country because bureaucracy functioned well and theft and road accidents were very uncommon. One person shared, “[In Asmara] you could leave your phone on the sidewalk and six months later it would still be there. No one would dare touch it. In Uganda there aren’t even sidewalks.”<sup>46</sup> Although most respondents of all ages and genders struggled with feeling physically unsafe and politically vulnerable in Kampala they overwhelmingly still would rather be in Uganda than in Eritrea, reflecting a prioritization of human rights, freedom, and agency over their own futures. These findings highlight how definitions of safety and protection can evolve and depend on a specific context, particularly for people who left their home countries because they lacked human security and political protections.

## COPING WITH THEFT

Qualitative respondents shared that they frequently felt unsafe and suspicious of Ugandans due to the frequency of theft in Kampala. Every qualitative respondent either experienced theft or had a friend or relative who did, ranging from a cell phone being pick-pocketed to armed home break-ins. Out of the seventy-one quantitative respondents, 38, or 53 percent experienced theft within the year of the survey. All but four of these crimes were committed by groups or individuals unknown to the victim. A related but distinct challenge is price inflation. Some respondents described situations in which they would be asked to pay more money than the norm in Kampala for motor taxis and goods from the market. Although this was a source of frustration and fomented lack of trust in Ugandans, it did not feel nearly as violating or frightening for respondents as theft. Some felt targeted for theft and price inflation because they are Eritrean and have lighter skin, but others saw it as an inevitable facet of life in Kampala.

Eighteen people, or just under half of the quantitative respondents who experienced theft, reported it to the police. However, none of them felt that they received any recourse after reporting. Many of the individuals who reported the theft to the police allege that the officers demanded money before they would investigate the crime. Futsum called the police after surviving an armed robbery in his home. He shared: “Two investigators came. They asked me for my refugee papers and saw that I was an asylum seeker. After that, one lady took pictures of what happened and then they told me, ‘Okay, so we have seen everything. So can you give us money’ ‘What?!’ I said, ‘I don’t have money, they stole everything.’ They wanted us to pay 150,000 shillings

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<sup>45</sup> Respondent Interview 068. Kampala. 10 August 2018.

<sup>46</sup> Field Notes. Kampala. 8 August 2018.

(\$40.00 USD) to investigate. I don't have any, so what could I do?"<sup>47</sup> After a twenty-two-year-old woman reported theft to the police she was told she would need to pay for fingerprint testing, which she could not afford. She explained that a senior police official sexually propositioned her and that she no longer feels comfortable asking for the police for help in any situation.<sup>48</sup> As displayed in Figure 5, none of the quantitative respondents trust the Ugandan police.

As displayed in the case studies, theft is often more than a temporary inconvenience, but a serious disruption to lives and livelihoods. Nearly every respondent faced protection challenges, but some demonstrated more resilience when these incidents occurred. Not surprisingly, people who had access to remittances bounced back more easily than those without access because they could reliably acquire capital to use in their recovery. Additionally, strong social ties to the Eritrean community proved to be an important asset in instances of theft or injury. This can be demonstrated through Aman and Senait's experiences. Aman used up his only social capital in getting his motor bike and deliberately chose to isolate himself from the Eritrean community. His failure to recover from shocks is tied to his lack of close relationships with people with the capacity to help. In contrast, Senait is active in her church and turned to friends for emotional and financial support following her home-break in.

### BUYING POLITICAL SECURITY: BRIBES IN THE ASYLUM PROCESS

Refugee status, passports, and other identifying documents provide migrants with the political capital they need to gain protection, build livelihoods, and work toward their future goals. However, Eritrean migrants in Kampala struggle with accessing this documentation, which is a common source of stress.

Most respondents have had to pay bribes as part of their effort to stay in Kampala and begin to head west. Bribes were allegedly demanded in other interactions, including traffic police, airport personnel, and shopping mall security. Thirty-four people, or 48% of the quantitative respondents reported paying bribes in the last year. Twenty-five of them, or 73% percent, paid more than one bribe, with nine sharing that they couldn't even remember how many they have had to pay. The number of people who paid bribes is likely underreported because of how ubiquitous they are in society and some fees for service are useful for migrants. For example, one woman stated in her survey that she had not paid any bribes. In her interview, she described paying an official to renew her tourist visa every three months, when she otherwise would be deported. After being asked if she considered this a bribe she stated that she knew it could be seen as one but that she didn't think of it that way because he was doing her a favor.<sup>49</sup>

There are three times during the asylum process in which Eritreans in Kampala are often asked to pay bribes: 1) reporting to the police station to claim asylum, 2) applying for refugee status at the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), and 3) appealing if their application was rejected at OPM.

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<sup>47</sup> Respondent Interview 033. Kampala. 11 August 2018.

<sup>48</sup> Respondent Interview 03. Kampala. 21 June 2018.

<sup>49</sup> Field Notes. 23 July 2018.

## Police Station

Asylum seekers are expected to report to a police station when they first arrive in Kampala. There they are registered and given a card with a date for an appointment at OPM to begin the process of getting asylum. Typically, the primary contact in the police office for Eritrean migrants, who serves as a fixer, is Eritrean. He assigns migrants an OPM appointment date, often many months out. At their OPM appointment they will be processed to receive temporary asylum status, which can be renewed every three months at OPM. They will also begin applying for full refugee status.

The majority of respondents are in the temporary asylum stage. Of the 13 respondents at this stage, 10 reported paying bribes at the police station to the Eritrean fixer and most did not feel as if they had a choice. The most common amount of money reported was 80,000 shillings (\$22.00) and some people paid as little as 50,000 shillings (\$14.000) or as much as 250,000 (\$70.00).

## Office of the Prime Minister: First Application

The next point at which people might pay bribes is when they apply for refugee status at OPM. No one reported being demanded to pay bribes at this stage; instead, they knew that if they bribed the Ugandan officials then their applications would be accepted. According to respondents, this used to not be a common practice but has increased as the percentage of Eritreans given refugee status has decreased. People who can access the requisite financial capital and fear their application will be rejected see paying a bribe at this stage as strategic and an investment.

One person worked with a fixer to pay for guaranteed refugee status for his family. He explained, “When he [the fixer] started asking for money, we decided it would be better to pay for refugee status instead of wasting our time and money. Because he was going to ask [for money] and he was going to send us to OPM, which will give us an appointment before we can get asylum. Once we got asylum it would be extended many times and they will expect us to pay. We prefer to buy in advance.”<sup>50</sup> People reported paying \$200-\$800 in bribes per household member for refugee status, with \$300 being the most common.

## Office of the Prime Minister: Appeals Process

The last stage in which people report paying bribes is if their application for refugee status was rejected by OPM. Everyone is given an opportunity to appeal the decision. At this point, people are fearful of being rejected again without further recourse. Therefore, they will pay a bribe to their case manager at OPM to secure a promise that their appeal will succeed. The reported cost is similar to people who pay bribes before their initial application. Out of the seven qualitative respondents who have full refugee status, four paid bribes for this status, either with their initial application or at the appeal stage at OPM.<sup>51</sup>

In addition to the importance of remittances, the most reoccurring theme in the qualitative interviews was respondents’ frustration and anger regarding the asylum process. In response to a

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<sup>50</sup> Respondent Interview 040. Kampala. 11 August 2018.

<sup>51</sup> This number does not include any bribes that may be paid earlier in the process, such as at the police station.

question about what forms of support people wanted from NGOs, 17 out of 32 cited a free and fair system for asylum seekers, double any other answer to that question.

Most people know that this process is supposed to be free: they lamented the seeming inevitability of paying bribes and the frequency with which Eritreans are rejected for refugee status. Many respondents suspect that migrants to Kampala from other countries are not expected to pay bribes to the same degree and are not rejected as frequently.

This perception does appear to be grounded in reality. According to a project manager at the Refugee Law Project of Makerere University, a nonprofit that provides services to migrants, including pro-bono legal counsel and trauma counselors, most Eritreans are being rejected for asylum and these numbers are greater than those of other migrant groups. She believes this is because, “Eritreans are not telling their stories very well.”<sup>52</sup> Eritrean’s lack of English skills makes it more difficult for them to be self-advocates. Additionally, the Ugandan government does not view fleeing national service as a legitimate asylum claim as military conscription is Eritrean law. She believes migrants’ chances would be greater if they focused on any instances of imprisonment, torture, gender-based violence, and persecution. Born-again Christians do have a better chance of getting asylum- if they articulate their experiences well.<sup>53</sup>

Regardless of “evidence” the entrenched culture of corruption is not something that NGOs can change easily, if at all. Corruption does not emerge in a vacuum and often fills important functions in society and its institutions (Schrbatke-Church and Chigas 2016). Many Ugandans, in addition to Eritrean officials at the police station and fixers, benefit from the current system. As exemplified by the passport case described above, Eritreans with financial capital may benefit from their ability to bribe.

Through a case study on Eritreans in Kampala, Cole questions if the UN refugee structure serves a utility and benefits migrants, pointing to the pervasiveness of corruption and the difficulty that the most vulnerable migrants have in benefiting from these institutions (Cole 2018, 8). While this is likely true on a theoretical level, for Eritreans currently in Uganda, refugee status is necessary for accessing many livelihoods and institutions. Even though most Eritreans do not plan to settle in Uganda long term, many Western countries require that they have refugee status in Uganda to apply for asylum. In addition to being excluded from pursuing employment in the formal economy, migrants in Uganda without refugee status cannot benefit from the services offered by UNHCR and InterAid. Under its mandate from UNHCR and the Ugandan Government, InterAid, which offers a broad range of health, protection, and education programs, only serves people with full refugee status in urban settings.

Eden came to Uganda by herself after her husband was jailed for trying to get the family permission to leave Eritrea due to her serious post-partum complications. She paid for all of her medical expenses out of pocket while applying for asylum and was initially rejected. She built a strong appeal case and received status without having to pay any bribes. At this point she learned

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<sup>52</sup> Key Informant Interview 04. Kampala. 3 August 2018.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid

about InterAid. She explained her impression: “I used to go to InterAid because they have free medical treatment for refugees. When I was there they kept sharing the number of people they helped, but very few of these people are Eritrean. They are all Congolese and other refugees.”<sup>54</sup>

In contrast to most of the findings in this research, Cole found that many Eritreans in Kampala did not want refugee status because the process was arduous, they saw their time in Kampala as very temporary, and didn’t self-identify as refugees (Cole 2018). In this study, three qualitative respondents aligned with this finding, seeing themselves as students or tourists. An additional respondent refused to participate in the asylum process because he ideologically opposed to lying about having lived in Israel.<sup>55</sup> For all other respondents, refugee status was highly coveted, not out of an attachment to being identified as a refugee or being able to stay in Kampala long term, but because of the political capital it afforded.

## Passports

Another key political institution that is out of reach for many migrants is an Eritrean passport. As previously described, Eritreans are not eligible to receive passports unless they are over a certain age and have completed military service. Therefore, everyone who left in violation of Eritrea’s laws does not have a passport. In order to get a passport they need to report to an Eritrean consulate, sign paperwork, and pay 2% of their annual income in a diaspora tax (Cole 2018).

Passports are critical for people who are trying to cross borders through formal channels. Three respondents trying to join relatives in Sweden shared that their applications were denied due to their lack of passports. People reported going to great lengths to get passports including traveling to the Eritrean consulate in South Sudan to acquire them through formal channels, which sometimes required bribes for officials, and getting a fake passport.

Navigating a lack of political capital is a feature of daily life for many young Eritrean migrants in Kampala. The current system renders accessing political capital and proper documentation more difficult for those who are most vulnerable. People without money, social connections to provide loans and advice, or the knowledge, language skills, and street smarts to navigate and manipulate the system, end up without the critical tools they need to pursue livelihoods and move forward.

## “I CAN ONLY TRUST MYSELF”

Most qualitative respondents expressed that they feel vulnerable in Kampala. Although there is an Eritrean community, they find it to be less cohesive and supportive than they had hoped and are generally suspicious of people who they did not know prior to coming to Kampala or through their church community. As displayed in Figure 5, respondents exhibited very little trust; although they trusted their neighbors the most, even this number was under 50 percent. Respondents’ lack of trust in the police, government officials, and Ugandans, is not particularly surprising given that theft and bribery are serious protection concerns in everyday life. The protection issues migrants face not only lead to obvious shocks, but also make it more challenging

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
<sup>54</sup> Respondent Interview 020. Kampala. 8 August 2018.

<sup>55</sup> Respondent Interview 072. Kampala. 31 July 2018.



for them to integrate into Ugandan society due to their fears and suspicions.

It is perhaps less intuitive why respondents expressed such low levels of trust for other Eritreans and other migrant groups. The large number of people who answered “I don’t know” likely reflects that for many respondents these populations have not actively violated trust, but that the respondents are naturally suspicious and resistant to trusting others. According to a community leader, Eritreans are generally more suspicious people because of the culture of fear and repression cultivated within Eritrea, the level of control the Eritrean government exercises over people’s lives.<sup>56</sup> Respondents expressed fears that some Eritreans might be spies for the government, discomfort with people in Eritrean rebel groups, and also felt resentment over the role that Eritrean fixers played in the asylum process. Respondents’ suspicions both reflect how insecure they feel in Kampala and perpetuate it as they are reluctant to build relationships and engage in social structures and institutions that may offer greater protection and support.



## Chapter 7: Migration Routes and Eritreans’ Wellbeing in Kampala

This study tested the hypothesis that Eritreans’ migration routes are a major determinant of their livelihood assets, thus shaping their livelihood strategies in Kampala. It further predicted that migrants’ routes shape their protection risks in Kampala. Eritreans who lived in Israel were predicted to have the greatest differences from other Eritreans in Kampala. In practice, respondents’ migration routes may influence livelihood strategies on an individual level, but they do not make any measurable difference on migrants’ wealth. Respondents who lived in Israel or South Sudan may be more vulnerable to expensive bribes and theft respectively.

### LIVELIHOODS AND FINANCIAL CAPITAL

As described in Chapter Four, financial capital in the form of remittances, savings, and bridewealth is critical to helping Eritreans in Kampala meet their basic needs and pursue livelihood strategies. Of these assets, remittances are the most useful as they are reoccurring.

<sup>56</sup> Respondent Interview 017. Kampala. 1 August 2018.

## Israel

This study hypothesized that respondents who lived in Israel are in a better position financially in Kampala because they came to Uganda with a \$3,500 cash transfer in addition to any savings. However, respondents who came from Israel also had spending patterns and expenses that somewhat differed from other Eritrean migrants. Their cash transfer spending falls into five categories, listed by frequency:

*Bribes and documentation:* All 11 of the respondents used a large portion of their money to pay bribes to receive temporary asylum in Uganda, cover the costs associated with getting a legal Eritrean ID and passport, or to acquire fake passports, transcripts, or other documents. Respondents chose to spend their cash transfers on these documents not to game the system, but because they arrived in Uganda without identifying documents. Although the Israeli government told them they would be receiving legal status in Uganda, the quasi-legal travel documents they are given in Israel are confiscated as soon as they arrive in Entebbe Airport (Lee 2019).

Tesfay spent nearly his entire transfer on traveling to Juba from Kampala to get a passport and Eritrean ID, the associated diaspora tax, and bribes for local Eritrean officials.<sup>57</sup> He spent the remainder on bribes to get asylum status in Uganda.<sup>58</sup> Sami spent most of his money on a plane ticket to Europe and a fake passport to use in his travels, which was confiscated when he tried to use it at Entebbe Airport.<sup>59</sup>

*Theft and extortion:* Nearly half of the respondents who lived in Israel lost a large portion of their cash transfer due to theft after landing in Entebbe. Literature on Israel's "voluntary departure" program warns that participants are at a higher risk of experiencing theft because people may be aware that they are coming from Israel and carrying a lot of cash (Shoham, Bolzman, and Berger 2017). However, as described in Appendix 6 Table vii in this study's quantitative findings, Eritreans who had previously lived in Israel were not statistically more likely to experience theft in the last year than those who did not. This may indicate that Eritreans who lived in Israel experience theft due to the high frequency of theft in Kampala in general and the targeting of people who are visibly migrants rather than their participation in the departure program.

Some respondents who used to live in Israel pointed to instances where their assets made them a target. Aaron described a day shortly after he arrived when he was wearing his favorite outfit. A group of police officers commented on his nice clothes and threatened to arrest him on sham charges if he didn't pay them off. Being so new to Uganda he acquiesced and gave them \$400 from his cash transfer.<sup>60</sup>

*Basic expenses:* Many of the respondents used at least a portion of their cash transfer to pay for rent, basic supplies, and food. Since most Eritreans who lived in Israel can't formally work in

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<sup>57</sup> The closest Eritrean embassy to Kampala is in Juba, South Sudan.

<sup>58</sup> Respondent Interview 01. Kampala. 2 August 2018.

<sup>59</sup> Respondent Interview 072. Kampala. 31 July 2018.

<sup>60</sup> Respondent Interview 058. Kampala. 8 August 2018

Uganda and many are not receiving remittances, the cash transfer and any savings from Israel are their only source of money.

*Weddings and reunions:* Three respondents used at least some of their money to pay for family members in Europe or Eritrea to visit them. Marhawi used his entire cash transfer to fly his wife from Sweden to Uganda and pay for their wedding.<sup>61</sup> In addition to fulfilling a meaningful life dream, this was also a strategic decision as it allows for his wife to apply for family reunification so he can join her in Sweden.

*Small businesses:* Abraham, age 31, is one of two Eritreans who left Israel who started a business and is the only person who departed from Israel to have been born in Asmara. At two and a half years, he has also been in Uganda the longest of those who came from Israel. Abraham utilized his cash transfer to help open two small businesses, one of which he co-owns with Eritreans who live in South Sudan. He started his second business with another Eritrean who lived in Israel.<sup>62</sup>

*Onward Migration:* None of the respondents in this study utilized their cash transfer for onward migration. However, based on the literature, funding onward migration is likely the most common use of the cash transfer (Rozen; Shoham, Bolzman, and Berger). This study did not pick up on this population because they had already left Kampala.

Three out of the 11 survey respondents still have money left from the Israeli cash transfer. At the time of their interviews, these individuals had lived in Kampala for two weeks, two months, and seven months compared to the ten-month average for respondent who came from Israel. The data suggests that most people use up their transfers within a few months and only a slim minority managed to invest it in activities that generate future income. The cash transfer may have had limited utility in generating future income because of how respondents prioritized their spending or due to unavoidable expenses like bribes and documentation. Paying for these services is necessary due to Uganda's refusal to acknowledge that this population exists.<sup>63</sup>

Migrants who came from Israel also described remittances flows that differ from those who never left Africa. Five of the seven respondents who lived in Israel and receive remittances are getting support from relatives whose journeys to Europe they funded when they lived in Israel. Yusef's story exemplifies how funding migration is a multi-step and long-term affair, particularly for those who lived in Israel. It also provides insight into why some of them chose to go to Kampala (See Figure 6).


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<sup>61</sup> Respondent Interview 057. Kampala. 8 August 2018

<sup>62</sup> Respondent Interview 062. Kampala. 11 August 2018

<sup>63</sup> See Chapter Two for more details on the Ugandan Government's formal response to Israel's "voluntary departure" program.

Figure 6. Case Study on Remittance Patterns for Respondents who Lived in Israel<sup>64</sup>



Although Yusef is unusually lucky, his story also displays a few key patterns: 1) Respondents who lived in Israel becoming remittance-receivers after previously being remittance-senders 2) Cross-continental marriages and family reunification efforts 3) Kampala being uniquely positioned as a place where relatives in Europe, Eritrea, and other parts of Africa can meet.

### 1) Circular Remittances flows

Many of the respondents who lived in Israel found themselves in the unusual position of receiving remittances from the same people that they previously supported with remittances. As previously described, migrants had ample livelihood opportunities in Israel, which enabled them to send money home to fund younger siblings' journeys. In Kampala, the people who participated in Israel's "voluntary departure program" have been largely unable to make money beyond what they brought with them. Therefore, like most other Eritreans in Kampala, they are now dependent on family in Europe. This phenomenon aligns with larger findings regarding migration being a long-term process often involving decisions made at the household level rather than the individual level. It differs from other patterns because people who participated in Israel's "voluntary departure program" were the only people in this study to have returned to Africa after spending considerable years in the West.

### 2) Marriage and Family Reunification

Respondents often developed migration strategies and selected their transit destinations based on having relatives or romantic partners who already made it to the West. The presence of family in Europe that could apply for family reunification was a major pull factor for respondents who articulated that they truly participated in Israel's "voluntary

<sup>64</sup> Respondent Interview 057. Kampala. 8 August 2018.

departure” program of their own free will. These individuals intend to wait in Kampala until they receive approval to join their families.

Three of the respondents who used to live in Israel are married or engaged to Eritrean women they knew from childhood or who they met online. Although they largely did not get to spend much time together in person, in each of these instances their fiancées traveled from Europe to either Israel or Uganda to visit them and get married. While plans to get married and then reunite with their partners in the West inspired some of the respondents to take the risk of participating in Israel’s “voluntary departure” program, this strategy does not work as well for everyone as it did for Yusef.

Aaron, for example, grew up in circumstances nearly identical to Yusef’s and the two of them were friends with similar lives in Israel. They both left Israel for Uganda at the same time with the goal of getting passports so they can join their wives in Sweden. While Yusef succeeded, during this study, Aaron received his second rejection from Sweden. He was running out of money, hated Uganda, and felt depressed and desperate. According to Yusef, Aaron left Uganda to try to cross to Europe through Libya three days after his interview.<sup>65</sup> The differences between Yusef and Aaron’s stories display that while living in Israel shaped respondents’ lives, it does not determine their well-being in Kampala. Yusef’s plans to reach Sweden seemed to be thwarted by his wife’s lack of sufficient financial capital and their difficulties navigating Swedish bureaucracy.

### *3) Family Reunions in Kampala*

According to Habtom Mahari, a PhD student at Hebrew University, Kampala has become a popular place for Eritreans to hold reunions with their loved ones.<sup>66</sup> When Eritreans turn fifty and complete their military service, they may be allowed to leave Eritrea legally. Parents, children, and even extended families will travel to Kampala to get to see each other, sometimes for the first time in decades. Kampala is a popular choice for these reunions, which sometimes revolve around holidays or weddings, for similar reasons to why Eritrean migrants chose to stay there while they try to reach the West: It is one of the places closest to Eritrea that respects migrants, feels relatively safe, and is thought to be beyond the reach of Eritrean government spies.

## **South Sudan**

One may similarly speculate that respondents who lived in South Sudan are in a better position financially because they have savings from their better-paying work or have benefited from social ties to a once vibrant Eritrean economy in Juba.

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<sup>65</sup> Author Field Notes. Kampala. 16 August 2018.

<sup>66</sup> Key Informant Interview KI05. Jerusalem. 28 June 2018.

Most respondents who lived in South Sudan described using their savings to help them get started in Kampala, largely by setting up their homes and covering initial expenses. Similar to those who came from Israel, only two of the thirteen respondents who lived in South Sudan established their own business or micro-enterprise in Kampala. Without investing in income-generating activities, once their savings ran out they found themselves in precarious financial positions- unless they had access to remittances.

Other than providing initial financial capital, respondents who lived in South Sudan did not describe this experience as either helping or harming them in in Kampala. However, many respondents continue to receive help from South Sudan, either from spouses or friends.

Although respondents who lived in Israel or South Sudan may have access to forms of financial capital that are not available to most others, they are not in a better position in Kampala than the general study population. There is no statistically significant difference between people who spent over a month in Sudan, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Israel, another country, or only Kampala.

**Table 6: Ordered Logit of Monthly Wealth and Migration Journeys<sup>67</sup>**

	Sudan	Ethiopia	South Sudan	Israel	Straight to Uganda	Other Countries
<b>Dependent variable</b>	Monthly Wealth	Monthly Wealth	Monthly Wealth	Monthly Wealth	Monthly Wealth	Monthly Wealth
<b>Country of Interest</b>	0.164 (-0.693- 1.022)	0.500 (- 1.276 - 1.076)	0.780 (- 1.147 - 1.303)	-0.087 (-1.349 - 1.173)	-0.266 (-1.41 - 0.881)	1.229 (- 0.204 - 2.663)
<b>Pseudo R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000
<b>N</b>	71	71	71	71	71	71
Note: significant at $\alpha= 0.1$ **significant at $\alpha= 0.05$ ***significant at $\alpha= 0.01$						

This finding largely aligns with those of the qualitative interviews. Regardless of journey, one could note stories of migrants who have managed to live reasonably comfortably in Uganda and stories of those who suffered from serious poverty. This is because people had a myriad of other circumstances that shaped their financial capital, particularly remittances access. However, there is also not a statistically significant relationship between respondents' migration routes and the likelihood that they receive remittances.<sup>68</sup> This likely contributes to the inconsequential contribution of migration journeys to Kampala livelihoods.

<sup>67</sup> Note that it is possible for respondents to have stopped in multiple countries. Therefore, each country was ran as a separate regression.

<sup>68</sup> See Appendix Six Table iv

## SOCIAL CAPITAL

Although a respondent's journey does not appear to be a major determinant of his or her financial capital and livelihoods, it does appear to shape his or her social capital and networks. Nearly all respondents expressed their frustration with the Eritrean community in Kampala; this is particularly the case for respondents who previously lived in other countries, which allowed for comparison.

### Israel

Eritreans who previously lived in Israel already have experience with a hostile host country, but the policy mechanisms and relationships with host populations manifest very differently in Israel and Uganda. Respondents shared disgust and frustration with Israel's increasingly aggressive policies toward migrants and politicians' anti-migrant rhetoric. However, some respondents deeply miss it there, enjoy speaking Hebrew, and built meaningful friendships with Israelis. Two respondents shared that they would turn to their former Israeli boss if they needed a large loan. In contrast, on paper, and in many ways in practice, the Ugandan government is much more welcoming toward refugees. However, the Eritreans in this sample do not feel respected, fear extortion and theft, and have not developed meaningful relationships with Ugandans. Aaron lamented, "without money, [in Uganda] you are garbage."<sup>69</sup>

Perhaps because of these varied experiences, Eritreans who used to live in Israel largely have their own social circles, distinct from the broader Eritrean diaspora in Kampala. Many of the respondents who lived in Israel depend on a couple close friends who are people they knew in Israel or from home. Most of them spend their days playing pool in pubs and sometimes taking English classes.<sup>70</sup> Tesfay explained,

In Israel, if you met anyone who has his paper or work permit, you won't find him, he is very busy. At the same, in the days when I used to have the work permit I was very busy with my job. I didn't have any time to give to others. But back home in Eritrea, the community is very interactive. You could just eat in one plate...But here in Uganda you get afraid of the people even Eritreans. If you become close to them there is nothing you will get it free. Even if you want to get information from them, you have to pay something. Not money wise, but you have to spend time, you have to treat them, you have to do something favor for them. You don't get anything for free.<sup>71</sup>

The broader Eritrean population in Kampala often felt uncomfortable and suspicious of Eritreans who came from Israel. Samuel, a bible teacher, said that those who came from Israel are easy to identify: "They don't interact with other people, some of them, they take very dangerous risks. Like fighting, taking a lot of alcohol, and moving during the night...You can tell that they have frustrations and they don't care about their life. They are well expensive people but they have a lot

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<sup>69</sup> Respondent Interview 058. Kampala. 8 August 2018

<sup>70</sup> Author Field Notes. 26 July 2018.

<sup>71</sup> Respondent Interview 01. Kampala. 2 August 2018.

of things in their head so they are easy to expose to any kind of problem... So it is not easy to actually handle them.”<sup>72</sup>

It is not clear whether other Eritreans who live in Kampala are suspicious of Eritreans who lived in Israel because of their experience in Israel or because they are young men with little formal education from rural regions who live without their families. Israel has a liberal alcohol and nightlife culture, which may lead the young men to have lifestyles that differ from a more conservative Eritrean culture. Eritreans who lived in Israel also likely experienced trauma in Sinai and have articulated feeling mentally unhealthy, which could influence how they are perceived by others. Alternatively, these differences could actually be reflecting social, class, and ethnic divisions within Eritrea: After Samuel was asked if their backgrounds in Eritrea were different he explained, “I can say like 99.9% are from the village, because what I can show you is those who grew up in the capital, when they leave the country they don't want to take the risk through Sinai somehow. If they are bright they go to Canada or something and they go safely. These villagers, they don't care and they can tolerate bullshit, so that's the difference. Those villagers, because of the way in the village, the whole family were there. No one was in Europe, so no one could help them.”<sup>73</sup>

The qualitative interviews indicate that Eritreans have less social capital in Kampala than other Eritreans and move in distinct social circles. However, if one uses whether a respondent has someone in Kampala outside their household they can turn to in a medical emergency as an indicator for social capital, the quantitative data does display any significant differences in the social capital of Eritreans who lived in Israel and those who did not (See Figure 7).

## SOUTH SUDAN

Eritreans who lived in South Sudan reminisced about the close-knit community in Juba and how much people supported each other. When asked about differences between Kampala and Juba, Dawit lamented, “The question is very difficult for me, at times I ask it myself. Because in Juba we used to help each other very much, but I don't know, here, when it comes to this country, when someone, they just want to run from you, not even help you or to be helped. What's the reason? Even I myself, I never know.”<sup>74</sup>

As previously described, most people who lived in South Sudan still maintain social ties in South Sudan while living in Kampala. Two respondents, citing their financial difficulties in Kampala and missing friends in South Sudan, have expressed a desire to go back.

The quantitative data indicates a possibility that Eritreans who lived in South Sudan have greater social capital in Kampala than migrants who never lived there. Respondents who lived in South Sudan were more likely to have someone outside of their household in Kampala who they could turn to in a medical emergency while those who lived in Sudan or Ethiopia were less likely. The

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<sup>72</sup> Key Informant Interview 03. Kampala. 5 August 2018.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid

<sup>74</sup> Respondent Interview 029. Kampala 8 August 2018.



regression does not provide any significant conclusions regarding people who came from Israel, went directly to Uganda from Eritrea, or lived in another country.

The qualitative data does not offer a concrete reason for the previously described quantitative finding. However, it does provide some possible explanations: First, this study and existing literature point to deep connections between the Eritrean diaspora in Kampala and Juba and a lot of transience of people and financial capital between these two urban centers. It is possible that Eritreans who lived in South Sudan were better able to benefit from their social capital in their prior migration destination and build a more resilient social network than those who may have lived in other places.

Relatedly, since there are wealthy Eritrean business owners in Juba who also participate in the economy in Kampala, it is possible that Eritreans who lived in Juba are not more likely to have strong social ties in general, but more likely to have strong social ties that actually have the financial capacity to help in a medical emergency.

**Figure 7: "Do you have people in Kampala outside of your household that you think you could turn to for help in a medical emergency?"**



\* significant at  $\alpha = .1$  \*\*significant at  $\alpha = .05$  \*\*\*significant at  $\alpha = .01$

The qualitative data does not provide any clear reasons for why people who lived in Ethiopia or Sudan are less likely to have a support system in a medical emergency. People who lived in Addis Ababa also found that community to be more tight-knit and supportive than Kampala. They also felt more comfortable and safer being surrounded by Habesha people. This experience may not have translated into support in Kampala because the community in Addis Ababa is less wealthy and intertwined with Kampala. In contrast, people who lived in Khartoum said that the financial, social, and safety situations in Khartoum were worse compared to those of Kampala and none of them expressed a desire to go back. Finally, the survey does not pick up on the nuances of whether people who lived in Sudan or Ethiopia primarily lived in refugee camps or also spent significant time in urban areas. These different experiences may also influence social capital.

The medical emergency question is only one possible indicator of social capital and it may also be picking up on other things, such as relationships with people with financial means and an individual respondents' natural propensity to feel comfortable asking for help. Attempts to measure the impact of journey on other questions measuring social capital did not yield any results, possibly due to insufficient sample size.

Although this study was not able to point to conclusive evidence about the role of Eritrean's migration routes in contributing to their social capital, it does raise some potential patterns that should be further explored. Future studies should investigate the relationships between the Eritrean diaspora in different African urban areas; it should particularly consider the networks between Juba and Kampala and how Eritrea and Ethiopia's peace deal may improve or disrupt Eritrean networks within Africa.

## PROTECTION

As described in Chapter Six, Eritrean migrants' biggest grievance in Kampala is the extent to which people are expected to pay bribes to obtain temporary asylum or refugee status in Kampala. Many respondents also feared theft and expressed concern for their physical safety that influenced their lives, routines, and comfort in Kampala.

### Bribes

Nearly all respondents, regardless of migration route, expressed frustration with corruption in the asylum process. There was no statistical difference in the likelihood that a respondent paid a bribe in the last year if they had previously lived in Sudan, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Israel, and other countries. Respondents who came straight to Kampala were less likely to have paid bribes in the last year.<sup>75</sup>

The qualitative data provided some possible explanations for why this might be the case. As described in Chapter Four, most respondents who came straight to Kampala were older women from Asmara who often traveled with young children. Some of these women may have overstayed tourist visas and thus have not had to interact with the police station or OPM where bribery often occurs. Additionally, women with children, particularly who are the head of their household or have evidence that they were fleeing evangelical persecution may have had more successful asylum applications at OPM.

Although respondents who lived in Israel did not pay bribes at a greater frequency, they did describe paying larger bribes than other Eritrean migrants in Kampala. Since Eritreans who lived in Israel were not officially resettled in Uganda through recognized formal channels and the Ugandan government continues to deny that it is cooperating with Israel's "voluntary departure" program, these respondents fear that they will be denied status, jailed, or deported if Ugandan officials find out they came from Israel. Therefore, they are vulnerable to extortion for expensive bribes if anyone suspects that they lived in Israel. Tesfay shared, "I was new and I was a stranger to this country. I stayed here 16 or 17 days. My friend took me to the police station. I went to talk


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<sup>75</sup> See Appendix Six Table vi

to the Eritrean representative there. He's the one who charged me money. He knew about me, that I speak Hebrew, so he wanted to charge me 180,000 shillings. (\$48.00)”<sup>76</sup> Another respondent who arrived from Israel two months prior to the study paid 250,000 shillings (\$67).<sup>77</sup> In contrast, as described in Chapter Six, the median bribe reported in the qualitative interviews was 80,000 shillings (\$21).

Since Eritreans who left Israel did so through an informal and unrecognized deal between the Israeli and Ugandan governments, they are invisible to UNHCR, IOM, OPM and other institutions designed to facilitate migration. For example, when asked if she encountered Eritreans who came from Israel, a project manager at the Refugee Law Project shared that she hadn't seen any since 2015 and that none of the ones who came through her office were able to get refugee status. She also thought all of them had arrived through Rwanda and had no idea that Eritreans were arriving to Entebbe Airport from Israel.<sup>78</sup> In addition to indicating that people who lived in Israel are not coming for help, this also may mean that Uganda has been successful in keeping its arrangement with Israel out of the public eye, even among practitioners.

Perhaps because Eritreans who lived in Israel perceive political institutions like OPM as not only corrupt, but as a serious protection risk these respondents also perceive themselves as facing discrimination by government officials in Kampala at a higher rate than other Eritreans.



\* significant at  $\alpha = .1$  \*\*significant at  $\alpha = .05$  \*\*\*significant at  $\alpha = .01$

The data displayed in Figure 8 could not be tested for statistical significance due to the large number of people who answered “I don't know.” However, this in itself might be telling. Eritreans who lived in Israel seem to be more uncomfortable or unsure in answering this question, in addition to articulating that they feel discriminated against in high numbers.

<sup>76</sup> Respondent Interview 01. Kampala. 2 August 2018.

<sup>77</sup> Respondent Interview 57. Kampala. 8 August 2018.

<sup>78</sup> Key Informant Interview 04. Kampala. 3 August 2018.

## Theft

A quantitative analysis testing whether an Eritrean who spent more time in Sudan, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Israel, or who went straight to Kampala is more likely to experience theft found that respondents who lived in South Sudan had a higher likelihood. None of the other migration routes displayed a statistically significant relationship with frequency of theft in the past year.<sup>79</sup>

The qualitative data did not provide any insight into this statistic and did not point to anything unusual or specifically targeted in the robberies experienced by respondents who lived in South Sudan. This finding would take further research to assess qualitatively.

Overall, the quantitative findings related to protection largely conflict with the corresponding research hypothesis. The data did not conclude that respondents who lived in Israel are paying bribes or being stolen from at a greater frequency than other Eritreans. However, the qualitative findings indicate that they are likely paying higher bribes and face greater political insecurity. The finding that migrants who came straight to Kampala may be less likely to pay bribes and that migrants who lived in South Sudan are more likely to experience theft should be further explored, particularly with qualitative research that can provide insight into the reasons behind this possible pattern.

## Chapter 8: The Lasting Impact of Migrants' Identities and Origins

Although this study originally focused on the relationship between migrants' journeys and their well-being in Kampala, the lasting impact of migrants' situation in Eritrea prior to departure emerge during fieldwork. Four attributes in particular appear to shape migrants' lives far after they first left their homes: sibling order, marital status, region of origin, and gender. This chapter will explore each of these attributes at length and consider the different ways in which they may help or hinder migrants in building successful livelihood and protection strategies in Kampala.

### SIBLING ORDER

Many respondents who are oldest siblings or were the first member of their immediate family to leave Eritrea felt the need to highlight this identity during their interviews. The impact of family structures and sibling order on migration has been well documented. The literature shows that when migrants leave home with the blessing of their families and receive financial help they are often expected to send money home, which in turn may improve the household's well-being and alter its spending and saving patterns (Clemens and Tiongson 2012). However, these patterns are very context specific. In many cases the extent to which family members follow each other abroad participate is shaped by care for those who stay behind, as well as building greater prosperity at home (Stohr 2015). In Eritrea, mandatory military conscription and its disruptions to familial structures and income, leads to distinctive migration chains. Many Eritrean, particularly those from rural regions, attempt to leave Eritrea before they expect to be recruited for the military or

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<sup>79</sup> See Appendix 6 Table vii

shortly after they begin serving. Therefore, many or all children in a household leave as they reach their late teens and early twenties, sometimes joined by their parents. Three respondents described their family's homes in southern Eritrea as now being vacant.

Although the oldest children in Eritrean families, particularly males, tend to leave first, in some cases due to university acceptance or health issues some people will not leave Eritrea prior to their younger siblings, if at all. For simplicity, all respondents who were the first people in their immediate family to leave Eritrea will be referred to as "pioneering siblings." Thirteen of the qualitative respondents, or forty-three percent, fall into this category.

Even prior to migration, oldest siblings described significant responsibilities at young ages. Echoing the experiences described by Desawi and Dawit in Chapter Four, Aman felt significant pressure to provide for his siblings as the only male child in his family:

After one year my dad got married to another woman... When she gave birth a new baby for my dad, she started misbehaving. She started chasing us from the house. 'No more, this is my house!' When I was nine-years-old, I left. I was just working with someone farming. On the side, I used to make some small business and sell tomatoes. After that my older sister was staying with my grandmother and the other siblings. My younger sister keeps on saying, 'Because you're a boy you can easily leave the house, but for me because I'm a lady, I can't easily leave the house. I mean for the sake of my dignity, I'm still here. But don't forget, you are the responsible person.' I was just making some money for survival, for myself and for my sisters.<sup>80</sup>

For pioneering siblings who coordinated their departure with their families, their emigration was seen as an investment. Families would use their limited savings or borrow money from friends and relatives to help the first person leave. They would expect this pioneering sibling to send remittances home, ideally to repay the costs of their journey, help the family meet basic needs, and fund younger siblings' journeys. For example, Yusef, whose story is detailed in the previous chapter, takes great pride in successfully helping his four brothers safely reach Europe. He also recalls the stress of this project: "All four of them left at once without warning me. I was upset because that is too many people to help at once. I was already working so hard. I worked thirteen hours a day so I could send them money for their travel."<sup>81</sup>

It logically follows that a majority of pioneering siblings are unable to benefit from remittances themselves. Meanwhile, younger siblings are more likely to have access to remittances and loans. Of the thirteen pioneering siblings, ten did not have any access to remittances during their journeys. Seven of them were expected to send money back to Eritrea and most of those who did not have this expectation left without their family's knowledge or permission.

In addition to financial capital, pioneering siblings often provide their younger siblings with critical connections and advice when they leave Eritrea. These advantages are visible through Ginat and Kedame's stories in the case studies. In addition to financing her journey and life in

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<sup>80</sup> Respondent Interview 019. Kampala. 8 August 2018

<sup>81</sup> Respondent Interview 057. Kampala. 8 August 2018.

Kampala, Ginat's older brothers advised her on the strategy of moving to Kampala and set her up with connections to ease her transition. Kedame's sister also has helped him make migration decisions and provided him with the financial capital he required in order to open and run a successful business. Unless they have friends or other relatives guiding them, pioneering siblings do not benefit from these financial resources, inherited wisdom, and social networks.

Since the importance of sibling order only emerged through the qualitative interviews, the quantitative survey did not ask questions interrogating this concept. However, given the migration context in Eritrea, clear linkages between sibling order and access to remittances, and the centrality of remittances to livelihood strategies, the role of sibling order should be taken seriously and further examined in future studies.

## MARITAL STATUS

Married respondents, particularly those with children, can both help and hinder their abilities to develop sustainable livelihood strategies and a decent quality of life in Kampala.

Marriage as an institution can be a source of critical financial and social capital. Four qualitative respondents that got married before leaving Eritrea shared that they sold the gold from their dowries or bridewealth to finance their journeys or open a small business. One household liquidated their bridewealth to open a convenience store.<sup>82</sup> In another, a single mother used it to buy a passport and bribe airport officials to fly to Kampala with her child.<sup>83</sup> Additionally, in-laws and partners' siblings expand the pool of people in a migrant's immediate family who may be in a position to send remittances.

Simultaneously, households with multiple members, particularly children and seniors, also have more expenses. Respondents face financial concerns including maternal health, child health, and school fees. This makes the impact of this status on income difficult to predict. Quantitative tests of the relationship between marital status and the monthly wealth variable do not yield any statistically significant results. This can indicate that the financial impacts of marriage cancel each other out, that they are not meaningful, or that the study sample size was too small to draw conclusions. Ultimately, marriage has pros and cons in terms of financial capital: on one hand, it generates a one-time, but large source of capital that can be used to start a microenterprise. On the other hand, growing families have growing expenses.

## REGION OF ORIGIN

The childhood pressures Aman described above as pushing him to leave Eritrea not only reflect his status as the oldest male in his household, but also his rural upbringing. As described in Chapter Four, male respondents from rural farming regions, namely Gash Barka and Zoba Debub,


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<sup>82</sup> Respondent Interview 017. Kampala. 1 August 2018

<sup>83</sup> Respondent Interview 028. Kampala. 18 August 2018

frequently drop out of school at young ages to farm.<sup>84</sup> It naturally follows that respondents from rural areas have attained lower levels of education and have weaker English skills, which can be critical for finding a job in Kampala and navigating Ugandan bureaucracy. Additionally, many respondents from rural areas described coming from broken families due to divorce, abandonment or death, and living in extreme poverty.

In contrast, a much larger portion of respondents from the Asmara area completed high school and speak English. People who were selected by the Eritrean government to attend college mostly came from Asmara. These individuals stayed in the country until after they complete their education. Since on average people from Zoba Maekel left at older ages than those from rural regions, they also had longer to build financial assets through employment and marriage. Additionally, those whose families owned shops or worked in white collar professions in Asmara likely received larger sums of money to finance their lives abroad.



Note: \*significant at  $\alpha= 0.1$  \*\*significant at  $\alpha= 0.05$  \*\*\*significant at  $\alpha= 0.01$

<sup>84</sup> As a reminder, in this study “urban” captures respondents who live in Zoba Maekel, which is Asmara and the surrounding areas, and “rural” includes everyone else. Although this is a simplification, it allowed for the creation of a dummy variable and reflects Zoba Maekel’s higher development status and position as the epicenter of political and economic power in Eritrea.

As exhibited in Figure 9, Table 7, and Figure 10, quantitative analysis reveals that migrants from rural areas are less likely to have money, refugee status, or feel happy. These findings display just how profound the challenges are for Eritrean migrants from regions other than Zoba Maekel.

## Region of Origin and Economic Outcomes

**Table 7: Ordered Logit of Monthly Wealth and Region of Origin**

	<b>Model 1: Crude Model</b>	<b>Model 2: Adjusted Model</b>	<b>Model 3: Added Variables</b>
<b>Dependent variable</b>	Monthly Wealth	Monthly Wealth	Monthly Wealth
<b>Urban (vs. rural)</b>	1.682*** (0.702 – 2.663)	3.278*** (1.931 – 4.625)	5.494*** (3.550 – 7.437)
<b>Female</b>		-0.922 (-2.02 – 0.182)	-1.789*** (-3.099 – -0.480)
<b>Age (in years)</b>		0.309*** (0.100 – 0.517)	0.633*** (0.338 – 0.930)
<b>Length of time in Kampala (in months)</b>		-0.014 (-0.040 – 0.012)	-0.341** (-0.065 – -0.004)
<b>Age of Departure (in years)</b>		-0.236** (-0.423 – -0.048)	-0.454*** (-0.707 – -0.200)
<b>Married (vs. other relationship status)</b>		-0.630 (-1.707 – 0.448)	-1.147* (-2.35 – 0.058)
<b>Education (no education omitted)</b>			4.172 (-1.774 – 10.12)
Completed Elementary			-1.146 (-5.736 – 3.443)
Some Secondary			0.731 (-3.876 – 5.338)
Completed Secondary			-3.881 (-8.892 – 1.130)
Vocational Training			1.317 (-1.677 – 2.139)
Completed Higher Education			
<b>Lived in Israel</b>			0.231 (-1.677 – 2.138)
<b>Pseudo R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.062	0.161	0.318
<b>N</b>	70	70	70

Note: \*significant at  $\alpha= 0.1$  \*\*significant at  $\alpha= 0.05$  \*\*\*significant at  $\alpha= 0.01$



As displayed in Table 7, even after controlling for key variables in the adjusted model, respondents from rural areas are significantly less likely to describe themselves as having higher levels of monthly wealth. It is important to remember that the quantitative data was not collected to be representative of the Eritrean migrant population, hence caution needs to be taken in generalizing the quant findings beyond the sample.

One challenge with measuring the influence of region of origin on migrants' wellbeing is determining the casual channels of this relationship. Migrants from rural regions are younger and less educated than those from Zoba Maekel. The majority are also single and male. Moreover, nine of the rural respondents, or fifty-seven percent, also had previously lived in Israel and most are pioneering siblings. Therefore, the region of origin, departure age, sibling order, education level, marital status, and residency in Israel variables may be highly multicollinear and predictive of each other. In a statement that summarizes the muddled relationships between some of these distinctions, Michael explained, "Younger people struggle more. No dowry and they are often first in their families to leave."<sup>85</sup>

To attempt to tease out these relationships, Model 3 in Table 7 adds controls for respondents' highest level of education and whether or not they lived in Israel.<sup>86</sup> Even with these controls, the region of origin variable remains a significant predictor of wealth.

There are a few reasons why region of origin may be the strongest predictor of a migrant's current financial capital. Region of origin is set from birth and thus predates their education outcome or migration journey. In fact, region of origin may have contributed to those outcomes. As described in Chapter Two, the limited available data indicates that rural areas have much lower health, educational, and economic outcomes than in urban areas. Based on the literature review and confirmed by the qualitative and quantitative data, people from rural areas are more likely to drop out of school prior to high school matriculation. Since rural respondents on average left Eritrea at younger ages than those from Zoba Maekel, they had less time to complete their education.

This study is less equipped to draw conclusions regarding the relationship between rural origins, prior residency in Israel, and sibling order. As reviewed in Chapter Four, literature indicates that the Northern route to Israel was ideal for migrants from rural, border regions, as it was for a long time the most affordable and geographically accessible path to the West. This may also mean it was a common choice for pioneering siblings as it was a more affordable than taking a boat to Europe. All but one of the respondents in this study who lived in Israel came from rural regions and many are pioneering siblings. One could conclude that among this sample, people from rural areas were more likely to a) depart at a younger age, b) be a pioneering sibling and c) migrate north to Israel. Alternatively, it is possible that Eritrean migrants in Israel with rural origins or pioneering siblings are more likely to accept the Israeli Government's "voluntary departure" offer than to fight to stay in the country. Further research is needed to explore these possibilities.

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<sup>85</sup> Respondent Interview 018. Kampala. 1 August 2018.

<sup>86</sup> The limitations of the quantitative instrument do not allow for a sibling order variable.

## Region of Origin and Political Security

Eritrean migrants' regions of origin not only helps explain their financial well-being in Kampala, but also their political capital. As displayed in Table 8 Eritrean migrants from Zoba Maekel are more likely to have obtained full refugee status in Kampala than those from rural areas, even after controlling for gender, departure age, current age, and length of time in Kampala.

**Table 8. Logit and Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of the Influence of Region of Origin on Refugee Status in Kampala**

Dependent variable	Model 2: Logit Crude Model	Model 3: Logit Adjusted Model
	Refugee Status	Refugee Status
Urban (vs. rural)	2.59** (0.507 – 4.70)	3.995*** (1.10 – 6.90)
Gender		0.903 (-0.700 – 2.50)
Age (in years)		0.408** (0.318 – 0.786)
Length of time in Kampala (in months)		0.0228 (-0.17 – 0.061)
Age of Departure (in years)		-0.410** (-0.772 – -0.0480)
Married (vs. other relationship status)		0.679 (-1.074 – 2.430)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.141	0.324


There are a few channels through which Eritrean migrants' region of origin may impact their ability to gain refugee status in Kampala. As reported in Chapter Six, the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) frequently rejects Eritreans who cite military conscription as the reason for their asylum claim. Economic drivers are also not considered legitimate. These conditions work in favor of Eritreans from Zoba Maekel for a few reasons. First, all of the respondents who cited persecution of born-again Christians as their reason for coming to Uganda are from Asmara, a finding which is echoed in existing literature (Hsu 2011). Key informants believe that this asylum claim is much more likely to be accepted than military conscription alone.

Additionally, because Eritreans are frequently rejected for refugee status, many migrants will pay hefty bribes to secure refugee status.<sup>87</sup> Since migrants with urban origins are more likely to have greater financial capital, they may be more likely to have funds available to pay bribes.

<sup>87</sup> See Chapter 6 for details.

## Region of Origin and Overall Well-Being

By in large, Eritrean migrants in Kampala with rural origins are in a more precarious position than those with urban origins: of all the variables considered in this study, region of origin has proven to be the most compelling predictor of migrants' financial well-being in Kampala and the only notable predictor of their ability to obtain refugee status. Since respondents from rural origins are more likely to lack financial, social, and political capital, they are particularly vulnerable to shocks and stresses. The difficult conditions faced by migrants with rural origins shapes how they perceive their situations in Kampala. In comparison to migrants with urban origins, they report feeling happy less frequently (with statistical significance).



Note: \*significant at  $\alpha=0.1$  \*\*significant at  $\alpha=0.05$  \*\*\*significant at  $\alpha=0.01$

While the quantitative data paints a clear picture of the relationship between Eritreans' region of origin and their well-being in Kampala, respondents did not explicitly make these connections in their interviews. The difficult conditions of life in rural Eritrea were cited as push factors for leaving; however, respondents did not discuss the ways in which this background continued to affect them today. This may be because migrants have not considered this possibility or because the research team did not probe this line of inquiry.

Two key informants of Eritrean origin did recognize this trend. When Samuel, a bible teacher, explained that many Eritreans in Kampala are weary of Eritreans who lived in Israel, he may have actually been describing differences that reflect region of origin. He stated that those who came from Israel are easy to identify: "They don't interact with other people, some of them, they take very dangerous risks. Like fighting, taking a lot of alcohol, and moving during the night... So it is not easy to actually handle them."<sup>88</sup>

These sentiments toward Eritreans who come from Israel may be because of their experience in Israel: It has a liberal alcohol and nightlife culture, which may lead the young men to have

<sup>88</sup> Key Informant Interview 03. Kampala. 5 August 2018.

lifestyles that differ from more conservative Eritrean culture. Eritreans who lived in Israel also likely experienced trauma in Sinai, which could influence how they are seen by others. Alternatively, these perceptions could be because Eritreans who lived in Israel are mostly young men living without families who have little formal education and are from rural regions. These differences may actually be reflecting social, class, and ethnic divisions within Eritrea.

After Samuel was asked if Eritreans who lived in Israel prior to Kampala came from specific backgrounds he explained, “I can say like 99.9% are from the village, because what I can show you is those who grew up in the capital, when they leave the country they don't want to take the risk through Sinai somehow. If they are bright they go to Canada or something and they go safely. These villagers, they don't care and they can tolerate bullshit, so that's the difference. Those villagers, because of the way in the village, the whole family were there. No one was in Europe, so no one could help them.”<sup>89</sup>

## GENDER

It is well established in the literature that gender shapes migrants' experiences on the move and in transit destinations (Cosser 2014). This is particularly the case for young migrants. This study did not find any statistically significant differences in the experiences of women and girls and men and boys in Kampala. The qualitative data also did not point to major distinctions regarding livelihood strategies. Eritrean migrants of all genders are equally dependent on remittances, attempt to start small businesses with varying degrees of success, and struggle to find steady employment. Although women and men both want to run small business or microenterprises, married women choose businesses that they can run from their home such as hair salons, convenience stores, and jewelry making. Women and men who do not have a job or businesses are similarly frustrated and desire to be income-earners.

In contrast, the qualitative data points to differences in the protection risks experienced by people of different genders while they were on this move and as they establish lives in Kampala.

### Female Respondents

Literature argues that unmarried females leaving difficult circumstances at home, journeying independently, and arriving to destinations without social ties are the most vulnerable for sexual violence, trafficking, crime, and abuse.<sup>90</sup> Of the young women interviewed for this study who traveled to Kampala without adult family members, two fled child marriage and described experiences of sexual violence in Eritrea and Uganda. The third did not want to discuss her first weeks in Uganda because they were too traumatic. All three women had to pay bribes and experienced theft.

Ayana's experiences exemplify many of the dangers for girls from fragile states on the move: her parents were jailed when she was 10, forcing her to drop out of middle school to take care of her younger siblings. When her mother was released from jail 5 years later, she forcibly married

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<sup>89</sup> Ibid

<sup>90</sup> Ibid

Ayana to a much older man. She gave birth shortly after. They got divorced, meaning that she could be recruited to the military and forced to leave her daughter. She decided to give her daughter to her mother and leave Eritrea without any financial support.

After working in Khartoum for a few years, Ayana came to Uganda because she knew she had a wealthy relative. When she arrived at his house he attempted to rape her; she escaped in the middle of the night. She slept on the street until Eritreans helped her find a job at an Eritrean business and a place to live.

Paralleling the experiences of Eritreans who lived in Israel, if girls are perceived to be more vulnerable, they may be asked to pay higher bribes when they apply for asylum. Ayana shared:

An Eritrean guy met me at the police station when I was in the line going through the same process as anyone else. Since I didn't have a passport I was really afraid for my safety because they might catch me and without a paper they will put me in jail. So he told me that if you want to go to OPM you will need to wait a year or a few months for an appointment, but if you want to go through the process faster I'm the one who can connect you. I asked him if he was going to take money from me, but he said 'no, no problem', and gave me an appointment for the next week. Then he told me I needed to give him 250,000 shillings (\$70.00) for the paper...He knew my status, that I didn't have anyone helping me, but I still had to pay...There is no way I can get full status, not until its free."<sup>91</sup>

Given her life circumstances, one would speculate that Ayana is a strong candidate for asylum. However, the corruption in the asylum process, her lack of support network, and vulnerability, make her susceptible to protection risks and renders the services available to people with refugee status unavailable to her because she can't pay for the status.

## Male Respondents

Although their circumstances differed, many of the boys and men interviewed also experienced traumatic events prior to leaving Eritrea or on their journeys. These experiences continue to affect them in Kampala. All Eritreans who are caught trying to flee Eritrea or are found guilty of illegal religious practices are imprisoned, regardless of gender. However, in this study only males reported experiencing violent torture while in prison. These experiences, coupled with harsh conditions in military service, left some male respondents with lasting trauma. Once on their journeys, three male respondents reported being trafficked. This experience is particularly common for men crossing Sinai into Israel, where they may experience torture at the hands of their kidnappers (Rozen 2015). Male respondents lived experiences, or fear of violence and kidnapping on their journey, led many to try to reach the West through formal channels rather than to try crossing through Libya or Yemen.

Eritrean men in Kampala may be less of easy targets for theft and bribery than women, but they face different types of protection risks due to their presence in public spaces. When the research team approached women in public spaces to ask if they would participate in this study, they all

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<sup>91</sup> Respondent Interview 071. Kampala. 12 August 2018.

were working in customer service settings or occasionally frequenting one or two specific Eritrean cafes. Most women, particularly with children, spend the majority of time in the home. In contrast, men are often outside in bars, pubs and cafes. Since men spend more time outside of the home and at points of interactions with Ugandans and the police, they are also more likely to find themselves involved in physical confrontations or to experience assault or violent theft. Other than Ayana, all of the thirteen quantitative respondents who reported experiencing assault within the last year were men. Two men reported being assaulted by the police.

Just as Eritreans' understanding of security depends on their context, migrants' perception of safety and dangerous situations is informed by their gender. Within Kampala, women are cautious to avoid being outside of the home, particularly at night, to avoid protection risks. Girls and women in Kampala independently are perceived as easy targets for bribes and theft. However, many of their protection risks are relegated to private spaces and they are targeted by people that are familiar to them. Men face greater protection risks in public spaces from physical assault and robberies on the street or while riding motor taxis at night.

## Chapter 9: Discussion, Recommendations, and Conclusion

Migration-related policymakers have followed the warming of ties between Eritrea and Ethiopia with great interest, particularly regarding impacts this development may have on migration flows from the Horn of Africa. The peace deal will open greater freedom of movement between the two countries and perhaps lead to economic growth. However, statements from politicians, including the Prime Minister of Israel, that it may soon be safe to send Eritreans back to Eritrea are rash and misguided (Peleg, 2019). Similarly, predictions that migration from Eritrea will slow are also premature.

Eritreans leave their country due to forced military service, religious persecution, political repression, and lack of opportunity. Although many respondents did state that they hoped to return home one day and some were excited by the peace deal, it did not assuage their concerns. Respondents shared that they will want to go home once their government respects freedom and human rights. As long as Eritrea's forced military conscription endures, many teens and young adults will migrate fleeing service. Youth migration from Eritrea should thus continue to be a topic of concern for organizations supporting youth on the move. Although Eritreans are not likely to stop leaving in large numbers anytime soon, their routes and destinations will change alongside the geopolitical reality. As this study displayed, Eritreans have been heading to Uganda in greater numbers, making this study's findings particularly relevant.

This study found that most young Eritreans see Kampala as a transit destination. Respondents are often disappointed by how difficult it is to move to the West but also do not have sufficient financial capital to build a comfortable life while they are "stuck" in Kampala, particularly if they stay longer than they anticipated. This challenge is exacerbated by the relatively high cost of living in Kampala and the lack of employment opportunities. Respondents rely on remittances from relatives in the West or operating small businesses or microenterprises. However, without start-up capital from savings or remittances it is quite difficult to start and sustain small

businesses. Eritreans in Kampala are also highly vulnerable to theft and have a difficult time obtaining political documentation without needing to pay bribes. Many respondents see Kampala as the best of the bad options for transit destinations within Africa; however, they are generally suspicious of Ugandans and do not desire to assimilate. They also have thwarted expectations due to an absence of livelihood opportunities, protection challenges, and the ubiquitous corruption in the asylum process.

While nearly all respondents experienced difficulties in obtaining livelihoods and political documentation, some experienced greater difficulties than others due to circumstances that predated their arrival in Kampala. Eritreans from outside of Asmara tend to have a much greater uphill climb: they have less education and social ties, less financial capital, and greater difficulty obtaining refugee status. This study also found that there may be a connection between sibling order and migrants' well-being as people who had siblings who already reached the West were more likely to receive critical remittances, advice, and help with onward migration. Males and females both faced different challenges as migrants, which should inform practitioners working with Eritrean migrants. Although migrants' journeys prior to Uganda effected their experiences in Kampala less than originally predicted, they did shape respondents' financial capital and protection risks. Respondents who lived in Israel and South Sudan had greater opportunities to generate financial capital and those who lived in South Sudan had stronger social networks in Kampala. People who arrived from Israel also faced greater protection risks due to the unofficial and unrecognized nature of Israel and Uganda's "voluntary departure" arrangement.

## IMPLICATIONS

This study's findings regarding young adult Eritrean migrants in Kampala draw relevant conclusions for policymakers and practitioners working directly with this population as well as for the field of migration more broadly.

### Increasing Visibility of the Southern Route and NGO Response

Through reviewing available data, this study found that the number of Eritrean migrants spending time in Uganda is increasing, even while there remains a lack of literature on Eritreans who take the Southern migration route. This dearth of information corresponds to a lack of services for this population. This is likely both due to a limited number of organizations operating programs for migrants in Kampala and insufficient Eritrean recruitment.

Among the 71 survey respondents, 88 percent have not benefited from any NGO services in Kampala. Of the seven who have, five attend subsidized English classes at a school that served as a recruitment site for this research. When asked what kind of help from NGOs was most needed, most respondents described wanting to be able to gain refugee status without paying bribes and a need for support in developing sustainable livelihoods. Additionally, many respondents expressed deep concerns regarding the situation in Eritrea, which pushed them to become migrants in the first place and contributes to ongoing fears for family and friends.

Although asylum status is a key concern, only one respondent received legal or protection related support. Staff at Makerere Refugee Law Project (RLP) shared that Eritreans are among the

migrant groups they serve the most;<sup>92</sup> however, few respondents had heard of RLP. This may be because RLP's Old Kampala location is far from where most Eritrean migrants live. However, it is in the same neighborhood as OPM, so lack of outreach may be a more compelling explanation.

Migrants without refugee status have less access to services and aid in Kampala than those with full status. InterAid, the UNHCR-Ugandan government partnership for urban refugees, only assists people recognized as refugees. Its programs are thus not available or advertised to most Eritrean migrants.

### Protecting the Most Vulnerable Migrants

This study found that three sub-categories of migrants are particularly vulnerable: pioneering siblings, unmarried females, and individuals from rural areas. These individuals are often less resilient not due to their journeys or strategies, but their situation in Eritrea prior to departure. As illustrated in the case studies, early life experiences build on one another to create compounding layers of vulnerability, including lack of education, social networks, and access to remittances. These circumstances make it more difficult for these groups to bounce back following shocks or stresses such as theft, injury, and loss of livelihood.

Although global refugee systems ideally identify and support the most vulnerable migrants, this study found that many Eritreans in Kampala fall through the cracks. Migrants who lack savings and strong social ties in Kampala or family in the West have less support in establishing themselves, generating income, and navigating the complex migration institutions in Kampala. They are thus more susceptible to extortion in the asylum process but also less likely to be in a position to finance bribes. Without refugee status, unmarried females, people of rural origins, and pioneering siblings are more invisible to the institutions designed to help them.

### Recognizing and Responding to Risky Migration Decisions

More vulnerable migrants often took more risks during their journey and continue to do so when planning their journey onward from Kampala. For example, respondents who lived in Israel, all but one of whom were males from rural areas without family in Kampala, appear to be more risk-seeking. This pattern appears to apply to respondents from rural areas more broadly as well.

The Director of Africa Monitors described the differences he saw between Eritreans who spent time in Israel and those who didn't: "They [people who came from Israel] are not trusting and impatient. They are young and a lot has happened to them so their expectations are lower and they are very suspicious. They all want to get to the West, they don't plan to stay here."<sup>93</sup>

The director touched on different patterns of behavior between Eritreans who lived in Israel and those who didn't: levels of patience and risk-aversion. Eritreans who lived in Israel try to leave Kampala for the West as soon as possible (Shoham, Bolzman, and Berger 2018). While the majority of Eritreans in Kampala also aim to reach the West, those who have not left Africa generally display a preference for getting there through formal channels and a willingness to wait

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<sup>92</sup> Key Informant Interview 04. Kampala. 3 August 2018.

<sup>93</sup> Key Informant Interview 1. Kampala. 23 July 2018.



in Kampala until the opportunity arises. They chose Kampala because they did not want to take dangerous routes or had changed their minds after failed attempts. For example, Futsum, a shop-owner who tried to cross through Libya twice before going to Kampala shared, “I’m too old and settled now to try that again. I prefer to wait.”<sup>94</sup>

Eritreans who lived in Israel display a higher willingness to take risks and less patience regarding their situation in Kampala. This may be the case because they have already taken a dangerous journey through Sinai. Even electing to participate in the ‘voluntary departure’ program rather than waiting in Israel may show a level of impatience. It could also be because they are men in their twenties traveling independently, they do not have to be concerned about the safety of others and feel pressure to send remittances home. Since they are either single or separated from their partners, they also may be more desperate to move forward with their lives. This explanation could also describe why migrants like Dawit, who came from a rural area and has no financial support, display similar patterns. Eritreans who lived in Israel are only a third of the qualitative sample; however, they made up over half (4 people) of respondents who left Kampala during the study. The only respondents who shared that they were considering leaving Kampala to go back to South Sudan or try to reach the West through Libya were people from rural areas.

These patterns present challenges and opportunities for practitioners. If the findings from this sample are typical of the broader population, then this information can help practitioners better identify which migrants are most vulnerable and at risk for choosing dangerous migration routes. However, NGOs also need to balance a fine line between protection efforts and recognizing migrants’ agency to make their own decisions. One respondent who lived in Israel shared that he had a close relationship with an Israeli NGO until he began to believe that their staff were intervening when they disagreed with migrants’ choices: “I lose all respect for them”, he shared.<sup>95</sup>

### Political Solutions for Political Problems

Ultimately, structural political changes are needed for young Eritreans to secure the financial and political security that drove them to Kampala. Since Eritrea and Ethiopia signed their peace deal, Eritrea has not, as initially discussed, shortened military conscription. In the interim months, more— not fewer—people have fled (Baraaz 2019). Eritrean youth are only likely to stop leaving their country in such large numbers when they can live free from fear of political repression, forced labor, religious persecution, and starvation. It seems unlikely that the Eritrean government will open up and address these issues seriously in the near future. However, when discussing Eritrean migrants it is important that the changes required for a long term solution are not overlooked.

Within Uganda, many migrants’ ability to build a decent quality of life and achieve their goals are also mired by entrenched political structures. Although migrants hope NGOs can help with corruption in the asylum process, this challenge is deeply embedded in the inner workings of the Ugandan government and the functions that this system serves in society. For any efforts to fix

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<sup>94</sup> Respondent Interview 03. Kampala. 21 June 2018.

<sup>95</sup> Respondent Interview 100. July 31 2018.

this system to succeed, it will require a good faith commitment from senior government officials, and significant partnership between the government, UN agencies, and civil society.

Globally, Eritrean migrants' fates are also tied to the current international law regarding migration, its implementation, and the shifting political currents and resettlement policies within host countries. Perhaps nowhere is this more clearly displayed than in Israel, where the deportation of Eritrean and Sudanese migrants has become a touchstone political issue: Israel is not reviewing asylum claims, is withholding a percentage of migrants' income until they agree to leave, and is still encouraging participation in the "voluntary departure" through imprisonment and applying pressure at the Ministry of Interior. Although its 2018 efforts to forcibly depart migrants failed, during the 2019 elections politicians made deportation a campaign promise (Yaron 2019). Until it can move forward with forced deportation, the Israeli government will most likely continue with its "voluntary departure" program to Uganda while the Ugandan government denies its existence. Arguably, the best way to keep Eritreans in Israel safe is by ensuring that they don't come to a "third country" in Africa in the first place. If they do come, it should be through a truly non-coercive assisted voluntary return and rehabilitation program (AVRR). A legitimate AVRR program would be supervised by the IOM and provide participants with legal documentation and protection upon arrival.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

While NGOs like Save the Children may not be well positioned to solve the political and structural problems at the heart of Eritrean migration, they can take steps to alleviate the practical challenges faced by those who have already left Eritrea and are in need of assistance.

Migrants' perspectives and this study's generalized findings inform the following recommendations. Given the political and practical challenges facing young adult Eritrean migrants, these recommendations address advocacy and program design.

### Advocacy Recommendations:

- **Advocate for Interaid to expand its mandate to work with all urban migrants to Uganda, not just those with refugee status.**
- **Investigate instances of corruption within the Office of the Prime Minister in Uganda in regards to asylum seekers.**
  - Any investigation efforts should not simply try to find perpetrators. Instead, it should holistically examine why bribery is occurring and work to create policy solutions to the functions that corruption plays in this system.
- **Support Israeli civil society organizations working to inform migrants about the risks of Israel's "voluntary departure program" and advocating against forced deportations and other laws harming migrants.**
  - Since Israel is unlikely to stop trying to get migrants to leave, advocate for an AVRR program that is truly voluntary and provides proper documentations and protection.

- **Investigate accusations of human rights abuse and violations of international law within Eritrea and of Eritrean security forces operations in neighboring countries**
  - A concerted effort should be made to determine if peace with Ethiopia has actually changed anything inside Eritrea, as this argument is being made in efforts to reject Eritrean asylum cases.

#### Programmatic Recommendations:

- **If Interaid and UNHCR continue to only offer health, education, and livelihood support to people with refugee status, NGOs should fill in the gaps by offering these services to migrants regardless of political status.**
- **Prioritize the most vulnerable migrants for targeted interventions and programming.**
  - Staff should be trained to identify particularly vulnerable migrants, which includes unmarried females, survivors of torture and trafficking, youth who are the first in their family to leave Eritrea, and people from outside of urban epicenters.
  - When working with women staff should be prepared to respond to sexual violence.
  - Staff should respect migrants' agency over their decisions by offering guidance and advice without judgement or actions that can be perceived as controlling.
- **Develop programs to help migrants' gain financial capital needed for microenterprises.** This may reduce dependence on remittances and support livelihoods development.
  - Offer or fund **microloans for microenterprises**. Migrants should be assisted in determining which businesses are most realistic and sustainable.
  - **Support local community institutions in developing Ekubs.**<sup>96</sup> This can increase access to working capital, social capital, and a sense of social cohesion in the Eritrean community. The traditional model should be adjusted to account for the migration context and to ease self-sustainability. This can be achieved through shorter cycles and putting in a procedure for members' who need to leave before the completion of the cycle.
- **Operate or fund financial literacy programs for young adult migrants.**
  - The programs should encourage young migrants to strategize on how to support themselves, particularly since this study found they are likely to be in Kampala for longer than hoped or anticipated.
- **Support youth on the move with navigating asylum process bureaucracy.**

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<sup>96</sup> An Ekub is a form of rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA) indigenous to Eritrea. For further information see Habtom, and Ruys. "Traditional Risk-sharing Arrangements and Informal Social Insurance in Eritrea." Health Policy 80, no. 1 (2007): 218-35.

- Educate youth on the illegality of bribes and organizations, and on access to lawyer and other advocates that can help them if they are being extorted.
  - Help youth with their applications and provide guidance on how to articulate their experiences in Eritrea during asylum interviews.
- **Help local NGOs in Kampala build their capacity and outreach to Eritreans through funding support and guidance with recruitment strategies.**

This study had a small sample size and the recruitment methods utilized do not ensure a representative sample. Therefore, one should be cautious about generalizing these findings to all Eritrean migrants in Kampala without further research. In spite of these limitations, there are reasons to believe that this study's findings should hold true for the larger population of young adult Eritrean migrants in Kampala. The data was triangulated through surveys, informant interviews, and key informant interviews. These methods largely produced complementary findings, particularly regarding employment and business ownership in Kampala and the difficulties experienced by migrants from rural regions of Eritrea. There were two cases in which the quantitative data did not support key findings in the qualitative data: the importance of remittances and the disadvantages of being a pioneering sibling. In both cases, the survey had not been designed to properly explore these questions.

This study's findings regarding Eritrean migrants' in Kampala's livelihood and protection strategies also largely align with existing literature. Specifically, they affirm Kaplan and Omata's conclusions about the importance of a distinct Eritrean economy and remittances in developing livelihoods and obtaining financial capital. It also provides further evidence to Cole's findings regarding the corruption in OPM and the difficulties Eritreans face in obtaining asylum or refugee status without paying bribes. This research contributes to the field by being the first mixed methods study on this issue. It also specifically focused on how migrants' situation in Eritrea and experiences in other countries en route to Kampala shape these trends. This report identified vulnerable groups who may be more prone to shocks and stresses, which should inform political advocacy and programmatic and policy decisions.

## AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Further research should be conducted on how migrants' childhoods in their home countries and experiences impact their livelihood and protection opportunities in their destinations. Researchers should also consider conducting further studies on the Eritrean population in South Sudan and how conflict and economic crisis in South Sudan has influenced Eritrean migration routes and livelihoods. Additionally, since the importance of sibling order only emerged through qualitative interviews, this study was unable to make quantitative conclusions in this specific regard. Additional research should be conducted on the role that sibling order has on migrants' decision-making and access to financial and political capital. Finally, to address the larger political issues, further research is needed on how systems of corruption operate inside OPM and the asylum process more broadly in Uganda.

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## Appendices

### APPENDIX 1: QUANTITATIVE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

#### Chapter 5 Conceptual Framework: Kampala Livelihoods: Remittances and Businesses

	Variable	Definition/ Reason for Inclusion	Variable Type	Options	Possible Measurement Errors
<b>Output</b>	Monthly wealth	Categorical statements roughly measuring financial well- being in Kampala.	Categorical	<p>0 = “Most days, I do not have enough money for food, water, and rent.”</p> <p>1 = “I run out of money to provide everything my household needs before the end of the month.”</p> <p>2 = “At the end of the month, I do not have money left, but I have been able to provide everything my household needs to survive.”</p> <p>3 = “At the end of the month, I do not have money left, but have been able to provide everything my households needs to be comfortable and content.”</p> <p>4 = “At the end of the month, I have money left to save, invest, or pay back loans.”</p> <p>888 = DK</p> <p>999 = RA</p>	As a categorical variable, this question was subjective. Respondents interpreted what it means for them for their household to be able to survive or be content etc.

<b>Input</b>	Remittances	If the respondent is receiving money from outside of Kampala	Dummy	0= No remittances 1= Remittances	This variable did not capture remittance-senders or people who previously received them and no longer need them. Respondents were more likely to ask to skip this question than any other, meaning that people may have been reluctant to share that they get remittances.
	Owens business	If the respondent owned a business or microenterprise, with or without employees, within the last four months (while in Kampala.)	Dummy	0= Not business owner 1= Business owner	
	Employed	If respondent has had full or part time employment or petty trade within the last four months (while in Kampala)	Dummy	0= Not employed 1= Employed	
	Unemployed	If respondent did not have job or own a business within the last four months (while in Kampala).	Dummy	0= Not unemployed 1= Unemployed	
<b>Controls</b>	Age	Current age in months	Continuous		
	Departure Age	Age in months at departure from Eritrea	Continuous		

	Kampala Length	Length of time in Kampala in months	Continuous		For people who were in Kampala, left and came back, this was from their most recent arrival.
	Gender	Gender identity	Dummy	0=Male 1=Female	
	Region of Origin	If respondent is from Zoba Maekel, the region where Asmara is located, or any other region	Dummy	0=All other regions (Zoba Debub, Gash Barka, Southern Red Sea, Northern Red Sea, Zoba Anseba) 1=Zoba Maekel	
	Married	If a respondent is currently married	Dummy	0= No (variable generated from answers including single, engaged, divorced, widowed) 1=Married	

### Chapter 7 Conceptual Framework: Migration Routes and Eritreans' Wellbeing in Kampala

	Variable	Definition/ Reason for Inclusion	Variable Type	Options	Possible Measurement Errors
<b>Output</b>	Monthly wealth	Categorical statements roughly measuring financial well-being in Kampala.	Categorical	See prior chart	As a categorical variable, this question was subjective. Respondents interpreted what it means for them for their household to be able to survive or be content etc.
	Medical Emergency	Answer to the question: "In the case of a medical emergency, do you have someone outside your household in Kampala you could ask for help?"	Dummy	0= No 1= Yes	

	Theft	If the respondent was stolen from at least once in the last year (while living in Kampala)	Dummy	0= No 1= Yes	
	Bribes	If the respondent paid at least one bribe in the last year (while living in Kampala)	Dummy	0= No 1= Yes	Respondents may not have considered certain payments bribes due to how common they are. Therefore, bribes may be underreported. See Chapter 6 for further exploration.
<b>Input</b>	Country: Israel	If the respondent spent more than 1 month in Israel.	Dummy	0= No 1= Yes	
	Country: Sudan	If the respondent spent more than 1 month in Sudan.	Dummy	0= No 1= Yes	
	Country: South Sudan	If the respondent spent more than 1 month in South Sudan	Dummy	0= No 1= Yes	
	Country: Ethiopia	If the respondent spent more than 1 month in Sudan.	Dummy	0= No 1= Yes	
	Country: None	If the respondent went straight to Uganda.	Dummy	0= No 1= Yes	The survey did not include a “none” option in error. This option includes surveys where none was written in and ones where no country boxes were checked.
	Country: Other	If the respondent spent more than one month in UAE, Kenya, or Libya	Dummy	0= No 1= Yes	
<b>Controls</b>	Age	Current age in months	Continuous		
	Departure Age	Age in months at departure from Eritrea	Continuous		

	Kampala Length	Length of time in Kampala in months	Continuous		For people who were in Kampala, left and came back, this was from their most recent arrival.
	Gender	Gender identity	Dummy	0=Male 1=Female	
	Region of Origin	If respondent is from Zoba Maekel, the region where Asmara is located, or any other region	Dummy	0=All other regions (Zoba Debub, Gash Barka, Southern Red Sea, Northern Red Sea, Zoba Anseba) 1=Zoba Maekel	
	Married	If a respondent is currently married	Dummy	0= No (variable generated from answers including single, engaged, divorced, widowed) 1=Married	

### Chapter 8 Conceptual Framework: The Lasting Impact of Migrants' Identities and Origins

	Variable	Definition/ Reason for Inclusion	Variable Type	Options	Possible Measurement Errors
<b>Output</b>	Monthly wealth	Categorical statements roughly measuring financial well-being in Kampala.	Categorical	See prior chart	As a categorical variable, this question was subjective. Respondents interpreted what it means for them for their household to be able to survive or be content etc.

	Medical Emergency	Answer to the question: "In the case of a medical emergency, do you have someone outside your household in Kampala you could ask for help?"	Dummy	0= No 1= Yes	
	Refugee Status	If the respondent has full refugee status in Uganda.	Dummy	0= No 1= Yes	
	Passport	If the respondent has an Eritrean passport.	Dummy	0= No 1= Yes	Respondents discussed counterfeit passports. The survey would not have detected if people said they did or did not have a passport for fake documents.
	Stress Frequency	A likert scale of how often a respondent feels stressed.	Categorical	0=Never 1=Rarely 2= Sometimes 3= Often 4=Always	
	Happiness Frequency	A likert scale of how often a respondent feels Happy.	Categorical	0=Never 1=Rarely 2= Sometimes 3= Often 4=Always	
<b>Input</b>	Gender	Gender identity	Dummy	0=Male 1=Female	
	Region of Origin	If respondent is from Zoba Maekel, the region where Asmara is located, or any other region	Dummy	0=All other regions (Zoba Debub, Gash Barka, Southern Red Sea, Northern Red Sea, Zoba Anseba)	

				1=Zoba Maekel	
	Married	If a respondent is currently married	Dummy	0= No (variable generated from answers including single, engaged, divorced, widowed) 1=Married	
<b>Controls</b>	Age	Current age in months	Continuous		
	Departure Age	Age in months at departure from Eritrea	Continuous		
	Kampala Length	Length of time in Kampala in months	Continuous		For people who were in Kampala, left and came back, this was from their most recent arrival.
	Country: Israel	If the respondent spent more than 1 month in Israel.	Dummy	0= No 1= Yes	
	Education				



APPENDIX 2: QUANTITATIVE INSTRUMENT

Research on Eritrean Migrants in Kampala

Quantitative Instrument

Researcher name(s):

Respondent Code:

Date:

Location:

<p><i>Did you obtain verbal informed consent?</i></p>
---

Quantitative Instrument:

Demographic profile:

D1. How old are you?	888 = DK 999 = RA	<input type="text"/>
D2. What region of Eritrea are you from?	888 = DK 999 = RA	<input type="text"/>
D3. How old were you when you left Eritrea?	888 = DK 999 = RA	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
D4. How old were you when you arrived in Kampala?	888 = DK 999 = RA	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
D5. How long have you been in Kampala?	888 = DK 999 = RA	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
D6. Please list any countries you have stayed in for more than one month other than Eritrea and Uganda:	888 = DK 999 = RA	<hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/>

D6. How many years of education do you have?

- 1 = none
- 2 = some primary
- 3 = completed primary
- 4 = some secondary
- 5 = completed secondary
- 6 = Some university
- 7 = finished university

- 8 = vocational
- 79 = other (write in)
- 888 = DK
- 999 = RA

D7. What is your marital status?

- 1 = married →D7
- 2 = engaged
- 3 = in a partnership
- 4 = single

- 5 = widowed
- 6 = divorced/separated
- (If not married/with a partner →D9)**
- 888 = DK
- 999 = RA

D8. Is your spouse/partner living with you?

- 1 = Yes
- 2 = No
- 888 = DK
- 999 = RA

D9. What language do you speak at home?

- 1 = Tigrinya
- 2 = Tigre
- 3 = English
- 4 = Arabic
- 5 = Other (write in)
- 888 = DK
- 999 = RA

D10. What of the following languages do you know how to speak? (*Indicate all*)

- 1 = Tigrinya
- 2 = Tigre
- 3 = English
- 4 = Arabic

- 5 = Luganda
- 6 = Swahili
- 7 = Other (write in)
- \_\_\_\_\_
- 888 = DK
- 999 = RA


Household:

H1. What neighborhood do you live in?

888 = DK  
999 = RA

H2. How many months have you lived in this residence?

888 = DK  
999 = RA

H3. Currently, how many people are in your household? By household I mean people you share the cost of food with.

888 = DK  
999 = RA

(If more than one →H4-H8)

H4. Did you travel with members of your Eritrean household to Uganda?

1 = Yes  
2 = No  
888 = DK  
999 = RA

H5. Did you already have relatives or close friends in Uganda before you arrived?

1 = Yes  
2 = No  
888 = DK  
999 = RA

H6. How many people under the age of 18 are in your household in Kampala?

888 = DK  
999 = RA

H7. How many rooms are in your home?

888 = DK  
999 = RA

H8. Number of people in your household earn an income?

888 = DK  
999 = RA

H9. Do other households besides yours live in this home?

1 = yes (If yes → H10-H11)  
 2 = no  
 888 = DK  
 999 = RA

--

H10. How many other households share this home with you?

888 = DK  
 999 = RA

--	--

H11. What is your economic relationship with the other households that share your home? (Indicate all)

1= share rent  
 2= Share Income  
 3= share bills (medical, water, electricity)  
 4= other write in \_\_\_\_\_

5= hosted for free  
 6 = no relationship – each household is on their own  
 888 = DK  
 999 = RA


*Livelihood Strategies and Financial Capital:*

L1. What is your income situation in the past 4 months (Indicate all)

- 1 = unemployed, no income
- 2 = own business, employs no one
- 3 = own business, employs at least one person
- 4 = petty trade (inconsistent odd jobs)
- 5 = part-time, employed by individual/small business
- 6 = full-time, employed by individual/small business
- 7 = salaried, works for organization
- 8 = salaried, works for government
- 9 = None

Check Box      Describe activity:


888 = DK

999 = RA

L2. If there are other people in your household, how have they earned income in the past 4 months?  
*(Indicate all)*

Check  
Box

Describe  
activity:

1 = unemployed, no income

2 = own business, employs no one

3 = own business, employs at least one person

4 = petty trade (inconsistent odd jobs)

5 = part-time, employed by individual/small business

6 = full-time, employed by individual/small business

7 = salaried, works for organization

8 = salaried, works for government

888 = DK

999 = RA

L3. Does your household have additional sources of income?  
*(Indicate all)*

Check  
Box

Describe  
source and  
amount:

1 = Financial support from people in Eritrea

- 2 = Financial support from people in other count  
(write in country/ies) \_\_\_\_\_
- 3 = One-time cash transfer from a humanitarian  
organization/ government
- 4 = Ongoing cash transfer from a humanitarian  
organization/ government
- 5 = Real Estate
- 6 = Investments
- 7 = Loans
- 8 = Financial support from others in Uganda
- 888 = DK
- 999 = RA

L4. Which of the following best describes your situation?

- 0 = "Most days, I do not have enough money for food, water, and rent."
- 1 = "I run out of money to provide everything my household needs before the end of the month."
- 2 = "At the end of the month, I do not have money left, but I have been able to provide everything my household needs to survive."

- 3 = "At the end of the month, I do not have money left, but have been able to provide everything my households needs to be comfortable and content."
- 4 = "At the end of the month, I have money left to save, invest, or pay back loans."
- 888 = DK
- 999 = RA

L5. Please select your three biggest expenses in the last 4 months

- 1 = Food
- 2 = Housing
- 3 = Transportation
- 4 = Remittances
- 5 = Theft/bribes

- 6 = Healthcare
- 7 = Childcare
- 8 = Loan repayment
- 9 = Education/professional training
- 10 = Migration
- 888 = DK


999 = RA

--	--

*Institutions and Social Capital:*

I1. Where do you keep most of your money?

- 1 = In my home
- 2 = A bank
- 3 = A community savings group

- 4 = Mobile money
- 5 = I do not have money left at the end of each day
- 888 = DK
- 999 = RA

--

I2. If you needed a loan of 100,000 UGX, where would you go?

- 1 = A bank
- 2 = A community savings group
- 3. A microfinance group
- 4 = A friend/family member from Eritrea who lives in Uganda
- 5 = A friend/family member in Eritrea
- 6 = A friend/family member elsewhere in the world (list country)

- 7 = A migrant from a different country living in Uganda
- 8 = A native Ugandan
- 9 = My mobile money account
- 10= My employer
- 11 = There is nowhere I could go for a loan
- 888 = DK
- 999= RA

--

I3. If you needed a loan of 500,000 UGX, where would you go?

- 
- 1 = A bank
  - 2 = A community savings group
  - 3. A microfinance group
  - 4 = A friend/family member from Eritrea who lives in Uganda
  - 5 = A friend/family member in Eritrea
  - 6 = A friend/family member elsewhere in the world (list country)
- 

- 7 = A migrant from a different country living in Uganda
- 8 = A native Ugandan
- 9 = My mobile money account
- 10 = My employer
- 11 = There is nowhere I could go for a loan
- 888 = DK
- 999 = RA

--

I4. Have you or your household ever received any assistance from the Ugandan government or an aid agency?

- 1 = yes (If yes → I4-I5)
- 2 = no
- 888 = DK
- 999 = RA

--





- 2 Neighborhood committee
- 3 Union
- 4 Political group
- 5 A community savings group
- 6 Sports club


110. I am going to read you a list of people, please tell me if you believe that they are trustworthy, or if you think you have to be careful when dealing with them?

1 = can be trusted  
 2 = have to be careful, not so trustworthy  
 88 = DK  
 999 = RA

1 your neighbors

6 government officials

2 people from Eritrea living in Kampala

7 staff from NGO/donor projects

3 other migrant communities in Kampala

8 court officials

4 native Ugandans

5 police

11. Please share how well the following descriptions fit you:

1 = Never

4 = Often

2 = Rarely

5 = Always

3 = Sometimes

88 = DK

999 = RA

I feel lonely	<input type="text"/>	6	I have a plan to take care of myself	<input type="text"/>
I feel stressed	<input type="text"/>	7	I have a community supporting me	<input type="text"/>
I am afraid for my safety	<input type="text"/>	8	I know where to go for help when I need it	<input type="text"/>
I am happy	<input type="text"/>	9	People in Uganda would know if something bad happened to me	<input type="text"/>
I spend time with friends/family	<input type="text"/>	10	People in Eritrea would know if something bad happened to me	<input type="text"/>

*Political Capital:*

P1. What kind of documentation did you have when you arrived in Uganda?  
(Indicate all)

- 1 = Passport
- 2 = Eritrean ID
- 3 = Blue Card
- 4 = Yellow Card
- 5 = Ugandan refugee/ration card
- 6 = Ugandan travel document

- 7= No identification papers
- 8 = Stateless
- 9 = Temporary Ugandan documents
- 10 = Other (write in) \_\_\_\_\_
- 88 = DK
- 999 = RA


P2. What type of documentation do you have today?  
(Indicate all)

- 1 = Passport
- 2 = Eritrean ID
- 3 = Blue Card
- 4 = Yellow Card
- 5= Ugandan refugee/ration card
- 6 = Ugandan travel document

- 7 = No identification papers
- 8 = Stateless
- 9= Temporary Ugandan documents
- 10 = Documents from other countries (write in) \_\_\_\_\_
- 88 = DK
- 999 = RA

*Protection and Safety:*

S1. In the last year, have you or anyone in your household suffered from theft, or robbery?

- 1 = yes ( If yes → S2-S5)
- 2 = no
- 88 = DK
- 999 = RA


S2. Who committed the theft/robbery?

- 1 = An individual that was familiar to me
- 2 = A group that was familiar to me
- 3 = An unknown individual
- 4= an unknown group
- 5 = Police

- How many times?
- 6 = Government official
- 7 = other (write in) \_\_\_\_\_
- 88 = DK
- 999 = RA

--	--

S3. Did you report the theft/robbery to the authorities?

1 = yes ( If yes→ S4-S5)  
2 = no  
88 = DK  
999 = RA

S5. Did you accomplish your goals through reporting?

1 = yes

2 = no  
88 = DK  
999 = RA

S6. In the last year, have you or anyone in your household suffered from assault?

1 = yes ( If yes→ S7-S10)  
2 = no  
88 = DK  
999 = RA

S7. Who committed the assault?

1 = An individual that was familiar to me  
2 = A group that was familiar to me  
3 = An unknown individual  
4 = an unknown group  
5 = Police

How many times?

6 = Government official  
7 = other (write in) \_\_\_\_\_  
88 = DK  
999 = RA

S8. Did you report the assault to the authorities?

1 = yes  
2 = no  
88 = DK  
999 = RA

S10. Did you accomplish your goals through reporting?

1 = yes

2 = no  
88 = DK  
999 = RA

S11. In the last year, have you or anyone in your household been threatened?

1 = yes ( If yes→ S12)  
2 = no  
88 = DK  
999 = RA

How many times?

S12. Who threatened you/them?

1 = An individual that was familiar to me  
2 = A group that was familiar to me  
3 = An unknown individual  
4 = an unknown group  
5 = Police

6 = Government official  
7 = other (write in)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
88 = DK  
999 = RA

S13. In the last year, have you or anyone in your household suffered from extortion?

1 = yes ( If yes → S14-S16)  
2 = no  
88 = DK  
999 = RA

How many times?

S14. Who committed the extortion?

1 = An individual that was familiar to me  
2 = A group that was familiar to me  
3 = An unknown individual  
4 = an unknown group  
5 = Police

6 = Government official  
7 = other (write in)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
88 = DK  
999 = RA

S15. Did you report the extortion to the authorities?

1 = yes  
2 = no  
88 = DK  
999 = RA

S17. Compared to other neighborhoods in the city, how safe do you think your neighborhood is?

1 = very safe  
2 = safe

3 = unsafe  
4 = very unsafe  
88 = DK  
999 = RA

S18. Compared to your former neighborhood in Eritrea, how safe do you think your neighborhood is?

1 = very safe  
2 = safe

3 = unsafe  
4 = very unsafe  
88 = DK  
999 = RA

S18. If you lived in another country, compared to your former neighborhood in the other country you lived in, how safe do you think your neighborhood is?

1 = very safe	3 = unsafe	<input style="width: 30px; height: 30px;" type="text"/>
2 = safe	4 = very unsafe	
	88 = DK	
	999 = RA	
	List country: _____	

S19. Do you feel discriminated against by government officials?

1 = never	3 = sometimes	<input style="width: 30px; height: 30px;" type="text"/>
2 = occasionally	4 = regularly	
	88 = DK	
	999 = RA	

S20. Do you feel discriminated against by people in Kampala?

1 = never	3 = sometimes	<input style="width: 30px; height: 30px;" type="text"/>
2 = occasionally	4 = regularly	
	88 = DK	
	999 = RA	

Thank you very much for your time and participating, we deeply appreciate it. Do you have any more questions before we finish? As a reminder, all of our contact information is on this sheet of paper [share participant information sheet].

Would you be willing to sit for a more informal conversation and share more of your story? We would very much like to have a longer conversation with you about your experiences in Kampala on another day if you would be interested.

Additionally, would you potentially be interested in coming to a community discussion regarding findings of the study?

If so, please leave me your phone number on this separate piece of paper. I will not share this phone number with anybody and it isn't connected to your name as you can see [Take out paper with spaces for coded IDs and corresponding phone numbers]. Would you like to schedule a tentative time now? You can always change your mind.

Thanks again!

## APPENDIX 3: QUALITATIVE INSTRUMENTS

### Save the Children Research on Eritrean Migrants in Kampala

#### Qualitative Instrument

Researcher name(s):

Respondent Code:

Date:

Location:

*Did you obtain verbal informed consent?*

#### Verbal Consent (in Tigrinya):

Hi there! [If already took survey add: It is wonderful to see you again and I deeply appreciate your time. I am going to review some details about the study with you once again and make sure it all feels clear.] My name is Erica and I am a student researcher from Tufts University in the United States working with Save the Children to understand the experiences of Eritreans living in Uganda. Unfortunately, other than this cup of coffee/tea/juice, we are not able to offer you any compensation and you will not directly benefit from this research. However, this research can help people better understand the experiences and needs of Eritreans in Kampala. We hope that this study will lead humanitarian organizations to better respond to these needs and develop programming and that it can shape policies and help those who wish to advocate for migrants.

Although we will share the findings of the project with different organizations, everything that you say is confidential and will not be linked to you in any way. We will not ask you for your name or to write it down and will not share stories or information that can be easily linked to you. Although we are taking many precautions, there is always a small chance someone will find the data – but even if they do it will not have your name or contact information.

Taking part in this research study is entirely your choice. You can decide to refuse to participate in this study. If you decide to participate in this study, you can then choose to stop taking part in the study at any time for any reason. If you refuse to participate in the study or stop being in this study, it will not have any negative effect on you. If you do choose to participate, there will be an opportunity to come to a community discussion about the findings if that interests you.

If you decide to participate in an interview, we will ask you questions about your background, your experience living in Kampala, your community, your status in Uganda, your sources of income and financial situations, and your sense of safety. The interview should take one hour. You can stop the survey at any time for any reason and can choose to skip individual questions if they make you uncomfortable, bring up bad memories, or if you do not want to share the information.

#### Participant Consent

Do you have any questions based on what I have explained to you? \_\_\_\_\_yes \_\_\_\_\_no

1a. Are you willing to participate in the study? \_\_\_yes \_\_\_no

If no (to 1a), thank you very much for your time.

1b. If yes, do you understand everything I have explained to you about the fact that you are free to

participate or not in this study, you can ask questions at any time, and that at any time you can refuse to answer any question or stop the survey? \_\_\_\_\_yes \_\_\_\_\_no

1c. If yes, do you feel you have been fully informed of the study with its risks and benefits, and do you

agree to participate in this interview and the study? \_\_\_\_\_yes \_\_\_\_\_no

2. Would you be comfortable with us recording this conversation? We are only recording it so we can catch every detail of what you say. We will delete it after we write up notes and we will not share it with anybody outside of our research team. \_\_\_\_\_yes \_\_\_\_\_no

Signature of Investigator:

Date:

## Qualitative Instrument:

### *Demographic profile:*

- Age/Gender
- Place of origin in Eritrea (ie, rural location)
- Location at present
- Marital status/children
- How old were you when you left Eritrea?
- What was your life like before you left Eritrea? (Student/ employed/ unemployed etc.?)
- Can you describe your life in Eritrea?
- Did you choose to come to Uganda? If so why Uganda over other places?
- Did you live in any other countries other than Eritrea and Uganda? Can you share more about your life there?

### *Arriving in Kampala:*

- How long have you been here?
- Where in Kampala do you live? What kind of housing do you live in?
- How much money did you have when you arrived?



- Did you come alone or with other people? If with others, who? Are they still here? Are you in touch with them? Why or why not? If they left, why and where did they go?
- Can you tell me about your first week in Kampala? Your first month?
- How did you find a place to live when you first arrived? Who did you live with?
- Who is in your “household” here (people you share a pot of food with)? How do you think of your household here?

#### *Livelihood Strategies/Financial Capital*

- How long did the money you brought with you last? How did you spend it?
- What are the different sources of activity you do here for income?
- Of the activities you do today, what is the most important one for your income?
- How did you get this work, or get started in this work?
- How did you support yourself when you first arrived here?
- How much do you earn now in a day?
- What are your main expenses? Is what you make adequate to cover these expenses?
- Do you manage to save any money?
- Do you send any support back home or to people in other countries? If so, what?
- Do you get any support from home or in other countries? If so, what?
- How do you travel to/and from your work?
- How do you feel about your work here in town? Is this a good job? Why or why not?
- How do you feel that this work compares with the work you were doing before you moved here, or the opportunities you had in Eritrea?
- How do you feel that this work compares with the work you were doing before you moved here, or the opportunities you had in other stops on your migration journey?
- What livelihoods do the other people in your household (household here in town) do?

#### *Social Capital*

- How would you describe your social network here? Who do you spend most of your time with?
- Do you have any social connections with other Eritreans? If so, what are your interactions with them?
- Do you have any social connections with Ugandans? If so, what are your interactions with them?
- Do you have any social connections with migrants from other countries? If so, what are your interactions with them?
- What does community mean to you? Do you feel like you have a community here?
- If you need a loan of 100,000 UGX is there someone you could ask? Who?
- If you couldn't live where you are currently living, is there someone you can stay with?
- Do people ever ask you for help? If so, who and what?
- What do you do in your free time?
- Do you have contact with family or friends in Eritrea? If yes, in what form (ie, phone calls, visits, etc)? how often? If no, why is this the case?

- Do you have contact with family or friends from Eritrea who now live in other countries? If yes, in what form (ie, phone calls, visits, etc)? how often? If no, why is this the case?

### *Personal Capital*

- What is your highest level of schooling? Where did this schooling take place and why did you stop?
- Have you had any training in a trade or craft from outside of school?
- Does your training or schooling relate to your current work?
- What languages do you speak and where/how did you learn them?
- Have these languages helped you at all in Uganda?

### *Political Capital*

- What kind of documents did you have documenting your status when you arrived in Uganda?
- What kind of documents do you have now?
- How did you get this documentation?
- Do you ever feel that you are discriminated against here? For what reason?

### *Institutions*

- Do you get any assistance here in town? What sort? Who provides?
- Are you a part of any community organizations?
- Have you ever gotten support from any humanitarian organizations?
- Where do you go for help if you feel sick or need a doctor?
- Where do you keep your money?
- If you had a problem such as a dispute with your neighbor, to whom would you go for assistance?
- If you had a problem such as being the victim of a theft or assault, to whom would you go for assistance?

### *Expectations and experiences*

- What did you expect your life would be like in Kampala?
- How is it similar or different from what you expected?
- What has been the best part? The most difficult part?
- Have you been a victim of theft or violence?
- What do you think would have made your experience here easier or helped with [the thing that was named as the most difficult part]?
- Would you recommend that other Eritreans currently in Eritrea move here? Why or why not?

- Would you recommend that other Eritreans who are currently elsewhere in the world move here? Why or why not?
- Do you think most Eritreans you know here would feel similarly to you? Why or why not?
- How long do you plan to stay here? If you plan on going elsewhere, where might you go?
- Do you know of Eritreans who left Uganda? If yes, do you know where they wanted to go and what their experience has been?

Thank you very much for your time and participating, we deeply appreciate it. Do you have any more questions or anything to add before we finish? As a reminder, all of our contact information is on this sheet of paper [hand out participant information sheet].

Would you potentially be interested in coming to a community discussion regarding findings of the study?

If so, please leave me your phone number on this separate piece of paper. I will not share this phone number with anybody and it isn't connected to your name as you can see [Take out paper with spaces for coded IDs and corresponding phone numbers]. I will only use it to contact you to schedule a time for another conversation or invite you to the community discussion. You can always change your mind and there is no obligation to attend.

#### APPENDIX 4: CHAPTER 4 REGRESSIONS

**Table i. Ordinarily Least Squares Regression of Departure Age, Region of Origin and Gender**

	Model 1: Crude Model
Dependent Variable	Age of Departure (in years)
Urban (vs. rural)	2.645** (0.131 – 5.160)
Female	3.961*** (1.402 – 6.498)
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.212
N	70

## APPENDIX 5: CHAPTER 5 REGRESSIONS

Table ii. Ordered Logit Regression of Monthly Wealth and Unemployment

	Model 1: Crude Model	Model 2: Adjusted Model
Dependent Variable	Monthly Wealth	Monthly Wealth
Unemployed (vs. has livelihood)	-0.958** (-1.892 - -0.0213)	-0.342 (-1.434 - 0.750)
Urban (vs. rural)		3.143*** (1.766 - 4.520)
Female		-0.921 (-2.069 - 0.226)
Age (in years)		0.316*** (0.105 - 0.528)
Length of time in Kampala (in months)		-0.012 (-0.038 - 0.014)
Age of Departure (in years)		-0.232*** (-0.418 - -0.0479)
Married (vs. other relationship status)		--0.628 (-1.755 - 0.498)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.0214	0.164
N	71	70

Note: \*significant at  $\alpha= 0.1$  \*\*significant at  $\alpha= 0.05$  \*\*\*significant at  $\alpha= 0.01$

Table iii. Ordered Logit Regression of Monthly Wealth and Employment

	Model 1: Crude Model
Dependent Variable	Monthly Wealth
Has job (vs. unemployed or business owner)	0.465 (-0.459 - 1.390)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.0049
N	71

## APPENDIX 6: CHAPTER 7 REGRESSIONS

Table iv. Logit Regression of Remittance Access and Migration Destinations

	Sudan	Ethiopia	South Sudan	Israel	Straight to Uganda	Other Countries
<b>Dependent variable</b>	Remittances	Remittances	Remittances	Remittances	Remittances	Remittances
<b>Country of Interest</b>	0.313 (-0.657 - 1.283)	0.264 (-0.821 - 1.349)	0.780 (- 1.147 - 1.303)	0.952 (-0.496 - 2.401)	0.638 (-1.251 - 1.251)	1.450 (-0.797- 3.699)
<b>Pseudo R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.004	0.002	0.000	0.019	0.000	0.002
<b>N</b>	71	71	71	71	71	71
Note: significant at $\alpha= 0.1$ **significant at $\alpha= 0.05$ ***significant at $\alpha= 0.01$						

**Table v. Logit Regression of Support in a Medical Emergency and Migration Destinations**

	Sudan	Ethiopia	South Sudan	Israel	Straight to Uganda	Other Countries
<b>Dependent variable</b>	Medical Emergency	Medical Emergency	Medical Emergency	Medical Emergency	Medical Emergency	Medical Emergency
<b>Country of Interest</b>	-1.050** (-2.022 - 0.076)	-1.344** (-2.515 - -0.174)	1.274* (-0.132- 2.681)	-0.538 (-1.902 - 0.824)	1.379* (-0.116 - 2.771)	-0.062 (-1.736 - 1.611)
<b>Pseudo R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.047	0.057	0.037	0.006	0.000	0.000
<b>N</b>	70	70	70	70	70	70
Note: significant at $\alpha= 0.1$ **significant at $\alpha= 0.05$ ***significant at $\alpha= 0.01$						

**Table vi. Logit Regression of Bribery and Migration Destinations**

	Sudan	Ethiopia	South Sudan	Israel	Straight to Uganda	Other Countries
<b>Dependent variable</b>	Bribes	Bribes	Bribes	Bribes	Bribes	Bribes
<b>Country of Interest</b>	-0.356 (-1.301- 0.588)	0.826 (-1.292 - 1.127)	-0.082 (- 1.292 - 1.127)	0.438 (-0.824 - 1.902)	-1.421* (-3.055 - 0.212)	0.818 (-0.797 - 2.585)
<b>Pseudo R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.005	0.002	0.000	0.006	0.000	0.037
<b>N</b>	70	70	70	70	70	70
Note: significant at $\alpha= 0.1$ **significant at $\alpha= 0.05$ ***significant at $\alpha= 0.01$						

**Table vii. Logit Regression of Bribery and Migration Destinations**

	Sudan	Ethiopia	South Sudan	Israel	Straight to Uganda	Other Countries
<b>Dependent variable</b>	Theft	Theft	Theft	Theft	Theft	Theft
<b>Country of Interest</b>	-0.488 (-1.431 - 0.454)	0.730 (-0.387 - 1.849)	0.709 (-0.151 - 2.629)	0.307 (-1.054 - 1.668)	-0.613 (-1.979 - 0.753)	-0.909 (-2.675 - 0.857)
<b>Pseudo R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.010	0.017	0.036	0.002	0.008	0.011
<b>N</b>	71	71	71	71	71	71
Note: significant at $\alpha= 0.1$ **significant at $\alpha= 0.05$ ***significant at $\alpha= 0.01$						