

# Enabling Successful Migration for Youth in Addis Ababa

A Policy Paper for Save the Children

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## Executive Summary

Ethiopia has made major gains in the past decade, with strong economic growth, significant improvements in education and health, and a progressive new prime minister determined to further increase the pace of change. However, one of the country's major challenges lies in addressing the needs of its rapidly growing youth population, with 70% of the population under the age of 30 and almost 50% under the age of 15.<sup>1</sup> Young Ethiopian job-seekers are involved in a complex web of migration patterns within the country, as well as in the larger Horn of Africa region. This study focuses on the livelihoods of youth who have migrated from rural regions to Addis Ababa, who generally have one of three plans: stay in Addis Ababa for the long term, return home to their village, or migrate abroad, often to the Middle East. If Save the Children is considering supporting this population in the future, it is critical that the organization understand young migrants' aspirations - where they want to go, who they want to be, and what success means for them - to support them towards these aims.

This research intends to answer the following key research question and sub-questions:  
**How does the definition of success differ between Ethiopian youth who come to Addis Ababa with different ultimate intended destinations?**

- i. How do migrants define success and failure?
- ii. How do these definitions differ depending on one's migration plan?
- iii. Which general characteristics are associated with migrants who have different migration plans?
- iv. What is the role of different livelihood strategies, both before and after migration, in a migrant's ultimate degree of success?

The Enabling Successful Migration for Youth in Addis Ababa study employed a mixed methods approach to answer these questions, including 54 semi-structured qualitative interviews and a quantitative survey of 84 respondents. The data was collected in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia between June-August, 2018. The research team selected respondents using a purposive sampling approach which considered gender, region of origin, and occupation in addition to the main inclusion criteria of age (between 18-30) and time since arrival in Addis Ababa (five years or less). The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework informed both the design of the data collection tools, as well as the analysis of results. The data was analyzed using NVivo for qualitative interview transcriptions and STATA for quantitative analysis of the survey. The quantitative analysis included mainly simple linear regressions using either Ordinary Least Squares or a logistic model, and occasionally some multivariate analysis and a series of ordered logistic regressions. The main limitations of the survey are the small sample size and non-random sampling methods, which limit the generalizability of these findings.

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<sup>1</sup> Assefa Admassie, Seid Nuru, and Shelley Megquier, "Harnessing the Demographic Dividend in Ethiopia," *Population Reference Bureau* (blog), August 1, 2017, <https://www.prb.org/harnessing-the-demographic-dividend-in-ethiopia/>.

## Key Findings

This first portion of this section focuses on descriptive findings which explain the rural contexts which youth migrants come from, their journeys to the city, and what their everyday life is like in Addis Ababa. After, a discussion of migration plans (staying in Addis Ababa, returning home, or migrating abroad), and definitions of success and failure leads to a summary of the factors most closely associated with both success and failure. Finally, I present some recommendations on how Save the Children can build on these findings and incorporate them into future work.

Most respondents came from large, poor farming families and were one of the oldest children. Their families often have land, but land that is either small or poor quality. There are huge gender divides in land inheritance, with only 10% of female respondents expecting to inherit land, despite laws guaranteeing equal access for women. Even those youth (primarily men) who do expect to inherit land are often uninterested in the prospect due to a desire for independence, distaste for rural lifestyles, and hope for a non-agricultural livelihood. About  $\frac{1}{3}$  of respondents experienced a livelihood shock of some type at home. These shocks can come from illness, drought, and price shocks, but also from family conflict due to divorce and remarriage of parents.

Respondents were often students immediately prior to migration, though they have diverse educational backgrounds, ranging from no formal education up to a college degree. While at home, youth often juggled a tension between a desire to attend school and family pressure to spend their time either helping with home chores (primarily for women) or agricultural chores (primarily for men). With their time spread so thin, there was not much time to pursue other pastimes or join local voluntary organizations. For many young migrants, when education became infeasible for one reason or another – parental pressure to focus on home or farm chores, inability to afford school materials, or failure on the national exam – migration to Addis Ababa became the next best alternative. While a few respondents had worked before, most had never had any type of livelihood independent of their families.

About  $\frac{3}{4}$  of respondents came straight from their homes to Addis, with no experience migrating to another place. The most important factors leading to a decision to migrate were “a desire to change their lives,” an inability to pursue education, a lack of opportunity, poverty, or a livelihood shock. Many youth come to Addis Ababa in order to “change their lives.” This aspiration comes from peer influence and an expectation of plentiful and lucrative job opportunities. There is also a widespread assumption that jobs in Addis Ababa are both plentiful and higher paying than work in the village. Although land access is a structural force that shapes how youth are brought up and how they think about their future, it does not seem to be a major, immediate driver of youth’s decisions to migrate to Addis Ababa. The same is true for early marriage, which might not play as great of a role in recent migration to Addis Ababa as previously believed.

Upon arrival in the city, men and women tend to rely on different social networks for support. While women often depend on older relatives, men depend on their peers, usually other friends who came from the same village. Women tend to have a smaller social network than men. We also learned that, while having a link to someone already residing in Addis Ababa is important, it's also the strength of that link and how much they are willing to go out of their way to assist young migrants that really matters.

As youth begin to build a livelihood in Addis Ababa, one of the most urgent needs is finding a job. Social networks are the most important for finding jobs, but sometimes education, training, and relevant experience can also be helpful. Employment brokers are a flawed but vital part of the job search and migration process, particularly for young women. It can also help to be, as youth describe, "active" - a term that encompasses being outgoing, sociable, hardworking, and generally willing to go out of their way to find new people and make new connections

The majority of survey respondents' jobs fall along four categories, from most to least represented: self-employed, wage labor for an institution, casual laborers, and domestic workers. Certain characteristics are closely associated with specific types of work. For example, wage laborers were associated with the highest levels of education. Young migrants don't often perform multiple jobs at once, but they do tend to switch from one job to another fairly regularly.

Youth migrants tend to value jobs with sufficient incomes, flexibility, independence, as well as collaboration and skill building opportunities. Those who are self-employed seem particularly satisfied. Other youth complained about working long hours with minimal breaks, being asked to perform "tedious" tasks, and a persistent sense of anxiety and uncertainty about covering their expenses. Those who work as wage laborers or domestic workers are also often unsatisfied by their relationships with their employers. The most desired job for young women is a restaurant owner, but women's interests vary between many different positions. Men, on the other hand, are generally more focused solely on working in a SME or becoming a driver. Women also sometimes struggle in naming a preferred future livelihood.

The average income was about 51 USD per month, but depends a great deal on the type of job. On average, the monthly income was highest among casual laborers (\$67), then self-employed (\$50), wage laborers (\$43), and domestic workers (\$31). However, it is important to note that casual laborers face the most uncertainty in their livelihood since they find work on a day-to-day basis, while domestic workers can save almost all of their salary because they have limited living expenses. The factors most closely associated with having a higher income were being a casual laborer and having completed a previous migration.

Managing money is often a major challenge, particularly paying for high housing costs. Young men and women have different ways of coping with high living expenses. It is common for young men to share small and cheap housing with many other young men. Women, on the other time, sometimes work "full time" jobs like housemaid, bartender, or waitress, in which

the employer provides housing and meals. Despite challenges in managing finances, most respondents (81%) are still able to save some amount of their income. Bank accounts are the most common way to save, and some youth – especially young men – participate in traditional rotating savings groups called *equbs*. The most common motivation for saving is to start a business.

Young migrants often expressed a keen interest in education. Some youth came to Addis Ababa with a plan to simultaneously work and resume their education, though this proved to be more difficult in practice. Some other youth migrate to Addis Ababa only during the summer holidays from school to earn their school fees for the next year.

There is a progressive hierarchy of social relationships. At the lowest level are small-scale and frequent exchanges of money with peers and coworkers. On a slightly deeper level are people whom youth would feel comfortable asking for a larger loan or for help during an emergency. The deepest level of trust in this hierarchy are the people with whom youth would celebrate holidays with or ask to serve as their guarantor for a job or ID. Having a guarantor or an Addis Ababa Resident ID card can open many doors, but there are a number of bureaucratic, political, social, and economic barriers preventing youth from accessing these resources. New Addis Ababa acquaintances are mostly relied upon for more surface-level exchanges, while migrants depend on the closest connection - often family members - for the deeper relationship exchanges. Some youth complain that it can be very difficult to form close bonds with others in Addis Ababa. The most common barriers toward building new social connections are language and cultural divides, low levels of trust, and discrimination.

Most respondents are unable to send regular remittances to their families at home. Instead, they maintain ties through regular communication. However, this does not mean they share all realities of life in the city. In fact, most youth migrants intentionally protect loved ones from learning the more difficult details of their lives. The most common shocks experienced in Addis include unemployment, illness, theft, loss of merchandise, and homelessness. Youth cope with these difficulties by relying on social networks, finding solace in their religions, depleting savings, skipping meals, and sometimes substance abuse.

When they arrived, qualitative respondents were fairly divided on whether they wanted to stay or return home. A majority of survey respondents said that they arrived with no clear plan at all, followed by those who planned to stay only until they reached a particular savings goal. Since then, many of their plans have evolved. At this point, there seems to be the highest amount of interest in staying in Addis Ababa, but there are still a fair number of respondents who plan to return home or migrate abroad.

Young migrants who plan to stay in the city tend to have strong social capital, both from pre-existing links and new friendships that they've managed to form. The data also shows that they might come from poorer families due to smaller plots of land and access to fewer services in the village. Migrants intending to stay in the city also often have an Addis Ababa resident ID. They tend to fall into three categories: 1) those who have done well in Addis Ababa and want to

continue climbing the social ladder, 2) those who are unsatisfied with their level of success and want to avoid returning home empty-handed, and 3) those who reason that the negative conditions which caused them to migrate are still in place.

Youth migrants planning to return home often come from families with more than one hectare of land. They are also more likely to have an ID from their home region. Often, their desire to go home comes from a combination of frustration with high living costs in the city and a romanticization of the simplicity of their old life. Often, they say that they need to first find a better job or save a certain amount of money before they can return.

The sample included fewer youth who are interested in international migration, but there are a few important trends. They are often women with small social networks. Often they have had difficult life experiences which have left them with a low level of trust. They are most interested in going to countries in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. The main draw for them is the promise of higher salary, pressure from friends and relatives, and the hope of getting on a fast track to a better life.

For many respondents, an example of success involves a person who started in a low level job, but was able to save money and eventually invest in an asset or new business. Successful people also have a dependable and consistent income and have a strong commitment to saving and careful money management. According to youth, success is also enabled by having a strong social support network in Addis Ababa as well as an element of chance.

Failure is often connected to a static life. Youth also associate failure with poor financial decision-making. Young men mentioned that some of their peers tend to spend all of their money on alcohol, cigarettes, and drugs, habits which can sometimes lead to addiction, homelessness, and criminal behavior. Young women were more likely to give examples of female youth who now work in the commercial sex industry. Romantic and sexual relationships can also sometimes lead to unwise spending and personal failure. Interestingly, there is also the idea of “medium successful,” which one respondent described as an essentially urban subsistence existence. Most respondents would probably say they fall in this category.

Quantitative analysis revealed a series of characteristics related to demographics, skills and abilities, and financial, social, and natural capital (see Figure 1 on the following page) which appear to be most closely associated with their perceived level of success.

Factors w/ Strong Positive Effect on Success	Factors w/ Strong Negative Effect on Success
Being female Higher savings Being one of the younger siblings in a family High social capital Coming from a wealthier family Higher trust of brokers Faith in religion	Being older Experiencing discrimination in Addis Ababa Facing a livelihood shock in Addis Ababa Coming from a family with smaller land Expectation of inheriting land Those who speak regularly w/families at home

Figure 1: Summary of characteristics that are significantly associated with success and failure

Based on the findings summarized above, there are a number of important policy implications:

- Youth seek job opportunities, which might necessitate skills trainings. Any skills training should ensure that there is a **pipeline to employment**, as a lack of social connections can remain a barrier even for trained workers.
- A focus on **land reform, agricultural inputs** and a **resilience against natural shocks** like drought is *unlikely* to prevent or reduce youth migration flows.
- Youth need support in overcoming obstacles in rural areas that prevent them from pursuing what is often their primary goal of completing their **education**.
- Youth in rural areas do not have the **information** to make fully informed decisions about their migration and are unlikely to receive an accurate picture from their social networks.
- The **social needs** of men and women differ. Women could use more support in forming connections with their peers, while men might benefit from more mentorship opportunities with older adults.
- **Affordable housing** is a major challenge, the lack of which sometimes causes youth to make risky decisions.
- There is a great deal of potential in **brokers**, both for further research and for active engagement in improving the livelihoods of young migrants.
- Policymakers should foster migration that is **less permanent and more flexible**, like circular or seasonal migration.
- Enabling youth migrants to participate in **voluntary civil society organizations** in Addis Ababa could help reduce distrust and occasional discrimination.
- Any wage labor jobs that aim to attract youth migrants should include some **potential for promotion**.
- Equbs, which are traditional **rotating savings groups**, have the potential to bridge social divides as well as foster a commitment to savings, both of which contribute to success.
- Many youth are interested in attending Addis Ababa’s **night schools**, but need more flexibility from employers in their working hours.

- An interesting area for further research would be an exploration of youth migration among youth from the **Wolayita zone of SNP**, which seems to have particularly high numbers of migrants.
- There might be a connection between a difficult life in Addis Ababa and an increased interest in **irregular migration abroad**.
- Any initiative to support youth migrants in Addis Ababa must understand the complicated dynamics of **brokers, guarantors and IDs**.
- **Access to credit** could help bring youth closer to their own definition of success.
- There is an opportunity to work more closely with **religious institutions**, as religion is an important coping strategy for many youth migrants.
- Among youth, there is a need for **life skills** such as information on healthy relationships, financial management, the consequences of substance abuse, and developing a vision for the future.
- Support in learning **Amharic** would also be helpful.

## I. Introduction

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*“By this time it was afternoon, when everyone, it sometimes seemed, was out on the streets. And a capital’s streets were so different from those of a provincial town like Gondar, however overweening the latter’s self-opinion. So much disease, displayed for gain. So many young boys, younger than her son, gathering at street corners, offering shoe-shining, boys from the regions sent to better their families’ fortunes, boys carrying so much hope on their bony shoulders; hope, if they had failed the grade eight examinations in the new schools or knew no one influential, that would probably just wither away. Modernity then aped tradition, sending them out, like their fathers at church school, to beg for meals. But it did not offer tradition’s safety nets, or any concrete promise of graduation to a different stage.”<sup>2</sup>*

*-Aida Edemariam, describing her grandmother’s impressions of Addis Ababa in 1955*

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I arrived in Ethiopia in June 2018, just two months after Abiy Ahmed was named Prime Minister and began to launch his comprehensive program of government reforms. Under his leadership, the country is undergoing a period of dramatic change. During just three months of field work, I was present for a massive Abiy support rally in June, the end of the decades-long war with Eritrea in July, and the return of prominent Oromo activist Jawar Mohamed from exile in August. The scenes taking place in the streets of Addis Ababa during each of these events had one thing in common: youth. Clad in the red, yellow, and green of the Ethiopian flag, and filling the street with energy, passion, and hope, Ethiopian youth have driven the movement for change which brought Abiy to power and have remained some of his most enthusiastic supporters.

Abiy’s strong leadership and sweeping reforms have brought an overwhelming sense of optimism and newfound openness in most circles, but an undercurrent of tension and uncertainty remains. One of Abiy’s greatest challenges in the months and years to come will be addressing the demands of the country’s youth and preventing them from becoming disillusioned. Youth are a vital demographic in Ethiopia even apart from their political influence, with 70% of the population under the age of 30 and almost 50% under the age of 15, and Abiy must think strategically about how best to engage them.<sup>3</sup> Some of youth’s concerns are being addressed, but life remains difficult, especially for rural youth frustrated by the lack of opportunities available to them and desperate to change their lives. Many of these rural youth are tempted by their peers’ success stories, which often begin with a migration to the country’s capital city of Addis Ababa.

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<sup>2</sup> Aida Edemariam, *The Wife’s Tale: A Personal History* (HarperCollins, 2018).

<sup>3</sup> Admassie, Nuru, and Megquier, “Harnessing the Demographic Dividend in Ethiopia.”

Internal migration, the focus of this study, is common in Ethiopia, though less understood and researched than its international counterpart. A World Bank study in 2008 estimated that about 37% of all Addis Ababa inhabitants were born outside the city, with 15% denoted as recent arrivals (migrated between 2003-2008).<sup>4</sup> Since then, urbanization has continued at a steady pace, currently between 4-6%.<sup>5</sup> A recent USAID Youth Assessment predicts that the 19 million Ethiopians living in urban areas in 2018 will swell to 39 million by 2030.<sup>6</sup> Many of these new urban dwellers will be youth, who often arrive to the city with limited resources, connections, or skills, but high expectations for the success that life in Addis Ababa will bring them. Some youth plan to stay in Addis Ababa for the long term, while others hope to work and earn money for a few years before returning home to their villages. Still others come to Addis Ababa with the intent of pursuing international migration, particularly to the Middle East.

There is a huge opportunity for Save the Children to be one of the first organizations to actively include the highly vulnerable, often overlooked, but increasingly important population of youth rural-migrants in its programming in Ethiopia. To best serve these youth, it is essential to examine who they are, where they come from, and what their aspirations are for the future. To contribute to this knowledge base, this study explores the following key question: **How does the definition of success differ between Ethiopian youth who come to Addis Ababa with different ultimate intended destinations?** This research was designed to fill a vital gap in the literature and help move Save the Children closer toward understanding the diverse needs of this population. To answer this question, the study employed a mixed methods approach, including semi-structured qualitative interviews as well as a quantitative survey. The data provides valuable insights about the livelihoods of youth migrants, both before their migration and after their arrival in the city.

To ground the study, this report begins with a discussion of local and regional migration dynamics to understand how rural-urban migration fits within the larger context. It is also important to examine existing linkages between internal and international migration routes. The following two sections outline the details of the methodology used and provide the descriptive characteristics of both the qualitative and quantitative samples. The study then describes what migrants' lives were like back in their rural places of origin, their reasons for migrating to Addis Ababa, and their current livelihoods. In the final sections of the report, there is a comprehensive analysis of respondents' migration plans, ideas of success and failure, and how these concepts relate to one another. The closing section highlights several implications relevant to Save the Children and other key policymakers.

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<sup>4</sup> Lars Christian Moller, "The Ethiopian Urban Migration Study 2008: The Characteristics, Motives, and Outcomes of Migrants to Addis Ababa" (The World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management, Africa Region, August 24, 2010), <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/207921468022733336/The-Ethiopian-urban-migration-study-2008-the-characteristics-motives-and-outcomes-to-immigrants-to-Addis-Ababa>.

<sup>5</sup> Tom Gardner, "'Addis Has Run out of Space': Ethiopia's Radical Redesign," *The Guardian*, December 4, 2017, sec. Cities, <https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/dec/04/addis-ababa-ethiopia-redesign-housing-project>.

<sup>6</sup> Zeru Fantaw Desta, Anne Bitga, and Jack Boyson, "USAID/ETHIOPIA CROSS-SECTORAL YOUTH ASSESSMENT SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS," n.d., 94.

## II. Background on Migration Patterns in Ethiopia

Over the past fifty years, migration patterns in Ethiopia have changed drastically, as the country transitioned from several decades of intense conflict, political upheaval, and famine into an era of relative stability. In 1974, Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown by the Derg, a violent socialist military regime. Two years later, in 1976, the Derg initiated a period of intense violence known as the Red Terror, which lasted until 1979. During the 1970s, the country was also engaged in war with Somalia from 1977-1978, and suffered famines in 1973, 1977, and 1978. This confluence of civil war, political violence, drought, and famine in the late 1970s led to the highest numbers of Ethiopian refugees in a fifty-year period (see Figure 2). In the 1980s, issues with food security continued with the most catastrophic famine beginning in 1983, in which one million Ethiopians died and another 600,000 were displaced.<sup>7</sup> In 1991, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front overthrew the Derg regime, but in 1993 the country weathered yet another famine and a war with Eritrea.




Figure 2 : Ethiopian Refugees and IDPs, 1967-2018 - Source: UNHCR Data, Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. Note: no data for IDPs available prior to 2009

Beginning in the 2000s, the country entered a period of relative peace and economic growth, in which widespread conflict and natural disasters became less frequent. While there are still episodes of conflict and food insecurity, thus far, these incidences tend to be fairly brief and geographically isolated. During this recent period, traditional internal migration patterns have persisted, though they are often difficult to track. For example, rural agricultural households have continued to rely on seasonal migration to supplement household income during periods of low production.<sup>8</sup> Migration has also remained common for young women, who traditionally go to live with their husbands' family after marriage. Today, researchers

<sup>7</sup> Sonja Fransen and Katie Kuschminder, "Migration in Ethiopia: History, Current Trends, and Future Prospects" (Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, December 2009), <https://tufts.app.box.com/s/sukoyuz4tv4d9ygbvx2atqat7v6ys1i3>.

<sup>8</sup> Markos Ezra and Gebre-Egziabher Kiros, "Rural Out-Migration in the Drought Prone Areas of Ethiopia: A Multilevel Analysis1," *International Migration Review* 35, no. 3 (September 1, 2001): 749–71, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2001.tb00039.x>.

believe that both internal and international migration is mostly driven by economic factors, though the recent spike in internally displaced people might call this assertion into question.<sup>9</sup> Technically, the youth migrants included in this study fall into the category of voluntary, internal economic migrants, but this research has reinforced the view that domestic migration and international migration are highly interrelated. Therefore, before moving into research methodology and main findings, it is important to contextualize the information by first discussing the international and domestic migration trends in Ethiopia. Then, I will bring forward some of the connections between the two types of migration flows relevant for this study.

## International Migration

### Migration to the Middle East

The international migration path most relevant to this study is the journey from Ethiopia to Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Yemen. As Atnafu et al found in their qualitative study, young Ethiopians perceive migration to the Middle East – particularly to perform domestic work – as the type of migration which provides the highest returns.<sup>10</sup> The minimum legal age for migration is 18, but a study on adolescent women by Jones et al for ODI found that false identity cards are rampant, and girls as young as 13 have gone to the Middle East as domestic workers.<sup>11</sup> This route is particularly common among young women; while young men also migrate to the region, researchers like De Regt have noted that male migrants in the Middle East might experience more challenges finding employment in the region.<sup>12</sup> The route eastward over land through Djibouti, then across the Gulf of Aden into Yemen is extremely dangerous, and more common among young men.<sup>13</sup> Most women, on the other hand, travel by air through flights arranged by employment intermediaries.<sup>14</sup>

Stories of abuse, deception, and exploitation are common, both during the journey and after arrival.<sup>15</sup> According to the U.S. State Department’s annual Trafficking in Persons country

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<sup>9</sup> Fransen and Kuschminder, “Migration in Ethiopia: History, Current Trends, and Future Prospects.”

<sup>10</sup> Adamnesh Atnafu, Linda Oucho, and Benjamin Zeitlyn, “Poverty, Youth and Rural-Urban Migration in Ethiopia,” *Migrating out of Poverty Research Programme Consortium Working Paper 17* (July 2014): 23.

<sup>11</sup> Nicola Jones et al., “Early Marriage and Education: The Complex Role of Social Norms in Shaping Ethiopian Adolescent Girls’ Lives” (ODI Country Report), accessed June 2, 2018, <https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/node/8517/pdf/9183.pdf>.

<sup>12</sup> Marina De Regt, “Ways to Come, Ways to Leave: Gender, Mobility, and Il/Legality among Ethiopian Domestic Workers in Yemen,” *Gender & Society* 24, no. 2 (April 2010): 237–60, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243209360358>.

<sup>13</sup> Tom Gardner and Charlie Rosser, “Deadly Journeys: How Despair Drives Young Ethiopians to Flee to Yemen | Tom Gardner,” *The Guardian*, May 9, 2018, sec. Global development, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/may/09/young-ethiopians-poverty-yemen-the-gulf>.

<sup>14</sup> Asefch Haileelassie Reda, “An Investigation into the Experiences of Female Victims of Trafficking in Ethiopia,” *African and Black Diaspora: An International Journal* 11, no. 1 (January 2, 2018): 87–102, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17528631.2017.1342974>.

<sup>15</sup> Jones et al., “Early Marriage and Education.”

report from 2018, many Ethiopian domestic workers in the Middle East experience a number of abuses, including physical and sexual assault, denial of salary, sleep deprivation, passport confiscation, and confinement.<sup>16</sup> As Jones explains in her study for ODI, many of these young women make their migration decisions based on limited and inaccurate information, and there is sometimes a very fine line between migration and trafficking in this context.<sup>17</sup> However, at the same time, it is important to recognize, as De Regt did in her qualitative study of Ethiopian domestic workers in Yemen, that illegal or irregular migration is not synonymous with trafficking or a lack of agency, and “the dominant discourse about trafficking leaves very little space for difference.”<sup>18</sup>

### Government Response

The Ethiopian government has been extremely concerned with stemming and regulating these flows to the Middle East, particularly after 2013-2014, when the government of Saudi Arabia forcibly expelled 170,000 undocumented Ethiopian migrants, including many young girls.<sup>19</sup> This was a turning point in the country’s migration strategy, and prompted the Ethiopian government to place a temporary ban on international migration as it worked with Saudi Arabia and several other countries in the region to try to negotiate increased protections for Ethiopian migrants.

Another major strategy employed by local and regional governments throughout the country is awareness raising campaigns. These efforts have produced a trafficking manual and enlisted donors to facilitate hundreds of community conversations on the topic of migration. However, the “awareness campaigns did not reach all parts of rural Ethiopia, and there remained a serious lack of awareness of the dangers of irregular migration and human trafficking.”<sup>20</sup> In any case, increased awareness has not led to a decrease in migration, revealing that there are a number of other drivers at play that a simple increase in information cannot resolve.



Figure 3: Sign located in Amhara district as part of an awareness-raising campaign, photo taken by author, July 2018.

<sup>16</sup> “2018 Trafficking in Persons Report - Country Narratives: Ethiopia” (U.S. Department of State, n.d.), <https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2018/282653.htm>.

<sup>17</sup> Nicola Jones et al., “Rethinking Girls on the Move,” *ODI*, December 2014, 84.

<sup>18</sup> De Regt, “Ways to Come, Ways to Leave.”

<sup>19</sup> “Young and on the Move: Children and Youth in Mixed Migration Flows Within and From the Horn of Africa” (Save the Children and Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, September 2016), <https://tufts.app.box.com/s/fx2fjsvgt21nyzdfcxf6euqhloq1ap48>.

<sup>20</sup> “2018 Trafficking in Persons Report - Country Narratives: Ethiopia.”

The Ethiopian government has also made efforts to regulate and formalize employment intermediaries, known as brokers or “delala” (see text box below, *What is a broker?*). Brokers are crucial for youth who arrange migration abroad, and they run the gamut from private and officially licensed employment agencies, to informal transnational social networks and unlicensed agents, and in some cases traffickers and organized criminals.<sup>21</sup> Official, legal employment agencies were designed to provide migrants some degree of recourse if they experience an abusive situation while abroad. However, enforcement of these contracts has been lax.<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, even these licensed agencies sometimes subvert government regulations by overcharging migrants, colluding with unlicensed brokers, and systematically underreporting their client numbers to the authorities.<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, young migrants report that unofficial intermediaries are more plentiful as well as cheaper and faster. In fact, the study by Jones et al estimates that up to 70% of international migrants choose the illegal route because of these advantages.<sup>24</sup>

#### What is a broker?

Brokers, or “delala,” as they’re often called, are a distinct feature of the Ethiopian context. Ethiopians of all social classes and backgrounds rely on brokers for assistance, both in rural and urban areas. Brokers facilitate both international and internal migration in Ethiopia, but their services are often much broader, ranging from real estate agent to employment arbiter, linking job-seekers with employers to obtaining work visas. The government has made attempts to formalize the institution, creating “official” brokers, but there remain great – and probably much larger – numbers of unofficial brokers. For the purposes of this report, I refer to both formal and informal agents as brokers. Thus far, there is limited research delving into their role in society. Even the term “delala” itself is somewhat derogatory, reflecting brokers’ low status.

#### Other routes

While much of the current research literature, government policy, and aspirations of youth in this study focus on international migration to the Middle East, there are several other major international migration routes worth noting. There are some young migrants, particularly those from the Somali and Afar regions, who tend to migrate to other countries in the Horn of Africa like Djibouti or Somalia.<sup>25</sup> Other young people – approximately 13,400-14,050 per year– might undertake the long journey to South Africa.<sup>26</sup> A few travel westward through Sudan, Libya or Egypt and then across the Mediterranean into Europe, but this route tends to be more popular for Eritreans.<sup>27</sup> Finally, given the large numbers of Ethiopians who fled as refugees between 1970-2000, there are now large Ethiopian diasporas in Europe and North America. Their young

<sup>21</sup> Bina Fernandez, “Traffickers, Brokers, Employment Agents, and Social Networks: The Regulation of Intermediaries in the Migration of Ethiopian Domestic Workers to the Middle East <sup/>,” *International Migration Review* 47, no. 4 (December 2013): 814–43, <https://doi.org/10.1111/imre.12049>.

<sup>22</sup> Fernandez.

<sup>23</sup> Fernandez.

<sup>24</sup> Jones et al., “Early Marriage and Education.”

<sup>25</sup> “‘There Is Nothing for Us Here’ - An Assessment of the Dynamics of Employment and the Potential for Social Transformation in Sitti Zone” (EC Recovery Program, August 2016).

<sup>26</sup> Bram Frouws and Christopher Horwood, “RMMS Briefing Paper 3: Smuggled South” (Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, March 2017), <http://www.mixedmigration.org/resource/smuggled-south/>.

<sup>27</sup> Frouws and Horwood.

relatives in Ethiopia sometimes seek to use these familial ties to pursue chain migration to these countries.

### Links between Internal and International Migration.

While this report focuses on internal migration, it is important to understand the international dynamics because the two processes are very interlinked. Migration from the rural areas to Addis Ababa is sometimes part of a step migration process, in which migrants first travel to a city within Ethiopia before eventually pursuing migration abroad.<sup>28</sup> Some migrants arrive in Addis Ababa with this plan and intend to work in the capital just long enough to earn the money needed to migrate abroad. While the Addis Ababa office of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs does provide training and employment matching for those considering migration abroad, these services are only available to official Addis Ababa residents, so rural migrants are usually ineligible. Others arrive in Addis Ababa with no intent to go abroad, but later reconsider. As the SOAS report notes, “what little research in this area there is, however, confirms the vulnerability of young migrants in Ethiopian cities, and suggests that poor labor regulations and a lack of support in major urban centers and regional towns leads many to move onwards.”<sup>29</sup> Despite these perceived linkages between internal and international migration, most research focuses on only one topic or the other, rather than addressing this interplay.

### Internal Migration

#### Voluntary Economic Migration

In the past, rural-rural movement was the dominant internal migration pattern, often for marriage purposes.<sup>30</sup> At the same time, after the revolutions, natural disasters, and upheaval between 1970-2000, Ethiopia’s cities began to develop and attract more people looking for economic opportunities. A study completed in 2018 by the Ethiopian Civil Service University confirmed that, according to the National Labor Force Surveys, internal rural-urban migration is on the rise.<sup>31</sup> In 2005, rural-urban migration made up 24.3% of all migration, compared to 46% for rural-rural migration. By 2013, rural-urban migration had grown to 32.5% and rural-rural had decreased to 34.5%. If these trends have continued in the years since, then rural-urban migration might have already surpassed rural-rural flows. Very little is known about the pathways that youth take to reach Addis Ababa, and whether it is generally a primary or secondary destination after they have first spent time in another regional town.

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<sup>28</sup> Eshetu and Beshir, “Dynamics and Determinants of Rural-Urban Migration in Southern Ethiopia.”

<sup>29</sup> “Migration and Conflict in the Horn of Africa: A Desk Review and Proposal for Research” (Research & Evidence Facility, EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, March 15, 2017), <https://tufts.app.box.com/s/zl38glkc4cd8bsj7p0d8w5g5hlls7769>.

<sup>30</sup> Ezra and Kiros, “Rural Out-Migration in the Drought Prone Areas of Ethiopia.”

<sup>31</sup> Desta, Bitga, and Boyson, “USAID/ETHIOPIA CROSS-SECTORAL YOUTH ASSESSMENT SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS.”

A number of scholars have focused on examining the causes of migration, including land access,<sup>32</sup> child marriage and employment opportunities,<sup>33</sup> educational opportunities,<sup>34</sup> and drought.<sup>35</sup> There are few studies which consider the details of life once arriving in Addis, and those that do focus largely on the challenges of urban life, and very little on the successes.<sup>36</sup> The World Bank's Ethiopian Urban Migration study by Lars Christian Moller is the only survey designed to be representative of the urban migrant population in Addis Ababa, and provides significant insights, but the study lacks qualitative details about migrant life. Furthermore, the data collection took place in 2008, and therefore too early to truly represent current trends like the complex migration dynamics related to the rise in migration to the Middle East.

### Government Response

In the past several years, the government of Ethiopia (GoE) has focused primarily on developing a policy to address cross-border international migration.<sup>37</sup> In contrast, there is not an official domestic policy related to internal migration.<sup>38</sup> Generally, the GoE has pursued a strategy of preventive measures to reduce the number of internal migrants who are putting pressure on public services in cities like Addis Ababa. To support these preventive goals, the 2009 National Employment Strategy "largely focuses on addressing push factors such as the need for agricultural diversification, rural transformation, better services, infrastructure and communications in rural areas, and greater diversification into non-farm based rural employment."<sup>39</sup> These structural interventions will take time to generate results, however, and in the meantime at least, migration will likely continue. Furthermore, critics note that "there is little evidence to suggest that... development aid close to home can dissuade people from moving."<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Sosina Bezu and Stein Holden, "Are Rural Youth in Ethiopia Abandoning Agriculture?," *World Development* 64 (2014): 259–272, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.06.013>.

Katrina Kosec et al., "The Effect of Land Access on Youth Employment and Migration Decisions: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia," *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 100, no. 3 (April 1, 2018): 931–54.

<sup>33</sup> Annabel S. Erulkar et al., "Migration and Vulnerability among Adolescents in Slum Areas of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia," *Journal of Youth Studies* 9, no. 3 (July 1, 2006): 361–74, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13676260600805697>.

<sup>34</sup> Moller, "The Ethiopian Urban Migration Study 2008: The Characteristics, Motives, and Outcomes of Migrants to Addis Ababa."

<sup>35</sup> "Wag Hemra Social Transformation Programme: Assessment and Preliminary Design" (EC SHARE- Ethiopia Program: ACF and SCI Consortium Project, May 2016).

<sup>36</sup> Desta, Bitga, and Boyson, "USAID/ETHIOPIA CROSS-SECTORAL YOUTH ASSESSMENT SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS." "Adolescents in Transition in the Horn of Africa" (Save the Children, May 2, 2018), [https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/node/13375/pdf/adolescents\\_in\\_transition\\_in\\_the\\_horn\\_of\\_africa.pdf](https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/node/13375/pdf/adolescents_in_transition_in_the_horn_of_africa.pdf).

<sup>37</sup> "Young and on the Move: Children and Youth in Mixed Migration Flows Within and From the Horn of Africa."

<sup>38</sup> "Causes and Effects of Migration in Addis Ababa" (Ethiopian Civil Service University, May 2018).

<sup>39</sup> Clare Gardner, Alex Rees, and Yasmin Hassan, "Youth Transitions in the Horn of Africa: A Study on Youth Migration and Save the Children Programming in the Arid Lands of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia" (Save the Children, November 2017), [https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/node/13335/pdf/youth\\_transitions\\_in\\_the\\_horn\\_of\\_africa\\_report.pdf](https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/node/13335/pdf/youth_transitions_in_the_horn_of_africa_report.pdf).

<sup>40</sup> "Migration and Conflict in the Horn of Africa: A Desk Review and Proposal for Research."

A few other initiatives, both in rural and urban areas, are worth highlighting, including industrial parks, micro and small enterprises, and vocational training institutes. GoE's Growth and Transformation Plan II, the roadmap for 2015-2020, focuses on creating jobs in the manufacturing center, particularly for women and youth. Towards this end, the government has opened four new industrial parks since 2014 with the help of Chinese financing and plans to unveil eight more by 2020.<sup>41</sup> While a few industrial parks are on the outskirts of Addis Ababa, most are located in regional capitals like Mekele and Dire Dawa in an effort to boost growth in secondary cities and put less pressure on the capital. However, impact has been mixed, with reports of low wages, long hours, and dire housing shortages for workers.<sup>42,43</sup> Another government initiative aims to provide youth with the up-front capital needed to start their own small enterprises in rural villages. Researchers have found that, while these policies are well intended, the requirements for savings, collateral, and documentation needed to access these opportunities are often burdensome and impractical for most youth.<sup>44</sup> Finally, the National Technical & Vocational Education and Training (TVET) strategy calls for improvements and expansions to the TVET system, but these institutes still struggle to connect graduates with jobs.<sup>45</sup>

Beyond these measures, the GoE's efforts to effectively manage migration have been impeded by coordination challenges and political pressures to prioritize non-migrants. The Causes and Effects paper notes that the migration management system is fragmented, with four different federal ministries, each with some responsibilities: Women and Children's Affairs, Youth and Sport, Police, and Labor and Social Affairs.<sup>46</sup> The relationship between migrants and the police forces appear to be particularly fraught, with reports of police harassment, beatings, and intimidation directed at migrants as well as some cases of forced return. Though the city administration of Addis Ababa provides a number of programs for youth on job training, skills development, and unemployment assistance, migrant youth are generally not included in these initiatives.<sup>47</sup> The administration is under pressure to prioritize official residents of Addis Ababa rather than young migrants, and as one report noted, "any development activities that might be seen to facilitate or encourage urban migration cannot expect to receive more than qualified GoE approval."<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Bill Donohue, "China Is Turning Ethiopia Into a Giant Fast-Fashion Factory," *Bloomberg*, March 2, 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-03-02/china-is-turning-ethiopia-into-a-giant-fast-fashion-factory>.

<sup>42</sup> Andreas Beavor, "With Appropriate Housing, Ethiopia's Industrial Parks Could Employ Hundreds of Thousands of Young...," *Medium* (blog), July 12, 2018, <https://medium.com/@dream.andreas/with-appropriate-housing-ethiopias-industrial-parks-could-employ-hundreds-of-thousands-of-young-9b13585c3ce8>.

<sup>43</sup> Tom Gardner, "Expansion of Ethiopia's First Industrial Park Reopens Old Wounds," *Reuters*, February 2, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-landrights-industrial-idUSKBN1FL59R>.

<sup>44</sup> "Causes and Effects of Migration in Addis Ababa."

<sup>45</sup> Desta, Bitga, and Boyson, "USAID/ETHIOPIA CROSS-SECTORAL YOUTH ASSESSMENT SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS."

<sup>46</sup> "Causes and Effects of Migration in Addis Ababa."

<sup>47</sup> "Causes and Effects of Migration in Addis Ababa."

<sup>48</sup> "Wag Hemra Social Transformation Programme: Assessment and Preliminary Design."

## Internal Displacement

While this report focuses on migrants, not IDPs, it is important to briefly discuss displacement as well, since sometimes these distinctions can become blurred. In recent years, there has been an increase in internally displaced people within Ethiopia. According to IOM, as of February 2019 there are 1,663,396 people in Ethiopia displaced due to conflict, and 508,723 displaced due to environmental factors such as drought, floods, and landslides.<sup>49</sup> Displacement is also sometimes caused by development projects such as industrial parks or infrastructure developments. Most recently, there has been an escalation of conflict along ethnic lines in Gedeo and West Guji zones in the south of the country. Between April-July 2018, an estimated 958,175 were displaced due to this conflict alone (see Figure 4), and as of February 2019, 619,071 are still unable to return home.<sup>50</sup>




Figure 4, Number of IDPs by Cause of Displacement, Source: Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) - DG ECHO Daily Map, European Commission, January 22, 2019

## Gaps in the Literature

While the existing literature provides valuable insights, there are several important gaps which this study will address. First, most recent studies on migration flows in Ethiopia tend to focus either on international or internal migration, while failing to address the complex interplay between these two dynamics. That being said, the majority of available literature

<sup>49</sup> "Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Ethiopia Round 15: January to February 2019" (International Organization for Migration, March 2019), <https://displacement.iom.int/ethiopia>.

<sup>50</sup> "Rapid Response Assessment Gedeo and West Guji: Round 5" (International Organization for Migration), accessed April 6, 2019, [displacement.iom.int/ethiopia](https://displacement.iom.int/ethiopia).

concentrates on international migration. There is also limited information available about the extent to which migrants have a clear migration plan and how this intended destination might shape their livelihoods. Many academics and practitioners have focused on the question of why youth migrate, but the understanding of what their lives are like in the city once they have undertaken this decision is far more limited. While many researchers have noted some of migrants' challenges, there has been very little discussion on what success means for this population and the skills, knowledge, and personal characteristics which might foster a successful migration experience. Finally, it is common for reports to concentrate on one gender rather than presenting a balanced, comparative view of the similarities and differences of their experiences.

### III. Methodology

This study aims to contribute to these gaps in the literature on migration in Ethiopia while also serving of practical use to Save the Children by answering the following main research question: **How does the definition of “success” differ between Ethiopian youth who come to Addis Ababa with different ultimate intended destinations?** The three “intended destinations” or “migration plans” most relevant to migrants coming to Addis Ababa are 1) staying in Addis Ababa, 2) returning home to their villages, or 3) migrating abroad. The idea is that success in Addis Ababa might look fundamentally different for those preparing to migrate to the Middle East, for example, compared to those hoping to build a long-term livelihood in the city. As Save the Children considers expanding its programming to serve youth migrants in Addis Ababa, understanding this relationship between migration aspirations, livelihoods, and ideas of success will be extremely valuable to better serve the diverse needs of this population. To answer this main research question, I also examined the following subsidiary questions:

- a) How do migrants define “success” and “failure”?
- b) How do these definitions differ depending on one’s migration plan?
- c) Which general characteristics are associated with migrants who have different migration plans?
- d) What is the role of different livelihood strategies, both before and after migration, in a migrant’s ultimate degree of success?

To explore these questions, I designed a mixed-methods study focused on a series of semi-structured interviews and a quantitative survey. Both data collection tools were designed using an adapted Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (See Figure 5). Questions about life at home, the decision to migrate, the first weeks in Addis Ababa, and shocks helped to set the vulnerability context, and I grouped questions about the migrants’ current situation along the major Livelihood Assets of human, financial, physical, natural, and social capital. I noted relevant policies, institutions, and processes as they arose, both from the literature review and interviews, and considered degree of “success” – as defined by migrants – as the livelihood outcome.




Figure 5: Research Framework, adapted from the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, DFID, 1999

Before beginning the data collection process, the research was reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board of Tufts University. All interviews took place in Addis Ababa between June and August of 2018, and included a total of 54 qualitative interviews and 84 survey responses. There was no overlap between the qualitative and quantitative respondents. The inclusion criteria were 1) whether the respondent fell between ages 18-30, and 2) if he/she had migrated from a rural area to Addis Ababa at some point in the last five years. I began with the qualitative interviews, and then used information gained during these discussions to significantly improve the original survey design.

To conduct this research, I recruited and trained an experienced team of two qualitative interviewers and two survey enumerators. All four team members represented different personal experiences, language skills, and genders. The female researchers interviewed female respondents, and same with the men. I worked with the qualitative interviewers to translate the data collection tools into Amharic and then back-translate them into English to ensure accuracy in translation. We piloted the tools and then completed several rounds of revision before implementing the final version. With participants' consent, the research team recorded and transcribed all qualitative interviews to facilitate later analysis. The survey data responses were recorded using Kobo Toolbox software on a tablet device.

Respondents were selected using purposive sampling to ensure that the sample was as representative as possible of a variety of different experiences. Beyond the basic inclusion criteria of age and time spent in Addis Ababa, I considered gender, region of origin, and type of job. To determine the most common and relevant jobs, as well as areas within the city where we might be likely to find these types of respondents, I drew on both the literature and the research team's knowledge of the population. Erulkar's research on adolescents in slum areas of Addis Ababa indicates that the most common occupations include domestic worker, daily laborer, and shoe shiner.<sup>51</sup> The Save the Children research conducted in Wag Hemra breaks down occupations by gender, demonstrating that men who migrate to towns often work as daily laborers, guards, porters, or street vendors, while women tend to work as housemaids, waitresses, hotel staff, or sex workers.<sup>52</sup> The research team also used some limited snowball sampling for populations that proved to be more difficult to access than expected, like youth from the Tigray region and factory workers.

After data collection was completed, I spent several months cleaning and analyzing the data. I examined the transcriptions of qualitative interviews using Nvivo software, which enabled me to code interviews based on topic and then sort responses and quotations based on gender, region of origin, and migration plan to reveal important themes and insights. To interpret the survey findings, I input the data into STATA and then cleaned the data for any errors. Because of the relatively small sample size of 84 survey respondents, I was mostly limited to performing simple linear X-Y regressions to reveal general associations, using either ordinary least squares or a logistic model depending on the nature of the dependent variable.

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<sup>51</sup> Erulkar et al., "Migration and Vulnerability among Adolescents in Slum Areas of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia."

<sup>52</sup> "Wag Hemra Social Transformation Programme: Assessment and Preliminary Design."

In a few cases I was able to run more complex regressions using multiple arguments. In the final section of the report, which focuses on success, I analyzed the data using an ordered logistic regression.


To explore which factors might be associated with each type of success, I performed a series of ordered logit regressions to examine the effect of a number of variables (including demographic characteristics, social capital, human capital, access to services, job, etc.) on the respondents' own perception of their success. To measure success, I used a series of mountain questions which asked the participants to place themselves either higher or lower on a mountain depending on how successful they see themselves. I then compared the effect size and statistical significance of each variable across the eight different mountain questions (See Appendix 5: Series of Ordered Logit Regression of Characteristics Influencing Levels of Success). Unfortunately, this analysis was limited to bivariate regressions due to the small sample size. A multivariate regression would be much preferable, as it would be able to isolate the effect of different variables at once, holding all others constant. Nevertheless, these simple regressions still reveal some important and interesting associations.

While this study has been able to draw out several interesting insights on the lives and livelihoods of young migrants living in Addis Ababa, it is important to remember that this is very much an exploratory study, and therefore subject to limitations. First and foremost, this is a very small sample size, particularly for the quantitative survey. Furthermore, because this study used purposive sampling rather than a random sample from the total population of migrants, it is difficult to draw larger conclusions about the generalizability of these experiences. While I designed the study to include many different experiences, the information recounted here is certainly not comprehensive. There are some populations that are extremely relevant to the topic of this study – such as sex workers and street youth – that were difficult to access, either ethically or logistically, so they are not included in this study.


## IV. Descriptive Characteristics of the Samples

Over the course of three months, the research team spoke to 138 youth in total, 54 in qualitative interviews and 84 during the quantitative survey. The demographic breakdown of the two methods differs slightly, but on the whole, the samples are very similar in terms of gender, region of origin, and age. The figures below provide a basic summary, and further details can be found in Appendix 2: Summary Table of Qualitative and Quantitative Samples. In addition, Appendix 3: Geographic Model of Migration Likelihood provides a detailed geospatial analysis of the areas of Ethiopia where youth migration may be most likely compared with areas where respondents actually came from.


### Region of Origin and Ethnicity (Quantitative)




### Region of Origin (Qualitative)




### Age (Qualitative)




### Gender (Quantitative)



### Gender (Qualitative)



### Age (Quantitative)



## V. Life at Home

### What were their family lives like?

The migrants included in this study often came from large, poor families engaged in agriculture. In fact, 92.9% of respondents indicated that their families' primary source of income came from farming their own land, followed by petty trade at 13.1%. There were also a handful of youth who come from families that farm others' land, work in local government, or engage in more formal types of trade. For some youth, agriculture seems to be the only option for building a life in their home village. This perception is widespread, and continues to drive youth towards urban areas in search of lives that are different than those of their parents.

Most migrants described their families as poor. A number of respondents explained that their parents sometimes struggled to provide food and clothing for the family members, let alone pay for educational expenses. While most of their families owned agricultural assets such as farm tools, ox carts, and livestock, far fewer had more expensive items like solar panels, a television or sewing machine. Only 33.3% had electricity in their villages, and 40.5% come from households that benefit from the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), a social assistance program designed to support vulnerable and food-insecure households. While many migrants' families had access to mobile phones (82.1%) and cellular networks (86.9%), their families' experiences with other types of technology like the internet (23.8%) and social media (15.5%) was far lower. The majority (63.1%) had ready access to transportation networks, which likely facilitated their migration.

Often, these migrants grew up as one of the oldest siblings within a large family. In the quantitative sample, the average number of siblings was five, higher than the 2016 national average of 4.2, and the most frequent responses were that they had five, six, or seven siblings.<sup>53</sup> There was a tendency for migrants to be one of the oldest children in their families, a position that often comes with a higher degree of responsibility. For example, one young woman told us that she had never attended school, but that she has other siblings who have finished 6<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup>, and even 12<sup>th</sup> grade. When we asked why she had been unable to attend school as her siblings did, she explained that, although she was the fourth of eight children, she was the eldest girl, and that "at that time, it wasn't accommodating for our parents for me to go to school, but it was when [my other siblings] were. So because of that, I didn't get educated." Instead, as the oldest daughter, she took on the greatest amount of responsibility at home doing house chores. For young men, the responsibilities of older sons tend to be more related to agricultural labor rather than household tasks.

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<sup>53</sup> "Fertility Rate, Total (Births per Woman) | Data," The World Bank, 2016, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=UG-ET>.

## Did they have access to land?

### Land Size and Quality

To understand the rural agricultural livelihoods that young migrants often come from, it is important to understand the unique status of land rights in Ethiopia. Beginning in 1975, the Derg regime placed all land under the ownership of the government.<sup>54</sup> Though the Derg regime is long gone, the system remains, and even today, Ethiopian farmers do not hold formal ownership over their lands. This means that, since land cannot be bought or sold, the main source of land for young Ethiopians is through family inheritance. However, as rural population pressures have increased and land parcels have grown smaller and smaller, one family's land divided among siblings leaves each child with land too small to establish a traditional agricultural livelihood.<sup>55</sup> Land size can also vary greatly depending on region, with Oromia generally the most land abundant, and SNNP as the most land scarce.<sup>56</sup>

Most respondents – 92.9% in this study - did come from families with land,<sup>57</sup> but they often noted that it was very small, both in absolute and relative size. Among the respondents who come from families with land, 67.5% estimated that their families had less than one hectare. This is slightly higher than the national average of approximately 56.7% of households with landholdings less than one hectare.<sup>58</sup> Relative to others in their area, 50.0% of respondents with land reported that it was smaller or much smaller than average. Land quality was also an issue, as only 17.1% were able to say that their land was of good or excellent quality. There is also a statistically significant positive correlation between quality of land and asset ownership, holding land size in hectares and relative land size (on a scale of 1 to 5) constant ( $p=0.006$ , see Table 4). This shows that the minority of respondents with larger and better quality land were also able to afford more assets and a higher standard of living than those with smaller and poorer quality land.

### Land Inheritance

Formally, Ethiopian youth are guaranteed access to land, but in practice this is not always the case. According to the official 2005 Rural Land Administration and Land Use Proclamation, “Any citizen of the country who is 18 years of age or above and wants to engage

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<sup>54</sup> Sosina Bezu and Stein T. Holden, “Land Access and Youth Livelihood Opportunities in Southern Ethiopia” (Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB) - Center for Land Tenure Studies, September 16, 2013).

<sup>55</sup> Bezu and Holden, “Are Rural Youth in Ethiopia Abandoning Agriculture?”

<sup>56</sup> Bezu and Holden, “Land Access and Youth Livelihood Opportunities in Southern Ethiopia.”

<sup>57</sup> For simplicity of expression, from here onward I will to families or individuals “having” land, though technically this means land usage rights rather than ownership.

<sup>58</sup> “Report on Land Utilization (Private Peasant Holdings, Meher Season) - Agricultural Sample Survey 2011/2012” (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Central Statistical Agency, May 2012), [http://harvestchoice.org/sites/default/files/downloads/publications/Ethiopia\\_2011-2\\_Vol\\_4.pdf](http://harvestchoice.org/sites/default/files/downloads/publications/Ethiopia_2011-2_Vol_4.pdf).

in agriculture for a living shall have the right to use rural land.”<sup>59</sup> However, in reality, most youth cannot rely on these rights guaranteed by the state. The government has stopped land redistribution policies to make land tenure more secure and encourage investment in the land. The end of redistribution, combined with land scarcity, population growth, and laws against the buying and selling of land, create a situation in which land inheritance from their families is the main way for youth to access land.<sup>60</sup> Furthermore, many families are unable to pass on land to all of their children. The survey data reveals that while 92.9% of respondents come from families with land, only 51.2% of all youth surveyed report that they expect to inherit any of that land.

Gender, it turns out, is the key characteristic driving this discrepancy between land access and land inheritance. When this data is disaggregated by gender, we discover that 89% of men in the sample expect to inherit land, while only 10% of women have the same expectation ( $p < 0.001$ , see Table 5). Though the law guarantees equal land use rights for men and women, the way it plays out in practice disadvantages women, because traditional land inheritance is patrilineal.<sup>61</sup> As one young waitress told us, “I don’t have any plans [to inherit], because the priority is given to the sons. So the only way I would inherit is if there were no sons in the family.” She continued to explain that the land would be better used by her brothers since in many communities, men perform most agricultural work<sup>62</sup>: “Because I’m a girl, I’m not going to use it for farming. I would rather give it to my brother and come back here [to Addis Ababa] to work.”




Figure 6: Expectation of land inheritance by gender, % total survey respondents

While daughters inheriting land from their parents is not very common, they are able to access land through marriage. Marriage in Ethiopia follows patrilocal traditions, in which wives move to their husbands’ communities after marriage. This reinforces favoritism toward sons for land inheritance, since parents expect that their daughters will eventually leave the community.

<sup>59</sup> Bezu and Holden, “Land Access and Youth Livelihood Opportunities in Southern Ethiopia.”

<sup>60</sup> Bezu and Holden, “Are Rural Youth in Ethiopia Abandoning Agriculture?”

<sup>61</sup> Bezu and Holden, “Land Access and Youth Livelihood Opportunities in Southern Ethiopia.”

<sup>62</sup> Kosec et al., “The Effect of Land Access on Youth Employment and Migration Decisions: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia.”

As one young man explained, “My father... has three hectares of land. I have one brother, and together, we can inherit the land. The other two sisters are not supposed to inherit the land since they marry and move far from the area.” Therefore, for young women who aspire to create their own livelihoods independent from their parents or husbands and believe that agriculture is the only option in rural areas, migration to an urban area becomes even more attractive.

For the predominantly male group that does expect to receive land from their parents, an important question is whether or not they actually *want* to inherit land. The qualitative interviews revealed a degree of resistance towards the idea of inheriting, driven by a desire for independence, dislike of rural lifestyles, and preference for a non-agricultural livelihood. One 23-year-old man from Amhara declared proudly that “I want to win out and lead my own life. I do not need any house or land from my parents.” For this man and others like him, accepting land inheritance from his parents seemed almost shameful. There also seemed to be implicit belief from migrants that inheriting land was almost selfish, given the impact that it would have on younger siblings. With a finite amount of land, inheritance becomes a zero-sum game among siblings.

*Personally, I want to live here in Addis and engage in business rather than farming. There are students and little children in the family – they are still dependent on [my parents], so it could be good if [the land] is given for them to sustain their lives. -18-year-old man from SNNP*

## How did they spend their time?

### Education

Prior to their migration, many respondents spent most of their time in school. The average years of education was seven, but responses varied widely from no formal education all the way up to a few who have university degrees. The majority, however, dropped out sometime between fifth and tenth grade.

The Ethiopian government has made education a priority, and essentially doubled education’s share of the national budget from 14% in 2000 to 27% in 2013.<sup>63</sup> The system has made major gains, tripling the number of primary schools in the country and increasing youth literacy rates from 34% in 2000 to 52% in 2011.<sup>64</sup> Rising levels of education have also led to some unintended effects relevant to migration. In Mains’s 2012 ethnographic study, he found that educational improvements have led to higher ambitions among the

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<sup>63</sup> Tom Gardner, “Ethiopia’s Remarkable Education Statistics Mask a System in Crisis,” Quartz Africa, December 29, 2017, <https://qz.com/africa/1163797/ethiopias-remarkable-education-statistics-mask-a-system-in-crisis/>.

<sup>64</sup> Gardner.

newest generation of Ethiopian youth.<sup>65</sup> These high aspirations do not necessarily match what is available in the job market, and led some young men, according to his study, to choose to remain unemployed rather than accept a low-level job that does not align with the way they have come to see themselves. Furthermore, as Chuta and Crivello noted, new curricula can sometimes lead to increased tensions between the modern ideas introduced at school and the values of their much more traditional communities.<sup>66</sup> For example, while classes at school caution children and youth against “harmful traditional practices” like female circumcision, they often receive a completely different message from their conservative families.

Despite improvements, there remain serious problems with educational quality, dropout rates, and matching the educational system to employment opportunities. The scores on the government’s National Learning Assessments (NLA), which are administered in Grades 4, 8, 10, and 12, are consistently well below targets (see Figure 7), with far fewer than half of students achieving a score above 50%.<sup>67</sup> Furthermore, dropout remains a persistent issue, as “for every 1,000 children who begin school, around one-half will pass uninterrupted to Grade 5 and only one-fifth to completion of Grade 8.”<sup>68</sup> There are also large numbers of unemployed graduates, even those who have gone on to complete college and university degrees, which leads others to conclude that the time and money required for education might not pay off in the end.<sup>69</sup>

Grade [Assessment Year]	4 (2012)		8 (2012)		10 (2014)		12 (2014)	
	Target	Achieved	Target	Achieved	Target	Achieved	Target	Achieved
Scoring 50% or above	75	25	70	7.5	70	23	70	34
Scoring 75% or above	25	2.3	25	0.1	25	3	25	4

Figure 7: NLA Scores against Education Sector Development Programme IV Targets, Source: Education Sector Development Programme, Ethiopia Federal Ministry of Education Figure 7

There is also sometimes a disconnect between young people’s interest in education and the priorities and constraints faced by their parents, leading to tensions within the family. As one respondent explained, “My family wanted me to work for them in agricultural tasks... Missing a week or a month [of school] and then continuing again was so challenging. Finally, I decided to quit and find my own job rather than working for my family.” On the other hand, in a few cases, a young person’s parents tried unsuccessfully to pressure their children to attend

<sup>65</sup> Gardner.

<sup>66</sup> Nardos Chuta and Gina Crivello, “Towards a ‘Bright Future’: Young People Overcoming Poverty and Risk in Two Ethiopian Communities. Young Lives Working Paper No.107” (Young Lives: An International Study of Childhood Poverty, November 2013), [https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/node/7877/pdf/wp107\\_chuta-crivello-risk-and-poverty.pdf](https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/node/7877/pdf/wp107_chuta-crivello-risk-and-poverty.pdf).

<sup>67</sup> “Education Sector Development Programme V (ESDP V)” (Federal Ministry of Education, The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2015), [http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/sites/planipolis/files/ressources/ethiopia\\_esdp\\_v.pdf](http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/sites/planipolis/files/ressources/ethiopia_esdp_v.pdf).

<sup>68</sup> Gardner, “Ethiopia’s Remarkable Education Statistics Mask a System in Crisis.”

<sup>69</sup> Desta, Bitga, and Boyson, “USAID/ETHIOPIA CROSS-SECTORAL YOUTH ASSESSMENT SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS.”

school when the youth was more interested in work or migration. A young woman from Oromia told us that her parents continuously pressured her to attend school, but that she was a rebellious child and usually dropped out by the end of every school year.

### Voluntary Organizations

Only a few of the migrants in this study (11.9%) participated in any sort of voluntary organization at home. Under this category of “voluntary organizations,” we included everything from sports teams, to traditional savings groups, to the youth clubs, Youth League chapters, and youth centers promoted by the GoE’s Youth Policy. Voluntary organizations are often included as an indicator of social capital, as they have the power to “transform isolated individuals into public citizens.”<sup>70</sup> For youth, these groups can help promote norms of cooperation and civic participation at a young age, which might then carry on into adulthood. There might also be a connection between voluntary organizations and democratic norms like political reform, pluralism, and responsible governance.<sup>71</sup> This finding is consistent with recent research conducted by USAID, which found that many youth are frustrated by too few opportunities to engage in civil society, and that “despite scores of government-affiliated youth associations... real opportunities for youth contribution and leadership in the communities are sharply limited.”<sup>72</sup> In addition to lack of opportunity for participation, qualitative interviews also indicate that the largest barrier might be lack of time. Between school and family responsibilities in the home or the fields, many youth do not have the free time to participate in these types of organizations, despite their benefits.

### Work Experience

Beyond unpaid family labor, most youth did not engage in any income-generating activities prior to coming to Addis Ababa. According to a recent study on the causes and effects of migration to Addis Ababa, this is likely either because they had tried and failed to find an opportunity in the rural area, or they were so pessimistic about the lack of opportunity at home that they decided to try first in the city, where their chances might be better.<sup>73</sup>

Among the 16.7% of survey respondents that had worked for pay at home, their jobs included housemaid, construction laborers, street vendors, agricultural laborers (on others’ land), and in one case, commercial sex work. Many of these youth were frustrated by the low profits and small markets in their villages. For example, one man started as a shoe shiner in his home village, but only made 20 birr (\$0.70) per working day, and found that there was only

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<sup>70</sup> Abraham Wandersman and Paul Florin, “An Introduction to Citizen Participation, Voluntary Organizations, and Community Development: Insights for Empowerment through Research | SpringerLink,” *American Journal of Community Psychology* 18, no. 1 (February 1990): 41–54.

<sup>71</sup> Dessalegn Rahmato, “Civil Society Organizations in Ethiopia,” in *Ethiopia: The Challenge of Democracy from Below*, ed. Bahru Zewde and Siegfried Pausewang (Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala and Forum for Social Studies, Addis Ababa, 2002), 103–19.

<sup>72</sup> Desta, Bitga, and Boyson, “USAID/ETHIOPIA CROSS-SECTORAL YOUTH ASSESSMENT SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS.”

<sup>73</sup> “Causes and Effects of Migration in Addis Ababa.”

demand during the weekends, when people wore their nice shoes for church services. Another factor at play is *yilunnta*, a term noted by Daniel Mains' ethnographic research which describes an intense experience of shame.<sup>74</sup> The experience of performing jobs that are seen as lower class – such as shoe shining, cleaning, or domestic work – among those in their community brings on these feelings of *yilunnta*, and a belief that it would be better to perform such work in the anonymity of the city.

### What kinds of shocks have they experienced?

In understanding migrants' lives at home in their villages, we learned that many of them have experienced a shock of some type. Overall, more than one third (37.5%) of survey respondents reported that their families had experienced an unexpected shock within the past five years (see details in Figure 8). The most common shocks were drought (10.7%), illness (9.5%), and death of a family member (7.1%). Many researchers choose to distinguish between covariate shocks like drought or flooding and idiosyncratic shocks like illness. However, in this context some of these lines can be blurred, so perhaps a more useful categorization of shocks could be to group them by source, similar to the method used by Yilma et al<sup>75</sup> in their study on coping mechanisms in Ethiopia, using the following categories: health-related events, natural events, economic events, agricultural events, and crime/conflict/family related events.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Mains, *Hope Is Cut*.

<sup>75</sup> Zelalem Yilma et al., "Coping with Shocks in Rural Ethiopia," *The Journal of Development Studies* 50, no. 7 (July 3, 2014): 1009–24, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2014.909028>.

<sup>76</sup> In this study, responses are grouped as following: Health-related events: illness or death, Natural events: drought, flood, or fire, Economic events: job loss, price shock, or theft, Agricultural events: pests or loss of livestock, and crime/conflict/family related events: divorce, neighbor conflict, and remarriage

## Shocks Experienced at Home




Figure 8: Shocks experienced at home, by number of respondents

### Health-related

Some young migrants have also coped with illness, either a personal sickness or an illness or death in the family. Qualitative interviewees reported several instances of malaria, typhoid, and pneumonia. A few told us that they had also experienced mental health issues, often as a result of a difficult personal experience. One young man from Wolayita zone in SNNP explained that he had finished 12<sup>th</sup> grade, but became sick at the time he was planning to enroll in university, so he had to delay his enrollment. A 24-year-old woman from Oromia region has had periodic seizures from the time she was young. She would sometimes receive religious treatment in the village, but has never been formally diagnosed. Just before she came to Addis Ababa, her husband abandoned her and their baby because “I have this condition, and he couldn’t stand to be beside me because of that, so he left.”

When health-related issues result in the death of a parent, it can be difficult for the remaining caregiver to continue providing for all of the children. The first cost to be cut is often schooling. One respondent told us that “My mother got sick and was unable to afford the cost of schooling. Nobody was there to support us and I was forced to withdraw from my education.” Death of a parent can also place a higher burden on children to increase household responsibilities. One young woman began to cook for her family once her mother died, while another started to sell coffee beans at age ten after her father died. One traditional coping mechanism in cases of death are *idir*, a type of burial society in which the community raises funds to assist with funeral costs.

## Natural events

The most commonly reported natural event shock was drought, which generally tends to be most frequent in the Eastern regions of the country, but of higher magnitude and duration in the Northern and Southern regions.<sup>77</sup> Major droughts occurred in 1983 and 2002, in which 45% and 54% of the country, respectively, suffered severe drought conditions.<sup>78</sup> More recently, the 2015/2016 El Niño-influenced drought was the worst drought in the past thirty years, with 10.1 million people in need of food assistance.<sup>79</sup>

When drought conditions occur, subsistence farms lose all or most of their crops and livestock, resulting in severe food shortages and loss of livestock, not to mention the psychological stress.<sup>80</sup> In general, the response to the 2015 drought was more effective than in years past, but there is still a worrying trend of decreased rainfall in some of the highest populated areas of the country, as described by a Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET) report: “The correspondence between the high population densities in the south-central Rift Valley area and the receding long-cycle rainfall pattern is of particular concern. This area is heavily populated, all available fertile land has been cultivated, and the size of land holdings is diminishing as population grows. It appears likely that the combination of population growth, land degradation, and more frequent droughts will result in more frequent food-related crises.”<sup>81</sup>

Overall, 10.7% of the quantitative respondents come from communities that have experienced drought in the past five years. A young man from Oromia told us that fourteen years ago, his sister and brother had died as a result of drought-related food shortages. He was likely referencing the major drought which began in 2002 and continued on through 2004. Another respondent from SNNP told us that drought in his region typically occurs about every three years. Again, in the aftermath of a shock, youth often take active roles in helping their families recover. One young man told us that when his community had a drought during his sixth-grade year, he started shining shoes every day after class to contribute money for food. In addition to drought, there were also a few respondents who mentioned flooding or fires as other important rural livelihood shocks, but on a much lower scale.

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<sup>77</sup> K. V. Suryabagavan, “GIS-Based Climate Variability and Drought Characterization in Ethiopia over Three Decades,” *Weather and Climate Extremes* 15 (March 1, 2017): 11–23, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wace.2016.11.005>.

<sup>78</sup> Suryabagavan.

<sup>79</sup> Paul Dorosh and Shahidur Rashid, “Ethiopia’s 2015 Drought: No Reason for a Famine,” International Food Policy Research Institute, December 14, 2015, <http://www.ifpri.org/blog/ethiopias-2015-drought-no-reason-famine>.

<sup>80</sup> Getachew Alem Mera, “Drought and Its Impacts in Ethiopia,” *Weather and Climate Extremes* 22 (December 1, 2018): 24–35, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wace.2018.10.002>.

<sup>81</sup> “A Climate Trend Analysis of Ethiopia” (Famine Early Warning Systems Network - Informing Climate Change Adaptation Series, April 2012), [https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2012/3053/FS12-3053\\_ethiopia.pdf](https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2012/3053/FS12-3053_ethiopia.pdf).

## Economic events

For the purposes of this study, “economic events” are categorized as price shocks or disease of crops/livestock. There are relatively few examples compared to other types of shocks. Three survey respondents said they had experienced price shocks, but no qualitative respondents mentioned sharing this experience. One qualitative respondent told us that they typically lose at least one of their livestock every year, often from eating a type of poisonous grass called *wazima*. In these situations, families often borrow money from others or deplete their savings.

## Crime/conflict/family related events

During qualitative interviews, a number of migrants mentioned their parents’ divorce as an example of a type of shock. Though this type of shock was less common in the quantitative survey, qualitative respondents explained that these experiences can be damaging financially, mentally, and socially, as well as directly related to their migration decisions for those it affected, so it is worth explaining further. There is some precedent for including divorce as a type of shock within the Ethiopian context,<sup>82</sup> but it is generally overlooked in favor of other more traditional conceptions of shocks like drought.

While divorce is certainly discouraged, it happens fairly often in Ethiopian communities, and has much lower stigma than in some other conservative societies.<sup>83</sup> In addition to the emotional and social difficulties that divorce brings, it can also bring a fundamental shift in a parent’s ability to provide for his or her children. This is especially the case for Ethiopian women who divorce their husbands. After years of depending on their husbands for the most part, these women must find a way to earn money to care for their children on their own. Jones, in her article for ODI, notes that girls whose mothers are divorced are often particularly vulnerable.<sup>84</sup> This was confirmed in the data from this study. For example, one respondent told us that “after the divorce process, I was living with my mother, but she had nothing to support me... My father had only been giving us 100 birr [\$3.50] per month, which could do nothing at all for me as well as my mother.” For this young woman, her family situation led her to migrate alone to Sudan at the age of fifteen to try to support her mother and siblings.

Remarriage after divorce is common among both women and men. We found that youth whose parents had divorced and then remarried often fell into conflict with their step-parents, who sometimes resisted the idea of financially supporting their stepchildren. This can sometimes also result in physical abuse, as it did for this young man:

*“My family got divorced. I was forced to grow up with my stepmother because my mother got remarried when I was five years old. My stepmother had bad*

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<sup>82</sup> Yilma et al., “Coping with Shocks in Rural Ethiopia.”

<sup>83</sup> Jones et al., “Early Marriage and Education.”

<sup>84</sup> Jones et al., “Rethinking Girls on the Move.”

*behavior – she didn't like me, I don't know why. She used to beat, insult, and harass me... Even she wasn't giving me enough food. My father didn't know that. She acted as if she loved me when we were all together, but the reality was different... Most stepmothers do not want to care for their husband's child. It is very common in the community."*

Divorce and remarriage can also create complications regarding land. One young man had expected to receive land from his mother, but after her remarriage, the land was left to his stepsiblings rather than to him.

### What is the role of marriage and relationships, particularly for women?

For women, in particular, there are a number of discriminatory norms that affect their lives while growing up, including early marriage and pregnancy, limited mobility, lack of decision-making power, accepted notions of masculinity and violence, and lack of control of sexuality and fertility decisions.<sup>85</sup> A few older respondents were married before coming to Addis Ababa, but a majority of youth migrants in both qualitative and quantitative samples were not married at the time of their migration. Though the tradition of early marriage is not as common as it used to be,<sup>86</sup> some youth were still pressured by their families to become married at a very young age. Two qualitative respondents – a man and a woman, both from the Gojjam zone of Amhara – had similar experiences of child marriages that were later dissolved. In both of their experiences, the marriages did not go well, but the families agreed to end the marriages after a brief period of time.

The young man, now age 23, was married to a 13-year-old girl when he was 18 years old. He said that, "In Gojjam it is common that the parent arranges marriage for their children at an early age. She and I didn't have the permission to decide. Rather, my family told me I must get married and so I did. I told them that my interest was to attend school rather than become married, but they didn't pay attention... The girl was feeling the same way and they sent her by force." About two months later, they were divorced. The female respondent was married at the much younger age of eight. She remembers being excited and happy about it at first, because she was too young to understand what was happening. After the marriage, she had to leave her family to live in her new husband's village, and she remembers crying constantly. After a few weeks, the families agreed to end the marriage. She says that her parents did try to marry her again, but she was able to refuse.

Another traditional practice in some areas of Ethiopia is marriage by abduction, in which the man abducts the woman for marriage without either her or her family's knowledge. Though the Ethiopian Penal Code provides grave punishment for abduction, the practice still continues.<sup>87</sup> Only one respondent described this experience, and she was very matter-of-fact:

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<sup>85</sup> "Wag Hemra Social Transformation Programme: Assessment and Preliminary Design" (EC SHARE- Ethiopia Program: ACF and SCI Consortium Project, May 2016).

<sup>86</sup> Jones et al.

<sup>87</sup> Jones et al.

“There wasn’t anything official... My family didn’t have any knowledge of it, he just abducted me and afterwards we were supposed to stay together. Their marriage lasted just over a year, when her husband decided to leave her.

According to Jones et al, from parents’ perspectives, early marriage is sometimes a strategy designed to reduce the likelihood of rape and unwanted pregnancy.<sup>88</sup> Sexual violence can indeed be a part of migrants’ early formative experiences, though this was rarely discussed during data collection. The exception was one very open respondent from SNNP, who told us that at age 16, when she was in 8<sup>th</sup> grade, she was raped by a friend. She did not tell her parents at the time, because she knew that they would not understand. For her, this was a major turning point in her life. The experience caused her to drop out of school and begin associating with a group of girls who engaged in commercial sex work. At the age of 19 or 20 she also became a commercial sex worker and started sneaking out of her parents’ house at night. Though this woman was the only person who openly volunteered this information, it is very possible that other youth had similar experiences at home.

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<sup>88</sup> Jones et al.

## VI. Migration Experience

### Was coming to Addis Ababa the first time they migrated?

For about three quarters of respondents (73.8%), they came straight from their home villages to Addis Ababa, with no prior experience migrating to another place. Of those who had lived elsewhere, most had migrated to another town first, either in their region or another region, rather than another rural area (See Figure 9). In a few cases, youth followed dramatic, complicated journeys to arrive in Addis Ababa (See text box<sup>89</sup> below). During the first migration, they performed similar jobs as they did in Addis Ababa, such as street vendor or daily laborer. A few also migrated to attend secondary school, vocational school, or university, and therefore were primarily students rather than wage-earners during this earlier migration. There are also some youth who migrate to Addis seasonally. During the qualitative interviews, we met several young male migrants who are full time secondary school students in their villages, but

#### Gyasi, age 23

Gyasi is originally from the Lalibela region of Amhara. When he was young, his parents divorced and remarried. Gyasi had very fraught relationships with both his stepmother and stepfather, and experienced physical and verbal abuse from both. At age 18, he failed the 10<sup>th</sup> grade National Learning Assessment and happened to receive a job announcement for a sugar factory in Afar, one of the eastern regions of the country. He ended up spending three years in Afar. At the sugar factory, he made some new friends, one of whom asked Gyasi for a loan of 10,000 ETB (\$345 USD). The friend ran away with his money, and since then Gyasi has had trouble trusting people. At around this time, he decided to leave the factory and start producing charcoal. This is a lucrative livelihood, but technically illegal, so also fairly risky. One day, he lost about 10,000 ETB again when the security forces confiscated his supply. After this experience, Gyasi became mentally ill, and traveled around seeking religious treatment at various churches. Eventually he found his way home, where he was rehabilitated with the help of his mother. He decided to enroll in a TVET training in tailoring, but found that business in his home region was slow. He came to Addis Ababa in 2017 and started selling religious items outside of churches. These days, Gyasi spends most of his time in Addis Ababa, but travels to important religious sites around the country for holidays, where he can earn money selling religious items to pilgrims.

come to Addis Ababa during the school holidays to work and earn money for the next school year.

Location	Freq	%
City/town in another region	13	15.5%
City/town in home region	7	8.3%
Country in Middle East	1	1.2%
Village in another region	1	1.2%
No other place	62	73.8%

Figure 9: Frequency Table of Previous Migration Destinations

### What made them decide to migrate to Addis Ababa?

Overall, the most common reasons for migration were a desire for job opportunities, a hope of changing one's life, a livelihood shock in the village, failure on the National Learning Assessment, or an inability to continue education due to poverty. There are

<sup>89</sup> Note: any names of respondents used in this report are pseudonyms. Any identifying information was kept completely confidential.

some notable differences along gender lines (see Figure 10 below), with women more likely to name poverty or a shock as the primary migration driver, while men were noticeably more likely to identify an inability to pursue education. Furthermore, there are some geographic areas of the country where these risk factors are more prevalent (see Appendix 3: Geographic Model of Migration Likelihood for a complete geospatial analysis and related maps).

### Most Important Reason for Migration, by Gender



Figure 10: Most important reasons for migration, compared by gender

“I had friends who came before me and told me Addis was good and easy for accessing jobs.”

A common refrain, both among respondents and in the literature, is that migration is driven by a lack of jobs in rural areas. In Eshetu and Behsir’s study<sup>90</sup> of 665 migrants in four towns in SNNP, this was the most commonly stated reason for leaving home, and two other notable studies found that job opportunities were the second highest reason for migration.<sup>91</sup> Implicit in this reasoning are the structural factors of limited land and large family size that constrain agricultural opportunities, as well as their ambitions of non-agricultural livelihoods developed as a result of their education. Our interviews revealed that there is a widespread assumption among youth that jobs in Addis Ababa are both more plentiful and higher paying

<sup>90</sup> Fasil Eshetu and Mohammed Beshir, “Dynamics and Determinants of Rural-Urban Migration in Southern Ethiopia,” *Journal of Development and Agricultural Economics* 9, no. 12 (December 2017): 328–40, <https://doi.org/10.5897/JDAE2017.0850>.

<sup>91</sup> Franses and Kuschminder, “Migration in Ethiopia: History, Current Trends, and Future Prospects.” Moller, “The Ethiopian Urban Migration Study 2008: The Characteristics, Motives, and Outcomes of Migrants to Addis Ababa.”

than work in the village or the closest town. Often, jobs are indeed higher paying; for example, one young man told us that daily laborers in the Southern town of Hawassa make 40 birr (\$1.40) per day, while in Addis they can earn up to 80-100 birr (\$2.80-3.50). However, as many migrants discover soon after moving, these expectations fail to take into account higher living expenses and higher competition for jobs in Addis Ababa.

“I came up with the idea that I would work hard and change my life”

During interviews, we heard over and over again from youth that they came to Addis Ababa “to change my life.” In the survey, 63.1% of respondents said that this desire was a factor in their migration, and 22.6% said that it was the most important factor for them. For some, the monotony of their rural lives weighed on them and they dreamed about living a life that is different than that of their parents. This desire to change their lives is closely connected with peer influence. Seeing other young people who have gone to Addis Ababa and then come back to the village wearing new clothes and looking more modern can make a significant impression on other youth. One woman, looking back on her decision to migrate, told us that “I was highly encouraged when I saw those individuals who wear unique clothes. I don’t know – maybe it was because of immaturity – but I was highly motivated and assumed that they had an improved life and were now modernized. I ended up deciding to come to Addis after looking only at their physical situation.”

“Why don’t you go to Addis and live safely rather than constantly being in conflict with your stepmother?”

For a handful of respondents, a shock of some sort was the main catalyst for their decision to migrate. Based on quantitative data, death of a family member is the shock most commonly connected with migration to Addis, though a few others mentioned divorce or remarriage of parents, early marriage, or other conflicts (See Figure 11). For example, a shy young Tigrayan girl told us that “My parents had a dispute and because I didn’t want to choose sides, I came here.” This seemed to be a spontaneous decision for her, and she arrived in Addis Ababa with no plan and few connections. Another young man told us that a drought had brought intense challenges to his family two years earlier, the same year that he had arrived in Addis.

Shock	Freq	% Total
Divorce with my spouse	1	1.2%
Divorce or remarriage of my parents	3	3.6%
Death of family member	8	9.5%
Other conflict in family	2	2.4%
Avoid early marriage	3	3.6%

Figure 11: Frequency table including the migration reasons which are considered shocks.

## Educational Attainment




Figure 12: Educational Attainment, with orange signifying a National Learning Assessment year. Note that there were no observations for 11th Grade.

“When I got to 10<sup>th</sup> grade, I didn’t get a passing mark, so I came to Addis.”

Some youth decide to migrate partially due to an inability to pursue their education. Dropping out of school often coincides with migration and is especially common immediately after the National Learning Assessments (NLA) in 4<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup>, and 12<sup>th</sup> grades (depicted in orange in Figure 12 above). In Ethiopia, students who do not pass these national exams are unable to move up into the next grade. When faced with the prospect of either repeating a year or dropping out to begin working, migration becomes an even more attractive option. As demonstrated in Figure 12 above, this trend was very much borne out in our data, as the four years with the highest frequency were the NLA years, followed by a drop-off in frequency in the following year. These findings are consistent with the work of Jones et al, who discovered that rural youth who fail the National Examinations often decide to migrate.<sup>92</sup> Note that there were no observations for 11<sup>th</sup> grade, possibly indicating that youth who can continue into upper secondary school rarely drop out when they are so close to attaining the 12<sup>th</sup> grade level.

<sup>92</sup> Jones et al., “Early Marriage and Education.”

“[My family] gave me a lot of housework and this made it unsuitable for me to go to school.”

For other respondents, their inability to stay in school was related to poverty or large family size. Attending school requires many expenses, and, for poor parents with many children, it can be difficult to enable every child to go to school, especially when time in school competes with time completing tasks at home. An eighteen-year-old man now working as a lottery vendor in Addis Ababa told us,

*“I am from a poor family. They have land but [it is] not sufficient for food, for education, and other expenses. Most people say that youth from our community are careless about their education. In reality, we are tough enough and eagerly need to attend [to] our education, but our parents do not support us appropriately. They are not able to buy uniforms, exercise books, and other materials. We all would not be here if we had support in our villages to continue our education. Personally, I am here for economic reasons only.”*

These frustrations were especially prevalent among young men. 70.5% of male respondents said that a lack of financial support from their families for education was one of the factors in their migration, while only a third of women (67.5%) said the same (see Figure 10). Schewel and Fransen’s research on education and migration aspirations found similar results, noting that “when young women and men are unable to continue their education... migration arises as an alternative pathway to achieve their aspirations.”<sup>93</sup> Some of these young people hoped to be able to continue their education once in Addis Ababa, where they could potentially work and go to school at the same time, though few were successful in achieving this balance. Moller’s 2008 study found that educational opportunities were the top reason for migration.<sup>94</sup>

“No, I do not want to inherit because one cannot be successful through farming.”

While land scarcity has certainly affected the livelihood options of rural youth, this research reveals that, contrary to some literature, land scarcity does not appear to be a driving factor of youth migration. Only 7.1% of survey respondents said that a lack of land was the most important factor in their migration system. For women, because they are unlikely to inherit land regardless, it does not seem to play a factor in their decision. In fact, there is a statistically significant negative association between being female and citing land as a reason for migration ( $p=0.003$ , see Table 6 in appendix). For men, as discussed, many who do expect to inherit land do not necessarily intend to pursue rural agricultural livelihoods.

In qualitative interviews, we asked this question in two ways. First, we asked respondents to explain their reasons for migrating to the city. In this first question, youth migrants rarely mentioned land. Later, after asking about their family’s land size and quality, we

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<sup>93</sup> Kerilyn Schewel and Sonja Fransen, “Formal Education and Migration Aspirations in Ethiopia,” *Population and Development Review* 44, no. 3 (September 2018): 555–87, <https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12159>.

<sup>94</sup> Moller, “The Ethiopian Urban Migration Study 2008: The Characteristics, Motives, and Outcomes of Migrants to Addis Ababa.”

asked whether this situation had also influenced his or her decision to migrate. In this second framing of the question, some youth were more likely to connect their land issues to their migration decision. For example, a lottery seller initially identified the primary motivations for his migration as a need to earn money for school fees when his parents were unable to support him. Later on in the interview, after discussing his family's small parcel of land, he said, "Yes, definitely, [land was a factor]... My parents produce crops but only for consumption purposes... As a result, [my siblings and I] were supposed to find our ways to get income."

Hence, this study implies that land scarcity only influences migration decisions in an indirect way, as a structural factor constraining the rural livelihoods available to them, rather than as a direct impetus for migration. These findings are in line with a World Bank survey focused on urban migrants in Ethiopia, which reported that none of the survey respondents noted land access as a factor in their migration.<sup>95</sup>

### Early Marriage

This study also shows that early marriage might not be as strong of a factor in the migration decisions of young women as previously believed. Erulkar et al's 2006 survey of 1000 adolescents in Addis Ababa found that many young women come to the city to escape forced marriage, and that these girls tend to live in worse conditions than other youth.<sup>96</sup> As previously mentioned, two qualitative respondents had experienced early marriage, but the relationships were quickly dissolved long before these youth decided to migrate. Only a few survey respondents (4.8%), all of whom were women, indicated that one of their reasons to migrate was to avoid early marriage. However, we do not know the details of their experiences. The recent work of Jones et al found that early marriage rates have decreased in the past decade due to new laws with improved enforcement, expansions in education, changing attitudes toward fertility, and increasing numbers of youth choosing their own spouses.<sup>97</sup>

### What were the first weeks in Addis Ababa like?

How do they travel to Addis, and how do they finance their journeys?

Once the decision was made, youth made the journey to Addis Ababa, sometimes alone, other times with family or friends or potentially a job broker. According to Moller, the financial cost of migration for most migrants is generally rather low, well below 100 birr on average.<sup>98</sup> The money for the journey came from family, savings from a previous job, and, in one case, a traditional moneylender who expected the loan to be repaid with interest. Most migrants took

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<sup>95</sup> Moller.

<sup>96</sup> Erulkar et al., "Migration and Vulnerability among Adolescents in Slum Areas of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia."

<sup>97</sup> Jones et al., "Early Marriage and Education."

<sup>98</sup> Moller, "The Ethiopian Urban Migration Study 2008: The Characteristics, Motives, and Outcomes of Migrants to Addis Ababa."

the bus, but one young man who was unable to find the money decided to walk and traveled all 300 km on foot.

Which social networks do migrants rely on upon arrival?

We found that it is not just having a link to someone in the city, but the *strength* of this connection that matters. While 89.3% of respondents had at least one link when they arrived in Addis Ababa, in a few cases, the relative whom the migrant had expected to depend on was either unable or unwilling to support them as expected. In other cases, relatives expect that, in return for assisting migrants during their transition, the migrant will work for the relative's home or business. Sometimes this arrangement can be mutually beneficial, such as for a man who was able to immediately step in as a waiter at his brother's hotel, but in other cases it can turn exploitative. For example, one respondent was a college graduate with a degree in accounting, but has been working without pay in his aunt's café since his arrival one year ago. As he explained, "I don't get paid because this isn't my ideal job. I am here to help my aunt until I get a better job." With long hours at the café, it has been difficult for him to find the time and money for search for a job in his field.

How is the settling-in period different for men and women?

Young men and young women tend to have very different experiences in the immediate adjustment period. Upon arrival, young men seem to be more likely to be met by friends from the village who had come before. These young men often live together in very small and cheap houses and split the rent. The survey echoed these findings, revealing that men were significantly ( $p=0.033$ , Table 7 and Figure 13) more likely than women to have a friend from the village as a link in Addis Ababa. Young men also reported either sleeping in the streets for a few weeks after arrival or renting out a spot on the floor in low-income, slum neighborhoods. For instance, several young men referenced an area of the city colloquially known as "DC." In 2019, this area was described in *The Guardian* as,

*"Nestled between cramped brothels and dimly lit bars, [DC] consists of low-slung, tin-roofed dwellings containing rows of bunk beds. Each night, hundreds of thousands of homeless children come looking for a place to sleep, sometimes two to a mattress. One house, run by 27-year-old Mabit and her family of six, hosts about two dozen children a night. She charges them 20 birr (\$0.70) each, and cooks food to sell to them. The dormitories are cramped and crowded, and some of the boys can be drunk and violent, but it's better than a night on the street."*<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> Tom Gardner, "Homeless Children Struggle to Survive on the Streets of Ethiopia's Capital," *The Guardian*, January 7, 2019, sec. Global development, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/jan/07/homeless-children-struggle-to-survive-on-streets-of-ethiopia-capital-addis-ababa>.

### Type of Social Link in Addis Ababa by Gender




Figure 13: Type of social links upon arrival to Addis Ababa, disaggregated by gender

Women tend to have a smaller social network upon arrival, on average 2.7 fewer links than men ( $p=0.006$ , see Table 8). They are also less likely to have a link at all when they arrive ( $p=0.074$ , see Table 9). Young women were more likely to depend on an older family member – often an elder sibling, aunt, or uncle – for support immediately upon arrival, rather than a friend or a sibling (see Figure 13). Young women who arrive without connections often turn to employment brokers, who wait at bus stations to connect new arrivals with jobs. While brokers can sometimes be helpful in this crucial moment, as one young woman – who happened to be waiting in line for assistance from brokers – explained: “[When they] come looking for work, many women spend the night at the broker’s house and have bad things happen to them. It saddens me when I hear about this, even though I haven’t seen it first hand.”

## VII. Life in Addis Ababa

How do youth find jobs?

### Method of Finding Job, by Gender




Figure 14: Method of finding job, by gender of survey respondents

#### Friends and Family

Most youth migrants rely on social connections to secure employment, as noted by Broussar and Tekleselassie,<sup>100</sup> and also born out in our research, in which 59.5% of respondents found their current job through a friend, acquaintance, or relative. Several youth who relied heavily on these connections upon their arrival in the city later recognized how crucial this support was in finding a job. One young woman explained that finding jobs is “very difficult. The only reason I had the opportunity to stay here for a year [searching for a job] is because I had relatives here. If I didn’t have them, how would I have had a place to stay?”

#### Brokers

About 22.9% of survey respondents – mostly, but not exclusively women - found their most recent job using the assistance of brokers (see Figure 14). The data shows that use of a broker is positively associated with being female, coming from Amhara, and having a higher education background, and negatively associated with having a link in Addis Ababa and being

<sup>100</sup> Nzinga H. Broussar and Tsegay Gebrekidan Tekleselassie, “Youth Unemployment: Ethiopia Country Study” (The International Growth Center, London School of Economics, April 21, 2012).

Welaita. Those who arrive with a link might be in less need of brokers' services since they can rely on their friends and relatives to find a job.

The services provided by these brokers depends to a certain degree on whether they are official, government-licensed brokers or operate informally. While unlicensed brokers typically charge a fee to job-seekers, licensed brokers instead receive their commission from the employer.<sup>101</sup> According to interviews conducted by Save the Children with brokers around the country, unofficial brokers often charge job-seekers one half of their future monthly salary, and their assistance ranges widely from simply providing a phone number of a possible employer to negotiating a formal employment contract.<sup>102</sup> Facilitating a contract, however, is much more likely to be incorporated by official brokers. However, most researchers estimate that informal brokers are far more numerous and commonly used than the officially licensed brokers.<sup>103</sup>

#### “By my own initiative”

A few respondents, both in the quantitative and qualitative data, said that they did not rely on friends, family, or brokers to find their jobs and instead used their own initiative by simply approaching employers and asking for a job. For example, a young woman from SNNP who currently works as a coffee vendor told us how her willingness to ask for a job helped her escape from a difficult initial living situation with her sister, whose life in Addis Ababa was not as she had described. Her sister was often out at night, and the respondent seemed to suspect her sister of engaging in commercial sex work. As she explains, “My first job was at a guest house, as a bed maker... I got it by myself because I didn't have anyone and didn't have money. I got in and asked them. They said ok and told me to start. When they asked, I boldly said that I can do it all. Because there wasn't anything I knew how to do, I just boldly said that I did. Because God willed it, I worked.” This boldness came out of a moment of complete desperation, but ended up helping her find some stability and resilience. It is also worth noting that all six respondents in the survey who had found their job by their own initiative were women. This initiative might be a product of necessity, as women generally have fewer social links to rely upon.

#### Being “active”

As many qualitative interviewees told us, migrants who are “active” and sociable, can form relationships quickly with others in Addis Ababa, and these more recent connections can be equally helpful in finding a job. One man currently employed in a bamboo furniture enterprise had previously worked as a shoe shiner, but used his social skills to work his way into this job, which provides a higher income and more skills. As he explained, “I was doing shoe

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<sup>101</sup> “Wag Hemra Social Transformation Programme: Assessment and Preliminary Design.”

<sup>102</sup> “Wag Hemra Social Transformation Programme: Assessment and Preliminary Design.”

<sup>103</sup> “Wag Hemra Social Transformation Programme: Assessment and Preliminary Design.”

shining around here intentionally. I had created a good relationship with the owner [of this enterprise]. I was giving him free services for about two months. After he observed my commitment for the job, he let me join his business as a contract based employee.” This is a perfect example of the motivation, boldness, and intention that make job seeking easier for those who are “active.”

### Education and skill requirements

Some migrants who have been in Addis Ababa for a longer period of time have noticed that competition for jobs is increasing as more migrants arrive. As a result, some jobs now ask for educational prerequisites when they did not before. One young woman gave an example as follows: “Many organizations announce vacancies but they need experience... uneducated youth may not get a job if all business owners require education and experience. For example, I saw an announcement in a juice house but it requires completion of grade 10 and a certificate of one year of experience in the same job. I have one year of experience in the same job, but couldn’t complete grade 10.” As new waves of more educated youth continue to arrive in the city, competition for jobs will become more difficult for youth like this woman, who dropped out of school after 8<sup>th</sup> grade to migrate.

For those who attended some formal schooling before coming to the city, a majority (58.3%) said that their education has been helpful in finding a job, and 13.1% even said that it has been very helpful. Smaller proportions of respondents said that their education had been unhelpful (14.3%) or very unhelpful (9.5%). Unsurprisingly, the more education that a respondent had, the more likely they were to believe that this had been helpful ( $p < 0.001$ , see Table 10).

While human capital can be helpful in finding a job, sometimes social connections are more powerful. One young man currently working at a garage told us that his friends who came before him had been able to find him this job despite the fact that he has no experience or training related to car mechanic work. This shows that, for some employers, receiving a recommendation from a reliable source about a potential employee’s good character and work ethic is deemed even more valuable than whether or not they are entering the position with the required skills. On the other hand, we also met a few respondents who had completed higher education, vocational training, or another skill-based training, but were not pursuing related careers because they still found it difficult to break into these industries without a link. For example, one woman had completed a six-month training in welding and leatherwork, but still says that she has been unable to find work in that field without any social connections in the industry.

### What kind of work do youth do?

After migrating to the city, the highest proportion of the survey respondents (38.1%) was self-employed, following by those who perform wage labor for an institution like a

restaurant or shop (32.1%), and then casual laborers (14.3%). We also found that certain jobs – like housemaid, daily laborer, porter, and taxi assistant – tend to be very gendered, while others – like street vendor, guard, factory worker, and waiter – included a fairly balanced representation of both genders.

### Top 16 Jobs, by Gender




Figure 15: Most common jobs among quantitative respondents, by gender

Although these were the most common occupations within this sample, it is important to remember that study participants were not selected randomly, and therefore these percentages are not statistically representative of the larger youth migrant population. Some jobs, like street vendor and shoe shiner, might be over-represented because they were easier to access during working hours. On the other hand, youth who work in more formal institutions like factories or in private households doing domestic work were more difficult to access. One population in particular which is under-represented in this research is commercial sex workers. Several studies have indicated that a large proportion of women working this

industry have migrated to Addis Ababa from rural areas.<sup>104</sup> During the qualitative interviews, we spoke to one former sex worker and another young woman who did not openly state that she engages in commercial sex work, but subtly hinted at this occupation during points of our conversation. These were the only respondents whom we know to be involved in this industry.

### Who is most likely to perform which types of work?

Though it is difficult to generalize from this sample, there are some statistically significant trends by employment type that are worth highlighting. Engaging in casual laborer was associated ( $p=0.012$ , see Table 11) with having less formal education, while youth working in wage labor for an institution like a restaurant, small business, or hotel, tended to have slightly higher education levels ( $p=0.017$ , see Table 12). This might reflect the fact that

<sup>104</sup> Lorraine Van Blerk, "Poverty, Migration and Sex Work: Youth Transitions in Ethiopia," *Area* 40, no. 2 (2008): 245–253, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4762.2008.00799.x>.  
 "Mapping and Census of Female Sex Workers in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia" (Family Health International, August 2002).

educational requirements for some jobs are higher. Youth from the Welaita ethnic group were slightly positively associated with casual labor ( $p=0.099$ , see Table 13) and especially with self-employment ( $p=0.048$ , see Table 14), and less likely to be engaged in wage labor ( $p=0.034$ , see Table 15). Amhara youth, on the other hand, were less likely to be self-employed ( $p=0.013$ , see Table 16). These trends along ethnic lines might be a result of a network effect, in which new migrants tend to gravitate toward others from their home regions and follow their advice and pathways toward building a livelihood.

Do youth often shift from one job to the next?

While most respondents did not perform multiple jobs at the same time, they do seem to shift from one job to another fairly often. Among the youth in the quantitative survey, 44.1% have had more than one job during their time in the city, which averaged about 2.5 years. Youth's desire to shift between different jobs is often connected to their hope that their migration can lead to social mobility. For many youth, they are often on the lookout for the next and best opportunity. Based on qualitative interviews, the most common first jobs in Addis Ababa were porter and daily laborer for men, and housemaid for women. All three of these jobs are fairly low in social status, but relatively easy to immediately step into, as they do not require an up-front investment in training, supplies or equipment. For men, being a daily laborer and porter can be a stepping stone toward better work, as these jobs provide immediate cash that can be used to purchase, for example, shoe shining equipment. For young women, being a housemaid can be a good first job because it enables a high level of savings and provides important skills that can be used eventually to transition to, for example, the hospitality industry.

Which types of jobs are more or less satisfying?

During the qualitative interviews, we learned that youth migrants value jobs with sufficient incomes, flexibility, independence, collaboration, and skill building opportunities. Among those who described themselves as satisfied with their current jobs, many youth explained that a key source of satisfaction was having enough income to cover their basic expenses. Self-employed youth in general seemed fairly satisfied, and appreciated the level of freedom, flexibility, and independence that these jobs provide. For example, one young woman started out as a housemaid, but

#### Formalizing the Informal Economy

Beginning in late 2017, the Addis Ababa City Administration Trade Bureau has made a concerted effort to regulate the activities of informal workers like street vendors, shoe shiners, and motorcycle deliverymen. Street vendors are technically required to register with the Trade Bureau and pay a fee for a working license and identification badge. Every six months, vendors must renew their licenses. Few informal workers in this study have followed this directive, and several have had instances in which the security forces have chased them, beat them, or confiscated their inventory. One shoe shiner explained that "security forces discourage us from working around here. They say that this type of job is illegal because we do not have a license, and we do not pay taxes to the government... My dream is to have my own permanent shop so that I can manage my business safely." While both men and women work in the informal economy – indeed, ILO estimates these rates are higher among women – all respondents who recounted abuse by police were men. These recent regulations have dissuaded some youth from working in the sector, but for many, the independence, dignity, and financial returns associated with self-employment are worth the risks.

now works in a small enterprise as a parking attendant. When asked to compare this job with her previous work, she says that “It is incomparable actually. We can see this in terms of freedom. When I was working as a housemaid there was no time to talk to my friends and relatives. I was under control of my boss. I really like my freedom. The payment of this job is also much more than the previous jobs.” Those in the informal economy face particular challenges with government regulation (see text box, *Formalizing the Informal Economy*, on previous page), but are generally fairly satisfied as well. In addition, other respondents appreciated chances to work together with others and gain tangible skills.

Among those with lower levels of satisfaction, many complained about long hours with minimal breaks, “tedious” tasks, and a persistent sense of anxiety about whether or not they would earn enough to cover their expenses. For those who work under employers, these relationships can also be a source of dissatisfaction. Some employers can be rigid and unforgiving when it comes to small mistakes such as breaking a dish. In more serious cases, employers took advantage of youth by denying wages and manipulating broker connections.

For example, Abena,<sup>105</sup> a young woman who works at a grocery (small liquor store), told us that she used to work as a housemaid. The family employed her to clean both their personal home and the family’s business, a nearby night club. Like many housemaids, Abena worked very long hours and only had one day off per month. Her day off was always a Sunday, when banks are closed, so she was never able to open a bank account to keep her money safe. Therefore, her employer had offered to store Abena’s money for her. When Abena decided to leave the position, she asked her employer for the money, but she claimed that Abena’s money was with the broker. In the end, neither her employer nor the broker gave her any money, so Abena worked for more than two years without any payment. This story confirms the findings of Moller’s work, which noted that domestic workers are a particularly vulnerable group among migrants due to their lower chances of attending school, higher likelihood of migrating alone at a young age, and lower salary.<sup>106</sup>

### What are their earnings?

The respondents in this survey indicated that their income greatly varies, from no income for those who are unemployed and relying on friends or family, up to about 4,000 ETB (\$144) per month for those with the most lucrative jobs. The average, however, was about 1,431 ETB (\$51) per month, and 61% earned between 1,000-2,000 ETB (\$35-70) per month. This monthly average places the majority of the respondents below the World Bank’s global poverty line of \$1.90 per day (see Figure 16 below).

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<sup>105</sup> Pseudonym

<sup>106</sup> Moller, “The Ethiopian Urban Migration Study 2008: The Characteristics, Motives, and Outcomes of Migrants to Addis Ababa.”

## Estimated Monthly Income by Livelihood Type




Figure 16: Monthly income by livelihood type, in relation to global poverty line

Among survey respondents, there were some statistically significant differences in incomes between livelihood types. On average, the monthly wages of casual laborers were \$67, \$50 for self-employed youth, \$43 for wage laborers, and \$31 for domestic workers (see Table 17).<sup>107</sup> While casual laborers earned the highest income among these categories, it is important to note that, for the most part, these laborers must seek out work every morning. This inherent uncertainty is a source of deep dissatisfaction among many daily laborers we met. On the other hand, domestic workers clearly earn the lowest wages, and yet respondents felt that an advantage was the lack of expenses on food and accommodation. Therefore, unlike daily laborers, they are able to save almost all of their earnings besides spending a few hundred birr per month on cosmetics and mobile cards. Finally, it is worth noting that years of education are not necessarily connected with higher wages. Though daily laborers generally have the lowest levels of education, they earn the most, while wage laborers have more education yet earn much less.

<sup>107</sup> P-values: 0.000 for casual laborers, 0.023 for self-employed, 0.001 for wage laborers, 0.004 for domestic workers

There are some other notable associations between higher incomes and ethnicity, type of work, life experience, and prior migrations. Higher wages are associated with being Welaita ( $p=0.038$ , see Table 18), working as a casual laborer ( $p=0.004$ , see Table 19), prior migration experience ( $p=0.024$ , see Table 20), and having worked in the village ( $p=0.020$ , see Table 21). There is also a connection between higher wages now and being taken advantage of by an employer in the past ( $p=0.013$ , see Table 22), possibly indicating a level of resilience and lessons learned from difficult experiences. However, once these factors are combined into a multivariate regression, working as a casual laborer and having a previous migration are the only variables that retain significance ( $p=0.026$ ,  $p=0.081$ , see Table 23). Therefore, the most important factors which contribute toward a higher monthly income are type of job and prior migration experience.

However, it is important to note that for many respondents, their income varies greatly on a daily basis, making a reliable monthly estimate difficult. Furthermore, for those who are self-employed, there was often confusion about whether they were reporting only their profit or their total monthly earnings. We also found that two people performing the same job can have vastly different incomes. For example, the first woman we met who worked as a parking attendant earns 4,000 ETB per month through her cooperative, while another woman who performs the same work independently and in a different neighborhood earns 1,500 ETB per month. Therefore, these factors make it difficult to be able to make broad statements about which respondents and which positions earn more money.

How are migrants able to manage their money and save for the future?

While many respondents were drawn to Addis Ababa with the promise of high incomes, they often failed to consider the higher costs of living. As one respondent noted, “Since I hadn’t seen Addis before, the only thing that I saw was through TV and I used to think that there would be money on the ground here. But it’s not anything like that. The cost of buying anything is expensive.” This finding echoes both a Save the Children study in Wag Hemra<sup>108</sup> as well as the Causes and Effects<sup>109</sup> research, which showed that youth who migrate to urban areas are unable to save money as they expected due to unanticipated living expenses.

The largest expense is often housing, which respondents reported paying up to 35, 69, or even 175 USD per month in rent. Affordable housing in Addis Ababa is a major problem, complicated by the fact that the outer borders of the city are unable to expand due to agreements with the surrounding Oromia region.<sup>110</sup> Instead, the government in 2006 launched the Integrated Housing and Development Plan, which included building subsidized condominium units for low-income residents. However, the demand for these units far outstrips the supply, and there are currently nearly one million people on the waiting list.<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> “Wag Hemra Social Transformation Programme: Assessment and Preliminary Design.”

<sup>109</sup> “Causes and Effects of Migration in Addis Ababa.”

<sup>110</sup> Gardner, “Addis Has Run out of Space.”

<sup>111</sup> Gardner.

Young women and young men have developed different strategies to cope with high housing costs. Many young men choose to share a room with several other young men – often migrants as well – to reduce costs to about 200-400 ETB per person per month. Young women, on the other hand, rarely share homes. Some stay with relatives for long periods of time, but, more commonly, they choose “full time” employment, in which they eat and sleep at the place of employment. Housemaids are “full time,” as are some bartenders, waitresses, and cleaners.

Full time work has some advantages for young women, particularly in enabling them to save money. One young Tigrayan woman previously worked at a factory, but when it became difficult to support herself with that income, she decided to quit and take a job as a coffee brewer at a bar. Despite this job being below her qualifications – she has a degree in accounting, but was unable to find a job in a related field – she is pleased that this work has alleviated some of her financial stress: “It got hard paying for house rent and covering all my expenses, so I quit my job and got a full time job. Now here is where I sleep and do my job... [this job] is much better because I don’t have to worry about covering my expenses.” However, this type of work also involves risks and limitations in one’s freedom. Full time positions can sometimes be an entry point into sex work, according to the Census of Female Sex Workers, which found that some waitresses are also believed to provide sexual services for money, though most did not admit this publicly.<sup>112</sup>

Besides housing, other expenses include food, which often costs between \$1.75-\$5.24 per day, and transportation, which varies widely. Money management is slightly different for youth who are married. Couples often divide the expenses, with the husband making larger regular payments like rent, and the wife managing smaller day-to-day expenses like food. As a result of high living costs, most young migrants own very few assets. Out of a list of potential assets,<sup>113</sup> the average number owned in Addis was 1.7, compared to 7.7 by their families before migrating. The most common assets for youth were mobile phones (90.5%), radios, (43.6%), and books (28.6%). A few had some jewelry (16.7%) or a television (9.5%), while only one person had a sewing machine or computer (1.2%).

Despite the challenges in managing expenses, we found that most migrants (81.0%) in our sample were still able to reserve some savings. On average, total savings are about 4,209 ETB (\$155), and the highest proportion (34.5%) have saved between 2,000-5,000 ETB (\$70-175) total. We even met two young men – one a bicycle repairman, and one a lottery ticket seller – who have managed to save 50,000 ETB (\$1,751). Higher savings is positively correlated with time spent in Addis Ababa ( $p=0.064$ , see Table 24), showing that the longer time migrants spend in Addis Ababa, the more they are generally able to save (see Figure 17).

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<sup>112</sup> “Mapping and Census of Female Sex Workers in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.”

<sup>113</sup> List of assets for Addis Ababa included: radio, mobile phone, ox cart, motorcycle, bicycle, farm tools, jewelry, sewing machine, large livestock, medium livestock, small livestock, kerosene lamp, TV, car, business equipment, permanent stand for selling, house, computer, books, no assets, or other

## Money Saved by Months in Addis Ababa




Figure 17: Money saved (ETB) by time spent in Addis Ababa

Most young migrants save using a bank account (73.5%), and some store money with friends or relatives (13.2%). Only a few (7.4%) said that they save money in their home, likely due to fear of theft. Some young migrants also make use of *equb*, which are traditional rotating savings groups in which each member contributes a fixed amount of money during each period, and they take turns collecting the central pot. Young migrants form *equbs* with coworkers, household members, neighbors, or friends from their villages. While only 5.9% of survey respondents reported using an *equb*, they were mentioned more frequently in qualitative interviews. For example, a 20-year-old woman from Amhara told us that she participates in an *equb* with some of her neighbors. Each person contributes 100 ETB per month, and she hopes to use the money to rent out the veranda of another business to sell coffee, a common practice among female coffee vendors. Another man told us that the discipline of being in an *equb* has been essential for him: “Saving using *equb* is important because it forces me to work hard. It helps me to be a committed and hard worker since I have to work and get the daily money. I wouldn’t have saved this amount without the *equb*.”

Youth migrants’ saving is largely motivated by the goal of starting a business. In the quantitative survey, we found that 48.8% of all youth are saving for this purpose. This finding was also common in quantitative data, which revealed that youth admire the freedom, independence, and self-sufficiency of those who have become entrepreneurs. Other common savings goals were to prepare for emergencies (21.4%), attend a training program (8.3%), purchase assets (8.3%), pay for school fees (7.1%), or migrate onward (7.1%). Each of these goals, besides preparing for emergencies, represents an investment in building a future and changing their lives, either through physical, financial, or human capital. Very few were saving for medical expenses or to send remittances home.

## What is the importance of guarantors and identification?

In the large, cosmopolitan city of Addis Ababa, people are more wary of trusting strangers than they might be in rural areas. In order to gain someone's trust, they expect an assurance of someone they already know and trust, otherwise known as a guarantor. Having a guarantor can open doors for job seeking, particularly for wage labor. Among respondents, 66.7% had guarantors. There was also a large gender difference, with 44 out of 44 men having a guarantor, but only 12 out of 40 women. Guarantors are most often a relative (55.4%), sibling (32.1%), or friend from the village (26.8%). Very few reported using a more recent acquaintance like a friend from Addis Ababa (5.4%) or a coworker (1.8%). Qualitative interviews revealed that brokers might occasionally agree to be a guarantor as well.

Identification is a related but distinct issue. Youth migrants either have an ID from their home region (71.4%), a resident ID for Addis Ababa (23.8%), or in a few cases, no ID at all (8.3%). Having an Addis Ababa ID can be very important for accessing services and government programs, as well as for pursuing international migration. To enroll in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs' training and job placement services for those aspiring to go to the Middle East, they must have an Addis Ababa Resident ID. One third (33.3%) of respondents lacked access to financial services, often because of either lack of identification or restrictive work schedules, as in the case of housemaids. Some banks insist on an Addis Ababa Resident ID specifically, but according to one respondent, "When I was about to open my account, they told me I couldn't open with the ID I have. I had to beg them to let me."

One respondent told us that she had applied for a shared housing project, but was denied because of her lack of ID. Another person was unable to apply for a food distribution program without the correct ID. A metalworker from SNNP told us that "Addis Ababa City Administration might give me a working premise if I had an ID card. Most of my friends who were working as street vendors had received working premises because they had an ID card at the time. I asked them frequently how to get one and they told me that having this ID card was the main criteria." Finally, for a young woman working as a coffee vendor, not having an Addis Ababa ID has prevented her from pursuing her goal of migrating abroad: "[Going to the Middle East] requires a Resident ID and I didn't have anybody to help me with that, so I am not seriously pursuing it."

According to respondents, there are several main barriers that prevent them from obtaining an Addis Ababa Resident ID. In order to get an Addis ID, migrants must first have an ID from their region of origin. But they can only get an ID from their region of origin after they turn eighteen. One respondent told us that she was unable to obtain an ID before she came because she migrated before age eighteen. Now that she is in Addis Ababa, she is stuck living without an ID until she can afford to travel home to Tigray, which is the northernmost region of the country, to get her Tigrayan ID. For others, they are prevented by a lack of connections with non-migrants. Respondents told us that in order to get their Resident ID, they need another Addis Ababa resident to be their guarantor. If most of their social circle is also migrants without

Addis IDs, then they are out of luck. Finally, there are some respondents who attempted to procure a local ID but could not afford the fee associated.

### Are young migrants able to access education?

Some respondents arrived with the intent to work while continuing their education. In Addis Ababa, there are “night schools,” government-run education programs at the primary and secondary level designed to accommodate those who work during the day. One man is currently in his fourth year of studying Electrical Machine Surveying at a TVET night program. After one more year, he will receive a certification equivalent to a Bachelor’s of Science degree and hopes to open his own maintenance shop. Another migrant joined formal education for the first time after coming to Addis Ababa. At home, he had only attended religious schooling through the Orthodox church. He was able to test into 3<sup>rd</sup> grade, and now studies in a 5<sup>th</sup> grade class. Explaining his motivation, he says that “after I came to Addis, the main lesson learned is the importance of education. I have observed that every job needs education. Vacancy announcements request 5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup>, or 8<sup>th</sup> grade completion, or even beyond.”

Two other men have been able to enroll in part time programs at private colleges in the city. The first, a 20-year-old 12<sup>th</sup> grade graduate from Wolayita, spends part of the day selling umbrellas in the street, and the rest of his time in Economics classes. He hopes to become a university professor, and was the only respondent who insisted on completing the majority of his interview in English. The second, a 29-year-old military veteran also from the SNNP region, is enrolled in a three-year diploma program in marketing. He completed 10<sup>th</sup> grade many years ago, but did not succeed on the National Learning Assessment. He balances school work with shifts as a guard, which can sometimes be difficult: “Sometimes I miss class. I have shifts, but my boss forces me to stay here for long hours in times of emergency or schedule adjustments with my colleagues.”

Other migrants are interested in continuing their education, but have struggled to find the time or the money. Many youth migrants have livelihoods that require long hours, intense physical labor, or limited freedom to move independently. As a young car mechanic explained, “I was thinking about [continuing my education], but it has not been convenient to work the whole day and then attend school in these circumstances. Look – I work here [at the garage] from 8:30 A.M. until 6:00 P.M. It seems challenging to go to school after that. Also, sometimes the owner gives us overtime assignments.” Another young woman migrated in order to work and study at the same time, but has run into similar challenges.

Another option for youth who want to migrate but also want to finish their schooling is to come to Addis Ababa only for the summer holidays, work and earn money, and then use that money for the next year of school fees. For example, one respondent has now completed this process four times. He told us that he was the top scorer in his 9<sup>th</sup> grade class, and in the future hopes to work to improve people’s health. These students are extremely motivated, and expressed frustration with some of their peers who are not as diligent about saving money and working towards a goal.

The qualitative data demonstrated a clear trend in that far fewer women have been able to continue their education in Addis Ababa compared to men. None of the female respondents were currently attending a night school, TVET, or college/university program. One girl who worked as a housemaid briefly attended a night school class, but she joined late in the year and only had a month to study before the final assessment, which she failed. Another is planning to start night school in September, but only with the financial support of her parents in the village. We also did not hear of any women coming to Addis Ababa for the summer season holiday to earn money for school fees. Part of this gender discrepancy may be due to the prevalence of “full-time” positions held by many female migrants, which require more restrictive working hours and minimal time off compared to the positions usually held by men. Another possibility is that there may be greater social obstacles to older women being enrolled in younger grades in school.

### What kinds of relationships and support systems are young migrants able to create?

To learn about the social capital of youth migrants, the study asked a series of different questions related to times that a respondent might rely on others for support. These survey results, along with richness offered by the qualitative interviews, provide evidence for a hierarchy of social relationships, from the weakest to strongest relationships (see **Error! Reference source not found.**). At the most basic level are small-scale financial exchanges, often with friends, neighbors, and household<sup>114</sup> members. On the other hand, the deepest level of social relationship for many migrants is a person who is willing to serve as their guarantor, putting their own reputation on the line to vouch for the migrant’s trustworthiness. There are also some important differences along gender lines, which will be noted in the final section.




Figure 18: Model of Social Relationship Hierarchy

<sup>114</sup> The quantitative survey did not ask detailed questions about household composition. Households were only mentioned a few times in the survey, so participants were able to define the term as they saw fit.

### Small-scale financial exchanges

Youth commonly exchange small amounts of money with one another to pay for daily expenses such as lunch or transport. In the quantitative sample, 54.8% of respondents reported having lent money to someone else since arriving in the city, but, based on qualitative data, there is reason to believe these numbers are much higher. Youth are most likely to exchange these small, everyday loans with friends made in Addis Ababa (44.4%<sup>115</sup>), friends from the village (33.3%), or possibly a household member (11.1%). Relying on mostly peers for these types of exchanges might indicate a degree of shame in asking for such small amounts from relatives. It could also show that small financial exchanges are a strategy for forming and maintaining relationships with friends.

### Help during a medical emergency

Asking someone for help in the case of a medical emergency requires more than just a surface-level social connection. For a migrant to reach out to someone in this situation, they must have a strong belief that the other person can be relied upon. Assistance in an emergency requires a high level of reliability, but not necessarily financial contributions. Overall, 82.1% of respondents said that they had someone they could ask for this assistance, with the average being 2.7 potential people. In contrast to the previous category, in a medical emergency, migrants are more likely to rely on kin connections like siblings (31.9%) or other relatives (56.5%), or possibly a friend from the village (27.5%) rather than a household member (7.3%) or friend made in Addis Ababa (4.4%).

### Medium Loans

Obtaining a medium-sized loan of 500-1,000 ETB (\$17.50-35) from someone requires that they are not only a close connection with mutual trust, but also that the person has sufficient status or income to provide the loan. This person must also be someone with whom the respondent has succeeded in building up a level of trust. Of all survey respondents, 78.8% believed that they had someone from whom they could ask for a loan of this size. The average number of people whom they might be able to ask is slightly lower than for the previous question (help in medical emergency), at 2.3. The types of people that youth are most likely to ask for this assistance are similar to the small-scale financial exchanges, including a household member (53.2%), a friend from their village (38.7%), or a neighbor in Addis Ababa (30.7%). Again, respondents were very unlikely to ask a family member for this type of assistance.

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<sup>115</sup> 44% out of those who reported ever having lent money while being in Addis Ababa. The same principle applies to other percentages listed in this section.

### Celebrating a holiday together:

Celebrating a holiday with someone else indicates a generosity and degree of mutual affection that is quite different than one person asking another for a favor. Slightly fewer respondents felt that they had this type of person in their life in Addis Ababa than other types of social connections, at 78.6%. Those that did had, on average, 3.2 people to celebrate holidays with. These connections are far more likely to be a close familial or long-term relationship such as a relative (41.7%), friend from the village (26.2%), or sibling (17.9%).

### Larger loans

There is an important difference in relationship between asking someone for a medium-sized loan and asking someone for a large loan of 1,000 ETB (\$35) or more. Far fewer respondents, at only 40.5%, had someone they would feel comfortable asking for a loan of this size. Those who did only have a few people they could rely on for support this significant. Again, as with other financial relationships of exchange, the most important connections are household members (58.8%), neighbors (38.2%), and friends from the village (20.6%), and there was no mention of asking siblings or relatives for this type of assistance.

### Serving as a guarantor:

For many migrants, the deepest level of connection is the person who is willing to be their guarantor for a job, a rental home, or an Addis Ababa Resident ID. For this assistance, more than any other, it is imperative that the person have a high level of social status, ideally an Addis Ababa resident. Only 66.7% of all respondents had someone currently acting as their guarantor. The connections most important for having a guarantor are relatives (55.4%), siblings (32.1%), and friends from the village (26.8%), similar to the primarily social relationships mentioned before. This is logical, as displaying a willingness to vouch for a migrant youth's character in such a permanent, public, and significant way implies a strong relationship built up over time.

### Gender differences:

For almost all relationships in this hierarchy, female migrants are at a disadvantage. Female respondents were significantly less likely to have someone to ask for a medium loan ( $p < 0.001$ , see Table 25) or large loan ( $p = 0.007$ , see Table 26). Furthermore, while all 44 male respondents (100%) had someone acting as their guarantor and someone they could call in an emergency, only 30% and 62.5%, respectively, of women responded similarly. It is worth noting that qualitative findings slightly contradict this last assertion in terms of guarantors, as both male and female interviewees often struggled in finding someone willing to act in this role. However, interestingly, women were more likely than men to have someone with whom they can celebrate holidays ( $p = 0.009$ , see Table 27). This might indicate that, while women do have some close relationships in Addis Ababa, they feel less comfortable than men do in asking for favors like a loan or a guarantor.

One possible reason for these gender distinctions is that women generally begin their time in Addis Ababa with fewer social links than men. This immediate disadvantage might carry forward even after they have spent several years in the city. Furthermore, male migrants' stronger social connections with peers, especially friends from the village, could be a significant factor. Friends from migrants' home villages play an extremely important role in this social hierarchy because migrants rely on them for both practical assistance like a loan or being a guarantor, as well as for social support like celebrating the holidays together. Women, who are less likely to have a strong network of friends from their home regions, are therefore at a disadvantage without these connections.

### What prevents migrants from forming deeper social connections?

As time goes on, youth in the city appear to broaden their social networks and form new connections with neighbors, household members, coworkers, and new arrivals. However, qualitative interviews revealed that, while it might be easy to make friends, it is extremely difficult to form deep relationships. As one respondent explained, "It is easy to meet and make friends, but I cannot trust people in Addis Ababa. Even though it is easy to meet and make friends, we always suspect the behavior of others... Personally, I have to approach and know individuals very intimately to call them my friend."

One simple reason is that the adjustment to a new environment takes time. During the transition period, youth grapple with adjusting to urban life, interacting with a diverse community, and learning the new urban culture. For non-Amhara youth, learning Amharic can be another major barrier for the first few months or even years. Because of Ethiopia's federalized education system, each region conducts schooling in its own local language, but in Addis Ababa, Amharic is the default language of everyday life. One young man from SNNP remarked, "Yes, I was unemployed for some days just after my arrival. I was unable to speak Amharic and couldn't communicate with people. Later I found someone who spoke my local language and he told me how and where to find jobs."

In other cases, a reluctance to trust others inhibits youth from forming meaningful new relationships. For some, this attitude comes from a personal experience of betrayal. One man told us a story of a time that he had purchased some used household materials and arranged for a friend to transport the materials to the buyer. His friend, however, sold the material to someone else and took the money for himself. To cover his tracks, the friend switched off his phone and immediately left the area with the money. In total, the respondent lost about 37,000 ETB (\$1,300). For several weeks afterward, he says that he had a mental health problem and only recovered by using holy water. For him, this experience "gave me many lessons. I will never trust anyone and if so, I am aware of all the mischief that might happen. I became serious and now have limited social relationships." For other respondents, this lack of trust has been imparted on them as advice from others or as a cultural norm.

To determine levels of trust, the survey asked respondents to rate, on a scale of 1 to 5, how likely they were to trust certain categories of people. The youth reported the highest level of trust, with a median score of 5, for their immediate family, followed by extended family, friends from their home village, and housemates (all with median score of 4). Young migrants were more willing to trust a random person in their home village (3) than they were in Addis Ababa (2), indicating a belief that people in Addis Ababa overall are generally less trustworthy than people in their rural home villages. Similarly, youth trusted their friends from home more than their friends made in Addis Ababa (3). The lowest levels of trust overall were reserved for brokers, who had a median score of 1 out of 5.

Discrimination in Addis Ababa based on ethnicity, profession, gender, or migrant status can also affect youth's ability to trust. While discrimination in the city is relatively small (16.7%) compared to in other areas (31.8%), partly because it is such a melting pot of different types of people, it is still important to note. Within the city, there are tensions between those born and raised in Addis Ababa and the migrant population.<sup>116</sup> These undercurrents come to a head when, for example, a migrant is attempting to work in a formal sector job typically dominated by those from the city. One respondent told us, "There was a time where I was in an interview. They asked me about the field I studied, and then they asked me about hotels in Addis Ababa just because of my place of origin. The hotels they asked were not famous hotels, but when I told them I didn't know them they said, 'Why would you lie about the fact that you knew Addis?' They never called me back for that job."

This study indicates that discrimination might be more prevalent among male migrants, as all 14 respondents who answered affirmatively are men. Discrimination against male migrants is often along ethnic lines. Desta et al's research for USAID found that ethnic stereotyping is pervasive, and marginalization occurs across social, economic, and political areas of life.<sup>117</sup> Young men in particular played a major role in the past several years of political upheaval in Ethiopia, through political protests and demonstrations and membership in ethnic organizations like the Oromo Liberation Front. One street vendor who says that he was unjustly imprisoned as a result of ethnic-based discrimination reflected, "I think in Ethiopia, extreme nationalism is becoming a serious problem which results in uncertainty for youths migrating from one area to another. Everywhere we go, people are discriminated based on their ethnic group." Save the Children's study in Sitti Zone found that ethnic stereotypes can become a barrier for job-seekers, as some employers openly admitted a preference for hiring *habesha* workers from Oromia or Amhara rather than Somalis, because they are presumed to be more reliable and willing to accept less money.<sup>118</sup>

In qualitative interviews, some female respondents disclosed instances of discrimination, though more often along gender rather than ethnic lines. For example, we met

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<sup>116</sup> "Causes and Effects of Migration in Addis Ababa."

<sup>117</sup> Desta, Bitga, and Boyson, "USAID/ETHIOPIA CROSS-SECTORAL YOUTH ASSESSMENT SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS."

<sup>118</sup> "'There Is Nothing for Us Here' - An Assessment of the Dynamics of Employment and the Potential for Social Transformation in Sitti Zone."

a Welaita woman whose main job is a parking attendant, but during downtime she also washes the cars, shines shoes, and sells lottery cards. While parking attendant is a livelihood common among both men and women, car washing and shoe shining are generally only done by men. She says that “there are people who are from the south (SNNP), and when they see me washing cars they would say to me that I am a girl and I shouldn’t be doing this job.” Another woman told us that she decided to quit her job working as a waitress because, “I don’t like people hitting on me [shyly].” Another woman, who currently cleans and does laundry for others, told us that she is discriminated against for three reasons: being a former commercial sex worker, being from SNNP, and having darker skin tone.

### What kinds of ties do migrants maintain with their rural homes?

This research indicates that for many youth, sending regular remittances to their families is impractical. In fact, only 45.2% of survey respondents reported sending money home. Some respondents even laughed at this question, explaining that they can barely meet their own living expenses, let alone reserve a surplus to send home. This confirms Moller’s 2008 finding that only 13% of migrants could afford to send money home to their families.<sup>119</sup> Interestingly, in a few cases, qualitative interviewees reported that their families at home are the ones to send *them* support in Addis Ababa, either financially or through in-kind goods like grains. This trend was even more pronounced in quantitative data, in which 15.5% of respondents indicated that they receive money from their families in the village.

For those who do send remittances, it is usually to support investments such as farm inputs, school fees for siblings, or livestock purchases rather than basic consumption. Occasionally, they might also support their families during a shock such as drought. In a few circumstances, when youth are doing well financially in Addis Ababa, they might choose to invest the money at home, where it can go further than in the city. For example, one woman and her husband have purchased several *bajaj* (three-wheeled transport vehicles) and motorcycles and rent them out to drivers in their rural village.

Although young migrants might not be able to support their families financially, they still tend to stay in regular communication, with 69.1% of survey respondents stating that they speak to family members regularly. Young women tend to keep in touch with 1.8 fewer people than men ( $p=0.061$ , see Table 28), and were particularly less likely to have regular contact with parents ( $p<0.001$ , see Table 29) and siblings ( $p=0.001$ , see Table 30) at home. This might be related to the finding that more women than men migrate without the knowledge or support of their families, which can cause long-term rifts. Although most migrants keep in close contact with their families, they do not share all the realities of their lives in the city. In fact, most admitted that they intentionally keep their loved ones from knowing about the difficulties they have faced. As one respondent explained, “I only tell them the good things. If I am struggling, I

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<sup>119</sup> Moller, “The Ethiopian Urban Migration Study 2008: The Characteristics, Motives, and Outcomes of Migrants to Addis Ababa.”

wouldn't tell my mother, because she's not capable of helping me. Why would I stress her more?"

For those youth from Wolayita zone, one respondent emphasized the importance of *Gifata*, the Welaitan New Year celebration. During this time, he said, "any youths from anywhere are supposed to go to their village and family to celebrate the holiday. Whatever their economic status may be, the youths who live in Addis wear nice clothes and shoes for the holiday. As a result, the resident youths who live in the rural area are encouraged by them, only looking at their appearance. They think that they have changed their life. This is becoming the main driving force for youths [from Wolayita] to move to Addis." Therefore, in this case, not only do the *Gifata* celebrations help youth maintain close connections to their home communities, but they also contribute to perpetuating rural-urban migration and false assumptions about life in the capital city.

### What kinds of hardships do migrants experience, and how do they cope?

After migration, youth still experience periodic shocks, though of a different nature than shock at home. Rather than environmental or family-based shocks, which affect the family or community as a whole, shocks in Addis Ababa seem to be more individual, and usually stem from unemployment, a personal illness, or theft. In a few cases, respondents have also undergone periods of homelessness related to unemployment or depletion of savings. These were mostly male youth. One respondent was sent to prison after she and a friend had a public altercation. Street vendors mentioned instances in which the security forces have confiscated their wares, forcing them to start over and purchase a new inventory of supplies.

Unemployment was by far the most frequent livelihood shock among the study participants, at 67.7%. Periods of unemployment are common, with about 80% of respondents being unemployed at some point since their migration. However, not all of those who have been unemployed list this as a livelihood shock, because these periods generally tend to be fairly short. Most (58.3%) were unemployed for three months or less, and only two people were unemployed for more than a year. On a much lower scale, 8.3% respondents also mentioned a personal illness as a major shock to their livelihoods. While theft was not a common shock according to the survey, qualitative respondents told us that theft is a pervasive problem. Some have had money, mobile phones, or bags stolen while at the bus station, in transit, in the streets, and even from their homes.

### Coping mechanisms

Migrants' greatest sources of resilience are social networks, savings, and religion. During unemployment, migrants often sustain themselves through savings, social networks, and by borrowing money from friends. In his anthropological study of young men in the town of Jimma, Daniel Mains concludes that social relationships and the associated exchanges of gifts

and favors help to support youth through prolonged unemployment.<sup>120</sup> Some migrants also reduce expenses by decreasing food consumption and skipping meals.

One common coping mechanism, especially for illness, is prayer and use of holy water. These practices are frequently used, especially by the Ethiopian Orthodox community. For example, one young woman was told by a doctor that she might have breast cancer. In response, she says that “I prayed hard and I’m better now. I feel dizzy, but because I didn’t have money to go to the hospital, I went to church and had people pray for me. I’m much better now, thanks to God.” In general, many youth place a high degree of trust in their religious beliefs. When asked to what degree (scale of 1-5) they believe that their fate is up to God, the average 4.8. This strong faith can be a source of great resilience during life’s challenges, but can also sometimes lead to riskier behavior.

### Aspirations for the Future

Overall, there is a strong preference for self-employment over wage employment. In the survey, the top three responses for respondents’ ideal jobs – SME (27.4%), restaurant owner (14.3%), and driver (11.9%) – are all examples of self-employment. As one young woman put it, “One thing I should tell you is I do not want to be employed in any organization hereafter.” For her, working on her own rather than for someone else was the most important quality in a job. In qualitative interviews, many respondents dream of starting a business, either in the city or back at home, with examples including a spare part shop, a retail store/boutique, a pool house, restaurants or cafeterias, a stationary store, a coffee shop, and a jewelry store. A few others mentioned professions, such as doctor (4.8%), accountant (3.6%), and teacher (1.2%).

Aspirations also differed by gender (see Figure 19). The quantitative data revealed that the most desired job for women is a restaurant owner, which demonstrates the desire for the freedom of self-employment and entrepreneurship that still falls within accepted gender norms. While women seem drawn to becoming entrepreneurs within the hospitality industry, no male respondents indicated an interest in opening a restaurant or hotel. When compared with men, women have a much

### Ideal Job by Gender



Figure 19: Ideal Jobs Disaggregated by Gender

<sup>120</sup> Mains, *Hope Is Cut*.

### Kidist, a female taxi assistant

Kidist came to Addis Ababa at the age of sixteen and began work as a housemaid. Since then, she has also dabbled in bakery and restaurant work, but always wanted to be a taxi assistant, the person who collects money from customers on the ubiquitous and very cheap minibuses that shuttle passengers around Addis Ababa. This role is traditionally filled by young men, but this did not faze Kidist. On the day of her interview, she wore a loose brown t-shirt and pants, with closely cropped hair, and sat near a group of young men near the bus station. She has been working as a taxi assistant off and on for a while now, but has faced discrimination both for her choice of work and her gender expression: “As you know, being a taxi assistant isn’t known as a woman’s job. When I go to the brokers – because of my choice of clothing, they tell me I should choose to be either a girl or a boy and that there isn’t a job for me. I used to feel hurt the first few times, but after I got used to it. I don’t care about their opinions.” Kidist’s unconventional lifestyle has also caused some tensions with her aunt, who has provided her a room in their house since her arrival. Nevertheless, Kidist still has some strong advice for other young women, and wants to tell them “they can do any job a man does. Just because they’re a girl doesn’t mean they have limited options. The only difference we have is in gender.”

wider distribution across a variety of preferred jobs, while men’s interests are channeled into either opening a SME or becoming a driver. Other top jobs for men were skilled occupations such as doctor or accountant. In fact, zero women expressed an interest in these professions. However, the qualitative interviews provided more nuance to these trends. While there was only one female survey respondent who expressed a desire to open a SME, we met several young women in qualitative interviews with that goal. We also met a few young women working as car washers, taxi assistants (see text box, *Kidist*), and other roles that are traditionally reserved for men. We did not notice a similar pattern (i.e., working in typically female jobs) among male respondents.

One surprising result common in both qualitative and quantitative data was that women had more difficulty than men in naming a preferred future livelihood. For example, an 18-year-old currently working as a housemaid had trouble articulating her preferred livelihood: “[My ideal job] is to work and get a higher pay so I can get more money... I’ll work any kind of job.” In the survey, all respondents who said that they do not know what they want their future job to be (7.1%) or that they are willing to work any job (2.4%) were women. This could reflect both positive and negative qualities. From a youth development

perspective, it might be concerning that young women seem to struggle in envisioning a goal for their future. On the other hand, it could show that women are more flexible and less “selective” in their work, which might be an asset in the job market. It is also possible that many years of subsistence living has given these respondents a limited time planning horizon, though this does not explain why men are more comfortable thinking in concrete terms about their future.

## VIII. Migration Plans

Having established a foundational understanding of migrants' livelihoods, both before and after migrating to Addis Ababa, we now shift to a deeper analysis of respondents' migration plans.

### Migration Plans

A common assumption among long-term residents of Addis Ababa is that young migrants arrive in the city with an intention to put down long-term roots. However, this research shows that this is not the case. When qualitative respondents reflected on their plans upon arrival, they were fairly evenly divided between those who planned to stay in the city and those who hoped to return home after a few years of work. A majority of survey respondents (38.1%) reported that they arrived in the city with no clear plan at all, followed by those who planned to stay only until they reached a particular savings goal (27.4%), after which they would return home. Only a few had anticipated staying between 2-5 years (6.0%) or more than 5 years (2.4%).

During the time since arrival, some of these plans have clearly evolved. Some youth who dreamed of Addis as a shortcut to wealth and success quickly became disillusioned and found a new appreciation for the simplicity of rural life. Others who planned to stay for just a year or two ended up doing better than expected, and maybe found a partner to settle down with in the city. In reference to migration plans, the results of the quantitative and qualitative data are slightly different (see Figure 20). Among survey respondents, a clear majority of 63.1% said that they planned to stay in Addis Ababa for the long term, while just 19.1% planned to go home. Only a few- 4.8% - expressed interest in going abroad. In the qualitative interviews, the distribution was more balanced, with 38.9% planning to stay in the city, 29.6% intending to return home, and 20.4% hoping to go abroad. These differences might have been due to sampling methods and sample size, different phrasing of the questions, or just the nature of these two different tools. Despite these differences in distribution, however, it seems safe to say that there is the highest degree of interest in staying in Addis Ababa, but that there are still a fair number interested in returning home and going abroad.




Figure 20: Comparison of Migration Plans in Qualitative and Quantitative Samples

## Plan A: Staying in Addis Ababa

### Who is more likely to stay in Addis Ababa?

Youth who plan to stay in Addis Ababa for the long term tend to have strong social capital, often with a combination of pre-existing social links in the city as well as a sense of ease with making new connections. Their pre-existing social connections were probably helpful in the initial settling-in period, through providing advice, comfort, and possibly financial support. But many of these migrants have avoided limiting themselves to these older connections. They tend to see themselves as very sociable and are more likely to say that making friends in the city has been fairly easy.

In a series of Ordinary Least Squares regressions comparing the effect of different factors on the likelihood of a respondent planning to stay in Addis, the variable with the strongest positive correlation was whether or not the migrant had someone to celebrate holidays with in the city (see Table 1). This is another indicator of social capital in the place of destination, as it shows that the person is close enough with others to enter this deeper form of social connection (see **Error! Reference source not found.**), and also, importantly, that they have these people in Addis Ababa. Qualitative interviews also indicate that these migrants are also the type of person on whom others depend in an emergency, demonstrating a degree of trustworthiness. This social capital and trustworthy reputation likely helps these youth procure Addis Ababa Resident IDs, another quality closely associated with youth who want to stay in the city.

Table 1: Results of a Series of Logit Regressions of Factors Associated with Remaining in Addis Ababa

	Stay in Addis
Number of siblings	-0.419***
Welaita ethnicity	-1.928***
Months unemployed	0.299*
Addis ID (binary)	2.015*
Having Someone to Celebrate Holiday with in Addis (binary)	1.564**
Self-employed	-1.039*
Wage laborer	1.234*
Relatively smaller land than others	1.029*
Less than 1 hectare of land	1.674**
Number of services in village	-0.255**

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1

Results also indicate that those who want to remain in Addis might come from poorer households in the village, making a return to rural life perhaps less attractive. Statistical analysis reveals that these migrants tend to come from families with smaller plots of land, both relative

to others and in terms of hectares. With smaller family land, there is less opportunity for migrants to return to a rural agricultural livelihood, since land access largely depends on family inheritance. Migrants interested in remaining in the city also tend to have accessed fewer services in the village, which shows that either they or their village as a whole was poorer and more remote. Youth generally have access to far more services in Addis Ababa, so returning to rural areas becomes difficult. Finally, the quantitative data also demonstrates that these youth often come from smaller families and are less likely to be Welaita.

### What makes them want to stay?

Youth in this group tend to fall into three major categories: 1) those who have done well and want to continue moving up, 2) those who are unsatisfied with their level of success and want to avoid returning empty-handed, and 3) those who reason that the negative conditions which caused them to migrate have not since changed. Other common themes among the qualitative interviews with these youth are better access to work and educational opportunities, more freedom, better infrastructure and services, and a more peaceful and diverse community (see Text Box, *Loret*).

Some youth have done well in the city, and through either social connections, skills, being “active,” or pure luck, have found a way to thrive. Once life becomes more comfortable in the city, there is little incentive for them to move again. For example, one young woman who runs a small business has been pleasantly surprised by how well she and her husband have done after several years in Addis Ababa: “A lot has changed [since coming here]. My husband used to sell mobile cards, and from the money I got from cleaning, we were able to save up money to buy our own car for him to be a taxi driver... [In] general we’re living a good life here and saving our money to have an even better life.” She has been able to gradually move up in status since arriving and is optimistic that she and her family will be able to continue this path.

On the other hand, there are some who have the opposite experience, and realize that life in Addis Ababa is far more difficult than expected. And yet, they come to the same conclusion that it is better to stay, because a combination of determination and shame motivates them to remain in Addis Ababa until they find success. For one female factory worker, she says that “I have no plan of going back home... because I haven’t changed like I wanted to. Until then, I will stay here.” Many youth have sacrificed a great deal in order to migrate to the capital, and their families and communities have high expectations for how the migrants’ lives will change. Returning home empty handed is not an option.

#### Loret, age 21

One particularly expressive respondent told us that her main reason to stay is that there is more harmony and love in Addis Ababa than there was in her village. She remembers people at home frequently becoming involved in petty disputes over issues she considers “very silly,” like land borders. In contrast, she says that “Here in Addis, we respect and love each other... it is not the same in rural areas... people out there have limited awareness. They have conflicts [over] very simple issues... so it is better to live here in Addis peacefully and brotherly.” While this respondent was the most passionate about this idea, others expressed a broader belief that city dwellers in Addis Ababa are subject to less discrimination and conflict than those in other regions of the country.

“I cannot go to school there, and there aren’t any job opportunities, mostly house chores.”

For others, it seems pointless to go home when the reasons that they left – including lack of opportunity, land shortages, inability to access education, and family disputes – are still present. One young woman explained that she wants to stay in Addis Ababa “because there is a land shortage at home. How would we live if we don’t have any income?” Another respondent associates his village with negative memories of the death of his father and abuse at the hand of his uncle. He says “I came to Addis to live my whole life... In general, I have no good memory of my life back home.” Migration has given him a chance to start fresh and he has no desire to return to type of life he led before. Interestingly, Jones et al noticed a similar attitude among Ethiopians who have migrated abroad, noting that “the drivers that propelled them to migrate – primarily poverty and a lack of employment opportunities locally – are still present and have in fact been compounded by the stigma associated with unsuccessful migration.”<sup>121</sup>

### Plan B: Going Home

Who is more likely to want to go home?

Welaita are significantly more likely than other ethnic groups to have a plan of returning home (see Table 2). Though Welaita youth often complained of the small and poor quality land in their region of SNNP, they still seem to be very connected to their home, so it is not surprising that this group has the strongest preference for returning. There is also a positive association between wanting to return and currently being self-employed, which is logical since Welaita are far more likely to be involved in wage employment. Those in this group also tend to have a higher number of siblings. It is possible that those with larger families might have more pressure to return home and help the family.

Table 2: A Series of Simple Logit Regressions of Factors Associated with Returning Home

	Return home
Number of siblings	0.289**
Welaita ethnicity	1.07*
Months unemployed	-0.326
Addis ID (binary)	Omitted
Having Someone to Celebrate Holiday with in Addis (binary)	-1.269**
Self-employed	1.025*
Wage laborer	-0.851
Relatively smaller land than others	-0.594
Less than 1 hectare of land	-1.476*
Number of services in village	0.114

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1

<sup>121</sup> Jones et al., “Rethinking Girls on the Move.”

Youth who plan to return home also tend to come from families with more than one hectare of land (see Table 2). This could mean that these youth come from relatively better off families than youth who want to stay in Addis Ababa, or that they are returning home in the hopes of inheriting land. These survey respondents were also more likely to still have an ID from their home region rather than Addis Ababa. This trend might indicate an inability to generate the kind of social capital necessary for procuring this document. This theory is supported by the fact that these youth were also less likely to have someone in the capital with whom to celebrate holidays.

### What makes them want to go home?

At first, it might be surprising to learn that some youth, even after experiencing the exciting and fast-paced life in Addis Ababa, might still prefer to return home. In qualitative interviews, respondents explained that the cost of living in the city is far higher than they ever expected. As one respondent put it, “we are working for our landlords,” meaning that it seems that every birr he earns goes straight to his landlord’s pocket. These concerns were especially prevalent among men, who are more likely to live in expensive rental homes. Others have come to realize the benefits of living in a small community with strong social ties, and romanticized about the simplicity of rural life. One daily laborer explained, “If you ask me hypothetically, I would love to live in my village. Life is good there. I can manage to live easily there. In addition, my presence is important because I have to take care of my mother, siblings, and manage farming assignments.” Tasks that once seemed like burdens were now a mark of pride, maturity, and responsibility.

### When do they hope to return?

This desire to return home is often conditional upon first finding a better job or saving up a certain amount of money. Many youth want to go home, but only after they have enough savings to finish their education, build a house, or start a business. Often, youth find themselves failing to meet these goals, and repeatedly adjusting their timeline to postpone their return.

#### An exchange with Getachew, age 24

Getachew: Yeah, my plan was to stay here a maximum of four or five years. I was expecting to get my goal, like getting a certain amount of money, within those years.

Researcher: Has that plan changed after you came here to Addis?

Getachew: Yeah, to some extent it has changed because I am celebrating the fifth here, but still I have no plan to leave in the near future.

Researcher: Why has your plan changed?

Getachew: Because I haven’t gotten enough money as I expected. Unless I get money, I could not go back and start my own business. So the main reason to change my plan is the amount of money I have right now. I couldn’t get more money to start my own business in my village.

This pressure to remain in Addis Ababa until they have changed their life is related to *yilunnta*, the concept of shame discussed by researcher Daniel Mains.<sup>122</sup>

## Plan C: Migrating Abroad

Who is more likely to want to go abroad?

Though the sample of youth planning to go abroad is small compared to those wanting to stay in the city or return home, it is still possible to draw a few important conclusions. The size of this group was too small to run a sufficiently powered quantitative analysis, but qualitative interviews provided a few anecdotal patterns. In general, it seems that women are more likely to pursue onward migration, especially to the Middle East. Like those who plan to go home, these female youth also tend to have smaller social networks in Addis. They might have a few links, but they tend to be heavily reliant on just one or two close friends or relatives rather than the social butterflies who plan to remain in the city and are able to both broaden and deepen their social networks. This reliance on just one or two people for social support can lead to feelings of shame or being burdensome. There also seems to be a trend of women planning to go abroad who have undergone difficult life experiences and livelihood shocks, such as theft, discrimination, abuse from employers, and betrayal by friends. These experiences have left them with a low level of trust, which contributes to their hesitance in forming new social connections.

Peer influence is particularly strong for this migration path, as these young women often know either a friend or sibling who has experience with working abroad or is currently undergoing the application process. Some female returnees actively encourage other young women to go, promising high salaries and high savings. On the other hand, some respondents admit that they have also heard stories of abuse during domestic work in the Middle East, such as an employer who threatened to pour boiling water on her housemaid for making a disrespectful comment. There are also stories of women who have worked abroad and sent money home to a relative for safekeeping, only to have that person spend all of their savings by the time they returned. However, even these negative stories are often not enough to dampen their hopes of finding success abroad.

Which countries are potential migrants most interested in, and how do they plan to get there?

Most respondents who hope to migrate abroad plan to go to the Middle East. Specific countries included Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, and Qatar. One male respondent also expressed interest in joining family in the United States. No respondents said that they planned to go to another African country or follow the Western route to Europe. Youth reported that these journeys abroad are facilitated by brokers, who charge between

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<sup>122</sup> Mains, *Hope Is Cut*.

7,000-10,000 ETB (\$245-350) up front for visa processing and transport fees. The remainder of the costs will be taken out of the migrant's salary after reaching their destination.

What makes them want to go abroad?

The main draw for onward migration is the hope of better salaries. Some youth appear to conclude that they could do similar work that they do in Addis Ababa (cooking, cleaning, tailoring, etc.) for more money, and then return to Ethiopia with the savings needed to invest in a business or purchase assets and change their lives. A 24-year-old woman from Amhara region told us that she wants to go abroad "because their money is better than ours. Because rather than staying here for five years, I would rather work there for three years." Migration abroad is seen as a fast track towards more aspirational work like owning a business. Another young woman, when asked why she prefers to work in Beirut rather than Ethiopia, explained that it's "just to work and change my life. I do not want to continue working as a waiter and housemaid. My plan is to go there, collect money, and [come back to] start my own business." In some cases, the push for going abroad comes from parents and relatives. One woman told us that her uncle has been pressuring her for years to go abroad: "He tells me that I won't change my life with the work I'm doing here, and that I could work just as hard there and get a better salary, even though I may have to suffer for a small period of time. He tells me that I won't get money here."

Kalkidan, age 26

Kalkidan has dreamed of working in the Middle East for years. When her husband of four years forbade her from going, she divorced him and came to Addis Ababa with her infant daughter. For a while, she did cleaning part time with her daughter on her back, but was unable to earn enough to support her expenses, let alone save money to go abroad. Five months ago, she decided to bring her daughter back home to live with her parents, who agreed to care for the baby while Kalkidan works in Addis Ababa. Even after all of this, she says "my heart is set" on going to Saudi Arabia. Since Kalkidan started working as a housemaid full time, she has saved 7,000 ETB, which is close to the 10,000 ETB requested by her broker. She has not told her parents of her plans out of fear that they will refuse to care for her daughter in order to prevent her from going. This example demonstrates the power of these aspirations of success abroad, and the spirit of determination they can ignite in young migrants.

Weighing the options

While most youth fall into one of the three categories of 1) hoping to stay in Addis Ababa, 2) planning to return home, or 3) intending to go abroad, not everyone is able to clearly identify one preferred course of action. In the quantitative survey, 13.1% did not have a clear migration plan, while 11.1% of qualitative interviewees were also undecided. As a young man currently working in a bamboo furniture enterprise explained, "If you ask me to choose now, I may say living in my village would be good since there is cheap housing and food. But in the future, I do not know what will happen and what life could be in Addis [in a] few years. Who knows, I may get a good job and be able to afford life here... Generally, I want to live here in Addis as long as my income is able to cover all my costs. Otherwise, I will go back to my village."

## IX. Success and Failure

The key research question relates to the connection between migration plans and success or failure. In qualitative interviews, we asked respondents their general conceptions of these ideas, while in the quantitative survey, we asked them to rank themselves in terms of success using the analogy of a mountain.<sup>123</sup> To analyze these responses, it is important to first understand how youth think about success and failure more generally, and then we can compare the characteristics that more and less successful youth have in common.

### What are youth's general ideas about success and failure?

When asked to identify a peer who has become successful, many respondents gave an example of someone who started in a low-level job, but was able to save money and eventually invest in an asset or a new business. For example, one man told us that, "I have a friend with whom I was working together in a similar business. But now he bought a house in Mekelle [in Tigray region], got married and has a good business with more capital. He was here for about four years." Similarly, a twenty-four year old woman told us about a friend who "has now gone back to her village, opened her own shop, and is married and living her life. She's built a house for her family as well as herself." Both examples mention marriage despite the fact that most respondents were still single. This might indicate that marriage is something they will wait to do in the future once they are successful, or perhaps that marriage is an indicator of success.

On the other hand, failure is often associated with a static life, in which a young migrant stays in the same job and has the same level of income long after he or she arrived. A respondent told us that a friend of his is not successful because he has been in Addis Ababa for seven years, but still washes cars for a living. According to another young man, unsuccessful youth are those who "came here many years before but... they live in groups, switch from one job to another, and don't get a constant job." This response also demonstrates an association between success and a consistent, dependable income.

While there are examples of young migrants who are perceived as obvious successes or obvious failures, the reality of course is that far more migrants fall somewhere in between. Interestingly, one street vendor told us that he does not consider himself and his friends as either successes or failures, but "medium successful." When asked to explain further, he elaborated, "They are not as poor as those who are unable to succeed in their job. Rather, they are still trying to do more jobs and hoping they will be successful... They are doing their businesses well, but unable to get extra income to buy a house or other assets." In other words, they are living an urban subsistence existence, earning enough to satisfy their basic expenses, but not enough to save up for larger investments. Another young man explained that for him,

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<sup>123</sup> To do this, we asked youth to envision a mountain with five steps. The first step at the bottom of the mountain represents the lowest level of success, while the top step at the peak represents the highest. We then asked a series of questions asking them to place themselves on the mountain in different scenarios, sometimes relative to other people, and sometimes in terms of their own personal success.

anyone who makes more than 150 birr per day is successful, as this is the turning point at which someone can afford to start saving on a regular basis rather than consuming all of their income.

Youth seem to feel that this ability to save is determined by both income and financial discipline. Male respondents in particular often discussed the importance of this “commitment” to saving among those who are successful. A daily laborer from Amhara believed that the difference between those who are successful and unsuccessful is “due to their money management system. Some individuals get more money but spend it unwisely. Others save their money properly to achieve their goals.” Having an objective is very important, agreed another young man, who lamented, “Most youths have jobs but are unable to save money because they are addicted to alcohol or other substances... The other factor could be a lack of a clear vision for personal development. Here in Addis Ababa, youths have freedom but they do not use it wisely.”

Youth associate failure, therefore, with poor financial decision-making. Some – especially young men – mentioned that their peers often spend their earnings on alcohol, cigarettes, and khat, a widely available leaf traditionally chewed as a stimulant. Respondents also connected these habits to addiction, homelessness, and sometimes even criminal behavior. A shoe shiner told us, “I have friends with whom I came together, but they are not successful. They work as daily laborers, but they use drugs, chew khat, smoke cigarettes, and live in the street.” Young women rarely mentioned substance abuse or homelessness as examples of failure, but instead gave examples of peers who work in the commercial sex industry. One interviewee told us the story of how her friend went down this path: “Yes, most [unsuccessful migrants] are females. For example, I have a friend who I came together with from my village. She was employed in a bar and now she is HIV positive. She was a commercial sex worker. Now she... has become less motivated and unemployed. This is the one who I think is not successful.”

Social connections can also be an important determinant of success or failure. Many respondents mentioned that having a support network or link in Addis Ababa can be closely connected to success. As an example, an eighteen-year-old housemaid described two migrants who arrived in Addis Ababa at the same level of success, but one had relatives while the other did not. In this case, she said, the one without relatives might not be as successful. Both men and women also said that romantic and sexual relationships can lead to unwise spending and personal failure among their peers. For men, this might be the cost of wooing multiple girlfriends or hiring commercial sex workers, while for women they might agree to lend money to a boyfriend who then disappears.

Finally, some respondents acknowledged that there is also an element of chance that determines one’s success or failure. Some, like the bicycle repairman, believe that the luck that a migrant encounters, especially just after arrival, can have a long-term impact on how successful they will be overall. As he explains, “their commitment is important, but the opportunity they get or their luck also matters in their success. For example, an individual may

get a good job as soon as he arrives here in Addis but others may not get the chance for maybe a whole year.”

### How successful do youth consider themselves?

Rather than asking this question point-blank, we used the analogy of a mountain with five steps. Step five, at the peak of the mountain, represented the highest level of success, while step one, at the base, represented the lowest level of success (see Figure 21). We presented respondents with several different scenarios and asked them to place themselves on the appropriate step on the mountain. For example, we asked respondents to rank their degree of success compared to others in their home village, both before and after their migration. In another series of questions, youth indicated their current level of success as well as where they see themselves in one year and five years in the future.




Figure 21: Example of mountain diagram used as an analogy for success during quantitative survey

In response to the “mountain” questions, it is clear that youth generally view their current level of success as quite low. However, respondents did feel that they have become slightly more successful since coming to Addis Ababa, moving from a median score of 1 prior to migration up to a level 2 after migration, compared to others in their villages. Despite the challenges that many have encountered since migrating to Addis Ababa, respondents were also fairly optimistic about their chances of becoming more successful in the near future. Their median expected success in one year was a level 3, and in five years they hope to be at a level 4.

### Which factors are most closely associated with success and failure?

Using the data from this series of success questions, we can then analyze the similar characteristics among migrants at different levels of success, and make hypotheses about which factors are most important in contributing to a feeling of success. After performing a series of ordered logit regressions (See Appendix 5: Series of Ordered Logit Regression of Characteristics Influencing Levels of Success), some quantitative findings match quite well with qualitative results, while others are more surprising. In the following section, I offer hypotheses about the reasons behind some of the significant relationships. At this point, because of the limitations of this study’s sample size, it is difficult to perform a multivariate analysis, which could isolate the effects of each characteristic while holding others constant. Therefore, while this study can identify general correlations, and trends, it is not possible to make any firm causal conclusions about which characteristics are truly driving these differences. The following analysis is grouped

into 1) factors that have a positive correlation with success, 2) factors negatively correlated with success, and 3) other interesting findings.

Factors that have a strong, positive effect on success:

**Being female:** Across the board, female respondents consistently rated themselves as more successful than their male counterparts. This was a surprising result, considering the generally lower status of women in Ethiopia. One hypothesis is that perhaps the women who choose to migrate to Addis Ababa are a very selective group. During the qualitative interviews, we found that more women than men had migrated to Addis Ababa without their family's permission, even running away from home. The decision to migrate requires a high degree of ambition, courage, and confidence, perhaps especially for women due to the stricter constraints they face in traditional societal expectations. On the other hand, this result could also indicate that women have lower expectations for what level of success is possible for them. Therefore, if women's level 5 is a lower threshold than men's, it would be easier for women to be higher on the mountain, whether the question relates to the past, present, or future.

**More savings:** The data shows a relationship between higher reported savings and a higher degree of success. This finding is very much in line with ideas of success in qualitative interviews, in which youth explained that the ability to save is crucial to achieving success in Addis Ababa.

**Being one of the younger siblings in a family:** Those who are later in the birth order among their siblings also report a consistently higher level of success. As mentioned previously, the qualitative interviews revealed that parents often place a high level of responsibility and expectations on the eldest children. Perhaps, therefore, there is less pressure on younger children and hence they have a greater capacity to think of themselves as being closer to success. Younger siblings might also benefit from having older siblings who have spent time in Addis Ababa and can provide advice and support.

**High social capital:** The survey attempted several different proxies for social capital. The two which were most significant in terms of success were having someone in Addis Ababa to celebrate holidays with and having someone in Addis Ababa whom they could ask for a large loan. The first, knowing people in Addis Ababa to celebrate with, shows a certain level of connectedness and community that might help migrants feel more at ease and at home in the city. The second, knowing someone who could provide a large loan, shows a deep level of social relationship with someone of a reasonable amount of means. Having someone in their social circle who is this successful and who is also close enough to them to be willing to provide support likely provides migrants with a level of security and safety. If they are faced with a particularly serious emergency or livelihood shock, they know someone who will probably be willing to help them.

**Coming from a wealthier family:** Several variables indicate that there is a relationship between a migrant's level of wealth at home – in terms of both land and assets – and their perceived

level of success. Those with land that is good quality, greater than one hectare, or relatively larger than others in their community generally feel that they are more successful. As explained earlier, having land does not necessarily mean that a migrant is either able to inherit it – especially for women or those from very large family – or interested in actually building an agricultural livelihood. It is more likely that this relationship shows that those who come from families with more resources start off with a higher perception of themselves than those who come from very little. The same is true of those who report that their family had access to a greater number of assets in their villages.

**Higher trust of brokers:** The survey asked respondents a number of questions regarding trust, in which they gave an answer on a scale of 1-5 of how much they trust certain groups of people. The type of trust that proved to have the most significant relationship with success was trust in brokers. Trusting brokers probably means that a migrant would feel more comfortable in going to them as a resource during the job search process. The ability to rely on brokers for assistance in the event of job loss or in the process of moving up to a better job might help migrants feel more optimistic in their success.

**Faith in religion:** The final major factor which was connected to success was a measure of what we called “religious trust.” This question asked respondents how strongly they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: “I have a strong belief that God will protect me.” This reliance on religion might make migrants feel more optimistic about their success.

Factors that have a strong, negative effect on success:

**Being older:** As age increases, migrants’ self-perception of success generally decreases. This might show a degree of disillusionment. The younger migrants may be more optimistic about how the future will be for them, while those who are older and have had more life experiences may have a more pessimistic outlook. This could also be related to the idea that there is a certain window of time in which youth feel as if they can attain success. The closer they are to end of that window – and therefore, the older they are – the more likely they might be to feel as if it is too late for them to reach a higher level of success.

**Experiencing discrimination in Addis Ababa:** Those who have faced some type of discrimination since arriving in Addis Ababa generally see themselves as less successful. Discrimination might have harmed their social capital, and it might make them believe that this poor treatment could stand in their way of achieving success. In qualitative interviews, we learned that discrimination has made some youth struggle in making connections and trusting others as well as barred them from certain opportunities and services.

**Facing a livelihood shock<sup>124</sup> in Addis Ababa:** Youth respondents who have experienced some type of livelihood shock in Addis Ababa report lower levels of success. This might show that youth who have faced hardships of some sort struggle to get back on their feet again.

**Those who come from families with smaller land:** Youth who report coming from families with land that is smaller than average or less than one hectare also see themselves as less successful. Again, this might mean that youth who come from families with fewer resources see themselves as less successful from the beginning.

**Expectation of inheriting land:** Those who expect to inherit land generally see themselves as less successful. Part of this might have to do with the impact of gender. As explained above, women reported higher levels of success and they are also less likely to inherit land. Another hypothesis is that inheriting land could feel like a burden for young men who are torn between building an urban livelihood and fulfilling their families' expectations of them. This burden could lead to a fear of disappointing their families and a feeling of being unwillingly tied to the land, sentiments that could pull them away from really investing in urban life.

**Those who speak regularly with their families at home:** Finally, those who maintain close communication with their families and friends in their home villages also tend to perceive themselves as less successful. These close ties to home might mean that they are more likely to feel homesick after migrating to Addis Ababa and struggle to make new connections, which could in turn influence their feelings of successfulness. Or, if someone is struggling in Addis Ababa, they might be contacting their family more regularly for emotional support, even if they do not openly share the details of their challenges.

Other interesting findings:

**Years of education** is most important for making migrants feel more successful compared to others at home and compared to their peers in Addis Ababa.

**Number of assets in Addis Ababa** was very important to success according to qualitative respondents, but the evidence was somewhat weaker in the quantitative data.

**Membership in an equb** (savings group) might be connected to success, though the results were not as significant across the board as some other findings.

**Number of services in Addis Ababa and having a guarantor** seem to be negatively correlated with success. However, after controlling for gender, these effects drop out.

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<sup>124</sup> This refers to a binary question on whether or not the respondent has experienced any type of shock in Addis Ababa. The study is not sufficiently powered to disaggregate between different types of shocks.

## What is the connection between success and migration destination?

After outlining the livelihoods of youth migrants, both before and after their migration, and then describing their migration plans and level of “success,” it is time to return to the original research question: “How does the **definition of success** differ across Ethiopian youth who come to Addis Ababa *with different ultimate intended destinations*?” After comparing qualitative responses between youth with different migration plans, it appears that there are no obvious differences in how youth with different intended destinations define the concepts of success and failure. However, this research has revealed important insights into how youth migrants in general think about these concepts, which will still prove helpful for policymakers.

The quantitative data can assist with answering a slightly different, but equally important question: “How does the **level of success** differ across Ethiopian youth who come to Addis Ababa *with different ultimate intended destinations*?” As demonstrated in Table 3 below, there were a few statistically significant relationships between level of success and migration plan. The first mountain question asked respondents to state their level of success compared to others in their home communities, after their migration. Those who plan to stay in Addis Ababa tend to score significantly higher on this question, while those who aim to return home score significantly lower (see Table 3). This result implies that youth who believe they have achieved a higher degree of success are more comfortable staying in the city, while those who are doing worse are more likely to be interested in going home. The other two statistically significant mountain questions asked youth to predict where on the mountain they will be in one year and in five years. Again, those who plan to return home scored significantly lower, demonstrating a higher degree of pessimism about their future levels of success.

Table 3: A Series of Simple Logit Regressions of Level of Success on Migration Aspirations

	Stay in Addis	Return home
Mountain: compared to others at home, post-migration	0.736**	-0.87**
Mountain: personal expectation in 1 year	0.642	-1.008**
Mountain: personal expectation in 5 years	0.495	-0.9**

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1

These findings might initially seem to be in conflict with the qualitative data. As discussed, qualitative interviews showed that there are also circumstances in which youth who see themselves as less successful in Addis are actually more likely to want to stay in the city, rather than return home. These are the migrants who repeatedly postpone their return to their villages until they become more successful. One hypothesis to explain this discrepancy is that the quantitative data represents the *desire* to return home, while the qualitative data indicates an actual *plan* of returning home in the near future. If this is true, then less successful youth at the very least feel a stronger desire to return home, likely due to feelings of discouragement after some of the challenges they have experienced in Addis Ababa. However, despite this wish,

in reality, they might indeed continue the pattern of repeatedly delaying their return until they can become sufficiently successful in order to return home without shame.

More broadly, this study has also shown that for some, failure in Addis Ababa might prompt a second migration abroad. For example, a young woman working in a factory in Addis Ababa told us that “I didn’t [think of migrating abroad] before, but now, because Addis Ababa is difficult to live in, I’m thinking of going to the Middle East.” She came to the city with a TVET certification in mechanical fabrication, and has been in the city for two years. So far, she has worked at a cosmetics company and a paper factory, but is frustrated by her dependency on her family and inability to afford the expenses of life in the city. Other researchers also occasionally mention the connection between failure in Addis Ababa and migration abroad. De Regt noted that poor labor regulations and a lack of support in cities might lead youth to migrate abroad, even if that was not their original intent.<sup>125</sup> This finding, if confirmed by additional data, could have important implications for policymakers interested in reducing migration to the Middle East but resistant toward policies that might improve the status of migrants in Addis Ababa, out of fear that these efforts would only increase the speed of rural-urban migration.

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<sup>125</sup> “Migration and Conflict in the Horn of Africa: A Desk Review and Proposal for Research.”

## X. Policy Recommendations

For Save the Children and other policymakers interested in engaging with youth rural-urban migrants in Ethiopia, this study has provided a thorough analysis of their livelihoods, migration aspirations, and ideas about success and failure. To support youth in advancing towards these ideals of success, the following key policy recommendations offer initial guidance. These recommendations combine key findings from the data analysis presented in this report as well as some suggestions coming directly from youth migrants themselves.

1. First and foremost, youth want job opportunities. From a programming standpoint, this would probably begin with some skills-based training. However, skills training alone does not necessarily lead to employment in this context. Respondents reported that sometimes, even with relevant training and experience, finding a job in an industry can be impossible without using a social link. Any skills training program, therefore, must be carefully designed to **create a pipeline to connect youth to employment** through building new social connections within the field, potentially through apprenticeship programs or trade guilds. Depending on the type of training, youth also noted that **assistance in accessing working premises** could also be useful.
2. A focus **on land reform or agricultural inputs is unlikely to prevent or reduce youth migration flows**. Young male migrants might inherit land, but are mostly disinterested in building a rural agricultural livelihood. For women, land inheritance and agricultural work play a minimal role in their decision-making regarding migration or livelihoods, since both of these are associated with men according to traditional gender norms. Even those men and women who do plan to return home to their villages rarely aspire to resume farming. They would much rather open small businesses in the rural areas. Further **investment in agribusiness** could be an area for further opportunities.
3. Building resilience against shocks by drought management techniques, reducing food insecurity, and improving health outcomes will reduce some of the vulnerability that can lead to migration, but not all. **Neglect and abuse arising from divorce and remarriage, as well as the abandonment and financial stress that can result from the death of a parent, would lead to their migration regardless**. Furthermore, the data reveals that plenty of youth also migrate without experiencing a major shock in their villages.
4. For many youth, completing education would have been their first choice, but migration became a backup when they were forced to end their education early. **Supporting youth in continuing their education in their rural homes** would require addressing barriers such as the high rate of failure on the National Learning Assessments, the burden of school fees, and competing demands of home responsibilities. Many youth might still migrate after completing their education, but they would have higher skills that, with the right connections, could set them up with more promising job prospects once they arrive.

5. One major challenge that should be addressed is that **youth in rural areas do not have the information to make fully informed decisions about their migration**. They receive negative information from government anti-migration campaigns, but at the same time positive messages from their peers who have built their parents a new house or visited wearing fancy clothing. With conflicting messaging, many decide to take the risk and migrate to the city to see for themselves. They often struggle, but rarely tell their families about these challenges due to a combination of shame and a desire to protect their loved ones from problems they can do nothing about. Therefore, the cycle of unrealistic expectations and disappointment continues.
6. Any initiative designed to work with migrants in Addis Ababa must take into consideration the major differences in living arrangements and social networks between young men and young women. **Women in particular could use more support in forming connections with their peers, while men might benefit from more mentorship opportunities with older adults**. Furthermore, migrants emphasized that **access to affordable housing open to migrants** is a major need, though likely outside the scope of Save the Children to address.
7. There is a **great deal of potential in brokers**. Though often distrusted and looked down upon, they offer a vital service and can exert a great deal of power over youth migration and livelihood choices. They also have powerful social networks as one of the foundations of their work, and know more about the employer/employee dynamics than almost anyone else. Efforts thus far to formalize the institution have done little to curb informal brokers or improve protection for the workers who use their services. Improving policies regarding brokers requires better information about how they work, and this is a vital area for further research and engagement.
8. Migrants who come to Addis Ababa and struggle to find success often feel trapped, in that they are unable to return home until they have attained a certain degree of success. Some migrants are willing to undergo serious and potentially dangerous hardships in Addis Ababa rather than go home empty-handed. Policymakers should consider how they might be able to foster **migration that is less permanent and more flexible**, like circular or seasonal migration. One area of potential for this would be to more closely examine and potentially seek to replicate the groups of secondary students who come to Addis Ababa for the summer season to earn enough to pay the next year's school fees.
9. Social connections are extremely important for feeling successful and getting ahead in life, but can also be difficult to form. Two limiting factors are high levels of distrust and occasional instances of discrimination. Some of these issues could be addressed by **enabling youth migrants to participate in civil society organizations in Addis Ababa**, as a casual way to form connections with other youth who are from different backgrounds

outside of home and work. However, most of these organizations are currently limited to youth with an Addis Ababa resident ID.

10. Youth are on a constant quest for social mobility. They often move fairly quickly between jobs, always searching for something better. Employers, on the other hand, are often frustrated with what they perceive as unreliability in youth, which makes it risky to invest in the personal development of young employees who might quickly leave to pursue other opportunities. To bridge these divides, **it is very important that any wage labor jobs present some potential for promotion, independence, and growth among employees.** These incentives could be a gradual increase in income, responsibilities, or both over time.
11. There is great potential in **harnessing the power of *equbs*, traditional rotating savings groups.** These groups provide both a commitment to saving, as well as a stronger social network, two qualities that youth identified as key to success. They also often help bridge divides between youth from different areas or occupations.
12. After migration, youth are often interested in continuing their education in a part time capacity. The night schools offered in Addis Ababa are an excellent step, but many youth are excluded from participating due to long, draining work hours. One option would be for policymakers to **incentivize employers by providing a benefit of some sort for those who support their workers in attending night school.** Furthermore, organizations should work to **support the high levels of educational aspirations among male migrants and better understand seemingly lower education ambition among young women.**
13. There are several areas of the country with high levels of migration, but **one of particular interest is Wolayita zone in SNNP.** There are many Welaitans shining shoes, selling wares on the street, and serving as housemaids in homes across Addis. Welaitans appear to have a very strong group identity that forms the basis of their social networks, as well as a strong pull to return home to Wolayita. In the geospatial analysis of youth migration in Ethiopia included in Appendix 3: Geographic Model of Migration Likelihood, it is clear that even this predictive model is unable to explain why migration rates from Wolayita are so high. It is important to establish a better understanding of why so many Welaitans are coming to Addis Ababa and any specificities of the regional culture, demographics, governance, and environment that might be contributing to these trends.
14. **There might be a connection between a difficult life in Addis Ababa and a higher interest in pursuing further migration abroad.** Exploring this question could be extremely valuable for further research and programs designed to help manage irregular migration to the Middle East and encourage the Addis Ababa city

administration to allocate funds to improve the lives of migrants as well as long-term residents.

15. Any initiative designed to support youth migrants in Addis Ababa will need to somehow address or tackle the **complicated problem of lack of Addis Ababa Resident IDs and guarantors**. Organizations working in Addis Ababa generally collaborate with the local city administration for permissions to engage in programming. These local officials are under pressure from both their constituents and the ministry higher-ups to prioritize official Addis Ababa residents for social services. To implement a program incorporating youth migrants, the organization would need to be prepared to engage in some **negotiation and advocacy work with local officials** in order to receive permissions.
16. **Access to credit could help bring youth closer to their own definition of success**. Many youth expressed interest in an opportunity to receive loans for starting their businesses. At the moment, many youth are locked in a cycle of urban subsistence in which they must spend almost all that they earn on basic expenses, with limited ability to save. Saving itself is a measure of success, in their eyes, and enables them to make major investments that could open the door to returning to education, getting a driver's license, finding the startup capital for their business idea, or giving them the funds to build themselves a house in the village. Even migration abroad could be considered a desperate attempt to access startup capital.
17. There could be an opportunity to **work more closely with religious institutions**. In times of difficulty, youth often turn to religion, which can be a source of strength and resilience during a shock. Trust in religion is also associated with higher degrees of success.
18. A training program on life skills should include **tools for healthy relationships, information on the consequences of substance abuse, financial management techniques, and developing a vision for the future**. New arrivals who come from Oromia, Tigray, and SNNP are also in need of **Amharic language support** to facilitate their adjustment to the city.

## XI. Conclusion

Although the definition of success does not clearly differ among young Ethiopian rural-urban migrants with different intended destinations, this report has brought forth many other notable findings. After outlining the Ethiopian migration context and the research methodology, the study highlighted key aspects of migrant youth's livelihoods, both before and after their migrations to Addis Ababa. This report has also provided details on how migrant youth think about success and failure, and which characteristics are most closely associated with each extreme. Finally, the report noted relevant connections between migration aspirations and success/failure, before contributing a list of policy recommendations for Save the Children and any other local or international organizations.

One question that this report has not delved into is whether or not youth *should* migrate to Addis Ababa. Youth themselves are often divided on this topic. Some are adamant that youth should focus on their educations and find ways to contribute at home rather than coming to the city. Other respondents said they encourage others to come, but only if certain conditions are met, such as having a relative and completing a certain amount of education. Some were more pragmatic, acknowledging that, no matter what they might do or say, they know that other youth will follow in their footsteps: "Youth these days do not mind the input of other people." Finally, a few youth told us that they encourage others to get complete information about the situation of youth migrants, both the good and the bad, and then make an informed decision. "Otherwise," as one respondent explained, "they will face challenges and may be forced to go back to their village without achieving their goal."

Following the recommendations identified in this report will be a strong start to improving the lives and livelihoods of rural-urban migrant youth in Addis Ababa. These recommendations will enable those who want to go home to their villages to do so earlier, without wasting year after year living at a subsistence level in Addis Ababa in order to avoid the shame of returning empty handed. Supporting youth migrants in the city might also help reduce the likelihood of some of the most vulnerable migrants deciding to pursue irregular migration, a much riskier option. Finally, for those who want to stay in Addis Ababa, this support will help them to build productive lives that will contribute to the healthy development of the city – the development that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the role model for so many of these youth, has promised. As Abiy himself stated in a recent interview, "If you can change Addis, you can definitely change Ethiopia."<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> Lionel Barber and David Pilling, "Ethiopia's Abiy Ahmed: Africa's New Talisman," Financial Times, February 21, 2019, <https://www.ft.com/content/abe678b6-346f-11e9-bb0c-42459962a812>.

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
## Appendix 2: Summary Table of Qualitative and Quantitative Samples

		Qualitative % (n)	Quantitative % (n)
Sample size		54	84
Gender	Male	48.1% (26)	52.4% (44)
	Female	51.9% (28)	47.6% (40)
Age (mean)		22.1	21.6
Time in Addis (mean)		N/A	29 months, or approx. 2.5 years
Region of Origin	Amhara	40.7% (22)	39.3% (33)
	Oromia	14.8% (8)	20.2% (17)
	SNNP	35.2% (19)	31.0% (26)
	Tigray	9.2% (5)	9.5% (8)
Migration Plan	Stay in Addis	38.9% (21)	63.1% (53)
	Return home	29.6% (16)	19.1% (16)
	Abroad	20.4% (11)	4.8% (4)
	Not sure/it depends	11.1% (6)	13.1% (11)
Ethnicity	Amhara		39.3% (33)
	Oromo		20.2% (17)
	Welaita		22.6% (19)
	Tigray		9.5% (8)
	Gurage		4.8% (4)
	Hadiya		1.2% (1)
	Sidama		1.2% (1)
	Silte		1.2% (1)
Religion	Ethiopian Orthodox		72.6% (61)
	Protestant		17.9% (15)
	Muslim		9.5% (8)
Marital Status	married		8.3% (7)
	not married		91.7% (77)
Children	have children		9.5% (8)
	no children		90.5% (76)
Family Background	Number siblings (mean)		5
	Birth order (mean)		3.08


## Appendix 3: Geographic Model of Migration Likelihood

To better understand the geographic factors which might be contributing to youth migration, I conducted a spatial analysis using ArcGIS. Specifically, I aimed to answer the following questions: 1) Where are the areas in Ethiopia in which youth have been most likely to migrate to Addis Ababa, between 2013-2018? 2) How closely does this predictive model of migration likelihood match with the actual origins of the respondents sampled in this study?


To develop a vulnerability index for migration likelihood, I selected eleven total indicators which, based on the literature and the primary data collection, contribute to youth migration decisions. These indicators fall along three different dimensions: socioeconomic risk factors, susceptibility to shocks, and ease of migration to Addis Ababa. Under socioeconomic risk factors, I considered lack of job opportunities, poverty, school drop-out rates, birth rates, population growth, and population density. The indicators related to shocks included conflict, food insecurity, death of parents, and divorce/separation. Finally, to determine ease of migration, I examined proximity to Addis Ababa along main roads. For each indicator, I created a map depicting the zones where youth are most and least likely to migrate (see detail maps below).




### Drop-out Rates




### Birth Rates




### Population Growth




### Population Density




### Conflict



### Food Insecurity





The majority of these indicators were calculated using 2007 census data<sup>127</sup> tabulated by Administrative Level 2 (zones), but a few layers required additional analysis using XY point data, raster calculation, and network analyst. Each of the eleven indicators was then assigned a score from zero to four, with four being the highest vulnerability and zero the lowest. I then created an average socioeconomic score and an average shock score using the related indicators. Because there was only one indicator related to ease of migration, there was no need to create an average. Next, I calculated a weighted average for each of the three categories as follows:

$$\frac{(average\ socioeconomic * 0.5) + (average\ shock * 0.4) + (ease\ of\ migration * 0.1)}{3}$$

3

<sup>127</sup> Sources: Armed Conflict Location and Event Database 2013-2018, Famine Early Warning Systems Network IPC 2013-2018, Ethiopia Central Statistical Agency 2007, UN OCHA, WorldPop 2010 and 2015, World Food Program GeoNode 2017, Humanitarian Data Exchange, World Bank

Projected Coordinate System: Adindan\_UTM\_Zone\_37N




Figure 22: Complete Youth Migration Vulnerability Index

The final vulnerability score has a possible range of zero to four, with values closest to four indicating the zones where youth might be most likely to migrate to Addis Ababa. The final map (see Figure 22) demonstrates that the highest migration vulnerability is focused around several zones in central and eastern Oromia region as well as Amhara region. The zone with the highest vulnerability is West Hararghe, which has particularly high rates of food insecurity, conflict, poverty, and birth rates. The areas with lowest vulnerability to migration are largely on the periphery of the country. This finding aligns with the literature, which demonstrates that these youth, if they do choose to migrate, are more likely to migrate to bordering countries such as Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan rather than Addis Ababa.

To explore the relationship between this model of migration likelihood and data provided by study respondents,<sup>128</sup> I ran an ordinary least squares regression of the number of survey respondents per zone by vulnerability score. The results demonstrate that there is a statistically significant positive correlation between areas with high migration risk and areas

<sup>128</sup> The study did not collect detailed information on the village of origin for qualitative respondents, so this comparison only includes the quantitative survey respondents.

with the highest representation in the survey ( $p=0.032$ , see Figure 23). However, there are a few outliers, the most notable being Wolayita. This zone had the highest representation in the quantitative survey, at 14 respondents, but ranked 52<sup>nd</sup> out of 95 zones in terms of vulnerability. This mismatch could be due to the non-random sampling procedures of the survey. It could also indicate that the geospatial analysis failed to consider certain cultural factors in places like Wolayita which contribute to migration, but are not readily measurable. Another limitation in this analysis is that the last Ethiopian census took place in 2007, while the migration data from respondents comes from 2018. Much has shifted in the migration dynamics during this time, which makes comparison difficult.




Figure 23: Regression Results Depicting Correlation Between Survey Respondents and Predictive Migration Model

## Appendix 4: Regression Tables

*Table 4: A Multivariate Regression of Land Size and Quality and Number of Assets in Village*

	Coeff	Std Error	t	P value	Confidence Interval
Land Size (hectares)	-0.134	0.290	-0.46	0.645	[-0.712, 0.443]
Land Size (relative, scale 1-5)	0.580	0.383	1.52	0.134	[-0.183, 1.342]
Land Quality (scale 1-5)	0.718	0.251	2.86	0.006	[0.217, 1.218]

*Table 5: A Logit Regression of Gender on Inheriting Land*

	Coefficient	Std Error	z	P value	Confidence Interval
Female	-5.081	0.898	-5.66	0.000	[-6.840, -3.321]

*Table 6: A Logit Regression of Gender on Access to Land as a Reason for Migrating*

	Coefficient	Std Error	z	P value	Confidence Interval
Female	-3.104	1.06	-2.93	0.003	[-5.182, -1.026]

*Table 7: A Logit Regression of Gender on Friend from Village as a Link*

	Coefficient	Std Error	z	P value	Confidence Interval
Female	-1.121	.527	-2.13	0.033	[-2.153, -0.089]

*Table 8: An OLS Regression of Gender on Number of Social Links*

	Coeff	Std Error	t	P value	Confidence Interval
Female	-2.743	0.969	-2.83	0.006	[-4.671, -0.815]

*Table 9: A Logit Regression of Gender on Having a Social Link (binary)*

	Coeff	Std Error	z	P value	Confidence Interval
Female	-1.494	0.835	-1.79	0.074	[-3.130, 0.142]

*Table 10: An Ordered Logit Regression of Years of Education on Helpfulness of Education*

	Coeff	Std Error	z	P value	Confidence Interval
Yrs Ed	.349	0.088	3.97	0.000	[0.177, 0.521]

*Table 11: A Logit Regression of Years of Education on Being a Casual Laborer*

	Coeff	Std Error	z	P value	Confidence Interval
Years Ed	-0.260	0.103	-2.51	0.012	[-0.462, -0.057]

Table 12: A Logit Regression of Years of Education on Being a Wage Laborer

	Coeff	Std Error	z	P value	Confidence Interval
Years Ed	0.196	0.082	2.39	0.017	[0.035, 0.357]

Table 13: A Logit Regression of Being Welaita on Being a Casual Laborer

	Coeff	Std Error	z	P value	Confidence Interval
Welaita	1.085	0.657	1.65	0.099	[-0.202, 2.372]

Table 14: A Logit Regression of Being Welaita on Being Self-Employed

	Coeff	Std Error	z	P value	Confidence Interval
Welaita	1.058	0.535	1.98	0.048	[0.009, 2.106]

Table 15: A Logit Regression of Being Welaita on Being a Wage Laborer

	Coeff	Std Error	z	P value	Confidence Interval
Welaita	-1.670	0.790	-2.11	0.034	[-3.218, -0.122]

Table 16: A Logit Regression of Being Amhara on Being Self-Employed

	Coeff	Std Error	z	P value	Confidence Interval
Amhara	-1.273	0.510	-2.50	0.013	[-2.272, 0.274]

Table 17: A Multivariate OLS Regression of Job Category on Monthly Income

	Coeff	Std Error	t	P value	Confidence Interval
Self-employed	-464.583	199.935	-2.32	0.023	[-862.544, -66.623]
Wage labor	-688.333	204.922	-3.36	0.001	[-1,096.22, -280.447]
Domestic work	-1,008.33	341.010	-2.96	0.004	[-1,687.097, -329.569]
Other	-286.111	260.451	-1.10	0.275	[-804.526, 232.304]
_cons	1,908.333	170.505	11.19	0.000	[1,568.951, 2,247.715]

Note: left out category = casual laborers

Table 18: An OLS Regression of Being Welaita on Monthly Income

	Coeff	Std Error	t	P value	Confidence Interval
Welaita	340.275	161.016	2.11	0.038	[19.964, 660.587]

Table 19: An OLS Regression of Being a Casual Laborer on Monthly Income

	Coeff	Std Error	t	P value	Confidence Interval
Casual Laborer	556.389	187.888	2.96	0.004	[182.621, 930.157]

Table 20: An OLS Regression of Prior Migration (binary) on Monthly Income

	Coeff	Std Error	t	P value	Confidence Interval
Prior Migration	351.554	152.464	2.31	0.024	[48.254, 654.854]

Table 21: An OLS Regression of Work Experience in Village on Monthly Income

	Coeff	Std Error	t	P value	Confidence Interval
Worked in Village	425.143	179.575	2.37	0.020	[67.910, 782.375]

Table 22: An OLS Regression of Being Taken Advantage of by Employer on Monthly Income

	Coeff	Std Error	t	P value	Confidence Interval
Bad Employer	449.75	176.316	2.55	0.013	[98.434, 801.066]

Table 23: A Multivariate OLS Regression of Factors Influencing Monthly Income

	Coeff	Std Error	t	P value	Confidence Interval
Welaita	193.159	175.958	1.10	0.276	[-158.054, 544.372]
Casual Labor	463.310	203.818	2.27	0.026	[56.488, 870.132]
Self-Employed	143.028	167.391	0.85	0.396	[-191.086, 477.141]
Domestic Worker	-236.657	310.428	-0.76	0.449	[-856.275, 382.960]
Waiter	-311.167	282.364	-1.10	0.274	[-874.768, 252.434]
Migration history	272.551	153.750	1.77	0.081	[-34.335, 579.437]
Bad employer	366.891	168.767	2.17	0.033	[30.030, 703.752]
Worked in village	272.093	173.814	1.57	0.122	[-74.840, 619.027]

Table 24: An OLS Regression of Time Spent in Addis Ababa on Amount of Savings (ETB)

	Coeff	Std Error	t	P value	Confidence Interval
Months in Addis Ababa	46.267	24.583	1.88	0.064	[-2.815, 95.348]

Table 25: A Logit Regression of Being Female on Having Someone to Ask for Medium-Sized Loan

	Coeff	Std Error	z	P value	Confidence Interval
female	-2.515	0.677	-3.72	0.000	[-3.841, -1.188]

Table 26: A Logit Regression of Being Female on Having Someone to Ask for a Large Loan

	Coeff	Std Error	z	P value	Confidence Interval
female	-1.281	0.474	-2.70	0.007	[-2.211, -0.351]

Table 27: A Logit Regression of Being Female on Having Someone to Celebrate Holidays With

	Coeff	Std Error	z	P value	Confidence Interval
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female	1.784	0.683	2.61	0.009	[0.446, 3.122]
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*Table 28: An OLS Regression of Being Female on Number of Regular Contacts at Home*

	Coeff	Std Error	t	P value	Confidence Interval
female	-1.857	0.968	-1.91	0.061	[-3.786, 0.091]

*Table 29: A Logit Regression of Being Female on Keeping in Touch with Parents*

	Coeff	Std Error	z	P value	Confidence Interval
female	-4.094	0.926	-4.42	0.000	[5.910, -2.279]

*Table 30: A Logit Regression of Being Female on Keeping in Touch with Siblings*

	Coeff	Std Error	z	P value	Confidence Interval
female	-2.253	0.694	-3.25	0.001	[-3.612, -0.893]

## Appendix 5: Series of Ordered Logit Regression of Characteristics Influencing Levels of Success

VARIABLES	Home premig	Home postmig	Addis peers	Addis everyone	Personal premig	Personal today	Personal 1 year	Personal 5 yrs
Age	-0.111	-0.142**	-0.097	-0.033	-0.083	-0.12*	-0.124*	-0.13**
Highest grade	0.321***	0.066	0.164**	0.075	0.203***	-0.002	0.094	0.034
Amhara	0.797*	0.543	0.53	0.561	0.691	0.464	0.464	0.516
Oromo	-0.177	0.211	-0.243	-0.281	-0.267	0.127	-0.509	-1.207**
Welaita	-1.066**	-1.053*	0.011	-0.83	-0.547	-0.446	-0.075	0.373
Female	0.927**	1.92***	1.557***	0.882**	1.037**	1.681***	3.137***	4.422***
Amount of savings (hundreds of ETB)	.008	0.022***	0.01*	0.011**	0.001	0.005	0.012*	0.005
Months unemployed	0.162**	0.102**	-0.02	0.08	0.111*	0.033	-0.015	-0.013
Number links	-0.07	-0.053	-0.021	-0.087	-0.027	-0.077	-0.114**	-0.061
Links (binary)	-0.716	-1.087	-0.21	-1.422**	-0.665	-1.693**	-1.058	-1.287*
Addis ID	-0.445	-0.05	0.107	-0.057	-0.392	0.076	-0.424	-0.951*
Guarantor	-0.647	-1.539***	-1.087**	-0.682	-1.039**	-1.841***	-2.538***	-3.07***
Number assets Addis	0.241	0.212	0.513***	0.423**	0.305*	0.201	0.275	0.034
Birth order	0.157	0.185*	0.195*	0.269**	0.217*	0.054	0.334***	0.241**
Children (binary)	-1.554	-1.402*	-0.427	-0.479	-0.658	0.474	-0.295	-0.534
Large loan	1.104**	1.135***	0.312	1.156***	1.128***	0.785*	0.223	-0.145
Number sources lg loan	-0.028	-0.425	-0.528	-0.24	-0.294	-0.854**	-0.586	-0.334
Medium loan	0.292	0.107	0.211	0.375	0.07	0.327	-0.492	-0.815*
Number sources med loan	0.093	0.112	0.069	0.376*	0.093	0.07	0.084	0.037
Bank	0.32	-0.109	0.091	0.417	0.268	-0.237	-0.843*	-1.261***
Equb	-0.083	1.8**	1.438*	0.575	-0.489	-0.325	0.697	0.895
Literate in Amharic	0.345	-0.754*	-0.293	0.051	0.167	0.3	-0.587	-0.707*
Trainings (binary)	2.133***	1.374**	0.239	0.635	1.38**	-0.121	0.393	-0.185
SC Holiday Addis (binary)	0.849	1.861***	0.905*	1.179*	1.327**	0.54	1.828***	1.529***
SC Holiday Addis Number	0.108	0.157	0.175*	0.03	0.031	0.108	0.134	0.235**

Casual laborer	-0.216	-0.434	-0.997*	-0.404	-1.024	-0.117	-0.147	-0.192
Self-employed	-0.65	-0.86**	-0.025	-0.37	-0.388	-0.443	-0.302	-1.09
Wage laborer	1.069**	1.074**	0.271	0.551	0.996**	0.254	0.512	0.479
Domestic worker	-0.673	-0.009	1.538	0.384	-0.82	1.434	1.657*	2.243*
Discrimination Addis	-0.974	-1.434**	-1.071**	-0.6	-0.792	-1.753***	-0.858	-1.321**
Lack of opportunity	-0.336	-0.714	-0.825	0.359	-0.21	-0.036	-0.934*	-0.973*
Poverty	-1.11	-0.289	-0.349	-1.351*	-0.72	0.082	-0.581	0.956
Land (binary)	-1.959***	-1.114	-0.144	-1.014	-0.975	-0.951	-1.408*	-0.314
Smaller land	-0.876*	-1.017**	-1.381***	-0.747*	-0.863*	-0.942*	-1.257**	-1.365***
Larger land	0.462	1.593**	0.91	1.853**	1.145	1.201	1.697**	2.212**
Less 1 hectare	-0.432	-0.592	-1.238**	-0.878*	-0.837	-0.821	-1.338**	-0.826*
More 1 hectare	0.752	1.312***	1.408***	0.924*	0.726	0.845*	1.097**	1.219**
Land quality	0.697**	1.037***	0.704***	0.757***	0.947***	0.736***	0.933***	0.891***
Inherit land (binary)	-1.131**	-1.736***	-1.115**	-0.751*	-1.075**	-1.302**	-2.586***	-3.63***
Number assets village	0.162	0.271**	0.445***	0.16	0.247**	0.191*	0.3***	0.328***
Number services Addis	0.056	-0.134*	-0.002	-0.032	0.015	-0.193**	-0.164**	-0.192**
Number services village	0.063	-0.132	-0.021	-0.026	0.074	-0.056	-0.094	-0.19**
God will protect	2.02*	1.23**	0.371	0.71	1.241*	0.415	0.769	1.427**
Faith will support	0.456	0.672**	-0.302	0.196	0.527	-0.411	-0.399	-0.086
Fate is up to God	14.562	1.616**	0.285	1.204	15.066	0.319	-0.091	0.422
Trust coworkers	0.378*	0.131	0.156	0.145	0.339*	-0.046	-0.211	-0.368**
Trust extended fam	0.24	0.14	0.084	0.341	0.137	0.036	-0.335*	-0.314
Trust brokers	0.279	0.603***	0.273	0.07	0.357	0.465**	0.519**	0.408*
Trust employers	0.103	0.465**	0.06	0.393**	0.453**	0.032	0.114	0.201
Trust friend home	-0.361*	-0.19	0.038	0.01	-0.241	-0.176	-0.186	-0.026
Trust friend Addis	0.260	0.108	-0.163	0.229	0.358**	-0.118	-0.257	-0.333*
Trust housemate	-0.495	0.171	0.275	0.333	0.014	0.029	0.219	0.029
Trust immediate family	-0.070	-0.473	-0.288	-0.630	-0.284	-0.812	-0.1	-0.426
Trust random Addis	0.523**	0.496**	0.174	0.257	0.082	0.039	-0.147	0.018
Talk home	-0.117	-1.245***	-0.606	-0.479	-0.406	-1.124**	-1.697***	-2.438***
Shock Addis (binary)	-0.395	-1.049**	-2.101***	-1.118**	-0.574	-1.914***	-1.8***	-1.467***

Voluntary org Addis	1.015	1.407*	1.111	1.513*	0.886	0.951	1.154	0.314
Voluntary org home	0.309	-1.434**	-0.596	-1.203	-0.095	-0.895	-0.564	-1.504**
Stay in Addis	0.397	1.176**	0.626	0.409	-0.026	0.522	0.825	0.662
Return home	-0.651	-1.228**	-0.933	0.078	0.069	-0.419	-1.294**	-1.22**

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\*p<.05, \*p<0.1