



## **ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF AU/IBAR CAPE UNIT CONFLICT MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE KARAMOJONG CLUSTER**



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### **About this document**

This document is a summary produced by AU/IBAR of a report prepared for AU/IBAR by Acacia Consultants Ltd<sup>1</sup>. The full report is available on request from AU/IBAR.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report summarises the findings of an impact assessment of the conflict management activities of the CAPE (Community Based Animal Health and Participatory Epidemiology) Unit of AU/IBAR (African Union/Interafrican Bureau for Animal Resources) in the Karamojong Cluster. The impact assessment involved a review of project documents, a consultative process with project stakeholders at the community, district and national levels and an assessment of beneficiary views. Acacia Consultants, a relief and development consultancy firm based in Nairobi undertook the impact assessment in two phases between November and January 2004. The report presents the findings and recommendations for future consideration for agencies implementing peace work.

The CAPE Unit's conflict prevention, management and resolution (CPMR) work evolved from its animal health work with different groups of the Karamojong Cluster. After several years of supporting community-based animal health care in the Cluster, insecurity and livestock raiding was identified as a major constraint to livestock-dependent livelihoods. In 1998, the communities themselves requested AU/IBAR to facilitate inter-communal dialogue to explore avenues for containing the insecurity and bring about reconciliation so that animal health services could be expanded. This led to the initiation of the Border Harmonisation Initiative in 1999. The Border Harmonisation initiative (1999-2002) which was later renamed the *Pastoral Community Harmonisation Initiative* (PCHI), began in 1999 with funding from the USAID's Regional Economic Development Service Office (REDSO), the UK Department for International Development and the Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF).

### Key Findings

#### Impacts on the three border communities:

- Community sensitisation and awareness was evident, as community members knew the problems caused by cattle raiding and violence. The elders and the women had also attempted to create awareness among the youth, who are the main raiders, so as to change their attitudes. The communities requested that the peace initiatives be continued
- Communities along the Turkana-West Pokot and the Turkana-Toposa border area stated that organized raids '*areom*' (which are approved by elders and the wider community) had decreased and small theft '*akoko*' (which are more often seen as criminal acts committed by individuals or small groups without community approval) had increased. Along the Turkana-Dodoto community border area, peace dividends had been realised in the recent past such as trade, freedom of movement and there was more inter community communication
- Resource sharing and joint border patrols were not observed although there was information that one grazing agreement between Turkana-Toposa was still in force.
- All communities were still living in fear of their enemies.
- No cases of returned internally displaced people were recorded meaning that there are still lots of no-go areas
- Inter-ethnic marriages, often used as an indicator of good inter-ethnic relations, had not increased in the sample areas
- Service delivery was not found to have increased in the sample areas

Impacts on stakeholders: Most partners perceived the impacts of CAPE efforts as commendable but more effort was required into participatory planning and collaboration especially with the Community-Based Organisations who are better placed to facilitate the formation of grass-root structures.

Impacts on root causes of conflict: The project did not directly address the root causes of conflict such as proliferation of small arms and bride price issues. However it was supporting other developmental actors in implementing developmental activities, which assist in peace maintenance such as animal health activities.

While the efforts of peace building by the CAPE Unit were widely recognised as important, commendable, with the creation of awareness and sensitisation having been well internalised by the target communities, there is need for CAPE to seriously re-strategise on a way forward that is pragmatic and which will yield the most impact out of its peace building work as suggested in the recommendations.

As observed in this assessment awareness creation by CAPE has been successful in all the operation areas and there has been some success with reduction of violent conflict along the Turkana-Dodoch border.

Efforts that have yielded positive impact such as the facilitation of government officials for negotiations can be scaled up, while the prioritisation of activities in the cluster will lead to financial resources being spent on interventions that will yield maximum impact on the concerned communities for example, following up resolutions agreed upon in meetings as this seems to be CAPE's weakest point.

Finally the consultants believe that there are numerous opportunities which can be exploited to produce better results and greater impacts, especially with participatory planning with all stakeholders and direct support to new district and village peace structures that would contribute to the sustainability of peace.

## **Key Recommendations Concerning CAPE Unit Strategy**

The lack of peace dividends by the communities was mostly associated with the CAPE Unit's lack of capacity to follow-up the resolutions agreed upon in peace meetings themselves. This has been attributed to the lack of capacity in the Lodwar office in terms of inadequate staff levels. The three conflict border areas are far apart with conflict present almost all the time in one form or another. The human resources at the Lodwar office are insufficient to deal with all these problems all the time. We therefore foresee the following three scenarios from which the CAPE Unit needs to choose from in their new strategy.

### Scenario One

Increase staff and resources to deal with all the operation areas, taking into account the stakeholders views of employing personnel from the warring communities as explained in Section 2.4.

### Scenario Two

Concentrate on cross-border work, especially Sudan and Uganda. Handover internal border conflict (West Pokot-Turkana) to other relevant peace organisations that have more capacity such as World Vision, Oxfam GB, ITDG and the NCKK.

In these two scenarios, prioritisation of activities to achieve better impact is necessary. For example the resources that were used by ITDG and CAPE for the celebration of the burial of the hatchet between the Turkana and the Matheniko, which was brokered by themselves in the 1970s, could have been channelled to support the meetings to follow-up grazing agreements between the Turkana and the Toposa, and the Turkana the Dodoth. These two communities were requesting for meetings due to the escalation of raids/theft that were going on at the time and which were bound to increase in the dry season due to lack of prior grazing agreements.

### Scenario three

Instead of direct implementation of peace building activities, CAPE could channel funds and technical advice through new local peace structures such as DPDCs, VPCs and CBOs and concentrate on policy lobbying and advocacy at district, national and international levels. Needless to say policy-influencing should be informed by peace building activities of CAPE's grassroots partners whose lobbying and advocacy capacities should be built/ strengthened.


## 2. BACKGROUND

Karamojong is a generic term used to describe the Eastern Nilotic agro-pastoralist tribes inhabiting the arid and semi arid regions of North-Eastern Uganda, North-Western Kenya, Southern Sudan and Ethiopia. The Dodoth, the Jie, the Karamojong, the Turkana, the Pokot, the Toposa and Nyang'atom have commonality in their origin, social organisation (generation systems) and livelihood (agro-pastoralism) systems. See map of area in Figure 1.

The area suffers from endemic conflicts over scarce natural resources, particularly grazing land and water sources. Such conflicts are aggravated by the ready availability of small arms which has been increasing since the 1980s. Inter-ethnic cattle rustling and cattle thefts, revenge raids, highway banditry and direct confrontations with government security bodies in the course of forcible animal recovery and disarmament operations are a reality for the local communities in the Karamojong Cluster. Many peace-building activities have been undertaken, mostly through the facilitation of peace meetings. Other peacebuilding actors in the area include World Vision, Oxfam GB, Pax Christi Netherlands and NCCK. All of the organisations have slight differences in approach, with some focusing more on research and advocacy, others on the facilitation of dialogue, and still others on community capacity to handle conflict.

Information collected by the consultants from the three different ethnic groups visited during this assignment showed that the communities used to honour peace agreements and even international borders during the colonial era. Evidence was also found to suggest that there were well established networks of communication between the different ethnic groups. The groups used these networks to request for permission into dry season grazing areas, to negotiate for the return of livestock and negotiate for peace with each other. These networks are still present although weakened. Since the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the onset of the war in Southern Sudan, the honouring of these traditional mechanisms has been eroded. There may be scope for such mechanisms to be strengthened and to function as they did in the past, as communities tend to own and honour their own traditional mechanisms better than conventional peace building mechanisms that are introduced by outsiders.

Figure 1: Map of the Karamojong Cluster






-  Pokot/Turkana internal border
-  CAPE operation area assessed during the study
-  Epiding, common border grazing area

Figure 1: Map of the Karamojong Cluster



## Methodology

The primary aims of the impact assessment were to assess the community-level impacts of CAPE's work in terms of both reduction of conflicts and impact on the capacity of communities to manage conflict. Several reports have been produced to document the work of IBAR's CPMR work<sup>2</sup>. This exercise was the first full impact assessment exercise however.

At the beginning of the assessment it was agreed that a variety of sites would be studied. The Turkana-Toposa and Turkana-West Pokot border areas were selected as more conflict prone locations while the Turkana-Dodotoh area was less prone to violent conflict. Care was taken to sample areas both where CAPE had been very active and where they had been implementing partners with NGOs and CBOs. Additionally, a variety of informants was selected to include those who have participated in CAPE peace activities and those who have not.

The following specific sites were visited:

- Study Area 1 - Turkana-Toposa international border (Kenya-Sudan), specifically Zolia/Songot and Naliel/Mogila *epidings*<sup>3</sup>. Enyanangachor/Lokotikol *epiding* was not accessible due to distance and timing.
- Study Area 2 - Turkana-Dodotoh international border (Kenya-Uganda). Only the Turkana side in Oropoi and Naporoto was accessible. Due to heightened tensions between the two communities at the time of the assessment, the Dodotoh did not respond to the invitation to be interviewed on the Turkana side and Kamion was not accessible via the escarpment by vehicle.
- Study Area 3 - Turkana-Pokot internal border (Kenya), specifically Kainuk/Samakitik and Nakukulas/Lokwamosing *epidings*. Lochuakula/Amaler, Kasei/Lorogon and Alale/Lokiriama *epidings* were not accessible due to distance and timing.

In the sites interviews with key informants were undertaken and focus groups were held with youths, elders and women in separate focus group discussions.

As with all assessments there are limitations to this work. Firstly, this assessment could not cover all the areas where CAPE had implemented peace-building activities. This meant that the observations made are specific to the sampled areas and would not necessarily apply throughout the entire border area.

Another second factor that influenced the findings of this assessment was that it was conducted during the dry season when conflict is heightened due to the scarcity of pasture and water. As such the results should be attributed to this particular season as conflict is seasonal and if the assessment had taken place in the wet season the outcome would have been different.

Finally, it should be stressed that the consultants were assessing the *impact* of the peace activities and not whether peace-building activities had occurred or not.

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<sup>2</sup> See bibliography for details

<sup>3</sup> Common border grazing area

### 3. PEACEBUILDING METHODS USED BY THE CAPE UNIT

The methods used by the CAPE Unit have been in constant development and experimentation. Strategies that have been used by the CAPE Unit for brokering and maintaining peace at the grassroots level include:

- 1) Peace meetings to resolve specific issues between stakeholders held in settlements and remote grazing areas
- 2) Burial of hatchets to symbolise community commitment to peace
- 3) Formation of Village Peace Committees to handle violent conflict
- 4) Holding inter-ethnic Women's Peace Crusades through contested areas to open up dialogue between the parties
- 5) Facilitating the return of stolen animals by communities and providing support to local authorities to undertake animal returns

The idea of establishing Village Peace Committees (VPCs) and linking them up with the local administration is currently under implementation in Turkana District. Grassroots institutions are potential conflict-mitigating alternative structures and the basis of the VPCs. In Turkana District the formation of VPCs NGOs and IBAR adopted the "Oxfam model" as developed in Wajir in the Northeastern Province of Kenya by linking community-level structures to a District level committee.

In early 2003, agencies such as IBAR, ITDG and Oxfam assisted in the formation of the Interim Turkana District Peace and Development Committee (ITDPC), which was to be a co-ordinating body of conflict management and resolution at district level. Its composition was made up of representatives from the VPCs plus officials and civil society organisations. This strategy has been widely adopted in the arid and semi-arid districts of Kenya and receives support from Oxfam GB and the World Bank-funded Arid Lands Resource Management Project of the Office of the President.

In an earlier study, 14 VPCs were identified in Kenya (Turkana) and 63 in Uganda (40 in Dodoth, 14 in Matheniko, 9 in Pokot)<sup>4</sup>. Recommendations were made to empower the village elders who can still control the traditional mechanisms of crime detection and punishment in order to enhance the synergies between the local administration and traditional conflict prevention initiatives.

#### **Women's Peace Crusades**

In April 2001, during the Women's Border Harmonisation Workshop Not previously mentioned held in Lokichoggio, the participants suggested a different approach for promoting peace and resolving conflict, the *alokita* or Women's Peace Crusade.

Pastoralist women over the years have been instrumental in fuelling conflict by inciting their husbands and sons to raid for household survival. However, as the main indirect victims of insecurity, they also play the role of traditional peacemakers.

It is the tradition of the women of the Karamojong Cluster to form an *alokita a ngaberu*- a group of women united to compose songs that express powerful messages on issues affecting the

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<sup>4</sup> Formalisation of Village Peace Committees in the Karamoja Cluster. A Consultancy Report for the Organisation of African Unity, August 2001. Give the full reference

community. AU/IBAR has supported women's peace crusades according to this tradition. The women peace crusades were meant to initiate dialogue between the warring factions and target the youth who are the main perpetrators of conflict with peace messages. The dialogues would then be followed up with further meetings to strengthen the peace accords or resolutions passed.

#### **Animal recovery and direct support to the administration**

The non-return of stolen animals or their forcible impoundment by state security forces has almost always triggered revenge raids (*areom*) and brought about an escalation of violence between pastoral communities. AU/IBAR has therefore facilitated several peaceful and forcible animal recoveries in liaison with elders' peace committees and the authorities.

The project has also supported cross-border negotiations, field trips and international travel for the local and national authority representatives to prevent the escalation of violence. These include the Commissioner of Kapoeta, December 2001 and Hon John Munyes, MP Turkana North, March 2003.

#### **4. GENERAL FINDINGS**

As the nature of conflict is dynamic and is influenced by multiple interacting factors, the process of peace building has to be multifaceted for it to have sustainable impact. As such peace-building activities need more than one actor to intervene. So, while reading through this section, the reader should take into account:

- The fact that any impacts discussed herein are mostly due to the combined efforts of all peace-building actors in the areas concerned
- That Turkana (Kwatela section)-Toposa relationships have been difficult since pre-colonial times and these relationships were made worse by the colonial government
- That Turkana (Sonyoka section)- West Pokot relations have also been difficult since the pre-colonial era and more recently the difficult situation has been compounded by political instigation from the Pokot side.

#### **Impact on the local communities**

In general the consultants observed that the creation of awareness/sensitisation on the negative impacts of conflict had been realised. This was observed from all communities and stakeholders interviewed. The local communities had realised the negative repercussions of cattle raiding through the sensitisation efforts of CAPE, the Government and other NGOs. Elders and women had consequently intensified their efforts to educate their youths to try and change their attitudes towards all forms of raiding which include cattle rustling and revenge raids.

The border communities along the Turkana and West Pokot border claimed they feared government intervention in raiding incidences. However, this had not significantly reduced conflict incidences as the Kenyan Government has been known to organise military operations against the raiders so as to capture and return stolen livestock. In these operations a lot of civilian lives were usually lost. The latest such operation took place in January 2004, when the Pokot were forced by the Kenyan Government to return livestock stolen from the Turkana.

The Toposa in Southern Sudan do not fear government interventions, as government activities in Toposa areas as there is no organised government currently in Southern Sudan.

All communities were of the opinion that there was still no peace - even though customary organised raids<sup>5</sup> have subsided, small livestock theft<sup>6</sup> has increased. However, in the last six months two massive raids were recorded. On 5th June, Turkana raided Toposa in Locheriakope water point, stole 940 animals and killed 47 Toposa. The many raids from the Toposa that had gone without revenge prompted the Turkana raid. On 20th November, as the assessment mission was going on, Pokot raided Turkana in Katilu, took 437 cows and 880 shoats.

The community's assessment of the following indicators of peace dividends since 1999 can be summarised as follows:

### **Reduction of insecurity climate and general fear**

All the communities along the three border areas both in the settlements and grazing areas were still suffering from insecurity and fear of their enemies. However in Lokichoggio town and its immediate environs, the fear and insecurity was less. According to PIMU (Pastoralist Integrated Management Association) and LYAS (Lokichoggio Youth Association), both local CBOs, the insecurity was less due to the fear of Kenya Government intervention in reported insecurity incidences. Since Lokichoggio is the operational centre for many humanitarian agencies serving South Sudan, including the UN, the Kenyan Government is obliged to make sure that adequate security is provided to these agencies.

### **Decrease of raids and road banditry**

Most community members interviewed claimed that the organised raids had decreased but small theft had increased. Small theft was found to be extremely frequent (every alternate month among Toposa-Turkana to almost every week among Turkana-Dodoth) to the point that the number of livestock lost in organised raids were sometimes less than the cumulative livestock lost through frequent theft. This observation may be the case during the height of the dry season when the assessment took place but may not be the case during the other seasons.

The decrease of road banditry was acknowledged in Lokichar division (Turkana district) through the efforts of the local administration, the TDPDC and the VPCs.

### **Decrease of loss of property and human life**

Since there was a decrease in organised raids in the homesteads loss of property and above all of human lives had decreased considerably especially along the Turkana-Dodoth border. The Turkana claimed that recently, when animals were stolen the Dodoth instead of killing the herders, usually held them hostage and released them when they were safely in their territory due to the fear of revenge from the Turkana. For example in January 2004, a woman was held hostage when her 32 goats were stolen and was later released when the Dodoth arrived in their territory and were sure that no one was following them.

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<sup>5</sup> Organized raids meant that the raiders were numbering more than 100, the raids were well planned over a long period and they took place in the settlements, where human lives were lost and hundreds of livestock was stolen. These raids also had the blessings of the elders with their so-called generals leading them.

<sup>6</sup> Small theft means that less than 10 young raiders steal livestock from the grazing areas and tens of livestock are stolen, with little or no human lives lost.

### **Natural Resource Sharing**

Lokapelimoe and Lotom, kraal<sup>7</sup> leaders from Zolia and Songot agreed that seeing animals grazing and watering together is the most genuine sign of peace (Burial of the Hatchet speeches, 2002). No shared grazing and watering was observed during the assessment. Grazing agreements had been brokered in the three border areas in the past but none were effective at the time of the assessment due to weak follow-up by CAPE according to the communities interviewed. However there was an agreement that was said to be operational between Ekipor (Turkana) and Lomong (Toposa) but the consultants were unable to verify this as Ekipor was not grazing near the Sudan border at the time of the assessment but was grazing in the interior (near Kaaleng) in Turkana District. In addition, very productive agricultural lands such as Napeitom, Lomelo, Kamuge and Amolem along the Turkana-West border Pokot are still deserted due to insecurity.

### **Freedom of movement to agricultural fields, markets, around the permanent settlement for wild fruits, insects collection and charcoal production**

In the Turkana-West Pokot and Turkana–Toposa border areas, no freedom of movement or trade between the ethnic groups was recorded. However between the Turkana and the Dodoth there recent exchanges were recorded despite the insecurity.

### **Return of Internally Displaced People**

One of the major consequences of conflict in pastoral areas is internal displacement of people to more secure areas (migration toward urban centres, other districts and region). The consultants did not observe any case of returned IDPs. Some settlements and agricultural areas are still deserted especially along the border between Turkana and West Pokot.

### **Increase of inter-ethnic marriages**

The consultants recorded marriages between Turkana and Toposa, and Turkana and Dodoth. However these marriages took place more than two decades ago and are not recent. They were informed that there were no intermarriages between the ethnic communities in the recent past due to the lack of good relations between the communities. The Pokot on the other hand did not marry Turkana women due to the latter not being circumcised.

### **Increase of service delivery (administrative, human and animal health) and development activities**

There had been no increase in service provision or development activities in the sampled areas. The security situation is still not good enough to permit service delivery to take place.

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
<sup>7</sup> Kraal is used in this report to refer to a mobile grazing unit under the authority of a leader

## 5. IMPACT BY SAMPLE AREA, GENDER AND BY STAKEHOLDER

### Study Area 1: Turkana (Kwatela)/Toposa international border area

#### Raids

In this area, raids intensified with the beginning of the civil war, in 1985 when the Sudan People's Liberation Army displaced the Toposa. Peace initiatives spearheaded by Church leaders such as George Kinga (Toposa) and Turkana Chiefs (Barnabas Lochilia) began in 1992. When the CAPE conflict work began in 1999 it complemented these earlier initiatives.



Information collected from this border area suggested that the communities did not consider there being significant impacts of peace initiatives because they associate peace meetings and crusades with conflict incidents. For example during the Turkana Women's Peace Crusade the participants were stopped and threatened by Toposa, because Turkana had stolen Toposa livestock from Natimor earlier while the crusade was taking place. On the day of the burial of the hatchet (October 2002), Toposa raided 1,500 Turkana cows. Turkana revenged and raided 46 cows in Nadapal. The Turkana returned some animals but the Toposa failed to return animal in November 2002. Later the Turkana raided the Toposa in June 2003 and stole over 900 heads of livestock to try and recover their animals.

The association between the animal theft occurring almost at the same time with peace meetings conducted by the CAPE Unit and other peace building actors can be associated with errant youths who do not want to see peace prevailing. They wish to continue raiding for different reasons (bride price, heroism). The concurrent raids with peace efforts are seen as efforts to scuttle the process of peace-building by the youths as most of their influential elders are attending the peace meeting and would therefore have no control over the activities of the youth at that time. This observation was also recorded along the Turkana-West Pokot border during the assessment.

On the other hand, from February 2003 there were no recorded efforts of peace building by the CAPE Unit between the two communities and as the dry season approached, with no grazing agreements being facilitated, violence escalated. The lack of CAPE activities in this area from February 2003 was attributed to delayed funding to the Lodwar office and this hiatus was compounded by the death of a staff member.

#### Grazing

Turkana (Kwatela) lack adequate water sources and grazing during the dry seasons and need to move to Toposa land in Sudan. The last time the two communities shared the grazing area located between Lokichoggio and Nadapal was in 1997. Grazing and watering agreements were brokered between kraal leaders of two *epidings* during the focal meeting held by the CAPE Unit in September 2002:

- Mogila/Naliel *epiding*. This was brokered between Ekipor (Turkana) and Lomong (Toposa). This grazing agreement unfortunately broke up when warriors alleged to have been sent from the *epiding* of Lokapelimoe attacked the kraals of Ekipor.
- Zolia/Songot *epiding*. This was brokered between Lokapelimoe (Toposa) and Lotom (Turkana).

Whilst the first grazing agreement between Ekipor and Lomong was well respected, the second was only partially implemented.

For the third *epiding*, Enyangachor/Nakaleso (Longechelemoi/Apangesesion kraal leaders), a meeting was scheduled in Lopotikol but never took place due to the escalation of conflicts.


### Peace committee

The Toposa elders' peace committee created by CAPE in Sudan of seven members (two Lolim, two Kalacha, two Nakolomai, and one from Narus) only attend peace meetings but are not active in animal recovery. Since the last recovery of animals in November 2002 the Turkana elders' peace committees have not been involved in follow-up of grazing agreements, animal recovery and punishment of thefts. The elders felt that they needed facilitation by other peace-building actors in order to pursue other peace building activities, as they feared being killed if they attempted to pursue these activities on their own.

### Fine system

According to the elders of Mogila, the fine system agreed in September 2002 is not operational because they claim that the Toposa do not return their stolen animals even when the Turkana have returned Toposa animals. The fine system can only work if the warring communities are at least showing efforts of returning stolen animals to each other. But when this is not the case, the issue of fines cannot arise.

## **Study Area 2: Turkana (Lokumong)/Dodoth international border area**



It should be noted that the consultants were unable to interview the Dodoth and therefore the findings of this border area may be biased towards the Turkana.

### Raids

The Turkana (Lokumong) and the Dodoth buried the hatchet in the 1970s. Unlike, the long-lasting burial of the hatchet performed by the southern neighbouring *epiding* (Turkana-Woyakwaran/Jie) in 1973, it broke up in 1982 while the two communities were grazing together in Timu (Uganda).

In 2002, the forcible disarmament in Uganda affected the grazing relations between the Dodoth and the Turkana. In February 2002, the Ugandan Peoples' Defence Force (UPDF) confiscated guns, rounded up livestock and captured three Turkana women at the border. The animals were returned at Oropoi on 18 March 2002 after the CAPE Unit sponsored Hon. Munyes, the Turkana North MP, to go Moroto to negotiate the release of the women and livestock. The elders of Apamulele classified this intervention as the best peace initiative because it illustrated that the government was capable of assisting them. Currently, the presence of UPDF is still seen as disruptive as the Turkana allege that the UPDF arm the Dodoth for raiding purposes and are then rewarded with some of the stolen livestock.

From August to October 2002, the two ethnic groups coexisted relatively peacefully. During this period they exchanged calves and bulls. Stealing began again in November/December 2002 when they shared grazing grounds at Kamion. In December 2002, the CAPE Unit facilitated the return of 12 cows stolen by Turkana youths from Oropoi in Kamion. The Turkana also returned 3 goats in November 2003 but apparently the Dodoth have not returned any livestock and have continued stealing.

The elders from the Turkana Lokumong section denied stealing from the Dodoth and blamed a neighbouring Turkana section, the Woyakwaran, for these offences. The last Turkana raid in Dodoth (six goats) was attributed to the Woyakwaran. Edoie (Lokumong section Kraal Leader) captured the goats and had them returned to the Dodoth so that the Dodoth do not take revenge on the Lokumong.

According to the Turkana (Lokumong), they have not been revenging because:

- They comply with the message of peace given by their administration
- If they organise revenge raids, they would become vulnerable to their other enemies such as the Toposa
- They cannot provoke the Dodoth because the water point they use at the height of the dry season is located in Dodoth land.

#### Grazing

The Turkana (Lokumong) lack adequate water sources and pasture in the dry season and therefore need to migrate to Uganda. The current tensions are manifested by the gathering of the three Turkana (Lokumong) kraals (Edoie/Akadae/Apamulele) in one grazing area (Naporoto) in Kenya. This gathering is also used for defence purposes as they own approximately 5,000 cows altogether. The women still complain about the fear of being attacked while gathering wild fruits around the river, when they travel from the kraal to Oropoi market and to the watering points.

#### Marriage

Turkana men used to marry Dodoth women but Dodoth men never married Turkana women. There have been very few inter-marriages since the 1980s.

#### Peace Committee

The Oropoi peace committee was created in 1996. It is composed of 10 representatives from the Edoie kraal and 10 representatives from Akadae and Apamulele kraals. It includes four women. In March, November and December 2003, the Oropoi peace committee sent letters to the peace committee of Kalapata (Dodoth land) for peace negotiations without response. Due to the fear of being killed by the Dodoth, they are using the Teuso from Uganda who act as mediators between the Dodoth and the Turkana. The Teuso are an agricultural community that also inhabits the border areas between Kenya and Uganda, and because they do not own livestock, the pastoralists find them appropriate mediators, as they have no vested interests in cattle rustling.




### Study Area 3: Turkana (Sonyoka) /Pokot internal border

#### Raids

The conflict between the Pokot and the Turkana is said to have escalated after Kenya attained independence from Britain in 1963. The escalation began with the killing of a prominent Turkana elder called Atiktik. The Pokot of the plains from Tikit village allege that they were forcibly displaced from Amoler by the Turkana in 1988.

According to both ethnic groups, peace activities have had limited impact due to the frequency of theft and raids. Conflict between the two communities intensified in November 2002 after the murder of a Pokot *laibon* (witchdoctor) that culminated in the Kainuk massacre in April 2003 where 8 Turkana were killed in cold blood. When the Turkana peace crusaders came back from Samakituk, the Pokot had raided Lorogon. The security meeting held in Nakwamoru in November 2003 was followed the day after by a massive Pokot raid in Katilu. Grazing areas and watering points were pointed out as the targeted areas for animal theft. The Turkana and the Pokot both denied that they raid each other because they have internalised and appreciated the peace messages being delivered to them by the government, CAPE and other NGOs, and therefore discourage their youth from raiding. The Turkana admitted going to recover their animals from the Pokot. However records show that both sides raid each other every so often.



#### Marriages

The Pokot do not marry Turkana, as Turkana women are not circumcised.

#### Trade

The only path of trade recorded between the Pokots and Turkana was Kasei-Lorogon. This may be attributed to the heavy presence of Kenya government security forces (GSU) at Lorogon.

#### Grazing

When the Pokot are affected by drought, they go to graze in Turkana land with prior arrangement. According to the Pokot elders, the last time they shared grazing with Turkana in Kainuk was in 2000/2001 when they were affected by the prolonged drought. This grazing agreement was brokered between the elders of both communities with assistance from the local administration. According to the Pokot youths, they shared Kainuk grazing area from January 2003 until April 2003. There was no raiding at the time but the raids resumed in the rainy season.

It appears that shared grazing and watering agreements made through the CAPE Unit in February and March 2003 between Nakukulas and Lokwamosing and Nakukulas and Amaler have been broken by the raiding of the kraal leader Tebaris from another *epiding* (East Baringo). There are currently no joint patrols and very productive agricultural land such as that at Napeitom, Lomelo, Kamuge and Amolem is still deserted.

### Peace Committees

In Nakukulas, there is a peace committee of 15 members created by the CAPE Unit in December 2002. The members attend peace meetings, educate the youths and strategise on animal recovery in close collaboration with the local administration. They have thus been highly successful in the recovery of livestock (July and September 2003).

### **Impact disaggregated according to gender (elders, women, youths)**

The CAPE Unit made considerable efforts to involve all key actors in their peace building activities. However elders and women have been the main participants of the peace activities in all the sample areas with the youths not being sufficiently involved.

### **Elders**

Elders from all communities interviewed have appreciated the CAPE Unit's efforts at peace building. Many elders interviewed had attended the CAPE Unit peace building activities as representatives from their communities. However despite the elders' efforts in advising the youths against raiding, the raiding and theft continue. Elders from Toposa even gave examples of incidents where the armed youths have turned on and killed their parents when advised against raiding.

Elders from Turkana, Pokot and Toposa border areas claimed they had not realised the positive impacts/ peace dividends of the peace building process as the raids and the thefts were still ongoing. Elders suggested that the peace building activities should continue with the strengthening of the VPCs and some even suggested disarmament on all sides. Other suggestions included targeting the youths in more peace building activities. The CAPE Unit's efforts at targeting the youths through the holding of meetings in the grazing areas and through the women's peace crusade had been appreciated but more needed to be done in terms of regular follow-up of resolutions in those meetings.

In terms of increased capacity of the elders to be able to manage conflict, the peace committee of Nakukulas (Sonyoka) and had been very successful in forcible animal recovery where they plan the recovery of animals and have strategic planning meetings when there is a threat of a raid after having spotted footprints of the Pokot. In Oropoi Turkana (Lokumong) the elders had managed to return three goats on their own without any facilitation. In terms of being able to negotiate and curtail any impending raids or theft, the elders from the three communities had not been successful as all claimed that they feared for their lives if they were to embark on these peace missions with their enemies.

### **Women**

Women interviewed from the three ethnic groups had also appreciated the CAPE Unit's efforts. In Turkana and Toposa, the women who had taken part in the women's crusades thought it was an innovative peace building idea; however they failed to see the impact the crusades had made due to the continuing raids and theft even, in some cases, while the crusades are going on. Some key rural women leaders, such as Atapar Longelia, could not attend the peace activities due the burden of housework. They therefore claimed it was for urban women.

According to the women, they advise their own youths against raiding but their youths are usually provoked by the enemy and therefore feel they have to retaliate. A woman crusader from Toposa land however reiterated that despite the continuing raid and thefts peace building activities should continue.

Women from the three ethnic groups are of the opinion that the peace building activities may have greater impact with the continuous targeting the youths in the grazing areas and the active involvement of the youths in the follow-up activities of peace meetings.

### **Youths**

Despite the CAPE Unit's efforts to reach the youths with peace meetings being held in the grazing areas and Women's Peace Crusades, the few youths interviewed had not been involved in peace building activities. Turkana youths interviewed claimed that in addition to not being involved sufficiently, their elders did not appreciate their opinions as they were seen to be stubborn. The Toposa youths had not been involved in the peace building activities as most of the time they were taking care of the animals in the grazing areas and watering points far from the places where the peace meetings and crusades were being held.

In Turkana South, the women of Nakukulas mentioned that the youths are not sufficiently involved. The Pokot youths blame the Turkana youths "*karacunas*" from Nakwamuru for the raiding and counter raiding. However, some Pokot youths had accompanied the Women's Crusade to Turkana. Pokot youths claimed that they were prepared to hold meetings with their Turkana counterparts to resolve the issues of grazing.

Both elders and women emphasised an increase in youth criminality. Youth criminality is also mentioned in the CAPE Unit reports: "*Phelix Palal gave the chronology of events that led to a bloody fight between the Toposa and the Turkana. According to the elder, two Toposa youth men invited a group of Turkana youth to their home assuming from their look; they are the Nyangatom. The visitors turned on the young Toposa men killing them in cold blood using machetes. The gang of murderers came across five old men holding a discussion under a traditional tree and shot them to death. The wanton killings continued. The spate of killings alarmed the Toposa who perceived it as provocation by the Turkana*". (Akoret, Kapoeta, Chemolingot peace follow-up meeting, July 2002).

In addition to raiding for bride price, youth alcoholism is a problem that was also observed. It is also mentioned in an AU/IBAR report: "*Kula Kolea said the unbecoming noticeable behaviour among the youth especially from Kotoa division is drinking alcohol indiscriminately in the villages on credit and when they fail to settle the bills, a raid is organised where raided animals are sold to settle debts*" (ibid.).

Payment of school fees was also identified as another contributing factor for raids by educated youths.

### **Impact on development stakeholders**

Generally, partners such as government institutions, NGOs and CBOs and local authorities appreciate the cross-border work of the CAPE Unit and their unique approach with the Women Peace Crusades that promote cross-border dialogue. However, they felt that the CAPE Unit needs to involve them more in the planning of its activities and that the project should concentrate on conflict prevention activities rather than crisis management.

Conflict prevention activities can include regular peace meetings between the warring communities with the frequency being intensified just before the onset of the dry season. It could also include, the enhancement of developmental activities such as water development occurring at the same time as the regular peace meetings and the support to grass-root CBOs to undertake the follow-up of meetings.

Currently the perception of the stakeholders was that the CAPE Unit moved into the conflict cycle after conflict had occurred, which was often too late as livestock had already been stolen and lives lost. For effective conflict management, the peace- building actors need to have interventions at every stage of the conflict cycle through collaboration and networking. It is this collaborative effort by all actors that will assist in the ultimate reduction of incidents.

### **Relations with NGOs and CBOs**

Most of the CAPE Units activities have been implemented in partnership with other international NGOs, especially ITDG, VSF-B, SNV in Kenya and church institutions such as DoT in Southern Sudan. Additionally, most partners gave credit to the CAPE for initiating the Women's Peace Crusades as a unique approach.

Whilst acknowledging the tremendous efforts of the CAPE Unit in peace building most partners pointed out the following weaknesses:

- Lack of participatory planning. Most partners in Turkana and Toposa areas wanted to be included in the planning phases of the CAPE Unit's activities so that they can adequately prepare for the activities in which they are required to contribute to. The CAPE Unit had not held activities in West Pokot district except the women's crusade in which most partners from West Pokot were not involved.
- All partners felt that the CAPE office based in Lodwar lacked sufficient capacity in terms of adequate staff for the effective implementation of their activities. Hence most activities tend to be implemented in Turkana District. The partners also felt that the CAPE Unit needed to employ staff from the communities they were assisting in peace building and conflict management such as Pokot, Dodoth and Toposa. Currently there are no staff from these communities in the Lodwar office, although there is a mixture of Karamojong and Turkana staff members. The partners were of the opinion that the impact of the peace building would be better if implemented by staff from their own ethnic communities as opposed to being implemented by staff from their enemy community.
- Lack of support to peace committees. Whilst the CAPE Unit has attempted to form peace committees at the village level (including areas such as Nakukulas), other partners such as ITDG, World Vision MAPOTU and VSF-B have made significant progress in this area. They would appreciate more collaboration from the CAPE Unit in terms of support to the formation or the existing peace committees for conflict prevention activities. Peace committees at the grass-root level are the most effective institutions for sustainable local conflict management.
- Limited support to local CBOs. The CBO umbrella organisation in Turkana TUDOF, and LYAS had not received support from the CAPE Unit despite several requests, neither had TDA in Sudan for peace building activities. However, the CAPE Unit had assisted PIMO, KOMDEI and ECOREDEP. In West Pokot the CAPE Unit still implement its activities through Community –based Animal Health Workers (CAHWs), instead of liaising with the new local CBOs such as PEDP.

It should be noted though, that the current CAPE Unit USAID funding is restrictive and cannot be utilized to support CBOs in West Pokot but only on the Kenya-Sudan border as stipulated in

the funding agreement. However the CAPE Unit is currently seeking approval for support to CBOs in other project areas.

Another point to note is that most CBOs are relatively new and have been formed in the last two years. As such they still lack capacity for effective project implementation. We feel that the CAPE Unit still has a role to play in strengthening the new CBOs capacities in various fields by supporting the district umbrella organizations such as TUDOF in Turkana district, which build the capacities of new CBOs.

### **Relations with governments political and administrative structures**

- The relations between the CAPE Unit project and the local authorities are good in Turkana district. According to the Assistant Chiefs of Lokichar, the collaboration between the local authority and the community has improved due to the peace initiatives by the CAPE Unit and other actors such as WV MAPOTU (creation of Village Peace Committees). More criminal reports are relayed by the community to the elders, chiefs, councillors and Police via peace committees. Hence highway banditry in Lokichar division has been curbed. However, it is important to mention that the improved security in some parts of southern Turkana can also be attributed to the deployment of administrative Police along the Pokot/Turkana border while there are GSU patrols in Lorogon.
- In Southern Sudan, the relationship between the CAPE Unit and the Kapoeta County authorities could be better. Issues of following protocol, consultation and participatory planning of activities especially conflict prevention with the authorities in Sudan can be improved upon.
- In West Pokot, the local administration had hardly been involved in the CAPE Unit activities as most activities other than the Women's Peace Crusade took place in Turkana district.

### **Impacts on root causes of conflict**

The root causes of conflict in the Karamojong Cluster range from competition over dry season grazing areas and water points (Turkana - Dodoth), bride price (Toposa), heroism, to wealth and border disputes (Turkana - Pokot). All these causes have been exacerbated by the proliferation of small arms and, in Southern Sudan, the lack of an effective government. The following points show the CAPE Unit's efforts in addressing root causes.

- **Behaviour Change:** The CAPE Unit has made tremendous inroads at creating awareness/sensitisation and education with the aim of changing cultural behaviours that contribute to reasons for raiding such as heroism, dowry and revenge. This was echoed by all stakeholders.
- **Sustainable Natural Resource Management:** The CAPE Unit also attempted to address the issue of resource management with the facilitation of grazing agreements and the establishment of judicial mechanisms to ensure their enforcement. The systematic failure of 'goodwill' statements and declarations made in peace meetings was associated with the absence of key community leaders<sup>8</sup>, weak participation of

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<sup>8</sup> According to Darlington Akabwai, the absence of Toposa key leaders in the Nanam meeting is the cause of the Lopotikol massacre

youths and the local authorities, especially the state security organs (army and police) and weak follow-up.

- **Governance:** The CAPE Unit has also made efforts to enhance international administrative and political communication and collaboration. A more active role in lobbying the state security organs to get actively involved in international border conflict management would be necessary. The lobbying here would be targeted through the National Steering Committee on Conflict Management and Peace Building.
- **Development:** The CAPE Unit has made limited efforts at directly addressing developmental issues such as increasing access to water in dry grazing areas, lobbying for the settlement of border disputes advocacy towards the control of small arms in the region
- It should also be noted that developmental projects such as the Turkwell Gorge Dam, economic ventures such as the irrigation project in Turkana land and Nasolot Game reserve have contributed to the escalation of conflict between the Pokot and Turkana as each community feels that they should be the ones benefiting economically from these ventures and not the other as the ventures are located along the border areas.
- The CAPE Unit does not provide animal health services directly but has technically facilitated international NGOs such as SNV and VSF-B in the provision of these services. The CAPE Unit has also supported the privatisation of CAHWs trained by the two NGOs. However, resources could be set aside to support other actors whose mandate is in other development sectors such as water. In as much as animal health services have been facilitated, communities such as the Kwatela and Lokumong among the Turkana claimed that water was their most pressing need, while the Pokot claim that the settlement of border disputes was their priority.

## **6. ANALYSIS OF IMPACT**

### **Reduction of Conflicts**

Communities who participated in the assessment claim the number of big raids had reduced but small thefts had increased. Yet by and large the same communities were not yet realising peace dividends such as trade, reduction of fear, joint patrols, access to common grazing areas and increased intermarriages among others.

The dynamic nature of conflict makes it a difficult phenomenon to control and to attribute its reduction to a particular actor or a particular intervention. This is because the root causes and the factors that contribute to the magnification of the root causes are numerous, intertwined and intricate. There are also many actors in conflict management and resolution attempting to grapple with this chronic problem using various methodologies and approaches. The reduction of conflict in the Karamoja Cluster even in the smallest quantities can therefore only be attributed to the sum total of the efforts of all actors. Actors can only hope to contribute to conflict reduction and cannot attribute any conflict reduction to themselves alone as partnership and collaboration with others is inevitable.

For example the Turkana-Dodoch border was found to be less volatile than the Turkana-Toposa or the Turkana-Pokot borders, meaning that the peace efforts in this area from the CAPE Unit, ITDG, the local authorities, the Catholic Mission had succeeded to some extent. This improved situation resulted in more communication between the Dodoch and Turkana on dry season grazing and the return of livestock and the two communities had been exchanging livestock in barter trade. It is to be noted that at the time of the assessment all these achievements were halted due to the increase of livestock theft by the Dodoch on a daily basis. As explained above, this was due to the onset of the dry season and the concurrent increase in tension.

While tackling conflict, actors need to target the whole cycle of conflict from the mitigation phase to the prevention, crisis and resolution phases. Most actors however target some phases and not others. Reduction of conflict cannot be realised when efforts are only targeted at the crisis phase and very limited efforts are geared towards the conflict management, conflict transformation and peace building phases where maintenance or efforts for sustainability of peace is vital. This can only be done through development activities and regular follow-up of peace agreements and resolutions. Without these, conflict reduction is only achieved temporarily and conflict escalates again in similar or worse proportions and the cycle begins again.

### **Community capacity to manage conflicts**

The capacity of communities to manage conflicts can be increased by supporting peace structures, especially at the grass-root levels such as the Village Peace Committees and through CBOs who are permanently on the ground with the communities. The efforts by various actors in the three border areas studied have gained momentum in this direction with Turkana district having an interim District Peace and Development Committee and Village Peace Committees in West Pokot. In Sudan Kapoeta County is in the process of forming district peace committees similar to the Turkana model, all of which are based on the Wajir model of peace committees.

Information collected by the consultants from the three different ethnic groups shows that the communities used to honour peace agreements and even international borders during the colonial era and there were well established networks of communication between the different ethnic groups. The groups used these networks to request for permission to enter dry season

grazing areas, to negotiate for the return of livestock and to negotiate with each other for peace. These networks are still present but weak. Since the proliferation of small arms and the onset of the war in Southern Sudan, the respect for these traditional mechanisms has been eroded. However we feel that they can be strengthened and be made to function as they did in the past, as communities tend to own and honour their own traditional mechanisms better than conventional peace building mechanisms that are introduced by outsiders.

### **Institutional constraints**

Institutional constraints within the CAPE Unit also played a role in the realisation of impacts in the Karamojong Cluster.

- The weak follow-up mechanisms of peace activities in all the operation areas due to under-staffing. It is important to note that the impact assessment was conducted when the CAPE Unit had just undergone personnel difficulties, which saw two staff being lost from the Lodwar office for various reasons.
- On the other hand, the lack of support to Kenyan CBOs is at least partially explained by donor constraints as explained above.
- Interruption of activities late in 2003 is also associated with a 3 month delay in the release of donor funds by one of the core donors. These led to the CAPE Unit not being able to facilitate any peace building activities. This hiatus was compounded by the death of one staff member.

## **7. RECOMMENDATIONS**

This section elaborates on recommendations suggested by the consultants with input from the target communities, international NGOs, CBOs and the local administrations from the three border areas sampled.

The multiplication of un-coordinated peace initiatives in the Karamojong Cluster over the past decades has been a source of turmoil. It is recommended that all actors, especially the international NGOs and the CAPE Unit, increase their co-operation and collaboration efforts at the district and national levels. They should as much as possible support the implementation of grass-root peace building structures as the impacts of the CAPE Unit, both in peace dividends and increasing capacity of local communities would be better with sufficient monitoring structures at the lowest levels.

### **Peace dividends**

In order to increase peace dividends the recommendations suggested were:

- Increase collaboration and participatory planning with local authorities, in Southern Sudan, Uganda and Pokot. The Sudanese and Kenyan authorities are still stressing the need for the provision of radio frequencies that can be utilised across borders for better conflict monitoring. Since this recommendation was made in the 2001 review and is still being stressed, the CAPE Unit having a cross-border mandate should explore the feasibility of this request.
- Establish bases in Sudan, Uganda and Pokot and employ indigenous staff from those areas or increase support to established CBOs in those areas such as TDA in Southern



Sudan and PEDP in Pokot. This recommendation was also made in the 2001 study and in November 2002 by the CAPE Unit field mission to Southern Sudan. A significant step towards this goal has been realised with the implementation of the Sudan Peace Fund Project with an established base in Kapoeta, Southern Sudan by the CAPE Unit.

- The facilitation of Hon. Munyes to Uganda by the CAPE Unit, to negotiate return of livestock stolen from the Turkana was highly appreciated by the Turkana and had a lot of positive impact on the way the Turkana viewed the government. the CAPE Unit can scale up this type of effort in other border areas.
- Identify, prioritise and plan activities in collaboration with other partners in the Karamojong Cluster such as the international NGOs, umbrella institutions such as the ITPDC and TUDOF as this was found to be weak. This includes increased participation in district forums such as the District Steering Group meetings.
- Greater effort is required to positively engage youths in peace building. the CAPE Unit has attempted to involve the youths by holding meetings in the grazing areas and using the women crusades to reach and influence the youths but these efforts have not resulted in sufficient impacts on the behaviour of youths. The youths suggested that they be involved in regular fortnightly inter-communal meetings. It is also recommended that they be engaged in developmental activities that will earn them a living (diversified livelihoods) so that they cease to view their main source of livelihood as livestock keeping. They can also be involved in peace monitoring activities such as the collection and collation of conflict data while sensitising their own communities about conflict issues. The CAPE Unit could collaborate with other developmental actors who specialise in diversified livelihoods for this.
- If the CAPE Unit cannot enter directly into the development arena it should enhance its support to the other actors implementing development activities in animal health, water and pasture management as development which reinforces peace gains has been shown to be one of the most effective ways of maintaining peace.

### **Community capacity to manage conflicts**

In order to increase the capacity of the communities to manage conflicts, the consultants recommend:

- Support the existing traditional negotiation mechanisms for grazing agreements and return of livestock. The communities seem to honour these agreements more readily than new treaties brokered by 'outsiders'. For example, before every dry season support could be given for the elders to meet and broker grazing agreements amongst themselves before they move to the dry season grazing area. The communities along the three border areas informed the consultants that they were willing to negotiate with each other for grazing agreements. Efforts should therefore be geared towards assisting the bordering communities to meet and broker their own peace agreements.
- Support and strengthen the district and village peace structures, through training and facilitation in terms of finance and materials through the DPDCs. The funding and institutional capacity building would still rely on external aid, however the fine system (compensation or penalties against crime) can be used to finance the peace committees as already practised in some areas.

- Support local CBOs in terms of finance and/or materials for mobilisation, assisting in the formation of grass-root peace structures and general capacity building through trainings such as group management and leadership. This can be done through the umbrella organizations such as TUDOF. This support should be well designed with exit strategies in place at the onset as the support after some time can lead to the development of the dependency syndrome on the part of the CBOs and therefore lack of sustainability. The CAPE Unit can learn from the Oxfam GB capacity building and institutional strengthening programme in Wajir which has documented many experiences and lessons from the implementation of a similar process.

## **Rethinking the CAPE Unit Strategy**

The lack of peace dividends by the communities was mostly associated with the CAPE Unit's lack of capacity to follow-up the resolutions agreed upon in peace meetings themselves. This has been attributed to the lack of capacity in the Lodwar office in terms of inadequate staff levels. The three conflict border areas are far apart with conflict present almost all the time in one form or another. The human resources at the Lodwar office are insufficient to deal with all these problems all the time. We therefore foresee the following three scenarios from which the CAPE Unit needs to choose from in their new strategy.

### Scenario One

Increase staff and resources to deal with all the operation areas, taking into account the stakeholders views of employing personnel from the warring communities as explained in Section 2.4.

### Scenario Two

Concentrate on cross-border work, especially Sudan and Uganda. Handover internal border conflict (West Pokot-Turkana) to other relevant peace organisations that have more capacity such as World Vision, Oxfam GB, ITDG and the NCKK.

In these two scenarios, prioritisation of activities to achieve better impact is necessary. For example the resources that were used by ITDG and CAPE for the celebration of the burial of the hatchet between the Turkana and the Matheniko, which was brokered by themselves in the 1970s, could have been channelled to support the meetings to follow-up grazing agreements between the Turkana and the Toposa, and the Turkana the Dodoth. These two communities were requesting for meetings due to the escalation of raids/theft that were going on at the time and which were bound to increase in the dry season due to lack of prior grazing agreements.

### Scenario three

Instead of direct implementation of peace building activities, CAPE could channel funds and technical advice through new local peace structures such as DPDCs, VPCs and CBOs and concentrate on policy lobbying and advocacy at district, national and international levels. Needless to say policy-influencing should be informed by peace building activities of CAPE's grassroots partners whose lobbying and advocacy capacities should be built/ strengthened. Lobbying and advocacy should target the following areas:

- Small arms and disarmament, national security such as border policing, increasing border police and KPRs and reviewing the role of the paramilitary institutions such as the KPR. This can be done through supporting the work of the National Steering Committee on Conflict Management and Peace-building based in Nairobi.

- Increasing development interventions such as water, animal health services and infrastructure in these conflict prone areas by governments and developmental agencies. Lobbying can be channelled through existing lobbying networks such as the Pastoralist Development Network of Kenya.
- For the Turkana–Toposa border area, the lobbying for the establishment of a new government in South Sudan is extremely important as the Toposa blamed the lack of peace enforcement to the lack of a legitimate government. Through the new conflict programme in the AU, the CAPE Unit can influence this process.

## **8. CONCLUSION**

The efforts of peace building by the CAPE Unit are commendable, with the creation of awareness and sensitisation having been well internalised by the target communities. There is however, a real need for CAPE to seriously re-strategise on a pragmatic way forward which will deliver the greatest impact from its peace building work. We have made some suggestions in our recommendations, which we hope IBAR will thoroughly review.

In this assessment it was found that the efforts at awareness creation such as Women’s Peace Crusades and meetings by the CAPE Unit have been successful in all the operational areas and there has been some success in reducing violent conflict along the Turkana-Dodoto border. In addition livestock recovery by the peace committee in Nakukulas along the Turkana - Pokot border has also increased showing improved capacity of the community to manage conflict. The consultants are of the view that this analysis accurately reflects the situation on the ground.

Better, more participatory and more rigorous prioritisation of the CAPE Unit’s operational activities in the Cluster would lead to financial resources being spent on interventions that will yield maximum impact such as following-up resolutions agreed upon in meetings and facilitating government officials in peace negotiations.

Finally the consultants believe there are numerous opportunities that currently exist, that can be exploited for the yield of better results and greater impacts especially with participatory planning with all stakeholders and direct support to district and village new peace structures that would contribute to the sustainability of peace.

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