Regional Livestock and Pastoralism Policy Training

Part 3: DROUGHT, LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD SECURITY

8th to 10th June 2009
Nairobi, Kenya
Contents

1. BACKGROUND 1

2. TRAINING CONTENT AND APPROACH 2
  2.1 Training approach 2
  2.2 Training materials 2
  2.3 Outline of the training course 2

3. OPENING SPEECH 3

4. TRAINING SESSIONS 5
  4.1 Drought in pastoralist areas of the Horn of Africa 5
  4.2 Effective drought cycle management 8
  4.3 Linking livelihoods-based programming and drought cycle management 10
  4.4 The heavy cost of late response: the economic implications of allowing asset loss and paying for food aid 13
  4.5 Where there is no budget? Institutional constraints to drought cycle management 14
  4.6 Herd growth and food aid 15
  4.7 New approaches: initial experiences with the use of cash-based safety nets in pastoralist areas of Kenya 17
  4.8 National and international guidelines and standards for livelihoods-based drought response 19

5. VISIT TO MAASAI PASTORALIST AREAS 20

6. POLICY ISSUES AND LESSONS FOR COMESA 21

7. NEXT STEPS: DRAFTING THE COMESA POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR FOOD SECURITY IN PASTORAL AREAS 23

Annex 1: Participants and facilitators 24
Annex 2: List of key documents 25

Acknowledgements

The Regional Livestock and Pastoralism Training Course (Part 3) was an activity of the Pastoral Areas Coordination, Analysis and Policy Support (PACAPS) project, under the Regional Enhanced Livelihoods in Pastoral Areas (RELPA) program, funded by the United States Agency for International Development East Africa and implemented by the Feinstein International Center, Tufts University in partnership with the COMESA Secretariat and CAADP. Additional support was provided via a grant to COMESA from USAID East Africa, also under the RELPA program. Professor Peter Little supported the training with the assistance of the International Institute for Environment and Development, and Mike Wekesa of Kesarine and Associates also provided technical support. The following people also made presentations or assisted with field visits: Mr. Sammy Keter, DFID/Government of Kenya Hunger Safety Net Programme; Mr. Soikan Meitiaki, Mainyonto Pastoralist Integrated Development Organisation (MPIDO); Mr. Eris Lothike, Oxfam GB Turkana.
1. BACKGROUND

In the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is tasked with developing a regional policy framework on pastoralism. This initiative is supported by a project called Pastoral Areas Coordination, Analysis and Policy Support (PACAPS) and recognizes that within the COMESA region pastoralists are among the most vulnerable and food insecure communities. To assist COMESA to strengthen its capacity in pastoralism and livestock issues, the PACAPS support includes the secondment of a senior policy adviser to the COMESA Secretariat, plus assistance with convening a Regional Livestock and Pastoralism Forum as a means to foster consultation with a range of governmental, private sector and civil society stakeholders. In addition to these activities, PACAPS works with COMESA to design specific training courses covering key aspects of pastoralism and policy.

A first training course for COMESA and partners took place in Garissa, Kenya in September 2008 and focussed on livelihoods analysis, and livestock marketing and diversification issues. The training included professional staff from the COMESA Secretariat, but also representatives from the African Union/Interafrican Bureau for Animal Resources, the Livestock Policy Initiative of the Food and Agriculture Organisation and Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), and national representatives from Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. The training introduced the livelihoods analytical framework as a tool for reviewing and analyzing pastoralist livelihoods, and then applied the tool to examine livestock marketing and livelihoods diversification, and related policy options. Livestock marketing was examined at domestic, cross-border, regional and international levels.

A second training took place in Adama and Awash, Ethiopia in November 2008, and this training focused on the underlying ecological rationale for pastoral mobility, options for legislative support for pastoral mobility, conflict issues, and pastoralist civil society and political representation.

This report describes the third and final training which took place in Nairobi 8th to 11th June 2009. The specific objectives for the training were as follows:

Objective 1: To introduce COMESA and CAADP to the scope, frequency, severity and trends of drought in pastoral areas and impact of drought in terms of food security and livelihoods.

Objective 2: To review and analyze approaches to drought preparedness and response in the Horn of Africa region, including comparison of food aid and livelihoods-based programming.

Objective 3: To review recent developments in pastoral areas related to food security, notably the introduction of safety programs in Kenya and Ethiopia.

Objective 4: To introduce COMESA to guidelines and standards for livelihoods-based drought response – the Ethiopian government guidelines and the Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards

Objective 5: To identify and prioritize policy issues relevant to the COMESA/CAADP food security policy framework for pastoral areas.
2. TRAINING CONTENT AND APPROACH

2.1 Training approach

The training approach focused on a mix of presentations and group work. This was complemented by visits to development projects in Maasai pastoralist areas, and discussions with local NGO staff and community members.

Wherever possible, the training used evidence drawn from the published literature and project evaluations and impact assessments. The final sessions of the training aimed to draw out key facts, issues and policy narratives which might feature in a COMESA policy on food security in pastoral areas. The intention was not to produce any of the final content of the policy, but to flag important aspects in relation to the mandate and strategies of COMESA and some of its ongoing activities.

2.2 Training materials

Training materials comprised copies of all presentations and supporting material in the form of handouts. These materials were also made available in electronic form on a CD-ROM.

2.3 Outline of the training course

Monday 8th June

Opening speech: Hon. Hussein Tarry Sasura, Assistant Minister for Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands, Government of Kenya

Welcome and introductions Mike Wekesa and Francis Chabari

Morning session

Drought in the Horn of Africa – current and predicted impact on pastoralist food security and livelihoods
Professor Peter Little

Drought preparedness and response – the drought cycle management model
Mike Wekesa, Kesarine and Associates

Afternoon session

Livelihoods-based approaches to drought response – experiences, impact, comparison with food aid.
Dr. Dawit Abebe, Tufts University

The heavy cost of late response: the economic implications of allowing asset loss and paying for food aid
Dr. Andy Catley, Tufts University

Tuesday 9th June

Morning session

Institutional constraints to drought cycle management
Mike Wekesa, Kesarine and Associates

Safety nets and food security – an overview of safety programs and issues
- The DFID/Government of Kenya Hunger Safety Net Programme, Sammy Keter
Regional Livestock and Pastoralism Policy Training Part 3: Drought, Livelihoods and Food Security
Nairobi, Kenya 8th to 10th June 2009

o Safety Net Issues in Turkana, Kenya, Eris Lothike, Oxfam GB

Afternoon session
Field trip to project sites of the Mainyoito Pastoralist Integrated Development Organisation at Enkereyian, Emboleoi, Oloontona and Iroret, Kajiado District.

Wednesday 10th June

Morning session Standards and guidelines for drought response – the Ethiopia government guidelines and the Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards (LEGS)
Dr. Andy Catley, Tufts University

Afternoon session Policy issues for COMESA/CAADP
Dr. Andy Catley, Tufts University

3. OPENING SPEECH

The Honourable Hussein Tarry Sasura, Assistant Minister for Development of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands and Member of Parliament for Saku Constituency made the following opening speech.

Ladies and gentlemen, first, let me welcome those of you that are visiting Kenya from COMESA member countries .... KARIBUNI! It gives me great pleasure to officiate at this training programme for COMESA on Pastoralism, Livestock and Policy under the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). I note with appreciation that you are gathered here this week to discuss three specific topics: Drought, Livelihoods and Food Security, and not food aid. For too long, the arid and semi-arid regions have suffered from recurring food shortages caused by drought, livestock disease, floods and conflict. You have the right approach, since food aid, as it is currently applied, has not solved food insecurity.

As you are aware, CAADP is an AU/NEPAD initiative to help African countries increase economic growth through agriculture and livestock-led development which eliminates hunger, reduces poverty and food insecurity, and expands exports. CAADP seeks to sustain growth in the agriculture/livestock sector growth rate at 6% per year until 2015, in order to ensure that we attain the Millennium Development Goal Number 1: reducing hunger and poverty by 50% by the year 2015. I am pleased to note that COMESA, as a regional body promoting regional integration and development, is increasingly aware of the role of livestock and pastoralism in reducing poverty and enhancing food security, and of the need to address key policy and institutional constraints at national, regional and international levels.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is widely known that in Africa the importance of livestock is most evident in pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities. Pastoralism is a major agricultural production system in the drylands of sub-Saharan Africa, where it supports 50 million of the 120 million pastoralists worldwide. The Eastern and Horn of African countries of the COMESA region are home to more than 25 million pastoralists who own the largest proportion of our national herds. Pastoral and agro-pastoral communities also contribute a significant share of national meat production and conserve most of the biodiversity outside protected areas.

As you may also know, livestock makes a significant contribution to agricultural GDP in the COMESA region. This contribution varies from country to country, but it is highest in
the Eastern Africa Countries: for example, 47% in Kenya, 63% in Eritrea, and 82% in Djibouti. These figures do not include other livestock products such as draught power and manure, nor do they take into account the intangible contribution of livestock to rural communities through risk mitigation and wealth accumulation.

Ladies and gentlemen, Kenya is proud to participate in AU-NEPAD initiatives, and especially the CAADP process, because agriculture and livestock are the mainstay of the majority of our people, accounting for 80% of rural livelihoods. Despite this overdependence on agriculture, a huge number are still food insecure. At the height of the drought in Kenya, just after the failure of the 2008 short rains, almost 30% of people needed some form of food assistance. According to the Ministry of Special Programmes, about 5.1 million people, including many pastoralists, currently need food assistance. This situation is untenable.

However, I wish to state that Kenya is one of the countries that has fully bought into the CAADP agenda. Implementation of the process is at an advanced stage, with the national compact due to be signed by the end of this month. To this end, I commend the leadership and commitment displayed by COMESA, which is mandated to support the implementation of the CAADP process in the region.

Ladies and gentlemen, allow me to update you on the work of the Ministry of State for Development of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands. We are actively consulting with all stakeholders to develop a strategy that will bring about sustainable change to pastoral livelihoods, thereby contributing an increased share to the economy. In the next few months, we will have a clear inventory of the potential of the region in terms of manpower and other development resources. We will also have a long-term policy framework for the development of the region, and an institutional framework through which to deliver it. The Ministry's area of responsibility stretches over 80 per cent of Kenya's land mass. Its work across such a large region will be shaped by the particular conditions prevailing in different parts of it. The Ministry is committed to:

1. Strengthen food security and drought management in all arid and semi-arid districts.
2. Support and enhance mobile pastoralism in all districts with significant pastoralist populations. Mobility is essential to the sustainable use of dryland environments. Since it often involves movement across national borders, regional institutions such as COMESA have an important role to play.
3. Transform the social and physical infrastructure of Northern Kenya and eliminate inequalities between this region and the rest of the country. Northern Kenya also occupies a strategic position as the gateway to new markets in countries to the north. The African Development Bank, for example, estimates that a tarmac road from Isiolo to Moyale will expand trade between Kenya and Ethiopia five-fold, from the current $35m per year to $175m per year. Opening up the north to appropriate investment will benefit not just that region but the country as a whole.

Finally, ladies and gentlemen, I wish to observe that climate change is now a reality. Although we are not yet sure how it will affect pastoralists' livelihoods, we are sure that the future will bring greater variability and uncertainty. Climate change is likely to exacerbate food insecurity in these regions unless we prepare for it well and strengthen our capacity to adapt. As I conclude, I would like once again to commend COMESA and its partner institutions for addressing these critical issues affecting pastoral livelihoods. I wish you all a most successful training workshop and look forward to deliberating on its outcomes.

It is now my singular privilege and pleasure to declare this workshop officially open. Thank You.
4. TRAINING SESSIONS

4.1 Drought in pastoralist areas of the Horn of Africa

The parts of the COMESA region where pastoralists live are characterized by extreme climatic variability, especially with respect to rainfall. This variability may be seasonal – as in the annual alteration between wet and dry seasons – or can be expressed as prolonged dry periods and droughts. The main drought risk ‘hotspots’ in Africa today are in fact similar to the 1970s, but two important policy issues are:

- Drought is often viewed by governments and donors as an ‘emergency’ in pastoral areas, but has sufficient predictability and frequency to indicate that it should be handled as a development planning issue, not an emergency. Drought is also slow onset, and usually results from the failure of two (or more) successive rains. Therefore, there is usually ample time for response to drought.
- Despite the ample time for planning and response, the dominant response to drought is food aid. Not only is this food aid often delivered late, there are a myriad of targeting and other issues which show that food aid is vastly over-used. Plus
  - While some pastoral areas are perceived as ‘food aid dependant’ the amount and type of food which is distributed cannot maintain households over long periods.
  - Whereas new settlements may develop around food aid distribution points, such settlements are not representative of pastoral areas as a whole.

Figure 1. Anatomy and Chronology of a Major Drought in a Pastoralist Area

---

1 Adapted from:
Therefore, drought results in the loss of livestock assets for both wealthier and poor households, with poor households affected relatively earlier in the drought cycle. The interplay between livestock prices (which fall during a drought) and grain prices (which rise during a drought) partly determines when pastoralists are able to sell livestock in exchange for grain.

Livestock are the main asset of pastoralist households, but pastoral livelihoods require a minimum herd size to support this livelihood. A characteristic of drought-induced livestock losses is that such losses take many years to rebuild. If drought is recurrent or if households experience other constraints (e.g. conflict leading to reduced access to grazing), poorer households may enter a ‘poverty trap’ from which it is difficult to escape.

![Figure 2. Livestock Assets, Drought and Poverty Traps in Pastoralist Areas](image)

---

2 From:

The importance of livestock assets is reflected in the ways in which pastoralists behave in the face of drought. For example:

- Pastoralists try to protect a core breeding herd, comprising mainly of productive adult females. This strategy is aimed at post-drought recovery, in which herd growth occurs primarily through managing the herd for maximum birth rates.
- Pastoralists will sell excess livestock during a drought, on condition that prices are perceived as fair and that payments from traders are timely.
- Income from livestock sales is used to protect remaining livestock e.g. by buying supplementary feed, trucking to distant grazing areas, or by buying veterinary care.

The extent to which these strategies can be used partly depends on access to traders, the livestock marketing system and demand and capacity for holding or fattening livestock in non-pastoral areas, the livestock feed industry and feed supply networks, and the status of basic veterinary services. All of these factors are long-term development issues.

In addition to livestock assets, the other key determinant of pastoralist’s ability to deal with drought is mobility. In the second COMESA Pastoralism and Policy Training ‘Mobility Matters’, the underlying ecological and economic rationale for pastoral mobility was discussed. Looking specifically at drought, mobility enables the most flexible use of available grazing.

Table 1. The impact of mobility of the capacity of pastoral households in Kenya to maintain assets during drought

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kenya sites</th>
<th>Average per capita livestock assets (Tropical Livestock Units) (2000-2002)</th>
<th>% decline March 2000 to December 2000 due to drought</th>
<th>% of households relying on pastoral satellite camps (2000-2001)</th>
<th>Mobility ranking (1-6, with ‘1’ highest)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kargi</td>
<td>6.98</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Horr</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>-24%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logo-logo</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>-46%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suguta Mammar</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>-33%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dirih Gumbo</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>-79%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngambo</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>-50%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This session ended with group work to discuss the following two opposing policy narratives.

“Drought is an abnormal event in pastoral areas which cannot be planned for, and needs to be dealt with in humanitarian terms”.

“Drought is a normal event in pastoral areas and needs to be incorporated into development planning and investment decisions”.

---

4.2 Effective drought cycle management

The concept of drought cycle management (DCM) assumes that drought is expected to occur and should be anticipated and planned for. Therefore DCM is the systematic planning and management of drought in order to reduce its risk, minimize its impact on lives and livelihoods and assist those affected to recovery from drought effects much more easily.

The DCM approach evolved largely from experiences in the drought-prone Turkana district in northwest Kenya, from the mid 1980s. A key influence was a realization that food aid was not an effective way to protect pastoral livelihoods. The DCM model was incorporated into large-scale government development programmes such as the Arid Lands Resource Management Project from the mid 1990s.

The DCM model draws on the principles of disaster risk reduction such as risk reduction, preparedness, response, rehabilitation and recovery, and aims to mainstream risk-based thinking into development programming – essentially, drought is not an emergency issue.

As shown in Figure 3, the DCM model uses four main stages of a drought cycle viz. ‘alert/alarm’, ‘emergency’, ‘recovery’ and ‘no drought’. For each stage in the cycle there are specific interventions which are appropriate. Furthermore, the earlier the intervention the greater its impact on livelihoods and cost-effectiveness. In other words, it pays to intervene early.

Figure 3. The drought cycle management model
The concept of early response is captured in the five pillars of effective DCM as follows:

1. **Timely information and data**

An effective early warning system (EWS) and other information and data sources are needed in DCM, which are accurate, credible, reliable, regular and accessible.

- Baseline information for planning, monitoring and evaluation;
- Information from EWS to identify drought stages and stress within affected communities;
- Assessments of vulnerability and capacity to enable effective livelihood support strategies to be designed;
- Strategic needs assessments to identify what activities are appropriate to support the specific needs of a particular community, at a particular stage of the drought;
- Joint assessment missions by all relevant stakeholders;
- Monitoring and evaluation information to track the progress of various interventions and to ensure they are appropriate, timely and effective;
- Evaluations, documentation of lessons learned and sharing of these lessons among all stakeholders to enhance best practice;

Without effective needs assessment, interventions tend to be poorly targeted and do not achieve the desired impact.

2. **Contingency planning**

Contingency plans should be drawn up at various levels: community, district and national. They should attempt to answer the question: “What should happen when drought hits?”

- The contingency plans should cover the most likely scenarios based on experience of previous droughts;
- They should identify problems that make people vulnerable to drought at each stage of the cycle;
- Analyze and prioritize these problems;
- Suggest strategies to deal with the problems;
- Identify the best strategies (use lessons learned);
- Draw up specific proposals that require external assistance;
- Aggregate plans from different communities to form a district contingency plans;
- Develop a budget for contingency funding.

3. **Capacity to implement interventions**

- Drought cycle management means doing the right thing at the right time in the right way. Stakeholders need a good understanding of the drought cycle to know what activity is appropriate at what stage of the drought;
- Skills on project cycle management;
- Skills by staff to enlist community participation in the project cycle;
- Skills to mainstream cross-cutting issues;
- Management of the implementing agency and capacity to provide assistance to implementing officers;
- Good relations with the community and with other agencies working in the same location;
- Experience of the agency to implement similar projects.

---

4 See COMESA CAADP Technical Briefing Paper No. 1 (2009), Pastoralists, food security and disaster response: the use of “Preparedness Auditing” to strengthen contingency planning.
4. **Institutional framework**

At community, district and national levels for coordination, information sharing, decision-making, collaboration and targeting; M&E

- Drought management is not the responsibility of any one organization. A multi-agency approach is required;
- The government’s role is to lead, facilitate, coordinate and provide overall direction, a legal framework, oversight and accountability, and to perform a minimum set of core tasks;
- Government should provide a central and district bureaucracy to carry out these tasks;
- Donors fund and carry out additional drought management activities and provide inputs to design, monitoring and evaluation;
- NGOs carry out drought management activities and have special skills in involving people and communities;
- Community organizations have perhaps the most important task of all. They are increasingly taking responsibility for managing drought.

The institutional framework should be permanent and not just an ad hoc grouping. Such a framework is necessary to:
- Coordinate drought mitigation initiatives;
- Collect, share and disseminate information;
- Make decisions and plan drought responses;
- Facilitate funding mechanisms;
- Implement, monitor and evaluate response interventions;
- Formulate drought management policies and strategies;
- Build the capacity to do the jobs that need to be done.

5. **Contingency funds**

- An effective drought cycle management system requires a drought contingency fund.
- A Drought Contingency Fund is a budget line allocated to all districts to fund contingency plans and rapid response activities when EWS signals show a decline in food security;
- These funds make it possible to respond rapidly to early warning, and in the best case prevent drought stress turning into a famine;
- Without effective drought contingency funds, the best early warning in the world, and the best prepared contingency plans, still have little impact.

4.3 **Linking livelihoods-based programming and drought cycle management**

This session began with a review of the reported losses of livestock assets during drought in pastoral areas, with up to 83% of sheep and goats dying during drought in part of southern Ethiopia between 2005 and 2007.

Pastoralist’s adaptive and risk management strategies were the summarized as follows:

1. **Mobility:**
   Drought movements which can cover long distances and cross international borders; they can require negotiation and agreement between different users.

2. **Livestock sales**
   Especially surplus males and unproductive females; rarely breeding females and only in a severe drought situation. During drought there is high supply, low and unstable prices and animals are in poor body condition. If herds have moved to distant grazing areas, access to urban-based markets in difficult.
3. Herd splitting
With different species and types of livestock moved to different areas to maximize use of grazing and water.

4. Livestock sharing, loans and gifts within kinship networks

5. Diversifying species composition of herds
   • camel – drought tolerance
   • efficient utilization of vegetation
   • faster herd rebuilding

6. Maximizing stocking densities

7. Livelihood diversification
Responses to herd losses include manual labour, petty trade, firewood and charcoal selling, and cultivation.

Group discussion was then used to review participant’s experiences of relief food aid and livelihoods-based interventions during drought.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food aid</th>
<th>Livelihoods interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The overwhelming and dominant response to drought by governments and humanitarian agencies</td>
<td>Relatively limited application during drought compared with food aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived to:</td>
<td>Aims to provide immediate assistance while also protecting or enhancing livelihoods assets – especially financial and social assets – and maintain the local markets, services and systems needed for post-drought recovery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• mitigate immediate food shortages and save lives</td>
<td>Recognizes underlying causes of vulnerability; aims to build resilience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• prevent migration</td>
<td>Includes specific interventions such as commercial destocking, livestock feed supplementation, veterinary care, slaughter destocking and restocking (see Figure 3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• prevent sale of assets to buy food</td>
<td>More cost effective than food aid (see section 4.4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>But limited effectiveness due to problems such as:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Weak targeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Limitations in volume of food aid distributed and its nutritional composition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Late delivery, after people have either already died or migrated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Various political and institutional factors e.g. targeting areas where political support is high; sale of food aid and profiteering.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The session ended by presenting the impact of a commercial destocking intervention during drought in southern Ethiopia in 2006. This programme linked livestock traders to drought-affected pastoral communities who wanted to sell livestock. The traders had limited previous experience of these areas, and so government and NGO partners introduced the traders to the pastoralists, and helped to organize arrangements for animal sales.

Although the traders received loans from the NGO Save the Children US, they quickly repaid the loans and invested far more of their own capital in buying livestock relative to the loans.

Some of the main results were as follows:

- An estimated 20,000 drought-affected cattle purchased by private traders
- Approximately 5,405 households benefited from the intervention
- The total value of destocked cattle was Ethiopian birr 8.76 million (US$1.01 million), which the bulk of sales using the capital of the traders
- On average each household sold 3.7 cattle and received Ethiopian birr 438 per animal (US$ 50.50); average income from cattle sales was therefore US$ 187
- The benefit-cost ratio of the intervention was 41:1.

Figure 4. How did households use the income acquired through destocking?

This experience helped to dispel at least two myths about the behaviour of pastoralists during drought:

- Pastoralists will sell animals during drought if prices are reasonable and traders can access drought-affected areas
- Pastoralists use the income wisely – they buy food and medicine for themselves, but also protect their assets; much of the expenditure involved use of local markets and services.

It also noted that a main driver of the trader's investment was an active livestock export market from Ethiopia to Egypt. This showed how export markets could assist drought interventions. But, in mid 2006 the Egypt market was closed. Egypt imposed a ban on Ethiopian imports due to an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in Egypt.
4.4 The heavy cost of late response: the economic implications of allowing asset loss and paying for food aid

This brief session used financial data from the commercial destocking in Ethiopia (see section 4.4) to present a comparison of the costs of destocking compared with the cost of providing either locally-procured food aid or imported food aid. The analysis used actual programming and food aid costs from Ethiopia in 2006.

Imagine that a pastoralist in a drought-affected area has 15 cattle. He decides to sell 1 bull as he knows that with the income, he can buy enough maize to feed his family of six people for two months. His decision is based on the fact that he can sell a thin bull for Ethiopian birr 440 (US$50), and with that money, can buy 200kg of maize (cost Ethiopian birr 160/100kg). Also, he knows that each person will eat around 0.5kg of maize a day and so for two months, he'll need 180kg of maize for the family.

Now imagine that the pastoralist is unable to sell his bull. This is because no traders are available in his area, which is remote. The roads are bad and the traders are unwilling to move their trucks. They're worried about high transaction costs, and hear rumours of insecurity. The drought progresses and the pastoralist's cattle all die, as do most of his sheep and goats.

A team from the World Food Programme now arrives and does an emergency assessment. They decide to provide food aid to keep the pastoralist and his family alive. But how much does this food aid cost relative to the cost of facilitating commercial destocking?

- Assume that for an NGO or government department, the relative cost of linking a private trader to the pastoralist is US$1. For a relative cost of US$1, the pastoralist is assisted to sell his bull and feed his family for two months.

- In comparison, all the cattle die and local food aid is used to feed the family of six people for two months during the drought. In relative terms the cost would be US$97 – that is 97 times more expensive than destocking. This factor does not include the cost of rebuilding the herd e.g. through a restocking programme after the drought, nor does it include the cost of feeding the family during the recovery period.

- In a second comparison, imported food aid is used to feed the family for two months. In relative terms, the cost would be $165 – that is 165 times more expensive than destocking. Again, this cost does not include the cost of rebuilding the herd, nor the cost of feeding the family during the recovery period.

Despite the huge additional cost of food aid relative to market-based support during drought, food aid continues to dominant drought programmes in pastoralist areas. The reasons for this situation were presented and discussed in the following session.

---

4.5 Where there is no budget? Institutional constraints to drought cycle management

This session started with some facts on figures on the use of food aid during drought. As shown in Table 2, in the drought response in Kenya in 2004 to 2006 food aid comprised 94.4% of expenditure.

Table 2. Budget and expenditure for food aid and other interventions during the 2004 to 2006 drought response in Kenya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Budget (US$ million)</th>
<th>Expenditure (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>% of total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food aid</td>
<td>395.0</td>
<td>91.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of seeds to farmers</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fodder provision breeding herds</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency animal health</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De-stocking pastoralists</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and sanitation</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and nutrition</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>432.8</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Against this introduction, the history of drought cycle management in Kenya was summarized as follows:

1984 Turkana district – drought impact prompted the need to monitor physical and natural resources and assets

1987 Turkana Drought Contingency Planning Unit started an EWS to collect and analyze data and provide information to other agencies to respond. Lesson – EWS not linked to response; did not elicit response

1992 Drought Management Project (DMP) expanded to 4 other districts + capacity to respond to emergencies only

1995 Drought Preparedness Intervention Recovery Project and Arid Lands resource Management Project (ALRMP) expanded to 10 districts, comprising EWS plus capacity for community development, drought management and institutional establishment of coordination and decision making structures at the district and national levels

2004 ALRMP expanded to 22 districts, with institutionalization of DM + CD + EWS within government structures

2006 ALRMP expanded to 28 districts = EWS +CD + DM + Support to local development + Drought Contingency Plans + Drought Contingency Funds + institutionalization into government structures

This timeline showed that over 22 years there had been a process of capacity building government structures in drought cycle management. Initially drought response was in the hands of the Provincial Administration (District Commissioners, District Officers and Chiefs) and they resisted change because of food aid benefits.

However, and as Table 2 shows, by 2006 food aid was still the major response by far. Some reasons for this situation were presented as follows:

- The EWS system and associated information and data provision has been found to be functioning.
- The link between early warning and early response is still weak, in part due to a lack of a national drought contingency fund to provide easily accessible funds to the districts for rapid response.
- Improvement to the EWS effectiveness – make it more participatory, review short rains and long rains assessment methodology.
- National Drought Contingency Fund now being established with EU support – Government of Kenya not committed yet to contributing to this Fund – budgetary implications and financial regulations.
- The system is only beginning to work in the semi-arid districts, where contingency planning is only just taking shape, while (and this seems valid for the whole of arid lands) the community-district interface is not yet well developed.
- The participation of communities in drought management e.g. EWS and contingency planning is still weak.
- A clear policy and widely accepted guidelines on food security and drought management are only now being addressed through the Ministry of Agriculture’s policy documents and the draft arid lands policy.
- The drought management system is not institutionalized into the regular government machinery yet.

The session ended with group work to discuss the following issues:

Despite an effective early warning and food security information system, food aid continues to dominate response. Why do you think this is so? What do you think are the hurdles to be overcome in having a system that aims to support livelihoods and to save lives during droughts?

“Often, programmes and development initiatives to address food security in pastoral areas are technically sound. What they lack is policy instruments to support effective allocation of resources and implementation.

Often programmes and development initiatives to address food security in pastoral areas are technically sound and have policy instruments to support them. But other powerful drivers militate against effective implementation and change.

4.6  Herd growth and food aid

For poorer pastoralist households with relative few livestock, herd growth is the key strategy for strengthening livelihoods. Using approaches such as cash transfers in safety nets (see section 4.7) its likely that a substantial proportion of pastoralist recipients will invest first in small ruminants, and then acquire large livestock such as camels or cattle. This strategy makes economic sense because the economic returns from livestock are better than any other investment opportunity in pastoral areas. As livestock assets increase, more livestock are sold.
In the case of post-drought recovery, ‘restocking’ programmes have been widely used in Africa as a means to enable pastoralists to resume their livelihoods. The more successful programmes recognize traditional restocking systems used by pastoralists, and build on these local systems. In terms of the impact of restocking, when designed and implemented well these programmes can help to shift households away from food aid. For example, in an evaluation of a restocking programme in the Somali region of Ethiopia it was concluded that after 18 months:

A total of 500 restocked households immediately attained increased capacity for economic standing, with potential for a significant number of families growing out of poverty.

For example, the contribution of livestock to food sources rose from 2% before restocking to 40% after restocking. At the same time food relief dropped from 50% before restocking to 7% after restocking. This means that livestock and by products had effectively replaced food relief as a source of food, signifying increased self-reliance and improved household food security.

Most restocked households pointed out that “food aid is very important but it does not reproduce like livestock. Livestock is a better food source because it builds up during the good years and gives the family some dignity and respect from other community members”.

Similarly, Figure 5 shows the impact of restocking pastoralists in northeast Kenya after two years. There was a marked decrease in the role of food aid as a source of food, and marked increases in foods derived directly from livestock, or from livestock sales.

Figure 5. Sources of food for restocked pastoral households in north east Kenya, before and after restocking

---


4.7 New approaches: initial experiences with the use of cash-based safety nets in pastoralist areas of Kenya

Safety net programmes using regular and predictable cash transfers to targeted pastoralist households are being developed in Ethiopia and Kenya. Although these approaches have not yet been evaluated, the concept of a future, institutionalized safety net support warrants attention by COMESA in terms of the pastoralist food security policy framework. This session involved two presentations and discussion as summarized below.

The DFID/Government of Kenya Hunger Safety Net Programme, Sammy Keter
http://www.hungersafetynet.org

The Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) was established to address the food needs of chronically food insecure households, that account for up to 70% of the population in the arid districts of Kenya. The programme aims to:

- Explore the value of cash transfers to food insecurity
- Answer whether cash only, food only or a combination of approaches are best
- Explore mechanisms for rolling out a national social protection programme
- Explore livestock insurance as an additional safety net (HSNP plus)

The achievements of the HSNP should include:

- To reduce extreme poverty in Kenya targeting the extremely poor (19% of population)
- To establish a government-led national social protection system delivering long-term, guaranteed cash transfers to extremely poor and vulnerable people
- Provide bimonthly non conditional cash transfers
- Hopefully this will strengthen consumption and production

The programme is currently funded by DFID in two phases: Phase 1 from 2007 to 2012; Phase 2 from 2012 to 2017. Phase 1 of the programme is a research/pilot phase which should:

- Develop mechanism of transferring cash to 60,000 chronically food insecure households through the HSNP to improve access to food; protect assets and reduce the impact of shocks
- Test and develop targeting mechanism (social pension, dependency ratio and community based)
- Develop an management info system with potential to become a central registry for all Social protection programmes in Kenya
- Support the development of a Government of Kenya-led institutional framework to enable convergence of these and other existing safety nets projects into one predictable on-budget financial mechanism.

The HSNP is being implemented in the 13 poorest districts in Northern Kenya (Larger Marsabit, Mandera, Turkana and Wajir), led by the Government of Kenya and implemented by independent service providers. The programme is coordinated by a secretariat under a steering committee aligned with existing government structures and includes government, donor and civil society representatives. There are six main components as follows:

- **Administration** for targeting, enrolling and registering beneficiaries, led by an Oxfam Consortium
- **Payments** to provide a cost effective, efficient, accessible and secure cash transfer instrument, led by FSDKenya and Equity Bank; payments are currently equivalent to around US$15 per month per household
Monitoring and evaluation to monitor progress and impact led by OPM and Research Solutions

Management information to document and manage all information related to the project, managed by a private consultant

Social protection rights organisation or Ombudsperson to receive complaints and grievances and protect the rights of recipients – managed by Helpage International

Pilot insurance scheme implemented by ILRI working with the University of Wisconsin and other partners.

Safety Net Issues in Turkana, Kenya, Eris Lothike, Oxfam GB

Oxfam GB is the lead agency on the HSNP in Turkana and Wajir districts, while CARE and Save the Children UK are the lead organisations in Marsabit and Mandera respectively. In Turkana 27,000 households out of the total 60,000 households are to be registered to benefit from the programme.

The programme has adapted three methodologies for targeting beneficiaries, namely:

1. Community Based Targeting – builds on vast experience in arid lands where it was effectively used to target beneficiaries of food relief and cash based interventions; is community driven
2. Social Pension – based on government contributory pension scheme over 55 years
3. Dependency Ratio – targets Households with many dependents (children under 18 years, disabled and elderly) compared to households which have strong individuals who can work

So far, about 7000 households have been registered and 6000 households have received their first payment. The programme started in the most difficult areas to work, bit progress so far shows that is possible to roll it out even in these areas. The community reception is very positive and the programme seems to be making a difference in the lives of poor people. The specific expected benefits of the programme are:

- Improve access to food, protection of assets and reduction of shocks
- Reduce food aid dependency and hunger through predictable long-term cash transfers. Each household will receive a monthly cash transfer of KSh. 1075 (US$15)
- Support the development of private sector and extension of financial services to remote pastoral areas
- Children from poor household given an opportunity for long-term human and capital development – less need for child labour and children can attend school.
- Influence government policy and practice on social safety net programmes and their benefit in helping chronically poor access basic needs.

Some of the key challenges experienced so far were:

- Complexity of the programme – new technology application in extreme conditions in a rural pastoral set up where there is no infrastructure such as roads or electricity. The entire process of registration and enrolment is computerised – registration, photo taking and payment
- Amount of transfer is seen as little, especially in relation to inflationary trends in the market. Transfer per month is Ksh 1075 (US$15).
- High levels of poverty – these pose a challenge especially on drawing a line who should be in or out.
- Use of new targeting methodologies like Dependency Ratio and Social Pension, which can lead to inclusion and exclusion errors
- Long distances to paying centres – where there is no qualified trader to be contracted to pay enrolled households, beneficiaries are forced to trek to the nearest pay point.
Political interference – some politicians have tried to get political capital out of the programme by spreading the rumours that they are the ones who influenced donors to bring money to help poor people.

Despite the challenges, on the whole the HSNP is should be seen in its correct perspective – part of social protection that the government must provide to its citizens to enable them live with dignity. It is a human right issue that should be seen as a duty of state.

4.8 National and international guidelines and standards for livelihoods-based drought response

This session provided an overview of the development of two sets of guidelines related to livelihoods-based drought responses.

At the global level, the new Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards (LEGS)\(^\text{10}\) are a set of international guidelines and standards for the design, implementation and assessment of livestock interventions to assist people affected by humanitarian crises. LEGS expands the commitment in the Sphere handbook - the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response\(^\text{11}\) - towards supporting livelihood assets, by presenting clear and practical options for supporting livestock during and following disasters, including drought.

The development of LEGS was overseen by a Steering Group comprising the African Union, International Committee for the Red Cross, Food and Agriculture Organization, Tufts University and VSF Europa. LEGS provides guidance on the identification of appropriate livestock responses, followed by detailed information on a number of interventions, namely: destocking, veterinary services, the provision of livestock feed, the provision of water, livestock shelter and settlement, and restocking. Each technical chapter contains minimum standards, key indicators, and guidance notes, together with decision-making tools and a discussion of key cross-cutting issues.

At the national level, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development in Ethiopia published national guidelines on livelihoods-based drought response in late 2008\(^\text{12}\). These guidelines follow many of the core standards and principles of LEGS, but adapt LEGS to the institutional and operational context of Ethiopia, and specific experiences from drought interventions in pastoralist areas. The guidelines include specific advice on interventions such as commercial destocking with the private sector.

The Ethiopia guidelines were developed through a multi-stakeholder process involving government, NGOs, research and academic institutes, private sector actors, UN agencies and donors.

---

\(^{10}\) See [http://www.livestock-emergency.net](http://www.livestock-emergency.net) for free download of LEGS and information in training courses.

\(^{11}\) [http://www.sphereproject.org](http://www.sphereproject.org)

5. VISIT TO MAASAI PASTORALIST AREAS

A visit to some of the project sites of the Mainyoito Integrated Pastoralist Development Organization (MPIDO) in the Oltepesi Magadi area of Kajiado District was organized. These were Maasai pastoralist communities and the area lies south of Nairobi behind the Ngong Hills, down towards the Kenya-Tanzania border. The area had experienced poor rains during the last three years, with migration of cattle and some losses. The following sites were visited:

Site 1: Rehabilitated dam (open water pan) at Enkereyian
- Managed via a committee of men and women
- Funding from community and support from MPIDO
- Pan fenced out to stop livestock from entering the water collection area; water pumped to tank and trough outside fenced area.
- Group believe only a borehole will solve their water scarcity problems

Site 2: Rehabilitated borehole, Oloontona
- Only borehole for a big radius, becoming a huge sacrifice (over utilized) area
- Managed via a committee
- No grazing around, so livestock moved out and borehole is currently catering for human needs
- Few livestock around are watering from run off pools from recent rains
- All livestock herders contribute to a maintenance and operational fund

Site 3: Community Primary School, Emboleoni
- Issue was water scarcity, MPIDO delivers water with tankers on request to school
- School has huge storage tanks to store the water
- School attendance is severely affected, sometimes up to 40% children missing school at height of droughts
- Idea of mobile school was discussed as a means of addressing this problem, capacity to implement the mobile school programmes still under discussion

Site 4: Rehabilitated Community Livestock Dip, Iroret
- MPIDO supported community to repair cracks on walls of the dip tank
Managed by local committee, with lady treasurer
Mainly cattle dipped, once a week for each herd. Charges – KSh 10 for each head cattle dipped, Ksh for sheep/goat
Dip attends to about 300 to 400 cattle each week, estimate about 1,000 cattle per week
Group has two community-based animal health workers offering animal health services
Currently not in use, animals too weak to go through the dip tank. Hope to start once the animals gain condition
Magadi Soda, a local rich company extracting Soda Ash in the region, supplies water to the dip as a Corporate Social Responsibility

Support to Women Groups:
Women groups supported to buy and fatten steers for sale. Experience has worked well and often groups sell the steers off before drought sets in. Household heads, mainly men, have learnt this good practice from the women groups.

6. POLICY ISSUES AND LESSONS FOR COMESA

Participants were asked to work in two groups, reflect on the presentations and discussions during the previous three days, and identify key policy-related statements which should inform future COMESA thinking and policy on drought, food aid and livelihoods-based programming in pastoralist areas. The feedback is reproduced below.

Group 1

a) Impact of drought – drought negatively affects the livelihoods of pastoralists and their food security.
   ▪ All COMESA Member States should recognize the impact of drought on pastoral livelihoods and thus plan for it annually.
   ▪ Member states should adopt diversified livelihoods to counter the negative effects of drought on pastoral livelihoods.

b) Drought - emergency versus development. Drought is a development issue not an emergency.
   ▪ Development plans should incorporate/anticipate the occurrence of drought and should therefore plan to minimise the negative impact of drought on pastoral livelihoods

c) Food aid and livelihoods
   ▪ Food aid has been a default response but has minimal and negative impact on pastoral livelihoods
   ▪ Livelihoods-based responses save and support growth of assets
   ▪ COMEDSA Member States should focus on livelihoods-based response interventions and only use food aid as and when absolutely necessary in a developmental approach.

d) Economic costs of late response - the economic opportunity cost of late response is always high.
   ▪ COMESA Member States need to design and implement DCM plans based on DCM logic

e) Institutional constraints
   ▪ COMESA MS have weak institutional/budgeting capacity to mitigate/manage natural disasters.
   ▪ Member States should strengthen institutional and budgetary capacities to respond to slow onset disasters.
f) Need opportunities for policies and best practice guidelines
   - COMESA Member States should have a common policy framework and guidelines on
drought responses that can be reviewed and updated as required.
   - COMESA needs to raise awareness of existing practices and guidelines (Sphere,
LEGs, country experiences etc).

g) Linkages to dev policies and frameworks
   - COMESA Member States should harmonize policies and create policy
forum/platforms to discuss drought as a regional issue.

h) Potential role of emerging safety net cash transfer approach
   - Cash transfers have the potential to protect assets of vulnerable groups to maintain
their livelihoods.
   - There is a need for further testing and verification of the impact of cash transfers
based on ongoing projects in the region.

Group 2

a) Drought is a normal occurrence and should be mainstreamed into development planning.

b) In planning for drought we should be concerned in protecting both lives and livelihoods.

c) Mainstreaming drought into development means a need to invest in a host of responses –
animal health, supplementary feeds, marketing, etc.

d) There is a need to distinguish between transitory and chronic food insecurity, and tailor
make appropriate responses e.g. safety nets for chronically food insecure.

e) There is a need for contingency planning focussing on those things that cannot be
mainstreamed into development plans.

f) Pastoralism contributes significantly to regional GDP but this has not been recognized. If
drought destroys the pastoral assets it becomes extremely expensive to recover and leads
to huge economic losses.

g) Timely response to drought saves costs and enhances recovery.

h) COMESA needs to develop response guidelines and standards based on existing ones.

i) COMESA will need to adopt DCM and a joint EWS with coordination at regional level
(lessons from IGAD and SADC).

j) Carry out an assessment to identify existing EWS regionally to avoid COMESA
replicating existing work.

k) A trigger mechanism for drought response and release of funds.

l) Put in place mechanism to facilitate trade for livestock and cereals across borders.

m) COMESA to use already adopted commodity-based trade to enhance commercial offtake.

n) Out of the budget set aside for agriculture in CAADP, COMESA should commit to
varying (re-allocate) funding for livestock in case of drought.
o) Food security in pastoral areas transcends food aid. Food aid should only be used as a supplement to livelihoods interventions.

p) Recognize mobility and flexible land use options as necessary for pastoral livelihoods.

q) Among livestock species, recognize that some species are more adapted to drought (camels, goats) than others (only Sudan promotes camels).

r) COMESA to integrate DCM into ongoing peace and security programmes.

s) COMESA to integrate DCM into ongoing gender in development initiatives.

t) COMESA to extend Simplified Trade regime to include livestock, livestock products and cereals.

7. NEXT STEPS: DRAFTING THE COMESA POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR FOOD SECURITY IN PASTORAL AREAS

The training in Nairobi was the third and final training under the capacity-building process to assist COMESA to draft a regional policy framework for food security in pastoral areas. The topics covered by the trainings in Garissa (Kenya, September 2008), Adama (Ethiopia, November 2008) and Nairobi (Kenya, June 2009) now include:

- Overview of pastoral livelihoods using the livelihoods analytical framework
- Livestock marketing and trade at domestic, regional and international levels
- Livelihoods diversification
- The ecological basis for pastoral mobility
- Legislative options for supporting pastoral mobility
- Conflict in pastoral areas
- The role of pastoral customary institutions
- Pastoralist representation in policy processes
- Impact of drought on pastoral livelihoods
- Drought cycle management and livelihoods-based programming
- Food aid and institutional constraints to DCM and livelihoods approaches
- Use of cash transfers in safety net programmes
- National and international standards and guidelines for livelihoods-based programming

The Nairobi training was followed by a one-day meeting with COMESA and partners to map out a process for drafting the COMESA Regional Policy Framework for Food Security in Pastoralist Areas, with a view to completing a final draft by the end of September 2009. This meeting is reported separately, and includes details of the pathway for finalizing the policy and seeking endorsement by the COMESA Council of Ministers.
Annex 1
Participants and facilitators

**Participants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Shamseldin M. Salim</td>
<td>Agricultural Economist</td>
<td>COMESA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Bruce Mukanda</td>
<td>SPS Expert</td>
<td>COMESA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Angel Daka</td>
<td>Coordinator CAADP Pillar III</td>
<td>COMESA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Gloria Phiri</td>
<td>Research Assistant, CAADP</td>
<td>COMESA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Edmealem Shitaye</td>
<td>Senior Livestock Expert</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Mesfin Berhanu</td>
<td>Coordinator, Emerging Regions Coordination Office</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Stanley Muli</td>
<td>Livestock Officer</td>
<td>Ministry of Livestock Development, Kenya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Facilitators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Dawit Abebe</td>
<td>Senior Pastoralism and Livestock Policy Adviser</td>
<td>Feinstein International Center, Tufts University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Francis Chabari</td>
<td>Chief of Party, PACAPS</td>
<td>Feinstein International Center, Tufts University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Andy Catley</td>
<td>Research Director</td>
<td>Feinstein International Center, Tufts University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Peter Little</td>
<td>Professor, Department of Anthropology</td>
<td>Emory University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Mike Wekesa</td>
<td>Senior Consultant</td>
<td>Kesarine and Associates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2
List of key documents for training Drought, Livelihoods and Food Security


