

# **PACAPS**

## **Early Warning & Early Response**

### **“Finding solutions to an old problem”**

**18<sup>th</sup> April 2008**

**Silver Springs Hotel**  
**Nairobi, Kenya**

**Workshop Report**



**USAID**  
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

**RELPA**  
REGIONAL ENHANCED LIVELIHOODS  
IN PASTORAL AREAS

**PACAPS**  
PASTORAL AREAS COORDINATION,  
ANALYSIS, AND POLICY SUPPORT



**Tufts**  
UNIVERSITY

Gerald J. and Dorothy R.  
Friedman School of  
Nutrition Science and Policy



**Feinstein**  
International Center

The Pastoral Areas Coordination, Analysis and Policy Support (PACAPS) project is implemented by the Feinstein International Center of Tufts University, under USAID grant number 623-A-00-07-00018-00. The early warning and early response components of the project are supported by the 'Food Economy Group.'

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## List of Acronyms

DFID	Department for International Development
DISK	Data and information Sub-committee of the KFSSG
DMI	Drought Management Initiative
DP2	Drought Preparedness 2
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Organization
EW	Early Warning
Govt	Government
ILRI	International Livestock Research Institute
IPC	Integrated Food Security and humanitarian Phase classification
KFSSG	Kenya Food Security Steering Group
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
PACAPS	Pastoral Areas Coordination Analysis & Policy Support
RELPA	Regional Enhanced Livelihoods in Pastoral Areas
SC UK	Save the Children UK
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme

## 1. Purpose of the meeting

The focus of the meeting was a **common search for practical solutions** to issues identified by participants during the PACAPS EW and contingency planning workshops.

## 2. Workshop Content

- i. Short evidence-based analysis of delayed response in the region
- ii. How interventions fit into different stages of a crisis
- iii. How to ensure that timely decision-making can lead to timely response.

The facilitators firstly presented a short evidence-based analysis of delayed response in the region. Most people attending agreed that there was a problem in the region in terms of timely response. Arid Lands did mention that their response in Kenya to the 2005/2006 drought had been timely as they had managed to draw on the District contingency funds. They stated that the food aid distribution had managed contain malnutrition rates, the Arid Land's de-stocking had been successful and timely and Oxfam had also managed to respond effectively. There was a general consensus that the main issue is the lack of linkage between early warning and early response. The identified areas to ensure effective early response are:

- Easily accessible contingency funds
- Alternative sources of funds – not necessarily always from the Humanitarian Aid agencies
- A structured framework to response to a crisis at the district level

The next presentation showed the drought calendar in a pastoral context and how interventions best fit into the different stages of a crisis. This presentation outlined when different interventions are appropriate in order to successfully protect pastoral livelihood assets. Problems around early warning and early response were summarized and the presentation closed stating that the people in the room could help find solutions to these old problems.

After the break, the attendees were split into 4 groups to address issues identified during the 2 previous PACAPS' workshops. Each group comprised of a mixture of people from early warning, donors and implementing agencies. The groups were given 45 minutes to select priority problems to address, come up with solutions and an action plan. Although this workshop was intended to focus on Kenya and Somalia – all groups chose to respond with an action plan for Kenya. This was primarily because the majority of the participants were working in Kenyan country offices, rather than regional. The groups then presented their action plans for the problems they identified.

## 3. Outputs from Group Discussions

### a. Group 1 – Structural & institutional barriers

**Problem identified:** Political priorities not necessarily focused on needs

**Solutions:**

- Get government to agree on a common development priorities and disaster strategies.
- Develop a structural/institutional framework to operationalise policies and coordinate activities.

**Action Plan:** (for Kenya)

- Advocacy for enactment of relevant policies through reactivation of pastoral steering groups and education on policies
- Support and engage the new Ministry through existing structures
- Develop a common agenda and policies for dialogue
- Work with new members of parliament who have the expertise

**DMI** already has a strategic disaster management policy that needs to be reviewed, in terms of understanding the whole mandate of disaster management.

## **b. Group 2 – Donor/Agency relations**

**Problems identified:** Broader issues that affect the response in Govt & NGOs

- Lack of Government leadership - always expectation that the donors should take the lead. Donors should support the government and not replace them.
- Lack of clear definition between chronic problems and long-term problems
- Assessment results are not clear or well defined – KFSSG seasonal assessments
- Humanitarian donors mandate doesn't allow them to spend funds predictably
- There is a lot of EW information available but how to use it is the challenge
- Competition for funding resources

**Solutions:** Donors, Government and implementing agencies need to develop a coordinated framework. Can the current KFSSG do the work although they do not have the mandate?

**Action Plan:** (for Kenya)

- Strengthen the **KFSSG** and back it up with legal legislations
- KFSSG support review of policies relevant to pastoralists
- Support the new Ministry of Northern Arid Lands to play a key role in coordination of these activities
- Open issues to parliament and informal lobbying
- **ECHO (DP2) & USAID (RELPA)** consortiums can be a strong basis for future coordination and collaboration between NGOs, Government and other forums to address some of the issues listed
- Ensure that through these consortiums, a more development mode is engaged to handle the disasters.
- Possibility of the DP2 and RELPA merging in future to create a platform for coordination.

**Note:** How to bring in the issues of National Drought Contingency Plans funding into the new districts

## **c. Group 3 – Early Warning Issues from EW providers & Users**

**Problems identified:** Credibility/transparency of EW systems

**Solutions:** Users of early warning information often interpret it differently which has an impact on decision making. Making the EW phases evidence-based, transparent, with clear thresholds and clear methods of moving from one threshold to the other will help improve a

common language and response to early warning. There needs to be agreed triggers in the EWS which initiate appropriate responses at appropriate times.

**Aridlands & DMI** are developing early warning phase classifications to work along side the situation analysis of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC). This is an on-going process

**EW & Assessment:** Some donors take more notice of assessments than the EW systems. If the IPC map is updated more often between the seasonal assessments, early warning will be more credible. The different early warning information providers should be encouraged to continue to consolidate the EW information i.e. meteorological information, Ministry of Agriculture information as well as LINKS/FEWS/LEWS etc. A three-month consolidated outlook would be useful.

**Action plan:**

- Improve district level contingency planning
- Ensure that funding is equally available to NGOs as well as WFP & UN agencies by improving the capacity of NGOs to fulfill the donor requirements on the structural complexity in terms of accountability and managing grants.
- Donors need to be clear about what they require
- Encourage donors to use and respond to EW information rather than just assessments
- Consolidate the different kinds of EW systems in Kenya as well as the region
- To avoid EW systems contradicting each other, they should be brought together and published under KFSSG

If we can get the above coordinated then DFID has stated that they can approve a proposal within 2 weeks.

**d. Group 4 – Technical issues around livelihood analysis**

**Problems identified:** Pastoral livelihoods are not well understood by most humanitarian actors

**Solutions:**


- Improve knowledge of livelihoods among the different actors
- Improve coordination among organization so livelihood analysis determines response
- Livelihoods assessments should understand the different needs of households within different wealth groups and different livelihood zones
- Understand the different synergies between different sectors i.e. milk production and water

**Action plan:**

- Discuss different livelihood analysis tools with ILRI, WFP, SC UK & DISK
- Develop feedback mechanisms i.e. impact and effectiveness
- Develop indicators to measure preparedness
- Understand the coping mechanisms of different wealth groups
- Improve the understanding of people's livelihoods to enable us to forecast how far people can cope

- Ensure that livelihood analysis is incorporated into early warning and response decision-making
- Engage with the **DISK** sub-working group to try and get all information available on livelihood structures
- Improve contingency planning at community level
- Develop common early warning triggers to ensure early response
- Improve impact analysis
- Ensure that existing livelihood knowledge is used to improve contingency planning – **SC UK/DMI/Arid Lands** will work with the DSGs to take this forward
- Develop a livelihood support plan – **PACAPS** is working with partners to create this at present.
- Establish a secretariat to continue with this process and institutionalize it within the new Ministry

# Annex 1: Presentation on EW & ER



## The Problem

“response to crises is often too late in pastoral areas”


- 2001 Tufts, Kenya
  - 4-6 month delay from response request to actual provision
  - Delay was not due to lack of EWS information
- 2006 ODI, Kenya
  - All EW reported growing destitution throughout 2004 and 2005.
  - ‘It was not until the situation was acute that it attracted meaningful attention’
  - If action is taken early to save livelihoods, the effects of drought can be mitigated
  - need for massive response to save lives can be reduced
  - Why did accurate and timely early warning not lead to a rapid and appropriate response?

## The Problem

- 2006 Oxfam
  - Continuing cycle of too little, too late
  - Most UN emergency appeals receive only 30% of requested funds in first month
  - early warning came Oct/Nov 2004 – action prompted by suffering child action June 2005
- 2008 ODI / Care, Kenya
  - ‘EWS works well but is anyone listening’
  - Assessments focus on food aid
  - Lack of coordination between EWS, assessment, decision-making & response; between relief & dev’t
  - Consider longer term funding for drought response (e.g. 2 years) that allows for recovery

## Timeline October 2005-May 2006

Figure 1: Timeline of key events, October 2005-May 2006



## The ‘normal’ year



## The first rains fail...

Sep-Oct	Nov-Dec	Jan-Feb
	pasture declining	pasture very bad, water scarce
normal births	cattle condition declining	
<b>milk</b>		<b>milk ends early</b>
	early migration (cattle)	
high l'stock price		low demand for l'stock, low price <i>reluctance to sell, expecting rains</i>
Debts not repaid	Debts accumulating	Grain price?


## The second rains fail....

Mar-Apr	May-June	Jul-Aug
<i>poor rain</i>		<i>poor rain</i>
no pasture	almost no pasture	no pasture
water very scarce		
cattle condition very Poor. old & weak start to die	L'stock mortality increasing	high l'stock mortality
v. low demand for l'stock, v. low price	almost no demand for l'stock. Exploitation price	
Distress sales to repay loans	Grain price ?	

## Rain at last....

Sep-Oct	Nov-Dec	Jan-Feb
<i>good rain</i>	<i>good rain</i>	
pasture recovery	good pasture	
Few births	almost no milk	almost no milk
l'stock mortality from cold.	good l'stock condition	
	harvest for agro-pastoralists	Grain price lower
	very high l'stock price	<b>- but nothing to sell !</b>

## But when does 'recovery' start ?




## ...and when did the crisis begin?


### "Saving lives"

- High child malnutrition (how high?)
- Raised child mortality
- Mass livestock deaths?
- Abnormal migration?

(these are outcome indicators of an existing crisis, not early warning)

## Updated Somalia IPC Map (April '08) Jan to June 2008 Comparison of January '08 and Revised April '08 IPC Map





## ...and when did the crisis begin?

### “Saving livelihoods”

“When households cannot meet their basic needs without ‘distress strategies’ (that put at risk their long term well-being)”

*But when is that?*

## What could we do to help?

- Protect core breeding herds for recovery
- Improve income from l’stock (condition/price)
- Reduce grain prices
- Alternative income

Possible ‘projects’: animal health, fodder supply, marketing (l’stock and grain), water trucking or water sources, support to migration, CFW or FFW, free food distribution

## When is ‘on time’?


animal health: before pasture disappears, before rains?

fodder supply: when condition affects price, when breeding animals in danger

marketing (l’stock and grain): when prices are ‘excessively’ high/low, when demand/supply is low

CFW or FFW: when distress strategies would begin

## When is ‘on time’?




## Fodder distribution start-up timeline

ACTIVITIES	Time
Identify intervention areas, partners	1 week
identify beneficiaries	1 week
Identify and source feeds	1 week
Proposal writing, internal approval	2 weeks
Communication with donor	2 weeks
Procurement process	3 weeks
transport of feeds	10 days
<b>Start-up timeline</b>	<b>3 months</b>

**Really ??**

## When is 'on time'?




## When is 'on time'?



## When is 'on time'?



## But are we on time?



## The implications

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- Our only relevant emergency response will remain - food aid or cash relief - aid unless we can respond more quickly
- Asset depletion will continue, aid dependency will deepen
- Costs of aid go ever higher – it's more expensive to save a life than a livelihood  
(feeding animals is up to 14 times cheaper than replacing them. Feeding children is MUCH more expensive.)



Finding solutions to an old problem

## The great hope....

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The people in this room can do something about some of these issues

## Early Warning Issues

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- Credibility of early warning reports is questioned
- Transparency of interpretation/analysis is questioned
- Unclear which parameters should be measured
- Agreement on identification of triggers
- What kind of prediction will be accepted ?
- ER is linked to emergency assessments and not to EW
- Cross-border information sharing
- Who is using EW information – their comments
- Why is EW not always bringing about ER ?
- What does EW need to provide to decision makers ?

How can we improve it?

## Early Response Issues

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- Donors and others hesitant to respond on prediction
- Lack of collaboration and standardisation of assessments
- Politicisation of assessments and emergencies
- “Lack of funding for contingency planning”
- Inflexibility of programmes
- Inflexible funding
- Insecurity
- Coordination difficulties

## Earlier Response ??

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There is some predictability about the development of a drought

There is some inevitability about the development of humanitarian crises

So it is possible to respond earlier...

...change will depend on the joint decisions of people in Government, donors, implementing organisations and Early Warning actors

## What may need to change...

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- Response based on prediction, not only on an existing humanitarian situation
- ‘Preparedness auditing’ – shortening timelines
- Flexible funding mechanisms
- Longer term support, “changing gears” (‘tracking strategies’)

## Annex 2: Finding Solutions

### FINDING SOLUTIONS – GROUP 1

Select from the issues listed below, setting out:

- **potential solutions**
- **specific action plan for a pilot on any scale, with proposed lead & timeline**
- **where solutions cannot be found – outline the reasons or deeper level issues**

#### **1. Structural or institutional barriers**

- Lack of trust of assessments leading to multiple assessments, and failure to respond to assessments - between different levels of government; between government and donors; between Gov't and NGOs; between NGOs and donors; between and within NGOs etc.
- Lack of agreed standards of assessment - different agencies wanting to use their own approaches.
- Many actors feel that humanitarian response can only happen when an “official emergency” is declared. This has political implications, and needs a central (or federal) Gov't decision – and is therefore subject to both political and bureaucratic delays.
- Politicisation of EW and assessments
- Political priorities of different organisations, governments and donors affects which problems and which countries receive attention
- Difficulty of responding to EW if existing programs have specific & inflexible objectives, or are too short term.
- Difficulties with coordination and clarity on roles at all levels, despite many coordination meetings/forums.
- Limited funding for contingency planning and preparedness
- Insecurity, lack of freedom of access to affected areas. Lack of infrastructure e.g. roads, telecommunications.
- Reluctance of agencies to change from ‘development’ to ‘emergency’, and inflexibility in systems to permit this where they are willing.
- High turnover of technical staff
- Decision makers’ limited understanding of realities of remote areas; their understanding is conditioned by their urban environments.
- Weak links between local organisations and organisations at national level

## FINDING SOLUTIONS – GROUP 2

Select from the issues listed below, setting out:

- **potential solutions**
- **specific action plan for a pilot on any scale, with proposed lead & timeline**
- **where solutions cannot be found – outline the reasons or deeper level issues**

### 2. Donor : Agency relations

- Contingency funds are not available
  - “burn rates” ?
  - lack of procedures ?
  - lack of trust ?
  - lack of implementing agency initiative ?
  - short funding cycles
- Agencies are assessed by donors on ‘formal accountability’, and are not held accountable for impact or lack of it. (So, better to be late, but with good paperwork...)
- Donors and agencies don’t have agreed contingency proposals –‘pre-approved’ proposals, agreed conditions, agreed approval procedures, etc.
- Proper accountability (tenders, etc.) takes time, especially in remote areas (where getting pro forma or even receipts can be hard). There are no agreed standards for ‘fast-track procedures’ in emergencies, which maintain adequate standards of accountability.
- “Some specific donor requirements cause delays (e.g. vet drug procurement, VAT exemption)”. Is there a forum for joint analysis between Gov’ts, donors and implementing agencies on how to tackle each of these specific problems?
- Limited donor funds mean that money may only be available for a fully developed crisis (‘donor rationing’).
- Donors unwilling to respond on prediction – insist on proof of actual humanitarian crisis, e.g. in terms of GAM. (Is this an interpretation of their mandate? Lack of trust in predictive analytical tools?)
- Rigidity by some donors on fund utilization and on funding terms.
- Structural arrangements of many donors, NGOs and FAO, with strict division of emergency and development sections – and sometimes even competition between the two.

## FINDING SOLUTIONS – GROUP 3

Select from the issues listed below, setting out:

- **potential solutions**
- **specific action plan for a pilot on any scale, with proposed lead & timeline**
- **where solutions cannot be found – outline the reasons or deeper level issues**

### **3. Early Warning – comments from EW providers & Users**

- There is still a problem with the credibility of EW reports, with many actors questioning the validity (i.e. factual basis) of some reports
  - Data collection is sometimes weak, strengthening the lack of confidence in EW as a basis for early response
  - Major EW actors rely on data gathered locally by others. They cannot verify quality or impose standards, making it harder to persuade others to act on basis of their reports
- Conclusions drawn from the EW are often questioned, in particular whether or not a situation is really serious or is 'normal'.
- Lack of transparency, leading to lack of trust, leading to multiple assessments, and failure to respond to assessments. This lack of trust appears: between different levels of government; between government and donors; between Gov't and NGOs; between NGOs and donors; between NGOs; etc. (*from above*)
- ER is linked to emergency assessments and not to EW, but assessment only happens when there is already a problem. Then,
  - assessments take time to organise at the best of time
  - hard to find experienced staff at the last minute; lack of preparedness
  - lack of standardization of methodology of the assessments done
  - organisations only believe their own assessments
- EW can talk generally about a problem, but cannot make reference to agreed 'triggers' or thresholds, which most actors accept for taking action
- Impossible for EW to be conclusive about predictions (esp. meteorological), but definite predictions are demanded for action
- Relationships between communities and local gatherers of EW (especially local Government) can be governed by factors such as fear of raising problems, or attempts to get more aid.
- Limited EW systems in place in some areas e.g. Borana
- Minimum telecommunication and infra-structure in pastoral areas
- Lack of local government technical capacity & information storage for quality analysis
- Appropriate information not always disseminated in time, or organisations not finding relevance of the info (if they don't know how to fit it into their programmes)
- EWS need to provide professional EW products for the different users
- Poor information flow between organisations on the ground, and decision making centres in capitals (including of implementation agencies).
- Limited communities' role in EW as users and contributors
- Lack of cross-border EW information sharing – on-going monitoring, common indicators

## FINDING SOLUTIONS – GROUP 4

Select from the issues listed below, setting out:

- **potential solutions**
- **specific action plan for a pilot on any scale, with proposed lead & timeline**
- **where solutions cannot be found – outline the reasons or deeper level issues**

### **4. Technical issues around livelihood analysis**

Too often, agencies and donors are hesitant to get involved in livelihood protection (preventing crises) because they are less sure they know what they are doing in pastoral economies. Concentration is therefore on pure 'relief' (food aid, therapeutic feeding, etc.) which does not require livelihood analysis.

- Although various livelihoods interventions are becoming available, we don't know enough about how to combine these interventions into rational, mutually supporting packages.
- Lack of specialized agencies dealing with pastoral economies. Humanitarian NGOs can "rush into" areas of disaster without any technical or local expertise (in pastoral livelihoods).
- Lack of standard interventions and policies, with agreed thresholds or triggers for response.
- The differences between livelihoods in different pastoral areas are not always appreciated. We have not yet mastered how to incorporate understanding of local livelihoods and knowledge in terms of determining appropriate response.
- Comparatively limited long term development support to pastoral livelihoods, into which humanitarian action can be incorporated. This may be linked to a relative neglect of market factors (prices, freedom of trade, etc.)
- Pastoralist livelihoods are not as well understood by most humanitarian actors; they do not all even appreciate that this is indeed an issue. For example, animal epidemics may be neglected because the livelihood implications for humans of livestock diseases are not properly appreciated.
- Learning has been limited by insufficient impact assessment and explicit studies to learn lessons to channel into improved programming. This is exacerbated where donors do not fund impact assessment, or, more seriously, where they have not allowed implementing agencies to undertake independent assessments.
- Limited community participation in prior analysis of intervention options, leading to limited understanding about which interventions and mixes of interventions are best, and when to implement them.
- Absence of consensus among stakeholders on how to interpret information coming from a particular area, and if or how to respond (e.g. Afar drought in mid-2007).
- There is also a limited ability by humanitarian actors to analyse and implement livestock interventions.
- Livelihood analysis of crises is hampered by the structural separation of many agencies (implementing agencies, Government agencies and donor agencies) into emergency and 'development' sections.

## Annex 3: List of Participants

### Pastoral Areas Coordination, Analysis, and Policy Support (PACAPS)

Regional EWER Meeting

Venue: Silver Springs Hotel

Date: April 18th

#### Attendees List

No	Name	Title	Agency	Location/ Area of Interest	Email	Telephone
1	Allan Kute	Kenya VAM Officers	VAM	KENYA	<a href="mailto:allan.Kute@wfp.org">allan.Kute@wfp.org</a>	7624073
2	Andrew Odero	Kenya rep	FEWS-NET	KENYA	<a href="mailto:aodero@fews.net">aodero@fews.net</a>	733819015
3	Bruno Minjauw		FAO REOA	REGIONAL	<a href="mailto:bruno.minjauw@fao.org">bruno.minjauw@fao.org</a>	733620004
4	Calum Mclean	Natural Resource and Drought Management	Arid Lands	KENYA	<a href="mailto:calum.mclean@fao.org">calum.mclean@fao.org</a>	733760000
5	Caroline Wanyonyi	Regional EcoSec Trainer	ICRC	REGIONAL	<a href="mailto:ecosec.nai@icrc.org">ecosec.nai@icrc.org</a>	721569185
6	Carrie Howard		OCHA	REGIONAL	<a href="mailto:howard@un.org">howard@un.org</a>	727532146
7	David Mwangi	Livestock Adviser	EU	KENYA	<a href="mailto:david.mwangi@ec.europa.eu">david.mwangi@ec.europa.eu</a>	733761206
8	Demeke Eshete		SC UK	ELMT	<a href="mailto:demeke.e@scuk.org.et">demeke.e@scuk.org.et</a>	
9	Emmanuel Ole Sambu		FAO	KENYA	<a href="mailto:emanella.olesambu@fao.org">emanella.olesambu@fao.org</a>	
10	Eric Patrick	Policy Specialist	UNDP Drylands	KENYA	<a href="mailto:eric.patrick@undp.org">eric.patrick@undp.org</a>	7624639
11	Frederic Vignoud	FSSL Prog Manager	SC UK	KENYA	<a href="mailto:f.vignoud@scuk.or.ke">f.vignoud@scuk.or.ke</a>	0202737201/ 2737229

12	Gatarwa Kariuki		ILRI	REGIONAL	<a href="mailto:gatarwakariuki@cgiar.org">gatarwakariuki@cgiar.org</a>	4223407
13	Geoffrery Leparateleg		ILRI	REGIONAL	<a href="mailto:g.leparteleg@cgiar.org">g.leparteleg@cgiar.org</a>	710235399
14	George Ombis	Information Technology specialist	OFDA	REGIONAL	<a href="mailto:gombis@usaid.gov">gombis@usaid.gov</a>	
15	Girma Kassa	Deputy ELMT Coordinator	Care Kenya	ELMT	<a href="mailto:gkassa@ci.or.ke">gkassa@ci.or.ke</a>	
16	Henry Narangui		DFID HSNP	KENYA	<a href="mailto:narangui@yahoo.com">narangui@yahoo.com</a>	733718721
17	James Kamunge		WFP	KENYA	<a href="mailto:james.kamunge@wfp.org">james.kamunge@wfp.org</a>	
18	James Oduor	Natural Resource and Drought Management	Arid Lands	KENYA	<a href="mailto:j.oduor@aridland.go.ke">j.oduor@aridland.go.ke</a>	722819227
19	Janet Wildish	Regional Inst Relations	SC UK	REGIONAL	<a href="mailto:j.wildish@scuk.or.ke">j.wildish@scuk.or.ke</a>	738 26 00
20	Jess Grunblatt	Project Manager	DEPHA	REGIONAL	<a href="mailto:jess.grunblatt@unep.org">jess.grunblatt@unep.org</a>	
21	Joseph Karugia		ILRI	REGIONAL	<a href="mailto:j.karugia@cgiar.org">j.karugia@cgiar.org</a>	4223000
22	Josie Buxton		OXFAM	KENYA	<a href="mailto:Jbuxton@oxfam.org.uk">Jbuxton@oxfam.org.uk</a>	202820000
23	Jurjen Draaijer	Int Livestock Consultant	FAO	KENYA	<a href="mailto:jurjen.draaijer@fao.org">jurjen.draaijer@fao.org</a>	0736992299/2725069
24	Lammert Zwaagstra	Regional support office	ECHO	REGIONAL	<a href="mailto:Lammert.ZWAAGSTRA@ec.europa.eu">Lammert.ZWAAGSTRA@ec.europa.eu</a>	22 2802407 / 020 2802001
25	Leigh Stubblefield		DFID	KENYA	<a href="mailto:lk-stubblefield@dfid.gov.uk">lk-stubblefield@dfid.gov.uk</a>	
26	Linda Chebichii		UNDP DDC	KENYA	<a href="mailto:linda.chebichii@undp.org">linda.chebichii@undp.org</a>	
27	Lucy Kirimi		AusAID		<a href="mailto:lucy.kirimi@dfat.gov.au">lucy.kirimi@dfat.gov.au</a>	722671102
28	Luigi Luminari		DMI	KENYA	<a href="mailto:luigi.luminari@aridland.go.ke">luigi.luminari@aridland.go.ke</a>	020 2227496/627
29	Michale Okai		KARI	KENYA	<a href="mailto:michal dominion2003@yahoo.com">michal dominion2003@yahoo.com</a>	733821386

30	Mike Wekesa		Kesarine		<a href="mailto:mike@kesarine.com">mike@kesarine.com</a>	721588016
31	Mohamed Abdinoor		SC UK	ELMT	<a href="mailto:abdinoor.m@scuk.org.et">abdinoor.m@scuk.org.et</a>	
32	Nancy Balfour		ECHO		<a href="mailto:Nancy.BALFOUR@ec.europa.eu">Nancy.BALFOUR@ec.europa.eu</a>	
33	Nancy Mutunga		FEWS-NET	KENYA	<a href="mailto:nmutunga@fews.net">nmutunga@fews.net</a>	7227607645
34	Robert Kaitho		LINKS/LEWS/ GLCSP		<a href="mailto:rkaitho@cnrit.tamu.edu">rkaitho@cnrit.tamu.edu</a>	
35	Safia Abdi	Prog Officer DMM/DRR	Cordaid	KENYA	<a href="mailto:s.abdi@cordaidke.org">s.abdi@cordaidke.org</a>	254 20 4442120/444909
36	Sammy Keter		DFID HSNP	KENYA	<a href="mailto:sammy.keter@thecoolwaters.com">sammy.keter@thecoolwaters.com</a>	
37	Sidow I Addoe		FEWS-NET	SOMALIA	<a href="mailto:sidow@fews.net">sidow@fews.net</a>	724355233
38	Stella Masawe		ILRI	REGIONAL		4223000
39	Suleiman Mohamed	Regional rep	FEWS-NET	REGIONAL	<a href="mailto:msuleiman@fews.net">msuleiman@fews.net</a>	020 3861476 0722206700
40	Ton Haverkot	Regional Prog Coordinator	Cordaid		-	4442120/444909
41	Walter Knausengerger	Nairobi/EA/Regional	USAID	REGIONAL	<a href="mailto:waknausenberger@usaid.gov">waknausenberger@usaid.gov</a>	733896956
42	Zachary Atheru		ICPAC	REGIONAL	<a href="mailto:zatheru@icpac.net">zatheru@icpac.net</a>	733817214