Livelihoods, Power and Choice:
The Vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat, Darfur, Sudan

Helen Young, Abdal Monium Osman, Ahmed Malik Abusin, Michael Asher, Omer Egemi
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Feinstein International Center
Tufts University
200 Boston Ave., Suite 4800
Medford, MA 02155
USA
tel: +1 617.627.3423
fax: +1 617.627.3428
fic.tufts.edu
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SUMMARY

Livelihoods in Darfur are intimately linked to the conflict, none more so than the livelihoods of the Northern Rizaygat—a group of Arabic-speaking, camel-herding nomads living in the Sudanese states of North, South, and West Darfur. They have achieved notoriety for their role in the Janjaweed—the pejorative name given to the loose groupings of armed Arab tribesmen, who, since 2003, have been integral players in Darfur’s conflict and instrumental to the Sudanese government’s counterinsurgency campaign. Little attention has been paid to exploring how the Northern Rizaygat’s lives and livelihoods have been affected by the conflict or to their livelihood goals and hopes for future peace and security. This lack of knowledge helps explain their relative exclusion from various forms of international action on Darfur—humanitarian programming, international peace processes, and international advocacy campaigns.

Recognition of this exclusion prompted this research, the first field-based study since the conflict started that specifically focuses on pastoralists, and the Northern Rizaygat in particular. Apart from their politicized image, other reasons for their exclusion are that they are widely perceived by the international community as less vulnerable than other groups, they are hard to reach, they live in scattered rural communities, and they have been alienated by the pariah status attached to them.

Our research uses a livelihoods lens to illustrate the processes that shaped the vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat, and brought them to the point where they were willing to actively support the counterinsurgency against the Darfuri rebels who are contesting Khartoum’s control. These processes are deeply rooted in history, and embedded in complex interactions between people, the environment, and institutional and policy processes. Lessons learned from this very specific case have broader implications, not only for prospects of peace and recovery in Darfur, but also for policies around pastoralism, land tenure security, climate adaptation, natural resource management, and humanitarian intervention.

The research and resultant recommendations have eight broad focuses. We seek to promote:

1. A participatory policy review of pastoralism in order to encourage policy coherence between ministries concerned with pastoral issues and to enable policies to be based on accurate field information and to be grounded in local realities.

2. Space for local and national civil society to develop a comprehensive advocacy strategy on camel pastoralism and the economic importance of the abbala Arabs (to which the Northern Rizaygat belong) to the national economy. Advocacy is vital to reverse processes of exclusion and neglect and to raise local and international awareness.

3. Localization of the peace process and stronger linkages from local- to higher-level peace initiatives. Livelihoods are very often based on ‘mutual’ benefits and locally-negotiated agreements. This experience, and the idea of communal rights based on livelihood groups, should inform higher-level processes and be officially acknowledged.

4. Linkages between pastoralist livelihoods and development: education, health, and women’s development are priorities.

5. Improved accountability, transparency, and responsiveness through building the capacity of such key governance institutions as the Sudanese government’s Pastoral Commission and Women’s Commission.

6. A new generation of leadership by enhancing capacities to understand and articulate local needs and by encouraging civil society development and local
NGOs, and by enabling youth to engage with government authorities and the military.

7. Reversal of processes of militarization linked to livelihoods.

8. Best practice, joint research, and collaborative learning. Interventions must be based on wider regional best practice among pastoralists. Capacities of local universities must be built and mobilized. Local universities need to be assisted in the integration of issues of pastoralism, livelihoods, and conflict in their curricula and in broadening their research agendas in collaboration with national and international institutions.

Darfuri nomads have much in common with pastoralists in other conflict-affected areas of Africa and elsewhere, who face equivalent challenges due to their social, economic, and political marginalization. The Darfur case must be viewed in the context of current discourses on pastoralism, climate adaptation, land tenure security, and rights of pastoralists. In turn, lessons learned from Darfur have much wider regional and international policy implications.

This research aims to understand the causes of vulnerability, which are often deeply rooted in history, and embedded in complex interactions between people, the environment, and institutional and policy processes. The wider purpose of this research is to promote understanding and raise awareness in Sudan and abroad of the livelihood challenges facing specific pastoralist groups in Darfur, and to promote their inclusion as stakeholders in relevant national and international processes to meet humanitarian need and promote peace and recovery. The appalling violence and associated human rights abuses that have been recorded in Darfur are not the subject of this research. We are not seeking to condone or excuse the violence. Our aim is to address the gap in understanding about the livelihoods of these groups and their particular vulnerability, and, in so doing, to challenge the oversimplified representation of this group as marauding militia.

Chapter 2 provides a background on the Northern Rizaygat, their history and identity, and describes how migration, tribal grouping, and ecology have interacted to influence their livelihoods and create a pastoral domain that traditionally spanned the entire Darfur region. This reveals that an emphasis on ethnicity does not provide a good basis for understanding the crisis. Observing access to resources through a livelihood lens provides clearer insights into power relations and the motives of the different groups involved in the violence, and sets the stage for a lasting peace.

Chapter 3 traces the long-term historic processes of marginalization (which reflect broader regional discrimination against pastoralists) that shaped livelihoods and pastoralism from the pre-colonial era up to 2003. We argue that it was the particular vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat’s livelihoods that drove them to actively join the government’s counterinsurgency strategy in 2004, thus catapulting them, in post-9/11 discourse, into the role of ‘evil’ Janjaweed.

Our analysis has shown that historical policy and institutional processes have contributed to unequal power relations, to the disadvantage of the Northern Rizaygat, and have exacerbated tensions between different pastoralist and sedentary groups and between the Northern Rizaygat and regional and national authorities. We explore how the longstanding (and inequitable) systems of land tenure and natural resource management, that have their roots in the sixteenth-century systems of the Fur Sultanate, were entrenched under colonial rule and after Sudan became independent in 1956. This created a hierarchy of rights to natural resources, which were to the disadvantage of the Northern Rizaygat. The impoverishment and marginalization of the Northern Rizaygat, and other pastoral societies, are an outcome of socioeconomic,
political, and ecological processes through which the state contributed to their exclusion from power and access to resources.

Chapter 4 uses our research findings to analyze the experience of the Northern Rizaygat during the war, including their active recruitment by the government, exclusion by the rebels, and how their former livelihood strategies have changed since 2003. As a result of violent attacks, livestock raiding, blocked migration routes, kidnappings, and killings, they were forced to move to safer areas, and many became displaced—a reality not generally acknowledged or reported.

The livelihoods of the Northern Rizaygat are going through rapid transition, which has been accompanied by sweeping changes in pastoralist lifestyles. The severe constriction of their pastoralist domain, accompanied by the blocking of livestock migration and trade routes by insecurity, has badly affected their traditional livelihoods. Their seasonal migratory movements are restricted to safe zones, which denies them access to their favored pastures, particularly in the north. The control of this northern area of Darfur by the Zaghawa—a semi-nomadic, non-Arab people living in Darfur and Chad—has also blocked livestock trade with Libya and Egypt, an important source of livelihood for many people. Most of this trade is now dominated by the Zaghawa. This restricted access has also negatively affected labor migration to Libya—another traditional livelihood strategy for the Northern Rizaygat.

They have quickly diversified into ‘maladaptive’ strategies that are short-term, quick-return and depend on a grossly distorted economy and a semi-captive market of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Rapid militarization, and the use of intimidation and violence as a means of controlling or restricting access to natural resources (e.g. forestry resources, access to cultivable land) are examples of livelihood maladaptations that undermine the livelihoods of others. Firewood, especially in West Darfur, provides a significant source of income for the increasingly sedentarized pastoralists. The increasingly urbanized IDPs are constrained by insecurity from themselves continuing to gather natural resources such as firewood and animal fodder.

While their ‘maladaptive’ livelihood strategies may have broadened their livelihood options, and strengthened certain livelihood capitals, other critical livelihood capitals—particularly, social, human, and political capital—have been seriously diminished. The displacement of many rural farmers to towns and camps has given pastoralists the upper hand in these rural areas, but, at the same time, has removed a critical part of the social and economic fabric of their society. The absence of rural farming communities has destroyed local markets, which nomads depend on to buy essential goods and sell their own produce. The loss of social, human, and political capital has further skewed their asset portfolio below the existing, very low levels at the start of the war. This reflects their continuing and deepening marginalization since 2003, and the vulnerability caused by militarization, constriction of the pastoralist domain, dependence on a war economy, and control of resources through violence.

Nomadic camel-based pastoralism is seriously under threat as a livelihood system as a result of insecurity limiting migration, biased or unfavorable policies, pressures to settle, and the economic incentives of maladaptive strategies. The traditional goals of seeking status and power through camels and camel herding are being replaced with more modern goals of seeking power associated with militarization and education.

The livelihood maladaptations over the past five years are influenced by the rapid acceleration in the prevailing policies, institutions, and policies which continue to shape the nomads’ vulnerability and future livelihood prospects. These include: processes of sedentarization; youth and militarization; social polarization; loss of local and transnational markets; governance and leadership; and international processes of exclusion and
misrepresentation. It is this combination of power-seeking, livelihood choices, and ongoing processes that continue to shape and characterize the particular vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat.

Chapter Six presents our conclusions, eight specific areas of recommendations, and more general considerations. We argue the need to rethink theories of vulnerability linked with Western models of humanitarian, recovery, and development assistance. A long-term perspective is needed in order to understand current livelihoods, power, and resources. We should not be distracted by spurious notions of ethnicity, disparaging attitudes towards nomads, and demonization of the Northern Rizaygat for becoming embroiled in a conflict not of their making.

While there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ model of international action in Darfur, there are core principles enshrined in humanitarian and human rights law that continually need to be reaffirmed. These include the right to life with dignity, non-discrimination, impartiality, and participation. There is a need for a deeper, more informed analysis of livelihoods at the local level.

Local peace initiatives are happening in Darfur and need to happen of their own accord and to be fostered. They will have limited impact unless supported by wider systems of good governance. Strengthening governance at every level will help to promote and improve dialogue and consultation between citizens, civil society, and government, and enhance participation in policy formulation and implementation. Good governance and respect for the rule of law is a prerequisite for lasting peace and for reversing long-term processes of political marginalization, economic impoverishment, and social exclusion. Thus, many of the specific recommendations in this report directly concern governance and government capacities at all levels.

Humanitarian actors are urged to take account of the particular vulnerability of pastoral groups, and to recognise that their needs are qualitatively different from those of IDPs. Exclusion, neglect, and marginalization are the unfortunate legacies of colonial and post-colonial policies, which the international community, including humanitarian actors, must not continue to legitimize and reinforce.

International peace processes must be more attentive to nomads. This requires getting to the heart of and really understanding local tensions and conflicts, and links with national and international level processes, policies, and institutions. This task is not just about looking back at events of the past five years of conflict in Darfur. It must primarily focus on tackling deep-rooted processes of marginalization and unrepresentative governance systems at federal, state, and local levels.
Map provided courtesy of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Introduction

Despite five years of global focus on the Darfur conflict, little is known about the lives and livelihoods of the Northern Rizaygat—the group of camel-herding nomads (abbala) who are seen as one of the main protagonists in the conflict as many are members of the irregular armed forces, pejoratively known as the Janjaweed. The impetus for this research study is recognition by a number of local, national, and international stakeholders that knowledge and understanding of these camel-herding nomadic groups are extremely limited. Partially as a result of this, the Rizaygat abbala have been relatively excluded from various forms of international action on Darfur—including humanitarian programming, international peace processes, and international advocacy campaigns (except as antagonists). To address this lack of understanding and analysis, the office of the UN Resident Coordinator (UNRCO) in Sudan and the Sudan office of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) proposed an exploratory research study by Tufts University as part of the UN Sudan’s 2007/2008 Work Plan. This research builds on a series of earlier Tufts independent research studies on the impact of the conflict and crisis on livelihoods, trade, migration, and remittance flows.\(^1\)

The purpose of this research is to analyze the evolving vulnerability of pastoralist livelihoods in Darfur, in order to:

- promote understanding and raise awareness in Sudan and internationally about the livelihood challenges facing specific pastoralist groups in Darfur
- engage a broader group of stakeholders and promote dialogue in order to broaden participation in relevant national- and international-level processes around peace and recovery
- sharpen the focus and effectiveness of strategic humanitarian action aimed at supporting the livelihoods of these groups now and in the future\(^2\)

By vulnerability, we mean the state of being vulnerable—in terms of weakness or susceptibility to harm, damage, or loss of livelihoods (rather than the outcomes of vulnerability).\(^3\) From this perspective we are interested in understanding and analyzing the causes of vulnerability, which are deeply rooted in history and embedded in complex interactions between human beings, the environment, and institutional and policy processes. Our overarching research interests have been a) to identify the historical and prevailing institutional, environmental, and policy processes that are shaping and driving livelihood vulnerability and b) to explore how these play out in terms of livelihood adaptations, and power relations between groups. The conceptual framework and methodology are explained in detail later in this chapter.

This study was designed to be exploratory and a preliminary ‘first step’ because these groups were thought to be ‘hard to reach’ and therefore difficult to research because of their nomadic way of life and conflictual relationship with the international community in recent years. They are widely perceived by the international humanitarian community to be less vulnerable, and therefore less in need of assistance. Consequently, they have had relatively little contact with humanitarians over the past five years. We were also aware of a sense among international and national actors that these groups would deeply mistrust researchers as a result of their lack of contact and the highly politicized aspects of much international advocacy.

The Darfur region has been the site of the most appalling violence. All parties to the conflict have deliberately targeted civilians. While the scale and ferocity of the conflict diminished after 2003, gender-based violence has continued to be reported (by all sides). This violence is not the subject of this research but needs to be acknowledged. By investigating the livelihoods of some of the groups associated with the government-backed militia, we are not seeking to condone or excuse the violence, or to make sense of it.
Rather, our aim is to address the gap in understanding about the livelihoods of these groups and their particular vulnerability, and challenge the over-simplified representation of this group as marauding militia.

This chapter briefly explores the centrality of livelihoods in the Darfur conflict, and the wider international debates and discourses on pastoralism, natural resource conflict, rights of nomadic peoples, and climate change. This background and global context is important for understanding the more specific context of the camel nomads of Darfur. The second part of the chapter describes in detail our approach to analyzing the vulnerability of peoples’ livelihoods, and related research questions. This is the first field-based livelihoods study that specifically focuses on pastoralists since the conflict began in 2003.

**Centrality of Livelihoods to the Darfur Conflict**

The first Tufts/Feinstein International Center study “Livelihoods Under Siege” confirmed the centrality and importance of livelihoods in relation to the Darfur conflict (Young et al., 2005). This showed that, like in so many other complex emergencies, conflict and peoples’ livelihoods are inextricably linked. Livelihoods are integral to the causes of conflict in Darfur and in turn conflict has had a devastating impact on livelihoods. Thus, addressing livelihood issues is crucial to any lasting local and international solutions to the conflict. This earlier research concluded that efforts to support and protect livelihoods must consider the wider political economy of conflict, while peace-building and wider peace processes must be based on a full understanding of the way in which livelihoods and conflict impact each other. This approach has slowly gained recognition among local and international stakeholders, as livelihood approaches have been brought to the fore of humanitarian, recovery, and local peace-building efforts.

Historically, rural livelihood systems in the Darfur region have been shaped by migration, ecology, and ethnicity. Immigration has been encouraged by the region’s strategic geographical location—with few natural obstacles to movement—and Darfur’s position as the junction for multiple trade routes. Migration, trade, and the strategy of the Fur Sultanate (which ruled the region until it was incorporated into Sudan by the British in 1916) to attract immigrants have increased the number of tribal groupings and the linguistic diversity of the region. Darfuris are of Hamitic, Arab, and Sudanic backgrounds and some fourteen distinct languages are spoken in the region (Morton, 1994; O’Fahey, 1973; O’Fahey, 1980).

To the north of Darfur are the arid desert zones of the Sahara and to the south the wetter Sahelian zone with rainfall up to 700 mm per annum. In the center, there are upland areas, reaching an altitude of over 3,000 meters which have higher rainfall. Rainfall variability combined with a fragile natural resource base, especially in the north and east, has exposed the region to environmental erosion and production hazards during periods of famine and drought such as those in 1972–73 and 1983–84. Population density varies according to ecological and climatic zones.

In the past, many of the kabilla tribes of Darfur were distributed very broadly according to ecology and livelihoods. Camel-based pastoralism was practiced in the arid northern areas (with migration to the south) by the abhala. Arable cropping was often combined with more sedentary animal husbandry in the central and western areas on the sandy and alluvial soil. Cattle-based pastoralism was practiced by the haggara (the term widely used for Arab cattle-herding pastoralists) in the wetter southern savannah area. This area of heavier clay soils was hardly used by cultivators prior to the introduction of mechanized equipment.

The number of ‘real nomads’—groups of people who have no fixed home and move with their livestock in response to seasonal variations in rainfall and pasture—is declining. Conversely, agro-pastoralism—where households combine long-distance livestock herding and more sedentary localized farming activities—has increased over the years, particularly as many adapted their livelihoods to the pressures of drought in the mid-eighties and subsequently. The importance of ecology and tribal affiliation in influencing livelihoods remains important, despite the massive rural-urban demographic shifts which have occurred as a result of displacement in recent years.
Livelihoods, tribe, and ecology are also factors underlying local conflict. These are explored in detail in Chapter Two. Historically, conflicts between pastoralists and farmers were usually between individuals over access to resources and could be settled by tribal mechanisms. When the rebel insurgency began in 2003, and the government subsequently launched counterinsurgency operations, animosity between tribes ratcheted up, leading to ever greater tribal polarization. This has been misleadingly represented by the Western media as black African versus Arab. Many commentators have reflected stereotypical views that the rebels harbor legitimate grievances while the Arab Janjaweed are apparently ‘Arab supremacists’. This report hopes to show that the reality is far more complex than these politicized and very misleading simplifications.

**Pastoralism in a Global Context**

Pastoralists inhabit sparsely populated, semi-arid areas far from national capitals and the concerns of governments. They are often located in politically sensitive border areas and many cross international boundaries at will. Their nomadic lifestyle and independence generate suspicions on the part of government, whose policies frequently neglect, marginalize, or alternatively try to settle pastoralists to bring them within the government’s reach. This process of sedentarization is often imposed by force (Gilbert, 2007).

Governments have systematically favored development of agriculture and settlement at the expense of pastoralism and nomadism (Bovin and Manger, 1990). Historically, tenure rights have been framed in terms of land occupation and improvement of the land by agriculture, while uncultivated land was not considered ‘fixed property’ (Gilbert, 2007). “The principal rationale behind such an argument was that nomadic peoples were regarded to be in a sort of pre-political state of nature with no proper laws and institutions dealing with property in land” (ibid., p. 686). In most countries, without properly defined rights, pastoralists face discrimination, and are frequently labeled as uncivilized, even criminal (Gilbert, 2007; Markakis, 2004).

The jury is still out on the future of pastoral production systems. A recent debate presents widely differing perspectives. Pessimists argue that poorer pastoralist households—unable to benefit from economies of scale—fare worse than richer as a result of the growing imbalance between humans, livestock, natural environment, and the technology available to improve land productivity (Sandford, 2008). Optimists, however, emphasize the importance of indigenous systems adapted to climate variability and fragile environments and also the marketing opportunities of a ‘livestock revolution’. Devereux and Scoones note several different livelihood adaptations to the problems of this imbalance. These including “stepping up” towards a more commercial production system; “stepping out” with cycles of accumulation and loss of herds, which are complemented by diversification of livelihood activities; and “moving away,” meaning moving out of pastoral modes of production, which is compatible with diversification and commercialization options (Devereux and Scoones, 2008, p. 3).

Catley points out that both sets of arguments ignore the role of conflict and violence. He emphasizes that peace, protection, and the political representation of pastoralists are the key issues (Catley, 2008). This view was reflected by over 400 pastoralists attending a recent regional gathering in southern Ethiopia who were very clear that violence and conflict from cattle rustling were the main challenges to lives and livelihoods in the border areas of Ethiopia, Sudan, and Kenya (OCHA RO-CEA, 2008). In both Darfur and southern Europe, there is a similar escalation of tensions between herders and farmers. ‘Traditional’ conflicts between pastoralist communities have become increasingly destructive and less manageable as a result of “becoming embedded in wider criminal networks serving national and regional black markets” (OCHA RO-CEA, 2008, p. 3). This link between war economies, conflict, and power is one of the themes of this study.
Pastoralism and Natural Resource Conflict

The issue of natural resource conflict driven by scarcity has preoccupied pastoralist analysts, Sudan scholars, and commentators for decades (Shazali and Ghaffar, 1999; Gilbert, 2007; Ibrahim, 1984; Hardin, 1968). A government committee—established by the Minister of Interior in his capacity as the president’s representative on Darfur—has identified natural resource conflict as one of the root causes of the Darfur conflict. Its report noted that “the committee attributed the current conflict to seven factors. The first factor is the competition between various tribes, particularly between the sedentary tribes and nomadic tribes over natural resources as a result of desertification” (International Commission of Inquiry, 2005, p. 57, para. 203).

This desertification paradigm has permeated the literature since the seventies and been adopted widely by the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and governments, despite intense debate among scientists. According to Veron et al., “although large amounts of resources were invested to inventory desertification…during the 1980s and early 1990s, these did not translate into a significant increase in our knowledge of desertification status” (Veron, Paruelo, and Oesterheld, 2006, p. 754). In 1975, Lamprey provided a catastrophic perspective on the rate of desertification across North Darfur and North Kordofan. He attempted to measure the rate of advance of the Sahara by comparing the location of the southern margin at two different times: 1958 (a wet year, preceded by a series of wet years) and 1975 (a dry year, preceded by a series of dry years) (Figure 2). Over this seventeen-year period he observed a 90-100 km displacement, and concluded that the desert was advancing rapidly (Lamprey, 1975). This data, combined with the known effects of the drought and famine of the early seventies, prompted a series of anti-desertification measures, including planting green belts around the Sahara, prohibition of goats, destocking of herds, prohibition of tree cutting or grass burning, and enforcement of soil conservation measures.

This early, simplistic paradigm has since been challenged and abandoned (Thomas, 1997; Veron, Paruelo, and Oesterheld, 2006). It is now recognized that desert boundaries are very dynamic and closely linked to patterns of climate variability and annual rainfall (see next section). Nevertheless, this desertification paradigm still persists in Sudan and not only within government committees. In 2007, UNEP concluded that an estimated 50 to 200 km southward shift of the boundary between semi-desert and desert has occurred since rainfall and vegetation records were first held in the 1930s. This boundary is expected to continue to move southwards due to declining precipitation. The remaining semi-desert and low rainfall savannah on sand, which represent some 25 percent of Sudan’s agricultural land, are at considerable risk of further desertification. This is forecast to lead to a significant drop (approximately 20 percent) in food production. In addition, there is mounting evidence that the decline in precipitation due to regional climate change has been a significant stress factor on pastoralist societies—particularly in Darfur and Kordofan—and has thereby contributed to conflict. (UNEP, 2007, p. 9)

UNEP describes desertification as “Sudan’s greatest environmental problem” (UNEP, 2007, p. 62) although it admits the available data is limited to anecdotal evidence and small scale studies and quotes just one source—the Government’s National Plan for Combating Desertification in the Republic of Sudan. UNEP recommends a major study to truly quantify desertification in Sudan combined with national weather and drought forecasting services (ibid, 2007).

The dry decades of the seventies, eighties, and early nineties were part of the mounting pressures on pastoralists, and drivers of social change. But local conflicts are not simply driven by increasing competition between pastoralist and farmer groups (and also between pastoralists) over their access to land, pasture, or water. We need to look beyond this to the factors driving this competition, including increasing population as a result of natural increase and migration (south to central Darfur), or, alternatively, investments in the exploitation of natural resources, which may be prompted by processes of commercialization and privatization (Manger, 2005). As we see in Chapter Three, both sets of pressures have been evident in Darfur. These pressures are mediated and influenced by systems of natural resource management, including local customary and federal
regulations for managing and controlling use of and control over resources. Consideration of these wider processes and institutions, and analysis of the relative power of different groups, is imperative to understanding natural resource conflict.

Manger examines theories dealing with institutions and resource management and, in particular, the tensions between individual, rational self-interest, and group interests. He explores what Hardin dubbed the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968)—where if individual users of a common resource are not controlled, their aggregate exploitation of the commons will lead to over-exploitation (Manger, 2005). Alternatives for dealing with this problem are privatization or political control. An opposing position is that pastoralists have their own culture of resource management which, if left to operate on its own, can solve the problem. Manger explains that this is not simply about actors’ preferences and incentives affecting the choice they make, “but a complex relationship in which the narrow process of management must be understood also against a background of broader social and political relations, relations that are defined by power inequalities” (ibid., p. 137). This explains why power and power relations are another key theme of this report.

**Rights of Nomadic People**

Nomadic peoples have been regarded as legally non-existent….At the national level they are generally still seen as squatters on their own lands. (Gilbert, 2007, p. 688, p. 716)

Nomads have very traditional and distinctive patterns of land use and occupation. This is characterized chiefly by their mobility and transient movements from place to place, which are prescribed by their access to pasture and water

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**Figure 2.** The Approximate Desert Boundary in 1958 and 1975 as Determined by Lamprey (Lamprey, 1975). Also Shows the Survey Route Taken by Aircraft and Vehicle in 1975 by Lamprey. (Taken from Veron et al., 2006)

Dotted and plain horizontal lines indicate the position of the desert boundary in 1958 and 1975, respectively. Upper right inset: Khartoum annual precipitation (in mm) from 1950 to 1980. Precipitation from years 1958 and 1975 appear in white.
within a fragile natural habitat. While livestock may be owned individually, livestock herding is usually carried out as part of a herding unit or community (*fariig*), which refers to the members of the unit rather than the location of the herding camp. Thus, nomadic livestock herding is usually a collective activity within a collective space shared by members of the herding unit, often on the territory or lands of other groups. In Sudan, there are historically strong cultural ties between nomads, their livestock, and the land which they access. These predate the arrival of Europeans and survived after their departure.

These distinctive features of nomadic lifestyles are not well recognized, acknowledged, or understood. In many countries, national policies have been adopted to settle nomadic peoples, and nomadic peoples are not well recognized under international law. Gilbert provides an excellent review of the human rights of nomadic peoples—particularly in relation to land use. He points out that historically, “nomadic peoples have not been regarded as having any rights to land because their nomadic lifestyle was not considered to fulfill the criterion of ‘effective occupation’ of the land” (Gilbert, 2007, p. 681), thus indicating immediate power differentials between nomads and other groups.

Climate Change, Climate Variability, and Pastoralism: A Longer-term View

Pastoralism in Africa came about precisely as an adaptation to climate variability and long-term climate change around 7,000 years ago. It may, indeed, have arisen earlier and clearly predated agriculture by several millennia and coexisted with hunting and foraging (Brooks, 2006). More than any other region in Africa, the Sahel has a history of long-term extreme climate variability. Despite a lot of research, much more work needs to be done to get a full picture of monsoon dynamics (Brooks, 2004).

The droughts and famines of the early seventies and eighties are widely reported but longer-term perspectives over a century or more on climate variability are rarely considered. Certainly this prolonged period of aridity and reduction in rainfall extending over 30 years was dramatic and caused devastating loss of lives and livelihoods of all groups. Climatologists generally agree this long-term desiccation was “a product of long-term climate variability driven by changes in patterns of global surface temperature… rather than being a consequence of the abuse of the land by humans and animals” (Brooks, 2006, p. 2; Brooks et al, 2005).

Brooks reviews climatic and environmental changes in the Sahara over the past 10,000 years and urges a long-term perspective so as not to be deceived by recent trends and their impact on agriculture. Brooks observes that the 1950s and 1960s were comparatively wet decades across the Sahel, which, combined with “the shift from subsistence to commercialization,” marked “an expansion of agriculture and a shift to agropastoralism which pushed pastoralists into more marginal regions” and thus made them more vulnerable to drought (Brooks 2006, p. 5). “The
over-extension of agriculture, and consequently pastoralism into historically marginal areas as a result of a failure to appreciate the nature of long-term (i.e. multi-decadal scale) climatic variability in the Sahel resulted in a massive loss of life and livestock, the destruction of communities and livelihood systems and massive societal disruption on a regional scale” (ibid., p. 5). While his arguments relate to the wider Sahel, this pattern fits Darfur well. Figure 3 shows rainfall distribution in El Fasher (capital of North Darfur state) for the twentieth century and clearly illustrates these wetter decades of the fifties and sixties versus the more arid seventies, eighties, and early nineties. A number of models of future climate change indicate that the dry conditions of the seventies to early nineties have since ameliorated, and the models suggest that this amelioration may continue, with the desiccation being reversed (Brooks, 2004). The El Fasher data show that since the mid-nineties rainfall is clearly increasing, although still below the values for the 1950s (Figure 3).

Broader trends across the Sahel have prompted speculation that the region is shifting to a wetter climate (Brooks, 2004). However, climate models are not foolproof and “may well underestimate the probability of ‘climate surprises’...which could lead to the onset of rapid and catastrophic drought in northern Africa” (Brooks, 2004, p. 22). What is clear from this uncertainty is the strong likelihood of longer-term climate variability, the dynamic nature of Sahelian environments, and the need for livelihoods to adapt to this, particularly in terms of resource management. According to Brooks, “where climatic conditions become more variable without leading to the collapse of rangeland, pastoral livelihoods have the potential to sustain populations in the face of climate change” (Brooks, 2006, p. 10). In other words, where rainfall is scarce and unpredictable, pastoralism is a more appropriate livelihood strategy than rain-fed agriculture. For this reason, in the face of increasing concerns about climate change, the long-term development and policy trends that have marginalized pastoralists for more than a century need urgently to be reviewed from the perspective of current-day local realities of pastoralists’ lives, livelihoods, and relationships with others.

Figure 3. El Fasher Annual Rainfall 1917-2007 and Ten-year Average Trend Line (Bromwich, 2008)
Livelihoods and Vulnerability: Conceptual Framework

The livelihood approach we have adopted as the basis for our research in Darfur is adapted from the Sustainable Livelihoods discourse and framework, with a shift in focus from ‘sustainability’ to ‘vulnerability’ and the explicit incorporation of political ecology and political economy. The original work on the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) took as one of its five broad elements “livelihood adaptation, vulnerability and resilience” (Scoones, 1998, p. 6). Scoones builds on the important work of adaptive livelihood strategies of Davies (Davies, 1993), and the concept of vulnerability, risk, and resilience of Chambers in the context of food insecurity and famine (Chambers, 1989). Chambers viewed vulnerability as having two sides: “an external side of risks, shocks and stress to which an individual or household is subject, and an internal side of defencelessness, meaning a lack of means to cope without damaging loss” (Chambers, 1989, p. 1). This view is directly reflected in the subsequent Sustainable Livelihoods discourse and framework. Scoones’ definition of sustainable livelihoods indicates that “a livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks” (ibid., p. 6). Similarly, sustainable livelihoods are those “that can avoid or minimise such stresses and shocks and/or that are resilient and able to bounce back” (Chambers and Conway, 1991, p.11). This view reflects the dualistic views of hazard (external) and coping (internal), yet has moved away from explicitly focusing on ‘vulnerability’ to ‘sustainability’.

This two-sided view of vulnerability has its roots in Western cultural perspectives on the relationship between human beings and nature which are often presented as being in opposition and separate (Bankoff, 2001). Oliver-Smith describes this well: “society,” he notes, “exists as a collection of human constructs and relations and the environment is ‘out there’ waiting to be acted upon in the cause of sustaining human life….this has led to a construction of hazards as disorder, as interruptions or violations of order by a natural world that is at odds with the human world” (Oliver-Smith, 2004, p. 14). This is problematic for two reasons, first because it says little about causes of vulnerability and how causes and symptoms evolve with any attempts to address them and, more importantly, because it ignores the way in which pastoralist livelihoods in particular are an adaptation to a fragile habitat, where climate variability is the norm. Thus, pastoralism, more than most livelihoods, endeavors to be in equilibrium with the natural world rather than in opposition.

This dualistic view continues to permeate approaches to disaster prevention and development. Within the disasters discourse, the focus became ‘disaster risk’ which is a function of hazard (exogenous) and vulnerability (endogenous) in terms of capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a natural hazard (Blaikie et al., 1994). In this case, vulnerability is concerned with the internal capacity to cope and is therefore conceptualized as endogenous, but the hazard remains as an exogenous threat, usually related to the environment. While causality relates to both sets of risk factors, prevention of natural disasters has tended to focus on the intrinsic factors that render a household unsafe.

In recent years, scholars of disasters and vulnerability have moved on in rethinking the relationships between society, economy, and nature (Bankoff, Freker, and Hilhorst, 2004) and there is now wider recognition of the mutuality of nature and culture, and a discarding of the dualism in human–environment constructs (Oliver-Smith, 2004).

But this dualistic perspective remains central to the sustainable livelihoods framework as adopted by a wide array of international actors. Within the sustainable livelihoods framework there is a physical separation between the ‘vulnerability context’, which represents ‘shocks, trends, and seasonality’ (i.e. hazards) and the livelihood system. Similarly, in the adaptation of the livelihoods framework by Collinson, the vulnerability context is a separate entity which impacts on all the components of livelihood systems (Collinson, 2003). This physical separation of the vulnerability box from the other elements in the conceptual framework is indicative of a dualistic approach, with roots in nineteenth-century cultural perspectives, to relationship between human beings and nature.
In relation to livelihoods, Lautze and Raven-Roberts have reconceptualized vulnerability as endogenous to livelihoods systems in violent settings (Lautze and Raven-Roberts, 2006). They argue that livelihoods assets may become life- and livelihood-threatening liabilities in times of conflict. Numerous examples of asset-stripping exist in the literature, in the form of predatory raiding (Keen, 1994), scorched earth tactics, gender-based violence, and direct theft and looting (Duffield, 1994), all of which are common to the recent Darfur conflict. Often these actions are sponsored by actors outside the immediate livelihood system with criminal or political motives (Hendrickson, Armon, and Mearns, 1998), or indeed, as in the case of Darfur, are deeply embedded within the system of governance and tactics of war. But to view predatory raiding or other violent acts as a one-off shock is to ignore the important indirect effects as a result of a state of insecurity and the knock-on or secondary effects generated, in terms of limiting the option of coping strategies normally resorted to (Hendrickson, Armon, and Mearns, 1998). A further indirect effect may be exacerbating intercommunal violence by lifting cultural taboos, and extending tit-for-tat violence.

As described in this report, while, on the one hand, conflict and insecurity destroy livelihoods, on the other, the livelihood adaptations that people make are themselves fuelling or driving further conflict. These adaptations become part of a self-perpetuating livelihoods-conflict cycle where such livelihood adaptations generate further polarization between tribes. The shock or risk is not some externally-driven phenomenon; rather, it is embedded within culturally diverse and increasingly competitive livelihood systems.

It is these wider institutional and policy processes that are crucial to explaining the relative power and vulnerability of different groups. Collinson argues that livelihoods analysis has the potential for taking into account “the totality of economic, political, social and cultural factors affecting people’s lives and livelihoods, from the local up to the national and international levels” and thus represents a form of political economy analysis. Vulnerability in conflict can therefore be understood as “powerlessness rather than simply material need” (Collinson, 2003, p. 4).

Lautze and Raven-Roberts argue that their reconfiguration of the livelihoods framework is relevant to violent settings (Lautze and Raven-Roberts, 2006). The adapted livelihoods framework in Figure 4 illustrates how households manage and acquire their livelihood assets or capitals in order to undertake livelihood strategies in pursuit of livelihood goals. Household decisions are influenced by the prevailing policy and institutional environment, and processes or trends (policy, institutions, and processes—PIPs) which also in turn affect the net asset gains (or losses) to the household from pursuing a specific range of strategies. The primary livelihood capitals of pastoralists are:

- natural: seasonal availability of water, pasture, access to long-distance livestock migration routes, and cultivable land for agropastoralists. This encompasses access to rights and land ownership or tenure.
- social: the social resources people use to pursue different ways of making a living, including networks, group membership, relationships of trust, and institutional arrangements with land owners on migratory routes. The concept of reciprocity is important, as are the exchanges which facilitate cooperation.
- physical: the basic infrastructure and producer goods needed to support livelihoods.
- human: rich indigenous knowledge of herders and guides to manage herds, livestock health, and migration; food processing and marketing skills.
- financial: this related to production and consumption, and the availability of cash or credit which enables conversion to other types of capital. In pastoralist communities financial capital is based on the ownership of livestock. People consume directly from livestock (e.g., milk) and sell livestock products (MARD, 2008).

An analysis of PIPs would include a stakeholder analysis, and their relevant policies and practices that are influencing household livelihood decisions, plus an analysis of the formal and informal institutions, such as customary law and
traditions, and also a consideration of wider environmental and climatic trends. Previous studies by Tufts/Feinstein International Center of livelihoods in Darfur have identified a range of policies, institutions, and processes that continue to shape and influence livelihoods (Table 1). These PIPS influence and interact with household livelihood assets, strategies, and goals which is captured in the livelihoods framework in the ‘feedback loop’. For example, rights of access to land and pasture influence household access, while other PIPs mediate the value of subsequent investments in livelihood assets (e.g. taxation and falling market prices reduce profits (financial capital) from sales of livestock). Thus, livelihood systems are dynamic, as they are subject to changes in the policy and institutional environment, not only in their immediate locale but in distant lands where people may migrate in future. This research seeks to get at the heart of what vulnerability means for pastoralist groups in Darfur, from a historical perspective, in the current context of conflict, and also for the future.

Lessons Learned from Darfur on Livelihoods and Vulnerability

Our earlier work on livelihoods and vulnerability in Darfur has generated important lessons that have informed this study:

1. Importance of understanding the historical nature of vulnerability, marginalization, and conflict

To understand current-day conflict and processes of marginalization, it is vital to trace their history and origins, which raises issues of governance, power relations, policy processes, and rights, all of which underpin the current inequalities within Sudan and the Darfur region. A historical review and related conflict analysis is crucial to understanding complex causal processes and current-day social, political, and economic dynamics. Chapter Two of “Livelihoods Under Siege” presents an analysis of the causes and origins of the Darfur conflict.

2. Livelihood asset-stripping is both direct (systematic) and indirect (systemic).

In the Darfur conflict, loss of livelihoods is attributed to livelihood asset-stripping, which has been a common feature of the counterinsurgency. Livelihood assets became liabilities as people were physically threatened, attacked, raped, and even killed as a result of such assets as land, water, fruit trees, livestock, cash/remittances, or simply because of their ethnicity, age, and gender. Loss of livelihoods lay at the heart of Darfur’s protection crisis.

Figure 4. Humanitarian Livelihoods Framework
More insidious has been the more systemic indirect asset-stripping, caused by the gradual erosion of livelihood assets as a result of conflict-related PIPs. While not immediately apparent, this has all but destroyed Darfur’s wider economy, which is largely based on the production of cereals, livestock, and cash crops. Markets and trade in these commodities have been severely affected if not devastated (Buchanan-Smith and Fadul, 2008), reflecting the wider impacts on the livelihoods of all groups in the region.

3. The institutions, environment, and policies are constantly evolving and shaping vulnerability.

This process of analysis has shown the dynamic and evolving nature of the institutional, environmental, and policy processes. They are neither static nor fixed, and are subject to changes instigated across a broad domain spanning global, regional, transnational, national, and local areas. Thus, actions in one part of the world can indirectly shape and influence the livelihood capitals on another continent. Conversely, local actions can stimulate a response in seemingly distant domains. An example of this is the transnational nature of livelihoods that includes labor migration and remittance transfers. Many new PIPs emerge as a direct consequence of the conflict, including: processes of militarization; environmental asset-stripping and degradation; border closures; formal and informal taxation; and emerging war economies. Much of the vulnerability in times of conflict is a result of these conflict-related PIPs. Thus, an analysis of the range of formal and informal institutional, policy, and environmental factors that have been brought about as a result of conflict is central to understanding vulnerability.

In Darfur, we first analyzed these PIPs in the study “Livelihoods Under Siege,” then reviewed them again in the Darfur Situation Analysis of 2005, and analyzed them once again in a ‘participatory livelihoods analysis’ by local, national, and international stakeholders in 2007. This latter exercise took place in four different livelihoods workshops in the three states of Darfur in mid-2007 which were attended by more than 180 local, national, and international stakeholders. The consistency of the analyses across the four livelihoods workshops was remarkable, and completely consistent with the two previous livelihoods analysis of 2004 and 2005 (Table 1), which shows the robustness of the analytical approach in identifying the principle conflict-related PIPs.

4. The livelihoods-conflict cycle

Conflict and insecurity destroy livelihoods through a combination of direct and indirect asset-stripping brought about as a result of conflict-related processes, policies, and institutions. In turn, the livelihood adaptations that people make are themselves fuelling or driving further conflict. Examples include the predatory grazing by nomads of farmers’ fields, the fencing-off of common grazing land for cultivation purposes, the gender-based violence used to control access to forestry resources, and the blocking of nomadic access to traditional rainy season grazing lands. These adaptations become part of a self-perpetuating livelihoods-conflict cycle where such livelihood adaptations generate further polarization between tribes. Local conflict may appear to play out at a tribal level, but in fact it is conflict between group identities linked to livelihoods and culture, particularly cultural differences in terms of the relationship to land and mobility.
Table 1. Impact of the Darfur Conflict on Livelihoods in Darfur:
Processes Causing the Systemic Destruction of Livelihoods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Livelihoods Under Siege (Young, 2005)</td>
<td>Darfur Joint Assessment Mission (DJAM Situation Analysis (Young and Osman, 2006)(^8))</td>
<td>Participatory Livelihoods Analysis (Young et al., 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity restricts mobility and access</td>
<td>Insecurity restricts mobility and access</td>
<td>IDPs continue to be intimidated by violence and rape Blocked migration routes—sedentarization of nomads</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continued erosion of tribal administration capacity</td>
<td>Local governance and continuing erosion of the tribal administrative system</td>
<td>Breakdown and failures in local governance, particularly in relation to competition over natural resources and local conflict resolution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalization of Darfur and within Darfur</td>
<td>Marginalization within Darfur—inequitable access to available resources</td>
<td>Some groups, particularly pastoralists, widely neglected</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closure of national border with Libya restricts transnational trade and migration</td>
<td>Market restrictions and the war economy</td>
<td>Continued disruption of markets and trade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The role of the international community and implications for Darfur</td>
<td></td>
<td>The inequitable distribution of humanitarian livelihoods programming</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction and loss of public infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental degradation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Acceleration of environmental degradation, particularly in areas of high population or livestock concentrations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land occupation, predatory grazing and other coercive behaviors</td>
<td></td>
<td>The most powerful (i.e., those who are best armed) usually retain the upper hand in accessing natural resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Darfur Peace Accord, May 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td>Increased inter-tribal conflict (in part a result of the failure of the peace accord)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Methods

This research is based on qualitative methods, including: desk literature review; stakeholder interviews in Khartoum and in capitals of the states of Darfur; actual case studies including key informant and focus group discussions; and strategic review of recommendations with stakeholders. The research protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Board of Tufts University.

The research questions (Annex 1) are organized loosely around the components of the conceptual framework and the core themes emerging from the analysis of the processes, institutions, and policies. There is obviously important overlap between these areas which corresponds to cross-cutting themes (governance, gender, natural resources, and pastoralism). Given the qualitative nature of the research, new themes emerged during the course of the study.

The team undertook a mapping of institutional relationships and contacts with the selected tribes, in order to identify a range of key informants in Darfur. This included identifying state-level as well national experts and resource persons. Meetings were held in Omdurman or Khartoum with relevant civil society groups, and Khartoum-level representatives of these tribes.

The field research took a case study approach of the Northern Rizaygat in three locations and their rural environs: Kebkabiya and Kutum in North Darfur, and El Geneina in West Darfur. In Khartoum, the team met with more than 25 key informants including: representatives of international organizations including UNHCR/RC, UNOCHA, UNEP, and ICRC; representatives of the newly formed Council for the Development of Nomads; representatives of the Darfur Darfur Dialogue and Consultation; and several national experts on pastoralism and Darfur. In North and West Darfur, among pastoralist groups the teams conducted a total of 35 focus groups, including more than 246 individuals. In addition, a further 13 key informants were interviewed in El Fasher and El Geneina (representatives of the Ministry of Animal Resources, the Pasture and Range Office, representatives of the Legislative Council of El Waha, representatives of the UN (UNOCHA, UN DSS, FAO, WFP), INGOs, and local NGOs).

The Council for the Development of Nomads facilitated the travel permits of the two international team members with the Humanitarian Affairs Commission in Khartoum. Individual council members and other local contacts facilitated the team’s access to the pastoralist permanent settlements (damar) and temporary herding encampments (fariq). Private vehicles were hired.

In West Darfur, the Tufts team was accompanied by a guide who was a former nomad teacher, three armed guards, a driver, and an Amir (a senior Arab tribal leader, or ‘prince’, who was only present for part of the time). Both teams stayed overnight for periods of up to five days at a time with pastoralist groups, sleeping alongside their hosts under the stars. Discussions often went on until midnight or later, and were resumed immediately on waking after the dawn call to prayer. Both teams felt this close contact with pastoralist groups was critically important for better understanding their situation and concerns. This makes this work different from other academic studies and surveys in Darfur. The latter are often questionnaire-based, where the enumerator visits for a very short time, and is not involved in the analysis.

On arrival, introductory meetings were held with community leaders, who were subsequently kept informed about the progress of the study and given regular updates. Checklists for the key informant and focus group interviews were based on the research questions in the light of the cross-cutting themes and conceptual framework. Three core members of the team met for two days after the fieldwork to develop strategic recommendations.

Notes from interviews and focus groups were typed up and entered into N-Vivo Version 7.0, a qualitative analysis software program, which facilitated coding and review of data for analysis of the research questions. All documents and relevant notes were recorded in an Endnotes Bibliographic Database.

This research benefited greatly from, and indeed would not have happened without, the support and direct help of a wide range of organizations and individuals (see acknowledgments). At the same time, we suffered serious difficulties and delays in getting travel permits and working out the logistics on the ground as the geographical areas covered are not travelled by international agencies and commercial trucks. A further challenge was to find qualified translators willing to travel to the field sites.
Conclusions

It is now widely recognized that pastoralism raises serious political and human rights issues wherever it is practiced and is now on the international agenda of indigenous people’s rights. In the context of Sudan, and the Darfur conflict, the complexity of these issues is multiplied, given the political alignment of the Rizaygat abbala. Despite this, as Darfuri nomads, they continue to suffer the same marginalization and discrimination that has dogged nomadic peoples around the globe. While the local power and conflict dynamics are crucial to understand, it remains vital to review the situation of the Rizaygat abbala in the global context of pastoralism and nomadic peoples. This means addressing issues of power differentials, authority, representation, and rights under customary, federal, and international law.

By positioning this research within the current international debates and discourses on pastoralism, indigenous rights, natural resource conflict, and climate variability, we are seeking to develop a more nuanced and broader framework for analysis that benefits from lessons learned in these wider domains. The camel herding pastoralists of Darfur have been relatively neglected in this extensive literature, yet their legacy provides a multitude of lessons for pastoralist policies in the wider region and globally.

Overview of the Report Structure

Chapter Two reviews the history and background of the Northern Rizaygat, their origins and identity, and the way tribal groupings and ecology have interacted to influence livelihoods. This reveals that an emphasis on ethnicity does not provide a good basis for understanding the crisis. Rather, observing access to resources through a livelihood lens provides clearer insights into the motives of the different groups involved in the violence and sets the stage for a lasting peace.

Chapter Three traces the long-term historic processes of marginalization (reflecting broader regional discrimination against pastoralists), that shaped livelihoods and pastoralism, in particular from the pre-colonial era up to 2003. We argue that it is the particular vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat in 2003 that gave them little or no choice in their decision to actively support the government’s counterinsurgency strategy.

Based on our field research, Chapter Four reviews the experience of the Northern Rizaygat during the war, including their active recruitment by the government and exclusion by the rebels, the various security incidents affecting them, and their displacement as a result of the conflict. The chapter describes how the former livelihood strategies of the Northern Rizaygat have changed since 2003, and the new strategies that they have diversified into.

Chapter Five analyzes the changing livelihood goals of the Northern Rizaygat, which are closely linked with seeking rights, power, and influence and are driven by ongoing processes of exclusion and misrepresentation. It is this combination of power-seeking, livelihood choices, and processes of exclusion and misrepresentation that continue to shape and characterize the particular vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat.

Chapter Six presents our conclusions, ten specific areas of recommendations, and more general considerations. We argue that we need to rethink theories of vulnerability linked with Western models of humanitarian, recovery, and development assistance. In every domain, there is a need to expand the timescales of our analysis, and be clear in our focus on livelihoods, power, and resources. We should not be distracted by considerations of ethnicity and associated unhelpful constructs.
Tufts/Feinstein International Center has been engaged in field research in partnership with a range of local, national, and international partners in Darfur, and neighboring Libya, since 2004. This has included surveys of the livelihoods of IDPs in Zalingei and Kebkabiya (2006 and 2007) and a study of trade and markets in 2007. In 2005, Tufts contributed a livelihoods situational analysis as part of the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission and also participated in the World Bank Wealth Sharing Workshop for parties to the Darfur peace talks. In 2007, Tufts/Feinstein International Center facilitated participatory processes of livelihoods analysis among key UN, INGO, and government actors, which have actively promoted livelihoods approaches in the Darfur region as reflected in the UN Workplan. The aim was to develop a more strategic approach for humanitarian support of livelihoods that integrated livelihoods, conflict, protection, and natural resource management. As a result of this work, national and international actors have sought to integrate an understanding of livelihoods as part of international peace processes and worked to ensure local humanitarian efforts provide more strategic support to livelihoods.

A specific objective has been added to support the UN Environment Program (UNEP) by reviewing major environmental issues affecting pastoralists in order to inform policies and programs on rangelands, forestry, and water. The issues we have explored include: livelihood adaptations to apparent climatic change such as changing rainfall patterns; the impact of conflict on access to water, pasture, and fodder for livestock; and changes in local systems of natural resource management.

In food security contexts, vulnerability is often defined in terms of an outcome, such as hunger, acute malnutrition, food insecurity, or famine. See Max Dilley and Tanya E. Boudreau (2001), “Coming to terms with vulnerability: A critique of the food security definition”, Food Policy, 26(3), pp. 229-247.

They have also been reflected upon in the Sudanese media, as our reports have been serialized in the Sudan Vision newspaper, been translated and posted on the website of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)—one of the main Darfuri rebel groups—and been disseminated in Darfur by civil society groups.

The Arabic term kabilla broadly translates as tribe, although ‘tribes’ are largely a Western concept, and were partly created by colonialists who found it much easier to deal with discreet units. Pastoralists are referred to in Arabic as ruhhal—“people on the move.” (Arabic /ruHHal/ ‘roving, roaming, peregrinating, wandering, migratory, nomadic’, Hans Wehr, Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic: 331). There is no direct translation for pastoralist or agro-pastoralist, which frequently generates confusion. In this report pastoralism and agro-pastoralism refer to the type of production system, while nomads refer to the groups with no fixed home.


In 1986, the Special Rapporteur to the UN Commission on Indigenous Peoples, José Martínez Cobo, provided an authoritative definition: “Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems,” http://www.iwgia.org/sw310.asp.

Chapter 2
The Northern Rizaygat: History and Background

**Introduction**

This chapter provides background on the Northern Rizaygat, their history and identity, and describes the way migration, tribal grouping, and ecology have interacted to influence their livelihoods, and thereby created a pastoral domain that traditionally spanned Darfur.

**History and Identity**

“Ethnicity is a very moveable and slippery concept and nowhere more so than in Darfur….The most complex kind of slipperiness or (ambiguity) comes with the African/Arab divide.” (O’Fahey, 2008, p. 9)

Traditionally, debate about the identity of Arab groups in Darfur has focused on genealogical data, based largely on oral tradition. It is believed that small groups of Arabs started to move into the Sudan, as far west as Darfur, in the ninth century, attracted by the rich pastoral plains there. Long-established trade routes, particularly the Darb al-Arba’in (Forty Days Road), joining Darfur with Upper Egypt, may also have provided incentives for Arabs to move into the region. Other factors, such as conflicts in North Africa, may have played a part in the early movement of Arabs into the area (Parkyns, 1850; Sharkey, 2008; Hassan, 2003).

Larger groups of Juhayna Arabs began to move into Darfur in the fourteenth century, either from western or northern Africa via the Sahara desert, or from the Nile Valley to the east (O’Fahey, 1980; Elhassan, 1995). Some migrations are known to have taken place following the conquest of the riverine Christian kingdom of Nubia by Arabs in the fourteenth century (Hassan, 2003). Conversely, the presence of large numbers of Juhayna Arabs in countries such as Tunisia and Libya, and in West Africa, at that time has been taken as evidence that the Juhayna migrations followed the Sahara route (Nachtigal, 1971). It is quite possible that migrations took place simultaneously from all these directions, though it remains uncertain whether the ancestors of the Northern Rizaygat arrived in the earlier or later movements, or both.

It is this very obscurity that has enabled a new political and ideological dimension, with wider regional implications, to creep into the debate on tribal origins in recent years. Some commentators have noted the recent movement of Arabs from Chad into Darfur as underlining the ‘foreign’ character of Arab groups there. In 2006, for instance, the government of Niger announced its intention to expel the Mahamid nomads from its territory, on security grounds (BBC, 2006; IRIN, 2006). This move against the Mahamid coincided with claims that Arabs from Niger and Chad had entered Darfur to support their fellow Arabs, with the intention of acquiring fertile land that had been depopulated by the Janjaweed and government forces, and of obtaining Sudanese identity documents so as to establish Sudanese citizenship (Sanders, 2007; Bloomfield, 2007). These claims are unsupported by empirical evidence.

The genealogical approach is clearly of limited value. It has been proven‘ to be more a reflection of de facto power relations between groups than of actual historical provenance. It provides no more than elusive—and often inaccurate—clues to the early history and origins of existing tribes, and glosses over the centuries-long processes of amalgamation, fission, and assimilation that have resulted in the current tribal groupings in the region (Hassan, 2003; O’Fally, 1982). In short, the genealogical slant has little use in modern-day Darfur, where people have multiple layers or dimensions of identity and “identify and consider themselves as part of many ‘communities’ based on identities informed by gender, age, caste, and ethnic affiliation, as well as economic position” (Manger, 2005, p.147). On the contrary, the genealogical method only serves to underline the false notion of an ethnic African/Arab divide in Darfur. Al-Mahri argues that such supposedly clean ethnic cleavages are neither supported by genetics, as claimed by advocates of the African/Arab divide, nor by skin color, as claimed by adherents of the Arab/Zurga (black) divide (Al-Mahri, 2008). He affirms that “(the notion of)
tribe does not indicate ethnicity, at best (it) indicates locality and self-identity” (O’Fahey, 2008, p. 9). Rather than a region populated by distinct ‘African’ and ‘Arab’ tribes, Darfur can be regarded as being inhabited by a number of interconnected African tribes, some of whom speak Arabic as their mother-tongue.

Tribal groupings and ecology in Darfur interact to influence rural livelihoods. If, for instance, a sedentary Fur farmer acquires so many cattle that local pasture is in danger of being overgrazed by his herd, he may opt for a strategy of ‘nomadization’, joining a group of baggara—Arabic-speaking, nomadic cattle herders—and migrating with them.2 (Haaland, 1972). Within one or two generations, his original language and culture will have been lost; his family will have been absorbed imperceptibly into the baggara. This crossing of tribal frontiers occurs in all directions. Baggara Arabs who have lost their livestock may settle among Fur farmers and merge with them. Further north, similar crossovers occur between Arab and Zaghawa groups. Since this process has undoubtedly been going on for generations, it will be seen that there exist no true ethnic boundaries between groups, only cultural frontiers defined by ecological adaptations. The Fur farmer who becomes a baggara nomad will adopt baggara culture, accessed through the baggara language—a dialect of Arabic—as a system more perfectly adapted to and reflective of the cattle-herding way of life.

In effect, tribal identity in Darfur is by no means the rigidly defined concept portrayed by traditionalists, but has a fluid and permeable nature. Tribes in Darfur represent a continuum of continually merging and splintering populations rather than inflexibly distinct entities, with groups expanding or shrinking depending on prevailing conditions. Essentially, a tribe represents a coalition through which groups and individuals can secure their interests in different situations. The tribe, combined with livelihood systems, underpins cultural diversity in Darfur.

It is the particular interaction of three factors: the tribe; camel-herding nomadism; and ecology that has shaped the identity of the Northern Rizaygat groups. As subsequent chapters explain, all three factors have been directly challenged in the recent past, which has in turn reinforced the collective identity of the Northern Rizaygat as a group, and denied them access to both traditional and more modern political power.

From the perspective of the Northern Rizaygat encountered during the course of this study, the 2003 rebellion had an element that was directed against them as a group (see Chapter Four). In addition, the war that began in 2003 was seen in many respects as similar to the tribal conflicts with the Fur and the Zaghawa in which they had been embroiled since the mid-eighties. The rivalries among these groups have historically been exploited by the central government to implement its policies (Elhassan, 1995; Holt, 1958). Erikson notes that “successful mobilization on the basis of collective identities presupposes a widespread belief that resources are unequally distributed along group lines” (Eriksen, 2001, p.55). Resources, he argues, should be understood in the wider sense to mean economic wealth or political power.

To summarize, the tribal identity of the Northern Rizaygat in Darfur, and the way it has evolved, is no different from the cases of other tribal groups. What should be stressed is that tribe and ecology have interacted in Darfur to influence rural livelihood systems. This is well-expressed in the distribution of different tribes in the region, with pastoral tribes to the south and north, and farming tribes in the central parts. Camel herding as practiced in North Darfur is described locally as a culture which transcends tribal groups. For this reason, an emphasis on ethnicity is simplistic and misleading, and does not provide a good basis for understanding the crisis.

The Rizaygat: Abbala and Baggara

The Northern and Southern Rizaygat form a loose ‘confederation’ of Rizaygat tribes in Darfur. The Northern Rizaygat are traditionally camel herders (abbala), while the Southern Rizaygat are cattle herders (baggara). The Northern and Southern Rizaygat have three branches in common—the Mahriyya, Nu’ayba, and Mahamid. They include both abbala and baggara. There are two additional Northern Rizaygat groups who are uniquely abbala—the Iraygat and Itayfat.

The Northern Rizaygat are located primarily in the state of North Darfur, although some Mahamid abbala have branches in southern and western Darfur. The Southern Rizaygat groups are...
found in South Darfur, and are united under one tribal administration with the town of Ed-Dain as the administrative center. In contrast to their cousins in South Darfur, the Northern (camel-herding) Rizaygat are found separately under their individual tribal administrations of Mahamid, Mahriyya, Nu’ayba, Iraygat, and Itayfat (Theobald, 1965; Elhassan, 1995; MacMichael, 2005). Efforts to bring them under one tribal administration with the Southern Rizaygat, or to organize them collectively under their own Nazir (the highest level of Arab leader within the tribal administration) during the colonial period, were not successful.

The Northern Rizaygat are atypical in that they are the only group in Darfur that has continued to practice nomadic camel-based pastoralism, with a seasonal migratory movement from the arid and semi-arid fringes of the Sahara in the far north, to the rich savannah in the southern and southwestern part of the region. Recently, the Awlad Rashid, Shatiya, and Mahadi have joined the ‘confederation’ of the Northern Rizaygat. This new alliance may be driven by a desire to increase political influence in view of post-1990s tribal polarization.

The Northern Rizaygat are one of several abbala tribes in North Darfur. Others include: the Zaghawa, a group speaking a Central Saharan language unrelated to any other in the Sudan, whose homeland lies to the northwest of Darfur, extending far into Chad and Libya; the Meidob, whose language is of Nubian origin, and whose homeland lies in north-eastern North Darfur; and the Arabic-speaking Zayadiyya, whose homeland lies to the south of Dar Meidob. In addition, sub-sections of the Beni Hussein, Beni Fadl, and Hemat (all Arabic-speaking) also practice camel nomadism. A few of the nomadic, Arabic-speaking Kababish, based in North Kordofan, can also be found in North Darfur, as part of their seasonal movements.

Demography
Reliable data on the precise numbers of Northern Rizaygat and other pastoralist groups in Darfur are unavailable. Swift and Gray estimate that between 10-15% of the total population of Darfur are nomads (Swift, 1989). A 2003 survey by the Al Massar Charity Organization for Nomads Development and Environment Conservation, quoting the 1993 census, suggests that in 2002 there were 199,000 nomads in Darfur, accounting for 29% of the total pastoral population (MONEC, 2003). They also note an 11.6% decline in the pastoralist population between Sudan’s third and fourth census compared with a positive growth rate of 4.22% for settled populations and comment that this is likely to be a result of undercounting and/or misclassification of the nomads as settled populations. During this current study, the administration of the mahaliya (locality—a subdivision of a state) of El Waha, in El Fasher, estimated that there are currently 350,000 Northern Rizaygat (Focus Group, 30 April 2008).

A census has recently taken place (May, 2008), and the Tufts research team met several census teams in rural areas of West and North Darfur. The last census was in 1993, and it differentiated between sedentary and nomadic populations. Both the 1993 and subsequent censuses have been criticized for their poor timing in relation to the seasonal movements of pastoralists. Census enumeration was carried out at the time of year when many nomads were temporarily settled or beyond the reach of enumerators. This is especially significant for nomads like some of the Northern Rizaygat, where entire communities are on the move together and may be easily missed.

The census probably understates the actual nomadic population, as a result of under-counting, and the miscalculation of nomads as settled populations. An added obstacle is the traditional reluctance of nomads to be enumerated.

Local Administration
The Northern Rizaygat are administered by the pastoralist administrative locality (mahaliya) of El Waha in the state of North Darfur. This mahaliya has no precise geographical borders, covering as it does the pastoralist domain of the Northern Rizaygat, though it does include 48 permanent settlements (dammar, sing. damra) and villages distributed along 11 seasonal livestock routes (muraahil, sing. murhal). These routes extend from Wadi Howar in the far north, to the Bahr El Arab in the south, and the border with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), in the far southwest of Darfur (Ministry of Finance, 2003, #300).
Table 2. Arab Nomadic Groups of North Darfur under El Waha Locality Administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Nazir</th>
<th>Geographical Center for Each Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mahamid</td>
<td>Musa Hilal Abdalla</td>
<td>Barakalla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahriyya</td>
<td>Mohammedin Adud Hassaballa</td>
<td>Ghureir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraygat</td>
<td>Hamad Abdalla Jibrill</td>
<td>Masri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iteyfat</td>
<td>Abdalla Jadalla</td>
<td>Um Sayala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awlad Rashid</td>
<td>Adam Jali</td>
<td>Abo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shatiya</td>
<td>Abdel Rahman Matat</td>
<td>Jabal Kolge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahadi</td>
<td>Ahmed Mohammed Abdel Rahim</td>
<td>Dawa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Nazir*: highest level of chief amongst nomadic groups

*Geographical Center*: usually the location of the *Nazir’s damra* or semi-permanent settlement

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Box 1. Government Bodies (Key Informants, 23 April 2008; Key Informant, 24 April 2008, 27 April 2008; Focus group, 30 April 2008)

Sudan is administratively divided into 26 states (*wilayaat*) subdivided into approximately 120 localities (*mahaliyaat*). These localities are supported by popular committees (*lijan shabiyaat*), which are responsible for local development. There are more than 20 localities across the three states of Darfur. Each locality is divided into administrative units, the lowest tier of government. Each locality is headed by a commissioner, who is appointed by the state governor with approval from the president. In North Darfur, El Waha is designated as a locality for nomads. Established in 1982, it has little or no budget and no geographical zone (i.e., no fixed boundaries). The money currently allocated for it is to cover the daily running expenses.

Below the administrative unit is a community-based structure known as the popular committee. Although there is provision for these committees to be elected, in practice members are politically appointed. The executive body in each Sudanese state is headed by a *wali* (governor), who is appointed by the president and supported by a cabinet of eight ministers and commissioners who oversee the line ministries and commissions.

The main government bodies concerned with pastoralist or nomadic issues include: the Commission for Nomads, which is based in South Darfur; the El Waha Locality for Nomads, whose headquarters is in El Fasher, North Darfur (it was moved from Kutum in 2003); and, at the national level, the National Council for the Development of Nomads, formed by presidential decree in May 2008. A goal of the National Council is to help nomads reach the economic and social levels of other communities. The council is mandated to coordinate the opening of routes and corridors, support livestock production and export, support pastoral women, and promote peace and co-existence between pastoralists and farmers. The affairs of nomads are also of concern to the line ministries and other commissions.³
The Pastoral Domain and Production System of the Northern Rizaygat

Central to the survival of the nomads is their seasonal movement within a geographically wide-ranging pastoral domain. This extends thousands of kilometers from the fringes of the Sahara desert in the north of Darfur, to the far south, and across international borders into the Central African Republic. For the Northern Rizaygat, such movements raise issues of territorial rights and the sharing of access to natural resources with settled populations. Their pastoral system requires that they move through the homelands of several different tribal groups in Darfur. These tribal homelands, known as duur (sing. dar), date back to the era of the Fur Sultanate. At that time the Northern Rizaygat inhabited the northern fringes of the semi-arid zone in North Darfur (O’Fahey, 1980; Abusalim, 1974).

This section describes the traditional livestock migrations of the Northern Rizaygat and briefly reviews the pressures on pastoralism (as reported in the literature).

Livestock Migration

Eleven muraahil (sing. murhal), or migration routes, are traditionally used by the Northern Rizaygat in the Darfur region. These extend from Wadi Howar and Wakhaim in the far north, to Jabal Marra and Rehid El Berdi in West and South Darfur states respectively. Some routes cross the borders to Chad and Central African Republic. Traditionally the pastoralists move from the dry-season grazing grounds (masaayif, sing. masyaf) at Umm Dafoug, Bahr El Arab, Jabal Marra, and Wadi Barai (Kebkabiya locality) in July, towards the north, until they reach Kebkabiya, El Dour, and Abu Hosh in September. They traditionally continue further north to Wadi Howar and the jizzu area, where, in a good year, they may remain from November until February.

During years of grazing shortage, they return south in October or November, and are thus out of phase with the post-harvest time or talaig in the central cultivating zone—the period during which they are allowed to graze agricultural residues. This is a potential source of conflict with...
sedentary farmers. According to the Range and Pastures Department, 2003, these livestock migration routes span more than 5,000 km. The longest route is Wadi Howar-Dar Ta’isha, at 673 kilometers.

In the past, the main tribes using these routes were the Northern Rizaygat groups (see Box 4). Sedentary farmers (the Zaghawa, Mima, Berti, and Burgo), who rear cattle, sheep, and goats with a few camels, generally limit the movement of their animals to the southern parts of El Fashir mahaliya and Wadi el Kuo. The livestock migration routes in El Malha district in north-eastern Darfur are shorter. Here pastoral land is extensive, but water is a limiting factor.

These routes are not only vital to the nomads as sources of water and pasture, they are also important in social terms, as sites facilitating social and economic relations within nomad groups, as

**Box 2. Importance of the Jizzu**

An important area within the pastoral domain of the Northern Rizaygat is the jizzu, an area of seasonal camel pasture that lies to the north of latitude 16° in northern Darfur, and extends eastwards into northern Kordofan, and west into Chad (Wilson, 1978). The Rizaygat abballa highly value this area, particularly because it is green and succulent enough to maintain camels, without the need for free water, for a period of several months—from October up until January or even February (Osman, 2006). During this period the herders themselves obtain their liquid requirements almost entirely from camels’ milk (Wilson, 1978; Newby, 1984). The jizzu also supports wildlife, such as the scroehorn antelope and dorcas gazelle.

The sporadic winter rains from the Mediterranean, combined with cool winter nights and good water-retaining soils, provide a succulent combination of grass and herbaceous plants excellent for grazing. The vegetation in the jizzu is of two types. Winter rainfall in the northern and central Sahara enables species such as *Aristida plumosa*, *Colocythis vulgaris*, *Cornicula monacantha*, *Dangibau firskalei*, the three species of *Farsetia*, *Helianthemum lipii*, *Lithospermum callosum*, *Neurada procumbens*, *Pulicaria undulate*, and *Salsola vermiculata*. Summer rains in the southern Sahara allow for such species as *Aerva javenica*, *Aristida mutabilis*, *A. papposa*, *Belpharis edulis*, *Concharus species*, *Desmostachya cynosuroides*, *Geigeria alata*, and *Fagonia certica* (Newby, 1984a; El Sammani, 1985; Nachtigal, 1971; UNEP/CMS, 2006; Wilson, 1978).

The jizzu provides seasonal grazing for the Rizaygat and other camel-herding tribes from Darfur (the Meidob, Zayadiyya, and Zaghawa) up to January and February. The end of the grazing season in the jizzu generally coincides with the end of the harvest season in the central cultivating zone around Jabal Marra, when Rizaygat herds are permitted to graze the crop residues. Thus, sojourn in the jizzu minimizes potential conflicts resulting from nomads trespassing on farms in Darfur’s central agricultural zone prior to the harvest. This period, when the central cultivation area is open for camel herds to graze, is locally known as talaig and represents one of the most important local arrangements for managing natural resources.

Apart from its importance as seasonal grazing, the jizzu’s proximity to the Sahara makes it a vital source of grazing on the camel-trading and emigration routes to Libya. Camel trading with, and emigration to, Libya have traditionally been important livelihood strategies for the Northern Rizaygat, as well as other abballa groups. The Northern Rizaygat are regarded as Darfur’s desert camel exporters par excellence. The jizzu, therefore, has a strategic political, economic, and social importance, for camel-herding groups in particular, and for Darfur in general.

Access to the area is disputed by both the Northern Rizaygat and the Zaghawa. Each claims ownership, and use rights, giving the area a potential for sustained unrest. It also has the potential to reduce conflicts and tensions in South and West Darfur, as discussed above, by providing pasture for the abballa until the time of the talaig. The strategic importance of this area to all the abballa groups is as a prospective means of reducing tensions. Interventions for further development and systems of resource use should be prioritized, together with local peace-building initiatives.
well as those between the nomads and settled villagers. Over the past twenty years, though, traditional policies and practices governing these routes have been eroded, and the actual courses of the routes themselves have become highly contested. According to one informant in a focus group, “the rule now is that if any livestock route is not used in a year when the rains are poor, it will be settled by villagers,” meaning that pastoralists are acutely aware of the development of permanent villages by sedentary populations along their livestock routes (Focus Group, 30 April 2008).

Of the eleven muraahil (migration routes), the two most important to the Northern Rizaygat are the eastern and western routes, which pass east and west of Jabal Marra respectively. In the dry season the Northern Rizaygat begin the wati—the southward migration—to where their animals can graze on rich vegetation in the central cultivating zone around Jabal Marra (Lebon and Robertson, 1961). This migration southwards takes them across the homelands and hakura of other tribes, into the Jabal Marra area, and, in recent decades, far south into the Bahr al-Arab, and across international borders. The eastern route takes them as far as Dar Rizaygat, in south Darfur, while the western route reaches as far as the Rahad al-Birdi and Kubum area, and sometimes across the border of the Central African Republic. The southern migration brings the abbala into contact with sedentary cultivators, as well as baggara tribes. This may result in conflict with both groups, especially with the cultivators, when the movement into the central agricultural area takes place earlier than the prescribed post-harvest talaig period (as mentioned above). This underlines the critical importance of the jizzu area as means of avoiding conflict (see Box 2).

With the start of the rains in the south, a reverse northwards movement begins to the jizzu on the periphery of the desert—known as the nashuugh. The jizzu satisfies both the nutritional and water needs of livestock from October/November to January/February. Since the early 1990s, security has become a critical factor on this migration, meaning that herds from different households are combined and herded together to minimize the risk of theft from armed bandits. The nomads express this concept in a saying: “Adri kaha fi miyat murah walla miyat faaris,” which means “seeking protection for one’s herd is better than a hundred guards.”

Like other camel nomads in Darfur, the Northern Rizaygat divide their herds into two main herding units. One is made up of camels that are grazed over long distances and herded by young, single men. The other is made up of

Box 3. Dry-Season Grazing in the South (JMRDP, 1995)

While the jizzu in North Darfur provides the winter grazing area (from October to February), the wadis and their tributaries (Wadi Saleh, Wadi Seirgilong, and Wadi Azum) in South and West Darfur represent critical areas for the dry-season grazing. In these areas, pastoralists feed their animals on the crop residues and on the pods of the Acacia albida until the time when the rainy season starts and they start to move towards the north.

The tree Acacia albida has special characteristics for dry-season grazing. First, it has the unusual characteristic of being leafless during the rains, which means that crops can be grown beneath its canopy without any adverse effect due to shade. The crops even benefit from the enhanced fertility around the tree. The green foliage during the dry season provides a useful browse at a time when green fodder is in short supply. The supply of pods from twelve trees has a crude protein equivalent to that of a hectare of groundnuts. Since the stands can be as high as twenty trees per hectare, the combined return from the trees plus the crops is extremely productive and is unlikely to be exceeded by any other form of crop production in the area.

The Jebel Marra Rural Development Project noted early on the disturbing practice of hacking down the primary branches in order to obtain browse. This practice is both wasteful and harmful, leading to a permanent reduction in both the productivity and life of the tree. As early as 1995, Acacia albida were being eradicated from some areas: for example, Wadi Uyur was destroyed.
lactating animals and is herded near settlements by other members of the family. During the rainy season, when water and grazing is readily available, the two units join together (MONEC, 2003). As well as camel herds, the Northern Rizaygat may keep sheep and goats. The latter are well-suited to being herded with camels because of their similar grazing habits.

The abballa are the most mobile of pastoral groups and many do not cultivate at all. However, groups that are settled in the damar usually practice cultivation, though to a limited extent. Migration and trade, especially in livestock, represent important livelihood strategies for the Northern Rizaygat. They have a long history of connection with North Africa, especially Libya and Egypt, through the Sahara, and are known in Darfur as the region’s principal desert experts. Livelihoods past and present are described in detail in Chapter Four.

Box 4. The Main Transhumance Routes

**El Fashir Locality Transhumance Routes:** The area comprises Sag El Naam Agricultural Scheme and Wadi El Ku, and is characterized by sand and clay soils suitable for millet and vegetable farming. Water resources are available, and there are four earth dams at Kulkul, Golo, El Fashir, and Abu Digais in addition to four private boreholes. Twenty other boreholes in Sag El Naam area are not functioning. Four routes start from Kulkul Dam and Um Sayala village, radiating towards the south. These are: i. Um Marahik, Alawna, Dar El Salam; ii. Jabel Afein, Goz Baina, Gaoor, Dar El Salam; iii. Murceb, Gilaidat, Abu Ziraiga, Shangil Tubaya; and iv. Umm Sayala, Wanka hills, Tabit, Shangili Tubaya.

These routes are used by the Rizaygat, who traditionally continue their movements southwards as far as the Bahr el Arab, where they spend the dry season. Sedentary farmers (the Zaghawa, Mima, Berti, and Burgo) who rear cattle, sheep, and goats, with a few camels, limit the movement of their animals to the southern parts of El Fashir Locality and the Wadi el Kuo (as mentioned above).

**Tawila Locality Transhumance Routes:** This area is mountainous with clay soil in the wadis. The routes here originally start from Wadi Howar. Three secondary routes radiate from Kafot and Komai towards the south, and meet after a distance of about 100 km near Dabo and Sharif Belli, on the border of the state of South Darfur. The southern end of the route is the Dar El Ta’isha region, near Rehaid El Badri. The routes at Tawila have been severely narrowed by tobacco cultivation, forcing the animals to follow the radmia (paved) road to El Fashir.

**Kebkabiya Locality Transhumance Routes:** Kebkabiya locality constitutes a transit station for the northern Rizaygat and Zaghawa tribes in addition to the local tribes (Tama and Berti). Three secondary routes start from Masri, Gangaa, and Abu Gidad Dam in Kutum locality and radiate towards the south as far as Foro Baranga village in western Darfur State. Manaazil (resting places), also known locally as savani, during the wet season, are widely scattered and dispersed with the camping sites being very close to water points. During this time, the routes are not quite clear and the demarcation signs are always invisible.

**Kutum Locality Transhumance Routes:** This area comprises a vast area of land with potential for pastoral and horticultural developments. Dry farming is practiced under high-risk conditions. The main stock routes start from Wadi Howar and Wakhaim, radiating into secondary routes, and terminating at Kulkul Dam, Komai, Sug Suliman, and Abu Gidad Dam. The destination is masaayif (summer grazing) at Um Dafuog, Foro Baranga, and Garsilla in western Darfur. The migrating animals spend the wet grazing period (manaazil) at different places along the route depending on the availability of water. Tribes using the routes are the Northern Rizaygat group and Zaghawa. The resident tribes of Tungur, Fur, and Berti graze their animals at the outskirts of the villages.
Conclusions

Ethnicity in Darfur is a historical construct that has limited value in understanding the conflict and groupings in Darfur. The crisis in Darfur is a complex political emergency, in which ethnicity has been mobilized to serve the interests of the main warring parties. Mobilization on the basis of tribal identities, and the involvement of different groups in the violence, indicate the nature of resource distribution among different livelihood groups in Darfur. Observing the distribution of, and access to, resources through a livelihood lens provides clear insights into the motives of the different groups involved in the violence. It sets the stage for a lasting peace, remote from the narrowly perceived issue of ethnicity.

The next chapter traces the deeply-rooted and long-term processes of marginalization of the Northern Rizaygat, within the broader context of the marginalization of Darfur. These processes represent the underlying causes of their vulnerability, and their subsequent choices in early 2003 to support the government’s counterinsurgency campaign.


2‘Tribes’ are largely a Western concept, partly created by colonialists who found it much easier to deal with discrete units. Berman and Lonsdale note in Kenya that “their former cultural identities, which had assured them against natural disaster, were being hardened into new ‘tribes’ by the factional politics of access to the narrow institutions of the young conquest state.” Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa, p. 13.

3The Secretariat General of the Government (the wali’s office); Ministry of Finance and Economy; Ministry of Local Government, Public Service and Manpower; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Resources and Irrigation; Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sports; Ministry of Urban Planning and Public Works; Ministry of Social Affairs; Commission for Women and Child Affairs
Introduction

Marginalization and livelihood ‘maladaptations’ lie at the heart of the Darfur crisis. The long-term marginalization of the Darfur region by the central government of the Sudan is well-documented. Lesser known is the long history of active and passive neglect of pastoralism and pastoralist groups, including the Northern Rizaygat, taking place within this wider marginalization of peripheral regions of Sudan. This has led to tensions between pastoralists and regional and national authorities, and also with sedentary agriculturalists. Both sets of tensions have implications for the current situation in Darfur. Impoverishment and marginalization result from socioeconomic, political, and ecological processes. The relationship between the state and the nomads has contributed to their exclusion from power and to the current pattern of resource distribution. Pastoralist groups have become powerless, with limited access to resources. The Darfur crisis is thus long-term and its scope extends beyond the boundaries of the region.

This chapter builds on the overview of Darfur and pastoralism as practiced by the Rizaygat abballa which was outlined in the first two chapters. It reviews the processes and institutions that have shaped vulnerability over time. The most important include:

- long-standing (and inequitable) systems of land tenure and natural resource management that have their roots in the sixteenth-century systems of the Fur Sultanate and were further institutionalized under colonial rule and post-independence governments;
- passive and active neglect by national authorities of pastoralist groups, which took place within the wider context of the marginalization of Darfur;
- the impact of recurrent droughts on the Northern Rizaygat, changes in land use patterns and development of new, and disadvantageous, rules influencing their access to pasture and water;
- local conflict—the Fur-Arab war and the conflict between Arabs and Zaghawa, a semi-nomadic people speaking a Central-Saharan language who live in Chad and Darfur, with whom the Rizaygat have long been in conflict;
- national conflict—the impact of the protracted civil war between the northern government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement which ended in 2005;
- regional conflict and tensions with Chad and Libya.

This review concludes that the relative power of nomadic groups such as the Northern Rizaygat was less than that of sedentary cultivating groups who enjoyed more secure access to land and other natural productive resources. The long-term processes that affect their daily lives and livelihoods generated a sense of social, economic, and political exclusion which built up over time and pushed them into alliances and violence at the end of the 1980s.

Five historical periods are reviewed: the pre-1916 era; the Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist eras; the colonial period from 1916 to 1956; the post-independence period 1956-1990; and the period 1990-2002. A final section deals with the regional dimensions of political and tribal alliances and implications for the Northern Rizaygat.

Nomads and the State in the Pre-1916 Era

The relationship between nomads and the various powers which controlled the pre-state entities prior to the emergence of the modern Sudan is a complex one, characterized by conflict, ambiguity, and power differentials (referred to in Chapter One). Nomads were drawn into the politics of neighboring powers as far back as the era of competition between the Funj Sultanate—a dynasty that controlled much of the Nile Valley in the northern Sudan from the early sixteenth to the early nineteenth centuries—and the Fur Sultanate in Darfur. Nomadic groups were traditionally recruited to take part in conflicts
between rival powers and to weaken other nomad
groups (Morton, 1994; Beck, 1996). Nomads took
on such roles not because they supported rulers of
pre-state entities but because it allowed them
access to resources. In the case of the Kababish of
Northern Kordofan, for instance, Beck (1996)
pointed out that the advantage for them of
backing Turco-Egyptian rule after 1921 was
“access to the rich grazing grounds in eastern
Kordofan and control of the strategically impor-
tant wells at Kajmar” (Beck, 1996, p. 76).

The Fur Sultanate emerged as a central
monarchy that ruled the Darfur region from 1600
to 1916 (except for the two short periods of rule
by the Turco-Egyptians and the Mahdists). The
sultanate exerted extensive power over tribal
groups (Salih, 1974), but the nomads remained
virtually autonomous due to their mobility, their
geographical distance from the center of the
Sultanate’s authority, their vast livestock wealth,
and their military prowess and experience with
desert warfare (Holt, 1958).

The Sultanate regarded the nomads’ indepen-
dence and aggressive character as a threat to the
security of trade routes across the Sahara to the
Mediterranean, and of access-routes to such
valuable commodities as slaves, ivory, ebony,
copper, and ostrich feathers, across the Sahelian
region. These routes passed through the territo-
ries of camel nomads (abbala) in the north, and
cattle nomads (baggara) in the south (O’Fahey,
2008; Theobald, 1965).

The relationship between nomadic groups
and the Fur Sultanate was defined by the use of
natural resources, and especially in tensions and
conflicts between farmers and nomads over water
and grazing rights. The nomads frequently suf-
fered at the hands of the Sultanate’s forces. The
Bani Halba, for example, a baggara tribe, were
decimated by Sultan Mohammed al-Fadl, who
ruled as Sultan until 1839, in the ‘bloodbath of the
Bani Halba’, a massacre which exhausted the tribe
for generations to come. Mohammad al-Fadl also
virtually wiped out the Iraygat, an abballa tribe in
northwestern Darfur, and had seven of their chiefs
executed. The Mahamid, of the Northern Rizay-
gat, suffered similar attrition from the Sultanate,
though their relatives in Wadai provided a refuge
for them against such attacks. In South Darfur, the
Southern Rizaygat were a constant source of
concern to the Sultanate. During the rule of
Sultan Mohammed al-Hassin (1839-1873) no less
than eighteen expeditions were dispatched against
them. The Southern Rizaygat continued to be a
source of conflict in Darfur until the fall of the
last Fur Sultan, Ali Dinar, who was killed fighting
against the British in 1916 (Theobald, 1965).

Letters exchanged between Ali Dinar, the Rizay-
gat leader Musa Madibo, and the British describe
the relationship very well: “My troops would
never have been taken away from your land until I
have uprooted its trees and grasses, as a punish-
ment to you” (Theobald, 1965, p. 132). “I beg to
add that Dar Rizaygat is in a pitiable condition.
There is not a single house which was not burnt
down by them [the Fur] beside what was looted
during the war” (Theobald, 1965, p. 132).

In a letter to the acting governor-general
about the Ma’aliya (a baggara tribe), Ali Dinar
wrote that: “I consider their destruction necessary,
and the country will make better progress with
other people than these. So, as I am under your
orders, if you will permit me, I shall exterminate
them, as they have all the wickedness of the wretch,
Abd Allah a-Ta’ishi” (Theobald, 1965, p. 46).

The era of Ali Dinar and his relations with
the nomads is described well by O’Fahey: “Al-
though today’s conflict is much bloodier, as a
historian I am struck by the parallels between the
present situation and the 1880s. When the sultan-
ate was restored in 1898 by Ali Dinar, he spent
most of his reign driving the nomads back, until
he was killed by the British in 1916. They then
discovered that they had no alternative but to
continue his policy. They also kept the old ruling
elite intact; many of today’s educated Darfurians
are descended from that elite” (O’Fahey, 2004, p. 1).

In summary, the complex relationship be-
tween the Fur Sultanate and nomads of both
northern and southern areas of the Darfur region
was essentially based on violence and coercion.
This was especially evident in periods of expand-
ing trade with the world outside and when more
pressure was put on nomads’ territories. The
geographical location of nomads in both North
and South Darfur on the trade and access routes
was a source of tension to the Sultanate, whose
attempt to control them resulted in violent
campaigns.
The hakura system, based on the power of tribal leaders, was traditionally the most important aspect of land tenure and access to natural resources in Darfur. This system acknowledges rights to land given as concessions or grants (hakura) by the Fur Sultanate. Though hakura land was granted collectively to the tribe, individual rights to land were recognized and could be inherited, but with no power to alienate the land from tribal ownership. Grants to religious men and other notables, especially merchants and traders, were approved in recognition of their valuable religious, governance, and commercial services to the sultanate. The Darfur hakura system was of two types: (i) administrative hakura, also known as tribal duur (sing. dar: homeland), granted to tribal leaders and owned collectively by a tribal group recognized as the original occupiers of the hakura area from the pre-sultanate period. Title-holders were able to extract customary dues from others considered as outsiders, using the land for cultivation or grazing purposes; (ii) exclusive hakura of privilege (hakurat gah) which was generally of more limited area, and recognized as being owned by a private individual, giving the title-holder all rights for collection of taxes and religious dues (Abdul-Jalil, 2006). Such hakura had limited administrative implications.

The administrative hakura created land tenure as an integral part of the administrative organization of the sultanate. The naming of tribal homelands after the tribes (e.g., Dar Zaghawa (land of the Zaghawa people), Dar Rizaygat (land of the Rizaygat people), Dar Masalit (land of Masalit people)), for example, introduced a function to the land other than its economic potential, as a symbol of group identity (Abdul-Jalil 2006).

It is worth emphasizing here that while cattle-herding, Arabic-speaking groups occupying most of southern Darfur (the Southern (baggara) Rizaygat, Habbania, Ta’isha, and Bani Halba, for instance) traditionally have their own duur, the Northern Rizaygat abbara of northern Darfur do not. This was partially due to the fact that the granting of tribal duur favored larger tribes, and because, in the past, land was not an issue: there was no shortage, and the prosperity of Arab tribes depended on nomadic pastoralism and the livestock trade, rather than on land ownership. The territorial rights of nomad groups resembled those of the pre-hakura communal rights system, in which these groups were considered ‘secondary rights-holders’ of the system. The ecological variations between different duur encouraged tribal leaders to establish close symbiotic relations, amounting almost to alliances that became important mechanisms ensuring the access of abbara pastoralists to land and natural resources. According to Abdul-Jalil (2006), Darfur customary law identifies the following as basic entitlements for every individual or group:

- Access to drinking water for humans
- Access to drinking water for animals
- Access to roads
- Access to animal routes (for sedentary, transhumant, and nomadic)
- Grazing
- Hunting
- Gathering of wild fruits
- Collection of firewood
- Cutting of building-wood
- Collection of fodder (for use or sale)
- Collection of other building materials (rocks, clay, etc.)
The Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist Eras: Devastation, Depopulation, and Revolt

In 1874, the Fur Sultanate was conquered by the slave-trader Zubayr Pasha, and subsequently came under Turco-Egyptian rule. Nomads and others were faced with a more exacting administration, which demanded high taxes and interfered with the slave trade. The taxation system, accompanied by violence and extortion, was a cause of permanent grievance (Daly, 2007), as was the official suppression of the slave trade by the Khedive of Egypt in 1877.

Baggara nomads were initially mobilized as a government militia against the slave traders, but later switched sides, partly in the hope of greater access to resources, and rallied to the Mahdist call. They eventually formed the core of the Mahdi’s fighters. Madibo Ali of the Rizaygat took the lead in mobilizing support for the Mahdist revolution against Turco-Egyptian rule. The nomads soon realized, though, that they had simply exchanged one autocratic authority for another, and in this case one that clipped their wings by insisting that they relocate to Omdurman, far from their duur. After the death of the Mahdi in 1885, the Rizaygat turned against his regime, and led the resistance against his successor, Abdullahi al-Ta’ishi—known as the Khalifa—who was himself of baggara (Ta’isha) origin.

Captured and executed in El Obeid, Madibo Ali’s head was sent to the Khalifa (Holt, 1958).

Indirect Rule, implemented in Darfur after the failed rebellion of Ali Dinar, rapidly improved security. From the 1930s, the Native Administration policy established mechanisms to resolve tribal conflicts over access to grazing and water and around livestock raiding. Tribal leaders were delegated to arbitrate between conflicting parties. Tribal courts, intertribal mediation, and peaceful negotiations worked to contain and minimize conflicts and restitution procedures for stolen or stray animals evolved.

Regular meetings between tribal leaders were organized. In the 1940s and early 1950s, the administration organized annual meetings between tribal leaders from Kordofan, Darfur, and Chad (Al-Amin, 2003).
The Colonial Period: The Controversy over Northern Rizaygat Land Ownership

The relationship between different tribes, the land, and its natural resources, has deep historical roots. The *hakura* system of the Fur Sultanate was largely upheld by colonial policies and by post-1956 national governments. Problems of tribal amalgamation and representation within the colonial system of indirect rule meant the Northern Rizaygat lost out in the allocation of land rights. This had subsequent implications for their economic, social, and political development.

The British maintained the core of the Fur land tenure system based on the pre-existing *hakura*, but established the present-day tribal boundaries which have institutionalized inequitable land rights. Land boundaries were not registered, and conflict over land was usually addressed by reference either to title deeds and documents issued by the Fur Sultanate, or, in some cases, to documents issued by Harold McMichael, Civil Secretary, Sudan Political Service. According to Al-Amin (2003), disputes over land boundaries were resolved by taking testimony from witnesses, who would put a copy of the Quran on their heads and swear a sacred oath that the boundaries were as they described them. The mediation committee then marked boundaries in a process known as ‘shigging the had’ (Arabic: lit. ‘splitting the boundary’) among Sudanese and British officers (Al-Amin, 2003).

The purpose was to keep tribal units as large as possible, and to amalgamate them whenever possible. This was driven by the colonialists’ calculations that small units could not financially sustain the apparatus of Indirect Rule. The amalgamation required relocation of some tribes or sections of tribes into new *duur* (sing. *dar*: homeland) and small tribes were sometimes incorporated within the chieftainship and *duur* of other, larger tribes. In other situations, it meant the relocation of some tribes into new *duur*. This was partly motivated by the fact that many tribes in Darfur had been scattered within and outside the region to escape the oppressive machinery of the Mahdist state, and of Ali Dinar’s rule (Theobald, 1965). The Bani Hussein, for instance, had been relocated in Serif Bani Hussein, which, during the Fur Sultanate, was known as Dar Madey. Some sections of the Northern Rizaygat were relocated from the *hakura* granted to them by the Fur Sultanate, or from areas north of Kutum, where they had moved during the rule of the Mahdists and/or Ali Dinar.

In 1925, the Anglo-Egyptian condominium government initiated efforts to amalgamate the Northern and Southern Rizaygat under the rule of Musa Madibo, the *nazir* (lit. ‘overseer’: traditional paramount tribal ruler). By 1929, irreconcilable differences led to abandonment of this objective (Daly, 1986). Efforts continued to bring the tribes of the Northern Rizaygat under one nazirate but these also failed. Flint and de Waal noted that “the title *nazir* was bestowed on Arab paramount chiefs, four in the south and two in the north, but none for the Northern Rizaygat, to their lasting chagrin” (Flint and de Waal, 2006, p. 13). There were considered to be “very few to qualify for their own nazirate. The first plan was to put them under the authority of Ibrahim Musa...”

Box 6. Kutum Rural Council and the Maqdumate

Under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, the Northern Rizaygat were part of the northern Maqdumate administration, managed by a council in Kutum which also oversaw eight other tribal administrations. The Northern Rizaygat were further divided into five sub-administrations according to their tribal groupings. The area was declared a ‘closed district’, which outsiders could enter only with official permission. (Daly, 1986; Al-Amin, 2003). Guy Moore, a district commissioner who oversaw the council for more than twenty years, remains particularly remembered. Moore was regarded as oppressive and rigidly determined to keep the area closed and isolated from other parts of Sudan. Until independence in 1956, there was no post office in Kutum and all letters were sent to El Fasher by runners. The telegraph was only used for a few minutes each morning. Moore blocked provision of services found elsewhere in Sudan. Thus, medical services in Kutum were limited to a dispensary. Moore also sought to keep close tabs on tribal movements.
Madibo, nazir of the Southern Rizaygat” (ibid., p. 41). However, this proved infeasible and a deputy nazir was to be elected by the Northern Rizaygat themselves. Abdel Nabei Abde Bagi Kiheil, a rival candidate of the Mahamid, was elected, but soon became unsuitable. No nazir was then elected by the Northern Rizaygat and this became an area of dispute at leaving “the status of the abbala Rizaygat in Darfur tribal hierarchy unresolved, fueling a cycle of tribal conflicts and economic grievances that culminated in the emergence of the Janjaweed” (ibid., p. 42).

**Box 7. The Colonial Period: Examples of Institutionalizing Neglect**

Two examples of institutionalized neglect and marginalization of the Northern Rizaygat are considered here. Both relate to current priorities of the Northern Rizaygat—education and camel veterinary services.

**Inequitable Access to Formal Education**

Under the colonial administration, education among the Northern Rizaygat, if any, was limited to the khalwa (Quranic school) in which children learned to read and interpret the Quran. The khalwa was provided and funded by the community itself (Galil, 1998). Government efforts to provide education for the nomads in Darfur in general, and North Darfur in particular, did not begin until the 1970s. Consequently, there were very few, if any, members of the Northern Rizaygat in government or the civil service.

Education under the colonial administration has been criticized for focusing on the creation of a political and professional elite to serve colonial economic and political interests. Education was geared towards assimilation, not adaptation. Such a vision has been inherited by national governments, and is reflected in the education system (Kratli, 2001; Ahmed, 1995). Darfur, like other peripheral regions, was neglected under colonial rule. Philip Ingleson, Governor of Darfur from 1936 to 1944, succinctly summarized education policy in Darfur: “We have been able to limit education to the sons of chiefs and native administration personnel and can confidently look forward to keeping the ruling classes at the top of the education tree for many years to come” (Daly, 1986, p. 107).

At independence, there was only one primary school in the entire Kutum area and only three students had gone on to tertiary studies. Two were Zaghawa and the third the son of the Magadam of Kutum (Al-Amin, 2003). Condominium rule favored educating the “sons of the Sheikhs alone” (Daly, 1986, p. 107). Education planners simply regarded nomads, and specifically the camel-herding Northern Rizaygat, as having no need for modern education.

**Camel Health: Services, Education, and Research**

The gross neglect of camel health started under colonial rule and continued for decades after independence. Only very recently have veterinary colleges begun to undertake research on camel health and production as the colonial focus on cattle—due to the high export demand—continued to shape government policies.

South Darfur has long been the principal source of cattle for export and domestic consumption in the Sudan. Southern Darfur and neighboring south Kordofán accounted for 69% of the cattle exported from the Sudan before the Second World War and 80% in the post-war period (Wilson, 1979).

Veterinary services were mainly concerned with the control of rinderpest and to a lesser extent with contagious bovine pleuro-pneumonia, the two major diseases affecting cattle. In a review of the incidence and control of livestock diseases in Darfur from 1916 to 1956, Wilson noted “there is an astonishing lack of information on camel disease problems.” There is only one mention in the annual and monthly reports of the provisional veterinary authority of camel diseases in Darfur during the whole colonial period, when trypanosomiasis was a suspected cause of death in Rizaygat camels in 1946-1947 (Wilson, 1979, p. 80).
It is the failure of these efforts to amalgamate the Northern and Southern Rizaygat or to bring them under one nazirate that underlies the current controversy over the tribal land of the Northern Rizaygat. This state of affairs has become more problematic due to the fact that their claim to dar ownership has frequently been disputed by the Zaghawa, their traditional rivals. This dispute over a dar within the land tenure system of Darfur has thwarted the Northern Rizaygat’s aspirations to settle and has limited their share of political power.

The Native Administration and hakura system enabled the Northern Rizaygat to access natural resources within their wider pastoralist domain and maintain social relations with the residents and tribal leadership of different duur. But this system, based on inequitable land rights, planted the seeds of vulnerability derived from inferior access to natural resources, welfare services, and social and economic development.

In summary, colonial rule was successful in establishing peace and security among the different tribal groups. The Native Administration System abolished the basic contradiction between the dominant position of the Fur and the clientele position of the nomads and semi-nomads in the north and south, “a contradiction which had marked the Fur sultanate” (Harrir, 1994, p. 154). However, the main impact of colonialism was to entrench structural problems, which, in the absence of post-independence good governance, guaranteed the continued social, economic, and political marginalization of the Northern Rizaygat within the marginalized context of Darfur.

1956–1990: Engineered Marginalization

The dawn of the first day of independence in Kutum was full of promise. “In that historic and emotional instant when the Sudanese flag was hoisted into the air over Kutum, replacing the twin flags of condominium rule, a famous Northern Rizaygat leader, Mohammed Hilal Abdalla of the Jalul, came forward leading one of his best camels. After he had congratulated and shaken hands with me, to my surprise and that of everyone present, he walked towards the flag-pole where he slaughtered the camel as a tribute to that great emblem, in celebration of this magnificent moment marking the defeat of colonial rule and the movement of the Sudan towards freedom and glory” (Al-Amin, 2003, p. 126).

However, the new era of national independence did not fulfill these aspirations for a better life and for development. The Northern Rizaygat, like other Sudanese nomads and pastoralists, found themselves increasingly denied access to natural resources, politically marginalized, unserved by national institutions, and excluded from the development process (Ahmed, 2001; Ibrahim, 1993). These processes of exclusion put them in a position where they seemingly had little or no choice, in terms of their survival as a group and as abbala (camel herders).

Between the proud reaction of Sheikh Mohammed Hilal Abdalla and the current situation in Darfur, a governance gap has developed and deepened. As former president Jaafar Nimeiry noted to Graham Thomas, ex-Sudan Political Service, on April 20th 1972: “I am afraid you will find our standards have gone down. The Sudan is not as efficiently and competently run as when you British were here!” (Thomas, 1990, pp. 118-120). This governance gap is the main factor contributing to the vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat, to the extent that by the end of the nineteenth century their leadership was prepared to respond rapidly to the government's call for the militarization of its menfolk in order to secure access to power and a greater share of power locally, including access to the natural resources from which they found themselves increasingly banished.

1956–1990: Ecological Constraints and Restrictions on Accessing Natural Resources

The social, demographic, and economic impact of the drought of the mid-1980s, which gave rise to unprecedented famine and mobilized large-scale international assistance, is well-documented. There was an increase of 20% in the urban population and large movements from North Darfur to the southern part of North Darfur and to South Darfur with an estimated decrease of 92% in livestock population in North Darfur. Around 33% of the livestock loss in North Darfur was attributed to distress sales, and the remaining proportion to death as a result of starvation and disease. Of all livestock species, camel losses were least (38% mortality and 26% off-take) (El Sammani, 1987).
Some migrants were accommodated and socially accepted, while others faced conflicts, primarily over grazing rights, rather than over access to farm land. According to El Sammani, “farming communities settled in areas where they had some knowledge or kin. The Zaghawa and the Masalit of El Geneina have established this tradition, thus new migrants are easily accommodated and accepted, while the nomads of north Darfur have not managed to develop such a tradition. Their new habits of grazing resulted in bloody conflicts such as the one which took place between the Mahriyya and the Bani Halba in the Idd el Ghanam area” (El Sammani, 1987, p. 59).

Eighty percent of the migrants to South Darfur were cultivators, and they cleared large areas to establish farms, which only added to tension and conflicts.

To make matters worse, the demise of the Native Administration meant that these changes were taking place in an institutional vacuum, as a result of which traditional relations and traditional natural resource-management practices (NRM) were replaced by more arbitrary ones.

In the years following the drought (and the southward migration of the population), for instance, the notion of giving dar owners priority of access to grazing and water resources came into play. At the same time, high grazing and water charges were imposed, as in the cases of the Kababish in eastern Umm Keddada, and of camels from northern Darfur in South Darfur. El Sammani’s report (1987) continued: “Regulation of nomadic movement was carried out by the police, which was not the case under the traditional system of tribal arbitration” (p. 68). The sale of crop residues, which had previously been grazed freely by the nomads, became a flourishing commercial business.

Another development which had serious implications for land tenure in the central cultivation zone and in South Darfur was zayreb el-hawa, the name given to the widespread practice of building enclosures by villagers to restrict access to pasture by others, and to lay claim to new private land (Rabah, 1998; El Sammani, 1987). This practice took place across the different tribal duur of the Northern Rizaygat pastoral domain. In the Fur area of the central cultivation zone, these enclosures posed serious problems for the nomads who grazed these areas in the dry season (see earlier chapters). As Håland (Håland, 1991) pointed out in relation to South Darfur: “in this situation, members of some local communities, particularly the Bani Halba of southern Darfur, have taken active steps to protect their communal wealth. By extending the perimeter fence around farm land to include several kilometers of pasture, they have, on a local community basis, tried to protect the land from grazing during the rainy season” (pp. 23-24). These enclosures were a cause of a tragic conflict between the Northern Rizaygat and the Bani Halba in the early 1980s.

Others have argued that the expansion of millet cultivation beyond the agronomic dry-boundary is one of the main factors contributing to desertification and reduced capability of land (Ibrahim, 1978). Consequently, traditional farmers started to expand their cultivable lands enormously while abandoning the traditional fallow system they used to adopt because of reduced capability of the land and to compensate for their declining yields. This resulted in acute losses of pastoral resources and encroachment on transhumance routes that became frequently blocked in many areas. The encroachment on transhumance routes was in direct contravention of customary law and the Transhumance Act of 1991.3

The rapid transformation of agriculture through expansion of fruits and vegetables (in Kebkabiya and Kutum areas) and tobacco cultivation (Taweila area) along the courses of the main wadis and their flood plains through water harvesting and irrigation techniques such as diesel pumps and the traditional shadouf 4 system created a market-oriented economy that resulted in enormous challenges to pastoralists. All these forces and challenges resulted in the loss of an important dry-season grazing resource for the pastoralists, while creating the farming and pastoral sectors as competing livelihood systems, rather than complementary ones.

In summary, it became apparent that apart from having to endure the impact of the recurrent drought as a physical disaster, the Northern Rizaygat had also started to face new restrictions on their access to pasture and water, within a system that put them at a disadvantage. It is therefore not surprising that by the end of the 1980s Darfur had become the site of devastating tribal conflicts with tragic consequences (Mohammed and Wadi, 1998; Harrir, 1994).
**1956–1990: Institutional Sidelining of Pastoralists**

Economic and political mechanisms of post-independence governments have led to a state of ‘engineered confusion’ which has undermined all institutions focusing on the interests of pastoralists. The phrases ‘virtual administrative chaos’ (Shazali and Ghaffar, 1999) and an ‘administrative vacuum’ (Bakheit, 1974) by which this situation has sometimes wrongly been denoted give the false idea that it came about unintentionally or through incompetence. On the contrary, this ‘confusion’ had a definite and calculated objective: to disempower pastoralists and to encroach upon their pastoral domain. Some scholars have argued that coordination suffered due to internal conflicts and jealousies that emerged among the different state organs. For pastoralists, though, the abolition of the Native Administration, combined with the lack of a credible state institution capable of articulating and advocating their interests, has contributed to intensified tribal conflicts between pastoralists and farmers, and between the pastoralist groups themselves. This has included: the encroachment of agriculture into areas once restricted to grazing, such as Abu Zarga south of El Fashir; the return of pre-1916 style raiding parties; and the spread of armed banditry.

Under national government, the power and authority of the traditional tribal administration was subsequently challenged by the 1951 and

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**Box 8. Challenges to Hakura Customary Rights**

The 1970 Unregistered Land Act declared all rain-lands government-owned. The Act, applying indiscriminately to the whole country, including Darfur, has been further reinforced by the Civil Transaction Act 1984 which legalizes elements of Sharia Law by recognizing unregistered land rights (urf) while confirming the role of the government as landowner and land-manager. The promulgation of the 1970 Act, virtually concurrent with the abolition of the Native Administration System, resulted in modified local land tenure systems, and contested customary law. The promulgation of the Act was most untimely for rural communities making a living on rain-lands, as it coincided with a period of severe drought, large-scale environmental degradation, massive population displacement, and rapid expansion of urban agribusiness capital into the rural areas. In Darfur, the areas of the Fur, Masalit, Birgid, Berti, and Daju tribes have been settled by waves of displaced groups from northern Darfur. The Zaghawa and various Arabic-speaking camel pastoralists whose traditional grazing lands suffered severe drought had to be accommodated. In this already chaotic situation, the famine of 1983-84 struck the area with devastating effect.

As the very survival of these pastoral groups was at stake, they opted for a different concept of access to natural resources, based on what de Wit (2001) has referred to as “the confrontation between legality and legitimacy or the non-legitimacy of the Sudanese legal ‘land’ framework” (de Wit, 2001, p. 4). Their argument was that, since the land is government land, and since they are Sudanese nationals, they had equal and inalienable rights over land and its resources. This new challenge to the traditional hakura system in Darfur explains the escalation of conflict between the Zaghawa and other tribal groups in South and West Darfur since 1990. Because control over land in rural Sudan means political power, the Zaghawa settlement has taken the form of disputes over domination of local politics.

The situation has been complicated by the demise of the Native Administration and the subsequent absence of credible institutions capable of mediating and resolving local conflicts over access to land and resources. Despite its reinstatement in the mid 1980s, the Native Administration System has remained weak and ineffective in settling disputes, managing grazing resources, and facilitating seasonal mobility. The result has been a growing mistrust and intensification of disputes between farmers and herders, inter-group and ethnic friction, and widespread banditry.
1961 Local Government Act, and in 1971 the People’s Local Government Act essentially abolished the powers of the traditional leaders, by transferring them to the provincial governments and the newly elected local councils established by the Act. The abolition of the Native Administration coincided with the passing of the Unregistered Land Act in 1970. The promulgation of the 1970 Act, virtually concurrent with the abolition of the Native Administration System, resulted in modified local land tenure systems, and contested customary law.

It would have been impossible to pass the Unregistered Land Act without having first downgraded or abolished the Native Administration. Despite the new federal law in Darfur, customary law in the form of the hakura system prevailed and continued as the system of land management (see Box 8).

Instability and Marginalization of Institutions Related to Pastoral Developments

As mentioned earlier, since the late 1960s, the pastoral sector has experienced a number of changes, including abolition of the Native Administration and changes in land tenure administration. These changes have been combined with the decline or restructuring of any government institution whose core mandate was pastoral development.

The government departments of relevance to pastoralism include those with responsibilities for range and pasture, animal health, livestock production, and water development. The Range and Pasture Administration and the Animal Health Department, traditionally the only government departments concerned exclusively with pastoralism and the livestock sector, have both been continuously marginalized and fragmented. In 1969, the Soil Conservation, Land Use and Water Programming Administration, a credible comprehensive institution in existence since the early 1960s, was closed down and split into two separate departments, the Management Administration and the Rural Water Development Corporation. This division has effectively divorced range management from water policy—crucial elements in the management of pastoral systems. This has also meant the dissociation of the Range and Pasture Administration from the Animal Health and Production Department and the gradual centralization of water policy.

The status of the department of ‘animal wealth’ has fluctuated between that of a full ministry, and of an agency within the larger Ministry of Agriculture. When the Jabhah al Islamiyya al-Qawmiyya (National Islamic Front, or NIF) took power in June 1989, for instance, it was brought under the Ministry of Agriculture. Since being set up as a ministry in its own right in 1996, its services have focused exclusively on cattle and sheep. Lack of attention to camels has had serious repercussions in states such as North Darfur.

The Rural Water Corporation, another key government institution concerned with pastoral development, has also experienced several changes in its status. By 1970, it had become part of the Ministry of Rural Development and Community Services and subsequently was attached to the Ministry of Energy. Post-1989, enthusiasm for privatization has turned the Rural Water Development Corporation into a commercial company.

This continuous cycle of institutional reorganization, as argued by Bakheit (Bakheit, 1974), is a manifestation of internal conflicts among the different government organs which has been a common feature since independence. Each department has pursued its own agenda, while nomads have been deprived of an integrated policy and program approach, which has left the management of natural resources in a state of confusion. The dismantling of government pastoral institutions has disempowered pastoralists and left them with no political and administrative framework to advance their interests. The critical dimension, though, that lies hidden under notions of an ‘administrative vacuum’ is the process whereby political and economically powerful groups have filled that ‘vacuum’ through the Mechanized Farming Corporation, which was established in 1969 by land legislation acts: “The MFC has promoted considerable land expansion in private mechanized rainfed farming” (Shazali and Ghaffar, 1999, p. 8). This has taken place at the expense of pastoralists and has benefited powerful, well-connected groups close to the Sudanese state.

In Darfur, rainfed mechanized agriculture has not been a major issue. But agricultural change in term of expansion and intensification has played, with other factors, as discussed elsewhere, a major role in restricting the access of the pastoralists to natural resources. In this regard Morton has noted that: “Because there is still bush-land which could be cleared and cultivated, it is possible to increase
production by extending the cultivated area. This is in contrast to much of the developing world, especially south Asia, where production can only be raised by intensification” (Morton, 1994, p. 6).

It seems, therefore, that the much-vaunted ‘administrative chaos’ or ‘vacuum’ is in effect a ‘confusion’ carefully engineered to facilitate the stripping from pastoralists of their pastoral domain, the backbone of their nomadic livelihoods system—a process that, while it has certainly impoverished and marginalized pastoralists, has created wealth and power for others.

In summary, further pressures on pastoralists have been exerted by the poor governance exemplified by the structural and systemic problems facing resource management institutions, including both government institutions, nationally and locally, and the local traditional institution of the tribal or Native Administration. Such problems include weak government systems of planning and management and distorted delegation of authority. Years of under-funding, compounded by conflict-related damage, have left key parts of resource management administration under-equipped to deliver core services. The malfunctioning of the aging boreholes, lack of clear land use policies, and the complete absence of a range management strategy are typical examples.

Collapse (or failures) of natural resource governance could also be explained by the systemic failure of resource management institutions to implement local acts (e.g., Transhumance

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Box 9. Pastoralists’ Unions and Associations

Outside tribal institutions, nomadic organization in Sudan is poor. Before the mid-1970s, there were very few pastoralists unions and those that existed, such as the Renk Cattle Owners and Shukriya Union, were dominated by tribal elites and largely served personal interests. They were first started in 1976 and were revitalized by governments in the early 1990s. Pastoralists’ associations were not encouraged by the May regime (May 1969 to April 1985) and the National Salvation (1989 to present) governments to become democratic and representative institutions and to develop/consolidate their financial, technical, and administrative capacity. Oxfam UK’s experience with the Renk Pastoralist Union is very instructive (Oxfam UK, 1994).

The Pastoralist Union was established by presidential decree, and its inaugural meeting was attended by the president (UNDP Sudan, 2006). At the national level, the Union is dominated by influential elites and businessmen, and in many ways has simply become an association of veterinarians. As with other Sudanese unions, it has become highly politicized and incorporated to serve the interests of the government. It lacks accountability to the wider constituency of pastoralists. Moves are underway (in Khartoum) to amalgamate it with the Farmer’s Union (Elshygi, 2008).

The concept and practice of trade unionism in Sudan is exclusively urban-focused. Attempts to transfer the urban concept of trade unions to the pastoralists’ dimension, without any modification to suit their socio-economic situation, is destined to failure. For example, in North Darfur, the Herders Union covers all the groups in the state. As one Northern Rizaygat informant commented, “all nomads are herders but not all herders are nomads,” meaning that the interests of his tribe, as nomads, are not represented by the Pastoralists Union. This pattern is not confined to Sudan. Pastoral associations throughout the Sahel have similarly failed to provide frameworks to represent pastoralists or further their development (Bruggemen, 1993; Hogg, 1990; World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, 1999).

The Northern Rizaygat have no affiliation to community-based organizations in Darfur. Just before the war erupted in 2003, the Kutum Nomadic Association was founded, but with the displacement and migration of Arabs from Kutum, the association has collapsed.

The apparent weaknesses of the Native Administration System remains a large part of the problem of natural resource management and, as such have contributed to the collapse of local governance, intensification of resource competition, and the current livelihood crisis of both pastoralists and farmers in Darfur.

1956–1990: Development Deficits Exclude Pastoralists

Pastoralists have been sidelined first and foremost because of the lack of relevant government policies and associated initiatives. The technocratic approaches of administrators with little or no expertise, interest in, or concern for pastoralism as a livelihood system have consistently failed to address pastoralists’ development needs. For the first decades of independence, government policy advocated the resettlement of nomads based on the assumption that pastoralism is incompatible with modern life, and that basic services were difficult to provide for nomads (Ahmed, 1976). As a result of their perceived lack of development, the Northern Rizaygat tried to promote local initiatives to develop their nomadic community. These efforts were undermined by their relative lack of both modern and traditional power. Their lack of influence within the government and their inferior position in land tenure undermined their own local development initiatives. The combination of both elements brought them into increasing tribal tensions, especially with the Zaghawa.

The Northern Rizaygat have twice tried to explore issues of development and settlement through conferences with the government. In the late 1970s, Eltayeb Elmardi, ex-commissioner of North Darfur, attempted to organize a conference on the development of the Northern Rizaygat to discuss development and the provision of basic services such as education, health, animal health, and settlement options. Funding was secured from the Northern Rizaygat themselves, who contributed 1,000 head of camels to pay for the organization of the conference, and from the United Arab Emirates. Sadly, though all the arrangements had been made, including preparatory studies by experts from the University of Khartoum, the conference failed to take place. The proposal was in fact shelved by Elmardi’s successor, a prominent member of the Zaghawa. The Northern Rizaygat believe that it was deliberately prevented from taking place because of the traditional rivalry between the Northern Rizaygat and the Zaghawa.

Almost two decades later, in October 1992, a large conference for the development of the Northern Rizaygat was organized in El Genaig, North Darfur, to explore settlement and development options. There were also serious efforts to raise awareness of and interest in education among the Northern Rizaygat. The conference generated serious tensions between the Zaghawa and the Northern Rizaygat, and since then, the issues of nomad settlement have been put on ice (Elnahla, 2008). While the first conference of the 1980s was prevented and halted by circles within local government in Darfur, the impact of the second conference was frustrated by circles within the national government, who created tensions during the conference.

The rivalries and tensions between the Zaghawa and the Northern Rizaygat are not new, and their relations oscillate between outright conflict and strategic tribal coalitions. The source of disputes most often relate to questions of camels, land rights, or politics. The issue of the settlement of the Northern Rizaygat is an area of tension both for the Zaghawa and for other tribes concerned with defending existing tenure rights. In the Darfur region, in the customary system of the dar, the tribe is conceived of as a territorial group with absolute rights. This means that non-members of the tribe can only gain access to land on the basis of usufruct—the right to use and enjoy the profits and advantages of something belonging to another. This entails requiring the user of the land to pay what is known as ushur, one tenth of the crop at harvest (Harrir, 1994; O’Fahey, 1980).

The settlement of an entire tribal group, or groups, introduces a number of challenges to the existing system in a region where arable land is in
short supply and political power depends on land. Land tenure through the customary *hakura* system gives tribes that are in control of a *dar* a distinct political advantage. They are the majority group, and therefore dominate political representation, and, by implication, control over and access to resources. This question of power explains the current eviction of many groups such as the Zaghawa, Bani Hussein, and Mahamid from South Darfur, even though they have been settled there since the 1980s.

In summary, all local development initiatives taken by the Northern Rizaygat have failed abysmally, only serving to generate further local tensions. These initiatives were resisted by the Zaghawa and other tribal groups. Once again, it was the absence of good governance and failure to establish representative mechanisms which allowed tensions and grievances to fester, perpetuating a discriminatory system in which political power continues to derive from control of the land.

**Exclusion and Low Participation of Nomads in Education**

Exclusion from education has widened the gap between the human development of nomads and rural residents in the Darfur region. Efforts to provide education for the Rizaygat *abbala* were almost negligible until the mid-1980s, when Commissioner Eltayeb Elmardi took the first step in establishing five primary schools in Barakalla, Gireir, Masri, Umrayalla, and Damrat Sheikh Abdel Bag in North Darfur. The fact that these schools offered boarding facilities made education more attractive to nomads. A conference on nomad education, held in 1993, led to the decision to approve around 100 schools throughout the greater Darfur region. Abolition of the boarding school system in the same year, though, set back progress in providing appropriate education for nomads, and has been an element in the discouraging nomad groups from educating their children.

The education of Sudanese nomads has faced many obstacles and challenges, including the invisibility of pastoralists within education policies and policy makers’ negative attitudes towards them (Aikman and El-Haj, 2006). The failure to integrate nomads into the educational system is because “the political administration had regarded nomads as static groups, resistant to change and having more allegiance to their tribal system than to national allegiance…. A dominant understanding has been that only settlement can provide nomadic communities with basic social services such as, for instance, education” (Larsen and Hassan, 2001, p. 5).

In addition to these myths, other challenges for the design and implementation of appropriate nomad education programs are top-down approaches to education provision, which do not take on board the views of communities. Formal education does not acknowledge, or even attempt to understand, the cultural values of nomadic communities. Understandably, this makes many nomads perceive education as a threat (Larsen and Hassan, 2001; Dyer, 2001; Ibrahim, 2006; Kratli, 2001).

As a result of these combined factors, the proportion of Northern Rizaygat children attending primary school was very low, and the dropout rate high. Chapter Five provides more recent attendance rates. Since the end of the 1980s, there have been very few men and no women from the Northern Rizaygat in the civil service, government structure, or other key positions in Sudan and Darfur. Exclusion from formal education also explains the very small number of Northern Rizaygat employed by international organizations in Darfur.

**The Invisibility of Nomads to Non-governmental Organizations**

There have been few large integrated rural development programs in the Darfur region. Two that stand out were the Western Savannah Development Scheme (WSDS) in southern Darfur and the Jebel Marra Rural Development Program (JMRDP) in West Darfur, both of which largely sprang from the response to the 1972 drought. The JMRDP started in 1958 as a project with an emphasis on horticulture and forestry, but was later transformed into a rural development project advocating technology transfer (Fadlalla, 2006). The WSDS aimed to integrate agricultural and rural development in the project areas, and in particular “to frame and execute programmes for the settlement of citizens in the project area, upon a basis open for livestock, and to endeavour to organize seasonal grazing, to stop desert encroachment, and increase productivity.” They also intended to develop water resources, and establish agricultural and pastoral settlement in the project area (Gordon, 1986, p. 171).
Before the drought years of the 1970s and 1980s, there were few, if any, international humanitarian organizations working in the Darfur region. They arrived during the famine years and were principally concerned with the provision of relief in the form of food assistance to the camps of displaced people on the periphery of towns. Nomads and pastoralists in general were last in line to receive food aid, because they lacked the political clout and urban influence to secure humanitarian relief. They were also less visible to newcomers to the region as compared with the more official IDP camp residents. In time, relief did eventually ‘trickle down’ to pastoralist communities (Walker, 1988).

Most humanitarian agencies left in the aftermath of the 1984/85 relief programs, but a small number of ‘multi-mandate’ INGOs like Save the Children UK and Oxfam GB stayed on and were joined by development NGOs like Intermediate Technology (now Practical Action). The work of the Agricultural Planning Unit within the Ministry of Agriculture in El Fasher was encouraged, and other development projects and programs in the region included: Sag El Naam Irrigation Project near El Fasher; the Lower Saxony Project in Jebel Marra; Emergency Drought Recovery Programme; Area Development Schemes of the UNDP in Idd El Fursan and Um Kaddaga; the Livestock and Meat Marketing Corporation (LMMC); and the Stock Route Project financed by IDA, IFAD and GOS (Fadlalla, 2006).

Community-based development programs implemented by INGOs were new and relatively small, and covered a very limited number of communities. However, they have spawned community-based organizations that continue to function.

With few exceptions, though, international programs have failed nomads in terms of their project focus and the projects delivered. In relation to rural production systems, their focus has predominantly been on agriculture, with an emphasis on agricultural inputs, including community-based animal health services. Projects and programs targeted the farming community, and by the end of the 1990s, the only project with a focus on pastoralists was the pastoral education program supported by Oxfam and UNICEF.

In summary, the lack of an institution to advocate the interests of pastoralists, combined with the inability of government departments to coordinate and address pastoralist issues and the weakening and politicization of the Native Administration, has created a confused and chaotic situation, and a major institutional gap. In this confused environment, the livelihoods of nomads have not been protected or supported. Chronic mal-governance has allowed powerful tribes to bid for power and to control land and resources, inevitably increasing tribal rivalries and conflict. The weakness of the Northern Rizaygat in local power-relations has deepened and accelerated their impoverishment and marginalization since independence. This has led to tensions with regional and national authorities on the one hand, and to rivalries with sedentary agriculturalists on the other. Both types of conflict have implications for the current situation in Darfur.

1990 to 2002: Setting the Context for a Complex Emergency

Dramatic changes took place at the end of the 1980s when the NIF seized power. This occurred at a time of local reconciliation efforts and negotiation between the Arabs and the Fur, as a result of the devastating conflict that erupted in 1987. The NIF’s coup pushed negotiators to reach an agreement within one week after the seizure of power. However, the agreement was not honored and violence resumed a few months later (Harir, 2000; Africa Watch, 1990; Harrir, 1994).

The new regime prioritized building and consolidating a power base. This meant the destruction of the power base of the sectarian parties in rural areas and of the leftist groups in urban areas in Sudan. In addition, it required the establishment of a military machine based on the radical ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. In Darfur, the already militarized tribal society has been subjected to an accelerated and intensified militarization process as the government sought recruits to engage in jihad against secessionist rebels in southern Sudan. In the context of the tribal polarization and conflicts taking place, different groups took advantage of military training, believing it would strengthen them to resist perceived threats from other tribal groups. As a result, by the early 1990s, tribal groups all across the Darfur region had become militarized.

This was coupled with changes in the Native Administration in which local tribal native admin-
administrators were replaced with new ones loyal to the regime, and new positions came into existence, such as the amir in West Darfur (senior Arab leader or prince). Moreover, the region was divided into three states, and into a number of political councils, in the name of popular participation (Mohamed, undated; Young, 2005). These actions exacerbated tensions over land tenure issues and led to more intercommunal conflicts.

Within such a context of militarized and tribal tensions, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the military wing of the main Southern rebel group, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, entered Darfur. An SPLA force led by Daoud Bolad, an ex-NIF Fur tribesman, invaded Darfur, but was defeated by regular government troops and pro-government militia from Arab tribes. The result was the active political marginalization of groups such as the Fur, and widespread asset stripping, as banditry and tribal tensions engulfed the whole area (Duffield, 1993; Africa Watch, 1990; Abusin and Takana, 2001). De Waal noted that: “what makes militarized tribalism into such an effective engine of conflict and displacement is that the key resource dispensed by tribal leaders is land. Once the government has adopted tribalism as its mode of control the contest is fought out over livelihoods. It is a war for survival” (de Waal, 2008, p. 30).

The whole area was overtaken by devastating conflicts and, by the end of the 1990s, the regional connections had reconfigured the political scene and tribal alliances in Darfur. This became evident in internal conflicts within the NIF; the split within the group led by the Islamic leader Hassan al-Turabi, and in the emergence of the two main Darfur movements—the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA).

The Regional Dimension: Political and Tribal Alliances

The regional dimensions and complexities of the crisis in Darfur have been discussed widely (Young, 2005; Burr and Collins, 1999; Marchal, 2007; Harrir, 1994). Since then, the political, social, and military connections in the region have reconfigured political as well as tribal alliances, which extend across national borders.

An understanding of the regional dimensions is critical in making sense of the political alliances and position of different tribal groups, especially that of the Northern Rizayqat and their alliance with, and manipulation by, the government of Sudan.

These dimensions can be traced to the Chadian war. When Hissène Habré was Chadian President (June 1982-December 1990), he and his Chief of Staff and security advisor Idriss Déby, a former army officer and Chadian-born tribesman of the Zaghawa, recruited a paramilitary tribal militia mainly drawn from the Bedayat, a notoriously warlike section of the Zaghawa living in both the Sudan and Chad, to attack Arab abbalas and rustle their camels. Arab groups were then opposing the Habré regime (Marchal, 2007). The strategy deployed by Habré and Déby was similar to that pursued by the Sudanese government, who recruited the Murahaleen militia to plunder the Dinka, steal their cattle, and thus deprive them of the foundation of their livelihoods (Keen, 1994). According to Harrir (1994), “This action was regarded by the Chadian government as a legitimate operation to recover Chadian national wealth which had been illegally smuggled out from Chad into the Sudan. Though the Chadian government never admitted responsibility for these paramilitary forces, its military forces later disregarded international laws and crossed into the Sudan, mounting military operations with some degree of impunity. The Chadian violations of the Sudanese territory, were regarded as a counterbalance to the complicity of the Sudanese government in the Libyan operations” (p. 66).

Armed bandits began to appear in North Darfur, and during the mid-1980s a mass killing of Chadian Arab abbalas occurred, forcing many nomads to seek refuge in Darfur. Soon after these events, Zaghawa living in northeastern Chad who opposed Habré’s forces became the victims of murder and mass rape, and suffered the looting and burning of their villages. These attacks, together with the mobilization of the Zaghawa by Déby (who was by then using North Darfur as his base), had a crucial impact on the collective identity of the Zaghawa in the Sudan and Chad. When Déby and Habré quarrelled in December
1990, it was the mobilization of Déby’s tribal supporters in Sudan (the Kobbe and Wegi branches of the Zaghawa), together with the Chad-based Kobbe and Bedeyat branches (Marchal, 2007), that played the key role in his military success.

Déby’s victory was also supported and facilitated by the Zaghawa’s influential role in and connection to the NIF after it took power in Sudan in 1989. Since then, the political and economic power of the Zaghawa in the wider region has been rising. They have the political power of the presidency in Chad and a strong influence on and connection with the NIF regime in Sudan, thus creating an alliance between Khartoum and N’Djamena. These regional political alliances, combined with the UN sanctions on Libya, combined to create a situation favorable for a regional transnational economy.

“… many operators from Darfur (mostly but not only Zaghawa) had good connections in Khartoum with the leadership of NIF: a triangular set of commercial networks emerged with nodes in Kufra, al Fashir, and Abeche, while supplying markets were located in Malta or in the Gulf (Saudi Arabia and Dubai)” (Marchal, 2007, p. 180).

One last point regarding the Zaghawa is that, before the 1999 internal conflict within the NIF that resulted in Turabi’s loss of power, they provided a good base in Darfur from which the NIF could recruit members of the Popular Defense militia, mobilized for the jihad launched by Khartoum against the SPLA.

To summarize, by the mid-1990s, a strong Zaghawa collective identity had emerged in the region, supported by political influence in both Chad and Sudan and by strong links with the regional informal economy. These sources of power had implications for land disputes and tribal rivalries with the Northern Rizaygat, which developed into armed conflict and associated camel raiding.

The nature of the conflict changed in 1999, however, with the NIF internal split. Most Zaghawa elements in the NIF sided with Hassan El Turabi, who then led the opposition party the National Popular Congress, and who lost power to President Umar al-Bashir. From the core of these pro-Turabi Zaghawa elements emerged the JEM, led by Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, a well-known NIF figure and a key player in the jihad campaigns in southern Sudan. Generously supplied with personnel and arms by Zaghawa officers in the Chadian Army and in the presidential guard (Marchal, 2007; Flint, 2007), JEM was branded a Zaghawa plot by the Sudanese government, who called on Arab nomad tribes to join its military campaign against it. Thus, “the Arabs and other segments of Chadian tribes that relocated to Darfur for safety in the 1990s quickly responded to the Sudanese government’s call to take this (unexpected) opportunity for revenge” (Marchal, 2007, p. 191).

The Northern Rizaygat’s reaction to the SLA was similar to that of the JEM. SLA was initially an alliance between its two main tribal components, the Zaghawa and the Fur, both of whom had been in conflict with Arab nomad groups since the 1990s. The SLA emerged out of tribal self-defense groups organized to fight Arab abballa nomads from the north. It is this factor that strengthens the conviction among the Northern Rizaygat that the Darfur rebellion is not primarily directed against the Sudanese government, but instead against Arab abballa groups. This concern was later strengthened when the Northern Rizaygat attempted to establish contact with SLA, but were rebuffed: “After the Zaghawa attacked Arab abballa in Umm Balul, raiding thousands of camels, Arab representatives sent to Abdul Wahid in Jabal Marra were turned back by the SLA. Abdul Wahid was later to regret the missed opportunity, because the representatives brought back to Hilal two negative messages, 1) ‘They refused to let us pass’ and 2) ‘These people don’t like Arabs’” (Flint, 2007, p. 161).

The SLA had been transformed by internal tribal politics and conflicts, and lacked the political vision to appeal to Darfuris and other Sudanese (Flint, 2007). “It started as the Darfur Liberation Movement and ended as the Sudan Liberation Movement, and between the two came the question of whether they wanted to restore the throne of the Keira Sultans or the monarchy of Wad Torshayn [the Khalifa Abdallahi al-Ta’ishi]” (Al Mahri, 2008, p. 4).

Another element that shaped the alliance of the Northern Rizaygat with the government was the connection between the SLA and SPLA. From 2002, the latter provided the SLA with military training and logistical backing, and provided support to the Fur for their war against the Arabs at the end of the 1980s. According to Harrir (1994), “The Fur looked (to) the model presented by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)
for inspiration” (p. 144). He noted that the “milishiyat - the militias - were the Fur’s vehicle for self-defense and were later used to forge links with the SPLA” (p. 165). It is these connections at the end of the 1980s that forged the cooperation and alliances for Daud Bolad in 1993 and for the SLA in 2003.

It is within this context of the intricate local and regional web of political and economic alliances that the position of the Northern Rizaygat is to be read. In Darfur, as in the entire region, it is the tribe and not ethnicity that provides the means for political activity or coalitions. Conventional analyses—such as those pitting the Arabs against Africans—offer little insight into the position and interests of the different groups affected by or affecting the war. Such stereotypes fail to acknowledge the conflicts among Arab groups, those between the Fur and Zaghawa, or the Zaghawa’s internal divisions. This context provided the regional framework which, from the end of 1980s, transformed the evolving crisis in Darfur into a complex political emergency that only belatedly attracted international attention in 2003.

Conclusions

Consistent socioeconomic, political, and ecological processes, of which the state-nomad relationship is an overriding factor, have ensured the exclusion of the Northern Rizaygat camel nomads from power and resources. Processes, institutions, and policy frameworks over decades worked to deepen their vulnerability. The same forces have not impacted the livelihoods of non-nomad groups to the same extent. The impact of those forces manifested itself in the everyday life of the group, with a continuing decline in their pastoral pursuits, and in the absence of an alternative livelihood.

Lacking good governance and in a regional context of political tensions and militarized tribalism, their marginalization, impoverishment, and militarization left the Northern Rizaygat, as abbala, in a state of deepening frustration, hopelessness, and desperation, fearing for their survival.

As this chapter indicates, the Northern Rizaygat, in the years leading up to 2003, when the full insurgency and counterinsurgency took place, were an impoverished and grossly marginalized group, whose situation was largely the result of government neglect over a long period. With a long history of local tribal conflict, with the Zaghawa to the north, the Fur in the central rangelands, and the Masalit in the west, the Northern Rizaygat saw the war of 2003 as a war against themselves, an impression which the government did nothing to disabuse them of, and everything to encourage. Faced with what they perceived as a threat of further marginalization and impoverishment, or subjugation by other groups, and possibly even of extinction or expulsion from Darfur, their decision to mobilize in support of the government appeared the only rational choice. The Northern Rizaygat were faced with a choice of no choice, or rather a coercive offer, which to refuse would be against practical reason. Their long-standing and unchannelled frustrations made them completely susceptible to the government’s coercive counterinsurgency strategy.

This does not mean that individual acts of violence by members of the Northern Rizaygat are either excused or justified or that their perpetrators do not bear the responsibility for such acts. It does, however, indicate that the Northern Rizaygat are not without claim to being among the victims of a war largely brought about both directly and indirectly by the government of the Sudan. Understanding and explaining that war, the position of the Northern Rizaygat, and the impact on them of the conflict, is impossible without an understanding of the political, economic, and social forces in operation over many decades. Failure to pay attention to these factors could result in a flawed peace process, or recovery plans that simply entrench the same grievances that led to the violence in the first place.

Under the terms of the Condominium’s Passports and Permits Ordinance. Other closed districts included the whole of southern Sudan, the Nuba mountains, and West Darfur (Zalingei).

This Act specifies the following prohibited activities and sanctions: i. Changes in the route; ii. Obstruction of water points or *manazil* (*sawani*); iii. Burning or removal of pastoral tents and enclosures; iv. Use of village boundaries as pastoral land or *manazil*; v. Village boundary of 5 to 8 km radius (*hasan al hilla*) should be maintained for sedentary herds; vi. Establishment of air enclosures; vii. Crop farming near water points; viii. Any person who violates the Act is considered guilty and is subjected to penalty and imprisonment for up to 5 months.

The *shadouf* system is a man-powered irrigation technique composed of a long suspended pole maintained by a weight at an end and equipped with a bucket attached at the other end. The farmer swings the bucket down into the water and then swings the filled bucket over to the field.

In Sudan, formal education is structured according to a ladder composed of Basic and Secondary education levels. Schooling of pastoralists is focused on the following:

- *Khalwa* (Quranic Schools)
- Mobile schools (Classes 1 - 4 Basic level)
- Boarding schools (Basic and sometimes Secondary level)

Chapter 4
The Northern Rizaygat and the War: From Marginalization to Maladaptations

Introduction

By 2003, the scene was set for the Darfur rebel insurgency and the brutal government counterinsurgency that mobilized the Northern Rizaygat and other groups as an irregular civilian army or militia. It was the vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat that brought them to the point where they would join the government’s counterinsurgency. Their vulnerability was a result of long-term historic processes of marginalization reflecting broader regional discrimination against pastoralists, combined with increasing pressures on natural resources, governance failures, and increasing competition and conflict, particularly over land and natural resources between farmers and pastoralists, and between camel pastoralists (Rizaygat and Zaghawa).

This chapter describes the direct experiences of the Northern Rizaygat of the conflict, including their active recruitment by the government and exclusion by the rebels and how insecurity affected them, including their displacement as a result of the conflict. The second half of the chapter describes the livelihood strategies of the Northern Rizaygat before the conflict erupted and how these have changed since 2003, including new strategies that they have diversified into, some of which are considered ‘maladaptive’, meaning that they potentially depend on violence, coercion, and a distorted market or war economy. The information in this chapter is based on the fieldwork undertaken by the two Tufts teams and therefore is limited to those groups and locations visited.

The livelihoods of the Northern Rizaygat are going through rapid transition. Traditional livelihood strategies linked to camel-based pastoralism have declined with the loss of access to seasonal pastures and the massive increase in salaried military service as a livelihood strategy. This has been accompanied by sweeping changes in pastoralist lifestyles as their seasonal movements are restricted to safe zones. This restriction denies them access to their favored pastures, particularly in the north. The control of this northern area of Darfur by the Zaghawa has blocked former Arab livestock trade with Libya and Egypt, an important source of livelihood for a large number of people. Most of this trade is now dominated by the Zaghawa. This restricted access has also negatively affected labor migration to Libya, another traditional livelihood strategy of the Northern Rizaygat. In the past, male migration to Libya was part of the way of life of the northern Rizaygat, first by camel and later by truck. Once there, they would be assisted by a network of Sudanese who are well-established there.

The forced displacement of many rural farmers to towns and camps, as a result of the government’s counterinsurgency against the rebels, has given pastoralists the upper hand in these rural areas, but, at the same time, removed a critical part of the social and economic fabric of their society. The displacement of rural farming communities has destroyed local markets, which nomads depend on to buy essential goods and sell their own produce. At the same time, the increasingly urbanized IDPs represent a captive market for firewood, grass, etc., as they are constrained from directly accessing these natural resources themselves. Firewood, especially in West Darfur, provides a significant source of income for the increasingly sedentarized pastoralists. There is obviously a wider context to the new livelihood strategies of the Northern Rizaygat, including their role as militia in the conflict and the use of intimidation and violence to control access to resources. Although the links between livelihoods and violence were not investigated directly, two areas that have been widely reported on are briefly reviewed as these relate directly to livelihoods (see Box 14. The Link Between Collection of Firewood and Gender-based Violence, and Box 15. Reports of Land Occupation, Land Grabbing and Patterns of Coercion and Intimidation).
Government Mobilization and Militia Recruitment

In early 2003, the government put out a call to Darfuri tribal leaders to rally men and support for a counter-rebellion in Darfur. In Kebkabiya, the governor called all tribes, including the Fur Shartai of Dar Fia, Sabkor, and Jebel Si, and so this call was not limited to pro-government tribes. He requested provision of people for military training to defend the country against the attacks of the rebellion. According to the local Tama Omda, the Fur did not consult with them and instead immediately refused the government’s request, in writing. The Tama took this to mean that the Fur supported the rebels, which ratcheted up dramatically the polarization between the pro-government and pro-rebel tribes. At this point, the Tama responded by providing both money and men to be trained as part of the Popular Defense and police, despite their earlier reluctance and, as a result, they were immediately classified as Arab by the Fur, since they were not supporting the rebellion (traditionally, the Tama are farmers, and many of those in the towns were teachers).

Musa Hilal, as the Nazir for the Mahamid, immediately supported the call of the government and his base in Misserya became the center for militia training. The leadership of the Northern Rizaygat tribes, the Amirs, Omdas, and educated Arabs, broadly supported the call and were quick to respond. In retrospect, some tribal members within Darfur complain that this very rapid response to throw their support behind the government’s plans was done in haste with little thought of the consequences and without political vision: “Accordingly the Arabs suffered in the division of the wealth and power of the Abuja” (Key Informant 1, 4 May 2008). The fact that the Arabs (Northern Rizaygat) were the first to join the government for their own interests is thought to underlie the current clashes between rebels and Arab groups (Key Informant 1, 4 May 2008). Although, at a local level, some members of the Northern Rizaygat felt these decisions were taken in the interests of individual leaders close to the government and not in the broader interests of the tribe.

Another aspect of the mobilization of the Northern Rizaygat by the government is their exclusion by the rebels in planning and executing their plans for rebellion, which had started as early as 2000. One group near Kutum described how the Fur, Zaghawa, and Tunjur “started the war in 2002 in a very organized way, and since then they have worked consistently to escalate it. [They] raised community funds to buy arms, [they] joined the PDF in a very well organized way and they started to isolate us from their social gatherings and festivals” (Focus Group 1, 5 May 2008). This exclusion from the discussions on the rebellion was also raised by Tama and Qimr leaders in the earlier Tufts research (Young et al., 2004).

Conflict, Displacement, and Livestock Raiding

The Northern Rizaygat have experienced violent attacks, killings, and looting during the course of the conflict, which they widely agree were directly targeted at them as pro-government Arabs, by rebel groups and their supporters. The continuing security threats and fears of being targeted were the reasons why many were compelled to move from their original homes and this also restricted their access to certain areas. A typical comment illustrating their fear was that “The Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa, started acting together. They told the Libyans that their intentions were to attack the GoS but their real intention was to attack the Arabs” (Focus Group 1, 2 May 2008). These fears were a result of a long history of tribal tensions and conflict, and those interviewed remember well a catalogue of incidents and killings, which, in West Darfur, date back to 1997 (Key Informant 1, 2-4 May 2008). According to one key informant in West Darfur, “after El Fasher airport was taken the government told Arabs ‘they are going to kill you’. The fear was
that after they dealt with the Government of Sudan they would then attack the Arabs” (Key Informant 1, 2-4 May 2008).

From 2003, fear of attack became a part of the Northern Rizaygat’s lives, particularly following the rebel attacks on Kutum and in Kulpous. For example, in Damra Masri, near Kutum, between 2003 and 2005, all the schools were closed because the schools, damra, and fariga were thought to be at risk of being attacked at any moment. Older children at every level of schooling “left their schools and came to defend and protect their families, livestock and tribal groups”. In the period just before the schools closed, the teachers took guns to the classroom for protection (Focus Group 2, 5 May 2008).

The experiences of the Northern Rizaygat are obviously different from the experiences of IDPs, many of whom were forcibly driven from their rural homes in 2003 as part of the government counterinsurgency. The losses and harm incurred by the Arab groups has not been acknowledged generally or properly investigated.

The purpose of this study was not to systematically collect individual testimonies on attacks on the Arab groups, but rather to get a sense of how the conflict and crisis had affected their livelihoods. As part of this, the people wanted to recount their experiences of intimidation, violent attacks, looting, and livestock raiding. For the respondents, these incidents were marked out as different from the former insecurity in Darfur (pre-2003), because they frequently involved killings. This took the local conflicts to another level of violence and prompted, forced even, many of the Northern Rizaygat to relocate to safer areas where their tribesmen were more concentrated (in this study around Kebkabiya and south and east of Al Geneina). All interviewees described incidents of displacement and restricted access to lands previously used by the group as part of their traditional livelihoods.

In some cases, groups had been forcibly displaced more than once from where they perceived to be their areas of origin or home. From Barakalla, in the north of Kutum district, Arab groups were displaced first to Kutum (to the Damra Elsheikh Abdel Bagei) and then, following the attack on Kutum, they moved to Kebkabiya. Similarly, the groups from Girair (near Muzbat) were forcibly displaced twice, first from Girair and then from Kutum (see Box 10). In these areas of origin for some groups of Northern Rizaygat, the rebels were said to have burned down houses (Elguba and Girair), uprooted fruit trees (almost fifty trees were uprooted in Elguba), and destroyed water pumps and looted livestock.

In one town in North Darfur, a respected member of the Northern Rizaygat tribe commented on the hostile environment against the Arabs in the town and recounted a number of serious incidents to the Tufts team, where Arabs and their property were specifically targeted. Women’s focus groups often corroborated these stories.

Apart from killings, raiding of livestock also featured: “they killed some of our people in the marketplace and looted our livestock. They stole a total of 100 camels from the Sheikh himself” (Focus Group 1, 5 May 2008). One senior Council Member in El Fashir described six different incidents of camel raiding in which approximately 957 camels were stolen (Key Informant 2, 5 May 2008).

In West Darfur, the situation was somewhat different. Interviewees described the long history of the increasing conflict between Arab pastoralists and local Masalit farming groups, dating back to the nineties. In Nurdan Damra, Asernei, the Owlad Jenoub and Owlad Eid described the increasing tensions and conflict incidents between them and the Masalit, which resulted in displacement, loss of livestock, and killings of them and other Arab tribes. As one informant described, “The problem was that the Arabs were not united and so they could be attacked,” which might partly explain their willingness to respond to the higher authority of the government in their call for support of the counterinsurgency discussed earlier (Focus Group 4, 5 May 2008). So, with the ‘problems’ in 2003 (a euphemism for the conflict), they again moved north, this time to Shallal. But they faced difficulties there also, and as a group they lost 3000 camels, first to raiders on horses and camels and then to raiders using vehicles, and so they returned to Nurdan (Focus Group 4, 5 May 2008).

The northward livestock migrations were increasingly restricted by livestock raids in the Kulpous area that resulted in fatalities and abductions as well as loss of camels (Focus Group 3, 2 May 2008). As a result, groups settled within a more restricted area to the south, which is where the team located them around Galala, Gokal, and

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larger damar close to Ardamatta and Asernei.

Thus, in West Darfur, there are many groups who have been displaced as a result of insecurity, conflict, and livestock raiding and now reside within a much smaller geographical area, but still often move every three to four months (Focus Group 1, 4 May 2008).

**Blocked Livestock Migration Routes**

Blocking of livestock migration routes started long before the conflict erupted in 2003 as a result of a series of tribal conflicts, which revolved around tribal access to water and pasture. These conflicts were linked to control of water sources, increasing of pasture enclosure (zaraib el hawa) by larger damar close to Ardamatta and Asernei.

Thus, in West Darfur, there are many groups who have been displaced as a result of insecurity, conflict, and livestock raiding and now reside within a much smaller geographical area, but still often move every three to four months (Focus Group 1, 4 May 2008).

**Box 10. Displacement to Kebkabiya, from Girair (near Muzbat) via Kutum**

This case illustrates the historical conflicts between the Northern Rizaygat and the Zaghawa over land in the north, the multiple displacements as a result of the conflict (that were often associated with rumors of ‘land occupation’ in Kutum), the raiding and livestock losses suffered, and the current desire to return to their original home in Girair, which again has contributed to more recent rumors about migrating Arab groups in search of land.

The Girair area, located to the northwest of Kutum, close to Muzbat in North Darfur, is traditionally inhabited by the Mahriyya camel-herding groups. The area is named after a valley that starts from Kutum and extends to Wadi Hawar. The middle part of the valley after it leaves Girair is known as Wadi Magreb. To the east of Girair is Wadi Abka and Wadi Beri, and to the west of it is Wadi Eldor, which runs towards Muzbat and then to Wadi Hawar. The area includes fertile land along the Wadi and is rich in acacia species. There were disputes over land ownership between the Zaghawa and Mahriyya in 1977, which were settled by a committee headed by a judge from Kutum. Disputes erupted again between the Zaghawa and Northern Rizaygat in 1983 and led to conflict. Since then, there have been no disputes or conflict over this land. Interviewees in the Kebkabiya area (Abara) (Focus Group 2, 6 May 2008) and Tura (Key Informant, 10 May 2008) reported their displacement from Girair to Kebkabiya, via Kutum, as a result of rising tensions, insecurity, and abductions.

Groups from Girair moved first to north and west Kutum with their livestock, and then, following the rebel attack on Kutum in early August 2003, they moved to Abara, where they stayed for three months. Finally, they moved south to the Kebkabiya area. One group of Mahriyya from Girair reported that local inhabitants, around the areas where they first went in Kutum, lodged complaints to the Maqdum in Kutum that the Arabs had taken over their land.

The Maqdum invited the Mahriyya to a meeting in Kutum on the same day the opposition executed a three- day attack on Kutum town starting on August 1. The Arabs believed that the Maqdum had prior knowledge of these attacks, prompting his invitation for that day, which they believed was part of a wider strategy of the rebels selectively targeting Arabs. On August 5, 2003, the Arabs made a counterattack on Kutum.

Another problem for this group were the livestock raids: “During the clashes and fighting when they were settled around Kutum they [Fur, Zaghawa, and Tunjur] could not raid any of our livestock but later they managed to loot 45 camels and 120 shoats in addition to the individual cases of robbery” (Focus Group 2, 6 May 2008). After these incidents, the Mahriyya moved south to areas around Kebkabiya, where they stayed in places such as Fago, Jebel Si, Tura, Aramba, and Seeh Jena to join their fellow tribesmen who moved earlier to that area. There is also a small group that moved towards Hamarat Elsheikh in Kordofan. The areas where they settled in Kebkabiya they named after their former homes in Girair.

Some of the groups who are displaced to Kebkabiya area are planning to return to the Girair area once they feel that the area is safe. A group interviewed in Abara had left Kebkabiya area three months previously on their way back to Girair and were called locally by the other Arab groups ‘the returnees’. They thought the area around Kebkabiya was not suitable for them and for their livestock because of the mountainous terrain and the unsuitable trees and grasses, which they thought were both unpalatable and poisonous for their livestock.
farmers, and commercialization of agriculture, as explained in Chapter 3. The main conflicts were between the Zaghawa and the Northern Rizaygat in the North of Darfur and the conflict between the Fur and the Arabs in central areas.

The water and pasture in the area around Wadi Hawar and the Jizzu have traditionally been shared with the Northern Rizaygat who have traditional settlements in this region. This created tensions, particularly in times of recurrent drought in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and as a result of subsequent perceived desertification. The Northern Rizaygat reported that their movements to the northern winter pastures in the Jizzu were blocked by the Zaghawa as long ago as 1997: “They undertook a series of very organized raids to block us from grazing in the north. This has limited our mobility and the reproductive capacity of our herds. In the past we had the she camel breeding cycle every year and now it is only every three years” (Focus Group 1, 5 May 2008).

The conflict with the Zaghawa in the north meant that the Northern Rizaygat were under pressure to move southwards earlier than usual, before the traditional set time when herds were allowed to enter Jebel Mara area to graze on the crop residues (tallaig), thus putting pressure on the Fur farmers in Kebkabiya, Zalingei, and Garsilla and bringing them into conflict.

The tensions in the central areas were compounded by increasing pasture enclosure by the Fur, in part a result of the increasing commercialization of agriculture, and because of increasing demand for cultivable land as a result of natural population growth and migration to the area by Zaghawa and other groups switching to cultivation from other livelihoods (including pastoralism). Fur farmers also kept livestock and were concerned that camel herds were over-grazing the areas around their villages, leaving no pasture for the Fur livestock. For this reason, the villagers burned the pasture to keep away camel herds, and thereby avoid the threat and conflicts with the herders (Key Informant 1, 1 May 2008). The Arabs reported that “Large parts of these muraahil have been taken by the farming communities” (Focus Group, 10 May 2008).

A further issue raised by the nomads was the confiscation of trespassing livestock by farmers and the high fees charged to get them back. Early southwards migration of camels risks them trespassing on cultivated land and grazing crops before harvest. In such cases, “Animals which trespass on the crops are usually taken by the popular defense members to the stray animals’ barns. They charge very high fees to get your animals back. This has left people with great grievances” (Key Informant 2, 5 May 2008).

So, even before 2003, livestock migration was severely disrupted, with access to the north increasingly restricted (including to El Atroun where salts for the camels were available), and pressures to move south earlier than usual brought the nomads into conflict with the Fur. Routes to the south were also disrupted.

With the rebel insurgency in 2003, large tracts of rebel-held areas of Darfur became no-go areas for the Northern Rizaygat camel-herding nomads. For example, their old adversaries the Zaghawa controlled the northern pastures, and the Northern Rizaygat faced the threat of livestock raiding and also abduction or killing of herdsmen, which was increasingly common.

In North Darfur, livestock is currently concentrated in the areas between Kutum and Kebkabiya, which provides alternative pasture for the Arab livestock to graze as they cannot move north beyond Kutum (Key Informant 1, 1 May 2008). To the south, they can move up to the Chadian borders to the south of West Darfur.

In the last few months, southerly movements from North Darfur on the eastern Murhal in Kas and Zalingei in South and West Darfur were blocked because the inhabitants of these areas refused to allow the nomads to pass through their homelands. This generated tribal conflict, for example between the Northern Rizaygat and the Turgem, who were believed to be worried that the Northern Rizaygat might settle in the Turgem homeland (Focus Group, 30 April 2008). In addition, the arrival of new tribes from Chad through El Geneina and Um Dukhon has complicated matters. The El Waha Administration reported that, in August 2006, around 6000 Chadian Arabs (Owlad Taco and Owlad Jenoub), with their livestock, crossed the borders into Darfur, where they merged with their fellow tribesmen in Darfur. In addition to these groups are refugees from Chad, who enter the region as IDPs and then move to other areas where their related tribes are found.

Another impact of the conflict on livestock migration is that several herds are combined, which means that more armed herdsmen are
available to provide protection. The herds from Nurdan damra in Asernei were migrating northwards to Sirba during the team’s visit and were accompanied by at least twenty-five herders (Focus Group 3, 5 May 2008). The larger herd sizes potentially increase risk of livestock disease transmission and also concentrate environmental pressures on water and pasture (Key Informant 1, 1 May 2008).

**Lack of Visibility of the Losses of the Northern Rizaygat**

The lack of visibility of the losses of the Northern Rizaygat internationally is the result of many factors. The widely publicized losses and serious harm incurred by the displaced in 2003 over a wide area naturally obscured from broader international view the relatively fewer and less conspicuous losses experienced by the Northern Rizaygat. This was in part because of the scale, ferocity, and orchestration of the counterinsurgency militia/air force attacks that were widely reported by human rights groups and the media, with relatively little reporting of humanitarian needs of all groups based on assessments. The international advocacy campaigns, combined with a vocal opposition movement among the western diaspora, also presented the Arab groups in a poor light.

But the lack of visibility of the losses of the Northern Rizaygat is also because of the lower ‘visibility’ of pastoralists generally. Nomads are in the minority in the Darfur region and are living either a nomadic lifestyle, or in damar on the outskirts of recognized settlements (rarely visited by the international community or media).

Another reason for their lack of visibility is the different ways they had been affected by conflict and their different ways of responding. For example, attitudes to displacement and moving to IDP camps among the pastoralist aballa and baggara are different from those of the sedentarized Masalit, Fur, Zaghawa, and other Darfuri tribes, who in the past have migrated to towns and camps as a coping strategy to drought (distress migration). Many of the Northern Rizaygat left their original homes to join their fellow tribesmen for their own protection. Similarly, in South Darfur, the tribal conflicts that erupted in 2006 later resulted in displacement of Arab baggara, not to IDP camps and towns, but to the home areas of relatives and friendly tribes (Young et al., 2007).

Attitudes to displacement do vary, and it is important for humanitarian response to consider and take this into account when planning programs with regard to targeting and distribution.

Increasingly, some Darfur analysts are reviewing and commenting on the attacks on Arabs by rebel groups (Flint, 2006; de Waal, 2008; McCrummen, 2007). The International Commission of Inquiry in 2005 also documented some rebel attacks and verified witness testimonies with thorough investigations in the field: “an attack described to the Commission by some eyewitnesses, where members of the nomadic Rezeigat [Rizaygat] tribe were attacked while in the Kulbus area by members of the SLA and JEM. The attackers killed forty-eight persons including women and children and stole property and livestock from the market and then destroyed it. The victims were buried many days after the attack in areas surrounding Kulbus” (International Commission of Inquiry, 2005, para. 287).

**Pastoralist Livelihoods: From Marginalization to Maladaptations**

The livelihoods of the Northern Rizaygat have gone through a rapid transformation over the past five years. Their former pastoralist livelihoods revolved around seasonal livestock migrations, livestock trade, and trade of animal products, combined often with export trade and labor migration to both Libya and Egypt. This livelihood profile has changed dramatically. Their former nomadic lifestyles cannot be sustained in the current insecurity, particularly as critical grazing areas are out of reach. Partly as a result of this, the Northern Rizaygat have adapted and diversified their livelihoods in this new environment. Influences on their livelihood goals are discussed in Chapter 5.

**Livestock**

As well as camels, the Rizaygat aballa traditionally kept sheep, goats, and sometimes cattle. Sheep and camels serve different purposes. In a region of extreme climate variability, camels provide insurance against drought, investments for the future, and a means to relocate rather than exhaust local resources. Sheep provide daily needs and can be readily sold (more easily than a camel) and sheep investments are converted to camels for
Importance of Camels

Although most of the inhabitants of Umm el Garra claimed to have come there because of the loss of livestock, especially camels, interviewees were unanimous in saying that camel-raising was the “most important” activity. This is clearly a cultural bias reflecting the importance of their continuing identity as abbala (camel nomads). However, it was also clear that many of the interviewees were still involved in camel rearing, the herds being tended by young men of the families, outside the damra. These herdsmen still take camel herds on migrations, traveling north as far as Jabal an-Nos (Halfway Mountain). In the south, camels are taken as far as Nyala. The camels are often away from the area of the damra for the entire rainy season. A few camels are sold in local markets, but most go to Umm Burru, which has taken over from the Al Geneina as the most important camel market in recent years. Some camels are taken for sale in an-Nahud in Kordofan.

Cattle

Cattle are also raised by some, but not all, inhabitants of Umm el Garra. The cattle are kept outside the damra in herds shared by two to three owners, who club together to hire herdsmen. The herdsmen are almost entirely hired from non-Arab tribes such as the Masaliit and Daju. A herdsman is paid an average of £Sud. 80 per month, plus food and drink. Interviewees said that these herdsmen were generally trustworthy, although they preferred to recruit older rather than younger men for the job.

The cattle are taken on limited migrations in the area. A few are kept in the damra for milk. Cattle are sold in the market of Al Geneina, mostly to local butchers, although Al Geneina market is said to have declined. A few are sold in the market of Ardametta. In Al Geneina market, a fat bullock goes for about £Sud. 700, and a small cow or bullock for about £Sud. 500. An average family of fifteen persons can expect to sell between six and eight beasts per year.

Sheep and Goats

Although interviewees claimed that the herding of camels and cattle is more important than the raising of sheep and goats, it is clear that the latter are of greater economic importance. In the damra close to Al Geneina, most inhabitants have sheep (goats are much fewer) and sheep flocks are herded outside the damra by hired shepherds, on a similar basis to that of cattle-herding, the herdsmen mostly belonging to non-Arab tribes. A shepherd is paid according to the size of the flock, £Sud. 80 if less than 300 head, £Sud. 100 if over 300 head. Sheep are sold in the markets of Ardametta and Al-Gineina, where a fat ewe goes for between £Sud. 100 to 120, and a ram for about £Sud. 150. The few goats are kept mainly for milk. An average family of fifteen can expect to sell twenty to thirty sheep and goats per year.

Horses and Donkeys

Horses are bred, but more often bought, by inhabitants of Umm el Garra, the current cost of a stallion being between £Sud. 600 and 700. Horses are used for transport, but are more important commercially for pulling horse-carts, which are used to transport firewood and hay. In rural areas, horses are useful for chasing and catching camel raiders (Focus Group, 3-4 May 2008). Horses are fed on sorghum, a horse consuming a sack every fifteen days. The cost of maintaining a horse is thus about £Sud. 200 per month.

Donkeys are also used to pull carts, but are considered less commercially valuable than horses, since a donkey has to make two trips to the firewood collection area to bring back the same amount as one horse.
future needs. Milk products enabled them to exchange and barter with local farming communities.

Even today, camels are the clear cultural preference of all groups, although it is widely understood that sheep and goats are more ‘economic’ (Focus Group 3, 5 May 2008) (see Box 11). In West Darfur, the population and relative importance of camels has reportedly diminished as a result of: diseases (in part because of restricted migration routes, see earlier section); loss of camels through raiding; and loss of herders because of militia recruitment and killings. In West Darfur, it was reported that in the past there were many more camels, and fewer sheep and goats, but this has now reversed, with increasing numbers of sheep and goats (Focus Group 1, 2 May 2008, 6 May 2008). This might also be because of the recent wetter years and lower population density in rural areas and therefore greater access to natural resources that has favored sheep and goats.

Before the conflict, many Arabs living in the damar would employ herders to look after their livestock, for payments of approximately thirteen sheep annually and one to two young camels, depending on the quality of the labor. In addition, herders are given all their food supplies. Since the war started, most of the labor joined the military groups, thus creating a shortage of herders for hire (Key Informant 1, 4 May 2008).

The number or proportion of ‘true nomads’ (those who follow a transhumant lifestyle) is almost impossible to estimate given their rural dispersal, mobility, and small encampments. To make it even more difficult to gauge, rural roads are rarely, if ever, travelled by the international humanitarian community, or even by Sudanese who are not from these tribes.5

Currently, in the settlements around Kebkabiya and in West Darfur few abbala depend totally on livestock. For example, in El Hara Garb, only one family owned more than fifty camels (Focus Group 2, 9 May 2008).

Livestock Health

Livestock health is an important concern of all abbala. Various livestock diseases were mentioned, some with relatively high mortality. Um bardab (hemorrhagic septicemia), which occurs especially at the beginning of the rainy season, has a mortality rate that ranges from 100 to 200 deaths in the Zariba region (Sheikh Abdal Bagi area) (Focus Group 2, 4 May 2008). Tick infestation and tick-borne disease currently need attention. The blocked migration routes, which were described earlier, have confined herds to more restricted grazing areas, thus affecting their health and contributing to excess deaths. The reported livestock diseases included haemonchosis and tick-borne diseases (Case 1, 10 May 2008; Case 2, 11 May 2008). Livestock vaccination was recently implemented by the International Committee of the Red Cross in collaboration with the Ministry of Livestock Resources. Livestock drugs can be bought commercially in the main markets.

Traditional Artisanry

Leather work, saddlery, blacksmithing, and handcrafts (mats, pots, storage containers) featured strongly as part of the nomadic culture. Women explained how they sold and bought animal hides in the market. They treat cowhides to make garfa, large saddle bags for storing millet. Before the war, they used to make leather rope, baskets from local materials, and gourds for storage with leather handles, but currently they only make these items for their own use and not for sale (Focus Group 3, 5 May 2008). Traditionally, women make the howdaj (the litter placed over the camel saddle in which the senior women rides) and the tent structures (the tent canvas is bought from Libya). The Misseriya in Al Geneina are famous camel-saddle makers.

Livestock Trade to Libya and Egypt

Before the war, the livestock trade to Libya (Kufra and Sebha) and Egypt supported many Arab abbala. This trade involved a large number of Northern Rizaygat who worked as herdsmen, drovers, guides, agents, guarantors, and traders.6 Livestock routes to Egypt and Libya are currently open, but, for the last five years, the routes have been totally controlled and dominated by the Zaghawa, mostly of the sub-tribe Bedeyat, and blocked to Arab traders (Key Informant 1, 1 May 2008; Focus Group 2, 6 May 2008; Key Informant, 7 May 2008). The route was blocked as a result of insecurity following the murder of ten camel drovers and the confiscation of 3,000 camels in April 2003, near Wadi Hawar, en route to Libya (Young et al., 2005). This incident was well-remembered by key informants during the current study (Key Informant 2, 5 May 2008) and...
reportedly neither the livestock nor many of the herdsmen were recovered.

Kebkabiya previously had many Arab traders, but currently there are just three engaged in the livestock trade: one is an old man working as a guarantor for the Arabs in the Kebkabiya livestock market, the other is a middle man, and the third is involved in trade to Libya (Key Informant, 7 May 2008). In Al Geneina, there are apparently no agents now, only guarantors (Key Informant 1, 2-4 May 2008). Elsewhere, the Arab livestock trade is mostly limited to trading locally for local consumption (Key Informant, 7 May 2008).

There are important differences in the export trade to Egypt and Libya. Currently, the market demand in Libya is 1000 to 2000 young camels (one year old and less) per week. The average price is £Sud. 800 to 1000, and sellers do not need any documents or certification from the government to be sold. In contrast, the market in Egypt requires camels to be older, between 7-10 years old. These camels are usually sold for the price of £Sud. 1300-1500, in addition to the veterinary fees, taxes, and zakhat (giving of alms). This means that trading here requires traders to have larger capital compared to that needed for trade with Libya. In addition, older camels are less available and it takes time to find them. Consequently, far fewer camels go to Egypt. The rate is two debka per month, i.e., 200 camel a month (Key Informant, 7 May 2008).

The route from Seraf Omra goes from Kas to Nyala to the north of Ed Daein, then from El Obeid to Dongola, and finally to Darwa in Egypt, where camels are handed to the Egyptian traders. Before the war, the trade route to Egypt or Libya was through Mellit, which was dominated by Arab traders.

There is also a southerly livestock trading route through Nyala, towards the eastern side through Misseriya lands and the Nuba Mountains, which takes longer, up to three to four months, to get to the Red Sea and up to Egypt. This “creates a lot of grievances,” including higher taxes en route (Key Informant, 27 April 2008).

Secret Trading Agreements
The trade route to Libya is open for the Zaghawa under the protection of the rebels (Focus Group 2, 6 May 2008), or, to put it another way, the Libyan market is controlled by the Zaghawa (Key Informant, 27 April 2008). However, small numbers of Arab traders make agreements and payments to Zaghawa traders who take the animals to Libya. According to one Arab leader, this reduces Arab profit margins and fuels grievances (Key Informant, 27 April 2008).

The route to Libya starts from Saraf Omra (north of Al Geneina between El Tina and Kulbus), where traders have to pay taxes or fees to the opposition in order to use it. The route goes from El Tina to Baw, and then through the desert to Hawash, between Libya and Sudan, and then to El Kufra or Sabha. The role of the Arab traders is limited to Saraf Omra (Key Informant, 7 May 2008). These secret trading arrangements between some of the Arabs and the Zaghawa were confirmed by interviewees in rural fariig and damar in West Darfur.

Labor Migration to Libya
Male labor migration is another long-standing livelihood strategy of the Northern Rizaygat, and travelling from Darfur to Libya in order to work was an aspiration of most young men before the war (Key Informant 1, 2-4 May 2008). This migration is supported by the Mahamid diaspora in both Egypt and Libya, who first went there by camel (Key Informant 2, 1 May 2008). For the Arab abbala, Libya was relatively accessible, since they were able to work their passage as a drover in a camel caravan, or, with their camel, joined a guide and larger group travelling together. With the advent of mechanized transport in the 1970s, the lorry routes to Libya expanded and it became possible for much larger numbers of Darfuris, including Northern Rizaygat and other Sudanese, to travel to Libya.

Married and unmarried men would work in Libya for up to about five years. Some go to earn money for their dowry and to buy livestock, while others go to support their wives and families, including their parents, back in Darfur. Cash was thought to be more important than goods from Libya, so they could buy goats and camels, but they would also bring back tents (canvas), clothes, tea, soap, and blankets (Focus Group 3, 2 May 2008).

Soon after 2003, it became difficult for Arab labor migrants to travel through Northern Darfur.
to Libya. Many groups in West and North Darfur reported the Darfur route to be blocked after this time, and consequently travelled to Libya through Chad and returned through Northern Egypt and down the Nile to Sudan. The groups displaced from Girair in North Darfur to Kebkabiya reported that after they left Girair there had been no communication with their contacts in Libya and Egypt and that many migrants had returned (Focus Group 2, 6 May 2008). In one group near Kebkabiya, out of fifteen men who were in Libya before the conflict, only three remained (Focus Group 3, 2 May 2008).

In West Darfur, the situation was a little different. In the damra near Asernei, women thought that there were many more men in Libya currently as compared with before the conflict. They estimated that sixty to seventy men were currently in Libya from this community. Partly they went to sell their livestock and partly to bring back aish (food). Libya seems to be the main destination for the Arab tribes. This could be explained by the knowledge of the route, the relatively easy and inexpensive travel to Libya, minimum documentation requirements, and the presence of other relatives who could provide support and help to them as immigrants. On the other hand, there seems to be very few diaspora in Europe or the US, as these destinations might require social networks and a level of education which the Northern Rizaygat do not have.

Cultivation Increasing

Since the seventies, the dependence of the Northern Rizaygat on rainfed cultivation has been increasing, with the majority undertaking some cultivation prior to 2003. In El Hara Gharb near Kebkabiya, for example, they explained that “all families in El Hara cultivate, except for the nomads” (Focus Group 1, 9 May 2008), clearly distinguishing between settled families and the transhumant nomads who visit the settlement.

Box 12. Recent Experiences of Returned Migrants

Case 1 (Case 1, 5 May 2008)

Khalil went to El Kufra by camel, and stayed for four years, from 1998 to 2002. He went to earn a living and to raise the money for a dowry so that he could get married. He traveled with a Zaghawa guide and there were about seventy other people, each with their own camel. Most were mixed Arab Darfuri tribes (abbala/baggara) and there were also one or two Masalit or Fur. His route was from Tine to Erdy to Aya, which took sixteen days, and from there to Kufra, another twenty-five days’ journey. He didn’t pay for the guide services up front, rather he paid the £Sud. 1500 after he had made some money in Libya. He used to send money back to his parents, which was hand-carried.

Case 2 (Case 2, 6 May 2008)

Occasionally, individual labor migrants were able to travel through North Darfur as part of larger groups in 2003. One returned migrant who travelled to Libya in 2003 in order “to escape the problems” described how he left for Libya in July 2003, because “life became hard.” He travelled in a convoy of twelve lorries, each with between fifty and eighty people on board, which started in Mellit. They travelled from Mellit to Harar, to Donky Issa and then on to Gharab el Toyb and Aweinat on the border. At Aweinat, the lorry driver took all their papers and passports (issued in Al Geneina) and gave them to the Libyan authorities. Your passport is given back once you successfully pass a blood test and then you can go anywhere. Labor migrants would prepare millet porridge, using firewood collected on their journey, and would share a jerry can of water between two (approximately 3.5 L water per person per day). The convoy included all Darfur tribes, but he thought probably more non-Arab than Arab. Despite the problems at the time in Darfur, there were no problems on the route. He worked in Tripoli in trade and stayed two years and three months. He thought more married men than single men go to Libya.
seasonally. On average for this group, the size of the cultivable area per family is two to four mukhamas, with each mukhamas producing around ten sacks, which is roughly the annual requirement of a family of five (Focus Group 1, 9 May 2008). Grain is generally not sold but kept to feed the household. In other areas further north (Damrat Mesri, Kutum), they reported lower levels of cultivation before the conflict of only one to two mukhamas, producing only five sacks of millet, and claimed that currently they purchased their cereal from the market (Focus Group 1, 5 May 2008).

Semi-nomadic groups reported a system where the group (men and women) help in preparing the land and planting and leave behind a number of people to harvest the crops, usually older people (Family Focus Group, 4 May 2008; Focus Group, 3-4 May 2008).

In West Darfur, Arab groups around Wadi Rati have been cultivating since about 1983, just after the drought years. Before, they believed that if you stayed in one place the animals would die. They cultivate a wide range of horticultural crops in the alluvial soils of the Wadi during the rainy season (Focus Group 1, 2 May 2008). Women and men share the work, and they use either a horse or a camel, led by the woman while the man takes the plough.

Many other groups in West Darfur have only been cultivating more recently and with mixed success. As one women’s focus group explained: “we plant, the rain is few, the livestock eat the plants. We can’t avoid this as in the night they graze the fields” (Focus Group 3, 2 May 2008). As a result, their harvest is very small.

Access to Cultivated Land

In areas where Arab groups have not been displaced and have been settled since before 2003, they are cultivating nearly the same areas as they had farmed before (Focus Group 3, 2 May 2008; Focus Group 3, 5 May 2008). In the established damar, like Nurad near Asernei, access to land is still controlled through the local Sheikh, and the Arabs who have arrived since 2003 have had to clear the land before farming. The wadi land in this area near Asernei is owned mostly by Masalit, who employ some Arab women as agricultural laborers.

Similarly, in Umm el Garra, the damra close to Ardamatta, many interviewees claimed that before settling in the damra they had no knowledge of cultivation, but learned it partly from settled people, partly by trial and error (Focus Group 1, 6 May 2008). Most cultivated plots assigned to the damra were originally in Wadi Arbukni, but, in 2003, the government declared the area forestland, and many cultivators were obliged to move to areas outside the wadi, where only goz (sandy soil) cultivation is possible. Plots are still available in the ‘forest’ land, but this land now falls outside the hakura system. To obtain a plot in the forest area, a farmer has to apply to the Forestry Department. If the farmer wants to dig a well, he has to do the work himself, and pay an annual tax of £Sud. 50 per feddan (1 feddan = 0.42 hectare). If the farmer does not require a well, the tax is £Sud. 15 per year, per feddan. In the wadi, the inhabitants of Umm el Garra cultivate millet,

Box 13. Case: Nomad Becoming Farmer

An older man explained how he first learned to cultivate in 1984, around the Damar Um Kaytero, in Dar Beni Hussein. At that time, he went to the Nazir, then to the Omda, who showed him the land he could cultivate. Payments/fees to the Omda were only due if the harvest succeeded and varied from five to six sacks, depending on the harvest. Currently, he is living in the Galala area and last year produced seven sacks of millet (in a year he needs twenty sacks, so had to buy thirteen sacks). He had to clear the land before he cultivated it, which he claimed under customary law meant he now was the owner (hashm el fass, the right to cultivate land that you clear yourself, not previously cultivated by others) (Focus Group 1, 4 May 2008). Like many of the Mahamid, he explains that cultivation is important as it provides them aish, but is not as important as their sheep, for eating and selling in the souq (Kerenic, Asernei, and Al Geneina). Once or twice a month, he sells on average two sheep.
sorghum, ground-nuts, potatoes, okra, onions, Jew’s mallow, tomatoes, tick-beans, cucumber, squash, and other vegetables. On the goz soil, cultivation is almost exclusively millet. Vegetables are sold in local markets.

Around Kebkabiya, many of the Arab groups interviewed, including those displaced from further north, were cultivating land on a share-cropping basis with the original owners (Focus Group 1, 9 May 2008). The landowners, who were mostly displaced to Kebkabiya, provide all the agricultural inputs, and the crop is divided equally between both of them. If the landowner does not provide the inputs, then the harvest is divided on the basis of 2:1.

In summary, the main difference in agricultural practices from before the crisis is that an increasing number of Arab pastoralists are settling and, in so doing, a larger number are cultivating crops, with mixed success. But even though there may be more trying to cultivate, from the various proportional piling exercises in West Darfur, the relative importance of cultivation as a source of food and income has declined, as other livelihood strategies have been developed, such as firewood collection (see Figure 7). The links between cultivation, sedentarization, and land occupation are considered in chapter 5.

Diversification of Livelihood Strategies

In addition to the changes in pre-existing livelihood strategies described above, most abballa households have expanded and diversified their livelihood strategies since the beginning of the conflict in 2003. Figure 6 shows the shift in strategies for a group north of Kutum. While the importance of livestock and trade (presumably livestock trade) has diminished, military salaries have come to dominate people’s livelihood strategies.

This pattern of declining trade was not universal. For example, in Umm el Garra damra close to Al Geneina, groups were engaged in a variety of trading activities linked to renting property, hiring vehicles, renting wheel barrows, and water selling.8

Despite this apparent thriving economic activity, informants were quick to point out that very few members of the Northern Rizaygat have salaried ‘professional’ jobs, such as teachers, police, and nurses. There are also few working for international organizations in any domain, including professionals, drivers, translators, or guards (Key Informant, 26 April 2008). They also complained that the international community did not rent their property, preferring instead to rent from the non-Arab tribes (Focus Group 1, 5 May 2008).

Figure 6. Shift in Livelihood Strategies of Mahamid Arab Aballa in Barka Alla, North of Kutum, North Darfur (Focus Group, 11 May 2008)
Military Salaries
Military salaries were important to the groups in Kutum and Kebkabiya in North Darfur, and also to the groups in the damar close to Al Geneina as shown in Figure 7. In the damna of Umm el Garra close to Ardamatta, many of the young men serve in the irregular army. Perhaps as much as 50% of households have one or more young men serving. Almost all interviewees expressed approval of this service. When asked, they weren’t worried about their sons/brothers getting killed or injured. They answered to the effect that it was “honorable” to die (Focus Group 1, 6 May 2008). They did not express any concern that military duties were taking the young men from more traditional activities, or show concern about the moral effect of such service on their youth. Militia service brings in £Sud. 300 per month.

In the more rurally-based faraig in West Darfur and among the true nomads, they claimed not to be receiving any military-related remuneration. Women in women’s focus groups in Nur el Huda (Galala) and Nurdan (Asernei) said they had no men working as part of the military and receiving salaries. They explained that they did not want their men to be regular soldiers in the army, as this would require them to go away and be recruited and trained in mixed regiments. Rather, they wanted them to join the defa shebeh (the untrained, civilian army). They explained that a member of the defa shebeh receives about £Sud. 250 to 300 every month, which was considered a lot of money, so definitely they were wanting that work for their families (Focus Group 3, 2 May 2008; Focus Group 3, 5 May 2008). Processes of militarization are discussed in Chapter 5.

Firewood and Grass Collection
Since the beginning of the conflict in 2003, firewood collection has increased significantly as a source of income for Northern Rizaygat groups. The increase in firewood and grass collection is a significant, relatively new source of cash income, especially for women.

Figure 7 shows that before 2003, in West Darfur, there was no income from firewood but after 2003 this amounted to more than 20% of the overall household income (all sources) (Focus Group 3, 2 May 2008). While the importance of livestock had stayed relatively the same, the importance of agriculture had decreased by about half, and labor migration to Libya had ceased altogether. The one area that had grown substantially since the beginning of the conflict is the sale of firewood.

For some women, this was the first time they had disposable income, and one woman described this as “a beautiful thing – now I participate in getting the food” (Focus Group 3, 5 May 2008). Before 2003, many groups were not involved in firewood collection (Focus Group 1, 2 May 2008). Firewood collection only started since the war began. Displacement led to the development of a captive market for firewood among the IDPs.

Firewood practices depend on proximity to markets and particularly on large concentrations of IDPs. In rural West Darfur, camel caravans loaded up with firewood heading for Al Geneina.

Box 14. The Link Between Collection of Firewood and Gender-based Violence

The study did not investigate the links between firewood collection and armed violence, particularly gender-based violence. Numerous reports on this exist, and include evidence based on testimonies (Martin, 2007; Gingerich and Leaning, 2004; UNHCR and UNMIS, 2006; Unicef, 2006). The human rights reports have tended to ignore the perpetrators and their motivations other than seeing gender-based violence as a war strategy intended to destroy and undermine the enemy. They have failed to recognize that it could also represent a means of controlling access to natural resources, and thereby is linked to contested livelihood assets. This has implications for the nature and range of the international response to gender-based violence. Gender-based violence does not only affect the non-Arab displaced groups. In North Darfur, women from the Zayadiyya tribe, an Arab abbala group who were displaced from rural areas into the town of Mellit, reported their fear of attack from rebel groups if they were to leave the town to collect firewood or return to their fields.
are a common sight. A typical caravan is about ten to fifteen camels, generally led by armed men and boys. It can take three days or more for the caravan to travel to market and return, so generally only two are sent per week. Dead wood is collected by children and women, and then each household sends one or two camels as part of a larger camel caravan escorted by two or three men, who take it to sell in Al Geneina to private households, not to merchants (Family Focus Group, 4 May 2008). In this particular community, they believed that every one of the 100 households in the same area was engaged in this work. One camel load sells for about £Sud. 25, so one household can easily make from between £Sud. 200 to £Sud. 400 per month based on two caravans per week, and one to two camels per household.

In West Darfur, Arab groups living closer to Al Geneina, e.g., in the damar around Ardamatta, use horse or donkey carts to gather firewood and hay, often making two journeys per week (Focus Group 1, 6 May 2008). For them, firewood is available at a distance of about thirty-five km from the damar, requiring a round trip of two days, over-nighting in the khala (bush). A cart-load of firewood is sold in the market in Al Geneina or Ardamatta for between £Sud. 50 to 60. The profit from the sale of firewood for cart-owners is between £Sud. 250 to 280 per month (comparable to a militia salary). Cart-owners also collect hay (gashsh) in season (summer months), bringing about £Sud. 40 to 50 per cartload, about £Sud. 200 per month (Focus Group 1, 6 May 2008).

Not all Arab households collect and sell firewood. The traditional nomads said they were too busy and could not spare anybody to do this (Family Focus Group, 4 May 2008). Similarly, an older man, and head of a fariig, said it was somehow shameful to collect and sell firewood, “some things he cannot speak of” (Focus Group 1, 4 May 2008). But for others, “it’s easy, children collect it, and we sell it in Geneina” (Focus Group 3, 2 May 2008), and, as some women remarked, it’s preferable work compared with agricultural labor in the wadi (Focus Group 3, 5 May 2008).

**Figure 7. Shift in Livelihood Strategies in Nur el Huda (near Gokal), West Darfur (Focus Group 3, 2 May 2008)**
Brick-making
In West Darfur, some Arab inhabitants of the damra close to Ardamatta partly own, or work in, brick kilns (Focus Group 1, 6 May 2008). There has always been a brick-making industry in the area, but it has grown with the influx of IDPs into Al Geneina. Informants said that most of the workers, in Arab-owned kilns, are Arabs (Focus Group 1, 6 May 2008). Similarly, in the damra close to Asernei, men and women make bricks, which they say they learned from the other tribes. They are also trying to become more skilled in brick-laying and building small houses for themselves, including thatching, which is an entirely new skill for them and a very different form of housing (Focus Group 3, 5 May 2008).

Strategies of Women
The conflict has had a massive impact on the livelihood strategies of Arab women, especially those living in damra close to urban areas where new market opportunities have arisen. In West Darfur, in the damra close to Asernei and Ardamatta, women reported a diversification of livelihood strategies to include many activities they would not previously have engaged in or engaged in to a small degree. Examples are: collection of firewood and grass by donkey; brick-making; thorn fences construction; agricultural labor in the wadi farms; and transportation of agricultural produce by donkey coach (Focus Group 3, 5 May 2008). This diversification shows how flexible and adaptable livelihood systems are as these former pastoralists engage in the strategies previously followed by the former rural residents, who are now IDPs.

Conclusions: From Marginalization to Maladaptations

Several important points emerge from this discussion the experiences of the Northern Rizaygat and the impact of the conflict on their livelihood strategies. First, these groups were directly affected by the conflict and insecurity, in terms of violent attacks, livestock raiding, blocked migration routes, kidnappings, and killings. As a result, they moved to safer areas, and were in fact displaced. These effects have generally received little acknowledgement, let alone response, i.e., they lacked visibility, except in a very negative sense. Various reasons for the lack of visibility of the losses of the Northern Rizaygat have been discussed earlier, and include: the scale of the counterinsurgency and the human rights reporting on this; the low visibility of pastoralists generally; and the way in which western models of vulnerability and displacement tend to prioritize IDPs in camps and towns over other affected categories of displaced.

There has also been a massive impact on the livelihood strategies of the Northern Rizaygat, particularly pastoralism and livestock herding, in terms of the severe contraction of the centuries old pastoralist domain and the rapid trend towards more sedentarized lifestyles. The displacement of many rural farmers to towns and camps has given pastoralists the upper hand in these rural areas, but, at the same time, it has removed a critical part of the social and economic fabric of their society. The absence of rural farming communities has destroyed local markets, which nomads depend on to buy essential goods and to sell their own produce. At the same time, the increasingly urbanized IDPs represent a captive market for firewood, grass, etc., as they are constrained from directly accessing these natural resources themselves. Firewood, especially in West Darfur, provides a significant and relatively new source of income for the increasingly sedentarized pastoralists.

As the Northern Rizaygat adapt and diversify into new livelihood strategies, these are often maladaptive in the sense that they are short-term, war-related strategies that provide quick returns but have no future as they are not based on any legal entitlement or right. Rather, they may depend on either a distorted market, in which IDPs are captive, or, alternatively, they are linked to conflict, violence, intimidation, and possibly coercion (militarization and possibly violence as a means of controlling firewood resources). The grossly distorted economy provides these groups with a cheap source of food in the form of food aid for use as animal fodder, while the large numbers of humanitarian aid workers, peacekeepers, and even IDPs provide a market for their livestock, livestock products, and firewood. IDPs depend to a large extent on buying their firewood from the market for cooking, and claim they are prevented by insecurity and the threat of gender-based violence from collecting it themselves. In addition, the war has provided the Northern Rizaygat with their first regular, salaried income, as government-backed militia.
There are several extremely serious consequences of these livelihood maladaptations: first, that acts of violence and intimidation associated with livelihood maladaptations are an abuse of human rights; second, that livelihood maladaptations negatively affect the livelihoods of others by preventing them from going about their business; and third, that the livelihood maladaptations of the Arab *abbala* fuel tensions between them and other groups, thus generating further polarization and potentially local conflict, thus reinforcing the livelihoods-conflict cycle. Maladaptive livelihood strategies are not only unsustainable in terms of their illicit nature, they are incompatible with localized peace, wider economic recovery, and sustainable environmental governance.

These shifts in livelihood strategies have directly affected the livelihood assets portfolio of the Northern Rizaygat. At first glance, certain livelihood capitals would appear to have increased, particularly as a result of two factors: increased financial capital (through military salaries, livestock, and firewood sales); and increased access to natural resources (in terms of better access to water, pasture, and cultivable land within a more confined area, i.e., within the contracted pastoralist domain). But even though financial and natural resources appear to be increased (with the exception of the contracting pastoralist domain), this is based almost entirely on maladaptive strategies linked to the war economy, forced displacement, the captive market of IDPs, conflict, and violence. It is not based on legal rights and entitlements and therefore has no foundation. At the same time, social, human, and political capital have further decreased below what were already extremely low levels before 2003. This distinctive and very skewed pattern of livelihood assets is illustrated in Figure 8. Note this figure is a figurative illustration of the typical pattern, rather than based on actual indicators for each of these different types of assets.

Figure 9 compares the asset portfolio of the camel nomads with an approximation of the livelihood assets of IDPs, which shows how they are qualitatively different from each other. While the IDPs are extremely food-insecure as a result of their restricted livelihoods and limited access to farmland and natural resources generally, the camel nomads are relatively food-secure. Up to May 2007, IDPs received a full food basket or ration, which met their average nutritional requirements, and benefitted from a range of humanitarian programs, including adult literacy and skills training, that collectively contributed to their human and physical capital. Without such interventions, the health and nutritional status of IDPs would have undoubtedly suffered. But their circumstances of forced displacement has meant loss of livelihoods, hence major loss of income and financial capital, and loss of access to natural resources, i.e., their former farms. This comparison is intended only to illustrate major differences rather than to provide an exact comparison.

The next chapter describes the wider processes at play that have undermined these particular livelihood capitals, and generated an extremely skewed livelihood assets portfolio that reflects the particular vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat.

**Figure 8. A Comparison of the Typical Pattern of Livelihood Assets for the Camel Nomads**
Interviews with tribal leaders in Kebkabiya, North Darfur, October 5th and 6th, 2004 (as part of Young et al., 2005)

The Tama had previously been offered weapons and training for self-defense purposes by the Governor of North Darfur, but had declined, recognizing that they would not necessarily be able to control these groups once trained. Interview with Tama Leader in Kebkabiya, October 6th, 2004

This view was echoed in focus groups and key informant interviews at all levels, in farīg, rural areas, state capitals, and Khartoum.

We had to travel off-road and actively search for these groups, taking directions from anyone that we met. We eventually met a nomad family in the process of putting up their tent and making camp.

The trade routes between North Darfur and Egypt are ancient. Scholars suggest the Forty Days Road (Darb el Arbaein) was in operation for more than 1,000 years.

About thirty of the inhabitants of Umm el Gurra own shops, but few of them are actively involved in retail selling. A plot in the marketplace is rented from the government for a deposit of £Sud. 1,000, paid only once, plus a small additional monthly rent. The cost of building the shop itself is about £Sud. 10,000. The shops are then hired by retailers at a cost of between £Sud. 100 to 150. There are about forty motor-vehicles in the damra, varying from 6-liter Toyota Landcruiser pick-ups to small saloon cars or sedans used as taxis. A taxi brings in about £Sud. 60 to 70 per day, less about £Sud. 25 for the cost of petrol. A Landcruiser brings in about £Sud. 200. Some inhabitants of the damra own wheelbarrows, which are rented out to professional porters in the markets of Ardametta and Al Geneina. The wheelbarrows (sing. barwiita, pl. barawiit) are rented for £Sud. 2 per day. Some of the population of Umm el Gurra own donkeys and double water-skins (sing. khurij, pl. khurja). Water-carrying and selling from local bore-wells (sing. donki, pl. dawaanki) earns between £Sud. 5 and 10 per day. No donkey-cart-borne steel water-tanks (sing. fanTas, pl. fanaaTiiς) are used in the damra.
Introduction

The severe contraction of the pastoralist domain over the past five years has been accompanied by maladaptive shifts in livelihood strategies. They are maladaptive because they are so closely linked to war economies, captive IDP markets, conflict, and violence. As such, these livelihoods are unsustainable in the medium- to longer-term, and are particularly destructive of certain livelihood capitals, including human, social, and political capital. This skewed asset portfolio, while providing food security in the short-term, is not conducive to longer-term peace and stability.

To understand how this bleak trajectory came about, it is important to understand the goals and livelihood choices of the Northern Rizaygat, and what drives or influences these choices. These goals are closely linked with seeking power, rights, and influence. This seeking of power includes both the traditional power of the camel and the modern power of education and militarization. Both are driven by a myriad of influences associated with the institutional and policy environment and wider environmental processes.

This chapter describes the post-2003 trends that have influenced the Northern Rizaygat’s vulnerability and future livelihood prospects. These include: processes of sedentarization; youth and militarization; social polarization; loss of local and transnational markets; governance and leadership; and, finally, international processes of exclusion and misrepresentation.

Balancing Livelihood Goals and Seeking Power

The livelihood goals of the Northern Rizaygat are linked to their attempts to acquire power and influence, in large part to address their overwhelming sense of social, economic, and political marginalization. This sense of marginalization is described in Chapter 4. There are three broad means of acquiring power and influence in both traditional and modern domains. These are: first, the traditional role and meaning of camels within nomadic society and how that has shaped relations with the environment and with settled communities at the local level; second, the power of modern education as they see it, in terms of securing influence in tribal affairs and political power more broadly; and, third, the most recent power of militarization, joining the armed forces, as a means of acquiring status, of gaining a regular income, of protecting individual and group interests, and of subjugating or defeating rival groups.

Chapter 5
Power, Exclusion, and Misrepresentation

Power and Importance of Camels, and Pressures on Pastoralism

The cultural significance and economic power of camels is central to status and identity within the nomadic community. Traditionally (and culturally), power within the tribe is vested in the ownership of camels. Many interviewees expressed goals related to getting back to this original nomadic status. This emphasis on security and getting back to the north to their home areas, and also their access to the summer pastures around Wadi Hawa and the Jizzu, was widely echoed among the Northern Rizaygat in North Darfur (less so in West Darfur). They believe “the future of our life is in the north” (Focus Group, 8 May 2008), but this requires security (from the armed forces who evicted them and from the threat of camel raiding) and, as they see it, development projects to enable them to settle (water, education, health, and veterinary services) and, of course, access to their livestock migration routes.

In the past, the Northern Rizaygat’s nomadic lifestyle and love of camels defined their traditional relationship to land, the management of natural resources (water and pasture), and their social relations with settled farmers. This earlier stage of ‘ecological integration’ between nomads and farmers reflects the integration of the two production systems in such a way as to maximize mutual benefits for both groups (Manger, 1990). But, since the seventies, a number of combined pressures have introduced remarkable changes in land-use patterns that have negatively affected pastoralists and their relationships to the people around them. These pressures include:
rapid population growth
increased farming population density in the central cultivating zone and the expansion of millet cultivation and horticulture (possibly linked to new farming technologies, e.g., from shifting to fixed cultivation, increased use of fertilizers, use of donkey ploughs instead of hoes, etc.)
a rapid transformation to a market economy and commercialization of agriculture, particularly livestock, linked to horticulture and citrus fruits
the increased farm-based production of livestock, putting pressure on natural resources, and the increasing use of enclosures
conditions of drought and the growing tendency towards climatic aridity, from the seventies to the nineties, which caused early southwards migration of nomads before the harvest, thus bringing them into conflict with farmers and increasing the risk of livestock morbidity in the south
reported land degradation and reduction in carrying capacity
the impact of legislation (abolition of the Native Administration and its later reinstatement and the Unregistered Land Act), in terms of undermining the Native Administration and local governance and associated systems of land tenure and natural resource management

The combined impacts of these pressures challenged the viability of camel nomadism as a livelihoods system and changed the system from one of ‘ecological integration’ with farmers to one of ‘resource competition’, whereby “the relative political power of farmers and nomads decides their access to land and natural resources” (Manger, 1990, p. 169). Sedentary farmers had the advantage of controlling the hakura (land tenure) in the fertile central zone and were supported by pro-agricultural policies and (to a limited extent) agricultural programs, neither of which supported pastoralism. While farmers could invest in livestock (and hire herders to take care of them), it was less easy for nomads to cross the boundary between the two systems and farm successfully, in part because they could only access land through the hakura controlled by other groups, and therefore would be unlikely to be able to access the more fertile land available (as this would be taken by the hakura holders). At this time, the relative power lay with the farming communities, and the nomads knew it. These inequities were reflected more broadly in political representation (which was linked to land tenure), representation in the civil service (where jobs were dominated by certain tribes), and access to services, particularly education.

The most pressing issue currently threatening the viability of camel nomadism, from the perspective of the nomads, is the security of their livestock migrations, which is linked to the security of their resource tenure. According to Wily (2007), insecure land tenure or access to the resources on the land, such as water or pasture, can affect identity issues, and “the degree of insecurity depends on the comparative power of the person who is seeking to take away rights and the strength of the rights to begin with” (Alden-Wily, 2007, p. 8).

Darfur has witnessed a series of serious power plays around land tenure and access to resources, most recently with the forced displacement of farmers in 2003, and, before that, with the denial of the nomads’ access to their former pastures, both in the north, by the Zaghawa, and in the central zone, by sedentary farmers. Darfur is a context of competing claims to land and natural resources that can only be resolved by recognizing the rights of all groups. This point is often overlooked as priority is often accorded to farmers and holders of the hakura. For example, in the context of the recent peace talks, peace mediators advocate for respect for the hakura system, which could mean implicitly respect for old power relations between farmers and nomads. This risks perpetuating the power imbalances that generated the insecure tenure and local conflict in the first place.

Power of Education
In place of the camel, education has become the perceived means of acquiring modern power and influence within local government and even national politics and was repeatedly raised in interviews. As a group, the Northern Rizaygat are acutely aware of their relative lack of education and, as they described it, ‘ignorance’. There are few statistics available on the literacy rates or
educational achievement levels of pastoralists. A survey by the local NGO Al Massar showed that a little over 10% of the total pastoralist population had ever attended any type of formal education. This estimate relates to all pastoralist groups, including the Southern Rizaygat, Zaghawa, Meidob, Zayadiya, etc. Given the nomadic lifestyle of the Northern Rizaygat, it is almost certain that, for them, this figure is much lower.

During the study in West Darfur, only one community had access to education and that was in Asernei. Of the children included in the 2002 survey, only 5.2%, 8.1% and 7.9% were enrolled in classes 1-4 of school in North, South, and West Darfur respectively. Lack of schools and the cost of education were quoted as the main reasons why children left or did not attend school (Al Massar, 2003).

The nomads interviewed believed that education has given the settled groups an advantage over them in many respects, from acquiring land to registering grievances and to their representation in local, regional, and national arenas, and even to their image in international domains. Their interest in education is about perceptions of improving themselves, their status, and their access to economic and political power. As one women expressed, “For her children she wants them to read, work for the government, to bring them food and treat the animals” (Focus Group 3, 2 May 2008). In another interview, a young woman said “with education, you know if people want to kill you” (Focus Group, 17 October 2008). Both comments illustrate the power that is attached to education, which these groups currently do not have. Education, employment, and services are also directly concerned with realizing claims on the government.

As one very senior Mahamid leader explained, “the man in the bush (khalla) will never be President,” and, for this reason, he was convinced that his people had to settle in order to benefit from development services, including education (Key Informant 2, 2-4 May 2008). In West Darfur, many local Sheikhs believe and have been told explicitly by their leaders that education will not be achieved unless nomads settle and become sedentarized. So, for many, especially among the groups in Western Darfur, education can only be attained by demonstrating that groups have become sedentarized and therefore qualify for delivery of services. This issue of sedentarization and education is explored in more depth below.

**Power of Militarization**

The other means of acquiring modern power is through militarization, by joining the militia. A senior civil society representative estimated that more than 50% of the Arab abbala are receiving salaries as militia. They estimated that there were not less than 20,000 men with monthly militia salaries of £Sud. 300 ($150) (Key Informant 1, 26 April 2008). So, compared with before 2003 and the counterinsurgency, there is a cash injection of more than £Sud. 72 million ($36 million) annually into Northern Rizaygat households. The Arab groups in Seeh Janna explained that £Sud. 300 per month was not a sufficient incentive to fight, and, therefore, they joined the militia in order to take up their own cause (Focus Group, 10 May 2008).

Not all soldiers who fought in the war received monthly salaries or official military identity cards. Protests in recent months by al jundi masloum (unjustly treated soldiers) and al jundi al mansi (the lost soldier, who fought in the war but received neither an official ID nor monthly salaries) have petitioned the government for recompense and recognition, thereby making claims on the government as a group.

The Northern Rizaygat are struggling to strike a balance between these traditional and modern paths to achieving their goals. The camel is associated with cultural identity and long-term traditional goals, while militarization has provided a quick fix for immediate problems, but introduced a whole raft of new and seemingly insurmountable problems (including devastating impact on social relations and knock-on negative impacts on livestock migration).

These traditional and modern goals are competing, if not completely mutually exclusive. The balance between them varies for different groups of Northern Rizaygat. The large numbers who have moved and settled in the urban periphery of towns are actively pursuing livelihoods based around militarization and their new livelihood strategies born out of the conflict and related war economies. Traditional nomadic lifestyles persist in more rural areas, but are being rapidly eroded and seriously challenged by the processes of sedentarization, conflict, and militarization.
Processes of Livelihood Erosion, Exclusion, and Misrepresentation

Livelihood goals and choices are mediated by a myriad of influences associated with the institutional and policy environment. We carefully reviewed the responses of interviewees to determine the predominant issues that they raised. Those issues that came up most frequently included:

- processes of sedentarization
- youth and militarization
- social polarization and local peace
- loss of local and transnational markets
- governance and leadership
- international processes of exclusion and misrepresentation

Processes of Sedentarization and Land Occupation

The pastoralist livelihoods of the Northern Rizaygat are at different stages of transition along a spectrum from true nomads, who do not cultivate or engage in the newer livelihood strategies, to fully sedentarized households, which are rapidly diversifying their livelihood strategies to take advantage of any new opportunities. In between these two extremes are groups at various stages in the process of sedentarization. For example:

- those moving to settle in existing damar (as evidenced by rapidly expanding damar in West Darfur)
- those moving their encampment (fariig) within a much more limited area
- those who have displaced from their home area completely to live temporarily in a safer area close to their kinsmen (around Kebkabiya)

These changes and processes of sedentarization are a result of pressures on livelihoods, particularly the blocking of seasonal migration and conflict, but have also come about in part because of choices driven by the belief that services and development are only attainable by settled communities. In West Darfur, senior Arab leaders have told their people that they must settle if they are to benefit from government services. In many of the communities in West Darfur, people said they had been settled for about five years, which corresponds with the beginning of the conflict.

Overall, this settlement is contributing to more localized concentrations of Northern Rizaygat. Of the areas visited by the study team, these concentrations included the area stretching westwards from Kebkabiya towards Misteriya and Seraf Umra, and the area to the south, east, and north of Al Geneina, but other areas of settlement also exist. Areas of Arab abbala settlement and concentration have tended to occur in locations where concentrations of fellow tribesmen already exist and which are relatively stable. Some observers link this with a grand plan orchestrated by the government, in reciprocation to their supporters, to change the demographic profile of an area and so influence the electoral representation (Key Informant, November 2008).

In the process of settling, the Northern Rizaygat abbala are rapidly diversifying their livelihoods to make the most of the new market opportunities like the sale of firewood, and the development of brick-making efforts. Changes in the damar, such as the considerable increase in size, changes in housing to brick gottiya, and the increase in number of vehicles (Umm el Garra), reflect these processes of sedentarization and the desire for both self-improvement and for gaining access to services and development.

The patterns of displacement and sedentarization do not fit neatly with the sweeping generalizations about ‘land occupation’ by the Arab abbala and reports of entrenched patterns of coercion and exploitation (Box 15). This gives a misleading impression that all recent settlement of Arab abbala is for the purpose of land grabbing and is generally associated with the intimidation and coercion of the former inhabitants. But this is clearly not the case, as suggested by the INTERSOS data (which shows many communities cohabiting peacefully) (INTERSOS and UNHCR, 2008) and also the evidence from this study.

Certainly, the question of land occupation by Arab and Chadian groups is far more nuanced.
than previously represented and securing land through cultivation of the land of others is an over-simplification of this complex issue. Given the importance of the land issue, it will be important to verify and map the patterns of displacement, sedentarization, and land occupation.

Youth and Militarization
Youth are at the forefront of the most significant changes to the livelihoods and culture of the *abbala*. It is mainly youth and young men who are targeted and directly recruited into the civilian army (*defah shabeh*), which provides them and their families with a regular income. Because of the salary and livelihood implications, women are actively encouraging their men to join (Key Informant, 2 May 2008; Focus Group 4, 5 May 2008).

Historically, to be a soldier and part of the military had negative connotations for the *abbala*, but attitudes have changed towards the irregular civilian army. Some are claiming officer positions, and increasingly the military is seen as a route to becoming educated and to ‘development’.

After more than five years of war, militarization has shifted from a trend to a new culture, especially among youth. The role and use of armaments is different from the past. To be *alifseen* (the government’s guards of the international borders) transforms youth into a more ‘professional’ formal group, with a common culture of being a soldier that also provides a livelihood, in a context where ‘professional’ livelihood options are non-existent.

The Northern Rizaygat have generally become more politically aware and the process of militarization has created a strong sense of unity and organization among them. In the past, it was said, “Nahalib wa nasoub” (We were just milking) (Focus Group, 10 May 2008). One group pointed out that now they are recognized by both the government and the different tribal groups in Darfur, which has had a positive impact on their treatment. In addition, some believe that they are now free people who can move anywhere with their military status and military IDs.

Yet respondents noted several negative aspects, particularly the increasing number of widows, without any support, and the corruption in organizing the civilian army. This was attributed right to the top leadership, who have “monopolized all the military jobs and associated salaries” (Focus Group, 30 April 2008). Unfair management generated the protests by the *al jundi al mazloum* movement (the movement of unjustly treated soldiers). The lack of regular payments by the commanders to the irregulars led to the many protests in El Fashir and Kebkabiya. This has now been resolved by formally recruiting the soldiers into the Sudan Armed forces (Focus Group, 30 April 2008; Key Informant, 2 May 2008).

Another negative aspect is the increasing drug trade in which Arabs are involved and for which military vehicles are used. There are reports of widespread use of drugs and alcohol by militarized youth. This has frequently caused tension and conflicts within families (Focus Group 2, 6 May 2008). Reports of *elatfil elmagnoun* (the crazy kid) are widespread in the area around Kebkabiya among the Arabs. Some believed that this habit is “coming from across the borders” (Focus Group, 10 May 2008).

As one respondent noted, these young Arab militants have gone from the bush (*khalla*), where they were herdsmen, to being armed military personnel, in contrast to many of the rebel recruits, who had the benefit of education in between being on the farm and on the front line. This illustrates an important difference between the armed factions on the different sides. This respondent noted that the Arab herders had nothing to lose because they were already forgotten before the war (Focus Group, 30 April 2008). The lack of education of the Arab militants has implications for processes of demilitarization, demobilization, and reintegration of young militants into society.

The danger is that youth now perceive that their goals can be achieved by military means. Youth protected their communities by taking up arms and were backed by their leaders and their women. But this is not the road to peace, reconciliation, and future goals of development.

The involvement of youth in the war is also an issue in terms of their representation and having their voice heard. A civil society representative felt there has to be a genuine process of engagement with youth, which is not controlled by tribal and military leaders (Key Informant, 2 May 2008).

Social Polarization and Peace
Chapters 2 and 3 describe the previous historical relations between the citizens of Darfur and the
There are reports of land occupation, land grabbing, and patterns of communities living under coercion (HRW, 2004; Tanner, 2005, 2006). The statements of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor and the 2005 International Commission of Enquiry reflect this: “At the same time, it seems very possible that the Janjaweed, who are composed of tribes traditionally opposing the three displaced tribes, also benefited from this displacement as they would gain access to land. The Commission found evidence indicating that Arab tribes had begun to settle in areas previously inhabited by the displaced, thus further preventing an eventual return of the displaced” (International Commission of Inquiry, 2005, para. 329). The ICC Office of the Prosecutor states that: “In South and West Darfur, IDPs’ land is being occupied by other tribes, in some cases with GoS acquiescence or active support. As an example, monitoring of destroyed and abandoned Fur and Massalit villages in West Darfur indicates that so far, more than one of every three villages monitored has been occupied by other tribes, including those affiliated with Militia Janjaweed” (Office of the Prosecutor, 2008, para. 96).

INTERSOS has been monitoring the returnee and IDP situation in southern West Darfur, covering 245 villages (INTERSOS and UNHCR, 2008), which is one area within West Darfur (not the entirety of West Darfur as suggested in the Prosecutor’s statement). The INTERSOS reports indicate that ‘Arab nomads’ are ‘squatting’ on the land of abandoned Fur villages. According to James Morton, “The situation is almost certainly not so clear cut as the word ‘squatting’ implies. Arab Fariqs have always farmed in Wadi Salih, in between the Fur villages. Equally the Fur themselves may well have been ‘squatting’ in the sense that the land may never have been formally allocated to them. This pattern of mixed settlement by more than one group – some or all of whose rights to the land are poorly defined – can be found all over Darfur. When there is peace, it is one of the region’s economic strengths. It allows the land to be used in the most flexible and productive way, which is particularly important when the rains are as unreliable as they are in Darfur” (Morton, 2008, p. 5).

Wadi Salih lies within the rich savannah zone, with average rainfall from 500 to 1,000 mm extending from May to October, with most rain from June to August. Traditionally, the pastoralist groups (camel herders) would move into the area only in the dry season as part of their annual migrations. The Wadis and their tributaries in West Darfur (Wadi Salih, Wadi Seirgilong, Wadi Azoum) offer exceptional dry-season grazing and forage, particularly because of the *acacia albeida* (haraz) trees that grow there (see Box 3, Chapter 2).

INTERSOS admits there may have been an issue with the composition of the monitoring team: “the entire team were of African origin and this may have influenced their understanding of the situation and the issues of the area” (INTERSOS and UNHCR, 2008). In addition, they state that “INTERSOS categorizes ethnic groups as “African” to describe the mainly sedentary farming groups of African descent and denotes as “Arab” the largely nomad groups with ancestral links north of the Sahara” (ibid). This overt reference to these external ancestral links reflects a non-Arab narrative, and unwittingly misrepresents the origins of the nomadic groups as outsiders.

A further human rights issue that has been widely reported is the patterns of coercion of Fur groups by Northern Rizaygat tribes, particularly in the area between Kebkabiya and Seraf Umra, and south from there to Zalingei. Reports that describe these arrangements suggest a degree of intimidation and the payment of protection fees (Buchanan Smith and Jaspars, 2006; IRIN, 2006; Young et al., 2005; Jaspars and O’Callaghan, 2008). IRIN estimated in 2006 that, in this area west of Kebkabiya, some 4,000 Fur from twenty different villages decided to remain and were living under ‘protection agreements’ with the tribes who are controlling the area (IRIN, 2006). This issue was discussed at length during four regional livelihood workshops in 2007 by local Sudanese experts, some of whom considered that the issue was indeed more complex than had been represented (Young et al., 2007).
increasing tribal conflict since the 1980s. Often, the conflict was around natural resources, but was exacerbated by national level political players and processes which were beyond the control or management of local forms of governance. For outsiders, the tribal dimension of identity often appears to be at the heart of this conflict (as in the view that it is African versus Arab), but it has been long forgotten that ‘tribes’ are largely a Western concept, and were partly created by colonialists who found it much easier to deal with discreet units. In Darfur, the tribal ‘unit’ provided an effective and cheap method of local administration under colonial rule, but its subsequent evolution has not generated an adequate form of local governance, as it is based on a majority, who hold all the power and minorities, who fall under the administration of more powerful groups.

This has generated long-standing grievances among the Northern Rizaygat, as they have been denied access to their seasonal pastures in the north (the Jizzu), thereby denying them their cultural rights, and have suffered discrimination in terms of their access to services, particularly education.

As explained earlier, the culmination of this denial and discrimination was the rapidity and willingness of the Northern Rizaygat to mobilize in support of the government’s counterinsurgency. Even in the context of long-term processes of polarization, the counterinsurgency in 2003 and 2004 marked the nadir in relations between the Darfuri tribes, as the tactics of war involved the most appalling and brutal violence on a scale never witnessed before. Since the partial signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006, inter-tribal conflict has spread, especially in South Darfur, with more tribes dragged into local tribal conflict, resulting in further displacement, insecurity, and destitution.

This polarization has hit social relations between tribes very hard. Where previously intermarriage between tribes was the norm, divorce between intermarried couples is now reported. Where previously there were strong links and mutual respect between the tribal leaders, now, for many, this is broken completely. The social fabric of Darfur has been torn apart. The forced displacement of the rural residents during 2003 as part of the government’s counterinsurgency operations, which involved the government-backed militia drawn largely from the Northern Rizaygat, has left a legacy of bitterness and hatred among the IDPs towards the Arab aballa, because of the brutal, often violent, displacement and dispossession of their land. One INGO commentator, with three years’ experience in West Darfur, said that the IDPs clearly wanted revenge, while nomads continue to see IDPs as their historical enemy (Key Informant 3, 6 May 2008). They said that if the opportunity were there, both communities would like to see the other thrown out of Darfur. For both groups at this time, all gains of the past five years are guarded jealously, and, for the nomads, the most important gain is their current access to land and natural resources.

As the Arab aballa tribes have become increasingly polarized from the Darfuri tribes who were displaced by the government-backed militia, they have become more cohesive and organized as a confederation. Polarization from other groups has brought them closer together. Divisions still exist, but they are increasingly aware of the external threat and so work together to manage the divisions.

Another aspect of the polarization relates to the differences between Arab aballa living in different domains: those in the khalla (the savanna or bush); those in the peri-urban communities living in the expanding damar relatively close to towns (and IDP camps); and the urbanized Rizaygat in Darfur and those in Khartoum and among the diaspora. The study found distinctive differences in lifestyles and livelihoods, with those living in the khalla in farig more likely to follow a more nomadic lifestyle. The one group of real nomads (i.e., those who have not settled even temporarily) were not involved in either cultivation, firewood collection and sales, or the militia. In contrast, those living in the damar close to Al Geneina reported that every household had at least one member who was part of the irregular army.

**Loss of Local and Transnational Markets**

The dire effects of the conflict on Darfur’s economy, markets, and trade were not foreseen by the Northern Rizaygat, and account for some of the major negative impacts on their livelihoods. As explained earlier, the loss of transnational livestock trade to Libya and Egypt directly affected the Northern Rizaygat, probably more than any other group. Previously, they had been
heavily involved in trade to both countries, but now their involvement is limited to ‘secret deals and arrangements’ with the Zaghawa who control this trade. In addition to the impact on the network of traders, agents, guarantors, etc., the depressed camel market offers poor prices to camel owners.

Locally, the loss of rural markets with the displacement of the rural farming communities has affected the Arab pastoralists, since they no longer have an easily accessible market for both buying and selling and must instead travel up to a day’s journey or more to the larger towns.

The Northern Rizaygat depend on market purchase of cereals for a significant part of their food consumption. Up to the end of 2005, the cost of cereals and other essentials was increasing, while, in general, the selling price of animals was decreasing. This diminishing terms of trade meant that the pastoralists and livestock owners at that time had far less income from selling animals, their traditional livelihood, with which to purchase other essentials (OCHA et al., 2005). In 2006, this pattern changed with a decreasing price of cereals and increasing terms of trade between goats and sorghum (see Figure 10, which was to the advantage of livestock owners.

Market prices of cereals are likely to be lower than would be expected, based on local production, because of the massive inflows of food aid. A recent study indicated that the cereal market in the Darfur region has been shored up by the trading in food aid, and thereby has lowered and stabilized prices (Buchanan-Smith and Fadul, 2008). Food aid (cereals and blended food in particular) has also been a valuable and relatively cheap source of fodder for livestock, especially horses and goats, among pastoralists in particular.

The recent (May 2008) cutting of rations by 50% by the World Food Program will almost certainly affect market prices, and will affect those who have most dependency on the market for their food supplies, especially the urban poor and pastoralists who do not cultivate crops.

Climate Variability, Environmental Threats, and Regeneration

Environmental concerns are increasingly recognized as central, not only to people’s livelihoods but also to future peace and stability in the Darfur region and in Sudan as a whole. Situated on the edge of the Sahara with a belt of extreme climate variability running east to west through the region, Darfur is particularly vulnerable. UNEP Sudan sees a strong link between peace, environment, and livelihoods in Darfur: “Long-term peace in the region will not be possible unless these underlying and closely linked environmental and livelihood issues are resolved” (UNEP, 2007, p. 8).

Figure 10. Terms of Trade for Two-year-old Female Goat and Sorghum in Al Geneina

Source: (WFP et al., 2008, p. 81)
Note the alternate spelling of place name Al Geneina used in Figure 10.
As a result of the conflict, the main environmental issues are the impact of displacement and the humanitarian response on the demand and supply of environmental resources. According to Tear Fund, the current crisis has caused “unprecedented concentrations of demand for water, forest products, grazing and other environmental resources. This has caused significant localized depletion of these resources” (Bromwich et al., 2007, p. 7). In a later study, Tear Fund reports that those IDP camps with large populations, which are sited on basement complex rock without sources of recharge other than local rainfall, are vulnerable to groundwater depletion (Tear Fund, 2007). Groups of Arab women in West and North Darfur corroborated this, and described how they had to travel much further than before in order to find supplies of dead wood for use as firewood (Women’s Focus Group; Focus Group 1, 6 May 2008), indicating that sources of dead wood were exhausted close to towns.

The issue of increasing demand as the population has risen has also been raised, although this increase is difficult to gauge given the lack of population data, combined with massive internal displacement and forced and voluntary migration out of the region. No doubt pressures on natural resources have spiralled in areas of population concentration, which necessitates policy and programmatic change, but another dimension of this issue is the issue of climate variability and rainfall. For the past four years, rainfall has been favorable, far more so than the years following the 1983–1984 drought, and the early nineties (see Figure 3 Chapter 1). This favorable rainfall has reportedly contributed to recovery and regeneration of the Jizzu, and of areas outside Kebkabiya and Kutum, visited by the team. This regeneration is not only a result of the improved rainfall, but also likely a result of the depopulation of rural areas, which are not accessible to the displaced because they are beyond the periphery of the urban areas where there are high population concentrations. Because of the absence of the farming population, animals are less constrained within their areas, and there is reportedly less over-grazing.

These reports of regeneration have to be reviewed very carefully. On the one hand, it is potentially very misleading as it is an artifactual improvement (the result of human agency), caused by the conflict and the displacement of the majority of the rural population. On the other hand, it is also related to climate variability (and possibly climate change), the long-term trends of which are not well understood. The regeneration is potentially a result of short-term climate variability, which could as easily be reversed.

Governance and Leadership
Chapter 3 describes in detail the policies and practices that, in the past, have undermined all institutions related to pastoralism, and how this undermining in turn has affected development policies and claims for development that is adapted to pastoralism. Government responsibilities are split between multiple departments, each of which pursues its own agenda, which deprives the nomads of an integrated set of pro-pastoralist policies. This partly stems from the government’s complete failure to acknowledge the social, cultural, and economic importance of pastoralism. In so doing, the government has failed to develop coherent policies to address the long-term marginalization of pastoralists. Few services are adapted to the specific needs of mobile communities, and service delivery to rural *damar* is generally poor. The appointment of the Nomad Council is long overdue and a landmark opportunity to seriously review and address these issues. Previous history would suggest the Council may lack capacity in terms of infrastructure and technical and organizational skills, and therefore will require support.

Representation of the Arab nomadic groups in local government, civil society, and among international agencies tends to be very limited. This limited representation is largely due to the nomads’ lack of education (and low literacy rates), but also because of discrimination and domination by other tribes.

Extremely few local NGOs delivering humanitarian assistance in Darfur work with Arab pastoralist groups of North and West Darfur, and many view those that do work with nomads as partial and pro-government (despite an IDP focus being equally partial). El Massar is widely perceived as the main civil society group working with nomads, and has delivered a wide range of development and humanitarian assistance. Its executive board includes some of the highest-ranking tribal and military notables. Many think this participation by notables over-politicizes the organization (Key Informant, 26 April 2008).
International Misperceptions and Lack of Engagement

The governance crisis discussed above is not limited to national and local institutions. There is a widely-held perception among the Northern Rizaygat that the international humanitarian community favors particular groups. At the same time, they believe they have been excluded by the international peace processes, where they have no voice. Of additional concern to them is the way that the western media, human rights groups, and ‘Darfur activists’ have demonized and blamed them for the war and human rights abuses. This sense of blame was troubling and often they would ask why it was so. They described how they felt discriminated against and even demonized, locally and internationally, as the following quotation illustrates: “Since the problems began people say Arabs are the source of all the problems, they say the Arabs have driven people from their homes – they blame them for the problem….the NGOs have changed their approach – why do they only work with one side and why do they blame us?” (Focus Group 3, 4 May 2008).

This statement captures both the element of demonization and of exclusion by the international humanitarian community. This sense of exclusion inevitably creates a gulf between international actors and these local groups, and even more worryingly could lead (if it has not already) to further alienation.

The humanitarian community, more than any other international actor, has made some efforts to engage and respond to the petitions of Arab abbala. ICRC sets the example, as they have purposefully engaged with all groups and implemented programs. For example, in collaboration with the government, ICRC has successfully implemented two emergency livestock vaccination programs, first in 2005 and more recently in early 2008 (Key Informant 2, 27 April 2008). Generally, several interviewees commented that there are members of government commissions, including the Pastoralist Commission in Nyala and the Nomadic Council in Khartoum, who are not close to the nomadic people or familiar with the real issues facing them. Even senior Fur leaders noted that “There are many groups of herders who have grievances against their tribal administration. The grievances are created because of the unlimited power that has been granted to these administrations that have been left to do what they please without anyone checking on them. This has created chaos and lack of control over these groups” (Key Informant, 8 May 2008).

There are tentative signs of new emerging leadership, in several contexts: among youth in the armed forces (who are at the forefront of the protests and claims on government); among youth and the tribal administration, where youth are challenging their traditional leaders; and among youth in civil society organizations, where youth want to work for the benefit of their communities. At present, these are presented as challenges to local traditional leaders and claims on government, but, tentatively, this could represent a new emerging leadership.
In recent years, there have been small-scale but nevertheless successful attempts by some INGOs to support the agricultural activities of nomads, and to support the negotiated arrangements between nomads and farmers to protect farmers’ crops in West Darfur (Key Informant 3, 6 May 2008). Reports are available of other INGO initiatives in South Darfur and in the Zalingei area (east of West Darfur), where INGOs have established programs that bring together different communities with the aim of peaceful coexistence (Jaspars and O’Callaghan, 2008).

In 2005, when WFP and their cooperating partners re-registered the population who were to receive food assistance, many neighboring Arab groups were also registered at the same time. In West Darfur, there had been pressures to register Arab abbala in order to quell their grievances at being ignored and excluded, in response to what was generally perceived as a threat to others if they were not included. The idea of ‘food for protection’ is rife in West Darfur, and is based on the assumption that food aid is provided to Arab abbala as ‘protection’ for neighboring IDPs, and for WFP and INGO vehicles and staff. This is not only wrong-thinking, it is potentially dangerous and inflammatory, as it further polarizes the two groups by demonizing one and taking sides with the other.

International peace processes have excluded these groups altogether as their concerns and issues were not represented by the government of Sudan, nor by the three political parties represented at the Abuja peace talks and not even by civil society. The Darfur Peace Agreement does not reflect a real understanding of the importance of the pastoral domain or of the natural resource issues at stake. Rather, it seeks to ‘respect the hakura’, which could be seen as reinforcing the power relations of a bygone age, which consistently favors the landlord tribes over the nomadic tribes. There was a perception among the Northern Rizaygat in North Darfur that the peace process at Abuja did not stop the war. They believed that the Zaghawa and Fur stopped the war because they were defeated and could not stand against the Northern Rizaygat in the battlefield (Focus Group, 11 May 2008).

There is a widely-accepted Darfur narrative that has been effectively mainstreamed in the international media by Darfur activists. As described by Mamdani, “Newspapers writing on
Darfur have sketched a pornography of violence. It seems fascinated by and fixated on the gory details, describing the worst of the atrocities in gruesome detail and chronicling the rise in the number of them. The implication is that the motivation of the perpetrators lies in biology (‘race’) and, if not that, certainly in ‘culture’. This voyeuristic approach accompanies a moralistic discourse whose effect is both to obscure the politics of the violence and position the reader as a virtuous not just a concerned observer” (Mamdani, 2007). This partisan position of the western public has made it difficult for humanitarian agencies to publicly engage with the Arab groups or to be seen to be supporting them for fear of controversy among their home constituency (Key Informant, 9 May 2007). The highly political nature of the international discourse on Darfur has generated unprecedented animosities between Darfur scholars (de Waal and Prendergast, 2007), sufficient to scare off anyone inclined to challenge the overarching belief that the only victims of the Darfur conflict are the non-Arab IDPs forcefully driven from their land.

The nomads are voiceless. Their illiteracy and lack of contact with the international community has completely disempowered them in terms of raising awareness about their situation. Even when the international community undertakes an inter-agency assessment, mobilizing three UN and three high-profile INGOs, as done in the Kutum inter-agency assessment, representatives of the Arab groups in Sudan or internationally were unable to capitalize on this to bring it to the world’s attention as evidenced by the apparent lack of international media coverage or INGO advocacy.

The expertise and knowledge of some of the Darfur-based UN and INGO personnel has not always filtered upwards to world leaders on Sudan issues. The UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon attributed the roots of Darfur’s crisis to “an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change” (Ki Moon, 2007, p. A15). As with many other observers, he only considers precipitation trends since the early eighties, since when “average precipitation has declined some 40 percent.” As explained in Chapter 1, much longer trajectories need to be reviewed in studying climate variability and adaptations to it.

Confrontation rather than engagement has been the way of certain international actors, and while this may be important in terms of international politics, in Darfur, it has reinforced polarized positions and contributed to further discrimination against the Arab civilian groups.

**Conclusions**

This chapter has explored the links between livelihood goals and power, especially power over all forms of livelihood capitals, which includes power (and influence) within wider institutions such as the market, power over natural resources, and local, regional, and national political power. The chapter has traced the more recent post-2003 trends that have influenced the Northern Rizaygat’s vulnerability and future livelihood prospects. These include processes of sedentarization, youth and militarization, social polarization, loss of local and transnational markets, the governance gap, and, finally, international processes of exclusion and misrepresentation.

It is this combination of power-seeking, livelihood choices, and wider institutional and policy processes, including ongoing processes of exclusion and misrepresentation, that continue to shape and characterize the particular vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat.
For example, the group in Abara (Focus group 2, 6 May 2008), listed their hopes for the future as follows: 1. Security; 2. Return to our home in Girair; 3. The return of our cousins who are in Kebkabiya area to Girair; 4. Access to the pasture in the north; and 5. Opening of the route to Libya and Egypt (in the north).

Personal Communication, Abdal Jabbar Fadul, based on North Darfur Range and Pasture Department’s Reports from 1968-2002

The damar of Kutum were also visited but there has been net migration from these settlements, rather than immigration.

INTERSOS is covering the area of Mukjar and Um Dukhun administrative units in Mukjar locality, the administrative unit of Bindisi in Wadi Saleh locality, and the corresponding Chadian and South Darfur border areas.

Cf. Kenya: “their former cultural identities, which had assured them against natural disaster, were being hardened into new ‘tribes’ by the factional politics of access to the narrow institutions of the young conquest state” Lonsdale, John ‘The Conquest State of Kenya 1895-1905’ in Unhappy Valley 1992, p. 13.

During this fieldwork, we were often accompanied by senior tribal leadership, who were challenged locally by tribal members as to what they were doing for them, and the fact that they had received no services or benefits despite following the leaders’ advice to settle.

Interestingly, the Fur Shertai also reported concerns about lack of representation: “Our children in Khartoum handle the cell phone issue and they make themselves the voice of the Darfurians when the community does not give them any legitimacy to represent them. It would have been better if they discussed the different issues with the people in order to understand the nature of the problems.”

The inter-agency assessment team included representatives of UN OCHA, FAO, WFP, GAA, GOAL, and IRC.
Livelihoods in Darfur are intimately linked to the conflict, none more so than the livelihoods of the Northern Rizaygat, the camel-herding nomads. Their notoriety as part of the Janjaweed militia and the government’s counterinsurgency has obscured from view any consideration of how their lives and livelihoods have been affected by five years of conflict, or of their livelihood goals and hopes for the future, which include peace and security.

Our analysis has shown that marginalization and livelihood ‘maladaptations’ lie at the heart of the Darfur crisis. Historical policy and institutional processes have contributed to unequal power relations and resource distribution, to the disadvantage of the Northern Rizaygat. The impoverishment and marginalization of pastoralist groups, within the broader context of the marginalization of Darfur, is an outcome of combined socio-economic, political, and ecological processes of which the relationship between the government and the nomads is an overriding factor contributing to their exclusion from power and resource distribution. This has exacerbated tensions between pastoralist groups and settled farming groups, and between pastoralists and regional and national authorities (discussed in Chapter 3). These tensions built up over time and pushed the nomads into alliances and violence that started to take shape at the end of the eighties, and was eventually manifested in their decision in early 2003 to join the government’s counterinsurgency.

From 2003 onwards, the livelihoods of the Northern Rizaygat were directly affected by their displacement, livestock raiding, blocking of livestock migration routes, and violence. Their own security has been their most pressing concern, which is in keeping with other livelihood groups in the region. As a result, there has been a severe contraction of the pastoralist domain and an increasing trend towards sedentarization of nomads. Some have expanded into maladaptive livelihood strategies, meaning short-term, quick-return strategies that depend on the captive IDP market, distorted conflict-related economy, conflict, and violence. These strategies are unsustainable in the longer term (see Chapter 4).

Because these strategies are not based on legal rights and entitlements, they have no future and no security. More seriously, other evidence suggests that these strategies at times depend on intimidation, violence, and coercion of other groups, thus inflicting serious harm and loss of livelihoods on others. These strategies are not the result of sedentarization per se, but are linked directly with the conflict and its causes. The conflict is further exacerbated and perpetuated by these extralegal, and sometimes criminal, acts linked to livelihoods.

Camel-based pastoralism is facing severe challenges as a livelihood system as a result of insecurity limiting migration, lack of development adapted to pastoralist lifestyles (including lack of water development on the routes north, which makes northwards livestock migration and travel to Libya even more difficult), unfavourable or biased policies, pressures to settle from leadership, and the economic incentives of maladaptive strategies. The traditional goals of seeking status and power through camels and camel herding are being replaced with more modern goals associated with militarization and education.

The livelihood maladaptations over the past five years are influenced by the rapid acceleration in certain trends and processes, which continue to shape the nomads’ vulnerability and future livelihood prospects. These trends and processes include: processes of sedentarization; youth and militarization; social polarization; loss of local and transnational markets; governance and leadership failures; and international processes of exclusion and misrepresentation (see Chapter 5). Thus, processes of exclusion, marginalization, and misrepresentation (discrimination) have been exacerbated.

There is virtually no systematic evidence available that shows the human and social development status of the Rizaygat abbala, or, for that matter, nomads and pastoralists generally, either in the past or currently. While IDPs are surveyed regularly, there is no available data on nutrition, morbidity, mortality, and literacy for the nomadic population. These groups may sometimes be included in random surveys, but their data is
automatically combined within larger datasets for the locality or region and therefore becomes hidden. As a priority, these basic statistics on human and social development must be established in order to inform policies and programs.

The value of this livelihoods analysis is that it sheds light on power relations, motivations of different groups, and, by acknowledging the conflict-livelihoods cycle, can help identify opportunities for breaking the cycle, i.e., a shift from maladaptive strategies to strategies that are sustainable in the longer term. This type of analysis is therefore important to better understand and ultimately reverse the marginalization, discrimination, and exclusion of pastoralists and nomads. The concept of livelihood vulnerability is more helpful in understanding motivations for violence and conflict between groups than are the concept of ethnic divisions or simplistic models of greed versus grievance. This is because the concept of livelihood vulnerability traces the long-term processes, institutions, and policies that influence livelihood goals, strategies, and assets and thereby shape the vulnerability of peoples’ livelihoods.

This type of deeper, more informed analysis is not generally supported by western models of humanitarian action, recovery, and development, which in turn do not easily accommodate the range of recommendations that follow. This research therefore challenges these frameworks to reconsider their conceptual underpinnings, underlying assumptions, and principles. Key points to consider in challenging these models include:

• Vulnerability is not something ‘out there’ or external in the form of shocks and hazards which impose themselves on societies. Rather, it is embedded within livelihood systems, particularly in the institutions, policies, and wider processes that shape vulnerability. This idea requires a conceptual shift from a dualistic construct of vulnerability to one in which the mutuality of environment and human relations is recognized (as explained in Chapter 1).
• In the context of climate variability, and possibly climate change, pastoralism needs to be more widely and strongly supported, as it is better adapted to the environment where rainfall is scarce, as compared with rainfed agriculture. Assessing environmental risks is part of the daily adaptations of pastoralists. But they have been undermined by policies and programs that are not adapted to mobility within the pastoralist domain or that actively undermine pastoralism as a livelihood system.

• The relatively narrow range of humanitarian programming options (dominated by food aid) and the short-term planning cycle of one year are unsuited to the protracted nature of the Darfur crisis. The narrow range and short-term cycle it ignore the deeper causes of vulnerability and the wider impacts of humanitarian aid on the local economy, the environment and local governance, and therefore the livelihoods of many groups, and the interactions between conflict and livelihoods. There is a need to expand time scales, in both analysis, from one or two decades to the past century or more, and in relation to strategic planning, from far beyond the immediate 12 months to far beyond, into the future.

• Recovery and development approaches engender different underlying principles and assumptions as compared with humanitarian aid, which are not all compatible with conflict and protection. Lacking are humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality, which need to be constantly reinforced in conflict settings. If they are not, discrimination in favor of one group will fuel the conflict. Consequently, recovery initiatives need to be pursued with the utmost caution and conflict sensitivity, which means they should be based on an in-depth understanding and analysis of livelihoods of all groups, and on links with tensions and conflict at a local level.

In conclusion, there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ model of international action within Darfur. The situation in Darfur calls for a deeper, more informed analysis of livelihoods at the local level, within the broader institutional and policy context. Programming interventions, whether they are humanitarian or recovery ones, must reaf-
firm core principles enshrined in humanitarian and human rights law, including impartiality, equity, non-discrimination participation and the right to life with dignity.

The answer to these dilemmas and challenges is not simple, and there is no ‘quick-fix’ for the problems of insecurity which have caused displacement, blocked migration routes, and the shutting off of markets and trade routes. Local peace requires dialogue, and dialogue involves consultation between groups. Local peace initiatives are happening to a limited extent, and need to happen of their own accord, but they will be of limited impact unless supported by wider systems of good governance and linked into higher-level peace processes. Strengthening governance at every level will help to promote and improve dialogue and consultation between citizens, civil society, and government, and enhance participation in policy formulation and implementation. In other words, to give voice to citizens, including pastoralists, and raise awareness about their rights and the duties of leadership and government will also require prioritizing capacity development of government bodies to allow them to act effectively and responsively to the claims of citizens. Thus, good governance is a prerequisite for lasting peace and for reversing long-term processes of political and economic marginalization and social exclusion, which is why many of the subsequent recommendations directly concern governance and government capacities at all levels.

This type of livelihoods analysis allows a rethinking of the way human societies (livelihood groups and institutions) interact with each other, taking account of the role of wider processes related to governance, conflict, environment, and migration in shaping livelihoods. A focus on improving resilience and decreasing the vulnerability of livelihoods must take into account the potential for conflict and the interactive livelihoods conflict cycle. From our work on livelihoods and vulnerability in Darfur, we would suggest this adapted livelihoods approach has a broader resonance, particularly in relation to the political ecology of climate adaptations in the wider region and globally.

Recommendations

These recommendations are directed at a wide group of stakeholders, including: local and national government bodies, especially the newly formed Council for the Development of Nomads; civil society groups; and donors, UN agencies, and INGOs to name some of the most important. The recommendations are not intended to be exhaustive. Rather, it is hoped they will generate national and local participatory processes whereby wider strategies and interventions will be identified, prioritized and then acted upon.

1. A Field-based Participatory Policy Review of Pastoralism

1. A participatory policy review is needed to create coherence between policies that originate from a wide range of ministries and jointly impact pastoralism. The review should be disaggregated and participatory, ensuring the voices of different pastoralist groups are heard, locally and nationally.

2. The policy analysis must be informed by rigorous research and participatory field studies and should embrace all types of intervention models, including humanitarian, recovery, development, peace-building and conflict prevention initiatives that impact pastoralists. Clarification is needed on the complementarities, linkages, and transitions between programming modalities.

3. Policy change must be based on field issues and grounded in local realities. This requires policy makers to engage directly with local stakeholders and spend time in these constituencies.

4. Specific policy issues that must be reviewed include the following:
   • The rights and participation of pastoralists in local governance, including issues of land use and management of natural resources
   • Pastoralism as a viable livelihood system adapted to climate variability—does this have the same recognition or emphasis as sedentary farming?
Within food security and marketing, the relative importance of and investments in livestock, including camels, compared with the supply of grains.

Specific issues of land use, livestock routes, investment in water (especially on the migratory routes north, and also on the route to Libya), marketing channels, taxation, and livestock health.

The adaptation of service delivery to the transhumant lifestyle, particularly education and health.

Mainstreaming pastoralism as part of the climate adaptation agenda.

A strategy for promoting pastoral development in the Darfur region within a broader national strategy.

The inclusion of pastoralist issues in humanitarian and recovery assessment tools and procedures.

2. The Need for a Comprehensive Advocacy Strategy on Camel Pastoralism and the Arab Aballa

1. Reverse processes of exclusion and neglect and increase the visibility of the situation of these groups by raising awareness at all levels, local to international. This study provides an initial analysis and background on these groups, which should be brought to the attention of local advocacy groups in Sudan, in order for them to commit to and develop a comprehensive advocacy strategy that targets:

   - Peace process mediators, advisors/resource persons, peace activists, and lobbyists
   - Humanitarian/early recovery agencies (INGOs, UN, and donors)
   - Peacekeepers (UNAMID)
   - Human rights lobby/Save Darfur campaign
   - Diaspora
   - Government/rebel groups
   - Khartoum elites
   - PANOS, AU, and other networks for supporting pastoralist rights

2. This strategy should include advocacy campaigns, lobbying, strategic alliances/networks, and consistent engagement with the government and other key national and international stakeholders.

3. The first step is a meeting of informed civil society/activists/professionals to raise awareness within Darfur (and in Khartoum) to challenge activists/resource persons as to how well they are informed on issues by people on the ground and what they are doing about the issues raised in this report. This research should be used to inform the advocacy focus and content, but the focus and content need to be developed and articulated by these groups.

3. Localization of the Peace Process and Strengthening Linkages from the Local to the Higher-level Peace Processes

1. The peace process is a multi-layered process of linked activities taking place at different levels. There needs to be more recognition of the importance of linking these activities at all levels, especially in terms of acknowledging and learning from local efforts and agreements.

2. Despite the importance of and attention given to international high-level talks, peace processes need to start at a local level, whereby people from different parties share locally, which could then be taken forward to national and international fora. By starting at the local level, it should be possible to clarify the issues, concerns, and interests of the Arab abbala with regard to the international peace process (as well as those of other groups). This is likely to clarify issues of community rights linked to livelihoods and compensation, which are very different from individual compensation. There are examples of negotiated agreements between different livelihood groups who share ‘mutual’ benefits. This experience should inform higher-level processes.
3. The Darfur Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) should precede and inform an international peace process. However, some clarification is needed on the relevance and approach of the DDDC in light of the failure of the Darfur Peace Agreement. Within the DDDC, it is not clear to what extent issues of diversity (of livelihoods, ethnicity, and gender) are taken seriously. These need to be addressed within an analysis of their impact on sustainable peace.

4. Human and Social Development Adapted to Pastoralist Livelihoods

1. The immediate priorities for intervention include education, health, and women’s development. There are some ongoing efforts in these areas, which need to be reviewed, revitalized, and extended.

2. Prioritize education, taking immediate steps to address the gross deficiencies in delivery of the most basic services by piloting educational programs, including intensive courses covering the primary syllabus (already practiced in Khartoum, with street children) and adult literacy programs. Priority should be given to the established damar and larger firgaan. These initiatives must be linked to an appropriate government institution, in order to gain their commitment to this kind of work and to engage communities with government institutions. Education should be linked to rights and governance, to enable rights holders to challenge and lay claim to their rights to education from the state duty holder.

3. Prioritize women’s development among the Arab abballa, taking account of their increasing livelihood diversification and the skills they need to build on. Adult literacy is a priority, as is mainstreaming gender within wider policy and programming domains.

4. Prioritize nomadic groups for assessment of standard humanitarian (and human development) indicators, including malnutrition (including women’s nutritional status), mortality (including maternal mortality), literacy, and other core health, education, and social indicators.

5. Learn and adapt from other relevant experience in Sudan and countries in the region with large pastoralist communities, e.g., Kenya and Ethiopia.

5. Governance: Improving Accountability, Transparency, and Responsiveness

1. Hold governance structures more accountable, through the combined recommended actions relating to a policy review at a higher level and the advocacy strategy and organizational development at the local level. This accountability will begin to reverse the exclusion of pastoralists from political and policy processes and address issues of poor governance of natural resources.

2. Give appropriate support and technical assistance from government, supported by the international community, to relevant public bodies with a view to capacity development, starting with the Council for the Development of Nomads, which is charged with developing a coherent strategy and plan of action that is accountable, transparent, and responsive to the claims of pastoralists. The capacity of council members to formulate a strategy for policy and legislative development, to engage in dialogue and consultation, and to monitor and oversee program implementation must be built and supported.

3. Build the capacity of a broader constituency of stakeholders and staff within the Pastoralist Commission, Commission for Women and Child Affairs, and relevant departments within the Ministries, in part to reverse existing prejudices and learn how to better engage with pastoralists, and also to develop the skills needed to implement appropriate frontline delivery of services. An initial task will be to determine functional responsibilities relating to pastoralism within the government structures and what the related revenue and expenditure implications are.

4. Develop capacity for strengthening the gender dimension of government bodies nationally, at the state level, and in the locality.
6. Encouraging a New Generation of Leadership

1. Build capacity of pastoralists to better understand and articulate their development needs in the context of pastoralism. This should be achieved by organizing around an activity, e.g., parent’s council, women’s business, educational activities, livestock interventions, etc. In turn, such engagement will support and encourage potential newly emerging leaders as they clarify and articulate claims to developing social and development organizations.

2. Invest in encouraging civil society development (organizational development, participatory planning) especially among youth who are outside of the military. Such development could be through Ajaweed, El Massar, or KSCS, all of whom have direct linkages with the Northern Rizaygat at the community level. This is done for IDPs but not for local communities.

3. Engage with youth (outside of the military) at the state (El Fasher and Al Geneina) and local level by engaging with them on some of their issues in order to indirectly address emerging leadership. By interacting with government and their dominant leaders, their capacities as emerging leaders will be enhanced.

7. Reversal of Processes of Militarization

1. The former irregular forces are now part of the formal military, and, as such, need to be integrated within the state-level/national army. They should not continue to serve as local defense forces within their own communities, as this undermines the ethos of a national military and maintains local divisions and social polarization.

2. Civil society has a role to play in engaging with youth outside of the military. There is little understanding of the emerging military leadership at the grassroots level, and of the extent to which these militarized groups can be responsive to other people’s rights, and allow space for democratization. Further research on the emerging political economy at a local level is needed in order to formulate recommendations on the future role and function of the local military, and on the role and relationships between leaders and representatives, with a view to strengthening downward accountability and civic development.

8. The Need for Best Practice

1. There is a need to base interventions among pastoralists in Darfur on wider regional best practice. For example, global standards and regional best practice guidelines on livestock interventions among pastoralists during drought are available and should be adapted to the Darfur context of protracted conflict and crisis. Interventions must be based on the following principles: livelihoods-based analysis and thinking; management in the context of conflict and drought cycles; evidence and systematic impact assessment; benefit-cost analysis; and continuous learning.

2. While there is a need for urgent programmatic intervention in and engagement with the pastoralist communities, this needs to be balanced with the longer-term capacity development and institution-building initiatives described above.

9. The Need for Research and Learning

1. There is a need to mobilize and build the capacity of local universities in Darfur, including integrating pastoralism, livelihoods, and conflict as part of the curricula and research program. This should include support for appropriate linkages with international and national institutions with expertise in pastoralism, conflict transformation and reconciliation, governance, livelihoods, natural resource management, and gender.

2. Relevant short training courses, workshops, and supporting materials need to be identified and developed, in conjunction with stakeholders at all levels. These need to raise awareness about pastoralism, appropriate interventions and policies, and the links between nomads’
vulnerability and conflict. They should build on wider regional experience and best practice.

3. Research and learning need to be collaborative between local, national, and international institutions. Examples of some of the priority research questions and issues are:

• A more nuanced and longer-term analysis of climate variability and its implications for pastoralism, farming, and systems of natural resource management

• In-depth case studies on land use and analysis of interests in land and access to natural resources, from a local, state-level, and national perspective which should be linked with a study of governance and how this applies to natural resources

• How current resource inflows, including remittances in cash and in kind, benefit human and social development, especially of women

• Education, nutrition, and health of pastoralist women, including knowledge, attitudes, practices, access, and human development indicators (as compared to sedentary communities)

• Livestock markets and trade networks (local, national, and transnational) and their links with wider political or conflict-related interests

• Markets and communications, and how mobile phones and other technology can support functioning markets

• Grassroots tracking of livestock migration routes and monitoring of pastoralist practices with a view to reviving camel pastoralism

• Camel health and production
Annex One
Research Questions

Policies/Institutions

Q1. Systems of natural resource management
What are the formal and informal policies and institutional constraints that affect the way pastoral communities acquire and manage critical pastoralist assets in the past and post-2003? What are the linkages between these systems of natural resource management and conflict resolution processes/institutions?

Q2. Impact of specific GoS policies
How have key national government policies and specific strategies for Darfur been perceived by pastoralists to have affected them?

Q3. International peace processes
What is the reaction of pastoralist groups to the Peace Agreement signed in Abuja? What is their understanding of what is needed for a peaceful solution to the current conflict?

Q4. International policies on Sudan; humanitarian and development aid to Sudan
How have development and humanitarian programs over the past forty years directly and indirectly affected pastoralists compared with other livelihood groups?

Q5. Markets
How have changes in primary, secondary, and tertiary markets affected pastoralists as buyers and sellers, or as agents and traders, and in their business relations with other groups?

Processes/Trends

Q6. Demographic trends
What are the main demographic trends in pastoralist societies in the Darfur region, in terms of their ethnic profiles, distribution, human migratory patterns, and diaspora?

Q7. Climate variability and environmental challenges
Are pastoralists aware of climate variability/change in Darfur (increased frequency of drought years/shorter rainy seasons) and, if so, what are the perceived impacts and what have been their adaptations to this? How have recent migrations (forced and voluntary) affected the environment and pastoralist livelihoods?

Q8. Marginalization
How has the human, social, and economic development of pastoralists progressed in comparison with other groups in Darfur and in Sudan generally?
Q9. Conflict trends
For each of the different levels of conflict, what has the role of pastoralist groups been and what are their political affiliations in these different levels of conflict and how do they perceive themselves to be affected by conflict?

Q10. Wider international trends/policies/influences
How do pastoralist groups perceive wider international trends, including donor positions on Sudan (sanctions, Security Council resolutions, the ICC) and the advocacy campaigns?

Q11. Humanitarian action
What is the nature and focus of humanitarian interventions among pastoralists since the crisis first started in 2003, and before? How do these correspond to the perceived needs of pastoralists and what impact or implications do they have on local relations/peace-building? How have agency programs supported or facilitated access to resources and relations between farmers and herders?

Livelihoods at a Local Level

Q12. Livelihood adaptations over time
What are the current goals of pastoralist groups, and how have these changed since 2003, and before? How have pastoralist groups been directly affected by the conflict (in terms of security events, displacement, and migration)? How have pastoralist groups adapted to the trends outlined above—in terms of livelihood diversification, trade-offs, etc. How have the different forms of livelihood capital been affected?

Natural – How has the displacement of rural sedentary groups affected their natural resource management?

Social capital – How have the alliances between pastoralist groups shifted in the past five years?

Political capital – How are pastoralist groups represented and what are their roles within local institutions, local and federal government, and opposition groups?

Physical – What is the significance of livestock ownership, and how has it changed during the past five years?

Q13. Characterization of pastoralist groups
How can different pastoralist groups be best differentiated in the Darfur region? (ethnically, livestock profile, migration patterns and routes, climate/ecological zones, political affiliations)
Annex Two
Researcher Profiles

Helen Young, PhD, is a Research Director at the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University, USA and a Professor at the Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy at Tufts. She first worked in Sudan in 1985, and continued to work in public nutrition programs for Oxfam GB, UNHCR, the World Bank, and others in Africa. In 2002, she managed the development of the new Sphere Minimum Standards on food security. In 2004, she directed a series of cross-university field studies in Darfur and Libya, culminating in the report “Livelihoods Under Siege,” which marked the beginning of the current Tufts Darfur program and direct involvement in various international initiatives. Dr. Young is also Co-Editor of the journal Disasters and is author of a wide range of publications. She holds a BSc from Oxford Polytechnic and a PhD from the Council for National Academy Awards, Bournemouth University, UK.

Abdal Monium Osman is currently a senior researcher at Tufts University Feinstein International Center. Since 2004, he has been engaged in Tufts livelihoods research in Darfur, including “Livelihoods Under Siege.” He has extensive work experience in Sudan, where he worked for Ministry of Animal Resources (1986–1989), Oxfam UK (1990–1998), and the UNDP (1998–1999), in different capacities at the program and policy-making level. Abdal Monium’s areas of interest include conflicts, livelihoods, and food security. He holds a BVSc from the University of Khartoum, Sudan, an MA from the University of Edinburgh, UK, and an MA in Humanitarian Assistance from Tufts University. Currently he is a PhD candidate at Tufts’ Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy.

Ahmed M. Abu Sin, PhD, has extensive work in research, studies with academic and international and national development organizations. He has numerous publications focusing on socio-economics, livelihood systems of agro-pastoralist communities, and the urban poor. He is also a recognized facilitator and has had training inputs on strategic planning, conflict analysis, and conflict management (particularly resource-based and farmer-herder conflicts and advocacy). He started work in Darfur in the early 1990s, through research and consultancies with Oxfam GB, ITDG, UNDP, and others. He led a baseline survey in the Masalit area of West Darfur (2001) and a more recent study on women’s empowerment in greater Darfur (2006) for UNIFEM. He is a resource person and expert on the eastern and western Sudan regions. Abu Sin has a BSc in Agricultural Economics, an MSc in Environmental Science from University of Khartoum (IES), and an MA in Agriculture and Rural Development from Institute of Social Studies (ISS) in the Netherlands.
Michael Asher is acknowledged as one of the world’s leading experts on the desert and its nomadic people, and has received awards from the Royal Geographical Society and the Royal Scottish Geographical Society for desert exploration. A graduate of the University of Leeds, he is the author of nineteen books, mostly connected with deserts and nomads, and is an elected Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature. A fluent speaker of both Arabic and Swahili, he ran the joint UNICEF/WHO support project among the Beja nomads of the Sudan’s Red Sea Hills, and lived independently with a traditional nomadic group in western Sudan for three years. He and his wife later made the first recorded west-east crossing of the Sahara by camel, a distance of 4500 miles. US author and historian Dean King recently paid tribute to Asher’s experience thus: “having walked the entire breadth of the Sahara himself,” he wrote, “… Asher understands this passion, this place, and these people, as well as any Westerner alive.”

Omer A. Egemi, PhD, is an expert in natural resource management, land tenure, and resource-based conflicts, especially between farmers and herders, with a focus on Red Sea, Kordofan, Darfur, Blue Nile, and Upper Nile. He has more than ten published papers on political ecology and land and natural resource management issues. He has contributed to a variety of national and international conferences. From 2005 to 2007, he was the Team Leader of the Conflict and Environment Section of UNDP Sudan. His most recent engagement on Darfur includes: as a member of UNEP research team in Darfur for the preparation of Sudan Post-Conflict Report, 2006; as a resource person (Land Tenure and Conflict) for the Workshop on Wealth and Power Sharing in Darfur, organized by the World Bank and IGAD, Nairobi, November 2005; and as a resource person for the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue Consultation. Egemi has a BA (1st Class Honours) and an M.A (Geography) from University of Khartoum, and a PhD from University of Bergen (Norway).
ABBALA Camel-herding pastoralists
Al jundi mazloum Unjustly treated soldiers
Baggara Cattle-herding pastoralists of the south and southwest
Beydawi Variety of millet, whitish in color
Damra (pl. damar) Semi-permanent camp
Dar (pl. diiran) Tribal homeland
Darb El Arba’in Forty Days Road, the first road that connected Darfur to Egypt, in existence since the 14th century
Defa shebeh Untrained civilian army
Dhamri Guaranter at livestock market
Dimby Variety of millet dominant in the Goz areas of North Darfur
Diyya Blood money
Donkey Mechanical bore wells which pump the water into wateryards
Fariig (pl. firgaaan) Camp
Fursan Traditionally, tribal horsemen, although because the government used these groups to fight the rebellion in the south, the Fursan came to be known as government armed militia (southern Rizaygat, Beni Halba, Fellata, Ta’isha)
Garfa Large leather saddle bags for storing millet
Goz Stabilized sheets of sandy soils
Hafir An excavated artificial reservoir used to collect and store the surface runoff experienced during the rainy season
Hakura Traditional tribal system for allocating and managing land. The hakura is also the term used for the tribal land.
Hashm el fass The right to cultivate land that you clear yourself, not previously cultivated by others
Hawala system System for transferring remittances in cash or in kind nationally and internationally, based on a network of Hawaldars (financial intermediaries). The Hawala is the name for the system and for the individual transaction.
Hawaldar Financial intermediary
Howdaj The litter placed over the camel saddle in which the senior women ride
Idara Ahlia Native Administration or Tribal Administration, developed by the British condominium authorities
Jaysh Army
Judiya Traditional systems of reconciliation and compensation through tribal/sub-tribal local courts
Kabilla Main tribe like the Zaghawa
Khalla The uncultivated rural savannah or bush
Khor Seasonal stream
Lijan shabiyaat Popular committees
Manaazil Resting places on livestock routes
Masayif Summer grazing
Morhal Grazing or stock route
Muraahaleen The muraahaleen militias were established in the 1980s to fight the SPLA in the south. They were largely drawn from the Rizaygat and Misseriya baggara tribes of South Darfur and Kordofan.
Muraahil (sing. murhal) Livestock migration routes

GLOSSARY
Nafir work party
Nashuugh Nomad migration (pronounced like French /ʁ/ )
Rahad Rain water collecting in naturally occurring topographical depressions
Ruhhal Nomads (emphatic)
Shadouf A man-powered irrigation technique
Shargania Grass mat for building huts
Tallaig The time period when the central cultivation area is open for camel herds to graze on crop residues
Tombac Chewing tobacco
Toujar Traders
Wadi Seasonal water courses
Zakhat Giving of alms or charitable gifts
Zarayeb El Hawa Enclosure
Zurga ‘Blue’ skinned non-Arab African. The term has become loaded with racial connotations since the outbreak of conflict in Darfur.

Terms Associated with the Tribal Administration
Wali State Governor
Nazir Head of Arab tribe
Malik Head of tribe, e.g., Berti, Zaghawa, Meidob, Tunjur
Sultan Head of tribe, e.g., Zaghawa
Omda Tribal leader beneath Nazi
Sheikh Tribal leader beneath Omda
Maqdum Head of Fur tribe
Shertai Tribal leader beneath Maqdum
Emirate The new level tribal administration introduced by government in 1995
Shartaya District chiefdoms under the Fur Sultanate ruled by a shartay (the sultan’s representative)
Dimlijyya Sub-district chiefdom falling under the shartaya, managed by the dimlij sub-district chief
Sheikh The third layer in the Fur Sultanate administrative system
Firsha Tribal territories within Dar Masalit

Measures
Mukhamas Local measurement of land area equivalent to one hectare
Feddan Official unit used for land measurement
1 feddan = 4,200 sq m; 1 feddan = 1.038 acre; 1 feddan = 0.42 hectare
Kora Used in North Darfur. 1 kora millet = about 1.7 kg; 2 kora = 1 malwah; 2 malwah = 1 roboh; 15 roboh = 1 sack (100 kg)

Currency
£Sud. Sudanese pound (£Sud 2 = US$1). The official currency of Sudan

Levels of Government Administration
Walya State, ruled by the State Governor (Wālī)
Mahalia Locality, beneath the level of the state
Wahida Adaria Administrative Unit
**ACRONYMS**

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>UNRC/HCO</td>
<td>United Nations Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinators Office</td>
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<td>APU</td>
<td>Agricultural Planning Unit</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>DDDC</td>
<td>Darfur Darfur Dialogue and Consultation</td>
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<td>DJAM</td>
<td>Darfur Joint Assessment Mission</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
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<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of Southern Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement</td>
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<td>JMRDP</td>
<td>Jebel Marra Rural Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFC</td>
<td>Mechanized Farming Corporation</td>
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<td>MoAR</td>
<td>Ministry of Animal Resources</td>
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<td>NDA</td>
<td>National Democratic Alliance</td>
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<td>NIF</td>
<td>National Islamic Front</td>
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<td>NUP</td>
<td>National Unionist Party</td>
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<td>PNC</td>
<td>Popular National Congress</td>
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<td>SCLUWPA</td>
<td>Soil Conservation, Land Use and Water Programming Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCUK</td>
<td>Save the Children UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDSS</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Safety and Security</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td>UP</td>
<td>Umma Party</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme of the United Nations</td>
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<td>WSDS</td>
<td>Western Savannah Development Scheme</td>
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References


Case 1. 10 May 2008. Nomad at a *fariig* close to Kebkabiya, North Darfur.

Case 1. 5 May 2008. Returned migrant from Libya, Nurdan Damra, Asernei, West Darfur.

Case 2. 6 May 2008. Returned migrant from Libya, Nurdan Damra, Asernei, West Darfur.


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Focus Group 1. 5 May 2008. Damraat Masri, Kutum area, North Darfur, Iraygat tribe.

Focus Group 1. 6 May 2008. Umm el Garra Damra, Ardamatta, West Darfur. Mixed Arab tribes.


Focus Group 2. 4 May 2008. Damrat Es Sheikh Abdel Bagei, Kutum, North Darfur.


Focus Group 3. 4 May 2008. Group of 15 male guests at Mahamid wedding, Galala area.


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الفصل السادس يشمل الخلاصة وثمانية مجالات للتوصية ومعها اعتبارات أخرى أكثر عمومية. إننا ندعو إلى ضرورة إعادة النظر في نظريات التعرض للمخاطر الناتجة من النماذج الغربية للاغاثة والعون التنموي. هناك حاجة لمنظور طويل الأجل لفهم الأنماط المعيشية الحالية وفهم علاقات القوة والموارد. يجب أن ينصرف اهتمامنا بمواجهة العرق والجنس، إزدراة الرعاة، وتصوير الزرقيات الشمالية كشياطين لتورطهم في صراع لم يقوموا بصنعه.

وبالرغم من وجود نموذج للعمل الاجتماعي ب_mockoat "مقاس واحد لجميع الأشخاص" في دارفور، فإن هناك مبادئ ترتبط بمواثيق العمل الاجتماعي، وحقوق الإنسان، والجوانب التي تحتاج بالضرورة لتأكيد عليها. وتشمل هذه المبادئ الحق في حياة كريمة، عدم التمييز، الحيازة، المشاركة، على المستوى المحلي.

وتجرى مبادرات سلام محلية وتحتاج لأن تتبوأها الخاصة وان تتشجع. ولكن تأثيرها سوف يكون محدوداً مالما يتم دعمها بنظام واسع للحكم الراشد. إن تقوية الحكم الراشد على كافة المستويات سوف تساعد على تشجيع الحوار الهم بين المواطنين والمجتمع المدني والحكومة وتطور المشاركة في صياغة السياسات وتطبيقها. إن الحكم الراشد واحترام حكم القانون هو شرط لسلام دائم ولآياف عمليات التنمية السياسية طويلة الأمد، الأفق الاقتصادي، والأرقام الاجتماعي. لهذا فإن الكثير من التوصيات المحددة في هذا التقرير ترتبط بالحكم والقدرات الحكومية على كافة المستويات.

إذا نحن نحتاج العملاء في المجال الاجتماعي، أن يضعوا في اعتبار الوضع الحرج للمجموعات الرعوية وأن يتعاونوا بتحتاجات هذه المجموعات تختلف نوعية عن احتياجات النازحين. إن الاقصاء، الاهتمام، والتهميش هي أرض مؤسفة للسياسات الاستعمارية، وفترة ما بعد الاستعمار، والتي لا يمكن أن يبتكر المجتمع الدولي، بما في ذلك العاملين في العمل الاجتماعي، في تعريفها ومنحها الشرعية.

إن عمليات السلام الدولية يجب أن تولي اهتماماً أكبر بالرعاية. ويمكن ذلك عبر قلب التوترات والصراعات المحلية وفهم حقيقة كنها، وكذلك علاقاتهم بالعمليات والسياسات والمؤسسات القومية والدولية. إن المهمة ليست فقط التفكير في أحداث الأعوازم المادية في دارفور، بل التركيز بصورة أساسية على عمليات التهميش، ونظم الحكم الغير عادل على المستوى الفيدرالي واللولائي والمحلي.
 الوصول إلى مراعاتهم المفضلة خاصة في الشمال. إن سيطرة الزُغوة - غير العرب - خصوصا في الشمال، تتشابه الرعاة الذي يعيشون في السودان وتشاد - على هذه المنطقة الشمالية من دارفور قد أدى إلى إغلاق طرق تجارة الفضية مع ليبيا ومصر، وهي مصدر مهم لمعيشة الكثير من الناس. وبيئتها الزَغوية الآن على الجزء الأكبر من هذا الطريق التجاري. لقد أثرت المناطق المحصورة أيضاً تأثيراً سلبياً على هجرة العمال إلى ليبيا وهي استراتيجية معيشية أخرى للرعييات الشمالية.

لقد قاموا بسرعة بتوزيع استراتيجياتهم في تكيف مضر قصير وطويل الأمد سريع العائد ويعتبر على الاقتصاد أسرد شديد التشويه يتكون من النازحين، إن العصبة السريعة واستخدام التخلي والعنف كوسيلة للسيطرة والتحكم في الوصول إلى الموارد الطبيعية (الموارد الغابية والوصول إلى الأرض الزراعية) هي أمثلة على سوء التكيف المعيشي الذي يفقد معية الآخرين. إن حلب الوفود، خاصة في غرب دارفور، هو مصدر كبير للدخل للرعاة الذين صاروا يستتون بصورة متزايدة، ووقد كاريان الذين أضلوا أكثر تحضراً الذين يزالون فقتهم من خطورة جميع حلب الوفود على سلامتهم وأنفسهم. وبدون عملت استراتيجيات التكيف المعيشي عاطفية، فإن كلما أثيرت فجأة انتفاضة من رأس المال المحلي، فإن أنواع أخرى من الوسائل المعيشية قد قتل بسرعة خطيرة. إن نزوح الكثير من المزارعين والرعاة إلى المدن والمعسكرات قد أعطى الرعاة اليد العليا في الريف ولكنها في الوقت نفسه قد أزال جزءاً لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه من التركيبة الاقتصادية والاجتماعية لمجتمعهم. إن اختفاء المجتمعات الزراعية الريفية قد دمر الأسواق المحلية التي يعتمد عليها الرعاة لشراء السلع الضرورية وبيع منتجاتهم. كما أدى فقدان رأس المال البشري والسياسي إلى خسارة أصولهم إلى مستوى أقل مما كانت عليه قبل الحرب. ويمكن ذلك أن يهدد التمويل المتزايد الذي يتعرضون له منذ عام 2003 م والمخاطر التي سببتها العسكرية وتفتيق مجال حركة الرعاة والاعتماد على اقتصاد الحرب والسيطرة على الموارد عن طريق العنف.

إن رعاة الإبل يعانون لخطر كبير كنظام معيشي نتيجة للقبول على المسارات بسبب اندماج الأمن، والسياسات الحالية وغير المبنية، والمكاسب والمعارضة الاجتماعية لاستراتيجيات المعيشي السائدة. إن الهدف التقليدي في المنتج عند النفوذ والوضع الاجتماعي عن طريق امتلاك ورعي الإبل قد حل محلها قيم جديدة تقوم على البحث عن النفوذ المرتبطة بالعسكرة والتعليم. إن عمليات سوء التكيف المعيشي خلال الأعوام السبع الماضية قد تأثرت بالتورط السريع في السياسات والمؤسسات التي تلقي في تحول المخاطر ونظام العيش في المستقبل، وتشمل هذه عمليات الاستقرار ؛ عسكري الشاب ؛ الاستقرار الاجتماعي ؛ فقدان الأسواق المحلية والاقليمية ؛ الحكم الراشد وعمليات الاستبداد الدولي والتشويه المتعدد. ونعتز بذلك خليط من خيارات المعيشة المرتبطة بالبحث عن السلطة والعملية المستمرة التي تظل تشكل مهادات العيش للريعيات الشمالية.
العيش و المخاطر المعيشية التي تواجه هذه المجموعات. ويتم ذلك لمواجهة الفهم المبكر والذي يجعل من هذه المجموعات مثليات سلب ونهب.

يقدم الفصل الثاني خلفية حول الزرقيات الشمالية، تاريخهم، وحياتهم، ويصف كيف تفاعل عوامل الهجرة والقبلة والبيئة. لكي تؤثر على سبل عيشهم، وخلق عواصف رعوية على كل إقليم دارفور. يكشف لنا ذلك أن التركيز على أن الانتهاك العرقي لا يؤثر أساسًا سلماً فيهم الإزمة. إن التركيز على مسألة الموارد باستخدام معيار سبل العيش يوفر رؤى أكثر وضوحًا لفهم علاقات السلطة ودوافع المجموعات المختلفة المشاركة في العنف، كما وانه يسوس أرضية لسامية دائم.

أما الفصل الثالث فيبحث في عمليات التهميش التاريخية الطويلة الأمد (والتي تعكس تمييزاً إقليمياً أوسع ضد الرعاة) يمتد من الفترة السابقة لعهد الاستعمار وحتى عام 2003. إنها نرى أن مخاطر العيش المهددة للزرقيات الشمالية هي التي دفعتها إلى المشاركة بنشاط في استراتيجيات الحكومة العسكرية المضادة للمسلحين في عام 2004 مما صورهم في عالم ما بعد 11 سبتمبر بالتجويد الإشرار.

لقد أظهر بحثنا أن السياسات التاريخية والعلاقات المؤسسية قد ساهمت في خلق علاقات سلمية غير متكافئة ولم تأخذ مصالح الزرقيات الشمالية في الحساب وزادت من حدة التوترات بين الرعاة والمجموعات المستقرة وبين الزرقيات الشمالية والسلطات الإقليمية والقومية. ينوي البحث بدراسة نظام ملكية الأرض (والغير عادلة) التي ترجع جذورها إلى سلطنة الفور في القرن السادس عشر وتثيرها على إدارة الموارد الطبيعية. واستمرت نظم هذه الملكية خلال القرن الثاني والثاني عشر وعقب استقلال السودان. وقد خلق ذلك هم للحقوق في الموارد الطبيعية ارتباطاً بالزرقيات الشمالية. إن الأفرار وتهميش الزرقيات الشمالية والمجتمعات الزراعية الأخرى هنا هو نتاج للعمليات الإقتصادية - الاجتماعية، السياسية والإيكولوجية التي ساهمت الدولة من خلالها في إعادةهم عن السلطة وعن الوصول للموارد الطبيعية.

ويجري الفصل الرابع باستخدام نتائج البحث لتحليل تجربة الزرقيات الشمالية خلال الحرب بما في ذلك تجنيدهم النشط بواسطة الحكومة، واستبعادهم من قبل المتمردين وكيف تغيرت استراتيجياتهم المعيشية السابقة منذ عام 2003 وما تنتجته للتهديدات العنيفة، والاعتداء علىساناتهم، قلل مسارات الرعاة وخطفهم وقتلهم فقد اضطرروا للتحرك إلى مناطق أخرى. أما مما صار العديد منهم نازحين - وهي حقيقة لا يتم الاعتراف بها أو الكتابة عنها.

إن النزيف المعيشي للزرقيات الشمالية يمر بتحول سريع صاحبه تغيرات كاسحة في نمط الحياة. فقد ضاق المجال الرعوي كثيراً، وعلل ما رافقه من قلل مسارات الماشية وطرق التجارة والدعم الأمني. قد أثرى بصورة سينية على نمط العيش التقليدي، وقد أصبحت حركة الرعية السنوية مقتصرة على المناطق الأمنية مما منعهم من...
البيئة التزامات الشمالية) للاقتصاد الوطني. إن المناصرة تعتبر عمالا حيوياً لتفكيك عمليات التهجير والاستفادة من الاختلافات والمستويات المثلية والمحلية وصولاً إلى جميع حق الفرد. إن التفاوض على التفاوض يعتمد على التفاوض المحلي. إن هذا التجاوز والقوة الحقوق المكرمة في المناطق عشراً يجب أن يتم الاعتراف بها رسمياً وان تؤثر على السياسات العليا.

الصحة والتنمية النوعية.

تحسين المحاسبة: بناء الشفافية والاستجابة وذلك بتطوير قدرات مؤسسات الحكم الرئيسية مثل مفوضية الرعاية التابعة للحكومة السودانية ومفوضية المرأة.

دعم الجيل الجديد من القادة: تطوير القدرة على الفهم والتعبير عن الاحتياجات المحلية وتشجيع تنمية المجتمع المدني والمنظمات الاليفة المحلية وتشجيع الشباب من التعامل مع السلطات الحكومية والجيش.

إيقاف وتشجيع عمليات العمليات العسكرية المرتبطة بسیل كسب العيش.

تابعي افضل الممارسات، البحوث المشترك وتطوير الشراكة: يجب أن يقوم التدخل على أفضل الممارسات الإقليمية تجارب الرعاية، وعلى بناء وتبني قدرات الجامعات المحلية ومساعدتها على إدراج مسائل الرعاية وسبل العيش والصراع في مناهجهم الدراسية وعلى توزيع أجهزتهم البحثية بالتعاون مع المؤسسات المحلية والدولية.

إن هناك الكثير المشترك بين رعاية دار فورد ورعاية في المناطق الأخرى المتاحة بالنواتج في أفريقيا وغيرهما. الذي يواجهون تحديات مماثلة واذا بسبب التهميش الاجتماعي والاقتصادي والسياسي الذي يتعرضون له، و يجب النظر إلى الحالة الدار فورية في إطار الحوار الراجح حول الرعاية والتكيف المناخي، ملكية الأرض وحقوق الرعاية. ومن جانب آخر فإن الدروس المتعلقة من دار فورد لها أثر سياسي إقليمي ودولية واسعة.

يهدف البحث إلى فهم أسباب مخاطر العيش والبيئة كثيراً ما تكون لها جذور تاريخية عميقية وتم كم في علاقات الصراع المعقده بين الناس، والبيئة والعمليات المؤسسية والسياسية. أن الهدف الأكبر لهذا البحث هو تشجيع عملية الفهم ورفع الوعي في السودان وفي الخارج بالتحديات المعيشية التي تواجه مجموعة رعاية محددة في دار فورد وتشجيع ضمانها كصانع الوعى في عمليات العون الإنسانية الدولية والوطنية لمقابلة الاحتياجات الإنسانية وتشجيع السلام والنمو. إن العنف والمراجع وخروقات حقوق الإنسان التي سجلت في دار فورد، ليست موضوع هذا البحث، إننا لا نريد تبشير أو إدانة العنف. ولكن هدفنا هو معالجة الفجوة المعرفية حول سبل كسب
فانيشتناین الدولي

قضايا العيش، السلطة والاختيار
المخاطر المعيشية لقبائل الرزيقات الشمالية بدار فور، السودان

ترتب سبل العيش في دار فور ارتباطاً وثيقاً بالصراع. ويدعو ذلك جلياً للعيان في حياة الرزيقات الشمالية وهم مجموع من القبائل التي تتحدث العربية وتعرى الأهل وتعيش في ولايات دارفور الثلاث (شمال، وجنوب، وغرب دار فور). ولقد ارتبط اسم الرزيقات الشمالية بالجنوب، الاسم الملي بالازدراء الذي يطلق على مجموعات متنوعة من رجال القبائل المسلحين الذين لعب دوراً أساسيًا منذ 2003 في حرب دار فور وفي العمليات العسكرية التي تقوم بها الحكومة السودانية ضد المتمردين، ولم تجري محاولة لفهم كيفية تأثرها بحياة الرزيقات الشمالية ومعيشتهم بالصراع الدائر في دار فور، أو لمعرفة تطلعاتهم المعيشية وأمالهم في السلام والأمن المستقبليين.

إن هذا الهدف يفسر عزلتهم عن الكثير من النشاطات العالمية الإنسانية المتصلة بدار فور، وعن عمليات السلام الدولية، وحملات المناصرة الدولية.

لقد كان إدراكاً لهذه العزلة هو الدافع لهذا البحث الذي يمثل أول دراسة ميدانية تركز على الرعاة تحديداً وعلى الرزيقات الشمالية بصفة خاصة منذ بداية الصراع. إضافة إلى النظرية الميسرة لهم، فإن الأسباب الأخرى لعزلتهم تمثل في تقدير المجتمع الدولي بأنهم أقل تضرراً مقارنة بمجموعات أخرى وفي صعوبة الوصول إليه.

هذا الهدف يفسر عزلتهم عن الكثير من النشاطات العالمية الإنسانية المتصلة بدار فور، وعن عمليات السلام الدولية، وحملات المناصرة الدولية.

و يستخدم بحثنا هذا معيار كمبي معينة لتبني العمليات التي شكلت مخاطر العيش التي تعرى الأهل وتعيش في حياة الرزيقات الشمالية وقومها إلى وضع جملة راغبة في الدعم النشط للعمليات العسكرية المضادة التي تقوم بها الحكومة ضد متمردي دار فور. إن هذه العمليات لها جذور تاريخية عميقية معروسة في التفاوضات المحددة بين الناس والبيئة والمعارف السياسية والسياسية. إن هذه العمليات لا تتعلن من هذه الحالة المحددة لها، إنها تأثيرات ليس فقط على احتمالات السلام وإنما أيضا على السياسات الرعوية، وملكية الأرض والتكيف على التغيرات المناخية وعلى إدارة الصراعات الطبيعية، والتدخلات الإنسانية.

يشمل هذا البحث توصياته على ثمانية محاور تهدف إلى:

- مراجعة السياسة نحو الرعاية بنهج تشاركي: وذلك تشريع التناغم في السياسات بين الوزارة المعنية بقضايا الرعاية وتمكين السياسات من أن تقوم على معلومات ميدانية دقيقة وتهدف إلى الوضع المحلي.
- تطوير استراتيجيات المناصرة حول رعية الأهل تشارك فيها منظمات المجتمع المدني الوطنية تبرز الامور الاقتصادية للعرب الأبالية (الذين ينتمي