

Pastoralist Community Harmonization in the Karamoja Cluster:
Taking it to the Next Level
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1. Executive Summary

This assessment was undertaken at the request of OAU/IBAR's CAPE Unit and the Feinstein International Famine Center, which supports the Unit's work through seconded personnel and other contributed resources.¹ The study focuses on the impacts of the Pastoral Community Harmonization Initiative (PCHI), now in its fourth year (Section 2 below.) The assessment is based on a week's participation in PCHI peace crusades in Sudan and northeast Kenya and on three weeks of report-reading and interviews with government officials, partner organizations, and others in Nairobi. More than 75 people were interviewed from some three dozen organizations (see Annex 2) and some two dozen reports consulted (Annex 3).

The resulting review gives PCHI high marks for its work on both the animal health and conflict resolution fronts, and in developing synergies between them. It also flags several weaknesses needing attention. With effective PCHI activities taking place in the field (Section 3) and excellent collaborative arrangements in place in Nairobi and elsewhere (Section 4), the stage is set for a significant scaling up of current PCHI work. A wide variety of options exist for taking activities to the next level (Section 5), with a number of recommendations offered by the author (Section 6). Some concluding reflections place this review in the broader context of the experiences of other humanitarian, development, and conflict management initiatives (Section 7).

Discussions already under way between and among OAU/IBAR, the OAU's Conflict Management Centre (OAU/CMC), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) hold promise of a significant expansion and institutionalization of current PCHI efforts. *The governments of the region, donors, and practitioners alike express a strong commitment to pairing continued work in the animal health sector with additional complementary efforts at the national and regional as well as local levels. That is the central recommendation of this review.* (Section 6)

The CAPE unit plans to circulate this study widely among its local, national, and regional partners and to potential donors to the next phase of its work. I hope that it will stimulate discussions of various options for the next phase in PCHI operations.

The Harmonization Initiative, one of several activities in East Africa facilitated by Tufts University (see Figure 1), is the focus of this assessment. While identifying options and making recommendations, this study does not address the capacity of the University to meet the needs identified.

2. Background

The Community-Based Animal Health and Participatory Epidemiology Unit (CAPE) of the InterAfrican Bureau for Animal Resources (IBAR) of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was founded in 1989.² An early initiative was the introduction of a heat-stable vaccine for rinderpest, developed by Tufts University veterinarian Jeff Mariner, to pastoralist areas in Africa.³

CAPE's vaccination work became part of a broader and pre-existing OAU/IBAR effort to make community-based animal health care delivery systems more available and sustainable. (Figure 2 provides a chronology of major events in the evolution of these activities.) Key features in the CAPE approach included developing and promoting policies in favor of poor pastoralist populations, seeking to reduce their chronic vulnerability by introducing a sustainable supply of veterinary drugs, training community-based animal health workers, and improving the access of pastoralists to livestock markets. CAPE is part of OAU/IBAR's Pan-African Programme for the Control of Epizootics (PACE). (Figure 1 provides an organigram of institutional relationships.)

Geographically and culturally isolated, with a harsh and uncertain climate, and declining natural resources, the Karamoja area has been disadvantaged, exploited and disturbed for over a century. Political crises of the seventies compounded by famines of the eighties and conflicts in Sudan and Somalia have turned a state of chronic low-grade insecurity into one of out-of-control lawlessness and civil disintegration. Banditry and cattle rustling are both a consequence and cause of the economic collapse, and of the spiraling distress and poverty now affecting the Cluster. Many hundreds of people have been killed, and thousands more have lost their livelihoods or been forced to migrate.⁴

PCHI Second International Meeting, 2001

Efforts to improve the quality of veterinary services, crucial to the welfare of pastoralists whose livelihoods are contingent on the health of their livestock, were routinely impeded by numerous conflicts in the region. Many were between and among the 14 tribes in the Karamoja Cluster, a semi-arid area spanning northwest Kenya, northeast Uganda, southeast Sudan, and southwest Ethiopia. Tribal conflicts were complicated by the civil war in the Sudan, which flared up anew in the mid-1980s, and by ethnic tensions in Uganda, Somalia, and Ethiopia, as well as by interstate tensions in the region. Playing out at the community level, conflicts of all sorts, expressed in traditional cattle raiding but now with modern automatic weapons, worsened pastoralists' vulnerability and frustrated gains made in the livestock sector.

The Pastoralist Community Harmonization Initiative (PCHI) was a conflict-oriented intervention developed in response to pastoralists whose confidence had been won by veterinarians from what is now CAPE, who for years had been working across tribal and national lines. In 1998, tribal leaders told the veterinarians, "You're wasting your time with rinderpest work as long as the guns are still roaring." "We accepted the challenge," recalls Darlington Akabwai, who became the field-based point person for CAPE's efforts to assist local communities in silencing, or at least in restraining, the guns. "You can't

do much without peace,” confirms Acting Director of OAU/IBAR, Dr. J.T. Musiimi, “especially in harsh remote areas which are conflict-prone and where few government services are available.”⁵ For reasons of insecurity, livestock owners were corralling their cattle, thereby exposing their livestock to new diseases.

Launched in 1999 with a modest six-month grant from USAID’s Regional Economic Development Services Office (REDSO), the PCHI began with a series of meetings drawing together at the community level the parties in the various Karamoja conflicts. The meetings then broadened to include wider geographical areas within the Cluster and a wider set of actors, including, in later stages, district and national politicians. Cattle raiding, which undermined progress in animal health, is now treated by people in pastoralist communities where CAPE has worked as a “disease.”

Currently in its fourth year, PCHI has become, by many accounts, a signature program of OAU/IBAR and certainly of CAPE. PCHI is credited with brokering a number of peace agreements, including one between the Merille and Turkana tribes in September 1999, which lasted until 2001, when violence flared anew. In that instance, the initial agreement was soon reaffirmed and the reinstated peace has lasted until February 2002.

In areas served by PCHI, available data appear to indicate a reduction in cattle-raiding, an expansion of grazing land and water access, an opening of previously insecure roads, and increased livestock trade over time. Several communities have credited the PCHI with facilitating incremental gains in the years 1999, 2000, 2001. An Ethiopian government agricultural official, for example, observes that improved security between the Merilles (an Ethiopian tribe) and the Turkanas (a largely Kenyan tribe) contributed to a steady improvement in the rate of successfully implemented livestock development projects of 60, 70, and 72 percent respectively. Peace facilitated by the PCHI between the Jie and its neighbors is reported to have made for rates of 20, 40, and 99 percent project completion for those three years respectively. A chief near Lokichoggio, Kenya gave figures of 55, 65, and 75 for the successful completion veterinary, borehole, and health projects.⁶

Paralleling PCHI’s growing credibility have been other significant developments with a bearing on the lives and livelihoods of the region’s pastoralists. “Thanks to peace,” rinderpest has been largely eradicated, with the result that vaccination programs are now being replaced by monitoring and surveillance activities. A wider set of actors has given higher priority to conflict (whether its prevention, management, resolution, or transformation), including civil society groups, platforms, and international donor and partner organizations. The reduction in conflicts has spurred a wide array of peacebuilding activities. Conversely, aid activities in many sectors, including but not limited to veterinary services, are now being framed as points of entry into the conflict arena.

In January 2002, the seven governments of the region that make up the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) agreed in principle to establish a Conflict Early Warning and Response (CEWARN) and national conflict early warning and response mechanisms (CEWERUs).⁷ Within Sudan, rapprochement in January 2002 between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudan People’s

Defence Force (SPDF) promises a reduction in south-south war. There have been other positive, if embryonic, signs of movement toward a negotiated settlement of the north-south conflict. The working group on Planning for Peace of the IGAD Partners Forum will meet in March 2002 to review a draft action plan to be implemented following the eventual adoption of an interim or permanent peace agreement in the Sudan.

The present assessment was based on more than 75 interviews with persons involved in and/or familiar with the PCHI, ranging from pastoralists themselves to government officials, from indigenous and international NGOs to local and expatriate veterinarians. (See Annex 2) The study also draws on the extensive literature available on the Karamoja Cluster, its peoples and its conflicts, and on the interactions with the region by national and international actors. (See Annex 3) The research was carried out during a four-week period in January–February 2002. Six days were spent observing PCHI harmonization activities between Turkana and Toposa communities in the field.

“Livestock ownership has major cultural significance in many societies, whether rural or urban, and features strongly in local perceptions of wealth and poverty. In areas with low rainfall, livestock are particularly important for human survival. When lack of water prevents crop production, livestock continue to convert natural vegetation into nutritious foods for people. Consequently, livestock are the main assets of pastoralist communities in Africa.

The pastoralist population of sub-Saharan Africa is estimated at more than 50 million people while Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Uganda support around 20 million pastoralists. Pastoralists usually inhabit semi-arid and arid lands, and typically, they derive at least 50% of their food and income from their livestock. The other common feature of pastoral groups and the key to understanding their way of life, is mobility. Movement is essential for pastoralists because low and erratic rainfall in dryland areas causes marked spatial and temporal variations in the grazing resource on which livestock depend.”

OAU/IBAR CAPE Brochure⁸

Returning to East Africa after a decade, I am struck by the multi-level and multi-layered conflicts and the variegated responses to them. Conflict prevention, management, resolution, transformation and, in a broader sense, peacebuilding have become a cross-cutting concern of host and donor governments and of indigenous and international organizations. USAID and other donors now require that projects include a “conflict vulnerability assessment” and suggest that root causes, proximate causes, and immediate causes of conflict be identified.

In 1989, when I led a study of Operation Lifeline Sudan, then in its first year (my initial assignment in the Sudan was in Juba in 1972-73), UNICEF officials told a delegation of Sudanese church leaders, who urged moving beyond relief to address the North-South conflict itself, that OLS did not have peace in its mandate.⁹ While the Sudan’s civil war continues to take a heavy toll,¹⁰ myriad organizations today do indeed have peace in their mandates. *The issue is no longer whose business conflict is but rather how to address conflict in its various manifestations effectively. The time is ripe for consolidating work*

in this daunting area by forging more strategic effective links between development activities and peace.

3. The View from the Field

Attendance at a February round of peace crusades provided a unique opportunity to assess the dynamics of harmonization work throughout the Karamoja region. I attended meetings in three different communities during the period Feb. 7-13: two in Toposa areas at Naliel and Kalacha, Sudan, and one in a Turkana area at Koyesa in northeast Kenya. A fourth in the series had already taken place at New Site in Sudan, also a Toposa area, by the time I arrived.

Tensions had been running high throughout the Karamajong Cluster in the wake of a major outbreak of violence on December 21, 2001 during which 130 Toposa and 30 Turkana had been killed. The four meetings laid the groundwork for a larger gathering which would take place at Lopotikol, the site of the December incident. The consensus that emerged from the meetings was that in the coming weeks, both groups should meet at the scene of the bloodshed and, in traditional fashion, bury the instruments of war and seal their commitment to peace with the slaughtering of a white bull.

Each of the four individual meetings was emotionally charged. Each began with the host community welcoming the visitors, who came to hostile surroundings bearing peace, and then reviewing earlier incidents that had transpired. In each instance, comments by an elder or other member of the community (for example, a Toposa), would be answered by an opposite number (a Turkana). “Let everywhere be peaceful, let all the bad things disappear,” began an elderly Turkana pastoralist in the meeting at Koyesa overlooking the plains of the Illemi Triangle and toward the mountains bordering Sudan. “Let peace be in these mountains of war,” responded his Toposa counterpart. “Bless this gathering, and Kenya and Sudan.”

And so the dialogue proceeded, back and forth for hours, laced with anger and grief, suspicion and hope, songs, dances, and prayers. Women from each community made their own eloquent statements and moved the crowd to express their emotions through singing. “These raids are worthless,” lamented one song, “costing us livestock, husbands, and children.” At Koyesa, one of the Toposa confessed to having been involved in the December raids, apologizing for having broken his own people’s traditions. A young Turkana who had lost his parents in earlier raids said he was willing to leave his gun and graze his livestock peacefully on the mountainside in the distance if his adversaries would do the same.

While the dynamics of each meeting played out along different lines, each session ended with a sense of reduced tensions and the beginnings of rapprochement. “Once they’ve vomited out their anger,” explained PCHI’s Dr. Darlington Akabwai, the key figure in orchestrating the encounters, “there is a possibility of reconciliation,” although there are no guarantees. “Something that was burning is cooling down,” noted one of the participants. “Connectors” between the tribes won out over “dividers.” “Turkana and Toposa,” asked one of the Toposa leaders, “Why are we fighting? We are one people sharing grassland and water.” The conflicts were real, but so were the resolutions and plans made.

One key element in the success of the meetings was their careful planning by PCHI in collaboration with, and at the invitation of, local community leaders, government administrative authorities, and NGOs, and community-based organizations (CBOs) such as the Diocese of Torit and the Toposa Development Association. The number of those who played key roles in the gatherings (in addition to the total of perhaps a thousand community participants) was an astounding 80 persons. These included 10 Toposa men and 2 Toposa women whom the organizers transported to Kenya, and 19 Turkana men and 11 Turkana women who made the trip to the Sudan sites. Security personnel provided by the Sudanese or Kenyan authorities, depending on where the meetings were held, ranged from three to 10.

Also playing key roles were one SPLM commissioner, 2 district officials (one Kenyan, one Sudanese), a representative of the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (the social services wing of the SPLM) and one of the Kenyan Department of Social Services. There were 7 chiefs from Kenya and a large contingent from Sudan. PCHI itself arranged for 5 vehicles, a cooking and kitchen crew of five, and a rapporteur who would help create written reports for widespread dissemination. Of particular importance was the presence of a video cameraman who filmed the proceedings for editing and later use. In the evening after the meetings, the staff showed videos to hundreds of villagers of all ages, reinforcing the message of peace and exposing remote villages for the first time to a new medium.

Based on my participation in these events and on my interviews with many of those involved both in the field and in Nairobi, I would single out three ingredients of PCHI effectiveness: building on already established trust at the community level, the use of livestock needs as an effective point of entry into peacemaking and peacebuilding activities, and the quality of the PCHI team and those associated with it. Each of these deserves comment in the context of the overarching recommendation below that current field activities be taken to the next level.

First, trust established at the community level

As noted above, the PCHI from the outset responded to, and built upon, the needs expressed by local communities for a resolution of conflicts that impeded the effectiveness of veterinary services. The immediate proposal came from two respected Turkana and Toposa seers, who, in conversations with Tufts' veterinarians in March 1999, requested that the two vets arrange a meeting between them. The seers believed that while "you won't make much progress in eradicating disease as long as the conflict persists," the two of them could, through a process of community meetings, arrange a durable peace. "The veterinary program," recalls Akabwai, "gave us our original connection with local decision-makers," including, along with the seers, key elders and women.

Based on firm links to community leaders, the PCHI methodology for delivery of veterinary services, initially in South Sudan and the Afar region of Ethiopia, involved identification, training, and utilization of community-based animal health workers

(CAHWs) “to treat or prevent a limited range of animal-health problems that were identified by livestock keepers.”¹¹ While communities gave top priority to rinderpest vaccination, “CAHWs were also trained and equipped to deal with problems such as internal and external parasites, wounds, miscellaneous bacterial diseases and ... trypanosomiasis ...”¹²

PCHI’s approach has evolved over time. Many of the communities in which it has worked have by now received an initial round of livestock vaccinations and other veterinary services. However, as discussed below, these have proved difficult to sustain through community-based animal health workers, community-level management and oversight committees, and revolving funds to help underwrite the costs of veterinary services. As a result, CAHWs are now approached more explicitly as entrepreneurial agents as well being members of individual communities. NGO and other partners, too, are coming to embrace a more explicitly private sector approach, though this is often hard to implement in conflict settings.

Some observers have questioned the extent of community ownership of “community based” veterinary services in PCHI itself. Is the community an informant rather than a participant? Are those with veterinary services to offer “stacking the deck” in asking communities to identify priorities? Saed on interview with pastoralists and observation of their interactions with PCHI personnel, there is no doubt in my mind that the activities break new ground in community empowerment. PCHI has taken the involvement of local communities, established in the Nineties by the successful rinderpest vaccination campaign and other veterinary services, to a new level.

A week in the Karamoja Cluster confirms that key decisions regarding the process of conflict resolution are made by the pastoralists themselves, and that these are driven by an overriding concern for the health of their own livestock. A common theme of the week was that having done effective battle against livestock diseases, the major remaining disease is that of war. In addition, as noted in an interview with a donor in Nairobi, the process of community involvement is indeed “galvanizing local level demands for better services” and promoting the rights of pastoralists, the mark of any effective development effort.

Second, livestock as a point of entry into harmonization work

There is an undisputed linkage between conflicts in the Horn and the importance of livestock. The need of pastoralists for access to grasslands and waterpoints and the role of livestock in the dowries of young men seeking brides is clear. As PCHI’s Akabwai, himself a Ugandan national, is fond of observing, “Without peace the veterinarians can do nothing.”¹³ In fact, peace crusades not only represent an activity by which local communities take charge of their own affairs. They also serve “to create a peaceful environment that will enable veterinary staff to treat homebred livestock [e.g., cattle not acquired through raids] so that the animals can reproduce and improve the welfare of the owner instead of increasing stocks through raids.”¹⁴ The indispensable foundation for both sets of activities, however, is basic technical competence in veterinary science and intimate familiarity with the people and traditions of the area.

“The best friend of a livestock owner is the vet. By treating and keeping the animals alive, the vet literally keeps the family of the livestock owner alive.”

Akeno Lorabok, Turkana Elder¹⁵

“Livestock is the perfect vehicle to hang peacebuilding on,” reflects Sally Crafter of VSF-Belgium. Veterinary medicines are cheap and easily administered, have an immediate impact, and can serve as the core of an operational livestock service than may be set up in a matter of months. They also address an overriding priority for pastoralist communities.¹⁶ Other agencies have chosen other points of entry such as human health services, small arms, or HIV/Aids awareness. While these are clearly also local priorities, the process of making an impact tends to be more complex and time-consuming in those areas than in the animal health sector.

From their own point of entry, the peace crusades and other vehicles for conflict resolution among pastoralists move on to identify issues well beyond the livestock sector and animal disease control. These include questions of natural resources management, the progressive degradation of the environment, land ownership and tenure, the need for livestock markets, political marginalization, and other factors that keep pastoralists poor and marginalized. In fact, one of the elements in PCHI’s success has been the framing of its livestock focus within a broader economic and socio-political context. Other organizations working, for example, to preserve the fragile natural resources base, thus have a programmatic interest in the success of the harmonization work.

At its second international meeting, held in Mbale, Uganda in May 2001, a diverse group of participants from various communities and walks of life developed specific action plans, country by country, to address the priorities identified by the meeting: reversing pastoralist marginalization, controlling animal disease and optimizing natural resource use; improving governance; better communications; [and] empowering women as peace-makers.”¹⁷ Participants also identified “link organizations” that were tasked with follow-up responsibilities in their specific areas of competence. Thus while PCHI does less hands-on veterinary service today, its use of animal health and its enabling environment still provides an essential point of entry into its harmonization work.

Third, the quality of the PCHI team and its associates

The PCHI team, under the direction of Tim Leyland in his capacity as head of the CAPE Unit, is respected by its peers, both as accomplished veterinarians and as effective project managers. The implementation and evolution of the harmonization program since its design by Leyland and his colleagues in 1999, the resources that have been marshalled from donor agencies, and the respect in which it is held by governments, NGOs, and local level participants testifies to the quality of its leadership. PCHI staff, which are

supported by others at PACE, OAU-IBAR, and Tufts, are funded by REDSO, DFID, and CRDA. (See Figure 3)

Perhaps the most visible and best-known aspect of the PCHI program today is the work of Dr. Darlington Akabwai. Present at PCHI's creation and a guiding spirit in its evolution, Akabwai has demonstrated the importance of field-level presence, initially using his veterinary skills to provide animal health services and more recently drawing on his knowledge of the Karamoja Cluster and his credibility as a veterinarian to facilitate harmonization work. The dedication and energy of his colleagues in the field, from media personnel to cooks and drivers, is also impressive.

While PCHI's own emphasis has shifted in the past year or so away from the direct provision of services, it has maintained links to the livestock sector through animal disease surveillance mechanisms established by CAPE. A survey currently being carried out by Yacob Aklilu, an OAU/IBAR economist also provided by Tufts, is examining current patterns of pastoralist livestock trade and what might be done by governments to facilitate and regularize it so as to improve pastoralist livelihoods. His work and the implementation in the area of livestock marketing and certification could have a significant positive impact on the livelihoods of the region's pastoralists.

In sum, the PCHI team is characterized by a high level of professionalism and energy, matched with a pragmatic approach to policy and programming. Its responsiveness to needs at the field level, its availability to grass roots communities, and its sensitivity to their cultures and indigenous knowledge have also contributed to its success. In keeping with the earlier conversations with two tribal seers, the Harmonization Initiative has explored the utility of ethnoveterinary resources and informed itself about local traditions of livestock management and environmental stewardship. It has built on local traditions of problem-solving, strengthening its harmonization work through the mechanism of women's peace crusades (*alokita*). In April 2001, the Initiative first harnessed the tradition of women uniting to express a shared concern to the issue of cattle raiding. Subsequently, women and youth have played major roles in reducing conflicts in the Cluster.¹⁸

One weakness has been flagged by the PCHI team and was illustrated by the peace crusade described earlier: the need for greater infrastructure to undergird and reinforce such efforts. "The logistics are against us," observed Akabwai at one point before the fourth meeting. Two of five vehicles had broken down, showing the signs of the punishment of 500-plus kilometers on poor-quality dirt roads. In addition, there had been technical glitches. When the first three meetings took longer than expected, there was no way of getting word to the pastoralists assembled at the fourth site to stand by for another day. When the visiting peace delegation finally arrived, hours were spent collecting the men who had already returned to their herds across the broad valley.

Technical shortcomings were apparent in other ways as well. Harmonization meetings had been held in mid-December only a week before the Dec. 21 raid. The fact that a raid was planned was known to the authorities, but the PCHI team was unable to return on short notice to head it off. The Sudanese Commissioner at Narus was also aware of what was brewing but lacked transport and other resources to take the situation in hand. The

Toposa Development Association went to the site after the violence to assist those affected and believe they may have helped deter reprisals. However, by then the major damage was done.

The lack of essentials such as radios, vehicles, and trained personnel limits the possibility of scaling up the harmonization initiative. Yet the infrastructure that exists does provide a foundation for expanding the geographical range of current activities outward and the vertical reach upward to national and regional authorities. By all accounts, the missing links are transport, radio communication, modest underwriting for the costs of holding community meetings (e.g., for arranging food and its preparation for participants), and links to CBOs and NGOs. These could indeed function as the eyes and ears of national governments and regional organization, alerting the authorities with early warnings and helping to defuse flashpoints. Enthusiastic about PCHI but aware of its limitations, one Kenyan chief made a strong case for the involvement of IGAD, IBAR, and OAU/CMC working together “to create space for animal health and other projects to succeed.”

In its first four years, the PCHI program has struggled with issues of sustainability at both the regional and local levels, as discussed in Section 7 below. Despite the impressiveness of Akabwai’s facilitation skills and credibility, the program to date has retained the services of only one such person. There are other Africans who are knowledgeable in the issues and/or could be trained so as to develop the necessary confidence of pastoralist leaders and communities. In fact, ITDG, a PCHI collaborator, has facilitators based in each of its three area offices. A Netherlands Development Organization pilot program to be launched in early 2002 will draw on the resources of two field offices.

While PCHI acknowledges the need to broaden its personnel base, it views the problem as largely a lack of resources. *Specific provision should be made in its strategic planning to expand its geographical outreach and to make a larger cadre of trained personnel more available to communities in need. In short, while there are constraints to broadening the reach and effectiveness of the harmonization work, the foundation is laid for effective utilization of new levels of resources and of organizational and political interest and support.*

4. The View from Nairobi

Based on interviews and report-reading in Nairobi but also confirmed by conversations in the field, I identify three additional qualities that have made for PCHI effectiveness: the establishment of collaborative relationships with partner organizations, the OAU connection, and advocacy work.

First, the establishment of effective organizational partnerships

PCHI from the start has promoted active coordination among the various actors in the animal health and other sectors and been clear about the limits of its own competence and capacity. For the Mbale meeting, it carried out two mapping exercises. The first listed for the Karamoja Cluster 28 development agencies active in the livestock and related sectors (including communication). The second listed the 32 agencies with national or regional peace mandates and activities.¹⁹ The group at Mbale identified five areas,

including animal health/trade and water/pasture, along with the key players involved in each for Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya.

Interviews in Nairobi confirm the welter of players with which PACE and PCHI interface, both in the animal health sector and beyond. Its major operational partners are Oxfam-GB, World Vision, and the Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG). Oxfam serves as secretariat to the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, a forum that has not been particularly active of late. World Vision has its own set of cross-border peace activities in Kenya and Uganda and its own training for district-level peace committees, reflecting its realization that “Fighting was disrupting all our development efforts.”²⁰ ITDG, which has its own Rural Agriculture and Pastoralism Program, also provides secretariat functions for the Livestock Service Providers Forum.

PCHI has also established working relationships with a host of other actors, all of whom value the collaboration. Those interviewed include Actionaid, the Africa Peace Forum, Christian Aid, CORDAID, CRDA, ECHO, the European Union, Lutheran World Relief, the Mennonite Central Committee, the New Sudan Council of Churches, Pact, and Veterinaires sans Frontieres. (See Annexes 1 & 2.) These partnerships have significant potential should a decision be made to scale up current PCHI activities. An expansion into new areas within the Sudan, for example, might draw on the resources of the NSCC. The NGOs and CBOs which Pact funds could become a network for keeping national and regional organizations more systematically informed about developments and needs.

Working relationships have also been established with the governments of the region at the local as well as national levels, with intergovernmental organizations such as IGAD, various units of OAU, and the European Union, and with donor governments such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. As PCHI explores the possibility of expanded activities in the South Sudan, there are no less than 17 organizations already operating programs in the livestock sector. Once again, the groundwork is laid for solid collaborative efforts. As the OAU/IBAR’s acting director comments, “You cannot work in isolation.” With PCHI’s *modus operandi*, that is not a danger.

Many of those interviewed underscore that the time is propitious for significant change. Mahboub M. Maalim, National Project Coordinator of the Arid Lands Resource Management Project in the Office of the President of Kenya, notes that a decade of relative disorganization had been followed, in the wake of the 1999 drought, by good interagency coordination. Pact, a PCHI collaborator, channels USAID funds for “conflict management through service provision” to a variety of indigenous NGOs and CBOs throughout the region. Country Director Bill Polidoro finds private agencies nowadays more interested and energized, treating as “axiomatic” an involvement in conflict management matters that as recently as six months ago was quite contentious.²¹

Second, the OAU connection

A number of PCHI’s operational partners see IBAR’s link with the OAU as crucial to its success. One donor credits the fact that the parent organization is African in nature rather

than a Western construct as a key feature. Not only does the OAU's involvement underscore the regional nature of the problems identified and the solutions required. It also gives PCHI personnel a certain flexibility to come and go across borders that is not enjoyed by many other actors, who themselves acknowledge that pastoralists and their conflicts are no respecter of interstate boundaries.

Moreover, commented one participant at a PCHI meeting, the OAU "can't be pushed out" of a given country, as can NGOs and other actors. However, since PCHI field operations are not invulnerable to political pressures, success in taking the work to the next level could be promoted by more systematic and routine communication with interested regional organizations. Expatriate PACE and PCHI leadership are already discussing the eventual handover some years hence of the operation to African colleagues, making the work even more thoroughly African throughout the organization chart.

The OAU connection also provides a mechanism for replicating and adapting the methodology and experience of the PCHI, PACE, and IBAR to similar challenges elsewhere in the Horn and across the continent. The inaugural issue of the *PACE Bulletin*, now circulating among veterinarians, donors, policy-makers and planners in Africa and beyond, highlights some of the recent successes of the PCHI.

It reports on the possibility of four key roads in the Karamajong Cluster that had been "closed for some time due to insecurity surrounding cattle raiding. ... The re-opening of the roads is a direct outcome of Border Harmonization meetings facilitated and pioneered by OAU/IBAR. It will restore the traditional grazing patterns disrupted when borders were closed. The move will lessen conflicts over water and grazing lands. Cross-border trade in livestock and other commodities is now possible thanks to easier regulatory measures. Relief food can also be transported easily across borders and disease control and epidemiosurveillance initiatives can now continue."²²

"Where there is peace, farmers will bring their animals and work with you. Where there is no peace, only 300 of a herd of 5000 will appear on vaccination day. Pastoralists have so much respect for their animals that they will forfeit offers for human health care for the sake of their livestock."²³

Dr. Solomon Haile Mariam, Chief Livestock Projects Officer, OAU/IBAR

While the OAU link has been a key element in the program's success, the shape of OAU's ongoing involvement in the program is also evolving and is currently the subject of internal discussions. At the first international meeting hosted by PCHI in Lodwar, Kenya in 1999, participants asked that OAU/IBAR "spearhead and co-ordinate animal health issues in the Cluster" and that "the on-going border harmonization process pioneered by OAU/IBAR should gradually be handed over to appropriate peace building organisation(s) for co-ordination."²⁴ Several years later, the recommendation of agencies and pastoralists would appear to be that the harmonization work be continued under its present OAU/IBAR aegis and given new visibility and resources. (The prospective involvement of the OAU's Conflict Management Centre is discussed below.)

Third, effective advocacy work

The PCHI program and its host CAPE unit have proved effective advocates for reforms in pastoralist policies and programs with international organizations, their constituent national governments, and, in their own right, the national governments in the Horn. Particular stress has been laid on “pro-poor” pastoralist policies.

OAU/IBAR was initially reluctant to engage in conflict-related activities, viewing its mandate as strictly limited to animal health. As the linkages between the difficulties of delivering veterinary services and the region’s conflicts became more apparent, the PACE program began to address the conflict connection in low-profile mode. The term “harmonization” was chosen in part to avoid the more political associations of the term “conflict resolution,” while “border harmonization” soon gave way to “pastoral communities harmonization.”

Observers have sensed in recent meetings at the OAU in Addis and in IBAR in Nairobi a growing awareness of the importance of the conflict connection with the animal health sector. To be sure, senior officials in IBAR look to OAU headquarters to take the lead on conflict resolution matters. “It is their domain and not our own area of expertise,” says a senior OAU/IBAR official. At the same time, OAU/IBAR staff see their own animal health and livestock sector experience reinforcing the importance of the addressing the conflict connection, as well as suggesting creative ways of doing so.

As noted earlier, IGAD and its member governments, too, have recently shown a new level of interest and potential involvement in conflict early warning and response. CAPE expects that in the coming weeks a tripartite memorandum of understanding will be signed by the OAU’s Conflict Management Centre, IGAD, and OAU/IBAR. When consummated, this new institutional collaboration would reflect effective advocacy, based on careful strategic planning, by OAU/IBAR and PACE staff.

PCHI and its affiliated OAU units have also engaged the governments of the region directly. PCHI staff interact with public officials at the district and local levels, encouraging them to provide the necessary services and facilitating their efforts to do so. They have also encouraged local communities to put pressure on the authorities to meet their obligations. Each of the harmonization meetings has included pointed messages from pastorlists to government administrators, who often plead impotence to responding to breaches of law and order.

The authorities are getting the message. In the past month, the Commissioner of Kapoeta has taken action to force Toposa to return 75 head of cattle to the Turkana while the District Officer in Lokichoggio has mobilized the army and police to deal with an alleged cattle theft by the Turkana. In each instance, the government officials who took charge were aware of and involved in peace meetings convened by PCHI and had been sought out by the elders. But government authorities can and should do still more.

During the July 2001 women's peace crusade, participants urged governments to "assist the communities to deal with the crucial issue of cattle rustling before the communities become extinct from the incessant raids."²⁵ During the August 2001 crusade, one woman "blamed the Kenyan, Sudanese, Ugandan, and Ethiopian governments for failing to identify, disarm and bring the [cattle-rustling] culprits to book. 'Why should the sons we have borne force us to die early?,' she complained."²⁶ In addition, politicians are occasionally criticized for encouraging, acquiescing in, and/or benefiting from the raids.

It is also evident that effective PCHI activities on the ground and effective advocacy based upon them are contributing to significant institutional change. Detailed reports of the many meetings held offer considerable data related to program effectiveness; they and the videos made at the local level provide a sound basis for advocacy efforts. As indicated earlier, the identification of specific recommendations and the deputizing of particular agencies to carry them out provide a form of accountability over time.

If there is a weakness in the Nairobi-based work carried out by the harmonization initiative, it ranges beyond PCHI to the broader question of an architecture for structuring community harmonization activities by the myriad agencies involved. There is currently better coordination among agencies working in the livestock and other development sectors than among those with conflict resolution and peace objectives. A significant danger exists that various harmonization efforts will result in confusion at the local community level and an inefficient utilization of available resources. "There is need to harmonize the activities of different actors in the peace arena," concludes one recent CAPE report. "As it stands now everybody is doing their own thing in their own way."

In the week in February 2002 in which the earlier-mentioned peace crusade organized by the PCHI took place, a gathering hosted by OLS of livestock coordinators in the South Sudan was followed by a workshop sponsored by the Toposa Development Association drawing together members of the Toposa, Merille, and Jie communities. Some of the convenors of the meetings, it seems, were unaware until the eleventh hour of activities planned other organizers. In the absence of more effective coordination – and PCHI may or may not be the best vehicle for ensuring this – the serious commitment that communities are now prepared to make to pursuing peace will be dissipated and frustrated.

5. Options

This report concludes that exceptionally effective work is taking place under PCHI leadership, and holds promise even greater effectiveness in the coming years. That judgment is reached within the framework of more than two dozen assessments conducted by the Humanitarianism and War Project during the past decade. Those studies, too, relied heavily on interviews (some 6000 in number) and on the findings of other analysts. Within this rather specialized (but large) genre of internationally-supported responses to conflict, PCHI activities reviewed here are, in my view, among the most effective and the most suited to replication of any that I have witnessed.

One of the distinctive features of PCHI's work has been its evolution over time from PARC through PACE.²⁷ The progression has involved the development of heat-stable rinderpest vaccine, the devising of participatory research and epidemiology that builds upon indigenous knowledge and traditions, the fashioning of animal health care delivery services, including attention to cost-recovery and other sustainability and quality-control issues, and the development of community-based disease surveillance. (See Figure 2.) *The evolution to date – particularly the growing effort to promote policy and legislative change that reflects experience at the field level and the sharing of experiences and dissemination of information – may well prefigure what could become the next stage of the work.*

Growing out of this evolution during the past four years has been the PCHI's harmonization work itself. That work, too, has evolved, moving from local meetings of selected groups (elders, women, youth) to international meetings of pastoralists and others from across the region, remaining strongly community-based throughout. The creative harnessing of the traditional *alokita*, or women's right to speak their minds, has been particularly effective, enlisting women as positive forces for conflict resolution.

“OAU/IBAR CAPE Unit has opened the eyes of the pastoralist community. Today, animal drugs are available in every cattle kraal [enclosure]. CAPE have formed a very approachable system of recruiting youth under the appointment of elders, trained by SNV [the Netherlands Development Organization], and provided with drugs. Community animal health workers can replenish their stocks and receive partial payment of their costs from the communities.”

Barnabas C. Lochilia, Chief, Lokichoggio Location²⁸

Numerous options exist for the next stage in the evolution of the Pastoral Communities Harmonization Initiative and its relations with other institutional actors. The fact that OAU/IBAR is itself now considering ways of strengthening, consolidating, and expanding the PCHI's work is to its credit. The available options include these:

- a. continue without major change the animal health sector work and its now integral harmonization component;
- b. continue current activities and methodologies but expand geographical coverage (e.g., to include South Sudan, Somalia, southern Ethiopia, and/or parts of Africa beyond the Horn);
- c. broaden the veterinary services provided (e.g., introduce a fuller spectrum of services, offer additional training and leadership development for community-based animal health workers, tackle such problems as tse tse fly control, expand disease surveillance mechanisms);
- d. building on the animal health experience to date, move more explicitly into the wider field of integrated agricultural development, or, wider still, into community development;

- e. reduce the operational component of existing veterinary work, maintaining only enough field activities to provide ongoing credibility to higher level policy and advocacy work;
- f. hand off existing operational activities in veterinary services and conflict resolution to competent operational partners: e.g., selected NGOs, CBOs, and local government administrative officers;
- g. give higher priority to efforts to backstop/influence the involvement of states in the region (for example, through CEWARU at the national level and through work with government officials at the district level);
- h. encourage, and provide backstopping and technical assistance for, expanded involvement in conflict resolution work by OAU's Conflict Management Centre and IGAD's CEWARN;
- i. increase the policy research component of animal health and harmonization work, giving additional attention to nurturing an enabling environment for improving pastoralist livelihoods through agricultural marketing and trade;
- j. review collaborative arrangements with research groups, whether through Tufts University and/or in partnership with academic institutions in Africa, with an eye to identifying the needs to be filled and the skill sets required.
- k. some combination of these options.

The option(s) chosen should reflect the evolving “actor set” and “strategy mix” in the region and should take into account the comparative advantages of the institutions and approaches involved. I would suggest criteria such as:

- (1) the expressed needs of pastoralist communities, particularly their poorer segments;
- (2) the availability of resources, internal and external, financial and technical;
- (3) the evolving actor set (i.e., heightened NGO interest, the development of indigenous civil society groups, and new actors such as IGAD and OAU/CMC), and the comparative advantages of the various institutional players, including OAU/IBAR and PACE;
- (4) the existence of a distinctive track record of achievement involving OAU/IBAR, PACE, and the PCHI in specified activities and sectors; and
- (5) the value-added to the current actor set and strategy mix by available university-based resources, indigenous and/or external.

6. Recommendations

Based on these criteria, I recommend that the Pastoral Community Harmonization Initiative continue to use animal health as a point of entry into communities experiencing

conflicts, retaining its current emphasis on the conflict-resolution potential of communities mobilized to articulate their needs and assert their rights. Geographical coverage should be expanded to new areas, keeping in mind that veterinary services – and for that matter, peacemaking efforts – may already be underway there. I do not believe that taking on new sectoral activities (e.g., human health, rural development) makes sense at this time.

The comparative advantage of OAU/IBAR and PACE lies in their signature achievements in the area of community-led harmonization activities. PCHI's community-based experience is indispensable for partnerships with other agencies, particularly for collaboration with the OAU's Conflict Management Centre and IGAD's CEWARN and CEWARU initiative, which currently lack the community-level outreach which is PCHI's strength.

Several persons interviewed were asked how they would allocate PCHI resources among activities at the local, national, and regional levels. One suggested that the proportions be 50/30/20 respectively, another 45/20/35. They favored a reduction in hands-on activities of veterinary services-cum-conflict resolution at the local level (more than 50% of PCHI's time and resources are now allocated there) in favor of stepped up activity at the national and regional levels.

It may be tempting for CAPE to cease operational activities (animal health and/or community harmonization) or to hand over animal health activities and to focus exclusively on harmonization and on policy and advocacy. That would be a mistake, not only in my own judgment but in the view of many of those consulted. PCHI's front-lines experience, continuously updated, enriches the broader cumulative international effort on behalf of pastoralist livelihoods. The fact that other agencies now look to PCHI as a model for their own conflict-related activities suggests retaining substantial field activities.

My recommendation thus includes options b, e, g, h, i, and j but rejects options a, c, d, and f. *Taking the current work to a new level, the theme of this assessment, I recommend intensifying existing efforts in the Karamoja Cluster, expanding them to new geographical areas, and engaging national and regional organizations and authorities more systematically. Consideration might also be given to having PCHI play a coordination, or at least an advisory, role in conflict-resolution activities throughout the region, as discussed in the section on Architectural Issues below.*

Given the pace of institutional change at the local and national/regional levels, I strongly encourage OAU/IBAR and interested donors to take a long view, using a timeframe for strategic planning of at least five, and preferably ten, years. Surely not annual funding cycles but rather decades will be needed to scale up in new geographical areas the kind of intensive interaction with communities in the Karamoja cluster that is now beginning to bear fruit. Both conflict resolution and the influencing of national policy have now achieved "flavor the day" status. Each deserves to withstand the inevitable changes in donor and practitioner fashion and to become at a minimums the "flavors of the decade."

7. Concluding Reflections

Conflict, peace, and development

The view from afar, be it from the policy desks of donor governments or the computer screens of academia and think tanks, is often highly theoretical: for example, that conflicts must be resolved before development activities may proceed. The once-fashionable relief-to-development continuum viewed interventions as sequential, moving from saving lives to reconstituting livelihoods.

The view from the ground is much more complex and dynamic. Given the centrality of livestock to pastoralist communities, the saving of lives and the reconstitution of livelihoods have to be pursued simultaneously. Taking the conflicts as a given, PCHI has created innovative veterinary delivery services that rely on the diagnostic skills of community-based animal health workers, rather than on landrovers and the more standard practices of taking blood samples to labs for analysis. Clearly, there are creative contributions to be made to pastoralist livelihoods even in the midst of war. At the same time, however, PCHI is working to end the conflicts so that vaccination efforts taking place on each side may proceed without hindrance.

As noted in the *PACE Bulletin*, there have been positive synergies between animal health services and conflict management, and between “development” and “relief.” The reduction of local conflicts has not only opened the roads for communications and trade but also for relief supplies. Conversely, “developmental relief,” applied with an eye to long-term nature of a conflict, can make a durable contribution to creating and/or nurturing sustainable local structures. The creative options that exist for working in conflict settings without worsening the conflicts is highlighted by the Local Capacities for Peace Project.²⁹

“The Toposa, the Nyangatom, and Turkana have confirmed that despite years of separation because of senseless animosity, they can still cultivate a new peaceful coexistence whereby they move freely across their common border, share their dry season grazing reserves ... and share the critical range water resources. They will further control their youth to stop raids and all sorts of road thuggeries and thus opening way to peaceful delivery of animal health services where rinderpest vaccinators can work peacefully on either side of the border. They pledged to start the trade on ordinary goods and livestock among themselves to pave way for the outside traders to enter the market.”

Conclusion, Elders Workshop, March 30–April 1, 1999, Lodwar Kenya.

There is also an intriguing but little researched connection between community-level tensions and the broader interstate conflicts in the region. Some governments in the region are supporting rebel movements against their neighbors. While most of the attention in harmonization meetings has gone to resolving local conflicts, interstate tensions in the region clearly complicate the task and contribute to the ready availability of small arms. Once again, monitoring and engagement by national and regional organizations has a positive contribution to make.

With reference to the Sudan in particular, there is evidence to suggest that the work of non-governmental actors in support of civil society organizations there has played a role

in the recent rapprochement between the SPLM and the SPDF. Certainly agencies see the reduction in south-south violence as lessening of the difficulties encountered by their aid. Whether the rapprochement leads to the hoped-for openness by southern leadership to an expanded role for civil society and private sector organizations remains to be seen. If it does, that will give more positive meaning to the activities of Operation Lifeline Sudan, which have come under increasing criticism over time for sustaining the North-South conflict rather than contributing to its resolution.³⁰

Other studies conducted by the Humanitarianism and War Project and by other researchers confirm that at the end of the day, effective development and durable peace go hand in hand. Effective humanitarian and development interventions can make a positive contribution to a climate conducive to peace and can reinforce peace once it arrives, while successful peace negotiations can provide additional space for assistance activities. But the converse is also true: conflict can interfere with aid work, while assistance efforts can worsen conflict. The PCHI confirms the truth of both sets of propositions, but provides experience far more positive than negative.

Architectural issues

What should be the framework for community development activities, including veterinary services, and peace, both within the countries of the region and in the region as a whole? By many accounts, the coordination of development activities in the Horn is generally adequate. A host of working groups, platforms, and roundtables shares information and harmonizes approaches. In fact, aid activities may have more to show for themselves than conflict resolution work. As veterinarian Bryony Jones points out, “Animal health is increasingly under control; raiding continues to be a problem.”³¹ The coordination challenge is complicated because, rather than creating separate architectures for development and for peace, some sort of common framework is needed to encourage synergies between the two.

What then should be the framework for development activities, including veterinary services, and peace, both in the individual countries of the region and in the region as a whole? The PACE staff sees the need to introduce a series of development benefits or “peace dividends” in order for peace to become truly sustainable. The community meetings they have hosted underscore the need for changes in the quality of livelihoods (including human health, education, and employment) if the today’s youth raiders of cattle are to become tomorrow’s youth traders of livestock. So, too, the upgrading of roads through food for work programs may stimulate livestock trade as well as reduce the cover from which cattle thieves and thugs ambush their victims.

The urgency of fashioning an architecture for development and peace is reinforced by a negative lesson from Afghanistan. Since 1997, UN and multiple partner agencies have struggled in vain to agree upon a strategic framework that includes both political/security and humanitarian/development components. In the absence of such a framework, the agencies were unprepared to respond to the opening provided by the transition in December 2001 from the Taliban to an interim government, losing valuable time.³² The more pro-active approach being considered for the Sudan by the IGAD Partners Forum is far preferable. “Even if North-South peace came tomorrow” to the Sudan, says one NGO

official, “hatred, violence, and revenge might produce another round of war, this time between South and South.”

In the discussion in Section (4), the need for better coordination of conflict-related activities being carried out or planned for various areas by myriad agencies was flagged. PCHI pioneering work in effective conflict resolution work is widely acknowledged. Its approach is being replicated to one extent or another by other agencies and partners, such as the Toposa Development Association and, the Kerio Valley to the south, the Netherlands Development Organization (SNV) and the National Council of Churches of Kenya. Oxfam-GB has carried out an extensive series of studies and meetings on conflict management, and World Vision is doing harmonization work along the Kenyan-Ugandan border.

The OAU/IBAR/PACE harmonization work stands out among these efforts as something of a model. The most recent study of efforts to address conflicts in the Karamoja Cluster (KC) describes PCHI as an “important, knowledgeable and experienced partner, professional, [and one that] seems well respected in the field. Excellent entry point into pastoral societies through community veterinary program.” The program is also credited with being “the most important, visible and consistent actor involved in conflict resolution activities.”³³

It may seem to represent cruel and unusual punishment to suggest that PCHI’s standing in the community should lead it to take on and/or accept some sort of coordination responsibility for harmonization work. As noted elsewhere, however, that was the role that Tufts University undertook at the request of UNICEF/OLS in January 1993: coordinating livestock activities. If that seems too much to tackle at present, PCHI might take the lead in putting together, encouraging, or providing secretariat services for some sort of forum for information-sharing and strategizing, researching, and monitoring conflict management and peacebuilding activities. Either the limited or the extended approach, however, would have significant resource implications for PCHI.

Insecurity and security

Recent policy debate at the global level has talked of replacing the traditional security agenda, with its heavy political-military component, with a “human security” agenda, which accords greater prominence to the lives and livelihoods of the marginalized. The two agendas converge in the Karamojong Cluster, where abundantly available small arms, whether used for cattle raiding or thuggery, undermine the fabric of law and order.³⁴ The point was made in dramatic form when the government of Ethiopia accused the Kenyan army of an invasion, only to learn that the incident involved armed pastoralists rustling cattle. One of the boxed quotations describes the slippage in some parts of the region of “a state of chronic low-grade insecurity into one of out-of-control lawlessness and civil disintegration.”

There is thus remarkable convergence in the Cluster between the political-military security agenda and the human security agenda. Given the nature of the small arms trade and of the pastoralists’ need for grasslands and water, regional initiatives are of the essence. “The cross-border dimension of the conflict and insecurity in Karamoja is

critical in the design of any intervention and management mechanisms,” concludes an Oxfam study. “For one, it complicates the problem by introducing into it regional and global perspectives that have a bearing on international law and geopolitics. For another it is the dimension that feeds the gun problem in Karamoja.”³⁵

Scaling up

A problem encountered by development agencies the world around involves the scaling up of successful micro-level activities so that their benefits are more widely shared and their lessons more widely applied. Typically, the benefits remain at a very local level while macro-level policies continue to be uninformed by grass roots needs, a reality confirmed in community meetings in the Karamoja Cluster.

There are various constraints involved in scaling up. One is the weakness of existing governmental social service delivery systems. Another is the cost associated with public expenditure of scarce resources on people marginalized from mainstream economic and political processes. A third is the need to adapt lessons learned to new settings. A fourth is that the more authentic the community participation, the more time is involved in nurturing ownership of activities. New partnerships with the OAU’s CMC and with IGAD should facilitate the scaling up process, even though those two entities are not themselves major operational agencies in their own right.

The earlier discussion of the limitations of relying on a single staff person skilled in harmonization efforts mirrors a larger problem faced by many interventions in the complex emergencies of the post-Cold War era. Many of the successes that have been achieved – be it in the Ngara refugee camps for Rwandan refugees in Tanzania or in the recasting of a food for work program in Haiti to function during the period of international economic sanctions – have been highly circumstantial and idiosyncratic in nature. The challenge faced by animal health-cum-harmonization efforts in East Africa is shared with other work elsewhere: that of moving from approaches that are ad hoc, highly personality-dependent, and serendipitous in their successes to approaches that are more strategic, structural, and systematic.³⁶

The Local Capacities for Peace Project, mentioned earlier, has chronicled a number of successes, largely at the micro level, in conflict mitigation and service delivery. However valuable the various small-scale initiatives, it has often proved difficult to expand such activities from the micro to the macro level.³⁷ That, however, is a key element in the task of taking the harmonization work to the next level.

Sustainability

Another generic problem faced by international assistance programs, and one that bears on issues of scaling up, involves the desirability of sustaining efforts initiated or facilitated with an infusion of outside resources. Donors and partners alike are usually anxious to phase down the level of outside involvement over time, “handing over” efforts to national or local counterparts. Frequently, however, rather than reflecting the complexities involved in nurturing long-term institutional change, donor insistence on

“exit strategies” provide a convenient “out” when funding fashions change or when available funds dry up.

PCHI faces sustainability issues in both its conflict management work and its veterinary services. With regard to the former, the strategy has been to encourage elders selected by their communities to form peace committees (in some areas called village committees) that punish young men engaged in cattle raiding, arrest thieves, and provide a vehicle for community empowerment. In Moroto, 30 elders have been supported in this role, formally legitimized and recognized for their contribution by the District Official. PCHI hopes to expand this approach throughout the Karamoja Cluster, particularly in flashpoint areas where violence is in danger of occurring or recurring. While this approach does not resolve the need for periodic outside presence and reinforcement, it is already proving a useful vehicle for restraining outbreaks of lawlessness.³⁸

On the animal health side, explains Dr. Jeff Mariner, there are several institutional channels to be mobilized for the delivery of services: NGO or intergovernmental projects, the host government, and the private sector. Each, having its own strengths and weaknesses, has been and is being tried. Projects tend to be coterminous with the external project operators. Although some NGOs have evidenced more staying power than UN or bilateral funders, many activities lose momentum when expatriates pull out. Host governments have the responsibility for providing animal health services, and the ultimate goal is to have the costs fully assumed by them. In the short term, however, the costs and incentives for government vets, including transport and per diems, tend to be beyond the reach of poorer governments.

That leaves the private sector. PCHI’s preferred approach has been to identify and train a cadre of community-based animal health workers, who work in tandem with and under the supervision of private vets, from whom they receive and replenish their supplies of drugs. Caring about livestock as they do, many pastoralists are prepared to pay for services, and having been doing so, even selling livestock to make that possible. The funds generated, in some instances calculated to ensure full-cost recovery plus some administrative overhead, provide the salaries of private vets and community workers. There are, of course, special problems in places such as remote rural areas of South Sudan where a barter economy, much less a cash economy, has not existed. Revolving funds, tried in various settings, have not proved particularly sustainable.

Despite the private sector variations tried, it appears that there is no solid model of sustainability for all seasons. One correlation, however, does appear to be reasonably consistent. “To large extent,” concludes a forthcoming book reflecting CAPE, PCHI, and other experience, “sustainability is linked to community participation. When local people have a say in the design and implementation of services, such services are more likely to be used and supported.”³⁹ “Privatization is moving in,” comments Sally Crafter of VSF-Belgium, “but there is an open question about how to marry it and community ownership.”

In sum, sustainability issues are a matter of daily PCHI concern. To the extent that they remain unresolved, it is not for lack of attention or energy. PCHI staff see progress in acceptance of the community-based animal health model in preference to the “old

school” approach. Indeed, its efforts to influence the curriculum of veterinary schools and the practice of vets in the field seem to be bearing fruit. At least the profession is reportedly beginning to see community workers as allies rather than competitors. Modern professionals are also beginning to acknowledge and tap into the “vast ethnoveterinary knowledge” that pastoralists themselves possess.⁴⁰

While the promised land of sustainability has yet to be reached, PCHI staff clearly have a keen sense of what is needed and a multifaceted strategy for getting there. “We’re in the process of making both our harmonization work and our veterinary services sustainable,” comments Dr. Akabwai. “We are confident that we can sensitize pastoralists to pay for services by marketing their own animals and even using their own sons who have abandoned raiding to come and carry on livestock marketing as an alternative.” Clearly such synergies between ending the twin diseases of cattle and warfare will not happen overnight, and will require reinforcement on the marketing side to succeed. But the broad strategy makes sense.

The approach taken by PCHI, strategically formulated but needing more time fully to institutionalize itself, places the burden on donors to clarify what they themselves mean by sustainability and what alternatives they have to offer to the innovative and incremental PCHI approach. The established link between a reduction in conflict and the creation of entrepreneurial opportunities for youth, including expanded markets for livestock products, should be factored in to realistic exit strategies. As indicated earlier, a decade would seem to be a reasonable period for giving sustainability a chance.

Gender

Another generic development issue on which the PCHI sheds helpful light concerns the importance of gender. In recent years, the policy debate has shifted from lamenting the absence of gender-sensitive assistance program to incorporating women in meaningful roles: as decision-makers, as beneficiaries, and as points of accountability. Post-Cold War conflicts have highlighted the extent to which women bear the costs of war disproportionately and yet play key roles in conflict management and peacebuilding.⁴¹ One again, PCHI experience is instructive, although more on the conflict resolution than on the veterinary services side.

“I am called Abonyo Monica, I come from Kotido and my language is Luo. I have come to take about peace. I am a representative of the youth in Kotido, and I have come to talk about one of the problems. It is that we girls incite our boys to violence. A boy may agree to marry, but we girls won’t agree unless he provides over 100 cattle. Where can he get 100 cattle? So the boy has to go on a raid. If the girls were educated, and the government boosted schooling of girls, we would forget about such things and bad customs would reduce.

I also tell the government and international community that if we girls were given funds to start things like poultry rearing and sewing, we would get involved in this, and would not need to incite our boys to raid.”

Abonyo Monica, presentation to the second international meeting, May 2001⁴²

As indicated earlier, “women’s peace crusades” were a local tradition upon which PCHI built. “Ever since the women were introduced to the Pastoralist Community Harmonization process in March 2001,” notes one report, “the situation has changed and will continue to change for the better. One may asked why the women have performed better than the men in the harmonization process? One of the reasons is that a woman is a neutral messenger of peace. ... She is a mother of peace as well as a mother of war. The mother of peace stems from the fact that a woman has unique control over her sons and husband. If she removes the traditional protection from her son, he becomes cowardly and vulnerable, and will drop out of the raiding expedition. There is a concerted effort to raise the awareness of the mother of war so that she will cross over completely to be the mother of peace.”⁴³

In PCHI meetings, women often lead songs and dances which touch people deeply and help them commit themselves to change. PCHI has not only enlisted women but has singled out the strongest leaders and role models for the task. One woman who made a particularly eloquent contribution to the meetings I attended was the widow of a warrior. If provided with resources to scale up its activities, PCHI might include a woman on its field staff with a specific mandate to work with women at the community level. In a broader anthropological sense, an evolution of gender roles among pastoralists is taking place. While “security” issues have traditionally been the sole preserve of men, women are now asserting themselves and having a propitious influence on the security of their families and communities.

Appropriate NGO roles

Outside observers are struck these days by the welter of NGO activity in the Greater Horn of Africa. CAPE staff reports that the number of organizations currently engaged in community animal health activities (including governments in the tally) is 60 in Kenya, 20 in Tanzania, 13 in Uganda, 12 in Ethiopia, and several in Somalia. As indicated earlier, 17 agencies are collaborating with OLS in livestock activities in the southern sector of the Sudan. A number of the agencies have extensive track records in the region, while more recent arrivals are still searching for their niche.

The ferment is enormously positive, bringing resources, energy, and hope to communities throughout the region, many of them weary from years of conflict. Yet there is a danger that where government structures are nascent or weak, NGOs will become preemptive and fill the gap themselves. One observer describes NGOs in the South Sudan as effective and efficient, but to the point of crowding out emerging private sector structures. An NGO comments on the lack of correlation between the size of an NGO and its impact. In the experience of Asenath Omwega, Regional Representative of Lutheran World Relief, the key correlative is decentralization. Some modest grass roots efforts by small-scale NGOs and CBOs, she believes, have demonstrated positive impacts well beyond their size.

There is ample experience from other settings to raise a cautionary note about the proliferation of NGOs and the tasks they tackle. In Mozambique, NGOs, with specific encouragement from donors, usurped the role of government agencies in the post-war

period, slowing down the reconstitution of civil society and the gestation of the private sector.⁴⁴ It would be unfortunate if, taking a leaf from the Mozambique book, the region turned into the Donor's Horn of Africa, or the South Sudan into an NGO Republic.

The essential note for the region and beyond was sounded at the second PCHI international meeting in 2001. "The development agencies should give more support to the community based organizations run by the people themselves, for the people themselves. The development agencies do not always consult enough or understand the culture of the people they work with; and they do not always take challenge and criticism of their actions well."⁴⁵ PCHI's Akabwai himself offers wise counsel: "The NGOs that have stood the test of time are those that let the community express their own wishes."

Geopolitical Context

Recent terrorist events and anti-terrorist responses have already had discernible impacts on assistance activities in the Horn. The summary of a regional pastoralist coordination workshop convened by USAID in late November 2001 notes that the U.S. government "has provided hundreds of millions of dollars over recent years in relief assistance to the GHA (Greater Horn of Africa) as part of its humanitarian efforts around the world. The terrorist attacks on the USA of September 11 dramatize the importance of promoting economic growth to this volatile region to support [U.S.] national security interests. The systemic poverty and conflict raging in Sudan, Somalia, and Northern Kenya require particular attention."⁴⁶

Members of the development and peace communities in the Horn and elsewhere also draw clear linkages between conditions that breed terrorism and the need for effective internationally-supported aid work. However, while the politicization of aid allocations may in the short term work to the advantage of the region, experience elsewhere has shown that geopolitics and the perceived national security interests of donor governments may also skew the activities funded and inject unrealistic expectations and forced-paced timetables.⁴⁷

Some in the Horn are already raising voices of concern about the impacts of the response to terrorism on assistance to Africa. The Kenyan Minister of Public Health, Dr. Sam Ongeru, has criticized the "lopsided" allocation of U.S. development resources to Afghanistan. He is reported as having urged that "the billions of dollars earmarked for rehabilitation of Afghanistan should also be sent to Africa as HIV/Aids and malaria could pass for a terrorist agent against humanity."⁴⁸ Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi has chided donors for bypassing "stable nations" and investing in conflicted ones. The message, he warns, appears to be that "it is better to fight to get assistance."⁴⁹

Implications for universities

"It is amazing," remarked The Hon. Omwonyojwok, Uganda's Minister of State for Northern Uganda Rehabilitation at the second PCHI international meeting in 2001, "how little those who claim to work for pastoralists, including myself, know about them." While the Minister may not be personally familiar with the wealth of resource materials

that have recently become available (Annex 3), it is true that analysis of the region does not adequately inform development and peace activities.⁵⁰

Universities in general and Tufts in particular may well have a comparative advantage in carrying out research of interest to those engaged in policy and programming, perhaps supplemented by providing training for practitioners. Certainly Tufts University has senior personnel who provide substantive input, and should now consider increasing the scale of its involvement. The contribution of a series of short-term and junior interns from Tufts, however, has been somewhat patchy, and the opportunity costs to OAU-IBAR and PACE high. Nor should it be assumed that universities are best suited for such research. A series of policy reviews such as those carried out by or for OXFAM-GB in recent years may in the end prove more useful in shaping programs. (See Annex 3.)

Other research institutions and sometimes donors have also seconded staff to agencies in the region. Here, too, a compatible fit in terms of competence or personality should not be assumed, although some placements have worked exceedingly well. As the programs and the actor mix evolve over time, the skills sets needed for seconded personnel will continue to change, as discussed below. Continuing tension can be expected since the agendas and career development objectives of social science researchers differ from the needs and constraints of the agencies to which they are assigned.⁵¹ One veteran of a lifetime of experience in the Horn calls the standard research culture “unproductive” from the standpoint of operational agencies, which invest time and energy in dialogue with researchers but seldom are recompensed with feedback and recommendations.

More broadly speaking, the involvement of Tufts University is currently among the best-kept secrets in the region, despite extensive contributions by a significant number of people in a variety of capacities for more than a decade. As of February 2002, four full-time professional staff are being provided to OAU-IBAR and one to FAO/OLS, each of them entrusted with substantial responsibilities. (Figure 1) A decade earlier, at the request of UNICEF, Tufts provided Tim Leyland to oversee the coordination of livestock activities in south Sudan from January 1993 onwards, later adding a northern counterpart and continuing to provide senior personnel after the handover of OLS from UNICEF to FAO in October 2000.

Tufts has also played significant roles in the development of heat-stable rinderpest vaccine, in the utilization of indigenous knowledge through the methodology of “participatory epidemiology,” in training and arranging supervision for community animal health workers, in concentrating on livelihoods, in advocacy with other institutional players, and in support of partner educational institutions (for example, Ahfad University in Khartoum). In none of these activities, however, has the University established an independent presence in the region, nor is that recommended, given the objective of empowering indigenous institutions. The low-profile status of Tufts personnel also reflects the legitimate desire of host organizations to receive full credit for what they themselves produce.

The involvement of Tufts is widely affirmed and appreciated by its partners, including government authorities and intergovernmental organizations. One NGO veterinary services agency says that it looks to Tufts to keep it informed of the latest thinking on

issues relevant to its work. One bilateral donor sees Tufts' experience in conflict management as a rich source of learning for the wider community. That said, however, one of the implications of taking the community harmonization work to a new level may be that the University itself will need to step up the level of its commitment of personnel and resources, research and training.

Concerns also need to be addressed regarding internship opportunities created year after year for Tufts-related students while similar openings are not available to their counterparts from the region. Again, there is not an easy fit between the perceived needs of a university based in the United States or Europe and the gaps that programs in East Africa would like to fill. Taking current work to a new level thus has serious implications for university partners as well.

While Tufts "led with its vets," who are still needed, the vets themselves underscore the desirability of having other specialists, such as anthropologists, to help them better understand the cultures within which they are working. Taking their successes to the next level may require specialists in civil administration, political science, and gender as well as animal disease control. The complexity of the issues underlying the conflicts are deeply rooted in highly traditional cultures, now fighting survival with not only resilience but often surprising signs of willingness to change.

It is not a foregone conclusion that the full array of well-meaning outsiders, despite their expertise and financial resources, will be equal to the challenge provided by pastoralists in Africa. It is thus eminently sensible to sustain, strengthen, and build upon the Pastoral Community Harmonization Initiative that has proved itself effective and innovative in the early going and which has positioned itself to make an even more significant contribution in the near- and medium-term future.

"Pastoralists should ... be given the opportunity of determining their future. Important decisions and policies affecting their mode of existence should not just be forced down their throats without their active involvement from the initial stages to the implementation process. ...

The problem of insecurity in northwestern Kenya cannot be solved unless the pastoralists are assured of the continuation of their age-old way of life. Indeed, it might be helpful if the neighboring countries liaised to introduce some regional, integrated programmes which could facilitate pastoral movements across the border in response to ecological constraints and climatic variations."

Joshia O. Osmaba, Egerton University, Njoro, Kenya⁵²

¹ The author directs the Humanitarianism and War Project, which is located in the Feinstein International Famine Center of Tufts University's Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy. Its website is hwproject.tufts.edu. He expresses appreciation to the many persons who facilitated this research, particularly to Tim Leyland of the CAPE Unit, Darlington Akabwai, and their team. Special thanks go to Edward Moseka and Henry Kimathi for computer assistance. He also expresses his gratitude to the many persons who took their time to be interviewed, and to the OAU/IBAR and CAPE staff who made themselves available for extensive discussions.

² IBAR itself has existed since 1951, becoming part of the newly formed OAU in 1965.

³ The OAU/IBAR initiative was called the thermostable rinderpest vaccination and technology transfer project (TRVTT). It was replaced in 1996 by the participatory community-based animal health and vaccination project (PARC-VAC). In 2000, PARC-VAC was replaced in turn by CAPE.

⁴ Delia Grace, "Pastoralist Harmonisation Initiative: Second International Meeting," (Nairobi: OAU/IBAR PACE, 2001), 12.

⁵ Interview, Feb. 6, 2001.

⁶ Roba D. Sharamo, "Track II Diplomacy: Reconciling an Endangered AK-47 Karamoja Generation: An Analysis of the Impacts of the Pastoralist Community Harmonization Initiative." (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University, 2002). [draft], 53-54.

⁷ The agreement, signed in Khartoum in January 2002, will come into effect once four of the region's governments have ratified it.

⁸ "Introducing the Community-based Animal Health and Participatory Epidemiology" CAPE Unit, undated, 1.

⁹ Larry Minear and others, *Humanitarianism under Siege: A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan* (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1990). The 2002 OLS budget, now under the management of the FAO, contains for the first time since the inception of OLS in 1989 a provision for conflict resolution activities.

¹⁰ On Feb. 10, 2002, the Government of Sudan dropped six bombs on the village of Akuem in Bahr el Ghazal Province. The Associated Press [dateline Washington, D.C. Feb. 13] reported the bombing came "only three hours after a drop of food [by the UN World Food Program] that civilians were still collecting."

¹¹ The methodology is described in detail in Andy Catley and Tim Leyland, "Community participation and the delivery of veterinary services in Africa," *Preventive Veterinary Medicine* 49 (2001), 95-113. The quotation is taken from page 100.

¹² *op. cit.*, p. 104

¹³ Darlington Akabwai, "The August Women's Peace Crusade," (Nairobi: OAU/IBAR PACE, 2001), 7.

¹⁴ Akabwai, "The August Women's Peace Crusade," 4.

¹⁵ Quoted in Grace, 32.

¹⁶ Interview, Feb. 7, 2002.

¹⁷ Grace, 5.

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- ¹⁸ See Darlington Akabwai, “The July Women’s Peace Crusade,” (Nairobi: OAU/IBAR PACE, 2001).
- ¹⁹ Grace, 43-53.
- ²⁰ Interview with Gerald Wagana, Director of Special Programs, World Vision, February 4, 2001.
- ²¹ Interview, Nairobi, Feb. 1, 2002.
- ²² PACE Bulletin, September 2001, Volume 1, No. 1, 9.
- ²³ Interview, Nairobi, Jan. 29, 2002.
- ²⁴ Main Outcomes of the First International Meeting quoted in Grace, 35.
- ²⁵ Akabwai, “The July Women’s Peace Crusade,” 10.
- ²⁶ Akabwai, “The August Women’s Peace Crusade,” 13.
- ²⁷ For a detailed review, see CAPE brochure, “Introducing the Community-based Animal Health and Participatory Epidemiology (CAPE) Unit,” undated, Nairobi.
- ²⁸ Interview, Koyesa, Kenya, Feb. 12, 2002.
- ²⁹ See, for example, Mary B. Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War*, (Boulder Co and London: Lynne Rienner, 1999).
- ³⁰ The point is made in a number of Humanitarianism and War Project publications, most recently Larry Minear, *The Humanitarian Enterprise* (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, forthcoming).
- ³¹ Bryony Jones, VSF-Belgium, interview January 27, 2002.
- ³² The need for strategic planning was one of a number of lessons learned from earlier conflicts which a group of evaluators identified for governments and aid agencies seeking to become operational in Afghanistan. See Alternative Learning Network for Accountability and Performance [ALNAP], “Aid Responses to Afghanistan,” prepared for a December 2001 meeting of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD.
- ³³ Management Systems International, *Assessment and Programmatic Recommendations: Addressing Pastoralist Conflicts in the Karamojong Cluster of Kenya, Uganda and Sudan* (Nairobi: USAID/REDSO, 2002 forthcoming), 42.
- ³⁴ See, for example, The Oxfam-GB study, “The impact of small arms on the population: A case study of Kitgum & Kotido Districts,” prepared by Action for the Development of Local Communities (ADOL), 2001.
- ³⁵ Michael Ochieng Odhiambo, “Karamoja Conflict Study,” March 2000, 29.
- ³⁶ For an elaboration of this theme, see Larry Minear, *The Humanitarian Enterprise*.
- ³⁷ One OAU-IBAR staff person suggests that a more accurate typology for capturing the Horn experience would place a “meso” level between the micro and the macro. This would be the place where national governments and their representatives function, while the macro level would be the domain of regional institutions.
- ³⁸ For a discussion, see OAU/IBAR Cape Unit, “Formalisation of Village Peace Committees in the Karamoja Cluster,” August 2001.
- ³⁹ Andy Catley, Tim Leyland, and Boniface Kaberia, “Taking a long-term perspective: sustainability issues,” in Andy Catley, Stephen Blakeway, and Tim Leyland, *Community-based Animal Healthcare: A Practical Guide to Improving Veterinary Services*, (London: ITDG, 2002 forthcoming), 51-104. The quotation is taken from p. 52.
- ⁴⁰ For a discussion of reinforcing government policies that contribute to sustainability, see John Young and John Woodford, “The rules of the game and how to influence policy,” in Catley, Leyland, and Kaberia, pp. 273-309.

⁴¹ For a Humanitarianism and War Project study on these issues, see Julie A. Mertus, *War's Offensive on Women: The Humanitarian Challenge in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan* (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 2000).

⁴² Quoted in Grace, 20.

⁴³ Akabwai, "The July Women's Peace Crusade," 16.

⁴⁴ See Stephen C. Lubkemann, "Rebuilding Local Capacities in Mozambique: The National Health System and Civil Society," in Ian Smillie, ed., *Patronage or Partnership: Local Capacity Building in Humanitarian Crises*, (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, and Ottawa, Canada: IDRC, 2001), 77-106.

⁴⁵ Grace, 26.

⁴⁶ USAID/REDSO, Regional Pastoral Coordination Workshop held Nov. 27-29, 2001 in Nairobi, [unclassified cable], Dec. 13, 2001.

⁴⁷ This has been a leitmotiv of case studies carried out by the Humanitarianism and War Project. See, for example, Cristina Eguizabal and others, *Humanitarian Challenges in Central America: Learning the Lessons of Recent Armed Conflicts* (Providence, RI: Watson Institute, 1993), Occasional Paper No. 14. Also S. Neil MacFarlane, *Politics and Humanitarian Action*, (Providence, RI: Watson Institute, 1999), Occasional Paper No. 41.

⁴⁸ Judith Akolo and Janet Chapla, "US foreign policy is lopsided, says Ongeru," *East African Standard*, Nairobi, Kenya, Feb. 5, 2001, 11.

⁴⁹ Patrick Wachira, "Moi queries donors' standards on aid," *East African Standard*, Feb. 14, 1.

⁵⁰ Grace, 79.

⁵¹ For a discussion of the converging and diverging agendas of researchers and aid agencies, see Stephen C. Lubkemann, *Humanitarian Action: Social Science Connections* (Providence, RI: Watson Institute, 1999), Occasional Paper 37.

⁵² Joshia O. Osamba, "The Sociology of insecurity: Cattle rustling and banditry in northwestern Kenya." Unpublished paper, 2000.

Annex 1
ACRONYMS

ADOL	Action for Development of Local Communities
CAHWs	Community-based animal health workers
CAPE	Community-Based Animal Health and Participatory Epidemiology Unit (OAU/IBAR)
CBO	Community-based organization
CDTF	Community Development Trust Fund (EC)
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response (IGAD)
CEWERU	National conflict early warning and response mechanisms
CMC	Conflict Management Centre (OAU)
CORDAID	Catholic Organization for Relief and Development Aid
DfID	Department for International Development (U.K.)
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
IBAR	InterAfrican Bureau for Animal Resources (OAU)
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ITDG	Intermediate Technology Development Group
LWR	Lutheran World Relief
MCC	Mennonite Central Committee
NCCK	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NPI	Nairobi Peace Initiative
NSCC	New Sudan Council of Churches
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan
PACE	Pan-African Programme for the Control of Epizootics (OAU-IBAR)
PARC-VAC	Participatory Vaccination and Community-based Animal Health Project
PCHI	Pastoral Community Harmonization Initiative
REDSO	Regional Economic Development Services Office (USAID)
SNV	Netherlands Development Organisation
SPDF	Sudan People's Defence Force

SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
TRVTT	Thermostable Rinderpest Vaccine Transfer of Technology Project
USAID	US Agency for International Development
VSF	Veterinaires sans frontières

Annex 2 Persons Interviewed

Yacob Aklilu, Economist, OAU/IBAR

Lomong Aliileum, Cattle Kraal Leader, Kikor Clan, Sudan

Lesso Apollong, Turkana Woman

Isaac Aremon, Water Engineer, Lodwar, Turkana District, VSF-Belgium

Robert Asurut, Turkana Chief

Plister Lodii Atabo, Kenyan Department of Social Services, Lodwar

Kuol Athin, Administrative Secretary, Bahr el Ghazal Youth Development Agency

Jessie Bokhoven, Director, SNV, Kenya

Andy Catley, Deputy Head, CAPE Unit

Francis Chabari, Program Coordinator, CORDAID

Sally Crafter, Head of Mission, VSF-Belgium

Jan Eijkenaar, T/A, South Sudan, Humanitarian Aid Office, ECHO

Nakuwa Ekaal, Turkana Chief

Elim Esiinyen, Kraal Leader and Livestock Owner, Natapan, Kibitch Division

Etaaba Esinyen, Lokichoggio Kraal Leader, Kenya

Daniel Evans, Natural Resources Management Advisor, Food Security Office, USAID

Leonora A. Foley, Democracy Fellow, USAID

Samuel Mut Gai, Executive Director, Naath Community Development Services

Dr. Riak Gok, Board Member, Bahr el Ghazal Youth Development Agency

Delia Grace, Technical Officer, OAU/IBAR-PACE

Ned Greeley, Leader, Regional Conflict Prevention Team, USAID

Henz Greijn, Project Manager, SNV

Dr. Solomon Haile Mariam, Chief Livestock Projects Officer, OAU-IBAR

Guyo Haro, Coordinator, Natural Resources and Conflict, SNV

Richard Hogg, Social Development Adviser, British Development Division in Eastern Africa, Department for International Development

Loki Ikio, Development Coordinator, Toposa Development Association

Bryony Jones, Rinderpest Project Coordinator, VSF-Belgium

Peter Kamau, community video producer

Amb. Bethuel A. Kiplagat, Executive Director, Africa Peace Forum

Ephraim A. Kiragu, Director, Development Programmes, National Council of Churches of Kenya

Sam Kona, Programme Coordinator, Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, Kenya Programme, Oxfam-Great Britain

Ruth Kottman, Head of Sub-Delegation, Lokichoggio, ICRC

Father Mark Kumbonyaki, Chair, New Sudan Council of Churches

Tim Leyland, Advisor and Head of CAPE Unit, OAU/IBAR

Barnabas Lochilia, Chief, Lokichoggio Location

William Lodup, Facilitator, Lodwar office, OAU/IBAR

Louis Labong Lojore, Commissioner of Kapoeta County, Sudan

Piyo Lokito, Toposa Leader

Joseph Lokinei Lomong, Tribal Leader, Sudan

Zacaria Lotioroyo, Toposa Leader

Marino Lotipu, Toposa Livestock Owner

Emmanuel LoWilla, Program Coordinator, New Sudan Council of Churches

Lona J. E. Lowilla, Peace Building Co-ordinator, South Sudan, Oxfam-Great Britain

Mahboub M. Maalim, National Project Co-ordinator, Arid Lands Resource Management Project, and Joint Secretary, Disaster Emergency Response Committee, Office of the President, Kenya

Isabella Masinde, Programme Manager, Rural Agriculture and Pastoralism Programme, Intermediate Technology Development Group

Harold F. and Annetta Miller, Co-Representatives (Sudan), Mennonite Central Committee

John Manuve, Senior Democracy-Governance and Conflict Prevention Advisor, USAID

Jeff Mariner, Livestock Program Adviser, Feinstein International Famine Center, Tufts University

Nicolas Mokii, Turkana Chief, Koyesa

Lo Mongolei Logwin, Turkana Woman

Paul Murphy, Consultant, IGAD Planning for Peace Initiative

Dr. J.T. Musiimi, Acting Director, OAU-IBAR

Elizabeth Muthuma, Program Support Coordinator, Actionaid

Ticilo Mnyamukoro, Toposa Chief

Jacob Nakuwaa, Turkana Chief, Kibitch Location

Dr. Joyce Njoki Njoro, Decentralized Animal Health Support Unit Training Officer, Intermediate Technology Development Group

Irene W. K. Nuumbi, Pastoralist Programme Manager, Intermediate Technology Development Group

Asenath Omwega, Regional Representative, Lutheran World Relief

Bill Polidoro, Country Director, PACT

Dr. Haruun L. Runn, Executive Secretary, New Sudan Council of Churches

Thomas Ruttoh, Area Development Programs Director, World Vision, Kenya

Moses Gai Samuel, Deputy Director, Naath Community Development Services

Paul Savage, Programme Manager, Christian Aid

Piers Simpkin, FAO Deputy Emergency Coordinator, Livestock, South Sector, Operation Lifeline Sudan

Nathan Simiyu, Logistician, CAPE Unit

Steven Smith, Senior Regional Conflict Prevention Advisor, USAID

Chip Stem, Pastoral Livelihoods Project, Senior Policy Advisor to the Director, OAU/IBAR

Jan Van Brussel, Air Coordinator, Humanitarian Office, ECHO

Daudi Waithaka, Peace and Development Foundation

Gerald Wanage, Director of Special Programs, World Vision, Kenya

Dr. Charles M. Wanjigi, Senior Veterinary Officer, Arid Lands Resource Management Project, Office of the President, Kenya

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Figure 1
An Organigram of Pastoral Community Harmonization Initiative




Figure 2
Chronology of Major Events Related to the

**Pastoralist Community Harmonization Initiative
and their Connections to Tufts University***

1986 – OAU/IBAR Pan African Rinderpest Campaign (PARC) starts

1991 – OAU/IBAR/PARC/Tufts Thermostable Rinderpest Vaccine Transfer of Technology Project launched, transferring vaccine technology to African labs and developing the concept of Community-based Animal Health Delivery Systems. Jeff Mariner of Tufts, heads project in IBAR, Nairobi.

1995 – Participatory Vaccination and Community-based Animal Health Project (PARC-VAC) project proposal drafted by Jeff Mariner and submitted to USAID

1996 – TRVTT ends, PARC-VAC funding agreed

1997 – PARC-VAC becomes operational, with Tim Leyland and Darlington Akabwai implementing the project from Nairobi and veterinarian Chip Stem serving as fund-raiser and principal investigator for the work from the Tufts campus.

1997 – Africa programs shift from Tufts University’s School of Veterinary Medicine to the new Feinstein International Famine Center. Stem continues to backstop the program at Tufts, moving to Kenya in 1998.

1997 – PARC-VAC negotiates funding from the Kenyan government and the EC to begin a Community-based Animal Health Delivery System pilot trial in Turkana and West Pokot districts of Kenya.

1998 – Community Animal Health Work project in Turkana begins, with Dr. Paul Mutungi employed to work with support from Akabwai in Northern Kenya. Community dialogue with Turkana elders raises the issue of livestock raiding as serious and disruptive of animal health efforts. Elders request PARC-VAC assistance to meet opinion leaders from across conflict lines.

1998 – Director of OAU-IBAR takes important step of expanding the breadth of existing border harmonization meetings, primarily for government veterinary staff up to that time, to include local communities and NGOS. Tufts negotiates with REDSO Natural Resource Adviser Joao de Queiroz for USAID funding of a collaboration between PARC-VAC and REDSO on an “expanded Border Harmonisation” Initiative.

April 1999 – First community meeting occurs between Toposa and Turkana held in Lodwar, facilitated by Akabwai with backstopping from Leyland.

May 1999 – Nov 1999 – Series of community meetings occur between Jie, Dodoth, Matheniko, Pokot, Turkana and Toposa (one per month). de Queiroz replaced by Dan Evans in REDSO, who in January arranged for an extension of the program.

Nov. 1999 – Four person assessment team, sent by DFID and led by Andy Catley, review the Pastoral Livelihoods Program (PLP) proposal. In January DfID decided against funding the PLP as submitted.

Dec. 1999 – First International Meeting, Lodwar

Jan. – June 2000 – Further community dialogues with elders, women, and youth. In June, Leyland and Catley write Community-based Animal Health and Participatory Epidemiology (CAPE) proposal and a proposal to the Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF) of the EC to provide funds to PCHI.

July - Sept 2000 – Proposal prepared by Leyland and Daudi Waithaka for further funding from REDSO. PLP proposal submitted to REDSO and OFDA.

October 2000 – DfID funds CAPE as part of Programme for the Pan African Control of Epizootics (PACE) while REDSO agrees to fund certain components of PLP, including PCHI.

Dec. 2000 – CAPE unit is launched. Stem is employed directly by IBAR to implement PLP. Retaining their Tufts connection, Leyland and Akabwai continue to implement PCHI using REDSO funds channeled through PLP.

2001 Leyland and Akabwai lay the groundwork for tripartite agreement with OAU/CMC and IGAD, making presentation in August to IGAD CEWARN conference and facilitating a meeting in November with CMC and IGAD.

Jan. 2002 – Extension of authority to expand REDSO funds continues PCHI activities until Sept. 2002.

* During this same period, Tufts' International Famine Center has supported FAO's OLS southern sector work by Dr. Piers Simkin and its northern sector activities by Dale Hogland, liaison work with Ahfad University in Khartoum by Sue Lautze, and training activities in nutrition for agencies in Nairobi by Helen Young.

Figure 3
An Overview of Major PCHI Activities, 2001

Local Level

- 8 community workshops, each identifying specific follow-up action steps
- 2 women's crusades planned, carried out, documented, and followed up
- Exploration of village committees as points of contact for PCHI, and identification of some potential members of such committees
- Production of four videos picturing workshops and crusades, and their distribution, to publicize the experiences

National Level


- A variety of strategies and occasions for engaging the authorities and institutions in Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Uganda
- Participation of many policy makers and administrative officials in discussions of community harmonization work and its implications for government policies and services
- Liaison with national associations of veterinarians, veterinary schools, veterinary services, and research institutes

Regional Level

- 2 major regional meetings held involving local, national, regional, and international actors and institutions in dialogue with pastoralists on conflict issues and other identified priorities. Widespread dissemination of published reports;
- 3 meetings with OAU and IGAD officials in Addis, laying the groundwork for a Memorandum of Agreement between OAU/CMC, IGAD, and OAU/IBAR expected to be signed in early 2002.
- 3 research studies commissioned/facilitated with a primary focus on impact assessment, using partner organizations and interns from Tufts University.

Total available budget resources for the year 2001: \$US 247,000 from U.S. Agency for International Development/REDSO, Department for International Development (U.K) and Community Development Trust Fund (EC).

Figure 4
A Map Showing the Karamojong Cluster



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