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RELPA
REGIONAL ENHANCED LIVELIHOODS
IN PASTORAL AREAS

PACAPS
PASTORAL AREAS COORDINATION,
ANALYSIS, AND POLICY SUPPORT

RELPA/PACAPS 'Contingency Planning for Early Response' Workshop

**Addis, Jan 16th-17th, 2008
Nairobi, Jan 30th - Feb 1st, 2008**

Workshop Report

The Pastoral Areas Coordination, Analysis and Policy Support (PACAPS) project is implemented by the Feinstein International Center of Tufts University, under USAID grant number 623-A-00-07-00018-00. The early warning and early response components of the project are supported by the 'Food Economy Group.'

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Annexes

Annex 1 15 easy steps to contingency planning – Simon Levine (PACAPS) & Mohamed Abdinoor (SC UK Ethiopia)

Annex 2 Workshop participants – Addis & Nairobi

External Powerpoint Attachments

Annex 3 Linking EW to ER: A case study in Kenya Presentation – A M Farah Arid Lands

Annex 4 Tracking Strategies Presentation – Piers Simpkin ICRC

List of Acronyms

| | |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| CAHWs | Community Animal Health Workers |
| CBO | Community Based Organisation |
| CP | Contingency Plan |
| DSG | District Steering Group |
| ELMT | Enhanced Livelihoods in the Mandera Triangle |
| ER | Early Response |
| EW | Early Warning |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organisation |
| GoE | Government of Ethiopia |
| HR | Human Resource |
| MOU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisations |
| PACAPS | Pastoral Area Coordination Analysis, Policy Support |
| PLI | Pastoralist Livelihoods Initiative |
| TOR | Terms of Reference |

Introduction

One approach of the PACAPS component of RELPA is to draw lessons from the Pastoralist Livelihoods Initiative (PLI) in Ethiopia and transfer experiences to RELPA NGO partners on the ground to improve livelihoods-based programming. One achievement of PLI was to promote livelihoods-based responses to drought and support livestock interventions such as commercial destocking and livestock feed supplementation - in some cases, for the first time in Ethiopia. However, although impact assessment showed some very positive results from these interventions a common finding was delayed response – if NGOs had responded sooner, the impact might have been far greater.

When examining the reasons for the delayed responses in PLI, a set of organizational constraints were revealed which showed that NGOs had not sufficiently prepared for drought in terms of general contingency planning or the specific administrative, procurement and decision-making arrangements needed to ensure rapid response. Based on these experiences, one activity of PACAPS is to work with NGOs to strengthen contingency planning, with a particular emphasis on organizational capacity to develop and implement contingency plans. This process begins with two workshops, in Addis Ababa (Jan 16-17 2008) and in Nairobi (Jan 30 – Feb 1 2008).

Objectives

Experience shows that the barriers to early response are of four different kinds: structural or institutional barriers within the humanitarian sector as whole; internal organisational difficulties within individual agencies; in some areas, limitations of early warning; and more technical problems related to an insufficiently livelihood-centred focus, leading to an underutilisation or inappropriate utilisation of potentially helpful early response interventions.

This workshop took a purely practical approach, and aimed to help participants analyse the particular constraints in their operating environment, and specifically:

- to help them identify the key areas which delay humanitarian response in their country and areas of work;
- to identify practical steps can be taken to reduce delays;
- to identify at which stage in the drought cycle different implementation activities are appropriate, from a livelihoods perspective;
- to analyse at which stage in the drought cycle planning such interventions needs to start, and hence which triggers are appropriate to determine decision making.

Session 1: What Delays Early Response?

Participants identified the factors which have delayed early humanitarian response in the region. No restrictions or directions were given on the kinds of factor considered relevant. Four groups identified the causes of delays separately. A combined list is presented below under the following headings. It became apparent that the categorisations are not clear cut, as factors overlap and are mutually reinforcing.

Structural or institutional barriers within the humanitarian sector as whole

1. Multiple actors with poor coordination at all levels; regional, national and district
2. Too many coordination meetings at country level, leading to minimum response.
3. Lack of clarity on roles and responsibility
4. Inadequate contingency planning funds

5. Political priorities of different organisations, governments and donors affects which problems and which countries receive attention
6. Insecurity - lack of freedom of access to affected areas
7. Lack of infrastructure e.g. roads, telecommunications
8. Unwillingness to declare/admit that there is a crisis by the government, or bureaucratic delays in the procedure of declaring an emergency. (Meteorologists have information but they can't declare emergencies.)
9. For Somalia, absence of central government leading to delay
10. Donors will not respond unless official declaration is made by the government
11. Reluctance and inflexibility to change from 'development' to 'emergency' (both in terms of funding and in activities).
12. Organisations 'protecting their territory' and hostile to new agencies "interfering" during emergencies
13. Rigidity by donors on fund utilization and on funding terms.
14. Donor focus on accountability for admin & finance procedures rather than on accountability for impact (i.e. timely response, technical appropriateness of intervention, etc.).
15. Donor requirements can bring lengthy delays, e.g. procedures for procurement of drugs, necessity to apply for VAT exemption etc.
16. Pastoralists traditional attachments to the value of their livestock, and reluctance to sell livestock early makes intervention hard *and/or*
17. Lack of reliable livestock markets where pastoralists can easily restock after rains making them unwilling to risk selling animals before rains have failed
18. High turnover of technical staff
19. Lack of trust in local NGOs who are most familiar with realities and closest to communities
20. Donors limited understanding of realities of remote areas, understanding conditioned by their urban environments.
21. Localized disasters receive minimal response as opposed to those that are country wide or regional.
22. Weak links between local organisations and organisations at national level (especially donors and government)
23. Weak links between humanitarian response and affected communities – resulting in weak understanding of local livelihoods/knowledge in determining appropriate response

Limitations within agencies

1. Lack/absence of contingency planning at organizational level working in the affected areas
2. Lack of clarity of how EW information feeds into the contingency plans
3. Bureaucratic constraints in terms of admin, finance, sector co-ordination, senior management, organizational priorities, and lack of flexible funds.
4. Internal organizational constraints e.g. procurement procedures, tendering, recruitment, etc
5. Inflexibility within large NGOs
6. Lack of willingness to collaborate
7. Lack of capacity in many areas to respond speedily (technical, HR and financial procedures)
8. Plans for assessments as part of contingency plans
9. Low presence of staff on the ground
10. Lack of flexible funds
11. Limited information sharing

Early warning/information flow

1. Credibility of sources of information
2. Quality of the interpretation or analysis of issues

3. Organisations only believe their own assessments
4. Lack of standardization of methodology of the assessments done
5. Lack of openness in information flow
6. Lack of on-the-ground reports
7. In some areas, lack of EW info
8. Lack of clear trigger indicators to link EW to response
9. Prolonged field assessments by agencies
10. Lack of appropriate information disseminated in time or the relevance of the info to organizations (how to fit it in to organisation's programmes)
11. Poor information flow between the organisations on the ground, and the lead organisations

Technical issues around livelihood analysis

1. Not knowing what to do and how to do it e.g. focus on food aid as 'easy option'
2. Lack of specialized agencies, and lack of livelihood support
3. Lack of learning from previous experiences/impact assessments
4. Lack of understanding of local livelihoods/knowledge in terms of determining appropriate response
5. Difficulty in adapting response i.e. not in tandem with changing circumstances
6. NGOs rushing into areas of disaster without any technical or local expertise
7. Difficulty of incorporating implications of EW, either into long term programs with specific objectives, or into programmes which are too short term to achieve real impact
8. Lack of standard interventions and policies, with agreed thresholds or triggers for response
9. Preference for responding to human disasters, rather than animal epidemics, because livelihood implications for humans of livestock diseases not properly appreciated

General Comments

- If assessments were broader, then most issues could be analysed together
- Sometimes information from local NGOs lacks credibility, undermining confidence in EW generally
- Expectations of food aid leads to exaggerated figures
- Estimating the number of needy populations is challenging
- EW information with qualitative information with clear thresholds can help in raising funds as well as in guiding early response.

Issues that need attention

- Capacity building of local NGOs
- High turnover of technical staff
- Assessment of EW information/systems
- Decision making; timeframe required before action can be taken
- Learning from the past to influence next interventions

Session 2: Livelihood Analysis of a Drought

Contingency plans are usually based on 'scenarios'. However, these scenarios are often not drawn in detail, but may be simply described as 'droughts' or 'conflict'. It was stressed that humanitarian response is not actually interested in *droughts* (as climatic phenomena) but rather with the livelihood crises which may be caused by such events in a certain economic and political context.

A 'typical' drought was described. It was assumed that most pastoralist households can withstand the economic problems caused by the failure of one rainy season. Table 1 - The Drought Calendar presented the changing livelihood context of households over the course of three years caused by the relative failure of 2 rainy seasons. The details were entirely based on participants' prior knowledge. It is stressed that the usefulness of the diagram is not based on the accuracy of the details but in giving an analytical framework for understanding household livelihoods during a crisis and hence in understanding how to support and protect them.

It was recognised that the most important question was not in fact answered during the exercise: when, and to what extent, would households need livelihood support? Answering this question would need good information on households' ability to cope – which would depend to a large extent on the size of their herds (how many animals they could afford to sell in a given period without endangering their ability to recover) and on their other income sources. This is obviously not the same for all households, so good information on the economic differentiation within pastoralist communities – and the extent to which households support each other – is also required.

We then examined which livelihood objectives and intervention strategies would be appropriate at which stage in the progression of the drought. It was clear that maintaining household income could be a necessary support (depending on the household's ability to cope with the situation) for a much longer period than is often considered – in fact true livelihood recovery did not begin until at least one year after the rains had resumed. Nevertheless, asset recovery would be appropriate as soon as the rains returned – so 'recovery activities' made sense at a time when the livelihood situations were in 'emergency'. Asset protection was important either when animals were at risk of dying or when asset depletion from excess sales would happen. In general, classifying the stages of the drought with the terms 'alert', 'alarm', 'emergency', 'recovery' was seen not to be useful for early response.

Many livelihood support strategies for a drought were seen to be extensions of the 'normal' support needed every year. For example, the animal health interventions needed were (largely) the same services which pastoralists need every year (protection from parasites, treatment of individual diseases) although the importance of the services could rise in a drought. Commercial de-stocking, or improving market opportunities for pastoralists, is also a necessary support in the long term, though of particular and pressing importance in a drought. This clearly highlighted the advantages of working on livelihoods in the longer term in drought prone, pastoralist areas.

Table 1: Drought Calendar - Nairobi

Session 3: Intervention Start-up Time-lines

Internal institutional factors behind delayed response were examined by looking at the length of time taken from making a decision to the implementation of an intervention. Four basic intervention types (animal health, livestock feeding, de-stocking and water) were used to demonstrate this. See table below for Intervention Timeline details.

For each of the interventions, a full list of activity steps was identified, along with an estimated time for each step. Each participant working groups took different approaches to optimism and made different assumptions about the starting position (e.g. was donor funding already secured? Was a contingency plan already in place?). There was limited time for an in-depth analysis of time-lines, and ‘critical paths’ were only looked at in an approximate way (i.e. seeing which activities could be done at the same time, which activities could only start when another had been completed, etc.) This overview concentrated on activity timing in relation to the triggers used to make a decision to implement that activity. It also compared the implementation period within each stage of the drought and when the intervention would be most appropriate. For example, if the triggers used to implement a programme would only happen when the activity was actually needed, then late response was inevitable – in these examples, interventions would be 3-4 months late, which very much parallels what has often been seen in practice.

Group work – Intervention Timelines

| Animal health Addis | | Animal Health Nairobi | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Intervention: de-worming and treatment of sick animals. No vaccinations. Assumed funding in place | | Intervention objective: disease outbreak prevention to increase resilience of animals during drought | |
| Activity | Duration | Activity | Duration |
| Development of contingency plan, determining responsibilities of each actor | 1 month | Vaccination: keeps the market open, reduces risk of getting diseases Recommendation: Long term staff to do the vaccination | |
| Meeting communities to define targeting strategy | 1 week | Reactivate the contingency plan | 1 week |
| Coordination with all other agencies (NGOs, GoE, FAO) at all levels | 1 month | Develop & Submit concept note Funding | 1-2 Months |
| Support pharmacists to buy drugs | 1 month | Procurement & Recruitment | 2 months |
| Refresher training of CAHWs; planning training | 1 week | Sensitization/mobilization & WP | 1 month |
| Inviting CAHWs for training | 1 week | Vaccinations needed | by June July |
| Distribution of Drugs to CAHWs | 1 week | | |
| Time frame: | 3 months | Time frame: | 4 – 5.5 months |
| Calendar analysis: in order to start implementation by June/July, a decision to intervene would have to be taken in February, that is, before even the first rains have failed! Such an activity can therefore never be implemented as an emergency ‘response’ – unless the start-up timeline is radically changed – but it must be seen as structural support for pastoral areas, which has to be in place every year. | | | |

| Livestock feeding Addis | | Livestock Feeding Nairobi | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Activity | Duration | Activity | Duration |
| | | a) support for fodder production | |
| Identify the intervention areas | 1 week | July: Assessment is applied for Emergency fund sources. | 1 week |
| Identify the implementing partners | | Aug: Entered MOU with CBO & purchase seeds | 1 week |
| Identify targeted beneficiaries - number of households owing livestock and requiring assistance - number and types of livestock that need assistance | 1 week | CBOs enter MOU with farmers | 1 week |
| Identify the types of feeds examples - hay, teff straw, concentrate | 2-3 days | Sept Oct: Production time Mid Oct: 1 st harvest; CBOs buy fodder from farmers – drying & baling | 1 week |
| Sources of feed and locations | 2 days | Nov: CBO resold direct to pastoralists | |
| Cost calculations of feeding/transportation/logistics and overhead costs | 2 days | Farmers start planting seeds | 2 weeks |
| Duration of the interventions | 1 day | Dec: 2 nd Harvest (re-growth) repeat process | |
| Proposal writing, appraisal, approval, and submission to the donors | 2 weeks <i>too optimistic</i> | Assume agency on the ground, irrigation available | 6 weeks |
| Comments and feedback from the donors and replying to those comments and providing further clarifications | 1 week | b) fodder purchase July: Rapid assessments | 2 weeks |
| Procurement process: • Terms of references for the bids • Bid advertisement • Selection of bidders & decision making • Letters of offers to the bidders • Agreements signed with bidders | 2 weeks | Dev proposal | 2 weeks |
| Delivery and the transportation of the livestock feeds to the project office & delivery sites | 10 days | Approval by DSG | 1 week |
| Distribution of the livestock feed to the local communities | 1 week | Aug: Procurement, getting suppliers, transporters | 4 weeks |
| | | Sept: Delivery | 4 weeks |
| Time frame: | 8-10 weeks | Time frame to 1st distribution | 13 weeks |
| Calendar analysis: <i>if the activity were only initiated after the failure of the second rains, in November, then even on this very optimistic timeline, the activity would not begin until livestock mortality was very high, and very shortly before the next rains. If the trigger for decision making were very high livestock mortality (Jan-Feb), then implementation would be after pasture had already recovered following the next rains (in this scenario). Implementation by November (the latest when feed is needed to maintain core assets) would need a decision in July/August, well before the alarm stage.</i> | | | |

| Commercial de-stocking Addis | | Commercial de-stocking Nairobi | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| Activity | Duration | Activity | Duration |
| Conduct awareness for the pastoralists, livestock marketing groups such as co-operatives, traders & exporters in collaboration with relevant government institutions | 1 week | Sourcing of funds - Commercial - Emergency | |
| Establish resource such as loans for the market actors such as cooperatives and traders | 3-10 days | Commercial - Identifying the livestock traders - Assess their capacity - Identifying constraints to gauge any support needed e.g. credit and or information | 6 weeks |
| Create market linkages amongst different actors through livestock traders visit to the areas | 1 week | - Organizational capacity to undertake activity e.g. managing credit - Identifying the holding grounds, private ranches and institute negotiation - Financing/leasing - Commercial feeds - Provision of business plans by traders | 2 weeks 8 weeks |
| Identify & set-up temporary markets & marketing centers where pastoralists can bring their livestock & traders purchase the livestock | 2-3 weeks | Emergency Usually when livestock prices decline, we move animals offered for sale but there are few buyers hence lower off take | |
| Provide soft loans to the cooperatives, and traders | 2-3 weeks | - Set up de-stocking committees at village level - Identifying local CBOs with implementation capacity e.g. women groups | |
| Monitor the procurement of the livestock to ensure that traders are using the loans to purchase livestock from the traders | continuous | Plan on how many animals to purchase, type, pricing (prevailing market price?) and the target beneficiaries | |
| Time frame: | 8 weeks | Time frame: | 8 weeks |
| Calendar analysis: The group did not specify triggers for decision making. The activity is most appropriate Sept-Dec, although before the rains in Sept pastoralists may be reluctant to sell many animals. This activity therefore needs to be prepared for after the failure of one rainy season (in June). A decision to implement taken after the failure of the second rains (Nov) would mean trying to implement in January, when livestock were already dying and possibly in too bad a condition for merchants to be interested. | | Calendar analysis: A decision to support commercial de-stocking would ideally be taken in July, immediately after the <u>first</u> failed rains. A response based upon the failure of the second rains would result in a programme being run in Jan/Feb, when livestock condition was extremely poor, and when most steers had already been sold. It would be very difficult to obtain decent prices for pastoralists at this stage. | |

| | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Water Nairobi | |
| Assume constituency funds available for water | |
| Baseline survey: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • availability of water • Identification of permanent source of water • Prioritization of distribution sites • Planning for collapses of boreholes or other contingencies • Where animals grazes | Duration 4 Weeks |
| Constituency funds available for water | |
| Tendering systems Preparation of tenders, documents Advertisements, receiving bids Selection of bids Signing of agreements (4 weeks) | |
| Community mobilization Formation of community Outlining of importance of security, Number of population | 4 weeks |
| Water distribution Some activities go into | |
| Rehabilitation of water sources Dams, boreholes during dry seasons | |
| Time frame: | 9 weeks |
| <i>Calendar analysis: in order to implement during the July-Sept 'window of opportunity', a decision would have to be taken by the end of April – when it was still unclear if the first rains had failed or were simply late. This again leads to the conclusion that unless start-up timelines can be radically changed, this kind of activity should be seen as an annual structural support to the pastoralist areas, rather than as a 'response' to a drought.</i> | |

Session 4: Tackling the Problems

To achieve early response we have to face several challenges. Livelihood crises develop very quickly with the failure of two successive rains. However, until the second rains have actually failed, all actors (including pastoralists themselves) will be waiting for those rains and unwilling to invest too heavily in drought response – which they assume will not be needed. If the second rains do fail, there is no time for preparation. (Livelihood analysis showed that many interventions would be appropriate just before the second rains, around August-September.)

New sets of triggers will sometimes be necessary. A better appreciation of the inevitability of a certain consequences once a certain stage has been reached could mean that we don't wait until circumstances deteriorate to move to 'alert' or 'alarm' phase – and to make implementation decisions. We also looked at how specific start-up timelines can be shortened to enable organisations to respond rapidly with a second rain failure.

Groups looked at how the implementation timelines of each of the three example interventions could be shortened.

Generic recommendations to shorten timelines – highlighted in the Addis workshop

- Better predictive livelihood scenario development
- Use of first rain failure as trigger for planning
- Identify likely beneficiary areas, populations, livestock types, etc in advance

- Lobby for extra contingency funds or variance after first rains failure
- Lobby for Woreda contingency funds
- Prepare TOR for feed bids, etc. in advance
- Agree specifications (e.g. for feed) in advance
- Templates for MoUs, offer letters, letters of acceptance, etc. agreed in advance, with the project teams working with finance and admin departments of the implementing organisation
- Maintaining a permanent database of suppliers, e.g. for feed, transport, etc
- Agree emergency streamlined purchasing procedures - (This needs designing in conjunction with admin, finance, country director, auditors etc. and may also benefit from coordination with donors.)
- Identify local suppliers and transporters to shorten tender processes where possible. This should be identified and agreed upon prior the onset of an emergency, and agreed with finance/admin sections of the organisation. Negotiations on the potential modalities of contracts, purchase orders, payment procedures etc. can take place before a specific tender is made. In the longer term, develop local capacity to supply items, e.g. veterinary drugs, livestock feed.
- Pre-qualification of suppliers

Specific recommendations to reduce timelines - highlighted in the Addis Workshop

Commercial Destocking

- Set up a regular forum for livestock marketing actors – traders, GoE, exporters, etc.
- Establish a national livestock policy forum
- Adopt the practice (policy?) of using traders own capital rather than providing loans for livestock purchase, as this delays response. *(Note: a coordinated policy is beneficial for early response. If some organisations use loans, this could cause delays where traders in other areas lobby for them or claim not to have enough working capital!)*
- Develop on-going market linkages (in the longer term)
- Identify sites in advance for setting up temporary markets, ensure their accessibility
- Strengthen relationships with Gov't

Animal Health

- Integrate contingency planning into longer term development activities
- Coordination of a Regional task force, make sure it meets regularly (before the emergency)
- Support EW committee at woreda level, so it really works
- Long term support to community vet pharmacists
- Have in place prior agreements on how vet pharmacists will be part of any emergency response
- Strengthen the CAHWs in both service delivery and disease surveillance. Make refresher training a regular event, so you don't need to do it during an emergency.
- Ensure good disease surveillance in place
- Modalities agreed among all actors on how emergency care will be given (free, subsidised or at market price? Through CAHWs, through GOE vets?)
- If applicable, establish agreements regarding incentives for CAHWs or GoE vets for emergency care in advance
- Template contracts for CAHWs established, agreed with all the necessary internal departments of each organisation

Example of Reduced Intervention Timelines - highlighted in Nairobi Workshop

| Animal Health | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Activities | Reduced duration |
| Reactivate the contingency plan | |
| Availability of Contingency funds | 2 week |
| Notification of the donor on the use | |
| Procurement (have a regional supplier) | 1 week |
| Standing MOU with supplier | |
| Redeployment of staff | 1 week |
| Sensitization/mobilization & WP | 4 weeks |
| Team identification/cold chain | |
| <i>new time frame: 8 weeks (a reduction of 2-3½ months)</i> | |

| Water | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Activities | Duration |
| Unified, comprehensive assessment, Rapid Baseline survey | 4 days |
| Link to reliable EW systems | |
| Updated databases- supplies, contractors, HR | |
| Proposal writing & release of funds | 10 days |
| Tendering | 1 week |
| Increased technical presence_CAHW, Nutritionist, Vets, Water, experts | |
| Increased donor relations/Trust | |
| Networking with other NGOs | |
| Community mobilization | 2 weeks |
| <i>new time frame: 5 weeks (a reduction of 1 month)</i> | |

| Fodder distribution (purchase option) | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Activities | Duration |
| Sensitization | |
| Updating procurement databases | 4 weeks |
| DSG Approval | 2 days |
| Distribution to pastoralist | 2 weeks |
| <i>new time frame: 8 weeks 2 days (a reduction of 4-5 weeks)</i> | |

Session 5: The Way Forward

In the final session, participants looked at their own practical contingency planning and how it could be improved. In the Nairobi workshop, the Kenya agencies (ELMT and Arid Lands) gave the following sketch map.

1. Identify information gaps in contingency planning
2. Liaise with ARID LANDS and other key actors on the ground
3. Coordinate and share CPs activities
4. Fine tune the action plan to fit in with the existing situation
5. Seek approval from DSG

Interventions

- Share information with respect to disease outbreaks in the ELMT areas (CIFA-Marsabit);

- Care-K Garissa; avail to VSF
- Liaise with DVS, DSG
- Investigate disease outbreaks and prepare proposals for mitigation
- Link with ELMT and the private sector
- Assess nature and extent of livestock migration
- Assess water and pasture situation in high concentration areas
- Develop/prepare action plan and write up proposals

Current and Emerging situations

- Localized disease outbreaks
- Internal livestock movement in search of water and pasture
- Emerging drought situation
- Political crisis
- Diminishing marketing opportunity (tied to the national crisis)
- Conflicts
- Livelihoods under stress

General lessons drawn about early response

- a. Change our attitude towards preparedness
- b. Make contingency plans alive – living documents
- c. Build emergency interventions into on-going programs
- d. Educate donors in-terms of timeframes for responding
- e. Harmonize approach in-terms of how to respond to emergency issues
- f. Improve the credibility of the local systems EW
- g. Apply lessons learned from previous responses
- h. Inform others on sharing i.e. triggers
- i. Have openness to learning
- j. Partner in the level of implementation and not just education-wise
- k. Minimum standard - Kite map
- l. Better feedback communication between agencies on the ground ('sub-grantees') and lead agencies
- m. Pilot new response systems with donors – starting with ELMT/RELPA?

Internal constraints

- Involve admin, finance, procurement in contingency planning
- Institutionalizing change attributes to response
- TOR in place for technical staff; job descriptions, etc.
- Consolidate proposals - have prepared templates for proposals; share these with other organisations
- ELMT Contingency Plans should be coordinated with other contingency plans, including those in other districts or operational area

The RELPA Guide to Early Response

or

“How to make contingency planning useful, in just fifteen easy steps”

draft version: February 2008



This is the first draft version of the RELPA Guide to Early Response, which was based on a conceptual approach developed for workshops in Addis Ababa and Nairobi in January 2008 for the PACAPS component. It is designed to be useful for implementing agencies (local Government, national Ministries and NGOs); for agencies supporting early warning, to help them ensure that their information leads to earlier response; and for donor agencies, to help them in to know at which stage in a crisis and on the basis of which information they can best make decisions to ensure timely response of the interventions they wish to support.

We hope to produce a final version of this guide later this year. In order to improve this draft version, we would like to receive feed-back and suggestions from users. Please send these to Simon Levine of the Food Economy Group at simon_levine@yahoo.co.uk or to Mohammed Abdinoor of Save the Children (UK) at abdinoor.m@scuk.org.et.

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We are happy to allow the free copying and distribution of this guide, provided that this page, giving acknowledgement to RELPA/USAID, is included in any copy.

Simon Levine (FEG/PACAPS) and
Mohammed Abdinoor (SC-UK/ELMT)
February 2008

The 15 steps for successful early response:

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| 1. Identify hazards | 21 | |
| 2. Describe your scenarios in detail..... | 22 | |
| 3. Describe the ‘normal’ seasonal calendar | 23 | |
| 4. Draw up your ‘scenario calendar’ | 24 | |
| 5. Analyse the changing livelihood implications..... | 25 | |
| 6. Decide on appropriate livelihood objectives for each stage | 25 | |
| 7. Choose appropriate livelihood interventions | 26 | |
| 8. Work out a ‘start-up timeline’ for each intervention | 26 | |
| 9. Plot the start-up time line back onto calendar | 27 | |
| 10. Look at the triggers you need to use for decision-making | 27 | |
| 11. Check that EW is giving you the correct info | 13 | |
| 12. Check that your activities can realistically be on time | 13 | |
| 13. Be prepared: shorten start-up time-lines for <u>all</u> interventions | 14 | Delet |
| 14. Repeat steps 8-10 with your improved timelines. | 15 | Delet |
| 15. Share these ideas with those in your organisation who can make change happen | 17 | Delet |

1. Identify hazards

You can't plan for everything. (Fortunately, you don't need to, since the lessons you learn in preparing for one hazard often mean you will be well prepared for other hazards as well.). Choose the two most likely hazards and start there. If you have time, you can always plan for a third and fourth eventuality.

Don't spend weeks trying to decide which hazards to plan for. And don't make your hazards too complex ('a drought at the same time as a war and an epidemic of rinderpest') unless you have good reason to think that what you are describing is really very likely.

Simply identify the most likely potential hazards which will have a serious impact on people's livelihoods ('their ability to cope'). Keep it simple and realistic. Choose 'normal levels of hazard (e.g. the kind of drought or level of conflict that is seen every few years, and not the most serious which has been seen in the past 20 years). Go beyond the 'title' of the hazard. You can't plan very effectively for 'livestock epidemics' in general, but you can plan effectively if you think of the kind of epidemic, when and where it may strike, and so on. It won't matter if the hazard you end up having to respond to is different from the one you have described. Once you know how the real life situation is different from your scenario, it is relatively easy to adapt your plan – and certainly much easier than starting your response without having had a plan.

2. Describe your scenarios in detail

Now fill in more details about each of your potential hazards – this is describing the ‘scenario’. Start with the most likely one (in case you don’t have time to do the second).

You have to quantify as many parameters as possible, and as accurately as possible. If you’re thinking of an animal epidemic, then try and estimate how many animals might be affected over what period of time. What percentage of these animals is likely to die? How much will calving or kidding rates (and milk production) be affected? How long will the epidemic last? Some people fear that if they are too specific in their scenario description, then they make it unlikely that this exact scenario can ever happen as they describe it. That doesn’t matter. You need to be realistic in your scenario, but you don’t have to be a prophet. A detailed and realistic scenario which is a bit different from what actually happens will be far more useful in helping you plan than vague description.

No hazard will ever have the same impact over a large area. Different places will always be affected differently, for many reasons. Think about this, but don’t get too worried about it. This is dealt with in step 3.

Try and think what the likely wider impacts of your hazard would be. What has happened in the past should be a good guide, though you do need to be aware of any major changes in the overall context. (If there is no relatively recent example of your hazard, then you may have picked one which is unlikely.) For example, a livestock epidemic might not only affect animal health and production. It may mean that quarantine restrictions are imposed, with wide-scale effects on market prices. If borders are closed, will this affect the migration patterns of those animals which are not directly affected by the disease?

You’re bound to miss one or two things which will happen in reality. The important thing is to write down exactly the scenario you are describing so that you can easily compare it with what happens – and then adjust your plans accordingly.

3. Describe the ‘normal’ seasonal calendar

The basis for your planning should be the normal calendar. We know that most people cope in a normal year. (Some form of social support or safety net may be a normal part of coping.) What we need to know at every stage of the development of a crisis is “how different are things now from what they ‘normally’ are at this time of year?” Don’t get too hung about defining ‘normal’. We just mean ‘the kind of year in which people can cope’ – though not necessarily a wonderful year for them.

There are many ways to get the information you need for this step. If you have been working in the area for a long time, you may simply know it yourself. If not, you can work with local communities to fill it in, if you have time. If the contingency planning is urgent, then it may be better to do it quickly by talking to a few ‘key informants’ (i.e. anyone who you think know the answers to your questions) and then later, when you have time, going to the communities to adapt and improve your calendar. (A contingency plan should ALWAYS be written on paper and NEVER carved in stone, so that it can constantly be updated and improved.) Always look for research which has already been done which may be able to help you. Livelihood studies have been done in many areas in the Horn of Africa, and these studies may include a seasonal calendar with most of the information you require for this step¹.

What should you put on the calendar? You need to describe anything which is important for people’s livelihoods (a ‘livelihood’ here just means their economic life – how they find their food and cash income and what needs they have). What is important in any one area will depend upon people’s livelihood strategies there. In most cases you’ll need to think of the following – but there could certainly be other things which are important.

- Rainfall
- Pasture condition
- Water availability (quantity, location – and maybe cost?)
- Migration – who goes where with which animals, impact on household livelihood (e.g. milk supply?)
- Market conditions (supply and demand? which animals are being sold? prices? Where do the traders come from? etc.)
- Peak calving periods and milk availability from different species
- Times when livestock are slaughtered
- Harvests (for agro-pastoralists). If their harvests are mainly for consumption, then when will the food run out*? If they sell their harvests, when will the money run out**?
- Price of basic food items
- Other income sources (e.g. firewood/charcoal, skins/hides, casual labour in towns)
- Other food sources – wild foods? hunting? fishing?

* As a rough guide: a household will need around 50-75kg of grain per month, depending on the other foods that are available.

** Buying back food is usually at a higher price than you get for selling your harvest.

Try and quantify as much as you can. If you don’t know all the details, don’t delay your contingency planning in order to go off and spend a month on researching it all. Take educated guesses, make a note of the important gaps in your knowledge, and take steps to fill in the gaps piece by piece over time.

¹ An example of a useful study is a household economy ‘baseline’ study. These have been completed for Somalia, for parts of NE Kenya, for Somali NRS in Ethiopia and are currently being prepared for Oromiya NRS. See references. Other kinds of livelihood study may also have useful information.

4. Draw up your ‘scenario calendar’

You’ll probably want to take a 2-3 year period, starting a few months before the hazard strikes and running through until recovery is more or less complete.

Go through the list of parameters that are important that were included in the normal seasonal calendar (step 3) and see if there are any parameters which you wish to add. Look also at the parameters that you quantified in describing your scenario in step 2. Describe the changes in each parameter over the two or three years – at some periods, you will need to describe the changes month by month and at other periods changes may only be seen over a few months.

Describe what is happening in as precise a way as you can – quantified where relevant. (When is pasture condition ‘poor’, when is it insufficient for a particular species, when does it disappear altogether?) It is worth repeating again here that your description is very unlikely to be an exact prediction of what will happen – but that doesn’t matter. As long as you have a detailed description, you’ll know how the real situation is different from your scenario – and you’ll be able to change the predictions accordingly. (For example, if you thought food prices would double by March, but in fact they only rose by 50% in March, then you know that the livelihood situation is less serious than your scenario. This may mean that you can delay a cash or food aid programme, or that you can scale it down or not implement it at all.) It’s very hard to adjust your plan unless you’ve actually written down the details of the scenario.

No hazard will affect everywhere in the same way. Describe the scenario for the most common context in the area where you work, and write down the other ‘variables’ that will be important in determining how the crisis is different in different areas – e.g. the density of livestock, the different security situation in different places, where market access is much better or worse, where there are pockets of more fertile land or perennial springs, etc.

5. Analyse the changing livelihoods implications

We often tailor our interventions by what is happening in the environment (*when do we need to truck in water to keep cattle alive?*) or to livestock (*when will they die if not given extra feed?*). Since our concern is to save people's lives and to protect people's livelihoods, we mustn't forget to take a livelihood perspective. (To put it crudely, we are trying to save cattle because people depend on the cattle, and not because we are animal welfare agencies.) It is perfectly normal in the pastoralist economy for there to be periods when cattle numbers fall and periods when they are built up. Our interventions should be guided by an understanding of the situations in which pastoralists cannot cope on their own – e.g. when they don't have enough money from other sources to look after their own livestock, and when they would lose too many animals and lose their ability to rebuild their herds in the following years. Herds can be lost through livestock death and also when people have to sell too many animals to buy food because of changes in the terms of trade. In order to know how well people can cope, we really need to understand:

- Their other sources of food and cash (e.g. the support they get from relatives or remittances; the income they can make from firewood or charcoal sales, etc.)
- How many animals they will need to sell to meet their living needs (food, health care, etc.) – this means looking at prices and quantities!
- How many animals they can afford to sell before their herds become too small and so become unsustainable.

Since none of these answers will be the same for all households in the community, we also need to know a lot about the economic differences between the richer and poorer members of the community – and how many there are in each economic group.

In practice, we are unlikely to have enough information about any of areas go really know how many need help at any one time. This is unfortunate, because where resources are limited, we really want to be able to prioritise our response where people have the most difficulties in coping, and not simply respond in the places where cattle are most at risk of dying. (Of course, this could be the area where people most need help, but it is not necessarily the case.)

Don't let what you don't know discourage you from seeing what you do know. If you know that people's only source of cash is from livestock sales and their only sources of food are from milk, meat or buying food in the market, then you can see when people will be able to cope after the hazard has passed – only when milk has returned, and when they have enough new (male) animals born which become big enough to sell. This lets you see that the livelihood crisis caused by a drought will not be over as soon as it rains, even if the pasture does start to re-grow quickly. People won't have goats to sell for another year, or cattle to sell for another 2-3 years. Even if they have larger herds of cattle and if there is a good market for milk, milk production won't for them to earn much income for over a year.

6. Decide on appropriate livelihood objectives for each stage

What is our role at each stage of the crisis that has been described? Before thinking about activities, think about what you should be trying to achieve. For example, the following objectives may make sense at different stages of a crisis:

- helping people to have enough cash and/or food in order to survive
- helping children to have a healthy diet
- helping people to maintain as many assets for the future as possible
- helping people to maintain their core breeding animals for the future
- helping people rebuild their herds as fast as possible.

Don't get too distracted by discussions about how you define your objectives. There is no single right way of defining objectives. (For example, you may say you are 'trying to help people diversify their income sources', or you could think of the same thing as 'helping people to maintain enough cash income to buy food, without having to sell assets'. It doesn't matter.) The important thing is to be clear about what you want to achieve. So, for example, there is an important difference between helping to keep animals in a good condition so they fetch a higher price, and helping to keep select female breeding animals alive for future herd regeneration.

7. Choose appropriate livelihood interventions

At the moment, there are not very many kinds of interventions which we have in our repertoire for pastoralist economies, but there is an increasing willingness to think creatively of different ways of meeting objectives. For example, cattle which are at risk of starvation can be kept alive in several ways:

- by distributing fodder,
- by helping provide irrigation for people to grow their own fodder,
- by helping provide transport for herders to move their cattle to areas where the pasture is better,
- by providing cash income for herders, which they can use either to pay for transport or to buy their own fodder
- by advocacy with Governments to keep borders open and to permit free movement of livestock
- ... and potentially many others.

Different interventions will make sense in different circumstances. What is important is to decide exactly when each intervention would make sense given your scenario description. Some interventions may be appropriate over several months; others will only make sense if they are targeted at very specific stages in the evolution of a crisis.

It is essential to be as accurate as you can about placing each intervention in the 'scenario calendar'. You can't possibly have timely intervention until you know what you are aiming for.

It is simplest to consider when it would be appropriate for the activity to actually start in the field. Don't worry at this stage about all the preparation work you need to do for each activity. That will be taken care of in step 8.

8. Work out a 'start-up timeline' for each intervention

For each intervention that you propose, write down all the different tasks which your organisation will have to accomplish before it can begin actual implementation. (You will probably need to talk to some colleagues in other departments, e.g. finance, logistics, administration, human resources, to get all the details on the time it may take for recruitment, for ordering vehicles or supplies, bringing in good through customs, etc.).

If you don't already have money available which your organisation can spend on this project, then you will need to consider the time it takes to write up a proposal for donors, to get this approved and for any money transfers then to be received in the place where expenditure will take place.

Some activities can take place at the same time, but others can't start until a previous stage is completed (e.g. you probably can't begin to recruit until your funding is secured). Work out the shortest possible pathway through all the steps: this will give you the minimum time between deciding you want to implement a programme and it actually starting.

There is a tendency to be optimistic in estimating how long each step takes. Remember that your organisation may be dealing with a large scale emergency in the country with programmes being launched in several areas at once. This can delay your own programme. Remember too that staff can be away at meetings, because of sickness or on holiday. It is probably best to give a time range for each step, considering both a 'realistic' estimate and a 'worst case' – based upon previous experience. It is not a good idea to do planning on the basis of 'best case' scenarios.

9. Plot the start-up timeline back onto calendar

Work backwards from the date when your proposed activity should start and count out the weeks or months that your start-up is expected to take. This will give you your 'decision date', the latest date by which you will have to take a decision to implement this intervention if it is to start when the activity is appropriate. For example, suppose (hypothetically) that a de-worming campaign must be completed one month before the rains are due, and it will take one month to cover the project area. If it takes two months to set up the programme, then the last possible date for deciding that this activity should take place is four months before the rains are due – if you delay the decision, then your activity will probably be late.

Remember of course that your actual decision date will not necessarily be the same calendar month as you have described in your scenario, because a real life crisis may develop more quickly or slowly than your scenario. Good monitoring of the development of any crisis is essential for you to be able to modify your scenario on a regular basis. See the following steps.

10. Look at the triggers you need to use for decision-making

In theory, this step is very simple – though in practice it can be the most difficult.

The theory

You have described a developing crisis, and you know from step 9 in which months of that development you need to make your decision for each proposed intervention. You can't rely on using the calendar months for your decisions, since each actual crisis will evolve at a different rate. You will need to make decisions based upon which 'stage' in the crisis you have reached – e.g. 'pasture being in very poor condition', 'the livestock price dropping to 50% of normal, in relation to the grain price', or 'men moving to urban centres to look for casual work'. If you have understood the development of this kind of crisis well, then you will know roughly how long it will be from the appearance of this stage of the crisis to the stage when you will have to intervene in a certain way. (For example, you know that it is usually around 3 months from the pasture disappearing to cattle being in serious need of extra feeding which households cannot afford for themselves.)

This means that the triggers for deciding to implement a certain intervention do not relate to whether or not that intervention is actually needed or appropriate at the decision making time. They are the conditions which indicate that in all probability the conditions for needing the intervention will exist by the time you are ready, if you start preparation now. No-one can ever be sure that the conditions will actually arise as forecast, so you need to continuously monitor the situation as you are preparing. Hopefully, you can cancel a proposed intervention if circumstances change in an unexpected way. (This requires a good understanding with donors. Building up these kinds of relationships is an essential part of preparedness.)

If possible, you don't want to choose triggers which will indicate the last possible date for decisions making that will still let you be on time. It's good to build some leeway into your start-up, though


the reality of early response is such that you may not be able to convince anyone to act until it's almost too late. Don't have too many triggers – they will either say the same thing, in which case you don't need them all, or will be contradicting each other, in which they are not helping you! You use several kinds of information to make your situational analysis and to make your plans. However, you want to rely on only two or three 'triggers' to tell you to activate your plans.

the reality...

Ironically, the most difficult kind of crisis to prepare for can be the very slow onset crisis! Droughts are usually only a serious livelihood crisis when more than one rains fail. However, the crisis can hit very hard shortly after the failure of the second rains. This means that a decision to intervene is usually necessary before the second rains have failed – when everyone (pastoralists, agencies, donors) may all be assuming that the rains are about to come and to avert a crisis. Figure 1 illustrates this, using a fairly generic 'drought timetable' for Northern Kenya or Southern Somalia and Southern Ethiopia. Agencies who have undertaken livestock feeding programmes say that fodder only starts to be distributed four months after the start of the programme. In order to distribute feed when livestock need it (when their condition is very poor, during the second failed rains), a decision to start the programme is needed by the end of June, or just after the first failed rains. Since one failed rains will not create a humanitarian crisis, how is it ever possible to run a fodder programme on time? (Experience indeed shows that fodder has been distributed in March or April, after the following rains had already begun and livestock had already died.)

Table 1. When should you decide to run an emergency livestock feeding programme?

The figure below is part of a 'drought calendar' (see step 4). Only two parameters are shown here, for illustration.



The humanitarian community (Governments, agencies, donors and pastoralist communities all working together) will have to find ways shorten the start up timeline of this kind of programme to 2 months, so that programmes can start as soon as it is seen that the second rains are not normal, or, if possible, based on the meteorological forecasts.

Longer term solutions may involve several factors:

much better preparedness, so that the actual start-up time lines are very much shorter
decision making based on accurate meteorological predictions
new institutional and programming arrangements, allowing for 'switching' from one programme to another very quickly and with limited 'waste'
a greater acceptance that sometimes we need to spend money and then cancel programme as circumstances change
developing new programming ideas that can be implemented much more quickly or with greater flexibility because the same crises repeat themselves (drought, conflict), longer term programmes are needed which address issues such as water, fodder supply, freedom of movement and markets in a fundamental way. Such programmes can then 'change gear' if crises arise.

11. Check that EW is giving you the correct info

You have made a list of indicators and the levels and the thresholds for these that will constitute 'triggers' for decision making. It is likely that this list will be quite short – probably not more than 2-3 indicator-triggers for any one programme type.

Now you need to ensure that you will always know how closely and how quickly any of these indicators is reaching the trigger-threshold. Existing early warning systems should be giving you this information in a timely way. You need to ensure that:

the early warning systems are giving you all the information you require for decision making

your organisation is getting the information quickly enough

the decision makers in your organisation are seeing the information and giving it the right attention

If current early warning is not giving you the information on one or more of the indicators that you need, then you may be forced to collect this information yourself. However, before you do this, contact the early warning information providers and other agencies. The chances are that if you need some other information, then so do others. Early warning providers are there to help you, and so they will almost certainly be willing to look at your information requirements, and, where possible, to include this in their future bulletins².

The likelihood is that early warning bulletins are giving you far more information apart from the information about your won chosen indicators. This other information is important for overall analysis about the humanitarian situation. You don't have to ignore everything else to focus 'blindly' on your chosen indicators. However, you will probably find that decision making becomes simpler when you focus on what you had decided was important, the information about your triggers.

12. Check that your activities can realistically be on time

You may find that one or more of your chosen intervention is unlikely to be on time, because the time delay between decision making and actual benefits appearing on the ground is too long. The example of fodder distribution in figure 1 may just fall into this category, if you could never persuade anyone to fund it or to support it when only one rains had just failed.

² Please contact PACAPS with any suggestions for making EW more useful for you and your organisation. See 'references'.

It's best to be honest and admit where an intervention is unlikely to be possible, even if you know that this would be the most appropriate thing to do, and even if you know that it would be possible to get funding for it – but that this would be too late. We need to spend our time worrying about what we can do on time. So, there are two choices: find a different way of achieving the same objective.
work out how to shorten the timeline.

You should choose the first option first. Find an alternative way of achieving the same objective, which has a better chance of being possible on time, even if it is not as good a choice 'in an ideal world'. Once you have prepared for this alternative programme, you can start work on the second option – seeing how you can shorten the time line for your preferred alternative. While you are working on this, you will at least know that your organisation is prepared for any eventuality and that no-one is assuming that you will succeed in shortening your start-up time line until you have actually done so.

13. Be prepared: shorten start-up time-lines for all interventions

It's very unlikely that your start-up timelines are short enough for any activity. Forcing decision making to be much earlier always brings disadvantages.

you are less likely to be sure that the crisis will indeed develop exactly as you have predicted;

it will be harder to persuade people in your own organisation or in donor organisations to support your programme; the longer the timeline, the more delays can arise; in a real life, your organisation will probably want to be doing other things as well. The more attention that is needed to start up one programme, the less time and concentration everyone has for thinking about other things that need doing.

If you analyse the start up timeline you drew up for all your proposed interventions, it is likely that you can find many steps which could either be taken in advance, or at least prepared for in advance. What is actually possible will depend on individual circumstances, but the kinds of thing to think about are:

Staffing: identify staffing needs, prepare draft job descriptions, prepare draft contracts, prepare recruitment procedures, identify possible candidates within the organisation for secondment and prepare the secondments, discuss the possibility of secondments with other agencies, prepare the induction. Keep all of this regularly up to date.

Financing: prepare a draft concept note and share it with potential donors; prepare a draft project proposals according to the format of the most likely donors; share these with the donors, and incorporate any feedback; look at the process of bank transfers from donor to field office; try and establish contingency funds which can be spent either with discretion or at least with quick approval procedures. Keep all the above regularly up to date.

Administration and logistics: identify the administrative procedures which cause most delays (e.g. duty exemption at customs clearance); discuss them with the agencies involved (Governments, donors, your own administrators, etc.) to agree the most streamlined procedures which would still be acceptable to all; pre-qualify suppliers for tenders; prepare draft contracts for transport, suppliers, service providers, etc.; discuss these contracts with them in advance to ensure acceptance and understanding; pre-position supplies, where possible (e.g. if they can be used elsewhere or sold later); discuss with other agencies how logistics and transport can be shared. Keep all the above regularly up to date.

Implementation: conduct regular refresher training for any staff who will be involved in a programme (your own staff, local Government or community based workers); make sure coordination systems at local level are working (e.g. District sectoral forums); use longer term (“development”) programmes to support any possible emergency intervention (e.g. structural support to the livestock marketing sector; support to regular fodder production and marketing, support to local animal health services; etc.)³; coordinate policy decisions on how interventions will be carried out – e.g. what should be given freely and what should be paid for, what role should Gov’t civil servants play, etc.;

14. Repeat steps 8-10 with your improved timelines.

When you succeed in putting better preparedness in place, you can go back and re-plot your shorter start up timelines on your hazard calendars. You will hopefully be able to work off a new, later set of ‘triggers’.

It will be useful to use the original trigger set as an ‘alarm’ phase, indicating that you are going to have to reach a decision within a fairly short period of time.

15. Share these ideas with those in your organisation who can make change happen

It is clear that no one individual can ensure early response. The problems lie in many places in each organisation and in many processes and relationships between different organisations. The problems can only be solved by many people working together. For example, a humanitarian programme manager may be able to programme appropriately and to achieve a level of preparedness in training their own staff and community and local Government staff. But they may not be able to organise the preparation of secondments from elsewhere in the organisation; they may not be responsible for negotiating with donors, for the logistics of importing. They may not be able to work with finance and administration departments in order to develop a common understanding of the needs of programmes, and to design new systems which meet the demands of donors (and auditors) but still allow for life-saving response to happen on time. This requires organisational buy-in at a high level. This commitment won’t happen on its own. Every individual is responsible for sharing these ideas with their senior management, through whatever avenues exist in their own organisation.

Also share your plans with other organisations working in the area. Plan a coordinated approach, so everyone knows in advance who would do what in a crisis. You all rely on each other, so you should all make sure that you hold each other accountable for your state of preparedness. Discuss what each of you is doing to speed up your response times, and share ideas on what else could help make response quicker.

We know that people and livestock move in response to crises and in response to interventions, so what you do will affect others. Share your plans with others who are operating outside your project area – whether in the same country or across the border. As well as sharing with central and local Government, make sure that also you share all your plans with UN-OCHA, which is the international agency with responsibility for coordinating response.

All organisations want to respond on time and want to achieve impact. Although the humanitarian community as a whole has usually been too late in responding to crises in pastoral areas, this is not because of the lack of good-will. We hope that this guide gives a

³ ICRC has produced ideas on how to do this as part of a comprehensive ‘tracking strategy’.
Contingency planning for ER Workshop Report

new approach for thinking about how to respond on time, and that it gives a practical tool for achieving earlier response.

If you find it useful, please share this guide both within your organisation and outside, because only when many people work together will we be able to achieve truly timely humanitarian response.

References

Livelihood baseline profiles using the household economy approach can be found at the following web addresses:

for Ethiopia: www.dppc.gov.et/livelihoods

for Somalia: www.fsasomali.org

Livelihood studies using different approaches may also be found, but will have to be sourced from individual agencies, until a central repository for all livelihood studies and assessments can be found.

For further information on the livelihood profiles available, and with any suggestions about making early warning more useful, please contact Alexandra Crosskey (FEG/PACAPS) at alexandracrosskey@yahoo.co.uk

Annex 2: Workshop participants' lists – Addis & Nairobi

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Annex 3: Linking EW to ER: A case study in Kenya Presentation – A M Farah Arid Lands (see powerpoint attachment)

Annex 4: Tracking Strategies Presentation – Piers Simpkin ICRC

The attached powerpoint presentation was given by Piers Simpkin (ICRC) at the end of the Nairobi workshop on 'tracking strategies'. Only selected slides were shown during this presentation. The 'tracking strategies' mean having a single longer term vision of how to support livelihoods in pastoral areas, whereby one overall strategy can encompass very different activities, or ways of working, according to the practical conditions which people are facing at any one time. This means that we no longer 'turn off' development programmes in order to 'turn on' emergency programmes. Instead we have a livelihood support programme with several 'gears', which can be progressively changed, e.g. supporting 'commercial' private livestock health workers using a full cost-recovery (and profit) system, but then using this network of workers to give free health care, e.g. on a voucher system, in certain conditions.