Ambiguity and Change: Humanitarian NGOs Prepare for the Future

A report prepared for: World Vision, CARE, Save US, Mercy Corps, Oxfam USA, Oxfam GB & Catholic Relief Services

The Feinstein International Famine Center
Tufts University
August 2004

“The future belongs to those who prepare for it today.”
Edmund Burke
Preface

The humanitarian endeavor and context has changed significantly during the past ten years. The sector is maturing with a growing number of technical standards, charters and codes to guide its activities for increased effectiveness and accountability. A group of operational international NGOs who work together at the sites of almost all emergencies have been grappling with a range of challenges that have raised important concerns about the future. NGOs are perplexed regarding where we are as a sector and where the future will take us.

A significant group of NGOs have consulted to frame the concept and the problem. This core coalition of NGOs has engaged external help from Tufts University to gather academics and researchers from numerous institutions including Columbia University, Brown University and Kings College, London, to map and research the humanitarian context and what we can expect during the next ten to fifteen years. This will include the state of the humanitarian NGOs today and how they can prepare for the changing social, economic, political, technological, economic, environmental, and legal context of the future.

This research and mapping will not so much be about predicting the future but rather building capacities to effectively respond to the dynamic and changing humanitarian context. Being sensitized to likely future scenarios is an important starting point for appropriate preparation. The intent of this work is for the humanitarian enterprise to be the best prepared and equipped to assist those who are suffering from emergencies. We are calling our initiative H-SMaRT: Humanitarian—Strategic Mapping and Research for Tomorrow.

Our desire is for an open approach of research and dialogue to stimulate initiatives that will move forward in new and more effective ways. We want the humanitarian endeavor to be better equipped to shape our futures rather than simply reacting to the context we find ourselves in. The perceived legitimacy of this work will be greatly enhanced by wide sector participation. We are pleased with the support this undertaking has receive from CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Oxfam UK, Oxfam International, Mercy Corps, Save the Children US, and World Vision. Now that the report is completed, we are confident that it will not only strengthen the work of its immediate stakeholders but also be of interest and utility to the humanitarian sector as a whole.

Mark Janz
Director, Humanitarian Planning
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Executive Summary

This study provides international NGOs with a rudimentary framework for strategic planning in the light of the likely challenges of ambiguity and change awaiting them during the next decade. It examines a series of hazard domains -- environment, urbanization, migration, and HIV/AIDS -- within which NGOs can exercise at least a modicum of control. It identifies other variables well beyond the capacity of NGOs to manage, including combinations of crises that cut across these individual domains and, more broadly still, civilization-changing events.

NGOs are encouraged to be more articulate about the elements of the global future that they see as possible. Based on the kind of future that they affirm, they are encouraged to be more assertive in areas where they have the capacity to influence change and more circumspect in areas in which they can make little impact. The essential optimism of the humanitarian enterprise, properly grounded and reinforced by effective programming, offers an important antidote to the ambient “gloom and doom” approach to human futures.

The study presents three landscapes on which NGO activities are currently situated and examines likely developments in each over the coming decade. The global hazards landscape (Chapter 1) offers a selective review of the four major potential hazards domains. The analysis examines each domain individually and then in a series of scenarios in which they interact with each other, complicating the humanitarian challenge.

The international political and policy landscape (Chapter 2) explores the bearing of world politics and international policies on NGO activities. Included are such factors as the global war on terrorism, the strengths and weaknesses of the United Nations system, and the predominantly western and northern cast of the current humanitarian apparatus.

The non-governmental landscape (Chapter 3) examines recent trends in the humanitarian marketplace. In addition to the blossoming of civil society organizations, there has been growing donor insistence on a more quantifiable and results-based approach by NGOs and increased utilization of for-profit contractors and military forces. These trends will necessitate greater clarity among NGOs on their own comparative advantages and cost-effectiveness vis-à-vis their competitors.

In assessing these landscapes and plotting their courses, NGOs may learn from the lessons of the past decade, particularly in the conceptual and political contextualization of their work (Chapter 4). Recent breakthroughs in the area of public nutrition and livelihoods, reviewed for illustrative purposes, need to be taken forward.

The study offers some reflections on what the humanitarian practitioners and their NGOs may look like a decade hence (Chapter 5). NGOs are encouraged to become more curious about the future, more seized with the trends, more comprehensive and holistic in their visions of change, more mutual in interactions with southern institutions, more circumspect in their use of government resources, and more seized with the challenges of educating northern constituencies and of advocacy with public policy-makers.

Within the evolving reality of globalization -- a mixed blessing from a humanitarian vantage point -- an Epilogue appeals for a more serious approach to the universality of humanitarian action. Challenging the predominantly western, Judaeo-Christian nature of the international humanitarian project, the Epilogue encourages a serious effort to articulate truly global values, not simply to globalize the current western apparatus.

As each chapter begins with questions intended to provoke reflection among NGOs, the Epilogue concludes with informal checklists for use in strategic planning activities by individual NGOs and the NGO community as a whole.
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Prologue

In 1421 the Chinese Emperor Zhu Di dispatched from Beijing four ocean-going fleets of junks to chart the
world, known and unknown. In the summer of that year they sailed off the map, rounded Cape Horn, and
proceeded up the then-unknown east coast of Africa. Eventually they would cross the Atlantic, chart the
coasts of both North and South America, and return to China via Australia. Their descriptions and maps
formed the basis of the Venetian and Portuguese maps which lead Magellan, Columbus, and others to strike
out from Europe three generations later to “discover” the new world.

When we look at what remains of these ancient Chinese maps, they seem strangely distorted, as if viewed
through a fairground mirror. Africa’s east coast shows hardly any westward bulge from Nigeria to Senegal.
Had they mapped the new geography wrong? No. They drew correctly what they knew and could measure. In
those days, navigators could measure latitude accurately using the stars and a compass. Longitude, however,
could be reckoned only by calculating the speed of a ship through the water and making a basic geometric
calculation based on distance covered and latitude change. What they did not know was that they were
traveling up the coast of Africa and around into the North Atlantic in a strong coastal current, going faster
than their speed in the water suggested. Redraw the maps taking this new factor into account, and the familiar
shape of Africa emerges. They had predicted the geography correctly, within the limits of their knowledge.

Zhu Di’s fleets made it back to China, two years after they set sail. Map-makers and sailors together had met
the unknowns, the unmeasurables and the uncertainties. They had mapped and coped with them. Today, as
NGOs try to chart the future, they are like Zhu Di’s admirals. There will be important trends out there they are
not aware of. There are factors they know about but cannot quantify. And there will be new worlds – new
discoveries – out there which will alter NGO thinking and cause them to change course. This study is
designed to assist them in their endeavor to understand and navigate the future.

This strategic planning exercise, undertaken by the Feinstein International Famine Center at Tufts at the
request of a number of major operational U.S. and international NGOs, seeks to sensitize humanitarian
personnel to the challenges they are likely to face during the coming decade. The year 2015 was chosen in
order to connect with other strategic planning initiatives. That is the year by which the objectives articulated
in the Millennium Development Goals and the Program of Action of the World Conference on Disaster
Reduction are to be met.

The title of this report, Ambiguity and Change: Humanitarian NGOs Prepare for the Future, suggests both
the world in which NGOs are called upon to function and their ability, within limits, to choose and create a
better future for those they seek to assist and protect. The study selects for examination four major hazard
domains: environment, urbanization, migration, and HIV/AIDS. In each of these areas, analysts present the
data, including trend lines varying according to best and worst cases and thus ambiguous in their precise
future.

Beyond the linear trajectories of specific hazard domains, sobering in their own right, exists the possibility of
a concatenation of events in which individual hazards play off of and complicate each other. Thus, climate
change could result, in the near future in the switching off of the Gulf stream, thus no longer warming Europe
and unleashing a major scramble for energy, widespread public health problems, and significant outmigration.
More frightening still is the possibility of “wild card” events not contemplated at the moment or on the
drawing boards of contingency planners. In retrospect, the end of the Cold War, the terrorist attacks of Sept.
11, 2001, and the AIDS pandemic seem to have been such “civilization changing” events. Such events raise
the possibility that the future may prove to be less an extrapolation of the past than a radical departure from it.

A review of the changes under way thus finds ambiguity the watchword both in their scale and their
implications for NGOs. On the positive side, there are identifiable elements of the humanitarian future over
which NGOs and other humanitarian actors can exercise at least a modicum of control. The same applies to
the international policy and political landscape and to the non-governmental landscape. These two landscapes are, in a sense, complex but, after all, no great mystery. NGOs can control the missions they set for themselves, the resources they mobilize, the governmental and private partnerships they establish, the ethos within which they function, and the activities they mount.

On the negative side, however, the future is also subject to a variety of factors which NGOs and other humanitarian actors do not control. This is true of the overall thrust of the trend lines in the specified hazard domains, of the broad directions of geopolitical developments, and of the competition with other actors lacking humanitarian credentials as such in which they find themselves. One does not have to be a cynic to believe that the future will be shaped in large measure by forces of economic globalization, extraction, exclusion, and unsustainability. The formidable forces with which NGOs have to contend, however, should not obscure the reality that NGOs have an opportunity to create the kind of future that they seek. The alternative future they believe to be possible is characterized, broadly speaking, by humanity, participation, inclusion, equity, justice, sustainability, and accountability.

The purpose of this research and the resulting study is to assist NGOs in becoming more knowledgeable about the vectors likely to influence future humanitarian challenges and to help them begin to move their agencies and activities toward their chosen future. Our assigned task, and certainly our expressed intention, is not to predict the future but rather to stimulate an awareness of realities likely to confront the agencies. The crises which lie down the road ahead are presented not as “humanitarian crises,” but as crises (whether political or economic, social or military) with humanitarian implications. Once again, NGOs cannot control the total landscape on which they are active but they can nevertheless define with greater precision than in the past the limits of their competence and what they take on... Given the magnitude of the gathering storms and the relative paucity of resources, defining coherent and achievable objectives will be of the essence.

The process of the study has been an iterative one from the outset. We began with a two-day workshop of stakeholders with the research group in Boston March 1-2. We established an electronic bulletin board to organize inputs from the agencies and work by the researchers. We conducted dozens of interviews in an effort to gather fresh data and perspectives to test our hypotheses. Among the agencies consulted, in addition to the NGO stakeholders in the research, were the NGO coalition VOICE: U.S. AID and the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration; and DIFD, SIDA, and the Danish Foreign Ministry. We have also sought out available studies of the issues by governments and private research groups. Appendix 2 provides resources for further study.

The process has also been iterative among the researchers themselves. We would like to express our gratitude for the major contributions made by the following colleagues: on urbanization and planning scenarios by Ben Wisner, on environment by William Moomaw, on HIV/AIDS by Susan Purdin, on migration by Karen Jacobsen, with assistance from Lakshmi Karan, on the policy and political context by Antonio Donini and Larry Minear, on the non-governmental sector by Adil Najam and Tasneem Mowjee, on the lessons learning process by Annelies Borrel and Peter Walker, and on institutional implications by Randolph Kent. Each researcher is identified in Appendix 3.

We also wish to express appreciation to the Worldwatch Institute for statistical data used illustratively throughout the report. We are also indebted to SustainAbility, the Global Compact, and UNEP for their thoughtful study, The 21st Century NGO: In the Market for Change, from which narrative and illustrative materials are included in this report. We are grateful to Jeff Danziger for permission to print one of his cartoons as Figure 14. Special thanks go to the Center’s Jennifer Gatto, who played an indispensable role in producing an attractive report within unusually tight time constraints.

While the report reflects the individual contributions of our research colleagues, we ourselves as the compilers and editors of the finished report accept full responsibility for occasional liberties taken with their texts in the interest of creating an integrated and action-oriented end-product. As part of our effort to sharpen
up the challenges posed by future events to NGOs, we have in deliberately provocative fashion identified a number of questions for reflection and discussion. These appear in boxes at the beginning of chapters and/or sections. They are designed to give added concreteness to the basic message of the study for NGOs, “Work to create the kind of future you believe in.” With an eye to bridging the recurrent gap between strategic planning discussions and institutional change, we have also listed a number of specific questions for NGOs in the Epilogue which merit more detailed discussion.

An interim oral report was provided to stakeholders at a meeting in Berlin on May 11. A draft of the final report circulated among the agencies for comment in mid-July. All of those involved -- agencies and researchers alike -- have approached the exercise as a preliminary effort at a strategic mapping of issues, not as a definitive statement. The presentation of the hazards landscape, for example, involves some, but by no means all, of the areas in relation to which NGO humanitarian programming needs to be contextualized. Those issues selected, along with others not treated in this study, will bear further elaboration and monitoring. The research group looks forward to continued dialogue with practitioners on these matters. We hope that individual NGOs that are not underwriters of the formal research undertaking, as well as NGO professional associations, will also find this report useful.

Hopes for the utility of this report, however, must be modest at best. It is a sobering exercise to look back on the “futures” envisioned over the last hundred years. “Flying houses. Talking dishwashers. Undergarments turned into candy. That’s what people 100 years ago thought we would be enjoying today,” according to a Newshour Extra on America’s PBS TV network. It is not that they got it wrong, but rather that they extrapolated their present to our present. The Green Revolution, computers, genetically derived drugs and enhanced crops, HIV/AIDS and obesity as killers were total unknowns and thus not plotted. So some humility is needed in any prediction of the future, especially one that tries to paint on as broad a canvass as this one. Where we can make intelligent statements by extrapolating from the present, we have done so. But the future is always more than an extrapolation of the past. It is therefore essential that NGOs to equip themselves to manage ambiguity and change, the unforeseen as well as the foreseen.

In 1914 Ernest Shackleton set out to cross the Antarctic overland but ended up shipwrecked, surviving only by leading his team through a six month ordeal and 850 mile voyage of survival in an open boat. The party was saved not by Shackleton’s planning for the future, but by his ability to deal with the ever changing reality they faced, to take decisions based on minimal information, to fix on a goal, to persist in the face of unimaginable challenges. The voyage of NGOs into the future also involves knowns and unknowns. It also requires special skills: dealing with ambiguity, taking calculated risks, being steadfast in purpose. This study seeks to identify not only the hazards to be encountered but also the skills needed to manage the interactions with them.

Peter Walker, Director, Feinstein International Famine Center
Larry Minear, Director, Humanitarianism and War Project
August 2004
Chapter 1 The Global Hazardscape: A Selective Review

The context in which NGOs plan and mount humanitarian activities is a complex and evolving one. Chapter 1 selects a number of hazards that NGOs confront, in each instance reviewing key developments during the past decade, challenges that can be anticipated during the coming decade, and potential roles for NGOs in responding to and/or shaping these developments. The areas selected for review are environment, urbanization, migration, and HIV/AIDS. While there are other major challenges that require attention – population growth, demography, and terrorism are three – the areas chosen are designed for purposes of the study to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. They represent domains in which vulnerabilities combine with hazards to produce serious risks.

The objective of a selective review of the global hazardscape is not to offer programming tips for the agencies in specific sectoral areas. Those are readily available, to one extent or another, in various existing agency handbooks and manuals. The purpose is rather to identify key factors that will underpin future crises with major humanitarian implications. Emerging hazards, old issues that will not go away, potential one-off events that may shape the future: these have implications that may run from prevention through emergency response to rehabilitation. While traditional responses may be comfortable and attractive, the challenges are such as to merit “outside the box” thinking about ways to fulfill agency mandates and missions, or perhaps even to recast or modify them.

By way of illustration from the environmental area, coastal flooding in the next ten years (as in the last ten) is going to become more and more of a reality, as is the rapidly changing use of scarce land from farming to grazing. The hope is that by flagging the need for information on the changing environment, agencies will not only be more knowledgeable in charting their courses of action but more discriminating in their allocation of resources, whether to operational activities, lobbying the UN Security Council and humanitarian agencies, educating their constituencies, or other functions. For purposes of the study, the terms disasters and emergencies are used interchangeably, although distinctions between the two on occasion are useful.

A. Environment

Interactions between fragile environments and marginal and vulnerable communities inevitably lead to more frequent crises than occur where plentiful more stable environments interact with more planned and affluent communities. Future predictions, driven principally by climate change and land-use change, posit an increase in the fragility of the environment and a growing population of communities less able to cope with that fragility. More frequent acute emergencies and more widespread chronic fragility of environment and community characterizes the future. Specific questions that NGOs may wish to ask are:

1. In the known future hot-spots of environmental crises – flood plains, marginal coastal communities, agricultural economies dependant upon glacial melt-water, and permanently water-stressed communities – can NGOs ally with climate change modelers, scientists studying deforestation, and the local affected community to “best-guess” future emergencies and adapt local mitigation and preparedness activities to meet them?

2. It is in cash-strapped and politically less stable states that most devastating environmental crises will occur. Without municipal and state level action and legislation, however, local mitigation efforts will have marginal effect. Can NGOs ratchet up their ability to work with local government to address future crises?

3. Advocacy to adapt the energy, environment and industrial policies of the North is vital to avert longer term chaotic change. Should humanitarian NGOs be advocating alongside environmental lobbyists for policy change, but based on the practical crisis-experiences of the communities they serve? To what extent must they be prepared to address life-style and consumption patterns among the affluent?

4. Notwithstanding constructive action, there may well be far many more people affected by more frequent flooding, drought and resultant deprivation than in the past, people with even less chance of building a sustainable future than at present. Should NGOs sensitize their constituents and governments to the very real possibility of a much higher and more sustained emergency crisis load than today?
Environmental hazards form the backdrop – and sometimes the foreground -- for many complex emergencies. Yet when such crises occur and when international responses are formulated, the role of the environment is often treated as peripheral or is ignored altogether. Understanding environmental hazards enables humanitarian action to be framed in its broadest possible context and can enhance the effectiveness of the responses mounted. In acknowledging the role of the environment in creating crises, one can also take steps to avoid exacerbating or accelerating environmental risks.

Broadly speaking, there are four major linkages between the environment and humanitarian action. First, altered environmental conditions can be a driver of episodic crises with major humanitarian consequences. Second, environmental degradation can create chronic conditions that require attention. Third, humanitarian responses to major crises can produce environmental degradation. Finally, the transition from humanitarian action to sustainable development is critical for preventing need for humanitarian action in the future. Each of these linkages will be examined in turn.

*Environmental factors in emergencies*

Altered environmental conditions can be a driver of crises with major humanitarian features. Many such crises are related to shifts in environmental indicators. These changes may be abrupt, as in a sudden storm, or gradual, as in the incremental increases in the frequency or intensity of episodic events such as drought. Most often, a crisis involves a sudden major event such as the massive typhoons that strike parts of Asia and the Pacific or hurricanes like Mitch that devastated Honduras. The enhanced droughts that have become a regular feature of the weather patterns of the Sahel region of Africa since 1970 now occur with increased frequency. We have floods most every year, commented a civic leader in Bangladesh in August 2004. This year’s floods, however, have been more damaging than most, setting the whole country back by a full decade.

The devastation from flooding is often compounded by preexisting environmental conditions such as deforestation or farming on steep hill sides that leads to additional flooding and/or mudslides and many additional deaths and injuries. The flooding of the Yangtze River in 1998, which displaced over 200 million people, has been officially blamed on deforestation in the highlands of Sichuan by the Chinese government. The typhoon that swept across southern Africa in 2000, producing flooding that displaced millions especially in Mozambique and Madagascar, triggered destruction that was exacerbated by land use changes and deforestation. Boston Massachusetts’ proverbial “one hundred year flood” now comes once every 37 years.

The problem of massive flooding is likely to become more acute in the future. The UN estimates that by 2025 half of the world’s people will live in areas subject to major storms and excessive flooding. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change points to increased likelihood of episodic deluges in many parts of the work, while most studies of changes in land use conclude that deforestation is continuing at an accelerating pace. One cannot imagine a more lethal combination of events to ensure that there will be a need for emergency relief on an ever-expanding and continuing basis.

Similarly, and illustrating the global nature of environmental threats, the drought conditions of the Sahel are now attributable to the warming of sea surface temperatures of the Indian Ocean during the past 40 years. Other multiyear atmospheric oscillations are also now regularly chronicled and are becoming better understood. As a result, the arrival of drought and famine conditions in Africa and elsewhere need not take relief agencies by surprise as they can now be anticipated and assistance can arrive before so much suffering and loss of life has taken place.
Another type of predictable crisis is associated with the dramatic decline in snowfields and glaciers due to global warming. More than 2.5 billion people worldwide depend upon these glacial systems to store water and release melt slowly throughout the dry season. Decreased availability of this water is already being felt in several Andean countries as well as in the western United States and in Europe, with severe implications for agriculture and forestry. In South Asia, there is an even greater danger. The melt from the Himalayan Mountain ice fields feeds all of the great river systems of the Indian sub-continent. At the base of many glaciers is a large and growing lake of melt water that is held in place by natural rock and ice dams. As the region warms, some of these dams will inevitably break, disgorging a wall of water that will deliver crushing destruction to millions living in the river valleys and on the plains kilometers below. One collapsing glacier disaster occurred in the Caucasus region of southern Russia in 2002, crushing a village and killing over 100 people in an avalanche that slid for 15 miles.

Because the linkages are now so well understood, it should be possible to create a catalog of potential sites for catastrophic floods and droughts and set priorities to help anticipate where massive relief efforts will be needed in the future. The ability to link upcoming drought and deluge seasons to El Niño, El Niña, and other systemic climate fluctuations should also allow anticipation of when such events might occur with as much as six to twelve months advance warning. Climatologists anticipate several more El Niño/El Niña events between now and 2015. They are likely to have increasing impact as a result of the progressive socio-economic and political marginalization in the intervening years. Anticipating the incidence of such events requires connecting the weather and climate research communities through such organizations as the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder, CO.

But the future picture has become even more clouded of late. New climate change research, including better modeling the effects of cloud cover, suggests the possibility of up to a 12°C Celsius global temperature rise, rather than the present best guess of 3 to 4°C Celsius. With that sort of change, present predictions on glacial melt, flooding, and drought may be conservative in the extreme. The implications of the new research for humanitarian action would likewise be formidable.
Instead of seeing droughts and floods as unpredictable exogenous events, as was done in the past, they need to be viewed as an integral part of the weather patterns of particular regions whose effects are often exacerbated by human land use practices and choices of where people choose to live. Remote sensing by satellites can provide realtime information on land use trends and of evolving weather related crises that have major humanitarian relief implications.

Global geophysical events

No consideration of the relationship between environment and disaster would be complete without at least passing reference to global geophysical events. This is the term (the nickname is Gee Gees) coined for highly infrequent but devastatingly large events with a destructive power many times greater than the hundred year flood and a “normal” major earthquake. Three types of events are usually considered in these scenarios.

The first is asteroid impact: the stuff of bad science fiction films but nevertheless a reality in earth’s past and, an inevitable, if low probability, reality in our future. This is one area in which science has made much progress in the past decade. In 1995 astronomers had plotted some 300 Near Earth Asteroids (NEAs); today 3,000 are plotted and within 20 years some 90% of all asteroids likely to intercept the earth’s orbit will be plotted. Once plotted and monitored, the possibility of destroying threatening asteroids before they reach the earth’s atmosphere exists. We may not go the way of the dinosaurs.

The second type of Gee Gee is the possibility of giant tsunami-like waves, caused not by submarine earthquakes but by the collapse of a massive rock face into the ocean. In 1958 a relatively modest landslide into a bay in Alaska generated a wave half a kilometer high, traveling not as a gentle swell but a crashing breaker. It stripped the coast line bare of forest, up to the 500 meter contour. The line of new tree growth can still be seen today. If that event was a relatively small one, the last mega-tsunami shows up in the geological record only some 4,000 years ago, generated by a collapsing cliff face on the island of Reunion. Today, scientists are watching with concern the island of La Palma in the Canaries. In 1949 a volcanic eruption opened up a huge crack across the side of the volcano. A rockface estimated to weigh 500,000 tons slipped towards the sea and then stopped. A second eruption, or the gradual weathering of the rock’s slipface, could cause it to crash into the Atlantic. The resulting wave of some 100-150 meters in height would hit the eastern coast of the USA a few hours later. Boston would be hit first, then New York. The wave would travel up to 15 miles inland, carrying everything in its wake.7

Finally, there is the possibility of a mega-volcanic eruption. The last known one was in April 1815, when Tambora in Indonesia exploded violently, killing 92,000 people and throwing a column of ash 28 miles into the air and depositing some of it 800 miles away. When Krakatoa erupted in 1883, the sound of the explosion was heard over 4,000 miles away. The ash circumnavigated the earth in thirteen days and caused spectacular sunsets for the next three before settling back to earth.8 Neither Tambora nor Krakatoa happened in populated areas.

Mega-events like these have happened in the recent past. They will happen in the future, but they are so rare that it is virtually impossible to predict when they will hit; where they will hit is less unknown. “In any one year, the chances of one of these [Gee Gees] happening is probably much less than 1%,” observes one expert. “But in the longer term it is 100%. We need to raise awareness, identify threats and improve surveillance.”9
Environmental factors in chronic crises

In a second linkage between environment and humanitarian action, environmental degradation can create chronic conditions that require international intervention. Water contamination and associated disease, degraded agriculture and grazing lands, as well as deforestation and loss of fuel wood are examples.

The relationship between poverty and the environment is very different from the environmental issues that are confronted in the industrial world. As pointed out more than fifteen year ago by the Bruntland Commission in *Our Common Future*, environmental degradation associated with efforts to meet short-term survival needs is a major cause of continual poverty. Since the poor are living so close to the margin, degradation of the land, water and natural resource base upon which they rely makes them far more vulnerable to epidemics, infections and chronic diseases, high infant mortality, malnutrition, and loss of fuel wood. It has also been argued by some that when the natural resource base is sufficiently degraded, tensions among different ethnic and cultural groups become more likely. The failure to have an early warning system in the Sudan, or to act on such warning signs as were present, arguably factors that contributed to the genocide there today.

Degraded water quality is perhaps the most significant contributor to the low health status of many of the world’s poor. Water-borne disease is among the leading causes of infant and childhood mortality. However, water-borne diseases such as chronic diarrhea, schistosomiasis, malaria, typhoid, yellow fever, and river blindness also debilitate the adult population, making them incapable of generating a living for their families. When drought or another form of disaster hits a community weakened by disease, it is even more difficult for local people to respond.

With perhaps 2 billion people dependent upon wood and agricultural waste as cooking fuel, the unsustainable harvesting of these resources is placing many regions into jeopardy. Rural villagers (mostly women and children and thus more vulnerable to sexual violence) now spend many hours a day going out to obtain fire wood as well as water. The size of cleared circles around villages in Africa, Latin America, and Asia testifies to the shrinking supply of this critical resource. As the availability of fire wood decreases, there is less capability to cook nutritious meals or to boil water to make it potable. The denuding of forest cover also degrades soils and leads to major soil loss, the most dramatic example being in Haiti, where deforestation is nearly complete and soils have largely been lost to the sea. A similar acute deforestation-soil degradation problem is occurring in El Salvador. It is predicted that once enough of the great tropical rain forests of the Amazon, Central Africa and South East Asia are depleted, regional precipitation patterns will shift and these areas will become much drier.

As populations are pushed onto ever more marginal lands for subsistence agriculture -- such factors as land tenure patterns and internal displacement are implicated -- degradation rates increase. While swidden, or slash and burn, agriculture works for small populations in the Amazon and in Central Africa, current cycles cannot sustain the much larger populations practicing that agricultural approach. Similarly in Central America, the Philippines, Kenya, and elsewhere, subsistence farmers move up hillsides, clearing them of forests, only to watch the thin top soils wash into the valley below, taking their livelihoods with them. This is a classic formula for future food crises and may also promote intergroup conflict, although the correlation with conflict is not absolute. Moreover the adaptability and coping capacity of farmers can, within limits, moderate the damages.

Responses as complicating factors

Responses to urgent humanitarian needs can themselves contribute to environmental degradation. The humanitarian imperative drives fast-paced responses geared with a sense of urgency to save lives and relieve suffering. While it hardly seems appropriate at such life-and-death junctures to ponder longer term issues as the environment, there are lessons to be learned from past interventions that can make future ones more effective.
Often there is a need to set up a “temporary” camp for refugees who have fled across a given border. The recurrent temptation is to find an “empty” piece of land to avoid conflict with indigenous local groups. Usually, however, the land is empty for a reason. Following negotiations with the authorities, some refugee camps have been located in low swampy places that became soggy cesspools for thousands of people spreading disease and much suffering. The locals know better than to appropriate these locations for human habitation. A dramatic recent example was the construction by the United States of a refugee camp in Albania to hold tens of thousands of Kosovars in anticipation of major refugee flows. Before it could be inhabited, however, the multimillion dollar camp was under several feet of water. Rather than a formal environmental impact assessment, a simple local inquiry as to why this place of seasonal flooding was not already in use would have flagged the problem.

Another problem associated with establishing refugee camps is the rapid exhaustion of local firewood supply. This can be avoided by supplying fueled stoves or solar cookers, although there be may be logistical difficulties in getting these in place and continuing to supply the fuel.10 Refugee camps are seldom as temporary as envisioned and are often too small to support the populations that inhabit them. Environments that might tolerate short-term habitation for a season may be totally inadequate for several years of protracted residency, as described in a subsequent section. If a camp is occupied for longer periods, competition for water, fuel wood, and land for gardens to feed refugees can create conflicts with local indigenous people. To avoid these problems, careful environmental assessment and planning to minimize the potential for such conflicts is essential.

**FIGURE 2**
GLOBAL AVERAGE TEMPERATURE AT EARTH’S SURFACE

![Global Average Temperature at Earth's Surface](image)

*Source: GISS*

*The development connection*

The transition from a relief intervention to a sustainable development approach is critical for preventing or minimizing the future need for humanitarian assistance. While humanitarian engagement is usually in
response to an acute crisis, the approach taken to the response can pave the way for a transition to a more sustainable future that is less likely to see the intervention repeated. While it is difficult to add this planning task to the management of any specific crisis, stepping back and conducting a longer term plan and coordinating with follow-up development agencies at the earliest possible moment can assist in this process.

When a major devastation such as massive flooding or a hurricane has displaced people and destroyed homes and livelihoods, there is an opportunity to assist them in creating a truly sustainable future for themselves. One of the arguments against shifting to an alternative development strategy is that there is already in place an existing system that can only be incrementally improved. That argument no longer holds when everything has been destroyed. Although “rebuilding” is often the response of agencies, one must ask whether rebuilding what was inadequate before the disaster is a good expenditure of development and relief funds.

Another advantage of following the UN mandate for sustainable development in the aftermath of a disaster is that it requires community participation and local accountability. While people often say they want what they had before, they are seldom provided with an alternative vision of what is possible. Since there are places that are likely sites of recurrent devastating weather events, why not select some of these locations and work with local people to envision an alternative future? In the best of all worlds, especially vulnerable communities would be moved from flood plains and other precarious locations into new settings built around sustainable development principles. Relief agencies and organizations can assist this transition by designing interventions so that communities transition not to “reconstruction” but to “construction of a sustainable future.” They may also capitalize on the openness to change as an opportunity to help alter practices that discriminate against women.

These four linkages between changes in the global environment and the activities of NGOs point to a number of conclusions and implications. The crises to which humanitarian organizations respond are often acute events, human rather than “natural” in their causation, while the quality of the environment that sustains people often deteriorates more slowly. Hence, most organizations that see themselves as first responders have traditionally not paid close attention to longer term issues such as the health of the environment within which they operate. It is increasingly clear that it is often poverty and the downward spiral of environmental degradation that enhances vulnerability to acute crises and complicates response to crises as they evolve.

Acute humanitarian responses can become more targeted and effective if there is better coordination with those who provide advanced warning of when and where crises are likely to arise. An understanding of a few basic environmental principles can also make humanitarian action more effective when it does occur and help those displaced by events to return to an improved quality of life in the post-crisis time frame. To accomplish these goals will require advanced coordination and new partnerships between communities of practitioners that have traditionally worked on different issues with different mindsets and time frames. Disparate groups actually have many interests in common, with the potential for synergies that enhance their own effectiveness and the benefits that accrue to victims. Collaborative approaches are better able to maximize the opportunities to apply pressure on traditionally discriminatory policies and practices.

New collaborations with remote sensing experts and with scientists who study deforestation, rangeland quality, climate change and hydrology can assist in anticipating when and where humanitarian crises are most likely to strike, and may even be able to provide lead times of up to one year as to where some of them will occur. Having this knowledge can save lives, decrease the cost of individual interventions, and help prevent their reoccurrence. Collaboration between the weather and climate research community and humanitarian organizations might also provide an important potential joint funding opportunity. The ability to reduce suffering from weather-based events could be vastly enhanced through active preventive actions such as evacuations to predetermined safe locations and timely interventions to prevent disease, famine, and drownings.
Finally, there are questions regarding the daunting scale of environmental hazards and the modest resources available to address them. Granted the value of environmentally-savvy program strategies by operational NGOs, are not the hazards of a magnitude well beyond the capacity of NGOs to have a significant impact, whether individually or even as a community? The innovative NGO forestation project in India which enhances annual rainfall by strategic tree-planting around the perimeter of a farmer’s field is a step in the right direction, but its one hectare enclosure is but a miniscule victory.

The community of nations has recognized that governments alone cannot handle the entire range of humanitarian interventions, development needs, and environmental degradation that is occurring. At the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development, governments officially called upon the full range of NGOs, private sector institutions, and civil society organizations to form “Type 2” agreements with them to address these problems. “Type 1” agreements among governments had proven too rigid, too slow, and suffer from the perceived infringement by governments and intergovernmental organizations in issues of national sovereignty.

FIGURE 3
CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK

Source: Environmental Systems Research Institute Inc (ESRI)
From The 21st Century NGO: In the Market for Change Report by SustainAbility, The Global Compact, and UNEP.

NGOs and local civil society groups are implementing many of the best programs that are currently reducing environmental risk and lowering the vulnerability of local people to environmental hazards. It is now time to mobilize the financial resources of governments and the private sector in effective partnership with these non-governmental efforts in order to expand their scale and replicate them wherever possible. Governmental remote sensing programs, for example, will remain financed by governments, but will also require the NGO community to identify the needs and opportunities for Type 2 agreements with governments both in space and on the ground.

There is also scope for advocacy on a whole host of planetary survival issues. Exemplifying the global nature of the challenge of a key issue such as global warming and the consequent need for coordinated advocacy on
a global basis, the Climate Action Network has developed an extensive set of linkages among NGOs around the world (Figure 2). Over 340 individual organizations are working together “to promote government and individual action to limit human-induced climate change to ecologically sustainable levels.”

To accomplish these goals will require advance coordination and new partnerships between communities that have traditionally worked on different issues and different time frames. In fact, as shown here, these groups actually have many interests in common, and combining them can produce better outcomes for those in need.

**B. Urbanization**

> Over 100 million people live in slum communities, most in the medium-sized cities of the less developed countries. It is in the less developed countries and particularly in Africa where the population growth of the next decade will largely take place. If present trends are not challenged, increasingly the rural population will flee to the city, pushed by war and the collapse of rural economies. Gone are the days when the move to the city was a matter of choice to seek a brighter future. Increasingly it is a last resort when all else has failed. In the city migrants meet the forces of modern economic growth, the drive for cheap and disposable labor, the externalizing of risk by commerce, the downsizing of welfare responsibilities by states, and governance by exclusionary systems. They have little to lose and see little hope for the future. Yet the city is also where self organized political action is most likely, where education and health services can be provided most efficiently, and where economic growth is going to happen. Crisis and opportunity meet face-to-face – the ultimate ambiguity. In this environment, humanitarian NGOs must ask some searching questions.

1. Are their present policies, programs, and staffing geared to sustained involvement in slum areas, where the future lies?
2. Can NGOs work with slum communities, local academia, and advocacy groups to map the possible cascades of disaster in the new urban environment and use this to advocate for changes in the planning and delivery of welfare services?
3. Can NGOs work with the most vulnerable in the slums – HIV/AIDS sufferers, illegal migrant labor, women – to change attitudes toward them and to build self-help strategies to better secure their present, let alone their future?

Shifting the focus from global environmental hazards to urbanization, cities have both positive and negative features vis-à-vis the quality of human life. They may serve as a refuge from war and natural hazards, or, alternatively, as a site for new hazards, particularly for displaced newcomers. Urbanism can serve as a stimulus for social transformation, or can prove destructive of traditional values and coping mechanisms. Cities afford an opportunity to provide public services, but also experience a rising demand for such services, some of them more difficult to meet through the privatization of water, health, sanitation, and electric resources. Cities form a more natural seedbed for political violence and more tempting target for terrorism than rural areas. Half of humanity now lives in cities; most population growth in next 10 years will be in small- and medium-sized cities in the least developed countries (LDCs).

The negative potential of urbanization requires that the distinction between (and professional treatment of) different kinds of hazards be compartmentalized for analytical purposes and treated individually. Yet an integrated approach is also essential to such vectors as violence and peacemaking, poverty and human development, vulnerability and resilience to disasters, which are triggered by violence, geophysical and climatic events, technological failure, environmental and biological hazards, and failures of public safety. In addition to adopting an integrated approach to risks in all these forms, NGOs need to develop new ways of supporting and working with local partners to confront such urban hazards. Some of these ways involve playing an active role in the political process and/or supporting organizations that do.

Some analysts affirm that cities need not be parasitic upon their rural hinterlands, that they need not be death traps and sites of hyper-exploitation for the poor. They assume that urbanism has a positive side that can enhance human development and that cities are, in principle, governable and ecologically and socially sustainable. An alternative set of assumptions stresses the pathologies of urban development and accentuates
the combustible elements of urbanism. Urban hazards include earthquakes, floods, landslides, and epidemics, as well as heat and cold waves, spontaneous building collapses, petrochemical explosions and transportations, not to say interethnic riots and terrorist attacks. While urban pessimism has articulate spokespersons, scenarios built on “the city of light” model are sustainable by social science data and also more in keeping with the optimism of the humanitarian ethic than “the city of darkness” approach.

**Trendlines**

Trends in urbanization and urbanism over the past decade have several prominent features, each with implications for the human condition and the humanitarian enterprise.

- **Rapid urban growth, especially in Africa.** In 1950, 18% of people in the LDCs lived in cities. By 2000, that proportion was 40%, and in 2030 it could be 56%. The urban growth rate in Africa is the highest in the world; 5% per annum. In 1970, only 23% of Africans lived in cities. By 2000 some 38% were urbanites, by 2025, that percentage could exceed 50%. Africa has 40 cities with populations of more than one million and could have as man as seventy “million cities” by 2015.

- **Growth and general neglect of smaller and medium-sized urban places.** Nations facing debt burdens and laboring under the constraints of structural adjustment have downsized urban services and public service employment. These cuts have been hardest for smaller cities which often lack political power at the national level.

- **The growth of slums, reflecting the underside of urbanization.** Some 72 percent of Africa’s urban population lives in slums. One of the targets agreed to at the Johannesburg Earth Summit, and subsequently affirmed by the Millennium Development Goals, is by 2020 “to achieve a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.”

- **Refugee settlements as quasi-urban places.** The 1980s and 1990s saw the proliferation of very large refugee settlements which, because of their size and longevity, took on features of natural urban places. Kakuma, in Kenya, with some 87,000 residents, is one example. They have in effect become towns or small cities in their own right and with the accompanying problems and opportunities.

- **Growth of urban social movements.** Social movements have grown along with cities. These include organizations of homeless people (on the model of the landless movement, MST, in Brazil), pavement dwellers (in Mumbai and Delhi), squatters (in Nairobi), the new unemployed (in Buenos Aires). These movements have counterparts in the U.S. and U.K. such as the Kensington Welfare Rights Union and various groups involved in the pursuit of environmental justice.

- **Urban networks and the facilitation of humanitarian responses.** Increased ease of transport and communication has brought such services closer to formerly isolated rural and border areas.

Paralleling these trends in urbanization have been concomitant trends in the nature of the crises encountered. Vulnerability and exposure to hazards have increased in urban places. Urban growth, especially increased numbers of urban slum dwellers, has meant greater numbers of people occupying hazardous locations in cities such as informal encampments near factories in industrial zones (Mumbai, Tijuana & Bhopal), steep slopes (Mexico City & Quito), flood plains (Dhaka), near railway lines and along natural gas and petroleum pipeline easements (Mumbai & Sao Paulo), low lying coastal wetlands (Luanda, Manila & Lagos).

While the sorts of hazards faced by cities in the LDCs and more developed countries (MDCs) are similar, the vulnerabilities are very different, as are the outcomes. In the LDCs there is much higher mortality. MDC mortality is lower while monetary losses are higher. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies made a simple comparison of death rate per disaster, cost per disaster, and level of human
development in its *World Disaster Report 2001* (adapted by Wisner et al., 2003: 24, Table 1.3). Human
development, measured by UNDP’s human development index (HDI), demonstrated that in low HDI
countries, 1,052 people died per disaster in the period 1991-2000, whilst only 23 perished in high HDI
countries. Yet low HDI countries lost only $79 million per disaster, high HDI countries $636 million. 15
Disasters affecting urban areas confirm a close correlation between deaths per disaster and the prevailing level
of human development. 16 Smaller cities as well as large are hazard-prone.

A tight linkage among disaster, development, and humanitarian crises has emerged. During the 1990s,
workers in disaster policy, management, and response began to appreciate more fully the tight coupling
between conflict, development policy, and disaster. For example, Chokwe, on the South coast of
Mozambique at the mouth of the Limpopo river, had become a refuge for rural people fleeing civil war in the
1980s. As its population grew, so did its vulnerability to the flood disaster, partly as an indirect consequence
of violent conflict. People displaced by the 1988 floods in Khartoum had already been displaced by civil war
from their homes in southern Sudan. Elsewhere, failed rural development and macro-economic policies had
created large populations of low income urban migrants who were highly vulnerable to the hazards listed. In
Bhuj and Hyderabad, there were former small farmers who had lost their land due to the concentration effect
of the Green Revolution. Squatters lived precariously on steep slopes on the coastal hills near Caracas and
Tegucigalpa, and the rural poor had migrated seeking employment in export enclaves in Guadalajara.
Turning to the future of urbanization and associated crises likely to have major humanitarian consequences, it
seems reasonable to expect that most population increase will take place in the LDCs. Most of it will be in
cities, some of it in smaller and medium-sized metropolises.

Currently nearly half of humanity lives in cities – a proportion projected to be 60 per cent by 2030.17 The UN
anticipates that almost all population growth in the world between 2000-2030 will be concentrated in urban
areas. Most of this increase will be absorbed by urban areas in LDCs. Cities of over one million will
continue to predominate the urban landscape, although roughly a third of urban dwellers will continue to live in
cities smaller than 1 million (2000-2015). In 2000, the number of cities with more than 5 million
inhabitants was 41. That number is likely to be 59 by the year 2015. True megacities – those of 10 million or
larger – numbered 19 in 2000 and could be as many as 23 by 2015.18

Of particular importance to the humanitarian challenge is the proliferation of low income, informal
settlements within LDC cities of all sizes. The UN Centre for Human Settlements reviewed the state of these
settlements, termed “slums” in its 2003 *Report on Human Settlements*.19 In his vivid overview, Davis does not
exaggerate the scale of what Habitat calls the challenge of slums:

There may be more than quarter of a million slums on earth. The five great
metropolises of South Asia (Karachi, Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata and Dhaka)
alone contain about 15,000 distinct slum communities with a total
population of more than 20 million. An even larger slum population
crowds the urbanizing littoral of West Africa, while other huge
conurbations of poverty sprawl across Anatolia and the Ethiopian
highlands; hug the base of the Andes and the Himalayas; explode outward
from the skyscraper cores of Mexico, Jo-burg, Manila, and Sao Paulo; and,
of course, line the banks of the rivers Amazon, Niger, Congo, Nile, Tigris,
Ganges, Irrawaddy and Mekong.20

*The marks of future urbanization*

Four features are likely to characterize the urbanization of the future: a wider range of crises, synergies among
them, the emergence of new vulnerable groups, and the importance of root causes. These features represent,
in a sense, a checklist for strategic planning by NGOs and other major actors.

20
First, the coming years are likely to witness a wider range and number of urban crises and disasters. Figure 3 provides an overview of the major natural hazards that frequently affect the world’s largest megacities. Much urban growth is taking place along the coasts, where sea level rise due to global warming and increased frequency and intensity of coastal storms may put more people, livelihoods, and investments at risk. This is particularly true of slum dwellers such as those living on islands in Manila harbor or the Bay of Bengal or in low lying coastal areas in African cities such as Lagos and Luanda, Angola. Floods – both slow and fast onset – are also likely to increase as urban build-out and sprawl creates less permeable ground surface and as more poor people squat in flood plains. Earthquakes and landslides have plagued the poor in cities where informal settlement has claimed steep slopes and ravines. Mexico City, Tegucigalpa, Guatemala City, Quito, and Bogota are examples. Vulnerability to these geological hazards is bound to increase as migrants fleeing conflict in rural areas or displaced by economic development projects (e.g. the dam building and petroleum extraction envisioned by the Plan Pueblo Panama) seek refuge in the only available urban space.

Epidemics of malaria, dengue fever, and yellow fever have followed flooding and coastal storms in a number of tropical LDC cities in the past (e.g. during the 1997-98 El Nino episode), and are likely to represent an increased public health threat as three trends coincide: increased climate instability, decreased municipal financing for public health outreach, and growing numbers of urban poor. Under these conditions cholera is a constant threat, as is the spread of new viruses such as SARS and avian flu. Slums are also prone to spontaneous collapse of poorly constructed structures – some of several stories – as well as shack fires that can burn extensive areas because of poor access for fire-fighting equipment. In one recent case in Nairobi, Kenya, many thousands of homes were destroyed.

With globalization, there will also continue to be expansion of industrial and port facilities in many LDCs. Industrialization with likely lax regulation brings its own stream of technological and environmental hazards, of which the deadly 1984 gas disaster in Bhopal, India and, that same year, the explosion of huge natural gas storage tanks in the north of Mexico City are iconic. Increased trade, pushing the limits of infrastructure such as railways and roads, may also bring about an increase in transportation disasters. As urban densities increase – again, very likely with insufficient attention to zoning and regulation – disasters such as the explosion of rail cars carrying ammonium nitrate fertilizer in North Korea, in April, 2004 may become more common. In that case, there were many people living and working nearby the railroad station, and much mixed land use, including three primary schools. At least 161 people died, and there were thousands injured, many severely burned.21 In all of this – and this raises the second feature of urbanization -- combinations of natural and technological hazards and cascades of multiple natural and technological/environmental hazard events are increasingly likely. An earthquake may be followed by petrochemical explosion and fire, or dam failure and flooding, or both. Such cascading, complexly interacting events may be accompanied by violence, depending on the underlying stability of urban society and polity.

In a broader sense, synergies – positive or negative, as the case may be -- among development, disaster, and life-and-death emergencies will increase as a necessary focus of policy analysis and new institutional capacity. Emergencies, disasters, and catastrophes most likely to create a humanitarian challenge in urban areas in the future will be the result of the interaction of poverty, fragile and deteriorating urban living conditions, crime, and conflict.22 The resulting amalgam will demand more than immediate relief, particularly in the form of policy advice and lobbying to mitigate or prevent these situations from arising. In response, NGOs that traditionally have provided only relief are now turning also to the policy realm as are UN agencies themselves. Risk reduction will require work on improving urban governance (especially the maintenance of urban infrastructure and services), reforming economic policies at many levels so that urban livelihoods are secure and well-being increases, and building greater capacity to manage conflict.
A third feature involves the emergence of new vulnerable groups. NGOs frequently focus their work on such groups; some have historically defined their missions accordingly (e.g., Help the Aged, Save the Children, etc.). Some groups will likely require special attention as vulnerability to urban risks increases. These include those living with AIDS (especially in southern Africa, India, and Russia), illegal immigrants/workers, workers in export-enclave “sweat shops,” displaced persons and refugees, orphans and homeless children/young, war veterans, and especially former soldiers and “child soldiers” (as in Angola, Cambodia). Women and children who are victims of worldwide trafficking are at multiple risk in cities on account of their voicelessness and the conditions and locations of involuntary servitude and labor. Figure 4 identifies some new patterns of risk reflecting a combination of new vulnerabilities and new urban hazards.

Indeed, an entire review of the demography of urban risk is needed. For example, hazards associated with climate change (flooding, landslides, inadequate water supply) will most seriously affect displaced indigenous groups and the isolated urban elderly or disabled because of their peripheral location and poor mobility and frail condition, respectively. Urban violence is likely to affect ex-child soldiers if they become “street children” and/or are drawn into urban crime organizations. Violence against displaced indigenous groups may arise because of their ethnic and linguistic minority status and long-standing prejudices against “natives” and members of religious minorities. A gender lens will be essential in reviewing the disproportionate impacts on women and girls. Workers in sweat shops may suffer or become involved in urban violence associated with disputes over working conditions, a continuing flash point. They will also be the immediate victims of unregulated industrialization associated with increased globalization of production and trade, although serious industrial explosions, fires, gas releases, and other technological hazards would affect many other people living in factory zones. Increasing megacity sprawl promises to make transportation and access to services more expensive and difficult, especially for the isolated elderly and people living with disabilities. The urban heat bubble created by huge expanses of urban land use could increase the risk of injury from heat stress for these groups during heat waves (which may themselves become more frequent).

Fourth, the drivers of urban change and the root causes of urbanization will become more powerful over time. The concentration of low income, vulnerable people in dangerous urban locations has many causes. More immediate drivers include the collapse of rural livelihoods, especially due to competition with U.S. and European farmers who receive enormous subsidies from their own governments. Large-scale commercial agriculture, expansion of mining and hydro power projects, and tourism have also caused considerable rural displacement and “de-peasantization.” The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), mandated to focus on small scale rural producers in LDCs, summarizes the situation starkly:

Progress in reducing rural poverty has stalled. In the 1990s, it fell to less than on third of the rate needed to meet the United Nations’ commitment to halve world poverty by 2015. Although three quarters of the world’s 1.2 billion extremely poor people live and work in rural areas, aid to agriculture, their main source of income, has fallen by two thirds.

Another driver of rural-to-urban migration has been violent conflict in any of a variety of forms. These include the “war on drugs” and “war on terrorism” and struggles over control of high value export commodities such as diamonds and oil. In 2004 there were approximately 21.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Asia and the Pacific, Latin America, and Africa – 12.7 million of these in Africa. Many of these people have settled in hazardous urban locations. There are also 14.9 million people recognized as asylum seekers or refugees, down from the peak years 1992-1994, when the numbers were between 16-17 million. At the beginning of 2002, nine countries/territories had produced three-quarters of the world’s refugees: Afghanistan, Israel, Burma, Angola, Sudan, Burundi, Congo-Kinshasa, Eritrea, and Iraq.
Refugees are more likely to be accommodated in camps than to self-shelter in host cities, as do many IDPs. However, refugee camps may very well over time take some characteristics of towns, even cities, and this includes their health and other hazards.  

Once relocated in cities, vulnerability of the new urban poor is exacerbated by exposure to other urban hazards, including the lack of formal sector employment, climate change, water scarcity, deterioration of health services and public health infrastructure. Resentment and anger builds, especially in situations with chronically narrow options for the young and the rise of ideologies of revenge by the excluded.

All of these drivers of change are likely to become stronger during the next ten to fifteen years. The key variable and indicator to watch will be less that of poverty (whether of food or income) and more that of exclusion and marginality, demographics and migration. In the 1950s and 1960s the urban poor had hope and expectations of improved living standards and a better life for their children. They built their urban homes literally brick by brick over many years through small amounts of saving and sweat equity. In a similar way, neighborhoods and whole cities such as La Neza in Mexico City took shape, from slum origins becoming legalized and gaining infrastructure and services. This hope may wane and even die among a new generation that has not experienced a similar trajectory. It is less likely that such people will cooperate with municipal authorities in programs to mitigate urban hazards; they may be even angrier when floods, landslides, and other hazards affect them, triggering a vicious cycle.

It is therefore evident that influencing the shape and pace of urbanization are a series of root causes. They include the impact of economic globalization in and insufficient international commitment to development assistance. Shallow democratization in many countries is another root cause, manifesting itself in poor urban governance and security. In many cities around the world the move toward privatization of life-line infrastructure such as water and electricity has often been grossly mismanaged, with international corporations that successfully bid for contracts raising prices for low income urban consumers without expanding or improving service. Corporate compliance and accountability is often not enforced by weak municipal governments. Poor governance also figures in the frequent failure to enforce building and other safety codes. Another root cause is the elite control over urban land use and planning, resulting in large rents for a few and a lack of security of urban land tenure for the majority. These trends have their roots in the development of market hegemony and globalized capitalism since World War II, with even deeper roots in nineteenth century imperialism.
### FIGURE 5
SOME POSSIBLE NEW PATTERNS OF URBAN RISK

<table>
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<th>New Vulnerable Groups</th>
<th>Climate Change</th>
<th>Urban Violence</th>
<th>Unregulated Industrialization</th>
<th>Increased Sprawl</th>
<th>HIV/AIDS &amp; New Disease?</th>
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<td>+++</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### C. Migration

While people on the move has traditionally meant refugee crises, that is not what the future holds. Today there are some 11.9 million refugees, 24 million forcibly displaced people and some 100 million who have been displaced over the past decade by major development programs. Human trafficking is now more profitable than illegal arms sales or drug trade. The thirst for cheap and disposable labor in the cash-poor economic sectors of the North or the rapidly growing conurbations of the South is completely altering the demographics and social attitudes towards migration.

1. Will NGOs develop the policies, systems, and skills that allow them to switch from working with concentrations of easily identifiable refugees over specific time periods to working with a more dispersed, less easily identifiable and more mobile population of voluntary and involuntary migrant labor?

2. In the North, fears over international terrorism are tightening asylum laws to the detriment of legitimate political refugees and economic migrants. NGOs with an advocacy base in the North need to make the case for better differentiation between asylum seekers, economic migrants, and trafficked individuals and to develop policy options specific to each group.

3. Human trafficking and its increased feminization is perhaps the biggest present and future emergency of migration. To tackle it, concerned NGOs will need to work with new partners, and across national boundaries. They will need to focus on the trafficking system, not just the country of origin or the place of exploitation of the trafficked individuals.

The past decade has seen increases in both international and internal migration, reflecting pressures resulting from environmental change, demographic trends, civil wars and conflict, and security and other measures taken by governments, and other governmental policies. A combination of push and pull factors is involved in the stepped up pace. On the push side, civil wars, conflict, poverty, political repression, human rights
abuses, and environmental change have impelled more people, skilled and unskilled alike, to leave their home countries. On the pull side, economic opportunities, political freedom, and the desire for greater security have attracted such persons into receiving countries.

For statistical purposes, migrants are normally grouped into several categories: refugees (persons crossing international boundaries seeking protection), internally displaced persons (persons who flee within their own countries), and migrant workers (persons who move predominantly for economic reasons). Migrant workers include civil servants, foreign students, and dependents who join them but exclude tourists, consular staff, foreign military personnel, and nomads. Migration is stronger within the South, where countries act as sending and receiving agents. Northern countries act predominantly as hosts. There are legal and illegal migrants.

In 2003, there were 11.9 million refugees, of which 1.12 million were new refugees and asylum seekers, compared with a peak of over 19 million refugees in 1993. While the number of refugees in recent years has fallen, the volume of internal migration has risen, primarily, as noted above, in the form of rural-urban migration to capital cities and smaller towns. At the end of 2003, some 24 million persons were forcibly displaced within their own countries, 5.28 million of them newly so.

Recent trends

While the aggregate number of people migrating accounts for only three percent of the world’s population, they nevertheless represent significant humanitarian challenges, specific and general, immediate and longer term. IDPs, for example, pose a challenge to humanitarian organizations that is often more complex than that of reaching refugee populations. Key developments in the field of migration during the past decade bearing on the strategic planning of NGOs include the following:

- Increased number of urban refugees and IDPs, as part of the general urbanization trend discussed in the previous section. Many national capitals in the South have seen dramatic population increases. In war zones, urban growth rates from displacement are likely to be even higher than such rates in non-conflict settings. Most of these urban migrants end up living in urban slums and impoverished zones, with few livelihood opportunities and multiple health risks.

- The emergence of new destination countries (Pacific Rim, Gulf states, South Africa) and new routes for the purposes of labor migration, trafficking and smuggling, and asylum. As the most desirable countries become more difficult to reach, other countries replace them as final destinations, or stopping places that can be used to access more desirable countries. Countries like Poland and Hungary are the bases where legal residence is maintained while temporary migration for work occurs into Western Europe. As asylum become more difficult in Western Europe, refugees from Afghanistan try their luck on boats headed to Australia. New people-smuggling routes go through Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Central America. In Africa, the route for refugees and economic migrants is south towards South Africa, with transit countries including Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi.

- An upsurge in human trafficking, sparing no country. Each year, an estimated 600,000-800,000 men, women, and children are trafficked across international borders and millions more trafficked within their home countries. Driven by criminal elements, economic hardship, corrupt governments, social disruption, political instability, natural disasters, and armed conflict, people are often forced into exploitative economies like prostitution, sweatshops, child soldiering, and other forms of involuntary servitude. With estimates of profits at between US $8 billion and US $10 billion per year, human trafficking is fast becoming more lucrative than arms or drugs dealing. According to an IOM report, South Africa is the regional center of a trafficking network that recruits women and children from
Ambiguity and Change

Mozambique, Angola, Malawi, Thailand, China, and Eastern Europe, and is conducted by organized crime and businesswomen.\textsuperscript{37}

FIGURE 6
NET MIGRATION FLOW PER REGION: 1995-2000

- A spate of new laws and institutions, especially since 9/11, regulating migration and reduce terrorist infiltration. These include trafficking protocols, new migration control technologies, and new forms of interstate cooperation to control and monitor migration. In the United States, immigration matters are now handled by the new Department of Homeland Security, which is experiencing many teething problems. At the same time, many new and longstanding host countries lack developed migrant or refugee policy regimes. While some governments take a laissez-faire approach, others resort to crackdowns and violations of rights. New asylum countries sometimes lack trained border officials with knowledge of refugee law, resulting in turn-backs.

- New protection and security problems facing many migrants and refugees. These include death and injury from smuggling (rates have risen as new and more dangerous techniques and routes are used), and the increased likelihood that smuggled or trafficked people will be linked into prostitution or drug smuggling rings.\textsuperscript{38} Illegal wage migration carries with it a series of risks (e.g., death by heat exhaustion). Other protection problems include harassment from police, deportation and detention. In addition, xenophobia and anti-foreigner violence by the public in increasing in many destination regions, such as Europe and South Africa.
Factors promoting migration

In surveying hazards in the area of migration, it is necessary to examine the determinants of population movements and their consequences in sending and destination countries alike. Migration has always occurred for a wide range of reasons, including demographics, the push and pull effects of globalization, violent conflict and persecution, and government policies. Each of these will be examined in turn.

The demographic effects of migration on destination countries have been significant in increasing the base population and in changing the racial, ethnic, and religious composition of the resident population. The growing diversity of immigration also creates tensions with host populations with whom they may not share values and customs.

One of the most significant trends in the last decade has been the feminization of migration streams that heretofore were primarily male. Recent statistics on gender distribution of international migrants indicate that fully 47.5 per cent are women. The implications for humanitarian organizations and other involved actors are clear: migration and development policies must be designed to address the migrants’ gendered identities and gender-related behaviors.

Economic globalization exacerbates disparities between rich and poor countries and in doing so increases migration. International migration itself constitutes a form of globalization, with concomitant costs and benefits to different social groups. Ever cheaper and more widely accessible communication technology, especially cell phones which are now easily available even in remote refugee camps, increase the incentives and disposition of people to move. Expanding networks make migration more feasible and profitable – both for the brokers or smugglers and potentially for the sending communities. In the coming years, many developed countries are expected to increase their demand for migrant labor as well in the face of gaps in labor supply, low fertility rates, and aging populations. This demand will act as an important pull factor for South-North migration.

With respect to conflict-related displacement as a causal factor in migration, several patterns can be discerned. First, acute conflict -- raids on villages accompanied by violence, kidnapping and asset stripping are examples -- leads to sudden flight, sometimes en masse, and emergency situations. These situations are sometimes resolved relatively soon, as in the case of Kosovo, when the refugees who had fled to Albania were repatriated within six weeks. But if not soon resolved, they may lead to protracted displacement.

In addition, protracted conflict leads to long-term or recurring displacement and immiseration. Most of the world’s refugees and IDPs today -- the major population groups described in the accompanying chart as being of concern to UNHCR -- are in protracted situations as a result of long-term conflicts and the inability of leaders to find political solutions to the problem of displacement. In 2003, more than 7.35 million people -- well over half of the world’s 12 million refugees -- had been displaced for ten years or more. More restricted access to countries for resettlement has lengthened the time spent in refugee camps or segregated settlements. In these protracted situations, “prima facie” refugees live in sub-standard conditions, often in insecure camps in conflict-affected border zones. Their legal status is precarious and they have limited rights to work or move around outside the camp and are not able to travel across borders except to repatriate.

Even when conflict and violence do not directly displace people, they may compromise the livelihoods of affected populations by destroying property, stripping assets, and limiting access to resources needed for coping. The destruction of livelihoods eventually leads to out-migration or protracted displacement as, conversely, the creation of livelihoods can represent an incentive to stay put.

A final major causal factor in migration, then, involves the policies of governments in the areas of development, policies that have received extensive study over the past decade. Local communities are the intended beneficiaries of internationally supported aid activities. However, people are often displaced by the
construction of infrastructure and other development projects. One estimate is that 100 million people were displaced in the 1990s due to construction of dams or roads. Government relocation policies linked to infrastructural development initiatives in countries such as Ethiopia, China, and Indonesia have led to high levels of internal migration, with uneven consequences for the affected populations. Conversely, the benefits of development geared toward low income populations can have a deterrent effect on migration.

FIGURE 7
POPULATION OF CONCERN TO UNHCR

Traditional discussions of the migration and development nexus have focused on the “three R’s” of recruitment, remittances, and return. However, this approach reduces migration to an economic act isolated from its social, cultural, and political dimensions. Research has yet to demonstrate a direct or conclusive link between aid for poverty reduction and reduced migration. In fact, some economic development generates both the resources and incentives for people to migrate. The connections between migration and development are thus complex and multi-directional. Development, at least initially, can increase migration, but it can also ease “distress migration.” It can also enhance the success of repatriation.

Migrants themselves can be seen as agents of development and mobilizers of resources for the benefit of both sending and destination countries. In the 1990s, the importance of remittances was reassessed because of their increased volume and multiplier effects. According to the World Bank, remittances were valued at $80 billion in 2002, an increase by a third over the previous four years. Migrants also promote trade and investment between the receiving and sending countries. It is now believed that remittances and foreign direct investment are more important sources of finance for developing countries than total official flows (including ODA) and private lending.

Out-migration also negatively affects development in the source country as a result of brain drain. The loss of skilled labor and educated people is a growing problem. But there is also some evidence that “brain gain” can be a positive side-effect of the mobility of human capital. The anticipation of migration opportunities can mean that more people seek education in order to increase their chances. Since not all end up migrating, the country’s level of human capital increases as does economic growth. Remittances also compensate for the losses incurred by brain drain.

A less migration-friendly world

Would-be migrants and refugees now face a series of obstacles. Well before the events of September 11, 2001, they confronted anti-immigrant climates in many European countries, as well in the “new migration” countries in Latin America, Central East Europe, Asia, and South Africa. In countries of first asylum in
Africa and Asia, governments have increasingly adopted restrictive refugee policies, requiring refugees to stay in camps and limiting or ending their rights to work and move around freely. Since 9/11, new security measures, reinforced by the public perception that migrants are linked to security threats, have been imposed. However these have not been fully effective, and international migration persists, but with an increasing proportion of it now illegal.

Recent control measures adopted by destination countries include restricted or closed down immigration routes through interdiction at sea, more burdensome visa regimes and carrier sanctions, and increased legal and technological obstacles to border crossing. Also evident are more complex and burdensome asylum systems including increased risk of detention and deportation, reduced rights to work for asylum seekers, and backlogs, bottlenecks, and other delays in processing. Creating a particular hardship in the United States are new government restrictions on remittance facilities and transfers. The closing down of traditional money transfer facilities such as those used by Somalis has drastically increased the transaction costs of sending remittances, thereby undercutting developmental effects and jeopardizing those in conflict-affected countries who depend on remittances for survival.

These changes have resulted in increased illegal migration, greater use of smugglers, and changes in the routes and destinations used by migrants and refugees (and smugglers). Despite the barriers to legal immigration, migration across borders continues because of the strength of the forces pushing and pulling migrants. Despite increased restrictions and attempts to control borders, the volume of total migration has not declined, but illegal migration in particular has increased. It is now widely recognized that illegal migration continues in part because employers want/need cheap labor and have been able to mobilize sufficiently at the political level to neutralize policy measures taken to restrict illegal entry of workers. Undocumented workers, while finding work, are nonetheless illegally in the country and as such have few rights. When they encounter exploitation there is little recourse to the law, and most of them therefore remain hidden. However, the lack of protection of rights even for legal migrants and refugees means that in some cases undocumented migrants do not consider themselves worse off than those who are legally in the destination country.

While the numbers of refugees in recent years has been stable or declining, IDP numbers are believed to be climbing, although it is difficult to get accurate figures and some statistics are based on dubious or outdated estimates. Assumptions and biases often creep into the process of enumeration by governments (and, for that matter, aid agencies) of the incidence of displacement. However, IDP estimates are particularly vulnerable to manipulation. Unlike refugee assistance, international assistance for IDPs is much less institutionalized and effective. New standards for the protection of IDPs were developed during the 1990s, and a new unit was created in OCHA to advance a policy framework for institutional cooperation in the field. However, there are continuing difficulties of overcoming sovereignty issues at an operational level and of getting and maintaining humanitarian access. As a result, millions of IDPs receive little or no international assistance or protection, remaining second class citizens among the world’s displaced.

Future challenges

Based on this analysis of recent trends and developments, it is possible to identify a number of major migration-related challenges that policy makers and NGOs will face in the next decade. To the extent that current migration and asylum management practices are failing to address these issues and in many instances have themselves contributed to current problems, the challenges are likely to increase rather than recede over time. For purposes of analysis, they are grouped according to those facing destination countries and those facing sending countries.

Destination countries face the challenge of how to combat trafficking and prevent abuse of asylum systems without jeopardizing refugee protection. At the moment, expensive and cumbersome asylum systems are failing to ensure protection for those most in need while creating scope for abuse by those not in need. As the range and types of migration flows increase, pressure on the borders of prosperous countries will grow and
governments will be under growing pressure to find ways to manage their borders. The challenge will be to do this in ways that respect the rights of both migrants and natives and that recognize sovereignty issues.

Destination countries also must reconcile the demands of certain domestic economic interests that support immigration with political resistance to immigrants. Given the presence of rising anti-immigration sentiment, governments will need to find ways to create a more receptive environment for migrants (illegal as well as legal) and refugees, one characterized by greater respect for their rights and greater appreciation of the economic and social benefits that such persons offer a receiving country.

For their part, *sending countries* face the challenge of addressing the systems of endemic poverty, conflicts, and human rights abuses that underlie much of today’s migration. Not only should they put in place policies that reduce the need for people to risk their lives through smugglers. They should also seek to maximize the positive impact of those who have emigrated on national and local government and civil society. After all, migrants are the visible manifestations of hidden immiseration, sent by their families to find means of survival for all. They are the scouts and breadwinners, with families dependent on them for supplemental income. For refugees, flight means safety from conflict, violence or persecution, and asylum or resettlement can become a way to support families at home.

This review of migration issues and trends suggests a number of potential roles for NGOs. Weighing individual options, or combinations of options, will require strategic judgments on the part of individual agencies about the trends and their direction, the respective resources and comparative advantages, and the most effective mix of operational activities (overseas and domestic), advocacy, and educational efforts.

In most wealthy countries today, NGOs are divided into the many that work with refugees and the few that work with economic migrants. Since both refugees and migrants face similar problems in destination countries, one strategy might be for NGOs to downplay the differences between these two groups and focus on their joint strengths. This approach is already being adopted by the Immigration and Refugee Society of America (IRSA), which until recently focused on resettling refugees but has now adopted a name change reflecting a mandate for all immigrants. Many of the religious organizations that for generations have handled refugee resettlement at the community level are now, given the precipitous decline in refugee admissions, in a position to work with migrants instead.

Most humanitarian assistance is not set up to meet the livelihoods needs of refugees and IDPs. Instead, emergency relief traditionally provides relatively short term supplies and services, such as health, shelter, nutrition, water and sanitation. While necessary in emergencies when traditional social service systems are stretched, emergency relief may potentially undermine rehabilitation and development efforts. Some humanitarian practitioners also worry that standard disaster relief practices have limited impact even in emergencies. A broader range of strategies is needed in order to meet the fundamental humanitarian imperative of saving lives with dignity where populations are threatened with or managing the consequences of violence.

In situations of protracted conflict and displacement as well as transitions where there is cross-border movement and incipient return, humanitarian and development needs converge and require new ways of coordinating assistance. To address the problem of how to coordinate humanitarian aid and development funding, NGOs will have to go beyond traditional forms of humanitarian relief and finding new ways to link humanitarian and development modes of thinking, response, and funding. For example, relief organizations will need to work with development NGOs in transitional situations such as repatriation. As indicated earlier, effective development programming in sending countries can tip the balance in favor of some potential migrants staying rather than leaving.
There are currently several regional groups working to link development with migration issues. In the Americas, the Regional Migration Conference (Puebla Group) brings together the countries of Central and North America for regular dialogue on migration issues, including an annual session at the vice-ministerial level. Since 1996, the Manila Process has brought together seventeen countries in East and Southeast Asia to address unauthorized migration and trafficking. Even though these forums do not focus specifically on humanitarian contexts, NGOs can collaborate among themselves and with governments and regional bodies to pursue similar information sharing networks on how best to link development approaches with assistance to forcibly displaced populations.

Agencies will need to decide whether to take an either/or a both/and approach to relief and development activities. Each approach has built-in opportunity costs. With an eye to promoting sustainable development, NGOs will also need to move from traditional relief strategies to support sustainable livelihoods.

There are dark clouds on the horizon as regarding funding for migration-related activities. As the UN finds itself less able to cope with protracted situations, NGOs will need to pick up the slack, perhaps through funds mobilized from the concerned general public. UNHCR’s current budget crunch means that in some cases it asks its operational NGO partners to find their own funding to implement UNHCR programs. NGOs will need to devise new ways to respond to identified need. Some are exploring the mobilization of private corporate funds (Starbucks is one potential source) to underwrite resettlement and development work. While such funds may be available, ethical and programmatic ground rules would be needed to frame their utilization.

Given the pivotal role of governmental policies in both sending and destination countries, a more active and substantial advocacy component in NGO work seems called for. NGOs should seek out governments which are seeking to address the migration challenges in creative and humane ways. One such is the government of
South Africa, whose South Africa Law Commission is developing policy on migration management and engaging local authorities such as police and immigration officers in the process. In South Africa and elsewhere, local as well as international NGOs have roles to play. Individual NGOs should step up the advocacy component of their work, for example underwriting specialized advocacy efforts carried out by coalitions or specialized agencies or some combination of these options. At the same time, the sensitivities of public opinion about terrorism and countries associated with it and the more prominent illegal component in migration makes future NGO engagement in these issues potentially more politically and institutionally perilous. As with other aspects of humanitarian action, work with migrants is set in a highly political context and has significant political implications.

More specific programming options that merit exploration by NGOs include the selection of particular target groups within the global migration dynamic outlined above. These could include urban refugees and migrants; refugees in protracted situations, both self-settled and those in camps; IDPs instead of refugees; and persons who have been trafficked or smuggled who may require new protection approaches. Ramping up programs that support livelihoods and increase protection rather than providing traditional relief materiel also seems called for, providing alternatives to the need for people to engage in trafficking or other illegitimate activities. NGOs need to understand the pull factors as well as the push factors that encourage migration.

### D. HIV/AIDS

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Should humanitarian NGOs work with the most vulnerable communities—those most at risk from HIV/AIDS? Public education, public health support, and advocacy with local and national leadership is no longer optional, some argue, but required. Should combating HIV/AIDS become a constant in NGOs programming and advocacy?</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>HIV/AIDS breeds fear, especially in countries and communities facing a rapid escalation in infection rates and those where the disease has radically altered the demographics and economy. Are NGOs prepared to champion attitudes of tolerance and long term caring as an extension of their commitment to the universality of humanitarianism. Are they in a position to ratchet up their ability to use the existing HIV/AIDS response tools?</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Given the political and religious sensitivity of HIV/AIDS among developing countries and also among outside contributors to humanitarian work, how should NGOs deal with this public health problem?</td>
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Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) emerged as a significant infectious disease in 1981, less than a quarter-century ago. Initially considered an illness limited to small pockets within the U.S. homosexual community, the disease has become a global phenomenon. Annually AIDS now kills more than three million people annually and infects five million more. It is the leading cause of death in Sub-Saharan Africa and kills ten times as many people as war.
The trajectory of the crisis

In the 1980s no one could predict how the epidemic would evolve, and relief organizations were reluctant even to approach it as a humanitarian issue within their portfolios. Certainly it was not a traditional area of aid work. Within a decade, however, it was clear that disaster was looming, even though NGOs remained slow to make it one of their own issues. In 1991 it was estimated that by the millennium nine million people in Sub-Saharan Africa would be infected and five million would die; this frightening scenario proved to be a three-fold underestimation. At the end of 1999, UNAIDS reported that in Sub-Saharan Africa, 24.5 million people were living with Human Immune Deficiency Virus (HIV), 14.8 million had already died (2.2 million in that year alone). Globally, an estimated 34.3 million people were living with the disease.

Much has been learned about the disease since 1981. Over time, the understanding of statistics regarding HIV/AIDS has improved. Current data published by UNAIDS, most recently in July 2004, have changed from fixed-point estimates to include ranges reflecting their level of precision. In today’s world, 38 million people (the range is from 34.6 – 42.3 million) live with HIV/AIDS. In 2003, 4.8 million (range: 4.2 – 6.3 million) people were newly infected with HIV and 3 million (range: 2.6 – 3.3 million) died of the disease. The shift from precise numbers to ranges may be a useful tool in strategic planning for other humanitarian crises as well.

In the twenty years since the first cases were recognized, AIDS has become a true pandemic, infecting people in all regions, of all social classes, races, and religions. Yet a pattern has emerged, both within countries and across the community of nations: this worldwide pandemic disproportionately affects the poor and disadvantaged. The most marginalized individuals, communities, and countries are the most vulnerable to HIV. Poverty, powerlessness, gender inequalities, and any form of discrimination increase individual and group vulnerability to AIDS.

Both across and within countries, HIV disease disproportionately affects the poor and powerless. Sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest region in the world, shoulders the overwhelming majority of the burden of HIV/AIDS. Within more developed countries of North America and Western Europe, ethnic minorities suffer increased vulnerability. In South Africa, the black population suffers the highest infection rates as compared to whites or Indians. In Eastern Europe and Asia HIV-disease is spreading fastest among intravenous drug users (IVDU). The spread of HIV within a country reflects a similar differential, beginning in vulnerable marginalized “high-risk” groups such as commercial sex workers, men who have sex with men, and IVDU. From these marginalized groups, infection can spread to the general population, hitting the poorest and most disadvantaged the hardest.

The impact of the epidemic is felt differentially by women. At the end of 1999, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) estimated that 55% of all HIV infections in Sub-Saharan Africa were among women. Young women are biologically and socially at greater risk – biologically because of immature immune systems and socially as men seek younger partners hoping to avoid disease exposure. Peak HIV prevalence among women occurs in 25-year olds, 10 to 15 years earlier than among males.

The situation for children in high prevalence countries staggers the imagination. Currently Africa is home to 12 million children who have lost at least one parent to AIDS. To date traditional extended family systems have adapted to care for their needs, but those systems are already stretched to their limits. In a Ugandan village near Lake Victoria, three grandmothers care for 45 orphaned grandchildren. The extent of the impending orphan crisis will be explored shortly.

Within the short span of time since HIV/AIDS was recognized, the international community, in addition to describing how the disease is spread, has documented success stories of how its spread can be controlled through public health measures. Additionally, there has been a dramatic evolution in the availability of treatment methodologies that have converted an AIDS diagnosis from a death sentence to that of a chronic
disease. Yet the lessons of successful epidemic control have been disseminated to little avail. Uganda’s national prevalence rate began its dramatic descent from a high of 30% in 1992 to less than 10% by 1996. Descriptions of Uganda’s success, along with that of Senegal and Thailand – success controlling the epidemic in less-developed countries before the era of antiretroviral drugs – has not resulted in the implementation of similar control measures in other settings. The disease rages on.

Perspectives and implications

The global political economy reflects new perspectives on the AIDS pandemic. AIDS is no longer seen as only a medical disease but now also as a social problem related to cultural, political, and economic factors. Likewise, the ways in which countries and the international community respond depend on changing the discourse about the disease.

Increasing rates of morbidity and mortality among productive age groups have resulted in increasing dependency ratios in populations of high HIV prevalence. In some countries, the education sector has lost a critical mass of teachers. In the late 1990s, communities in western Kenya reported burying a teacher a week. Health services are overburdened by increasing numbers of sick people in need at the very time they are losing astonishing numbers of trained health workers to the disease. In Malawi in the mid-1990s, it was estimated that 50% of the health workers were HIV positive. (Infection among health workers is predominately due to sexual transmission, not work-related exposure.) One of the factors cited in scenarios that predict social breakdown as a result of high HIV prevalence is the exceptionally high rate of infection found in the armed services. Some armies are reported to be up to 60% HIV positive. Studies have shown military forces to have prevalence rates 3 to 5 times higher than the civilians in their country.

For strategic planning purposes, it is important not only to locate and size up the disease but also to view its interplay with other humanitarian crises. Like all sexually transmitted infections, HIV/AIDS spreads faster when communities are in crisis. In times of violent conflict and natural disasters, instability breaks down family life and social norms, and health facilities are often damaged or destroyed. The presence of infected persons increases individual and communal vulnerability and reduces a society’s ability to cope with stressors. This may also lower the threshold for crisis.

The epidemic escalates in situations where power — economic, social, sexual, psychological, or the power of force — is exercised in ways that marginalize segments of society. HIV/AIDS spreads where there is a disregard for life, an intolerance of differences, an undervaluing of women, a lack of hope in the future, a breakdown of communal values, and a climate of impunity. A humanitarian crisis in its own right, the epidemic produces negative synergies as it interacts with other such crises.

In settings where HIV/AIDS prevalence exceeds 25% such as in southeastern Uganda in the late 1980s or currently in southern Africa, the disease terrorizes populations. It undermines moral and bodily integrity, unraveling the fabric of interpersonal relations and social cohesion. It "targets" leaders, teachers, and health workers, precisely those whose work symbolizes shared values and aspirations. It produces demoralization and fear when people fail to find ways to speak about it or to react and protect themselves. The resulting social and economic dysfunction may lead to mistrust, blame, stigma, interpersonal violence, lawlessness, political unrest, destitution, and conflict.

The conflict connection

Many of the countries most affected by HIV/AIDS are currently in situations of conflict or are hosting large numbers of refugees. While data on the burden of HIV/AIDS in emergency situations is scarce, it is believed that armed conflict facilitates its spread and aggravates its impacts. The factors associated with transmission in conflict settings may differ from the more stable environments in which most HIV research and control programs have been implemented.
Risk factors associated with conflict will vary from context to context. However, they frequently include such factors as massive population displacement, disruption of family and social structures and mores and of sexual networks, the frequency of sexual violence and coercive sex and of commercial sex work, sexual interaction of emergency-affected people with military or paramilitary personnel, the increased use of illicit drugs, unsafe blood transfusion practices at a time of greater need, and a high prevalence of sexually transmitted infections. In a broader sense, risk factors correlate with the increased economic vulnerability of women and unaccompanied minors, psychological trauma, and the disruption of preventive and curative health services.

That said, the assumption that exposure to conflict necessarily translates into more HIV infections and thus fuels the epidemic is subject to challenge. While risk factors clearly exist, there are also circumstances created by conflict that may mitigate or protect against HIV transmission. Factors that may decrease HIV transmission in conflict situations include reduced mobility and accessibility (e.g., destroyed infrastructure reducing travel to high prevalence urban areas, displacement to remote locations and survival in the “bush”); improved protection, health, education, and social services for displaced populations receiving humanitarian aid in “camp” settings; and low HIV prevalence among the affected community pre-conflict along with low HIV prevalence among the surrounding community for those who have been displaced and therefore a low level of transmission between the two communities. Moreover, the duration of the conflict and the length of time the displaced population has resided in a particular camp may dampen transmission rates by isolating populations for years. Furthermore, long term post-emergency refugee camps generally have better preventive and curative health services than the surrounding local populations.

There is, as well, epidemiological evidence that HIV infection has a deleterious effect on the ability of individuals to survive the stress of conflict. People infected are at increased risk of infectious diseases and malnutrition, the leading causes of morbidity and mortality in conflict. Increases in deaths due to AIDS in populations affected by armed conflict were recognized as early as 1994 in the camps for Rwandan refugees. In an MSF therapeutic feeding center in Goma, a random sample of 10 children who failed to improve were tested for HIV, 8 were seropositive. Since at that time Rwanda’s HIV prevalence rate was around 8%, the implications for humanitarian responders if conflict erupts in a population of 20 or 30% prevalence is extraordinary.

What are the connections between the HIV/AIDS hazard and non-conflict crises such as natural disasters, earthquakes; climate extremes such as wind, flood, drought and cold; and technological disasters such as toxic spills and transport accidents? While there is ample evidence that impoverished, marginalized populations are at greatest risk of HIV transmission, there is no evidence that the spread of HIV has been accelerated by non-conflict crises such as these.

In exploring how HIV/AIDS might contribute to tipping communities beyond their coping capacity into crisis, several hypotheses have emerged. One is that HIV/AIDS, given its devastating impact on mortality, morbidity, and livelihoods, should be viewed in and of itself as an emergency worthy of an emergency response. Another is that the HIV/AIDS pandemic undermines livelihoods and greatly increases food insecurity, making people more vulnerable to other shocks; disasters could start earlier, last longer, and be triggered more easily. A third explains that the impact of HIV/AIDS on livelihoods means that some form of safety net or welfare system will be needed for the worst affected, and that this need will persist for a considerable time. And finally, HIV/AIDS threatens a descent into crisis in which underlying vulnerability is so great that there is a permanent or chronic emergency, similar to that seen in long-running conflicts.

Other connections

What is the relationship between the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the broader hazards landscape? Three connections require exploration: the demographic link, the lessons now available to “second wave countries,” and the implications of the epidemic for other humanitarian crises as it evolves over time.
On the demographic front, given the poor track record of forecasting the first 20 years of the AIDS epidemic, one hesitates to attempt to foresee the future. Clearly there is a demographic momentum in “first wave” countries which bodes ill if the pandemic proceeds unfettered. What looms ahead allows for little optimism. The range of estimates looking forward to 2015 runs from a low of 5 million to more than 10 million deaths each year. Some put the annual tolls at 2 to 3 percent of a country’s entire population. An increase in global HIV prevalence of only one percent during the next ten years could mean that 150 to 200 million people will be living with HIV/AIDS by 2015.

For most nations, HIV is a fairly new invader, and the dying has only just begun. Countries in southern Africa were not the first to experience the epidemic, but its spread in the region has been phenomenal. In Francistown, Botswana, for example, HIV prevalence among pregnant women went from 7% in 1991 to 44% in 2000. A series of population profiles for Botswana showing the composition of the population by age and sex if AIDS is not controlled, gives graphic evidence of a potential phenomenon called “the population chimney.”

**FIGURE 9**

**POPULATION OF BOTSWANA, WITH AND WITHOUT AIDS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hypothetical size of the population in the absence of AIDS</th>
<th>Actual estimated and projected population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>[Graph showing population by age and sex]</td>
<td>[Graph showing population by age and sex]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>[Graph showing population by age and sex]</td>
<td>[Graph showing population by age and sex]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>[Graph showing population by age and sex]</td>
<td>[Graph showing population by age and sex]</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, World Population Profile 2000.

In 2000, Botswana had just begun to lose the classic pyramid shape seen in developing countries. By 2010 the impact of AIDS is shown in a decreased birth rate and increased death rates in children and in adults as young as 25. By 2020, there is loss of more than half the expected population of the country, with dramatic deficits in the age groups normally responsible for social maintenance functions including childrearing, food production, teaching, health provision, and governance. Such a potential generates doomsday scenarios of roving bands of unsocialized armed youth.

If HIV transmission were to stop today, which it won’t, the situation regarding orphans in Sub-Saharan African will get still worse. It is estimated that more than 10% of the entire population of Swaziland will consist of orphaned children by 2015. Within the next 10 years, it is projected that there will be 40 million children in Africa who have lost at least one parent to AIDS.
The next generation

Turning to lessons that may guide strategies in second wave countries, the history of AIDS in Africa offers a chilling reality now and for the future. The AIDS trajectory is charged with apprehension as the epidemic extends to much more heavily populated states including India, China, Russia, Nigeria, and Ethiopia. Even though it is not expected that India and China will reach the prevalence rates seen in Africa, a prevalence of only one percent in a population of 1 billion equates to ten million infections – and some experts anticipate that China and India could reach 5% prevalence rates by 2020. Six states in India have already reached a prevalence rate above one percent.

India, China, Southeast Asia, and the former Soviet Union are in the very beginnings of rapidly growing epidemics fueled by heroin use and an enormous sex industry. Russia has forecast that by the end of 2005, every 30th inhabitant of the country – that is, 5 million people – will be infected. The Russian Ministry of Health predicts that roughly 12% of the population will be HIV positive by 2015.

It is not anticipated that second wave countries will go the way of southern Africa’s generalized epidemic. Most people foresee the AIDS epidemic in these countries evolving in a manner similar to the Brazilian experience, with significant numbers of infected people but high prevalence rates concentrated only in selected high risk groups. The social mixing patterns and the administrative infrastructures present in second wave countries are different from those in high-prevalence Sub-Saharan countries. These differences can both limit transmission and improve response.

The evolving AIDS epidemic has implications for how it is approached in relation to other humanitarian crises. Some argue that AIDS, in and of itself, constitutes a humanitarian crisis and merits an emergency response tailored to its specific nature and dynamics. The trouble with declaring that the AIDS epidemic requires an emergency response is that an “emergency response” implies the diversion of resources and the neglect of other priorities. The reality of the AIDS crisis is that it is long-lasting and requires a heightened and sustained response. The demographic momentum and impacts to date require that AIDS programming be “mainstreamed” into all humanitarian and social service delivery systems. An appropriate response involves a multi-sectoral approach over a prolonged period of time. For humanitarian agencies as well as other actors – governmental and private sector alike – AIDS prevention and control must be included in all initiatives for the foreseeable future.

Lessons from the past have not shown AIDS to be a cause of non-conflict crises, even in very high prevalence situations. Hypotheses described below do, however, anticipate this possibility. Beyond the loss of livelihoods, some argue that entire nations will disappear as a result of the AIDS pandemic. By the year 2015, several countries are predicted to have negative population growth as a result of AIDS mortality – Botswana, South Africa, Swaziland, Mozambique, Namibia, and Lesotho.

The effect of HIV in non-conflict crises has been dominated by a discussion of the coping capacity of southern Africa following the recent drought. Although the situation did not result in a rise in mortality due to starvation, it has given rise to a new variant famine hypothesis, offering four factors related to the HIV epidemic to explain a region-wide limited recovery from normal patterns of decreased rainfall. Those factors are household-level labor shortages attributable to adult morbidity and mortality, and the rise in numbers of dependents; loss of assets and skills resulting from adult mortality; increased burden of care required by sick adults and orphan children; and the interaction between malnutrition and AIDS. 56

The most recent analysis of the relationship between HIV/AIDS and crises finds that HIV/AIDS has clear negative impacts on food security at the household level and that these impacts are complex, wide-ranging, and gender specific. 57 The two-way relationship between HIV/AIDS and food security is described as (1) the epidemic reducing food security through illness and death, and (2) food insecurity and poverty fueling the HIV epidemic as people are driven to adopt risky strategies in order to survive. The effects are seen in human
capital, financial capital, social capital, natural capital and physical capital. Figure 10 provides a schematic representation of the situation developed by analyst Paul Harvey.

Analysts also note a correlation on occasion between AIDS and political instability. A special session of the United Nations in 2001 discussed AIDS as a security issue: a threat to both national security and human security. As described above, AIDS has profound negative effects on the critical infrastructures that sustain the security, stability, and viability of nations. As it skims off the doctors, teachers, parents, lawyers, entrepreneurs, judges, police, soldiers and policy makers, it leads to institutional and societal fragility. It undermines education and health systems, economic growth, enterprise, policing and military capabilities; it weakens political legitimacy, family structures, and social cohesion. These stresses on social systems will have their greatest impact in very low income countries with low levels of education and a small professional class. If there were a fifth horseman of the modern apocalypse, it would surely be AIDS.

There is also a strong correlation between public health and state capacity in that public health drives state capacity. As a population’s health declines, it will have a negative effect on the governance of the state as a whole. As one commenter quipped, “All the voters will be dead.” When it undermines the stability of a state, the AIDS epidemic increases vulnerability to extremists and terrorists. Increasing levels of poverty coupled with increasing weakness of the state produces greater incentive and opportunity for political violence, as challengers seek to replace those in power and capture diminishing economic resources. AIDS-induced poverty also increases the risk of ethnic violence as individuals and groups blame others and scapegoat minorities for the increasing deprivation. The net effect of an AIDS-depleted society is a hollowing out of state and social networks.

**Alternative scenarios**

With an eye on the future, social scientists and policy makers have sketched out worst-case and best-case scenarios, each with a bearing on the roles played by NGOs. In the **worst-case scenario**, leaders continue to deny the threat of AIDS. HIV remains a taboo topic, becalming efforts at mass education and prevention. According to projections in this scenario, Africa by 2015 will have been decimated by the disease. The lack of educated staff will make hiring and training more expensive. The same will be true of parts of Asia. There will be widespread food shortages because of scarce labor and a shift on the part of wage-earners to subsistence farming for basic survival.

In Africa by 2015, around 50 million people will have died. In the most affected countries, 15-30% of workers are HIV positive and GDP is 30% lower than expected. The countries of the former Soviet Union will have an adult prevalence of between 1% and 5%. More than 30 million people will have died in Asia, and that continent will surpass Africa as the region with the most people living with HIV/AIDS. So many teachers will have fallen victim to AIDS that the schools will be forced to close. Orphaned children with few options will join the many local conflicts.

Eastern Europe and Central Asia also will be suffering a serious HIV epidemic with tuberculosis raging alongside AIDS. Major businesses will have begun to leave the region and recession, mass unemployment and disintegrating public services mean that intravenous drug use – often linked to prostitution – proliferates.

Asia faces an AIDS disaster as well. In China and India authorities may view those who are dying as “surplus” and feel that others can take their place in the economy. International businesses will still invest in the region with confidence. The Chinese and Indian governments will pride themselves on keeping the overall prevalence rate below other countries but become ever more heavy-handed to control the epidemic. Sex workers, drug users, and HIV sufferers can all expect periods of detention. Almost 5% of migrant workers will be infected, bringing the next wave of the epidemic with them. The stigma of HIV will deepen globally. India’s middle class, for example, sees AIDS as a problem of the poor. Elsewhere, infected people and their families are shunned, breeding increasing ignorance and fuelling the virus’ spread.
In the West, infected people live almost normal lives on long-term treatment. Vaccines protect the rest of the population. However, in other parts of the world unmonitored and uncontrolled use of pseudo drugs will breed highly resistant strains of HIV. Legitimate drug companies, fearful of losing intellectual property protection, will reduce investment in new treatments.

The worst-case scenario foresees a world of increasing tensions, social divisions, inequity and fear. Some governments have failed to learn the lessons of earlier epidemics in other countries. Millions of people expect to contract AIDS, to see their children die and to die themselves in their 30s or 40s.

Starting from the same data but building on a different set of responses, the best-case scenario projects a different and more hopeful trajectory for the evolution of the AIDS epidemic. This scenario affirms that countries starting from the same position can fundamentally change the course of their epidemics. The best way to beat AIDS, recent experience confirms, is through a combination of prevention, treatment, and ultimately immunization.

In the countries most affected by the disease, governments, business and civil society unite to build the infrastructure to care for millions living with HIV. Fewer people contract AIDS and those that do have greater support and comprehensive care. In Africa, countries with infection rates of 30%-40% in 2004, fall to 15% by 2015. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia infection rates reach 2%-3% in 2010 and then fall to 0.5% by 2020. India’s national prevalence never reaches 1% because prevention efforts keep the epidemic at bay. China has regional outbreaks, but national prevalence never reaches 0.5%.

By 2015, the epidemic isn’t over. The number of people infected in southern Africa, Russia, India and China continues to rise but at a slower rate. Notably, India and China introduce massive new programs of sex education for school children and for economic migrants. The fight against AIDS empowers women and
brings their voices to bear on a range of social issues. More young people decide to postpone sex, stick to one partner, and are tested together before having unprotected sex. The social stigma of AIDS is lifted.

Even under the best scenario, there are still enormous pressures on the education and health systems as a quarter to one third of skilled and educated workers have died. Despite some tough years, however, significant financial and technical cooperation from richer countries ensures that governments survive. The rich countries meet their commitment to give 0.7% of their GDP in official development assistance, coupled with debt relief. AIDS is seen to be everybody’s problem. Governments support broad corporate initiatives on HIV/AIDS through tax breaks and training. This is a world where strong leadership and growing cooperation between governments, business, and society have begun to turn the tide. Under the best-case scenario, an end to the epidemic is in sight.

Taming the epidemic benefits from a renewed focus on research and development to produce more effective drugs and a vaccine. A vaginal microbicide product that protects women during sex is an important breakthrough and is distributed globally at very low cost. Research efforts succeed in the development of a vaccine by 2015 and there is a concerted effort to roll it out worldwide in a phased approach that starts with the most affected populations.

Which scenario is the more compelling? Most experts do not expect the most extreme doomsday predictions to become reality. To date, high HIV prevalence has never resulted in state failure, nor has it tipped a population into famine. Even the predictions of the demographic momentum already underway are likely to be mitigated with the advent of low-cost highly active antiretroviral therapy, now available for $140 per year. The fall in cost of antiretroviral therapy is largely the result of an effort championed by the NGO Médecins sans Frontières (MSF). At that price, wage earners (teachers, health workers, government officials) can afford treatment, so the loss of social structure is less likely. India has already begun to turn the tide of governmental indifference with new policies and the pledge of free antiretroviral therapy to a number of AIDS sufferers, and the other second wave countries are instituting epidemic control measures as well. However, even without the realization of worst case scenarios; AIDS remains a hugely significant health, social, and economic problem requiring attention by humanitarian agencies.

**Charting NGO action**

Reviewing the worst-case and best-case scenarios, what should be the approach of NGOs? Does their program planning need to embrace one scenario or the other? Do NGOs as value-oriented actors have any distinctive roles to play in the overall response to the epidemic? To ask the question is, in a sense, to answer it. Humanitarian agencies have a leadership role to play in protecting and supporting aid workers, beneficiaries, communities, and governments. Their actions today can impact the future in positive ways, while inaction dooms millions to unnecessary suffering and death.

The key lesson about AIDS from its first 20 years is that new epidemics can be prevented and existing epidemics turned around. The crucial factor is accountable leadership at the highest levels in both developed and developing countries. Leaders from the broad arenas of government, civil society, the international community and business must be champions of action. They must come from Sub-Saharan Africa, where the epidemic is focused today, from Asia and Eastern Europe, where the epidemic is now spreading the fastest, and from wealthy countries, whose support is desperately needed.

NGOs, religious authorities and institutions, and people living with AIDS all have significant contributions to make. Finding new ways to leverage the contributions of civil society through partnerships between the public and private sectors can provide a new, powerful front line in the fight against the disease. One of the key lessons from Uganda, a country that turned around its AIDS epidemic before antiretroviral drugs were available, is that leadership, both at the political (or national) and community level, is essential and every sector must be involved in the effort to control AIDS.
Prevention is critical. However, it should go hand-in-hand with high quality health care, efforts to mitigate the epidemic’s impact on society, and provision of antiretroviral drugs. These drugs have been shown to prolong lives, even if they cannot provide a cure, and, despite the naysayers, more and more projects have proven that antiretroviral therapy can be delivered safely and effectively in low resource settings.

Another indispensable building block is provided by the guidelines, established by the UN Interagency Standing Committee (of which NGOs are members) to guide HIV interventions in emergency settings. All humanitarian agencies should incorporate these actions into their programming across all sectors. The guidelines offer a matrix of recommendations identifying actions to be taken in preparedness, in the acute phase of a disaster, and in the post-emergency phase.

The objective of the minimum package, designed for use during the acute phase of an emergency, is to control HIV/AIDS in the affected population and prevent further spread of the disease. Components of the essential first package are a limited set of activities addressing HIV transmission due to sexual violence, consensual sexual practices, medical procedures and maternal to child modalities, and providing essential support such as clean water and good nutrition for persons living with the virus.

A second, post-emergency package broadens the scope of interventions to include reducing HIV transmission by improved treatment of other sexually transmitted diseases, implementing voluntary counseling and testing programs, providing antiretroviral drugs for prevention of maternal to child transmission, and providing care for people with HIV that ranges from community support to antiretroviral therapy.

Beyond delivering social services, humanitarian agencies have a unique role to play as social leaders. By virtue of their missions, humanitarian workers, from agency presidents to public information officers to clinic personnel, are seen as moral leaders. Humanitarian officials at every level should take a position of solidarity with marginalized populations vulnerable to HIV/AIDS. At the minimum, agencies should adopt and enforce codes of conducts for aid workers to prevent exploitation of such populations.

In the global arena, humanitarian agencies should take a stand in support of access to the lowest cost, easiest to deliver effective drug regimens for persons living with AIDS. The Indian firm Cipla produces a WHO-sanctioned triple drug tablet which is taken twice daily and costs as little as $140 per year. While wage earners, or their employers, may be able to afford this cost, humanitarian agencies must engage in programming to make effective drugs available to people of more limited means as well. The effort to gain global access to low-cost generic AIDS drugs was championed by MSF at the 2000 International AIDS Conference in Durban, South Africa when annual costs of ARV triple drug therapy was about $5,000.

Humanitarian workers should rise above inter-agency competition to coordinate efforts at delivering an optimum package of services to beneficiary populations. Given the current jockeying for position among international programs, multilateral and bilateral, this will require discerning judgments by NGOs regarding the most productive partnerships. Within the standard practice of separate NGOs providing different services, this may mean that one agency does condom promotion while another sees to the nutrition needs of persons living with HIV/AIDS. It must also mean that agencies do not waste resources by duplicating efforts; they must cooperate to assure that the greatest coverage is achieved. It is also essential that agencies of certain ideologies, while not expected to act in opposition to their beliefs, not undermine interventions of proven efficacy such as the promotion of condom use.

Humanitarian agencies should work with communities to strengthen communal inclusion and reduce the numbers of people who are so marginalized that their very social position puts them at increased risk of exposure to HIV. These include ethnic minorities, young women, migrant workers, and street children.

Humanitarian agency programming to increase community resilience can also help combat AIDS. Programs that foster economic independence are key. As agencies find fewer trained workers to employ in providing
services to disaster-affected populations, they should increase their programming for skills training and capacity development. This will not only benefit the agencies and their programs but also will regenerate depleted human resources in AIDS-affected regions. James Kim, director of the World Health Organization’s “three by five” initiative to provide antiretroviral treatment to 3 million persons globally by the end of 2005, describes the program as an employment scheme requiring, to accomplish the goal, the training hundreds of workers. Once again, anti-AIDS efforts need to be clearly situated in the context of a broader set of community development activities.

The extent to which AIDS shapes the humanitarian future depends on decisions made today. For the best-case scenario to become reality, deeper national and international commitment in a variety of forms is indispensable. The will of governments, civil society, communities and individuals can protect a new generation and help those already affected. What better way to derive the essential benefits from the dreadful first-wave experience to date?

E. Scenario Planning

In each of the four hazard domains reviewed above, disasters become more frequent, more extreme, more widespread, and more complex. Yet the humanitarian endeavor was built on the premise that such crises were abnormal and that a return to non-disaster normality was possible. If this assumption no longer holds, agencies will need to develop new partnerships to inform their work before, during, and after disaster. Moreover, the analysis suggests that individualized scenario planning for industrial, public safety, biological, environmental, geophysical, and conflict-related disasters scenarios may not correspond to some future crises, which may be more interlocking and synergistic.

1. How will NGOs acquire the research and development functions necessary to drive scenario-based planning?
2. Can humanitarian NGOs build the necessary cross-sectoral alliances with environmental, human rights and governance focused groups whilst being true to the core ideas of impartiality, independence and neutrality?
3. How will humanitarian NGOS reshape their staffing, program planning, and agency culture so as to reward the more political and collaborative work of alliances to avert complex disasters?
4. To what extent may crises that are radical departures from the past rather than simple extrapolations of it figure in NGO strategic mapping exercises?

These hazard domains and the trends associated with them have major implications for the strategic planning of NGOs. On the positive side, NGOs are well advised to hope for and support the best – the humanitarian ethos is at root optimistic and can-do in character. However, given the real world, NGOs need also to plan for the worst. Their own experience confirms that even in the most controlled and apparently manageable situations, things often go wrong. While it would be out of character for practitioners to write large “Murphy’s Law” over the humanitarian sector – that if things can go wrong, they will – NGOs are well advised to take the measure of all the possible negatives in preparing for the future.

On the positive side, there are perhaps three conclusions to be drawn. First, NGOs need to become better at linking disaster risk reduction, development, and peace-building. In doing so, they may learn in particular from the experience of the excellent national and local NGOs who work in the slums of LDC cities. Some of the best and most widely used community-based methods for participatory vulnerability/capacity assessment have been developed by DiMP in Cape Town, La Red, the Citizens Disaster Response Network in the Philippines (cdp@info.com.ph), the Disaster Mitigation Institute (DMI) in Ahmedabad, India (http://www.southasiadisasters.net/NC%20list.htm), and guidelines called Working with Women at Risk produced by a team based at the International Hurricane Center at Florida International University. However, much disaster risk preparedness and reduction is accomplished through the work of NGOs involved in local capacity building for the defense of human rights, in work on sustainable livelihoods, community
based natural resource management, health, education, and, above all, in peace-making and conflict resolution.

Second, given the connectedness of problems and trends and the need for developing positive synergies, NGOs need to help bridge differences among agencies and build coalitions. “Many issues that confront society,” concludes one recent study, “are now so complex and intractable that they are not solvable without multisectoral approaches.” Yet many NGOs engaged in disaster risk reduction and capacity building for disaster preparedness and resilience do not interact with NGOs working in the fields of environment, human rights, sustainable livelihoods, peace and conflict resolutions. Sharing experience and forging structured communication would constitute a great step forward, reflecting the interlocking nature of the hazards identified. A major challenge to coalition-building is the fragmentation of civil society agendas and expertise, especially the division between the environmental justice movement and disaster management activity. Even among NGOs focusing on disaster risk reduction, there is often a split between those focused on climate change and others that emphasize earthquake, flood, landslide, and the like. This is a problem exacerbated, if not caused, by donor focus, priority, and fashions.

Third, within individual hazard domains, NGOs would be well advised to make key strategic choices. In an effort to grapple with urbanization in particular, for example, NGOs might well focus more attention than is normally the case on small- and medium-sized cities. International NGOs working in urban areas have tended to privilege large cities. To some extent this is understandable given the extreme precariousness of life for many people in “mega-slums.” But smaller cities and even towns often face hazards and have fewer resources at their disposal. On the plus side, they may also have more progressive municipal governments that have a better working relationship with the poor. In these circumstances, good models of participatory disaster vulnerability and capacity can be worked out and implemented and eventually extended to larger cities in the same country or region. Similarly, in the area of migration, NGOs might select normally underserved populations, such as persons caught in protracted camp settings or IDPs in politicized settings where governments are reluctant to become engaged.

Selected Scenarios

In addition to hoping for and supporting the best, NGOs also need to anticipate the worst. Scenario planning can serve as a vehicle for mobilizing and deploying resources. It should include such hazards as industrial, public safety, biological, environmental, geophysical/climatic, violent conflict, and terror. Some of the specific scenarios, arranged topically, are the following:

- **Industrial scenarios.** Globalization will continue to see increased amounts of petroleum and other hazardous materials shipped around the world, including high-level nuclear waste for reprocessing. There is great potential for “normal accidents,” especially in periods of increasing intensity of tropical storms. Efforts by terrorists to hijack shipments or sabotage them are now a distinct possibility. Also, single-hulled oil tankers will not be phased out and replaced by safer, double-hulled craft for at least another decade. In addition, more and more chemical and other industries with the potential for fire, explosion, and catastrophic toxic releases to air and water will be set up in export enclaves. Occupational health and safety and environmental standards are not being enforced in China, where an annual GNP growth rate of 9 percent is attracting tens of millions of poor rural people into hazardous working and living conditions in coastal export enclave cities. These cities have historically been prone to strong coastal storms and flooding. Forerunners of industrial disasters include Bhopal, the Mexico City gas works explosion, and Chernobyl. The detonation (accidental or intentional) of military stockpiles as in Lagos or Iraq may also apply.
• **Public safety scenarios.** Despite the polarizing influence of globalization on income distribution, there will be some increased level of disposable income and, as a result, of travel from rural areas, especially to visit and maintain important social networks. This is already evident in the huge movements of people in China during holiday periods. Road accidents are such a large hazard in many poor and middle income countries that the IFRC featured the problem in a recent volume of its annual *World Disasters Report*. Transportation accidents, some with many casualties, are very likely to be part of the world hazardscape during the next ten years. Urban fires, especially in slums and informal settlements, are likely to increase as slums expand. Recent examples of public safety disasters include increased transportation (bus, train, ferry boat) disasters in Senegal, Philippines, Tanzania; stampedes in China and Saudi Arabia, spontaneous building collapses in Russia, South Korea, India, urban shack fires in Cape Town and Nairobi, land fill fires in Guatemala City, and collapse of land fills in Manila.

• **Biological scenarios.** Annual deaths of children in Africa from malaria or of African adults from HIV/AIDS exceed the likely fatalities due to any new or “surprising” epidemic such as SARS. Chronic child death or adult HIV/AIDS mortality is a “quiet crisis” and is not considered an urban “disaster” by most policy makers. Nevertheless, the generally poor health and nutrition status of many urban dwellers in the world and the poor public health infrastructure in many cities provide pre-conditions for explosions of morbidity and mortality when and if new pathogens (e.g. SARS) arrive or return (e.g. cyclical recurrence of cholera). In the aftermath of flooding and during El Nino periods, insect-borne diseases such as malaria and dengue increase, as do sanitation-related diseases including dysentery and cholera. NGOs should be prepared for significant public health emergencies in some of the world’s cities in the next ten years. Possible forerunners include HIV/AIDS explosion in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, India, China, widespread SARS-like virus like influenza pandemic in 1918, and
earlier cholera, malaria, dengue epidemics. Rural areas may not be spared, although transmission rates may be lower.

- **Environmental scenarios**: As noted below, the next decade will see increasing water scarcity in many countries. This will affect the access to safe domestic water supply by slum dwellers in some cities, exacerbated in many cases by the trend toward privatization of utilities. The combination of poorly regulated industrialization and slum growth in a situation of growing water scarcity could mean unforeseen mass poisonings in urban areas on a scale of the rural tragedy that has affected many Bangladeshis. Possible forerunners include Bangladesh groundwater arsenic crisis and oil tanker accidents (or eventual sabotage) affecting coastal livelihoods of urban people. Rural areas themselves face significant public health issues related to inadequate supplies of potable water. Worsening shortages of water may also trigger armed conflict and interstate war in certain regions. Issues related to water supply for human and agricultural uses already occurring in the American West are being adjudicated in the courts.

- **Geophysical/ climatic scenarios**: These hazards are easier to anticipate. Historical records and hazard mapping and analysis during the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction provide reasonable expectation of at least one catastrophic urban earthquake (like Mexico City, 1985; Armenia, 1988; Iran, 1990; Maharashtra, 1991; Kobe, 1995; northwest Turkey, 1999; Gujarat, India, 2001; Bam, Iran, 2003). Likewise, dramatic episodes of flooding are very likely. A direct hit by a strong tropical cyclone on a major urban area is less likely, but surely some urban centers will be affected by such passing storms to some degree. Vulnerability to coastal storm surge and tsunami will increase in some large coastal cities because of sea level rise, coastal erosion, destruction of coastal vegetation, and ground water extraction with resulting soil subsidence. Scenarios anticipate in the next ten years at least one catastrophic urban earthquake and 3-5 moderate earthquake disasters; increased urban flooding (flash flooding, slow onset flooding, coastal storm surges); drought-related electric power shortage to cities and increased water scarcity; and one large LDC city isolated from its hinterland (transportation routes destroyed) and unable to access food supplies.

- **Violent conflict scenarios**. Such conflicts may take shape within a given country or city or result from terrorist action.

**With respect to civil wars within a country**, such conflict in Colombia has already displaced 2 million rural people. Civil war in Mozambique has displaced 4.5 million, and in South Africa, an estimated 3 million persons who have fled elsewhere in Africa reside illegally, most of them in cities. Pakistan, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, and Iraq provide other examples. Civil conflicts over the next 10 years are likely to produce further streams of illegal immigrants, internally displaced persons, official refugees, and asylum seekers. Urban areas are the most likely place where they will seek refuge and be absorbed, often in already precarious living conditions. Political and logistical sensitivities often render international access to those in need particularly difficult.

**Wars within a given city** (Beirut, Gaza, Jenin, Dili, Sarajevo, Monrovia, and Mogadishu are examples), are often very costly in lives, livelihoods, and property, usually destroying much housing, many municipal structures and infrastructure, and disrupting services and livelihoods. Peri-military sweeps through whole zones of cities and residential neighborhoods – for example, in Israel’s Occupied territories and in Rio – provide examples. “Surgical strikes” against “terrorists” – Colombia and El Salvador as well as Israel come to mind -- often do widespread damage among civilian populations. Again, the political-military terrain may complicate international access.

**Inter-ethnic violence on a large scale in cities** is another form of conflict with major humanitarian consequences. The “Rodney King Riots” in Los Angeles, the Indian Hindu/Muslim “communal” riots come to mind, as do the food riots in Brazilian cities. Rioting can be almost as destructive as para-
military or military operations within cities, especially when arson is involved. Ethnic tensions may also flare when, due to other disasters or rural conflict and the urban migration that results, ethnic groups with a history of tension are forced together in densely populated urban zones.

**Terrorist attacks** constitute a final type of violent conflict scenario. Targets may include life-line infrastructure in a city (explosive attack is more likely than use of chemical or biological agent); on petrochemical facility in an LDC city; on symbolic or strategic structures (the World Trade Center and the Pentagon); or sabotage (as in electricity cut off by insurgents in El Salvador and Colombia). To date, most citizens of LDCs who have died in terrorist attacks have been bystanders – in the wrong place at the wrong time – for example, in the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and the night club bombing in Bali, Indonesia. In the future, depending on the development of alliances and the perceived logic of dependency, some LDC cities may be targeted directly. In most cases the lifeline infrastructure of LDC cities is weak to begin with, poorly monitored, and not well protected.

- **“All of the above”**

Scenarios arranged topically to suit the analytical convenience of planners may not, of course, correspond to future realities. In addition to individual hazards, therefore, NGOs need to anticipate disasters that bundle together combinations of hazards in a kind of witch’s brew. Thus, environmental degradation stimulates migration, which seeks urban destinations, where infectious diseases in more concentrated form await the new arrivals. Refugee encampments are often sites for the spread of communicable diseases. Sometimes the ensuing public health emergency can constitute a disaster in its own right.

With what used to be called “natural disasters” a thing of the past, the world may in the future experience concatenations of events of biblical description and proportions: floods and droughts, pestilence and famine. The exhaustion of non-renewable energy sources could, in the absence of careful international planning, have wrenching economic and social, and even military, impacts. Most scenarios for the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS assume a viable state functioning in the role of educator and health care provider. Where no such state capacity exists, the challenge in compounded.

In an era of dwindling fresh water supplies, shrinking availabilities of potable water in the Middle East, for example, could lead to resource wars that spill across national borders. In an era of forced-pace scientific research, bio-hazards exist in the form of genetic experimentation gone wrong. In an era of porous technological safeguards, bioterrorism in pursuit of political objectives is altogether possible. Rapid population growth in some areas and negative population growth in others could have major repercussions for migration and political stability. AIDS, SARS, Ebola, and other dread diseases, in combination with collapsing public health, public safety, and education infrastructures could spread like wildfire. At the extreme end of the interlinked hazards landscape could be certain “civilization-changing events,” of which the terrorist attacks of September 11 may be only a pale foreshadowing.

Every major disaster involves significant loss of life and injuries. In some cases, there is also long term disability that calls for long-term aid commitment and specialist capacity building (e.g. post-Bhopal blindness and respiratory incapacity in perhaps 30,000 people). Livelihoods are also disrupted and/or destroyed and property lost. The poorest and most marginalized urban and rural groups will be last likely to be able to recover livelihoods and rebuild assets quickly, if at all. The disruption of social networks is particularly difficult for the urban poor, who rely on social capital. Careful resettlement needs to take into account the importance of maintaining social networks. Also of importance for psychological and political recovery, cultural landmarks may have been erased. At a macroeconomic level, major exports may be disrupted, causing a fiscal crisis (as in the case of the destruction of Ecuador’s oil pipe by earthquake in 1986, affecting livelihoods in the port city of Quayaquil). Anger at governmental authorities may feed into on-going social movements that support conflict and/or rekindling latent ethnic/class/religious tensions.
Implications for the agencies

Scenario planning has a number of implications for NGO disaster preparedness in specific. At the policy level in NGO headquarters, there is need for more integrated links among departments, divisions, and units, or possibly involving reorganization in order to deal in a more holistic manner with disaster risk reduction. Development of integrated analytical capacity is also required, linking, for example, disaster risk reduction to Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets and to peace-making.

At a more operational level, NGO strategies may include the strengthening of local partner organizations to prevent and mitigate the impacts of the existing hazards. NGOs may also attach priority to supporting the efforts of such groups to advocate and lobby for improved social protection: for example, re-building public health systems or, in urban areas, promotion of building code inspection systems, fire code inspection/enforcement, and transportation safety education and enforcement. Also needed is encouragement of a shift from a militarized, command and control model of disaster management, response-focused emergency management to civilian-based, participatory, mitigation-focused model.

At the local, national, and international levels, NGOs may support and/or play a leadership role in alliances against poorly regulated privatization of life-line infrastructure and services (water, electricity, sanitation, health) and, in a broader sense, in favor of higher levels of public expenditure on quality-of-life essentials (by both host authorities and aid donor governments). A more explicit commitment to influence public policy would also address root causes of vulnerability to disasters and could be linked to demands set forth in the 2004 report of World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization. A more public approach is also necessary in order to support lobbying for legal and other changes necessary to reform emergency management systems, improve governance, legalize land tenure for the poor, fight improper (“sweetheart”) privatization of urban infrastructure and services, and lobby for improved enforcement of safety codes. As commonplace as it may sound, good governance is the key to reducing risk. International NGOs can accordingly join with their LDC partners to insist on the changes that would bring about good governance.

These recommendations are not without their opportunity costs for NGOs. The negotiation of humanitarian access to persons affected by conflicts may exist in tension with the recommended higher profile advocacy role. The strategic analysis and public policy priorities of some international NGOs may differ from those articulated by local partner organizations, including local government officials. The policy emphases recommended by secular analysts may not square with the moral frameworks of some faith-based agencies and their clienteles. Such tensions underscore rather than undermine the fundamental recommendation that emerges from this review of the global hazardscape: that NGOs, both individually and as a community, be more strategic in their analysis of the hazards and opportunities presented by such realities as environment, urbanization, migration, and HIV/AIDS.

Staffing up for the future

Scenario planning has major human resource implications for most humanitarian NGOs. First, if scenario planning is to be useful, it must both be informed and actionable. As this report suggests, all the “future possibles” are framed in terms of more complex challenges, of multisectoral approaches, and of the need for greater synergy between civil society, local government, and the commercial sector. Most humanitarian NGOs operate lean staffing structures with resources concentrated on providing rapid and efficient emergency assistance and protection. Few have invested in the staffing of research and development or strategic planning. Yet without such a function they cannot partake in scenario planning in an informed way. At best they can borrow from the thinking of others. Humanitarian agencies will either need to expand into this staffing area or develop close and strategic alliances with academic and other research centers that can lead the work for them. Either way they are likely to need to new funding channels for this work. Present government funding is geared almost exclusively to hands-on assistance and rehabilitation, and, as research groups at universities are finding, foundation funding for the humanitarian sector has been severely cut back.
Assertive advocacy is going to be needed with state funding agencies, foundations, and the funding public, to make the case for research and development.

Secondly, all the scenarios suggest that successful management of ambiguity and change lies in linkage: linking relief to preparedness and rehabilitation; linking humanitarian efforts to environmental concerns, human rights work, or efforts to open up municipal governance; linking local action to international advocacy. Some NGOs already do this well, particularly in the area of international advocacy, but they are the exception, not the rule. Staffing patterns in the future will need to include long-term posts with the political, communication, and management skills to build, develop, and bring to fruition these alliances. The skills profile for such people is radically different from the more normal short-term emergency focus of humanitarian agencies. They must have relational skills to enlist local NGO partners in the strategic planning process. Likewise, to operate effectively, such people need to work in an operational culture which rewards depth of thinking, political skills, and the creation of alliances. This has implications both for NGOs human resource policy but also for how they wish to shape their organizational culture.
Chapter 2 The International Political and Policy Landscape

The reality of the political manipulation of aid and the equal temptation for humanitarian agencies to take political sides has always been with us. While those pressures waned during the post-Cold War period, they are back with a vengeance. Humanitarians play, at the same time, on two very different stages: locally at each road block, burnt out village, and displaced persons’ camp, and internationally engaged on such matters as the UN Security Council resolutions, the War on Terror, and the promotion of universal ideas. On both stages, how they are perceived by those who control accesses and resources and those they seek to assist, is key to their effectiveness.

Globalization and a sea-change in the power of states have left many nations with diminishing control over their resources and their future, nonetheless still expected to shoulder the welfare burden of their poor and disaster-affected population. In trying to help balance this unequal equation, humanitarian (largely northern) NGOs risk being intimately associated with the powers and forces that many in the South believe have forced them, as nations and individuals, into this humiliating position. Universal compassionate humanitarian action based on trust and acceptance can no longer be taken as a given. NGOs thus have a treacherous course to chart.

1. How will NGOs relate to a UN which is at once more sensitive in the Security Council to humanitarian crises and yet willing to subsume humanitarian action to a political agenda?

2. What role can and should international humanitarian NGOs play in reaffirming, or creating for the first time, a set of truly universal values around humanitarian action, which are inclusive of Islamic and southern viewpoints?

3. Humanitarian NGOs have no choice now but to work alongside human rights agencies, but how? How can the ideology of naming, shaming, witnessing, and calls for justice dovetail with fidelity to the principle of neutrality: that is, making no judgment regarding the worthiness of a cause?

4. With humanitarianism so firmly perceived as an extension of western domination, can humanitarian NGOs strip themselves of their Western institutional base and veneer in order to remain operational?

Humanitarian action has always taken place within a political context. During the forty-year Cold War, East-West tensions played themselves out in the purposes and country allocations of aid. United States policy pressed humanitarian aid into its overarching anti-communist agenda. The ostensible beneficiaries were movements seeking to do battle against leftist governments in places such as Afghanistan, Angola, and Mozambique. Assistance was used to destabilize countries with communist governments such as Nicaragua under the Sandinistas. An exception to the politicization of assistance was the stepped up U.S. aid during the Ethiopian famine of the mid-Eighties. Undeterred by the policies of the Mengistu regime, Reagan administration officials declared, “A hungry child knows no politics.” The prevailing anti-Communist rubric, which affected other donor governments and the work of the United Nations as well, reflected the view that “Any aid which goes to fight against global communism is humanitarian aid.”

What has changed since the Cold War has been not the existence of an ambient political framework within which humanitarian endeavors have been situated but rather the degree to which humanitarian action has been infiltrated and penetrated by geo-political concerns. During the post-Cold War era (roughly from 1989 until 9/11/2001), the politicization of aid which characterized the Cold War eased. With the terrorist attacks against the United States and the Bush administration’s response to them, however, the division of the world into those “for” or “against” the U.S. has constricted the room available for neutral and independent humanitarian action. The principle that people have a right to humanitarian assistance irrespective of location or political affiliation has come under increasing pressure. “People living in extremis are now assumed to be extremists.” Moreover, the terrorist threat has “spooked” public opinion and policy-makers to a degree not experienced during the Cold War (the Bay of Pigs incident in 1962 was an exception).

During the era inaugurated by the events of Sept. 11, the United States as sole remaining superpower and chief architect and promoter of the war on terrorism has been the dominant international political reality. For its part, the European Union has taken steps, within its new constitution and common foreign and security
policy, to situate humanitarian and development aid as “tools” to be used to advance perceived EU strategic interests. 

There are, to be sure, countervailing forces to the US-led preoccupation (some would say, obsession) with terrorism and counterterrorism. One is the political weight of other major aid donors, most of whom take a more needs-based approach to aid objectives and allocations. If the 500-pound gorilla gets the most attention, there are nevertheless other animals in the donor zoo. A second countervailing force is the existence of other aid instruments, notably the multilateral family of organizations related to the United Nations and the members of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. These bodies were created as counterweights to the bilateralism and overt political agendas of state actors.

However, the political and policy landscape remains dominated – perhaps to a more significant degree than during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods -- by the United States, both directly through its actions and indirectly through its influence in aid circles via such vehicles as the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, the Humanitarian Liaison Working Group, and other donor forums. The preeminence and policies of the U.S. government places a particular burden on American-based and American government-funded NGOs, as the experience of private aid groups in Iraq demonstrates.

The geopolitical upheavals of the Cold War, post-Cold War, and war against terrorism eras have taken place within a landscape that has experienced decades of rapid globalization. Globalization has economic aspects – the increasing connectedness of states through commerce and trade – as well as social and cultural dimensions accompanying western patterns of consumerism and travel. The telecommunications revolution has placed most of the world in instant touch with such developments, limiting the power of once-sovereign governmental authorities to control and interpret events. The political aspects of globalization erode once-sacrosanct state authority and open new humanitarian space for the international humanitarian apparatus, is itself under pressure to become more global.

Globalization brings life-threatening distress and abuses of fundamental rights into the world’s living room, making it more difficult for governments and insurgents to behave with impunity. Yet economic globalization can also be a driver of increased vulnerability to disasters by undermining the livelihoods of the poor. Moreover, by providing a virtual linkage among those who challenge the basic human right to international assistance and protection, globalization also complicates the work of the humanitarian apparatus. An example is the threat conveyed to ICRC workers at a roadblock in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that they would meet the same fate as their assassinated colleagues in no-longer-so-far-away Chechnya.

This chapter examines the intersection between the international political and policy framework and the work of NGOs. In reviewing trends first at the humanitarian/political-military interface and secondly in the financing of humanitarian aid, it urges incorporation into an NGO agenda for humanitarian action of greater attention to the encroachment of political factors into their work and higher priority to the formulation of an appropriate strategic approach in response.

FIGURE 12
A CONVERGENCE BETWEEN NGO AND WESTERN LIBERAL POLITICAL VALUES?

In my experience, more NGO and UN agency energy is spent discussing the threats posed by the ‘war on terror’ than the threat of Islamist ideology and terrorism itself. … Perhaps there needs to be a bit of truth-telling in humanitarian, human rights, and development circles. This might recognize that we are selective in owning our moral overlap. When we do not like … counter-insurgency authorities with whom we have moral overlap we tend to call it politicization and cooption. When we like them and feel good about being with them, we call it impartial cooperation or, more simply, solidarity.”

Hugo Slim, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
Politics and Policy

Contextualizing Humanitarian Action

The political harness which constrains humanitarian action in every era – tight-fitting during the Cold War, looser during the post-Cold War, and now more chafing than ever – has been the subject of a UN-led debate about “coherence.” The challenge of situating humanitarian work in relation to political, military, and peacekeeping action and actors has produced, broadly speaking, three different approaches. They are described by the shorthand of integration (in which humanitarian policies and programs serve the UN’s political objectives), insulation (in which humanitarian action remains within, but is somehow protected from close association with, those objectives), and independence (in which humanitarian activities are free to go their own way). The fact that humanitarian work is frequently carried out in raging, simmering, or recently concluded civil wars in which the UN plays a political and sometimes military role has lent urgency to the discussion.

In recent years, the trend has been toward the initial option: “humanitarian action itself is increasingly subsumed or integrated into other – essentially political – realms.” The UN’s humanitarian coordination machinery (first DHA, then OCHA) has taken the position that “despite recurring tensions, humanitarian principles can ultimately live in harmony with the UN’s coherence agenda.” The experience with “integrated” UN missions (as in Afghanistan and Liberia) does not augur well for the independence or insulation of humanitarian action. In Iraq as well as in Afghanistan post 9/11, the fact that OCHA had a seat at the UN “integrated” decision-making table did not protect humanitarian action from being instrumentalized as a means to the UN’s political objectives. Many UN humanitarian officials have accordingly stressed the need to insulate their work from those objectives, although they have not succeeded in doing so. As a result, debates within the humanitarian community including the UN humanitarian wing (the Montreux discussion in early 2004 provides a recent example) evidence growing sympathy to the need of humanitarian actors for greater independence.

Many (although not all) NGOs view multilateral political frameworks as more compatible with humanitarian action than bilateral ones. Certainly, they are less directly subject to manipulation by a single donor. U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, which over the years has largely set the pace for other governments as well, replaced modest aid levels during the Taliban years with massive flows post 9/11. “The good news is that a lot of high-level U.S. policy makers are interested in Afghanistan,” observed a senior State Department official in late 2002 in a comment applicable to both bilateral and multilateral aid funds. “The bad news is that a lot of high-level U.S. policy makers are interested in Afghanistan.” He concluded that “If Afghanistan were Liberia, we’d have a lot easier time managing the crisis.” While high-level political interest by a single donor can reduce the space available to humanitarian officials to mount activities in accordance with established humanitarian principles, many institutional protections would need to be in place before the UN is able to play its intended role as anchor against bilateral political winds.

The wordy coherence debate of the past decade, while underscoring the importance of independent humanitarian action, has given birth to an institutional mouse. Despite greater sympathy for humanitarian actors, there is no groundswell of support for structural protections of their interests. In the unlikely event that there were to be a major realignment of humanitarian work by the UN and associated agencies, it is also unlikely that their independence would be buttressed. While the creation of a single UN operational agency – a perennial issue – might strengthen the hand of humanitarian interests, the political economy of humanitarian action renders the advent of a mega-agency unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future.

Multilateralism and its Discontents

Although battered and bruised by the Iraq experience, the United Nations should not be written off as a key player on the humanitarian chessboard of the future. Beyond the experience of one crisis or another, the
Ambiguity and Change

shape of multilateral things to come is likely to be influenced by a number of variables affecting the international system. These include the management of three sets of tensions, ranging from the geo-strategic to the more programmatic:

- between the UN as an institution committed to protecting the rights of “We the peoples …” (a human security focus) and as a temple of sovereign states (a political agenda). The former emphasis would reinforce the UN’s interface with civil society and its consonance with NGO objectives, especially if the UN were to establish some form of “representation of civil society;”

- between the cooptation and the irrelevance of the UN. The world body has been buffeted by the political agenda of the United States and at the same time bypassed by events on which no consensus among member states has been found. Many NGOs would make common cause with a world organization which found a creative middle ground that were both interactive with governments and relevant to popular aspirations;

- between the integration of crisis management into the UN’s political and peacekeeping framework and the protection of humanitarian action from the manipulation that goes with such integration, as noted above. To the extent that humanitarian activities by NGOs could be associated with the UN’s humanitarian work, itself protected from political intrusion, NGOs would benefit from a more creative and durable multilateral connection.

FIGURE 13
WARS AND ARMED CONFLICTS, 1950-2003

Unless the Iraq adventure turns out to be an unmitigated disaster for the UN and despite the Secretary-General’s recognition that the world organization is at a “fundamental fork in the road,” it is difficult to envisage a major shake-up or revamping of its structures. The veto power of the Permanent Five in the Security Council will not be abolished and even the size of the Council seems unlikely to change. The more interesting question is whether, in the absence of reform of the institutional hardware, the functioning of the
organization – that is, its software -- will be upgraded. Much will depend on whether the U.S. continues to be the bull in the UN china shop and/or whether international attitudes towards sovereignty undergo further progressive evolution.

In recent years, there has been a gradual lifting of the inhibitions with respect to intervention on real or presumed “humanitarian grounds,” codified through the “Responsibility to Protect” agenda (although with mixed results in terms of actual protection of civilians on the ground). Also on the positive side, the Security Council itself is now much more regularly seized with humanitarian and human rights issues. This trend is likely to continue and NGOs can have an increasingly powerful voice in terms of advocacy and of shaping the agenda of the member states. Their advocacy work, however, raises the challenge of “humanitarianizing politics without politicizing humanitarianism.” The temptation to subordinate humanitarian and human rights principles to political goals is always present both among member states and the political departments of the UN.

While fundamental institutional change within the UN is unlikely, the increasing disconnect between UN institutions and the realities of fast-moving complex emergencies such as those discussed in Chapter 1 could be a factor in UN reform. Changes could go either in the direction of further integration of humanitarian responses with politics, or of some form of recognition that the independence of UN humanitarian functions deserves to be protected, including perhaps the resurfacing of the ultimate Loch Ness monster, the single UN humanitarian agency. Already there is debate about which of the multiple roles of the UN in the humanitarian sphere should be preserved or strengthened. Those roles include leader of the humanitarian pack, the coordinator of humanitarian activities, the assessor of the need for protection and assistance, the advocate of the humanitarian imperative with political authorities, and the buffer between them and humanitarian agencies.  

Finally, in terms of attitude towards NGOs, the UN’s political departments (as one would expect) as well as its humanitarian wings (as one wouldn’t) still suffer from a superiority complex. UN agencies are happy to utilize NGOs as implementers but remain mostly unable or unwilling to acknowledge their role as partners. This is true at HQ, where, for example, opening up to the NGOs did not come naturally to OCHA in the run-up to the Iraq war, as well as in the field, where UN agencies systematically take credit for work done by NGOs. Opportunities for strategic alliances are often missed (e.g. in Afghanistan, where prior to 9/11 the UN had a good rapport with the NGOs only to squander this capital when the integrated mission was established). Clearly, this is an area on which both sides need to work, but the onus for establishing a productive relationship for both sides really falls on the UN and OCHA in particular.

In sum, the centrality of the UN as the world’s humanitarian voice is far from assured. Its voice will in all probability remain heard, but more as part of a chorus in which other more or less discordant voices, described in Chapter 3, will also be clamoring for attention. Much will depend on the UN’s ability to promote, and the NGOs willingness to join, strategic alliances on key humanitarian issues and in particular on issues of principle.

**Universal Ethos, Western Apparatus**

*The Relevance of Humanitarian Principles*

The NGO galaxy comprises several very large constellations, myriad lone stars of various magnitudes, and a few black holes. Lumping this galaxy together with the other two main galaxies of the humanitarian universe, the United Nations and the Red Cross solar systems, does not make for a very uniform whole. Some parts operate as if they were light years away from the rest. Others, like the parallel universe of Islamic charities, have yet to be discovered by mainstream astronomers. Unlike the “eternal silence of infinite space,” however, the humanitarian universe is a noisy one. The signals on our instruments detect tension and even star wars between different cosmologies.
The key question to be explored, post-Iraq and -Afghanistan, is whether given the diversity of the “humanitarian community” and the multiplicity of contradictory pressures to which it is subjected, it is naïve to expect harmony on issues of principle. Rather than thinking in terms of a single “community,” would it not be more realistic to recognize the existence of different constellations and to distinguish, for example, between agencies striving to remain faithful to traditional humanitarian principles and those who believe that such principles have been overtaken by events?

Most practitioners would agree that principles have been eroded in Afghanistan and Iraq and no longer command the respect or elicit the restraint that they once enjoyed. To some, however, the lesson is that erosion is the result of the unscrupulous expansion of the humanitarian agenda and of flirting with politics. In their view, the way forward is, essentially, the way back: to an affirmation of the three core principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence. Others hold that in the brave new world of the global war on terror, traditional principles have outlived their usefulness and should be regarded as “for reference only.” For them, the triple core can represent an obstacle to relieving suffering rather than an investment in the task.

From a “purist” perspective, the denigration of humanitarian principles in Iraq and other high-profile conflicts has placed aid agencies in an ambiguous and dangerous position. Enormous pressure has been brought to bear on the UN, including its humanitarian wing, to perform in a subordinate role to US-led interventions. Financial and political pressure on American NGOs to act as “force multipliers” for U.S. foreign and military policy objectives has also been relentless, with some agencies keeping their distance and others accepting U.S. funds. Some European NGOs, benefiting from their governments’ less prominent political-military roles in the Iraq intervention, have had a less rough ride but are themselves voicing alarm about what the future may hold.

Of the three core principles, neutrality and independence are in greatest jeopardy. Most organizations that see themselves as “humanitarian” remain solidly wedded to the principle of impartiality, which specifies that assistance will be provided to all according to need. Neutrality and independence, in contexts such as Iraq and Afghanistan, are much more difficult to uphold without compromise. Some NGOs and even UN agencies have conceded that they are not neutral, while acceptance of funding from a belligerent renders protestations of independence suspect.

Among humanitarian agencies, four broad positions can be identified on matters of humanitarian principle and engagement with political agendas. The resulting template, however, oversimplifies complex realities and does not do justice to institutional and contextual nuances. The four are:

- Principle-centered – agencies striving to respect the tenets of the Dunantist humanitarian tradition enshrined in the principles of the Red Cross movement;
- Pragmatist – agencies which attach greater importance to “getting the job done,” even at the expense of compromising core principles;
- Solidarist – agencies which express solidarity with those who suffer, taking, if necessary, a political stance on such matters as human rights abuses; and
- Faith-based – agencies affiliated with particular religious tradition which are committed to address the underlying or root causes of suffering and injustice.

A number of variables determine how agencies position themselves in the humanitarian arena on matters of principle. They include management and leadership, institutional culture, connectedness with grassroots constituency, size, and geographical and programmatic coverage. A critical determinant, however, involves the extent to which a particular agency utilizes government funds in the form of grants or subcontracting arrangements. Conversely, agency attitudes toward government relations also influence willingness to collaborate with government. Donor practices of earmarking and bilateralization also cripple the
independence of the UN’s humanitarian wing, which is no paragon of principled humanitarianism at the best of times. Issues of funding are discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

Given differences within the humanitarian “community” regarding the relevance of principles, two approaches suggest themselves for the coming years. First, a clearer definition of what constitutes humanitarian action could be crafted, with the humanitarian “label” then applied only to activities and organizations that meet a set of verifiable criteria. A protected niche could be created for agencies embracing core humanitarian principles, with dedicated funding sources and agreed modus operandi. Alternatively, a more expansive definition of humanitarian action could be promulgated, encompassing a wide array of activities (including conflict prevention and conflict resolution) and actors (including military troops and commercial contractors). This approach would recognize the need for urgent assistance in settings beyond the capacity of traditional humanitarian agencies to access.

Clearly, there is no one-size-fits-all answer to the current uncertainties on matters of principle. In all likelihood, different answers will continue to apply depending on context. Where political manipulation is not a serious issue – i.e. in forgotten emergencies or where there is a broad-based peace agreement leading to a UN sanctioned transition – different agencies with their own traditions, ideologies, and modus operandi will work together or alongside each other with minimal friction other than the occasional jockeying for position. It is in those other situations where the humanitarian response becomes an inherent component of a political agenda that tensions will arise and contradictions emerge. Confusion may well be to the detriment of the prospective beneficiaries of humanitarian action. It is likely that some donors and parts of the UN will want to attempt to regulate the market or at least clarify the rules of engagement of individual actors, whether principled or not.

A view from the South

Many in the South do not recognize what the international community calls the universality of humanitarian values as such. To be sure, there is widespread unanimity in intergovernmental fora by representatives of the South on basic humanitarian propositions: the need to protect schools from seismic hazards and, in a broader sense, the right of children to a safe educational environment. At a deeper level, however, there is a gap of values and understanding no less in scale than the gap in poverty and quality of life. Northern leaders, thinkers, and program implementers in a handful of think-tanks, donor institutions, and universities, including those commissioning and preparing this paper, have appropriated the humanitarian and human rights discourses, paying lip service to the importance of “other” traditions and perspectives on universality. Until counterparts from the South get equal billing on the humanitarian stage, however, northern claims to universality will continue to ring hollow.

Humanitarian action is viewed as the latest in a series of impositions of alien values, practices and lifestyles. Northern incursions into the South – from the Crusades to colonialism and beyond – have historically been perceived very differently depending on the vantage point. When and where the struggle between “Jihad and MacWorld” becomes acute – in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya and elsewhere – humanitarian action is seen a part of MacWorld. International aid agencies become visible symbols – and easy targets – for all that is deemed bad about the North. Moreover, polarization in many contexts is made worse by the breakdown of the social contract that made humanitarian action acceptable or even desirable to belligerents. It is now becoming impossible to have a conversation, let alone a dialogue, with militant belligerents, with the price paid by aid workers increasingly high. If the bona fides of humanitarian actors are to be re-established, those involved must take a hard look at whom they talk to and how they talk.

A logical starting point involves acknowledging the existence and importance of other humanitarian traditions – Islamic in the first instance, but others as well – and being prepared to share the stage with them. Should this process of rapprochement between different cultures of caring for civilians in crisis and conflict be undertaken by advocacy built around existing tools – essentially international humanitarian law and the
Geneva Conventions – or should everything be up for discussion? The dangers of cultural relativism would militate in favor of advocacy on the basis of existing doctrines. However, this will undoubtedly be seen as the imposition of “northern terms,” making dialogue at a more fundamental level even more vexed.

FIGURE 14

In the human rights arena, the comparable problem of who sets the terms of the debate and how the dynamic is perceived in the South has no easy solution. Moreover, the rationalist northern approach, steeped as it is in the values of the Enlightenment, may be ill-equipped to understand or even give a fair hearing to the views of groups who do not espouse clear distinctions between state, society, the individual, and religion. It could well be that faith-based northern groups, particularly those willing to eschew a proselytization agenda, are in a better position to foster such a dialogue than governments.

“In until the lions have their own historians, history will always be written by the hunters” goes the African proverb. Perhaps the time has come for the lions, the gazelles, and even the suffering grass to claim their rightful stake in the debate. Testing the universality of the humanitarian impulse (and of its human rights cousin) at the grassroots level may be the way to go. Caring for war wounded and the protection of children and civilians in war situations are obligations recognized, in their own ways, in all cultures. This humanitarian substratum is undoubtedly universal. While the behavior of leaders and warlords, and occasionally of aid agencies themselves, is problematic, less so the dictates of cultures and religions. Hence, working with local groups and creating partnerships around common “humanitarian” concerns may be a more productive way of promoting universality than political dialogue between deaf and politicized civilizations. Perhaps, also, northern humanitarians need bigger ears and smaller mouths.

To cite a specific example, northern humanitarian officials and analysts are seized with a debate about the role of military forces in the humanitarian arena. But how does the issue look from the standpoint of person in
countries experiencing complex emergencies? Does who provides the bowl of rice or the temporary shelter over their heads even matter to beneficiaries? Northern humanitarians postulate that an Oxfam that works with communities, has a pre-existing relationship with them, is concerned about dependency, and is sensitive to cultural issues and power relations within the community would be the beneficiaries’ preferred over a civic action detail of UN or UK troops. However, is that really the case? From a southern or global perspective, does the “coherence” issue really matter?

The philosophical, corporate, and operational roots of the international humanitarian apparatus are inescapably Western and Northern. The principles may well be universal – or so humanitarians would like them to be. However, humanitarian action is based on the “restricted consensus” of the handful of donor states that hold the purse strings, along with operational agencies such as the ICRC who function as custodians of the flame. The fact that, viewed from the underlying political economy of humanitarian action, humanitarianism is “of the North,” is problematic because, unlike peacekeeping operations, the countries of the Third World have little visible stake in the policies and management of the enterprise.

Like human rights law, international humanitarian law is a basically Western social construct to which the rest of the world was then asked to subscribe – the entry ticket for joining the concert of nations. In point of fact, humanitarian action is more universal and multi-cultural in nature than the apparatus would suggest. The prevailing perceptions understate the involvement of non-traditional donors such as Islamic countries and charities, remittances of diasporas and migrants, and of course the contributions of affected countries, communities, and families themselves. There are no hard and fast figures to gauge the scale of this parallel universe of humanitarian action – the “informal economy” of the humanitarian marketplace -- but the magnitude of such untallied contributions is surely underestimated, as noted in the following chapter.

One way forward might be to accept that the humanitarian community’s claims to universality ring hollow. Taking this perspective to its logical consequences would lead to a bifurcation between those who will recognize themselves in the political designs of the West – and accept to play their part as the smiley face of globalization if not as tools in the war on terror – and those who will strive at all costs (including the cost of forsaking government funds) to resist cooptation and partisan manipulation. How realistic it is to pursue this latter position, which may well appear as holier than thou in post-9/11 murky conflict environments, is hard to tell. NGOs, individually and collectively, would be wise to carefully consider this issue. They may be soon asked to show their cards by the Superpower and its allies as well as by angry militant groups on the ground. Given the current ominous frequency of attacks against aid workers, bluffing or waffling is not advised.

The Humanitarian/Human Rights Nexus

The relationship between humanitarian action and human rights work in crisis countries remains a fundamental and unresolved issue. The Nineties have seen the mixing of these two agendas, sometimes effectively, often not. Will the “Naughties” (the first decade of the new millennium) bring a clearer delineation, or perhaps more creative interaction?

Humanitarians and human rights activists have resided and functioned in separate spheres. During the Cold War years, most humanitarians shunned human rights as “political.” The fact that humanitarian action took place mainly outside the conflict theatre – often in the relative safety of refugee camps – reduced the scope for “witnessing” to human rights abuses by NGOs and UN humanitarian staff. Where humanitarians were “in theatre” as in Ethiopia or the Sudan, the prevailing attitude can be best summarized by the observation of an aid worker in southern Sudan in the late Eighties: “If an intruder stole a computer from our office, we would immediately report this to HQ. If someone was murdered in the street in front of our eyes, we would keep it to ourselves.”

The end of the Cold War thrust humanitarian and human rights agendas into each others’ arms, or at least forced the actors to confront each other. This was partly due to the increased activism of rights organizations
such as Human Rights Watch who are much more present on the ground, with or without the official sanction of legal or de facto authorities. Also involved was the infiltration of human rights discourse into the humanitarian community, including cross-pollination by individuals moving laterally between the two constituencies. The conflation of the human rights and development agendas has also promoted interaction. Significant markers were the adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Such conventions were translated into “rights-based” approaches, with the impact of assistance on the rights of individuals carefully traced.

Such rights awareness has slowly entered the humanitarian mainstream, initially confined to the traditional protection activities of UNHCR and the ICRC. More recently, being rights-aware has become politically correct to the extent that a number of “truck and chuck” NGOs have re-labeled themselves “rights-based organizations.” Some NGOs -- CARE in Afghanistan provides an example -- have adopted a solidarist approach that binds assistance to an essentially political quest for justice and the respect for human rights. The “Do no harm” approach, the emphasis on root causes, and specific integrated country-based instruments such as the Strategic Framework for Afghanistan have also contributed to the internalization of the human rights dimension within the humanitarian template.

More recently, some discordant voices have warned against the unwarranted expansion of the humanitarian agenda to encompass human rights aspirations. Humanitarian groups have been warned against the temptation to do actual human rights work in crisis countries. The blurring of lines thus perpetrated is seen as deeply problematic, if not dangerous, both for aid workers on the ground and for beneficiaries. Negotiating space and access, they say, is fundamentally at odds with naming and shaming and even witnessing. The latter task is essentially political and will inhibit access, if not result in direct harm to civilians. MSF, David Rieff, and Nicholas Stockton have expressed concerns along these lines. This debate is a subset of the wider dialogue mentioned earlier between traditional humanitarians striving to remain faithful to their Dunantist roots and the “new humanitarians” who embrace a much wider definition of humanitarian action encompassing peace-building, rights and development objectives.

Thus, while humanitarian and human rights action stems from the same impulse and references parallel bodies of law, their modus operandi diverges in specific situations. Does humanitarian trump human rights law in conflict settings? Probably not, at least in theory. As rights are indivisible, it is not acceptable to single out the right to humanitarian assistance above others such as justice and the rule of law. In practice, however, things are not so simple, especially in volatile contexts where groups are in extremis (the DRC is one example) or in conflicts without frontlines and identifiable belligerents (as in Iraq). The institutional gravitas of relief agencies in relation to human rights groups also influences the dynamic, even in situations where the number of lives saved seems outweighed by the protections afforded to larger population groups.

Where will this debate go? The question is important for NGO strategic planning. Will the two traditions increasingly mingle or go their separate ways, recompartmentalizing themselves anew? Much is likely to depend on how “sovereignty” is re-defined and/or how the rich world conceptualizes its relationship with the poor and the vulnerable in the troubled borderlands of Empire. It is probably safe to assume that in many spheres of activity our perception of, and attitude to, sovereignty will continue to evolve. This will affect attitudes regarding the protection of civilians in conflict but also in relation to a wider set of threats that undermine the rights of individuals to a life with dignity. The North may well continue to safeguard its privileged way of life while becoming more aware that poverty, lawlessness, AIDS and other epidemics, criminalized economies, and the breakdown of state structures all pose threats to its own security. It is likely that measures aimed at resisting the northerly flow of migrants and asylum seekers will be coupled with more frequent, not necessarily high-profile, interventions predicated on humanitarian and human rights justifications. The inconsistence between humanitarian rhetoric and day-to-day political reality is captured in the comment, “All nations make decisions based on self-interest and then defend them in the name of morality.”
In short, the evolution of the hazards identified in Chapter 1 and of the response to them could affect the relationship between humanitarian and human rights interests in a number of ways:

- Continued instrumentalization of rights agendas, particularly by the rich world, to achieve non-human rights objectives that will weaken the global human rights movement;

- A split between northern and southern approaches to human rights, with groups in the North more focused on civil and political rights (stopping the wall or oil pipelines or promoting the landmines treaty or international criminal tribunals) and groups in the South more focused on socioeconomic rights (the environment, criminalized economies, the rights to food, health and related issues);

- A continuation of double standards, i.e. while rich governments formally advocate for respect for human rights, they will continue in practice to support policies and global arrangements that subvert the rights of the poorest and the disenfranchised. Likewise for corrupt and repressive southern regimes, particularly those that use religion or ethnicity as a cover for power or resource lust; and

- The protection of civilians. As long as resource wars, underdevelopment, and the breakdown of feeble state structures remain part of the southern landscape, the protection of civilians will continue to be an issue confronting the UN Security Council, northern governments, and others including human rights groups. In the best case scenario, there will be less and less tolerance for unbridled attacks on civilians and/or situations that force people to flee. Traditional notions of human rights and sovereignty will change with (a) greater attention to the concept of sovereignty vested in people, and (b) wider recognition that the notion of human security is predicated on the empowerment of the disenfranchised and that this includes attacking poverty and promoting respect for human rights.

More generally, however, it is unclear whether the human rights perspective will make deep inroads into social movements in the South, displacing outdated political and developmental ideologies, or whether it will remain sidelined in relation to the broader processes of social change. Should rights become the new frontier in the South, the scope for rights and solidarity-based North-South alliances in which northern NGOs play an important part would increase. Chances are, however, that militant groups – Islamist in particular, but others as well – rather than secular ones will continue to fill the vacuum left by collapsing states, corrupt elites, failed development, and ideological bankruptcy, presenting themselves as the only bulwark against world ordering, globalization, and the imposition of alien values. In this latter scenario, which would undoubtedly be accompanied by a progressive hardening of the northern security agenda, the prospects for independent humanitarian action, and indeed for the global human rights movement, would be unrelentingly bleak.

**Conclusion**

Traditional humanitarian agencies will doubtless continue to be caught in the maelstrom. Their northern identity may well become a growing source of embarrassment, if not a red flag to militant bulls. New levels of “humanitarian cunning” will have to be deployed to order to work in contested and volatile environments. Agencies that have been able to develop effective partnerships with groups rooted in local society will be at an advantage over those identified with outside and inimical agendas. Perhaps the very nature of such partnerships needs to be questioned and redefined to ensure that they are truly illuminated by the needs of the insiders rather than by the survival imperatives of the outsiders. That is, indeed, the subject of the following chapter.
Chapter 3  The Non-Governmental Landscape

Whether NGOs are the brave new face of people-led action or the coopted workhorses of states shedding their welfare responsibilities, the phenomenon of NGO growth is a reality. For humanitarian NGOs, now claiming some 60% of $10 billion in annual global humanitarian spending, this heady position has brought risks and challenges. Increased reliance on state funding challenges their independence. Being drawn into the modus operandi of the commercial marketplace challenges the role of ideals and advocacy, while competition from the military challenges their sense of worthiness and self-value. As major players, humanitarian NGOs lament these developments but can and should do far more to shape them.

1. If NGOs wish to continue to access the lion’s share of government funding, they need to accept greater accountability. Can NGOs do this on their own terms, rather than those of audit-driven state systems? Can they build accountability that allows local partners and constituents to play a key role? Can they devise mechanisms that do not create intolerable staff or financial burdens?

2. As state aid agencies find themselves under increasing pressure to align spending and policies with short- and medium-term political agendas, should NGOs be building public constituencies at home for more needs-oriented approaches? Must they play the aid game, complete with donor accountability, product definition, and increasing competition from corporate and military actors, or should they build a more independent existence, outside this marketplace, appealing directly to the concerned affluent public?

3. As the global role for NGOs expands, how will northern-based NGOs open up to true partnerships with southern counterparts?

4. Can and should the present handful of large global NGOs continue to grow? Should they become more specialized, or more comprehensive? How will they manage their international structures and partnerships to be both efficient and democratic? How will they resist the pathologies of large corporations and bureaucracies?

Writing in Foreign Affairs a decade ago, Lester Salamon declared that “a striking upsurge is underway around the globe in organized voluntary activity and the creation of private, nonprofit or nongovernmental organizations…. Indeed, we are in the midst of a global ‘associational revolution’ that may prove to be as significant to the latter twentieth century as the rise of the nation-state was to the later nineteenth.” It may be too early to determine whether this development will prove to be as important as the rise of the nation-state. However, there is no mistaking the importance, past and, by projection, future, of non-governmental organizations in matters of service delivery, innovation, and advocacy for social change.

The humanitarian activities of the non-governmental sector are situated against the backdrop of major hazards, present and future analyzed in Chapter One and framed by the international political and policy landscape sketched out in Chapter Two. This chapter examines the humanitarian marketplace and reviews major trends that are likely to shape the work of NGOs in the future. It utilizes interviews conducted specifically for this study as well as analysis of relevant critical literature on the subject.

The Humanitarian Marketplace

What are the trends in the underwriting of international humanitarian programs? Have aggregate availabilities of funds to operational agencies increased in recent years, whether from governments or from private sources? Has competition among such agencies (e.g., UN organizations, NGOs, the Red Cross movement) grown? Are new actors in the humanitarian sphere -- for-profit private sector agencies, commercial contractors, American and other military forces and international peacekeeping troops -- giving NGOs a run for what used to be “their” money? What are the implications of such developments and of longer term trends for efforts by NGOs to deal with ambiguity and change?

Marketplace data is not as readily available as hoped or expected, and some of the data that does exist is beset by problems of methodology and comparability. However, the financing of humanitarian action evidences a number of discernible features. Roughly $10 billion annually has been provided in recent years to the humanitarian enterprise by OECD/DAC governments and their publics and by non-OECD/DAC donors. This
figure includes, along with emergency relief, activities in the areas of post-conflict peace activities, which in 2001 were valued at some $4 billion. Funding for humanitarian work, which during the 1970s and 1980s represented some three percent of Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows, now represents about ten percent of ODA. Growth in humanitarian aid, now a larger piece of a smaller aid pie, has come at the expense of development assistance, which has shrunk.

Governments in recent years have divided their funding of the humanitarian enterprise into roughly equal thirds. One third goes to the Red Cross movement, another third to NGOs, and the final third to UN agencies. The general division varies from crisis to crisis and also over time. The Red Cross movement and NGOs tend to receive more funding in the early stages of emergencies while the UN attracts more resources as volatile situations stabilize.  

The NGO share of the total has grown in recent years. Western NGOs receive funding from three major sources: bilateral governments, multilateral organizations, and private contributors. In 2001, the last year for which figures are available, private contributions to NGOs worldwide were estimated at $1.5 billion. In addition, NGOs programmed about one third of all bilateral humanitarian assistance and as much as half of all humanitarian funds managed by UN agencies. During the years 1997-2001, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) granted more than sixty percent of its funds to NGOs. Such funding put the NGO share of the aggregate $10 billion in such aid flows at about sixty percent, or $6 billion. Demonstrating the importance of NGOs vis-à-vis other humanitarian actors, the figure also highlights the extent to which governments and the UN system are dependent upon NGOs, the indubitable and often unsung workhorses of the humanitarian enterprise. At a very minimum such dependency is mutual, rather than, as is often portrayed, that of the NGO supplicant who is paid by governments and must march to their tune.

The respective shares of multilateral and bilateral funding suggest a trend toward bilateralism, although not necessarily of the runaway sort that is often supposed. U.S. government funding has shown consistency of support for UN activities, both through the State Department’s underwriting of UNHCR and other international organizations and through AID funding of WFP. However, there have been some exceptions, as in U.S. funding of an NGO consortium to respond to the southern African drought as a counterweight to WFP. ECHO has recently increased the multilateral share of its portfolio.

Several trends within bilateral funding deserve mention, each with implications for NGOs. While the United States remains the largest contributor of humanitarian resources, European government contributions to such activities now exceed those of the U.S. In 2001, the figures were $2.55 billion and $1.97 billion respectively. Second, the U.S. continues to rank last among OECD governments in the amount of its ODA contribution as a percentage of its Gross National Product. Third, while popular delusions of grandeur about the levels of U.S. generosity abound, U.S. per capita aid contributions of less than $7 per American per year (the figures are for 2001) are dwarfed by those of humanitarian superpowers such as Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, with per capita contributions in the $37 -- $50 range. Finally, a disproportionately large portion of U.S. humanitarian aid takes the form of food assistance. This not only introduces a certain inflexibility into resource transfers but subjects food aid programming to an increasing chorus of criticism as part of a scheme to promote and prop up U.S. food exports to the disadvantage of developing country agricultural interests.

At a more programmatic level, four key trends have characterized recent developments in donor-NGO relations. First, donors are more insistent on measurable outputs. Second, greater cohesion has emerged within the NGO subsector, reflecting agency concerns about increased accountability to donors and their own perceived need for greater independence. Third, NGOs have increased the advocacy component of their work. Finally, the bona fides of NGOs as non-governmental agencies have occasioned more reflection. Each of these trends, and their likely meaning for the humanitarian marketplace of the future, is examined in turn.
**Quantifiable outputs**

In recent years, donors have become more insistent on measurable outputs. Many have made grants and contracts more focused on the specification of project goals and the identification of indicators to measure performance. A 2002 study of AID funding identified a range of mechanisms to fund NGOs, with grants and co-operative agreements the predominant ones. Under grant agreements, an NGO implements an agreed-upon program without further substantial AID involvement. Under a cooperative agreement, an NGO retains significant independence but AID is involved in agreeing to the activities to be performed, the selection of key personnel, and the approval of monitoring and evaluation plans. The study concluded that, compared with most other donors, USAID’s choice of funding mechanisms tends to be guided by a desire for programmatic and financial controls and competition. Hence it is not surprising that AID has increased its use of cooperative agreements and of for-profits (in relation to non-profits) as implementing partners. The head of AID has lamented the lack of standardized and quantified reporting by NGOs.

As for the U.S. State Department, although the cooperative agreements through which the Bureau of Refugees, Population, and Migration (BRPM) funds NGOs have not changed dramatically in recent years, there has been a gradual addition of requirements around Codes of Conduct and Sphere standards. BRPM has also become more explicit about its expectations of NGOs through guidelines available on its website. Overall, interviewees felt that BRPM relations with NGOs had been "formalized and standardized."

DFID now has Partnership Programme Agreements (PPAs) with most large UK NGOs. These are usually 5-year agreements built around a set of specific outcomes, with the responsibilities of both DFID and the partner articulated. The first set of PPAs are due for review in the near future and, if working satisfactorily, will be continued. Although PPAs require comprehensive reporting and self-criticism by NGOs, one interviewee appreciated that DFID is flexible enough to accept a modified version of the NGO's own internal reporting. An interviewee from an NGO which does not have a PPA expressed the view that the PPA device had a negative impact on its own levels of funding since DFID has a cozier relationship with PPA NGOs.

A SIDA interviewee felt that the Swedish government agency's relationships with NGOs had become more "institutionalized and regularized" in recent years, although perhaps with less of a micro-management animus than with the U.S. government. SIDA has framework agreements with leading Swedish NGOs and provides funding to smaller agencies through several umbrella organizations. Going somewhat against the donor mainstream, SIDA is looking to move towards less short-term project underwriting and more long-term program funding, reflecting a desire to get away from micro-management and towards a system based on trust and confidence in NGOs. Yet SIDA is also working on impact assessment for humanitarian programs (NGOs currently use a logical framework format for applications), thereby increasing performance measurement.

The Danish government, too, is focusing on performance measurement, having tightened its reporting requirements at the end of 2001. NGOs are currently required to outline indicators in proposals and then to report performance against them. However, one interviewee noted that NGOs would prefer greater emphasis instead on impact assessment. Explaining that politicians are usually more interested in measurable outputs than in impact, however, he accepted the requirements as a quid pro quo in the utilization of taxpayer funds.

ECHO has also come to place greater emphasis on financial and programmatic controls. It introduced a revised version of its Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA) towards the end of 2003, which moved from input control to an emphasis on outcomes. It has also introduced a requirement for interim reports, thereby increasing the administrative burden on NGOs. The new FPA is causing a further range of difficulties. There is trepidation, particularly among smaller NGOs but also among ECHO staff, about the new requirements introduced as a result of the Commission's Financial Regulation. Auditors, some of whom may have no experience with the challenges of complex emergencies, now have the power to interpret the provisions of the FPA and to demand the refund of money if they deem that NGOs have not achieved the stated outcomes.
New procurement rules require NGOs to source products in EU or ACP countries unless granted an exemption from doing so. The rules also make NGOs responsible for ensuring that suppliers adhere to ethical standards. However, it is unclear what these standards are, how NGOs are to verify adherence, and how far down the supply chain they are expected to monitor. The introduction of the new FPA has led to delays in ECHO decision-making, hampering the timely response of some NGOs to emergencies. While recognizing these difficulties, one NGO respondent was positive about the new FPA, believing that it was more realistic about costs and that the focus on outcomes was supportive of organizations striving to do quality work.

The insistence on measurable objectives and quantifiable outputs as well as the trend toward reduced operating autonomy for NGOs reflect wider government policies and pressures on donors. Tighter reporting and performance measurement requirements from USAID are due to the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and reflect congressional pressures to demonstrate results and report more frequently. Changes in ECHO's procurement rules reflect the requirements of the Commission-wide Financial Regulation.

By and large, NGOs have welcomed the growing systematization of funding because it clarifies what donors want. More comprehensive proposals can also be used as internal planning and programming tools, and reporting can improve NGOs' own performance measurement. However, the practicalities of providing reporting or of training field staff to meet requirements place an additional burden on NGOs. Accordingly, some European NGOs are considering setting up a crisis fund in case they are required to return money to the Commission. (This will divert funds from beneficiaries.) Some also question whether appointing additional NGO staff simply to report on contracts is a sensible use of donors' money. Still others question whether the emphasis on measurable objectives may be too narrow and see the increasingly short leash on which NGOs find themselves as driven by concerns about political control rather than enhanced results.

Despite the formalization of funding relationships and the now-shorter leash, a number of donors have devised mechanisms to enable NGOs to respond quickly to sudden emergencies. Since June 2001 ECHO has had a "primary emergency" procedure which enables it to take a formal funding decision within 24-48 hours and then fast-track the release of funding. SIDA allocates a certain amount of emergency funding to six or seven humanitarian NGOs at the beginning of each financial year. When an emergency occurs, the NGOs fax a one-page proposal to which SIDA responds within 24 hours, permitting the NGO to spend immediately up to SKr 1 million.

Government insistence on measurable outputs is reinforced by increased donor field presence and monitoring. AID’s OFDA deploys Disaster Area Response Teams (DARTs), DFID’s CHAD has Operations Teams, and ECHO has increased its network of representatives in the field considerably. The presence of more staff in the field gives donors the capacity to undertake their own assessment of needs, make better-informed funding decisions, and monitor the work of NGOs more closely.

Looking ahead, CHAD has confidence in the NGO community's ability to self-regulate in the area of principles and standards and is unlikely to make any additional explicit demands. The Danish government, like SIDA, would like to move away from micro-management by allocating lump sums to NGOs through longer-term framework agreements. A U.S. State Department official, too, suggested that although the agency would go further down the route of standardized, perhaps paperless, performance measurement, this approach is likely to prove unsatisfactory. Hence, it will probably look at qualitative measures as a way to explain and back up quantitative indicators.

**Concerted NGO Action**

A second trend in the NGO subsector of the humanitarian marketplace involves an increase in concerted action among NGOs. Recent years have witnessed a growing sense of discipline among NGOs. Given the traditional picture of the NGO world as a test tube filled with innumerable particles bombarding each other randomly with great force, this second trend is noteworthy.
What is often portrayed as an unseemly NGO “scramble” – Goma, Zagreb, and more recently Darfur have become part of NGO folklore – may in reality be evolving into somewhat less of a free-for-all. One analysis of the NGO “swarming” in Sierra Leone found that most of the 53 NGOs on the scene in 2002 were making a positive contribution, of varying scale, in an admittedly difficult situation. In broader compass, “although there are hundreds of NGOs, it is safe to say that 75 percent of their humanitarian spending is handled by fewer than fifteen large transnational organizations.” In 2001, of some 439 NGOs registered with AID, thirty percent of U.S. aid resources were managed by only five agencies.

Since a small handful of mega-NGOs manages a disproportionately large percentage of total NGO resources, there may be more order than the apparent randomness would suggest. Some analyst even speak of oligopolistic tendencies among the major NGOs, their federations and professional associations, which are seen as stifling desirable competition within the sector. Be that as it may, NGOs are probably better advised to make the most strategic use of the funds available to them rather than to engage in extensive hand-wringing over the opportunists and snake-oil salesmen who pass for NGOs. In short, there is at the operational level in major crises less confusion than meets the eye, although there remains undoubtedly a need for greater restraint and a higher degree of NGO professionalism.

In actual practice, coordination often works better and resources are more cost-effective when fewer NGOs are involved. That is suggested by the UNHCR/NGO experience in 1994 in Ngara with Rwandan refugees. Moreover, larger NGOs have certain evident comparative advantages, including the expressed preference of donors for wholesaling rather than retailing, an enhanced ability to maintain essential institutional infrastructure between crises, the greater network of human resource and networking contacts, and the capacity of publicly recognized agencies to mobilize resources from the general public. Interviews suggest that in order to remain competitive vis à vis donors, smaller NGOs need to develop specific areas of recognized competence. Donor governments, however, do not have a good track record in funding fewer NGOs rather than more. The suggestion by the Swedish government in 2001 that limits be placed on the number of NGOs funded for work in Afghanistan went nowhere. There are, in any event, trade-offs between the activation of fewer or more NGOs in a given crisis.

One of the areas in which greater NGO community cohesion is evident has been in the insistence on a more needs-based allocation of donor resources. It is an acknowledged fact that high-profile crises – Afghanistan and Iraq are the two most recent examples – command (some would say, commandeer) disproportionate levels of resources. One recent study has the disparity of per capita expenditures on persons in need ranging from $50 per capita in Africa to $300 in the Balkans. The issue for NGOs is not simply whether to seek some of the ample government funding available for the headline emergencies, but how to offset the dearth of resources that this creates for more serious humanitarian crises.

It is noteworthy that in raising funds for recent headline crises, NGOs and for that matter the UN system have piggy-backed discussion of the needs of persons in “forgotten crises” on the better-known (and sometimes hyped) situations for which resources are sought. Thus several agencies paired public fund-raising appeals for Kosovo in 1999 with requests for lesser known crises. While agencies have transferred personnel from the needy to the lesser needy locations, they have done so with some reluctance. One NGO staff person detailed on short-term assignment to Kosovo from Sierra Leone found herself upon her return to Freetown a pariah among her colleagues. A Danish Foreign Ministry official credits NGOs with acting as a watchdog on proportionality, working to ensure that governments do not channel all their funds according to a political agenda but also fund so-called forgotten crises.

Donors have taken some initial steps themselves to ensure that their funding is allocated according to need rather than reflecting only political pressure. One of the principles of good humanitarian donorship agreed by the major donors in June 2003 is to "allocate humanitarian funding in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments." The Stockholm session at which the good donorship initiative was launched had before it three hard-hitting reports, commissioned by donors and NGOs, on resources flows and the commercial and
political drivers of aid allocations. ECHO has committed itself to focusing more funding on “forgotten” crises, although this may reflect its desire to establish a “niche” for itself and validate its existence as a humanitarian aid donor at a time when its separate existence is under threat due to changes within the Commission.

An upswing in advocacy

A third trend in the NGO subsector involves an expansion in the advocacy component of NGO work. All the NGOs interviewed for this study believed they could influence relations with donors. In fact, some argued that NGOs had a responsibility to “use their muscle internationally in a constructive fashion.” That was, in fact, CARE’s approach regarding Afghanistan, where some two dozen staff persons (including the executive director in Atlanta and CARE officials in Washington, New York, and Brussels), and overseas staff in Kabul were engaged in advancing a specific policy agenda. There is talk among major U.S. NGOs of establishing a high-level alliance between themselves, donors, and other humanitarian actors in order to have greater influence on responses to crises through joint needs assessments and evaluations. NGOs are in a position to influence donors because of their pivotal role as implementing organizations. In instances such as Iraq, however, such influence may be limited given the supplanting of AID and State by the Defense Department.

Looking to enhancing the impact of advocacy on public policy further still, one European NGO official suggested that NGOs take a more indirect and long-term approach, devoting more attention to educating individual donors. He also argued that NGOs need to realize that “unity is powerful” when making a stand on situations like Iraq rather than allowing institutional survival to take precedence or letting governments "divide and conquer” them. In the Iraq situation, U.S. NGOs have shown considerable cohesion in defending programming space through contesting the Defense Department’s demand for prior sign-off on NGO press releases and through quietly resisting AID’s insistence on a binding declaration that U.S. government funds not benefit terrorists or their kin. The intermediate role played by InterAction on behalf of U.S. NGOs is paralleled at the country level by the liaison contribution of the National Coordinating Committee in Iraq (NCCI) vis à vis the Coalition Provisional Authority on behalf of a wider NGO membership.

One interviewee expressed the view that it would be helpful for NGOs to share information with donors and discuss policy-level issues with them outside of a funding relationship based on particular emergencies. Donors are certainly open to this; both CHAD and SIDA express a desire for more policy-level dialogue with NGOs. Although both donors have regular meetings with NGOs, these tend to be program-oriented. Interviewees from BPRM, too, felt that NGOs could share information or raise issues more assertively at their monthly meetings with the U.S. government.

Some NGOs express caution regarding the extent to which they can hope to influence donors. One pointed out that NGOs need to acknowledge that states have very different responsibilities and obligations from non-state entities like NGOs. Given the nature of the issues and scale of the needs, NGOs cannot always hope to have, or themselves to represent, the answers. There is also a perceived danger that, given the political pressure on aid programs, NGOs may find themselves relegated to the role of junior partners, with donors engaging in dialogue without taking on board what is said. To some extent, this has been the recent experience with ECHO. Due to pressures imposed by the new Financial Regulation and staff overload, the notion that the relationship with ECHO is a partnership, said one NGO official, is "absurd." U.S. NGOs often feel that the now-standard language of AID’s “partnership” with NGOs is also more rhetoric than reality.

In recent years, there have been numerous examples of traditionally fractious private agencies coming together to hammer out and implement common advocacy positions. In the case of Afghanistan, NGOs joined together to protest the deployment of U.S. military forces in plain clothes, blurring essential distinctions with humanitarian personnel; to oppose the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which have a mix of military, intelligence, civil affairs, and development, along with humanitarian, personnel; and to urge the expansion of NATO troops to provide additional security throughout the country.
Independence issues

Finally, recent events have caused increasing attention to the issue of the non-governmental aspect of NGOs. The increasing invasiveness of government donors into NGO decision-making and the need for advocacy efforts in support of humanitarian space and values have led NGOs to look afresh at their relative degree of independence. What is the real meaning of “non-governmental,” especially when most NGOs now habitually accept significant amounts of government resources? Is it a euphemism, or a distinguishing quality?

In an effort to safeguard their independence of action, some U.S. NGOs in recent years have diversified their portfolios, reaching out to ECHO and individual European government aid agencies, whether directly or through European counterparts or representational offices. This strategy—in effect, spreading relationships and risks of NGO dependency, does not address the underlying question of a private funding base as distinct from one or more governmental funding sources. It does, however, offer some protections, particularly inasmuch as donors in DAC and other forums have had only limited success in harmonizing their aid policies.

Most NGOs express a clear preference for privately donated funds, which, they often say, are more valuable by a factor of at least two than bilateral or multilateral funds. Among the objectives served by funds mobilized from the general public are the following:

- To ensure NGO independence from government donors and to enable them to work in neglected crises in which there is little specific donor interest;
- To be able to mobilize public outrage and involvement, promoting changes in host or recipient government policy where necessary;
- To have the capacity to respond quickly to sudden emergencies, especially when donor agencies take several weeks or months to approve proposals and transfer funds, and to moderate the cash-flow problems that exist up until government donors release funding; and
- To underwrite activities that donors are reluctant to fund, including risk reduction and disaster mitigation, advocacy and research.

Despite the greater utility of private over governmental funds, however, NGOs often identify reasons why it is difficult to increase their private funding base. These include the time-consuming requirements of cultivating individual donors, the vulnerability of public concern to cynicism about the humanitarian enterprise, the modest scale of individual contributions as contrasted with big-ticket government grants, and the tying of expenditures to the particular public appeal that commits funds to be spent in a given crisis and for specific relief activities.

Although there is a general perception that large NGOs have a comfortable private funding base, two interviewees pointed out that their organizations receive a great proportion of their humanitarian aid from institutional donors. Without this, it would be difficult to respond adequately to emergencies. Even World Vision US, which has one of the largest private funding bases, receives large government grants for emergency work and has a strategy for trying to increase both funding streams. One NGO also felt it was important to accept donor funding, particularly when there is a good relationship, because this enables it to influence donor objectives and scale of response.

NGO views on whether it has become more difficult to raise funds from the general public for humanitarian work vary considerably. CARE U.S. is exceeding its targets to raise unrestricted funds and has seen no change in its ability to attract funds for emergencies like the Gujarat earthquake. Save the Children UK’s levels of fundraising have fallen considerably, despite investment in this area. One interviewee suggested that recent criticism of humanitarian aid had made it more difficult to raise funds for this. (Specific well-publicized incidents that reflect poorly on the stewardship of NGOs can have a chilling effect on funding from governments and the public alike.) A Catholic Relief Services interviewee expressed the view that the greater number of emergencies in the public eye, the media's portrayal of crises, and the perceived politicization of
aid may have contributed to compassion fatigue in the US. NGOs focusing specifically on humanitarian aid like MSF and Mercy Corps seem to have suffered from this effect.

However, a Save the Children U.S. interviewee felt that there has been no real test of the level of public giving since 9/11. Using the examples of Rwanda during the genocide, Cambodia during the Cambodian/Vietnamese war, and Chechnya, he argued that it has been difficult to raise funds for humanitarian work in politically charged situations for decades. However, the public generally responds to images of people in circumstances beyond their control. Hence, there was no difficulty raising funds for Rwandan refugees in Zaire or Khmer Rouge refugees in Thailand or for natural disasters.

Concerns about the directions of government policy in both the United States and Europe, directions sketched out in the previous chapter, underscore the importance of NGO independence from governments. In the U.S., some NGOs express concern about an eventual politicization in aid allocations and programs reflecting the prevailing overarching counter-terrorist objectives. USAID and the State Department are now undertaking joint strategic planning for the first time. Also, a recent USAID White Paper places a very clear emphasis on overseas aid supporting U.S. national security interests. At a public meeting, a USAID official explained the White Paper’s focus on fragile states: "state failure is a U.S. security concern, as it provides fertile ground for terrorism, drugs, and the like." One U.S. NGO interviewed pointed out, however, that there were no conditions attached to the funding provided by the U.S. government for humanitarian work in Iraq.

Similarly, the EU External Relations Commissioner has linked development and counter-terrorism by arguing that tackling security concerns means tackling poverty. Taking Central Asia as an example, he saw the "glacial" pace of development leading to bad governance, intolerance, and religious fundamentalism. (The falling off of development aid levels in relation to humanitarian assistance may be implicated.) One British NGO expressed concern about funds being diverted away from humanitarian aid towards foreign policy-related objectives, both in the UK and at EU level as the Common Foreign and Security Policy is strengthened by the new European Constitution.

If there is a new level of interest among NGOs in strengthening their credentials as non-governmental agencies, some NGOs have taken this to the point of being anti-governmental in their approach to the authorities in southern countries. Post-Cold War experience in countries such as Mozambique and Haiti highlights the displacement of government functions by international NGOs, often with donor encouragement. While state structure in such settings are often weak or embryonic, state capacity is weakened further still – and the necessary resumption of responsibility by the authorities delayed – when NGOs overplay their hand.

In sum, then, reflecting developments in the humanitarian marketplace over the past decade, donors are more results-oriented and their funding of NGOs more instrumental, while NGOs themselves are demonstrating more cohesion, both in operational programs and in stepped-up advocacy work, and greater attention to the importance of independence as a prominent feature of their “non” governmental status. Clearly, the positioning of NGOs in relation to governments will require ongoing reflection and strategizing in preparation for a time of major ambiguity and change.

Other Actors and Competitors

The marketplace includes not only card-carrying humanitarian agencies but also other actors that are increasingly taking on tasks in the humanitarian sphere. As for-profit contractors and military personnel doing civic action work have become more active on the scene, competition with traditional humanitarian agencies has increased. In fact, one could postulate that decreased competition among humanitarian groups reflects their stepped up competition with the new arrivals. Interviewed for this study, some NGOs saw themselves as competing with other NGOs. Others viewed their competitor as the agencies of the UN system. For example, WFP was seeking food aid, as were NGOs, from the United States and the EU. Still others sensed that the real competition was from commercial and military quarters. Some complained about
their plight: they have to “act like a business” to safeguard their share of the market but at the same time must “act like a government” and show all the trappings of bureaucracy and accountability to be taken seriously.

As for competition from commercial contractors, the media’s focus on the role of mega-firms such as KBR and the Bechtel Corporation in Iraq has highlighted their activities and the lack of competitive bidding for contracts. In actual fact, however, such contractors are doing more in areas such as water and power infrastructure where NGOs have no demonstrated particular comparative advantage. The competition is more intense from smaller for-profit contractors working in the health and education sectors. Some NGOs concede that for-profit contractors are threatening because they spotlight the lack of evidence accumulated by NGOs over the years that would demonstrate the value of their activities from a results-based perspective. Most NGOs, including secular ones, have traditionally been “faith-based:” that is, animated by an intrinsic faith in the inherent efficacy and utility of what they do.

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. government has chosen to channel substantial amounts of funds to private, for-profit contractors for reconstruction work. There is some evidence that this has reduced the amount of funding available for traditional humanitarian aid activities by NGOs, giving rise to concern among U.S. NGOs in particular. USAID also works with for-profit development organizations like Development Alternatives International. NGO interviewees noted that for-profits have the advantage of being able to demonstrate quantitative results more conclusively, to provide tailor-made reporting as often as required (an important element as USAID itself is asked by the Congress for increased reporting), and to follow specifications and other instructions. Yet the phenomenon is restricted to high-profile emergencies: there is no sign of the U.S. government using contractors in Sudan or Ethiopia.

The European donors interviewed do not envisage a role for for-profit companies in humanitarian assistance. Although a private company, Crown Agents, undertakes reconstruction projects and occasional logistics work for DFID, a CHAD official emphasized that Crown Agents was not involved in humanitarian aid provision. British consulting firms are providing technical services on contract to the government in Afghanistan. If the use of contractors becomes wider U.K. government policy, however, it appears that CHAD will be under pressure to adopt a practice it is presently against.

On the contractual side, CHAD is unlikely to move down the route of defining work and asking NGOs to bid for it. This is because it values the independence of humanitarian NGOs. But it is being more explicit in its strategies for individual crises and NGOs applying for funding are expected to fit within these. However, the UK government is establishing a post-conflict reconstruction unit to undertake contingency planning. This will work with commercial companies for large-scale reconstruction, an area in which NGOs are not normally involved. But some humanitarian aid funding will be channeled through this unit.

**FIGURE 15**

**EVOLVING ATTITUDES TOWARD COOPERATION WITH THE CORPORATE SECTOR**

“In the end, a proportion of the NGO world will decide that the best way of leveraging corporate and market change is to get directly involved. As Randall Hayes, founder of the Rainforest Action Network, put it: ‘If you [as an NGO] are not talking to business, you are just preaching to the choir. The real change to protect the environment is going to come from the business sector; we can’t depend on government regulation to solve our problems.’“

Competition from the military exists both at the level of funding and in the jockeying for position in the field. Some donors (e.g., the U.K.) fund civic action activities by the military and traditional agencies from separate
pots. As a result, the two sets of actors are not locked in a zero-sum contest. Others (e.g., Canada) may dunn ODA accounts in a given crisis in order to fund civic action work. Still others (e.g., the U.S.) may advance funds to the military from humanitarian accounts, later to be reimbursed once defense appropriations catch up with events.

In the field, NGOs have been outraged by military personnel who have solicited funds from NGOs for their civic action work and by the quick-and-dirty approach the military has taken toward reconstruction. NGOs flag not only the damaging aspects of the competition but the perceived threat to the integrity of their own work, given the political objectives which civic action advances. The proposal currently under DAC review that funds provided for civic action by the military be counted as official development assistance (ODA) would doubtless exacerbate the issue. Such an approach would further blur essential humanitarian and military distinctions and inject even greater ambiguity in comparative performance than now exists.

While competition by NGOs with commercial and military actors may be reinforced by the policies of European donors, the relevant policies have their common tap root in the U.S. approach to humanitarian action. In the words of one analyst, “... the U.S. is leading the trend towards the bilateralisation and privatisation of aid, stressing corporate participation and implementation by non-governmental, particularly faith-based organizations.” The U.S. has also been in the vanguard of suiting up military personnel for humanitarian tasks, although U.S. policy toward the role of the military in nation building remains unclear and an object of contention even within the Department of Defense.

Charting a course across an increasingly competitive landscape is a more arduous a task for NGOs because of the pervasive distrust that exists between donors and NGOs. One example is the prevailing lack of transparency regarding the criteria used by donors to select one channel over another, the lack of connection between prior performance and future grants. The reality that both the military and commercial contractors are encountering serious difficulties in functioning in the humanitarian sphere may presage the peaking of competition with NGOs in high profile settings. Contractors and military personnel have taken far more casualties in Iraq than have NGOs, with some firms withdrawing personnel and phasing down operations as a result. In lower decibel emergencies, competition is far less an issue.

Since the Rwanda crisis, governments seem to have been more willing to consider using the military to deliver humanitarian aid. In the wake of the multiple tasks taken on by the military in the Kosovo crisis, there has been an active debate about the appropriate roles for troop contingents. USAID has been proactive in funding the military. An NGO interviewee pointed out that, in Afghanistan, NGOs and the military both competed for USAID funds to complete several school refurbishment programs.

A CHAD official was very clear that his division does not regard the military as humanitarian aid providers although they may play a temporary, stop-gap role. This is particularly the case, the official explained, in an outright conflict or situations of great insecurity when NGOs may not be able to operate (although even then ICRC and other preferred CHAD partners may be present). CHAD would not use the military as a channel, except in extreme circumstances. SIDA, too, does not favor a role for the military in humanitarian work. Hence, as Swedish members of the Provisional Reconstruction Teams were heading for Afghanistan, the government argued that they should focus on improving security rather than playing a humanitarian role. Although SIDA accepts that the military and civilian actors can work side-by-side, it believes that this should be done according to OCHA’s guidelines for the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA), which treats military assets in a “last resort” and “exceptional circumstances” mode.

In Denmark, there have been three-way discussions between the government, the military, and NGOs in the wake of the Afghan and Iraq conflicts (since 1995, a Humanitarian Contact Group has facilitated the exchange of views). The three parties have entered into an informal agreement that when NGOs are unable to render assistance and the Danish military is on the ground, it will provide a first response on a small scale. If NGOs and the UN are present, however, the government will provide assistance through them. The Iraq
conflict has underlined the need to ensure the neutrality and independence of NGOs. There is consensus among all actors that NGOs, for their own security and integrity, must not be seen to be part of the conflict.

Although ECHO does not fund the military and lobbied successfully to have the neutrality of EC humanitarian aid enshrined in the European Constitution, European NGOs are concerned about the implications in the Constitution that development and humanitarian aid are “tools” to be used to further the EU's strategic interests. It is unclear how this will play out until the new Commission takes office in November 2004 and new structures proposed by the Constitution, such as the post of a European Foreign Minister, are established in 2006. In the meantime, the Rapid Reaction Force, authorized to undertake humanitarian and rescue tasks, is being formed and the Commission is establishing an African Peace Facility which will divert €250 million from the European Development Fund to support African peace-keeping operations. These developments blur the line between the military and overseas aid and may lead to encroachments on the independence and neutrality of the assistance provided by ECHO.

NGO officials interviewed for this study expressed a range of views about the role of the military in humanitarian programs. One pointed out that since there is no clear and unambiguous answer, different opinions often exist, even within the same agency. On one hand, NGOs could work with the military to improve the quality of its work, introducing the troops to Sphere standards and community participation methods. On the other, NGOs may refuse to engage with the military because they fear that their independence and impartiality will be compromised.

One NGO concern about the involvement of the military is that it can threaten their security, as appears to have been the case with the Provisional Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. One interviewee argued that states do have the right to provide some humanitarian assistance through the military because they are well-placed to do the task in some situations. But when governments fund both the military and NGOs, the line between independent humanitarian actors and the state becomes blurred and confuses beneficiaries. He argued that NGOs should also be concerned if governments use NGOs in conflict situations to legitimize their military objectives. When MSF announced its withdrawal from Afghanistan in mid-2004, the immediate provocation was the killing of five of its staff, for which the Taliban claimed responsibility on the grounds that ‘organisations like MSF work for American interests.’ Earlier, however, MSF had condemned “the distribution of leaflets by the coalition forces in southern Afghanistan in which the population was informed that providing information about the Taliban and al Qaeda was necessary if they wanted the distribution of aid to continue.”

Will new actors such as the military and private contractors continue to play a much greater role in the humanitarian sphere during the coming decade? While they are likely to remain players in the field in high-stakes political crises, there will always be places like the Sudan which are not of sufficient political interest to deploy commercial and military actors and where only NGOs, along with the Red Cross Movement and the UN, have the demonstrated capacity to provide assistance. As a result, a more needs-oriented approach by NGOs to their engagement in crises might attenuate the intensity of their contretemps with the military.

Trajectories

This overview of recent developments in the humanitarian marketplace sets the stage for a look at trends that may be expected during the coming decade. They are the continuing growth of the NGO subsector, the refinement of a division of labor among NGOs, the financing of NGO activity, management challenges, and accountability issues. Each of these will be examined in turn.

Continued growth in the NGO subsector

NGOs are likely to continue to grow in number and importance. It is unlikely that the growth in the number of NGOs, which multiplied in the first post-Cold War decade, will subsist anytime soon. Indeed, every
indication suggests that the growth will continue and the field will become increasingly crowded. The recommendation that NGOs practice birth control is unlikely to be taken seriously. There is something about the humanitarian imperative that makes it difficult to “just say ‘no’.”

The likelihood that the number of NGOs will continue to blossom and flourish, unrelated to the ambiguity and change in the broader hazardscape, reflects the reality that the success of NGOs has bred imitation. In addition, the opening of political systems and advances in technology have democratized NGO-creation. As a result, NGOs, including international as well as local entities, are no longer a solely Western enterprise. “In organizational terms, global civil society today is less a Western-based phenomenon than in the past,” reports Global Civil Society, “and the significant growth rates of recent years enhanced its reach and expansion outside North America and the European Union.” A new generation of southern NGOs has introduced new issues relating to communication and cooperation North and South. The implication of this growth is that the field will become even more crowded, more diverse, and more competitive.

While the “supply” of NGOs is likely to grow exponentially, the “demand” for their services is unlikely to taper off. Chapter 1 sketched some of the problems that can be expected, each acute and complex and with major humanitarian implications. Poverty is still everywhere; in fact, on a global scale, it’s getting worse, even as the planet as a whole gets richer. Urbanization and migration are facts of the world’s future life. HIV/AIDS is challenging an entire continent, with “second generation” areas to follow. Lands are being deforested and species are becoming extinct. Natural disasters and armed conflicts will continue to happen. People will continue to be born and to consume the world non-renewable resources. Given the likely magnitude of the challenges, the growth of the NGO sector is heartening. NGOs are taking on more tasks, although there are limits to growth and a danger, noted earlier, to overreach.

The increase in size of NGOs and the consolidation of their numbers is likely to increase. Mega-NGOs, or BINGOs (Big International NGOs), are the equivalents of multinational corporations not only in their global reach but also in their range of soup-to-nuts activities. The sixty-year evolution of the World Conservation Union (IUCN), one of the oldest, largest, and most respected environmental NGO in the world is in some ways typical of what may be expected. It began as a group of scientists interested in very narrowly defined, scientific learning about conservation issues. When they realized that conservation policy needed to be not only motivated by science but action-oriented, IUCN evolved into a conservation action NGO. When action – particularly in the developing countries – led IUCN to confront issues of development, it transformed itself increasingly into a sustainable development organization, shedding its image as interested only in wildlife conservation. More recently it has found itself increasingly in conflict-prone and conflict-ridden areas, facing issues that might once have been defined as the exclusive purview of humanitarian organizations. Recently it became active in Afghanistan, where environmental conservation can be divorced from neither development nor conflict concerns. NGOs in other areas have come to similar conclusions about the interconnections of what might once have been separate spheres of activities.

Although there is a perceptible trend towards NGO consolidation, it is not clear whether this trend will, can, or, for that matter, should continue into the future. Very large NGOs, much like very large corporations, can sometimes implode from sheer size. There are also calls – some from the BINGOs themselves – for a more “networked” model that moves away from centralized management of activities and towards consortia, franchises, and partnerships which can be more nimble, less costly, and equally, if not more, effective. Some NGOs see advantages in specialization, rather than covering a waterfront of issues. But there are also some major unknowns: for example, as NGO lore holds, whether specialized NGOs have an advantage when it comes to innovation whereas all-purpose agencies are better at “scaling up.” “Scaling out” is yet another possibility: that is, where the organization may not grow in size, but the impact of its activities is scaled out through the demonstration effects, partnerships, networks and consortia. In any event, linear organizational models, like linear projections from the present to the future, may be unsuited to the situation.
Refinements in the division of labor

The division of labor within the NGO subsector is likely to be refined. The structure of the NGO community is changing to allow for new partnerships and networks. Distinctions between issue areas are blurring. Institutional insulation is giving way to institutional partnerships involving a more diverse array of actors, including for-profit and military institutions. The deck is shuffled as a new breed of southern NGOs reaches maturity, as established NGOs grapple with the pangs of age, size and specialized focus, and as new modes of partnership and management among groups and consortia of NGOs develop. Figure 16 suggests the broad directions of the evolution.

As suggested in the “world view” category, formerly distinct issues will blur and merge. It is no longer self-evident where humanitarian relief ends and development begins, or vice versa. The notion that an NGO focused on either saving one child’s life now or on creating conditions for a better life for children down the road might never have been true, but is certainly not a very useful distinction today. The much debated relief-to-development continuum may have been unhelpful in the artificiality of its stages of immediate disaster relief, short-term rehabilitation, or longer-term development. Yet the need to work across the spectrum, or at least to coordinate with others, is obvious. In practical terms, NGOs will either have to become “super-NGOs” covering a waterfront of issues, or create more refined and better operationalized avenues for networking and collaboration with other NGOs and actors. Each has major management implications.

FIGURE 16
PARTNERSHIPS: NEW PLAYERS ON THE FIELD, NEW WAYS TO RELATE TO EACH OTHER, 117

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<th>Issue</th>
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Is the recent trend of greater NGO collaboration with major development actors, including international bodies such as the UN and World Bank as well as northern government agencies such as USAID and DFID, likely to continue? Yes. The official development agencies have acknowledged their weaknesses in implementing projects. In turning to northern and southern NGOs they access cultural expertise and local connections, as well as knowledge of project implementation systems and technologies. Southern NGOs in particular can engage with local populations and enlist their trust as governments themselves often cannot. They can collaborate up and down; they have in fact successfully challenged their own governments while also supporting local grassroots movements. They often collaborate as well with northern NGOs or other organizations, as northern NGOs provide financial resources and international access. In short, a range of actors is acknowledging that collaboration with NGOs offers the best use of each entity’s strengths.

Even as NGOs are getting more involved in policy processes, they are being asked to do more service delivery. Indeed, many smaller “non-governmental” organizations are nearly entirely service delivery or technical assistance contractors for governments. This has been, and is likely to remain, one of the motors driving the emergence of more and more NGOs. Yet increasing interaction with governments and business could lead to “co-optation” by these better-endowed actors, while an ever-increasing scale of service delivery could make NGOs less innovative and flexible, more bureaucratic, and less willing to speak out against convention, governments, donors, or policies. Despite that danger, the great promise of this increasing
interaction is that NGO innovation and enterprise could rub off on other actors. Whatever happens, it is likely that both NGOs and other institutional sectors of society will influence the ethos and processes of the other.

The past ten years or so have shown – and the next ten are likely to confirm -- that international NGOs are indeed policy entrepreneurs, whether they want to be or not. The Oxfams and World Visions of the world are now seen as part of the “new global public management” regime. NGOs, big and small, find themselves interacting with other institutional actors – state and market actors – in multiple ways. Sometime NGOs are engaged in “pulling” those actors along by acting as contractors and consultants, at other times “pushing” them forward by being activists and monitors, and at still other times creating the policy space within which policy entrepreneurs from the market and state sectors can work with NGOs themselves to formulate innovative and integrated initiatives.

NGOs and INGOs, “the professionalized organizational components of global civil society,” have the role of entering governmental and political debates, acting as advocates and trying to influence policy in a more directly political way. NGOs are no longer just “doers” of things. By their choices and actions they are becoming “influencers” of things. This expanded role is being accepted in policy circles and has led to (and in turn been reinforced by) a growth of direct NGO involvement in policy making, with NGOs serving as knowledge brokers, advocates, monitors and sometimes serving on official national delegations. The international NGO system has been getting increasingly interconnected and is likely to become more so.

The near-term future is also likely to see increased collaboration within and across the NGO community. The size of an individual NGO is not the measure of success. Rather, it is the effect of the NGO in terms of structural reform or systemic change that marks a successful business, and humanitarian NGOs are, in a sense, in the business of reducing suffering. Working together as a collective unit is the most effective way to be business-effective. “What will make a difference to global poverty in the years to come,” note two analysts, “will not be the number of villages that are served or children that are sponsored, but how grassroots action is connected to markets and politics at multiple levels of the world system, a collective task in which the ability of [development NGOs] to work together—not individual competitiveness—will be critical.” If the goal is structural or some other means to sustainable change, there must be a collaborative effort to get to the root of the issue. Prerequisites include the economic know-how and influence to understand and work with markets and the political savvy and credibility and supporting pressure to command a hearing and action by policymakers. This kind of larger-scale project—a combination of advocacy and direct service—is much more possible with more major collaborative efforts.

A key challenge for the future is not only how NGOs interact with other sectors but what relationships might develop within the NGO sector itself. The larger North-South divides that have impacts on other global processes also influence NGO relations. Already the trend is for better endowed northern NGOs to “sub-contract” with less well-resourced southern NGOs. While the language of “partnerships” is often used, resource flows remain critical in defining these relationships. In a network setting, the question of unequal relationships will have to be dealt, including how to manage unequal contributions and unequal access to resources and how to deal with disparities of power and influence. In the absence of greater mutuality, it seems likely that the breach will widen between NGOs with agendas paralleling those of northern governments and NGOs that retain and expand real links with progressive civil society forces in the South.

At the same time there has been, and will increasingly be, a large segment of the local NGO sector that does not interact with northern NGOs at all, including religious NGOs in many societies. Indeed, these southern NGOs not only do not, or choose not, to interact with their northern counterparts. Indeed, some local NGOs in the South do not want to be called NGOs because the term is too closely identified with northern or North-supported civil organizations. The multiplicity of civil society organizations in the South adds to the challenge framed by the SustainAbility study: that “The most successful NGOs will be the best networkers, the most reliable partners.”
Financing

The financing of NGO activities will, according to most prognostications, continue to be substantial. There has been an ebb and flow of the amount of funds moving through NGOs since the 1970s, and the sources and direction of that aid have changed as well. In recent years, as noted earlier, humanitarian aid has come to represent a larger portion of a shrinking ODA pie. As humanitarian NGOs have continued to grow and expand in scope and legitimacy, many nations spent large proportions of their aid budgets through NGOs.118

At the same time, NGOs have benefited from new sources of funding. Resources from private investors and donors, including individuals, foundations, and corporations more than doubled from 1988 to 1999. Businesses, corporations, and other private ventures are expected increasingly to fund international NGOs, in the name of mutual gains and comparative advantage. Businesses can offer funding to NGOs in exchange for risk reduction, market information, a positive image in local communities, and new networks. Public–private partnerships are becoming more and more popular, particularly with environmental and human rights–focused endeavors, although clear ethical groundrules to protect the integrity of NGOs are only beginning to be hammered out.

Indeed, the partnership framework within which donors, new and traditional, provide funding for NGO activities will require additional attention in the coming years. International NGOs in their relations with donor governments, and southern NGOs in their dealings with northern NGOs and with northern and southern governments, will need to be on guard against cooption. Given the tendency of available funding to drive programming decisions, NGO managers face pressures of mission creep and the need to maintain program identity and integrity in the face of funders with particularistic agendas.

Nor is there an “invisible hand” that ensures the availability of resources at places and times of maximum need. That is particularly evident in food aid supplies, which are often least available when most needed. “Against a backdrop of almost escalating humanitarian crises—notably in southern Africa—global food aid has actually decreased from a peak of 15 million tones in 1999 to 11 million tones (in 2002), a drop of more than 25 percent,” reported a spokesperson for the southern African Development Community. As noted earlier, the future of food aid may be further clouded by the possibility that it will be found to violate international trade agreements. Such a finding would force a major change in the political economy of humanitarianism and confirm longtime criticisms of food aid as more tailored to the needs of exporting countries than to those of countries in crisis.

Preserving NGO identity from one year to the next is also becoming more difficult as donors earmark funds for particular projects or fashions. The combination of earmarked funds and trendy projects makes for a smaller pool of aid for less publicized or chronic emergencies. Combating donor fatigue will require clear proof of results. Good management and demonstrable outcomes will, as noted earlier, become even more key in securing funding over the next years.

While the issue of development fashions is of course not new, it poses for NGOs a particularly critical challenge, given their general reliance on government funding. Responding to the whims of donors may mean moving away from particular thematic or geographic areas in which they have developed expertise. If NGOs are indeed organizations whose values distinguish them from other actors, they follow donor fashions at their own risk. Indeed, a major financial challenge for the future is to create reserves of resources that lie beyond the whims of the flavor of the day. Most NGOs have not responded to this challenge well. Some are beginning to look at the business world as a source of new support and of new ideas on how to become more financially independent and sustainable.
Management

Management challenges will also require attention and innovation. Rapid growth coupled with structural changes in the NGO sector has triggered new challenges to NGO management. Entering a time when virtually anyone with a phone, fax, and business card can become an NGO, three management challenges are likely to loom large: the management of growth, the cultivation of diversity, and the need for efficiency.

First, there are the management implications of rapid growth in the size of NGOs. The strengths that make NGOs nimble and successful when they are small can be lost as they grow. As NGOs become “corporatized,” they may take on the management pathologies of large corporations and government bureaucracies, including lack of communication, of human resources and training, and of a common agency vision and mission. Enlarged NGOs often tend to reach for management tools created for corporations and bureaucracies at the expense of their “NGO-ness.” Some of the most important NGO qualities – innovativeness in ideas, nimbleness in operation, and energy in implementation – can become causalities of growth.

As NGOs grow in size, they are faced with demonstrating comparable growth in impacts. Developing, testing, and scaling up new ideas can become fairly expensive. The expense is justified only if new ideas and approaches are taken on by local actors and multiplied by them. Indeed, there are “economies of innovation” that correspond to “economies of scale” in industry. One option is to become bigger in size and therefore bring down the unit cost of doing things, which nevertheless often remain high. A more robust option is to create multiplication by duplication, thanks to a demonstration effect that leads to others following the same path. This is a preferred model but not an easy one, given the importance of local action and local realities. At the end of the day, size does still seem to matter, with jobs to fill, products to sell, salaries to pay, images to maintain. NGOs North and South have tended to take the first route option and become bigger while embracing the second option and presenting themselves as catalysts for innovation and change. The challenge of the future will remain that of scaling up impacts without bloating in size.

Cultivating diversity is a second looming management challenge. NGOs are no longer primarily a northern vehicle; in fact, they have grown more rapidly in the South than in the North during the past decade. For the most part, North-South NGO partnerships remain unequal and uneven. While northern NGOs may make conscious efforts toward genuine mutuality and equity, client NGOs have emerged in the South which essentially serve as sub-contractors. The ethos of partnerships is valued in the NGO world, but if relationships are indeed of a sub-contracting nature, should they not be managed as such? Building management structures that can reflect or induce true partnerships has not been tackled well by NGOs, North or South. Academic review of these issues is in its infancy, still borrowing heavily on business and public management experience and imposing the pathologies of those fields on NGOs.

A related management issue involves promoting consistency of values at a time of increased agency size and global reach. While business is clear in its goals (i.e., increasing profits) and bureaucracies in their processes (i.e., standard operating procedures), NGOs as value organizations need to highlight their own core values and respond to dynamic conditions accordingly. While, for example, many NGOs that work on sustainable development agree on this value, some view the task as making development more environmentally sensitive; others view it as making environment more related to development. The tension is apparent in large international NGOs working in this field.

A third major management challenge involves efficiency, a key demand of donors on NGOs. Financial efficiency exists in tension with the desire to experiment with new ideas, which (as with pharmaceutical research) can be risky and expensive. Too large a focus on efficiency can easily lead to predictability and a repetition of things known to work. The challenge is to retain a focus on the defining purpose of NGOs which relates to innovation and not take on the zealous focus on simple economic efficiency that is better done by the market sector.
Accountability

New arrangements for mutual accountability will need to be devised. The growth of and changes within the NGO sector have brought new challenges for its identity, scale of responsibility, and purpose within the broader global community. NGOs today are at a point of unprecedented influence, responsibility, and credibility. The non-profit sector is the world’s eighth largest economy. NGOs are considered by some to be the “third sector,” after the public and private sectors.

At the same time, however, and perhaps as a result of their higher visibility, NGOs are increasingly being asked tough questions about legitimacy, accountability, and transparency. After a long honeymoon period in which NGOs lived a charmed life, funders as well as the public want better accounting and measurement of efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness. Do they do what they say they do? Do they do it well? Do they do it cost-effectively? Do they actually make a difference on the ground?

As NGOs assume more major roles within the international aid apparatus, they make service provision a larger portion of their work. It has been steadily growing since the 1990s. In this framework, NGOs become a kind of subcontractor or instrument of privatization for states, utilizing their role as mediator and maneuvering between donors and recipient projects. This subcontracting can lead to cooption of NGO agendas and missions. NGOs also have obvious responsibilities to the people they serve, as well as to each other and to the missions they aim to uphold.

Governmental and intergovernmental partners of NGOs are able to draw on their cultural expertise and local connections, as well as knowledge of the systems and technologies necessary to implement a project or intervention. Southern NGOs in particular can engage with local populations and command their trust as governments themselves often cannot. They can collaborate up and down; they have successfully challenged their own governments while also supporting local grassroots movements. They often collaborate as well with northern NGOs or other organizations, as northern NGOs often provide financial support to southern NGOs; in fact, northern NGOs transfer more resources to the South than the World Bank. In short, a wide array of actors, including governments, militaries, international organizations, local NGOs, communities, and other entities are recognizing that collaboration with NGOs may be advantageous. International NGOs for their part have a variety of views regarding such collaboration.

To whom should INGOs be accountable and through what mechanisms? There are multiple stakeholders. NGOs collaborate upwards, downwards, and horizontally. Some people argue that some NGOs or growing NGO networks are big enough that they are not accountable to anyone but themselves and the causes they purport to serve. Some northern NGOs are held accountable by public and media, so an ebb and flow of donations is likely.

Good management must address issues of funding accountability, as well as criticisms that there is no accountability. According to several analysts, northern NGOs are lacking in their performance because they lack accountability. There is a need to look at both functional accountability (accounting for resource use, immediate impacts) and strategic accountability (accounting for the impacts an NGO’s actions have on other organizations and the wider environment). International NGOs should also be accountable within the NGO system, as initiatives such as Sphere and the Humanitarian Accountability Project underscore. This kind of intra-organizational cross-checking can only serve to help establish standards and work towards a viable monitoring and evaluation system. The accountability of NGOs to beneficiaries themselves, an overdue but problematic subject, is increasingly on the table.

Along with the growth in size and importance has come an increased demand for NGO transparency. This demand is still framed primarily in terms of finances but it is also becoming louder in terms of political agendas and influence as well. Governments and populations in developing countries are demanding to know where particular NGOs get their monies from and sometimes questioning the political motivations of their actions. Southern NGOs working with northern counterparts are increasingly under pressure from northern
donor governments and NGOs to provide greater financial transparency while under pressure from their own societies to provide greater political transparency.

For example, aid organizations in Afghanistan over the last many years have had to face both sets of pressures, with the pressure from below more critical. The old challenge for them was to convince northern partners that they were true to the values of the donor NGOs. The new challenge is more often to demonstrate that they and their values are rooted in their own societies and not in the desires of outside actors, government or NGO donors. This requires them not only to spend more effort in rooting their work and talking to their own societies but also to expend serious energy in negotiating with their donor NGOs to make the agendas of the northern NGOs more relevant to the societies where work is being done.

Concluding considerations

As humanitarian organizations prepare for the future, they will need to make some basic judgments about the probable evolution of the humanitarian landscape, including the increasingly competitive humanitarian sector and the fabric of political, institutional, financial, and programmatic relationships with multiple actors, northern and southern, governmental and non-governmental. Each of these changes has relevance for individual NGOs and/or the NGO community as a whole.

To the extent that terrorism remains an overriding preoccupation of the major governmental providers of assistance, humanitarian space is likely to become, if anything, more constricted. Either you are part of the help or you are not, government officials will doubtless say to humanitarian groups. NGOs will be hard-pressed, to the extent that they try, to use the humanitarian imperative to temper anti-terrorist policies and to establish independent humanitarian space. While multilateral structures may buffer humanitarian action from some of the more direct manipulation, they, too, are anything but immune from politicization.

Military actors are likely to become increasingly regular fixtures of high-profile emergencies. Such is the case even though doctrinal evolution may hedge involvement by the military in the humanitarian sphere. From the NGO side, a more disciplined approached to collaboration on the part of NGOs is developing as NGOs, both individually and corporately, clarify their terms of engagement with military forces. While international and/or national military or peacekeeping forces clearly have some comparative advantages over NGOs, it is unlikely that a more level playing field will emerge in which those advantages are reflected by government decision-makers.

High-profile emergencies politicize the space in which humanitarian action takes place. NGOs may thus opt to avoid engaging in such theaters specifically for that reason, choosing lower profile settings in which to work. However, there are opportunity costs to agencies that “sit out” a given crisis, and “forgotten emergencies” are not without political risks of their own. Based on recent experience, it is difficult to envision NGOs, as a matter of humanitarian principle, giving precedence to crises less in the international limelight.

Each of the major sources of funds for humanitarian work, too, has its costs and benefits. These need review as part of a thoughtful, long-term strategy by and for NGOs. Such a review might help restore integrity to the “non” in non-governmental. It would also have a bearing on whether U.S. NGOs continue largely to follow the American flag or take a more needs-based approach to country allocations.

NGOs based in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other developed countries often refer to themselves as “international,” reflecting the many nations in which they operate. In fact, NGOs in crisis countries are, by virtue of the multiple funding sources and outside partners with which they interface, equally “international” themselves. Transnational NGOs – that is, members of international NGO families – have particular advantages that need to be taken into account.
Even though most donors do not make grants based on a review of the comparative cost-effectiveness of individual agencies or kinds of agencies, NGOs should participate in, and perhaps fund, studies that demonstrate the effectiveness of their work in relation to non-humanitarian competitors such as commercial contractors and military forces.

Resource mobilization involves prior questions of a given NGO’s focus (e.g., relief, reconstruction, development, or some combination) and competence (sectoral, geographical, etc.). The recent trend for some agencies to take on chores within “the new humanitarianism” (human rights, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peacebuilding, advocacy) also merits review. To what extent are comprehensive programs more successful than narrower efforts?

NGOs are now more aware than during earlier periods of the importance of coordination – the more so as the interlocking nature of problems and the limits to what a given agency can effectively tackle become more apparent. Yet despite numerous studies, conferences, and discussions, the coordination conundrum shows no sign of resolution. Thus there may be a case for joint action by like-minded NGOs, avoiding the frustrations associated with the failure of broader NGO community-wide action to materialize.

The future of NGO action, however, may not turn on answers to questions of coordination or agency portfolio but instead be more fluid and unpredictable. Recent analyses have highlighted the political economy of humanitarian action, including the vested interests represented by humanitarian institutions, staff, and programs and the corrosive influence of commercial and political intrusions into serious humanitarian work. The northern/western humanitarian apparatus is likely to face competition as well from native-grown civil society organizations: Somali-type private religious groups, Hamas-esque social service organizations, diaspora-led voluntary service agencies, ethnic federations, professional groups, and the like.

From this wider perspective, the pace of social change may outrun the capacity of established NGOs to adapt. Laying the groundwork for a viable future for the NGO subsector may thus prove to be a race against the clock.
Chapter 4  Lessons Learned and Pending

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Humanitarian NGOs are fundamentally action-oriented bodies seeking to deliver assistance and protection. They are committed to learning from evaluations, academic studies, and action research but research and learning are not their main business. The more specific and directly applicable to field projects, the more likely such findings are to influence behavior. Present NGO collaboration with the research community has identified as a critical problem the poor collection of baseline and monitoring data. Learning that challenges policy, management, and funding, however, is far harder for NGOs to absorb.</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Can humanitarian NGOs take the lead in developing venues for serious and sustained dialogue with political scientists, economists, and other academics studying the “big picture” aspects of humanitarian action? How will NGOs use the insights gained in their programming?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Should NGOs be more supportive of the global research community in an effort to develop and refine field techniques for gathering of valid baseline and monitoring data during emergencies?</td>
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<td>3. Is there a role for NGOs to fund relevant research directly or to lobby state and foundation research funding sources to give elevated priority to humanitarian research?</td>
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In the past ten years – roughly since the Rwanda genocide and in reflection upon it – the understanding of how crises play out from the household to the global level has changed dramatically. In that time, globalization has moved from a theory to a living reality; many humanitarian NGOs have shifted from national to transnational in structure; and the use of a broader livelihoods analysis and the development of specific technical advances have improved assistance to crisis-affected households. However, as often happens, lessons learned also uncover a major gap between knowledge and its application in the field. As a result, a number of major lessons remain to be identified and applied in the future.

This chapter examines the understanding within the humanitarian enterprise, and particularly among NGOs, of key developments of the past decade and their application to humanitarian praxis. Using the public nutrition sector as a case in point, it identifies an agenda for further learning and research. The narrative cuts across and connects with some of the themes explored earlier such as the changing political framework within which humanitarian action is set and the pressure of a results-based approach by donor governments. It lays the groundwork for the look to the future offered in the report’s final chapter.

**Key learnings from the past decade**

**Political contextualization**

The past decade has seen a steadily expanding understanding among humanitarian organizations and personnel of the political context of humanitarian action. As noted in Chapter 2, the naiveté that characterized the work of aid groups during the Cold War was replaced during the first post-Cold War decade by greater realism about the interplay between relief activities and the political dynamics of conflict. Emergencies are situated in a context. More specifically, the past decade has seen a steady outpouring of political analysis on what drives war and conflict. Work by David Keene on the political economy of modern war and by Mark Duffield on globalization and the cooption of the aid community have represented seminal contributions. Duffield’s analysis of the changing nature of welfare systems in the West and the exportation of private enterprise-driven welfare to developing countries through NGO intermediaries has represented a fundamental challenge to the notions of independence and impartiality which many NGOs place at the heart of their work.

Reflection on the Rwandan genocide, both in the wake of the event itself in 1994 and on the occasion of its tenth anniversary, has also represented a pivotal learning experience for the humanitarian community. The work of Samantha Powers, David Rieff, and Michael Ignatieff – erstwhile journalists, now academics – has documented the agencies’ general misunderstanding of what was going on. The conclusions of the five-volume multi-donor study of 1995 have been confirmed in an updating review concluded in 2004. This policy and evaluation work underscores the linkage between human rights abuses, international humanitarian law,
and humanitarian action that continue to challenge humanitarian agencies. The timidity of governments to name genocide for what it was and meet their legal responsibilities under the Genocide Convention has also underscored the need for more forceful and effective advocacy as an integral element in humanitarian action. There is no longer any doubt that conceptual errors can exacerbate humanitarian extremity.

FIGURE 17

“THE SERENITY PRAYER”

God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change; the courage to change the things I can; and the wisdom to know the difference.

Reinhold Niebuhr

Finally, this decade has seen the growth of international terrorism, portrayed and perceived as driven by Islamic fundamentalism and a vitriolic rejection of the behaviors and values of what Duffield describes as the northern Metropolitan enterprise. Since 9/11 in particular, security concerns in the North and especially in the United States have promoted a Manichean view of the world divided into “them and us.” Jonathan Benthall, writing on Islamic charities and the impact on the Global War on Terrorism on humanitarianism, has shown how deeply this new rubric challenges the present Western-led practice of the international humanitarian community. As Chapter 2 has indicated, terrorist concerns and the anti-terrorist response, while not the first time that political concerns have framed humanitarian action, represent a potentially greater and more corrosive threat than their predecessors.

Improving effectiveness

If Duffield, Powers, Benthall, and the others have been providing the grand political frames, it has been NGOs and humanitarian practitioner-academics who, closer to the field, have driven developments in understanding and improving the humanitarian system. Among the key themes in the applied learning process have been accountability, financial transparency, and understanding the dynamics of vulnerability in local communities.

Beyond the evaluation of Rwanda, the past decade has brought forth the Sphere project, People in Aid, and the Humanitarian Accountability Project. Through the writings of people like Hugo Slim and Mary B. Anderson, the morality and ethics of aid have been explored and scrutinized as never before. All of this work, largely stimulated, led, and to a lesser extent underwritten by NGOs, has radically changed the way humanitarian practitioners see their role and accountability. The decade has witnessed not only individual but also collective efforts to improve the quality of the service agencies deliver. The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) is a particularly noteworthy example of a now-shared concern between donors and agencies to bring to bear lessons from recent experience on current policy and operational challenges, contextual and programmatic alike.

Paralleling the commitment to improve the quality of assistance has been a growing concern, mentioned in Chapter 3, to identify and understand better the financial flows within the aid system. The development of the UN’s Consolidated Appeal Process and its financial tracking mechanisms, coupled with the advent and maturation of Reliefweb, have lead to greater transparency in financial and information flow. Four studies prepared in 2003 by independent analysts with the encouragement of the InterAgency Standing Committee chart problems in need assessment, disproportionalities in aid allocations among crises, and other disfunctionalities in donor and agency behavior. These were the subject of review and action at a meeting on good donor behavior convened by the Swedish government in Stockholm in June 2003.\(^{121}\)
With respect to understanding the needs and resources of local communities, Amartya Sen in his 1981 work *Poverty and Famines* provided an entitlement theory that has influenced understanding and programming related to vulnerability and famines. Sen found that a failure in peoples’ abilities and capacities to access food through their entitlements (trade, production, labor, and inheritance) was a key cause of vulnerability. His new approach represented a paradigm shift from previously held beliefs that vulnerability to food insecurity was a result of food production failures, moving the analysis of vulnerability beyond food availability toward an assessment of capacities to access to food.

De Waal developed this model of vulnerability, stressing that the most vulnerable are not passive but engage in skillful and purposive ways to resist starvation and that threats to assets in general, not only incomes, were important. Furthermore, social disruption, migration, disease (not just economics) and illegal transfers or violence (not just legal transfers) were major determinants of vulnerability. Based on work in Darfur, de Waal developed the health crisis model, which proposed that infectious diseases were at least as important as starvation as a cause of death. Swift further explored and refined the role of “asset” entitlement, arguing that a wide range of assets can be mobilized in a crisis, including investments (human, educational, health, productive, collective), stores (food, gold, money), and claims (other households, local communities, government). These new understandings had substantial implications for aid agencies and how they approached their relief assistance work.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, epidemiological research work, conducted mostly in refugee camps, discovered that the prevalence of acute malnutrition among children less than five years of age (physiologically the most vulnerable) strongly correlated with levels of mortality in the same populations and therefore was a strong proxy for understanding levels of severity in crisis situations. Later surveys which focused more or less entirely on children led to an unintentional bias of interventions towards children of this age group. During the 1990s, further work contributed to the recognition that adults and other age groups may be equally, if not more, vulnerable in emergency contexts, depending on the type of risk to which different age, sex, and ethnic groups are exposed.

These important conceptual advances contributed to the development of assessment and analytical tools that have been widely adopted and further developed by humanitarian agencies. Several examples from the public sector are offered here, suggesting that the move from paradigm and concept to program and practice in that area is well under way.

The *food economy approach*, developed by Save the Children-UK in the early 1990s, has two main objectives: first, to understand how people survive and how patterns of survival change as a result of shocks; and second, to estimate the size of the food deficit and therefore of food needs. This approach takes an inclusive approach to food sources (production, gifts, etc), income sources (labor, trade, etc), and expenditure at the household level for different wealth groups within a community.

The *Unicef conceptual framework*, developed in the early 1990s for development contexts and since adapted by humanitarian agencies, emphasizes that the outcome of malnutrition is attributable to three broad clusters of underlying causes. These are inadequate food security (access as well as availability), inadequate social care environment, and a poor health environment or inadequate access to health services. The effect of all of these underlying causes is greater than the sum of the parts. While the statistically rigorous 30-cluster survey method developed by WHO is useful for estimating prevalence of acute malnutrition in crisis situations, Unicef’s conceptual framework provides a wider framework for understanding and explaining why malnutrition occurs in a given context.

The *DFID Sustainable Livelihoods framework*, again developed for non-crisis contexts, has been adapted and applied by some agencies such as CARE to emergencies. However, Sue Lautze argues that the framework is, not surprisingly, not readily applicable in complex humanitarian emergencies, given that its main purpose is to promote sustainable livelihoods in non-disaster settings. Oxfam’s livelihoods approach to food security
assessments combines the assessment of longer term risks to livelihoods with short-term or life-threatening risks (malnutrition, micronutrient deficiency diseases, morbidity, mortality). Oxfam’s analytical framework incorporates elements of availability and access to food and the severity of food insecurity, including the prevalence of malnutrition in relation to capacities and resources for coping with specific shocks or threats. Also taking a comprehensive view, the most recent edition of the Sphere Project, in identifying key indicators for minimum standards in food security and nutrition analyses, emphasizes the need to examine broad economic and social policies, institutions and processes, coping strategies and local capacities.

In ways more specific still, scientific knowledge has been translated into more effective program operations. Major developments in scientific knowledge have occurred in the last ten years that have direct impacts on humanitarian work. Once again, some of the most well known examples have occurred in the health and nutrition sector. This includes the development of fortified low-protein milks (F75 and F100) and of appropriate and safe foods (e.g. Plumpynut) for home-based treatment of severe malnutrition. When provided according to correct dietary and medical protocols, these foods contribute to greatly reducing mortality associated with severe malnutrition.

Knowledge and experience has also been gained in the local fortification of cereals as a mechanism for addressing micronutrient deficiencies. Recently developed oral rehydration salts (ORS), fortified with higher levels of zinc, as well as home-based safe chlorination systems are likely to be effective in reducing diarrhea. New vaccines have been developed against haemophilus influenzae (the cause of acute respiratory infections) and pneumococcus meningococcus (of meningitis). New delivery mechanisms for old vaccines have also been developed. For example, UNIJECT (preloaded, one-time-use syringes) is now available as a more safe and efficient vaccine used against tetanus toxin among women. There is evidence to suggest that extending measles coverage beyond five years of age (i.e., to 14 years) will reduce measles-related mortality in relatively unexposed populations. New drug treatments have also become available. For example, Artemisinin Combination Therapy (ACT) for malaria is effective in areas with widespread resistance to existing drugs. Antiretroviral Therapy (ART) in combination therapies (three drugs in one tablet) is a major development towards reducing mortality of HIV/AIDS.

Much of this new scientific knowledge has been gained in emergencies as well as development contexts as a result of collaborative initiatives among aid agencies, research institutions, and academic-practitioners. These partnerships have in some cases, been formalized through the establishment of scientific advisory committees (for example, Action Contre La Faim and Save the Children-UK).

The coming decade: lessons to be learned

Frameworks for the future

The frameworks offered by Duffield and his colleagues provide an opportunity for situating humanitarian action of the future within a broad political rubric. To take their conceptual contributions on board, however, NGOs would require a radical change in their relationships to western governments, UN agencies, and the marginalized communities they work in. The political analysis of humanitarian crises and humanitarian action is deeply challenging to humanitarians, particularly NGOs. Its central message is that, in a global economy with global communications, no one sits outside the power structures that shape people’s lives, least of all NGOs with a western genesis largely funded by western governments and a western public. These are not easy issues for NGOs to face, not least because they are premised on political-economy models which owe as much to one’s political beliefs as they do to empirical evidence. As a result, opting for these models require agencies to make political judgments.

Two other issues, also flagged in Chapter 2, involve the role of humanitarian action in relation to the “coherent” or integrated framework of United Nations activities, and the tensions between the avowed universality of humanitarian values and the parochial and Western nature of the humanitarian apparatus. The
future will require NGOs to situate themselves more clearly in relation to the political, military, democratization, and development aspects of international interventions, a difficult task given their own commitments to human security, democratic values, and participatory development. The future will also require the humanitarian enterprise, currently framed, driven, led, and financed by the West, to put down serious and deeper roots in crisis countries, as have the environmental, development, and human rights movements already. Both issues may require review of current relationships with the U.S. and other donor governments and stepped up efforts in the areas of advocacy with governments and education among northern publics.

Coherent analytical frameworks, while a step in the direction of more effective programs, are no panacea. In some instances, such frameworks have led directly to the development of assessment methodologies by or in partnership with other agencies. (Save the Children’s household food economy approach is a case in point.) In other cases, the responsible agency for developing the framework has been unsuccessful in institutionalizing its application within its own operations. (Unicef’s framework regarding the causes of malnutrition is an example.) The livelihoods framework may have had a slower uptake by agencies partly because it has largely been developed in academia in collaboration with a few major donors. This suggests that processes required to support (ongoing) ownership are important if agencies are to institutionalize and incorporate frameworks more systematically. Agencies too, may be rather uncritical in their acceptance of new theory, preferring to work with what is familiar. The failure to incorporate livelihoods analyses into assessments is to some extent because the humanitarian community as yet lacks an adequate conceptual framework to analyze livelihoods in crisis.

The challenges for agencies in adopting wider conceptual frameworks are many. Slow uptake may be associated with the burden of more complex analysis and the problems of perceived reliance on outside expertise. A framework requires an elaborate combination of qualitative and quantitative indicators and therefore agencies need to create, teach, develop, sustain, and monitor complex analysis at the national and program levels. Since not all agencies have access to expertise, affiliations with academic or training institutions may be useful. The reluctance to adopt complex frameworks may also reflect an awareness of the difficulties in using these tools for better programming. Agencies need to use these frameworks to advocate and justify more innovative programming. Similarly, donors need to be more flexible and open to tailored responses. Of course, insecurity and poor access may also impede more coherent analyses and related innovative programming.

These broader frameworks provide a tool for coordination and should therefore be incorporated into government policies and coordinating bodies. This will require multi-ministry and interagency initiatives as frameworks can rarely be successfully situated in single ministries or single UN bodies. Humanitarian NGOs have a role to advocate and contribute to this process. The process of developing consensus on a common vulnerability framework may address the characteristic tension between in-depth analyses, conducted at local levels (usually by NGOs) and scaled-up national data (usually by government and the UN). When different frameworks are applied at national and local levels, opportunities for comparisons are lost. By applying a common conceptual framework – the UN’s country-level Humanitarian Information Centers are a means to that end -- there is scope for developing common thinking on different levels while still allowing for differences in the extent of detail of information collected that is useful for the different users.

While frameworks for understanding the causes of malnutrition have been adopted by many agencies, data on each of the underlying causes of malnutrition (food security, social services, environment, and health) is often not systematically collected. Moreover, some information is not collected, depending on the circumstances and expertise available within the agencies or those conducting the survey. This weakness often biases the analysis and the resulting intervention. In some cases data is collected but not interpreted adequately for identifying the priority risks. Agencies need to systematically explore, analyze, and use information on the underlying causes of malnutrition. This would also entail linking emergency food and nutrition interventions with those that address the broader underlying causes, including non-food interventions.
Work at the Feinstein International Famine Center examines how livelihoods frameworks can be further adapted to capture aspects of violence that increasingly characterize complex emergencies. Lautze proposes that violence needs to be explicitly integrated as a process, institution, and/or policy within the livelihood framework, that assets need to be expanded to include liabilities (i.e. assets can be a liability in complex emergencies), and that greater flexibility is required to describe livelihood outcomes in emergencies. These elements will undoubtedly contribute to the development of a more appropriate livelihood framework that is applicable to various situations.

Until agencies analyze all of the potential underlying causes of malnutrition -- not just food security but factors associated with the social environment and health sector -- there is a risk that the “food-first” response to malnutrition will remain predominant. More rigorous analyses are required to minimize the use of inappropriate food interventions, especially in situations when food is not necessarily the major cause of the problem of malnutrition. NGOs need to be in a leading position to identify, advocate, prioritize, implement, and monitor non-food initiatives as means of addressing malnutrition, where these interventions are deemed appropriate.

FIGURE 18
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES, 1921-1999

Lessons have also been learned in the area of mitigation and prevention of loss from environmental hazards such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, droughts and floods. In the past two decades, natural disasters around the world killed over 1.5 million people. Annually, drought affects some 220 million persons, flooding 196 million, cyclones 119 million. Over 130 million people live in earthquake risk zones. Disasters associated with natural hazards play a significant role in affecting both short-term and long-term vulnerabilities. Three major recent reports on natural disasters and risk reductions by UNDP, ISDR, and the Overseas Development Institute come to virtually the same conclusions.
First, the most successful approach to disaster mitigation and prevention lies through risk management. “The modern risk management approach recognizes that a wide range of geological, meteorological, environmental, technological and socio-political hazards threaten society – individually and in complex interaction. Risks are located at the point where hazards, communities and environments interact, and so effective risk management must address all of these aspects.”

Disasters are not one-off events but rooted in the economic and political processes of daily life and development.

Second, by ignoring disasters as a risk, development programs often fail to meet their goals and at the same time can actually increase disaster risks. A similar problem was identified in Chapter 1 regarding activities mounted by humanitarian agencies. Achieving the globally recognized Millennium Development Goals cannot happen without factoring in disaster mitigation. Conversely, properly tackled through risk assessment and management, the achievement of these goals will in itself greatly reduce losses from disasters.

Finally, changing development practice will require “political commitment by public and private policy makers and local community leaders, based on an understanding of risks and disaster reduction concepts.”

Once again, this is a lesson learned by humanitarian organizations as well.

Agencies will also have to build HIV/AIDS into vulnerability frameworks and programming. Some basic assumptions – for example, that the relationship between food insecurity and vulnerability among communities affected by HIV/AIDS is similar to that relationship among non-HIV affected populations – has been challenged. Recent work suggests that even relatively modest rates of HIV have potentially devastating effects on social and economic resilience of communities, especially in rural areas. These effects are a result of declines in food production, changes in dependency patterns, a greater burden of care, a loss of assets and skills, and a greater requirement for appropriate nutrition.

Future knowledge and research

Humanitarian agencies, particularly NGOs, remain consistently poor in collecting and analyzing data on impact. This is to some extent the result of a rapidly changing environment and difficulties with security and access as well as of cultural factors which render information-sharing inimical to the ethos of most NGOs. The Sphere Project has been instrumental in encouraging more coherent monitoring systems, although in the past these have focused on the project-level rather than the population level. Other initiatives such as the inter-agency Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transition (SMART) effort may lead to more routine collection of impact indicators. SMART uses the Crude Mortality rate (CMR) and the nutritional status of children less than five years of age to develop standardized methodologies for assessing malnutrition and mortality as part of a wider technical support initiative.

Mortality data is increasingly being incorporated into impact assessments by agencies such as WFP and IRC. Some donors are also placing greater emphasis on the collection of mortality data: CIDA now requests that its operational partners report on the cost per death averted. Furthermore, where retrospective cause-specific mortality studies have been conducted, they have highlighted the unacceptable consequences of late or inadequate interventions. They also demonstrate the severe consequences of failing to implement preventive strategies, such as measles vaccination campaigns, as a priority intervention in early stages of crises.

Despite developments such as these that can be applied directly in operations and where benefits in terms of effectiveness can be immediately demonstrated, newly available knowledge and protocols are often inconsistently and selectively applied. Despite the fact that monitoring systems and indicators have been well developed for most interventions, there is huge diversity in the capacity to implement these monitoring systems. Poor agency capacity is often exacerbated by a lack of national policies and guidelines on minimum requirements for monitoring.
In collaboration with UN agencies, NGOs need to advocate and work with national authorities to ensure that best practice guidelines for emergency interventions and related monitoring requirements are adopted and applied. These should be based on best practice principles and adapted for the contexts of the country. Incorporating them into national policies will likely contribute to a greater obligation by programming partners to implement these guidelines consistently. Partnerships by agencies with research and academic institutions or expert advisory committees will facilitate greater agency access to scientific literature and debate and training opportunities. These partnerships create more opportunities for research and rigorous monitoring systems and consequently contribute to greater learning within organizations.

Sufficient and appropriate tools do exist that can provide a reasonable analysis of the impact of interventions. There are greater and greater expectations on agencies to incorporate comprehensive impact assessments. Agencies will need to pay more attention to the design, implementation, and maintenance of impact assessments that combine quantitative and participatory approaches for monitoring impact. The various constraints associated with emergencies cannot excuse agencies from being accountable. While agencies should learn from their own and others’ experiences and aim towards institutionalizing tools and methods, they will also need the capacity to adapt and refine impact assessment tools for different contexts at the country level. Investments should be made in not only data collection systems but in developing adequate capacities to analyze, interpret, and use the information at local and national levels. Given the constraints and limitations of monitoring impact as well as the unique contexts of crises, agencies will also need to maintain a capacity to monitor the process of implementing interventions as much as the outcomes or impact.

Research into the development of more suitable vaccines, medical, and dietary protocols is being conducted relatively rapidly. For example, current work is focusing on the development of a heat-stable vaccine for measles and new vaccines are being developed against rotaviruses (which cause diarrhea). Increasing attention is focusing on ways to reduce neonatal mortality as well maternal mortality through the development of appropriate emergency obstetric care practices (including caesarian and blood transfusions). Practical field instruments and tools will be developed for testing biochemical samples for micronutrient deficiency diseases. There will be an increasing role for agencies to establish partnerships to pilot and test these protocols. However, agencies will need to be aware and cautious of the ethics of research, especially in circumstances where national regulations may not be applicable or available. NGOs do usually have the flexibility to adopt and apply recent research findings immediately, but in the future they may be increasingly constrained by national government policies that prevent them from applying these newer practices. There will be a greater need for NGOs to work collaboratively with the UN and national governments to advocate and support the speedy translation of research into appropriate national policies.

Future research opportunities for new products and tools will be conducted in partnership with national research institutions, with the goal to strengthen local capacities and research skills as well as create processes for greater ownership. While new expensive products may initially be produced and supplied by western countries, the development of capacities for production at regional and national levels will need to be pursued, including the development of appropriate quality control mechanisms. This may lead to the establishment of more sustainable local supplies and shorter delays in accessing supplies as well as strengthened local capacities and ownership of relevant research.

The process of applying, but more importantly adapting, both technical knowledge and protocols for different contexts will be a major determinant of how agencies can effectively operate in the future. Increasing and improving technical knowledge will be inadequate without development of practical and decision-making skills. Likewise, the process for adapting widely accepted technical protocols in collaboration with national structures, in order to be more context appropriate, will be important.

While randomized control studies and other scientific approaches are regarded as the gold standard, these types of studies alone for public health and other interventions in crises are insufficient. In the future, the development of innovative participatory epidemiological tools which are able to capture relationships
between inputs and impact, in combination with quantitative data, will be increasingly important for measuring the impact of interventions.

The heightened pace of globalization and its propensity to exacerbate the gap between the powerful and the disenfranchised is unlikely to change in the next ten years. The bottom line in humanitarian action is saving lives, or, to put it in more scientific terms, reducing excess mortality and morbidity caused by crises. The challenge is to construct models of change which keep this bottom line central and stay focused on the crisis. Measles vaccination campaigns are justified because one can show a direct empirical linkage with reduced mortality. The actions suggested by the Sphere standards are justified because they lead, through people’s ability to acquire water, food, shelter and health care, to reduced morbidity and mortality. Livelihoods-based programs are justified if the link back to decreased mortality and morbidity can be shown. Likewise, international advocacy and lobbying is justified if the linkage can be traced back to the bottom line.

The development of livelihoods and similar conceptual models will make it increasingly difficult for agencies to ignore local institutions and structures. A key development in the next ten years will doubtless be that agencies will have to seek either to strengthen helpful government and local institutions or to influence them to change for the good. As noted in the following chapter, the decision of NGOs not to work with local government for reasons of independence – a point of considerable friction with the authorities in a number of countries during the past decade -- lacks logic and is unlikely to be acceptable in the future. Likewise, NGOs need to put their rhetoric of “beneficiaries first” into practice, routinely canvassing those they seek to assist in order to understand and respond to their material and non-material needs.

Just as agencies now need to demonstrate a greater understanding of the impact of their interventions, so, too, will there be greater expectations in the future that agencies will demonstrate that the design of interventions at the outset of response reflects a comprehensive understanding of the wider political, cultural and social contexts. The reliance on impact evaluations alone for purposes of accountability, is inadequate and too late.
Chapter 5  Implications for the Future

Who can tell what the world will hold for the humanitarian practitioner in 2015? Over a ten year period, unimagined events, unintended consequences, and unforeseen innovations make accurate prediction elusive at best. There are elements that seem not only logical but probable: matters, for example, that deal with technology. But how much faith one can place in forecasting social or economic phenomena? The accuracy and hazards of forecasting are neatly summed up by a recent analysis of a report done in 1937 by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences to predict so-called breakthroughs:

It came up with some wise assessments about agriculture, about synthetic gasoline, and synthetic rubber. But what is more remarkable is the things it missed. No nuclear energy, no antibiotics…, no jet aircraft, no rocketry nor any use of space, no computers; certainly no transistors. The committee overlooked the technologies that actually dominated the second half of the twentieth century. Still less could they predict the social and political transformations that occurred during that time.126

For those concerned about the future, the issue is not what will be but rather how best to prepare for what might be. Institutions in the humanitarian sector have shown relatively little interest in forward planning or in preparing to be more adaptive to changes in the short-term. Even less interest in or capacity for dealing with changes and complexity in the longer term is evident. Yet the purpose of speculating about what might be is not to predict but to sensitize, to explore ways that individuals and organizations can be more responsive to the environment in which they will operate.

Humanitarian organizations in 2004

Bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmental organizations expend considerable energy analyzing the implications of longer term global trends. These analyses have ranged from the technicalities of scientific forecasting to more general prognostications about future social and political structures. Much of this analysis has been undertaken jointly by the agencies, part of continuing efforts to speculate, anticipate, and in some instances warn about the consequences of present and future trends.

Despite such work on long-term trends, potential problems, and possible solutions, very little is being done regarding what happens if the solutions to such potential problems are not in place. Little effort has been dedicated to speculation about the types of crises that may have to be faced in the future. Where longer-term prospects are considered, it is usually as “indirect spin-offs” from mainstream trends analyses. For example, agriculture or medical health prospects in a two-decade timeframe inevitably raise issues of food security and disease. Rarely, however, are there efforts to speculate on how extensive such effects may be and how such potential crises might be handled.127

As confirmed by an earlier study involving nine international NGOs, there has been little systematic effort by the humanitarian community to speculate upon, plan, or prepare for any set of eventualities beyond specific budget cycles or immediately foreseeable challenges. To that extent, there have been practically no institutional or sector-based analyses of longer-term requirements and little if any thought given to relating present institutional capacity to longer-term future operations.128 This gap reflects those institutions’ present capacities, resource demands, commitments and institutional perceptions and is framed in terms of institutional and individual assumptions about the nature of crises. Four reasons help explain the humanitarian community’s lack of attention towards developing capacities to anticipate and address possible crises.

Doubts about anticipating future crises. The need for effective early warning systems has been a leitmotif of the community for well over two decades. Yet doubts exist about the effectiveness or usefulness of such systems. As an official in a major NGO consortium commented, “Early response systems and not early warning systems are what we need. Early warning we can get from the New York Times.” Early warning systems are regarded as a means to wrap the aura of science around the self-evident or as a method of
predicting the obvious and accepting the unobvious as unpredictable. Why become engaged in something that defies prediction?

To be sure, budget cycles demand forward thinking and planning. Yet such activity is tied mainly to extensions of present operations and operational requirements rather than involving creative speculation about a radically different future. Moreover, the outputs of the evaluation process, which stresses improvements in how activities should be handled the next time, are not directed toward systematic follow-up but left on the periphery. Speculation, however intellectually challenging, is perceived to have little direct institutional value.

**Lack of institutional incentive.** Most NGO governing bodies appear not to seek any longer-term plans or visions from their organizations. Almost without exception, internal dialogue with senior management focuses instead upon specific institutional problems or issues of short-term concern and consequence. Asked why this lack of interest in longer term planning appeared so endemic, one senior NGO official emphasized that day-to-day pressures relegated “speculation” to the category of “luxury items” disconnected from what one “was paid to do.” There were no incentives or rewards for thinking beyond immediate problems. The emergency relief lifeline that provides for institutional survival reflects the priority of the donors, who provide few if any incentives for nurturing a more long-term approach.

**Collaboration difficulties.** The difficulties in developing collaborative interactions, whether within the humanitarian sector or beyond, reflect more than just the normal frustrations associated with size and bureaucracy. Collaboration is widely viewed as a process largely dominated by “the strong against the weak.” Said one representative of a relatively small agency about a much larger potential partner, “They are as collaborative as you want as long as you do it their way.” But smaller agencies have their own difficulties in internalizing the expertise of larger groups. Quite apart from issues of size, agencies acknowledge an underlying competition for resources that undercut the development of truly collaborative relationships. Moreover, the increasingly acknowledged necessity for better coordination at the operational level has yet to be matched by an equally pressing sense of urgency to collaborate on longer-term planning.

**The ethos of humanitarian agencies.** “We would like to spend more time thinking about the future,” said one harassed NGO official responsible for activities related to central and east Africa, “but right now we have to deal with the DRC, and any thoughts that I have are being directed towards the Great Lakes.” This response in the midst of efforts to cope with rumors and counter-rumors about mass slaughter in eastern DRC is totally understandable. However, it has a certain poignancy transcending immediate pressures.

The history, assumptions, and traditional ethos of “the relief worker” still pervade the attitudes of many in the humanitarian community. The practical and the “hands-on” are regarded as the essence of relief; that which veers away from operational issues are considered to be “academic.” What in most agencies is a difficult gulf to bridge -- between planner and line manager -- seems particularly difficult in emergencies. The more an agency’s resources and identity are geared towards disasters, the smaller the proportion of resources devoted to planning, particularly as compared to organizations that see themselves as primarily developmental. 129

This telling tendency does not necessarily mean that more sophisticated planning departments need to be created; agencies that do not have a well-established longer-term planning capacity might work with those that do. There is considerable potential synergy in linking the planning capacities and outputs of those aid groups with established longer-term research and planning expertise with those that have well-established operational expertise. Greater interagency collaboration represents one way of developing longer-term planning perspectives, although it still does not address the more fundamental disconnect between the relief worker and the planner.

If agencies understandably shy away from such long term thinking, a study such as this enjoys the mandate to speculate. The following section provides one possible vision of what NGO humanitarian action, its
practitioners and its institutions, may look like in 2015. Reflecting upon this particular vision may stimulate the kind of thinking about dealing with ambiguity and adaptability to change that will necessarily become the hallmark of the successful NGO in the future.

FIGURE 19
CARBON EMISSIONS PER PERSON IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 2002

The humanitarian practitioner of 2015

If NGOs are responsive to the need mentioned in Chapter 2 for greater universality in the aid enterprise, the aid worker in ten years time will be more “local” than international. In a world marked increasingly by the forces of globalization, localization will become of greater significance to those concerned with humanitarian action. Beyond obvious concerns with local language and culture, the “local” NGO worker may well be the only aid provider who escapes the growing suspicions and hostilities reserved for the outsider. Becoming an integral part of the landscape in non-western countries, however, will take significant structural changes in the humanitarian apparatus. Whether the agencies require a specific “civilization-changing” event to spark such as change remains to be seen.

The humanitarian challenges to which humanitarian NGOs will be called upon to respond will involve people and areas on the periphery of other global interactions. The disaster-affected will increasingly represent those who fall outside the ever narrowing confines of governmental abilities to fulfill, or interest in fulfilling, traditional welfare functions. They will exist in slums and ghettos, potential breeding grounds for alienation and disaffection, although the wealthier will not be immune from the genres of hazards sketched earlier. Future crises with major humanitarian dimensions may be most prolonged in environments marked by relatively high levels of xenophobia. Trust and acceptability of the outsider will be scarce commodities in such settings.
The landscape will include no-mans lands where the capacities of states to defend themselves wane and borders become more porous. An increasing number of people will find themselves in enclaves where borders are uncertain or have actually changed. In some situations such groups may be regarded as buffers between states. In other instances, they may be used as spearheads to disrupt the status quo in a neighboring border: for example, Kazakh support for East Turkestan peoples on the Chinese border. Or they may be what has been called “borderland cultures… occupied by pathetic work seekers [living in] ‘no group lands.’”

Earlier discussions of migration and urbanization have sketched out some of the likely dynamics.

Local in a global context

Profound demographic changes, spurred by an unparalleled migration of peoples across continents, mean that “local” is less a factor of geography and physical proximity and more one of affiliation, identification, and functional linkages. The relationship between diasporas and their communities of origin offer a case in point. In a February 2004 meeting of the Disasters Emergency Committee, a committee comprising operational NGOs based in the United Kingdom, one organization emphasized its commitment to community engagement in Somalia’s Bakool region. To what extent could one be “community-based,” asked one questioner, if not at the same time working with the Somali community in Brent, north-London, since that portion of the “Bakool community” through its remittances was probably more responsible than any others for ensuring livelihoods throughout the region?

The diaspora from more and more countries are central players in their societies of origin. From Somalia to Guatemala, from the Philippines to Zambia, diaspora half way around the globe are “local.” They probably have greater and more consistent impact upon their communities of origin than do most conventional assistance agencies. While they do not always reflect the views and values of the countries they have left or, for that matter, the indisputably best approach to solving a given problem, their existence and growing importance calls into question assumptions about the relevance of geo-political boundaries and the nature of community, affiliation, and identification. Diasporas may give priority to transnational agendas – the plight of Muslims in Kashmir is an example -- which are well down the line on the international agenda.

The tools of the trade

Effective humanitarian practitioners will require a fairly new set of tools. Specific economic expertise in areas such as economic analysis, market trends, and trade will be indispensable, reflecting a more sophisticated understanding of the causation of emergencies and supported by data collection and analysis systems to monitor vulnerability trends. The emergency-affected may be protected by community-based insurance schemes, where credit and cash will replace the stock-in-trade relief items and delivery systems of the past four decades. Effective early warning systems will be underpinned by risk analysis and assessment; economic interventions will provide early countermeasures to fluctuations in vulnerability. A sound grasp of socio-economic analysis, combined with a background in statistics and numerical competence, will become an important skill.

The successful practitioner will also need to be able to monitor and anticipate potential crises and needs in ways unparalleled in the past. He or she will see their operations more in terms of information and decision-making networks rather than of standard organizational responses. The humanitarian practitioner of the future will necessarily be conversant with information technology (IT) and see local capacity-building for emergency and disaster response in terms of IT training.

Already surveillance technology can “map” migration flows, though the results are normally static if relatively “real time.” In less than a decade these capacities will increase significantly, allowing the tracking of the movement of peoples on a “real time, real movement” basis. Aid personnel will most likely be able to have access to very sensitive and detailed on-going analyses of those people on the move, including not only
numbers and specific locations but also gender, age, and even individual health analysis. Surveillance technology will reduce the current difficulty of enumerating and registering refugees.

These innovations will in no small part be driven by the exponential expansion of communications technology. The cost of data storage will be greatly reduced, telecommunications will become truly global as satellite technology makes contact totally accessible everywhere, and information flows will most likely blur current distinctions between headquarters and field offices. Coordination will be less determined by conventional institutional structures than upon information protocols that may form coordination through *ad hoc* networks of information and subsequent agreement on actions. Those in emergency response will most likely be less inclined to work through the repertoires and standard operating procedures of conventional organizations and more inclined to utilize *ad hoc* associations and shifting networks. They will feel comfortable with sophisticated technologies and adept at training others – including “locals.”

**FIGURE 20**

**STREET SCENE IN HANOI**

*Credit: John Geoghan, IFRC*

*The humanitarian practitioner in an organizational setting*

Much of an NGO official’s time today is focused upon issues of program development, logistics, and headquarters-field communications. In a decade or so, many aspects of these traditional functions may no longer be required. Programs and projects may developed through a combination of on-going vulnerability monitoring mechanisms linked to a computer program capacity that spends its downtime plotting scenarios. Probably no single organization will dominate the process since it will be in the hands of experts who will work for organizations but whose loyalties and ultimate security are linked to networks.

Yet these next generation programs and projects will rarely focus on the standard relief responses of the past three decades. Instead, they will be concerned principally with discrete interventions, focusing upon emerging vulnerabilities that will be more than likely addressed through more “market-oriented” drivers. It will be
predominantly those from local economies or those with access to local economies that will meet the needs of the affected – be they refugees, IDPs, or victims remaining in their localities.

The number of situations requiring responses that current providers would recognize is likely to diminish over time. Today’s logistics operations – the massive movement of food from one continent to another, shelter and health provisions that are brought from North to South, and so on – will not loom as large in the future. To a significant extent, local response, organized by local providers and based upon globalized credit, may be the unfolding future.

Headquarters and field relations will necessarily come in for significant changes. Headquarters will probably have only a limited amount of operational functions: for example, to ensure that credit is accessible in vulnerable areas or areas experiencing emergencies. Technology will facilitate the promotion of networks anywhere in the world, a second core function that the practitioner’s agency in 2015 will want to control. What today are called field offices will be different, too. The “4 x 4” vehicle will no longer be an essential field tool, largely displaced by satellite surveillance systems. The NGO field office of the future will be driven by technology, including remote sensing systems, vulnerability monitors, and program and project planning and implementing technologies. Such changes should not be to the detriment, institutionally or personally, of empathy with the disaster-affected.

**Humanitarian organizations in 2015.**

Looking beyond individuals to institutions, three broad sets of developments are needed. They involve promoting a paradigm shift regarding humanitarian security strategies, introducing serious planning for the future, and practicing the art of systematic speculation.

*First, human security strategies as a paradigm shift.* Such a shift would lead to a new criterion of adapting to change, one in which human vulnerability becomes for the first time an overt and explicit yardstick. This shift would be sustained by the growing recognition that emergencies are not aberrant phenomena but reflections of the ways that societies structure themselves and allocate their resources. The artificial division between natural and man-made disasters should also be discarded. The interactive dynamics of man-made and natural crises will be a core precept of the new humanitarian paradigm.

There still is a tendency to “bifurcate” humanitarian activities from development or human security initiatives. Some NGOs, particularly those described in Chapter 2 as “principle-centered,” maintain a strict separation. They are sympathetic to analysis of the problems underlying the need for humanitarian aid but limit their own operational responses to assistance and protection activities. Other NGOs, embracing a humanitarian-plus agenda, mount field-based activities in an explicitly developmental context. Their development programs contain specific initiatives designed to reduce the magnitude of disasters, while disaster prevention and preparedness activities focus on ways to protect development. While there will continue to be need for Dunantist-type groups that stress fidelity to principles such as impartiality, neutrality, and independence, the increasingly multi-sectoral nature of crises puts a premium on multi-sectoral analyses and approaches.

*Second, introducing futures into the organization.* Whether or not a paradigm shift in the direction of human security occurs, it will be essential to encourage NGOs to nurture the creativity, flexibility, information absorption capacity, and planning and policy-making authority to anticipate and respond to ambiguity and change. To date, such adaptive entities are rare at best. In developing capacity responsive to rapid change and complexity, organizational structure *per se* is less an issue than are organizational dynamics.

An effective NGO will give priority to planning, wary of the stereotype that future success will be assured with small incremental adjustments in existing goals and objectives. Instead, staff will think in terms of an expanded time-frame for planning, with a planning process that is ongoing and leads to regularly revised and updated plans. An institutional ethos is needed, affirmed by top management, that encourages and rewards
innovative thinking. Phrases such as “that’s a bit academic” should be dropped from the NGO lexicon, replaced by such phrases as “what might be the impact of this change in twenty years time?”, “how do we really know that’s right?,” and “how does this program relate to our long-term strategy?”

Incorporating longer term planning into NGOs will require institutional alignment analysis. Even for those NGOs that have policy units, these rarely have impact upon country-specific or thematic programs and projects. All too often, policy units are stand-alone entities isolated from other departments. One large US-based NGO conceded that his policy unit does not “cross over” into the emergency department. A large British NGO uses its policy department as an extension of the Director-General’s office, much of its time being spent on speech writing, analysis of IASC papers, and preparation of institutional positions for an array of external meetings. Proper alignment across an entire agency is needed to ensure that all policies and programs reflect agency thinking about the future.

NGOs involved in humanitarian work also have to make decisions about the scope of their activities, as discussed in Chapter 3. Does one remain as a highly specialized organization, focusing upon a particular activity or try to be more comprehensive? Each choice has associated costs and benefits. Decisions will require sizing up anticipated needs and the involvement of other actors in the light of the comparative advantages of a given NGO or NGO family. The power of institutional lethargy is suggested by the fact that few NGOs ever make far-reaching changes in their mission, ethos, or even sectoral or geographical signature.

Third, the art of systematic speculation. A third component of a humanitarian futures agenda involves scenario-building. Planners and policy-makers are inhibited in their efforts to plan for the longer-term because of their assumption that the future cannot be predicted. This attitude reflects in part the linear thinking that requires a precise understanding of cause and effect sequencing, suggesting an inherent resistance to ambiguity. And yet as a recent study of future consequences of climate change suggests, the only way to develop means to deal with the possible consequences of such change is to identify “a sequence of steps, each with associated uncertainties.” Without the necessary element of speculation, an agency is left with the assumption of a future limited to a simple extrapolation from the past.

The scenario approach -- both as a concept and a practical planning device -- accepts the value of relative probabilities. It acknowledges that definitive explanation only rarely rewards efforts to understand the future and that one will have to plan based on a set of compelling probabilities. Scenario planning is intended to help agencies “think outside the box” and to serve as “mind-shifting exercises,” yet its value is lost if it is seen as “one-off.” Scenario-building demonstrates that the organization is interested in thinking differently and that this sort of thinking is not only valued by the organization but an inherent part of staff training and education.

Finally, advocacy. Effective humanitarian institutions of 2015 will most likely devote far more time to a broad range of advocacy issues than they do today. The focus of such advocacy will be on global vulnerability, intensified attention to center-periphery asymmetries, and emergency prevention and preparedness. All three agenda items are not new but all will be increasingly important in a world in which the causes and consequences of large-scale crises are likely to become more complex and wide-ranging.

As stressed earlier, emergencies are all too often reflections of the ways that human-beings live their normal lives. The present fixation on such crises in terms of north-south divides will be less and less relevant over the next decades, as the activities of humankind make large-scale vulnerabilities increasingly transglobal phenomena. The threatened consequences of global warming, sparing neither developed or developing countries, may be a case in point.

The traditional argument that the impact of even such phenomena will fall hardest on the poor of the South needs to be carefully analyzed. There are economists who foresee that poverty in the “north” could increase. As resource margins there decline, possibly accompanied by a commensurate decline in the interest of governments in welfare functions, vulnerability of the poor to a host of disaster and emergency forces could
increase. While the “center” may remain affluent, the “periphery” might become more and more marginalized. In any event, agencies that take a global approach, avoiding the familiar north/south dichotomies, may have enjoy a comparative advantage.

Advocacy may become more and more important as the vulnerable become increasingly underrepresented and as the agents and impacts of emergencies become more global. Even to make such assumptions, however, one has to return to a core issue in preparing for the future: the need to challenge assumptions and to be sensitive to the implications of complexity, ambiguity, and rapid change. That vulnerabilities may intensify globally and that there will be intense asymmetries between center and periphery is not inevitable. To the contrary, so much of such “worst case scenarios” is predicated on the assumption that little will be done to resist these sorts of trends. Here, of course, is another opening for advocacy.

Three decades of promoting prevention and preparedness has resulted in much rhetoric and little action. Nevertheless, the NGO community – freer than most from the constraints of certain kinds of vested interests – should regard prevention and preparedness as a crucial advocacy platform for the future. Such advocacy will provide protection far nearer home, not merely for those in some distant, conceptually isolated “south.”
Epilogue

The preceding chapters, rather like expert witnesses in a trial, have provided evidence about future changes in the landscape on which NGOs function and, as a result, anticipatory and reactive changes on the part of NGOs themselves. Each chapter has offered its particular “take” on what is shaping events and what that implies for the future of NGOs. This final chapter provides something of the judges’ summing up and, in the form of two check lists, a charge to the jury. As researchers, we do not take it upon ourselves to render a verdict. That requires discourse among the jurors, including the CEOs, governance bodies, and constituencies of NGOs, as well as donors and allies in human rights and development communities. There are important decisions waiting to be made, both by individual NGOs and by like-minded groupings of agencies, to carry the NGOs, separately and together, into the next decade.

Globalization

The evidence presented in the preceding five chapters suggests a number of conclusions. The 1990s have set in place four facets of globalization, each of which play off and to each other. First, the globalization of corporate growth. Corporations, not the economy or trade or international relations, lie at the heart of globalization. Corporations are devices for turning resources into profits. Increasingly freed from government controls and operating within the broad framework of the World Trade Organization, corporations represent the key power blocks of the future. Their approach to the domains of the environment, human labor, and social responsibility will be a key determinant in the dynamics of disaster vulnerability and human need. While corporate behavior is not somehow intrinsically at variance with human values, NGOs at some point in the future will have to engage the corporations as they engaged the colonial state in years gone by.

Second, globalization of technology, and especially information technology, will increasingly place issues of privacy, transparency, and accountability in the forefront. In a world where there is nowhere to hide, agencies seeking to provide assistance will have increased access to real-time information and the ability to aggregate information across selected populations. They will have, and will need, greater anticipatory power as to the possible occurrence of emergencies. They will be confronted, through data and analysis, with telltale linkages between emergencies, inappropriate development strategies, and imbalances of power. The line between hero and scapegoat, already tenuous for many NGOs, may become even more ephemeral.

Third, globalization means that the schisms that divide “them and us” will increasingly be less geographical (north/south), less ideological (democratic/statist), and less even less religious (Judaeo-Christian/Muslim) in nature than at present. Fissures deeper still will separate the beneficiaries of globalization from those exploited by it. The disenfranchised poor in North America will have far more in common with sweat-shop workers in China and child laborers in Bangladesh than they do with the gated communities of Palm Springs. NGOs that focus exclusively on “international” as distinct from “domestic” human need will find themselves at a distinct analytical and institutional disadvantage.

Fourth, globalization has been accompanied by an upsurge in civil society activity around the world. Whether, as suggested in Chapter 3, the global “associational revolution” proves as significant as was the rise of the nineteenth century nation state remains to be seen. Organized civil society, however, represents to one degree or another a counterweight to the forces of globalization and a force for enhanced human security in its various aspects. They benefit from the erosion of state sovereignty which, as noted in Chapter 2, has opened “new humanitarian space for the international humanitarian apparatus, which as a result is under pressure to become more global itself.” On the downside, however, they may also contribute to the weakening of the state. Moreover, before the virtues of civil society organizations become deified, let it be remember that their ranks include Hamas and al Qaeda.
For humanitarian practitioners and their organizations, then, globalization is also a two-edged sword. In a world marked increasingly by the forces of globalization, Chapter 5 observed, localization will become of greater significance. For their part, humanitarians will increasingly need to understand and be trusted by persons in crisis areas. Achieving this will mean, at a minimum, reduced use of expatriate staff and greater reliance upon local staff and partners. At a more fundamental level, the newly acknowledged importance of the local will extract greater mutuality and accountability on the part of outside actors. The adage among environmentalist adage – think globally, act locally – may soon take on wider meaning.

Aid workers will increasingly look to understand major crises in terms of regional and global markets and economic forces, not just international and intranational politics. The beginnings of such an understanding are already reflected in livelihood and household food security analysis, but more study and strategizing is clearly needed. Some analysts are even looking to use market manipulation as a key relief delivery tool. The feeding of rapacious markets by consumerism and profit will drive the future. Affluent countries with consumption-heavy lifestyles will bear a special responsibility for improved planetary stewardship.

Aid workers will also need to be info-tech savvy, not just with hands-on radios, hand-held computers, and GPS satellite phones, but in terms of understanding the collection of data, its manipulation and analysis, and its application and use. Understanding the use of global information systems may well become as critical to a successful career as is a grasp of logistics or international humanitarian law today.

**Universality**

If globalization is the context, universality must be the distinguishing feature of humanitarian action of the future. Humanitarianism is, first and foremost, a value-driven endeavor. The international humanitarian apparatus and the personnel associated with it affirm the universality of its values. Yet affirmation is anything by universally shared. The challenge accordingly is to build a value set that is truly global. The building process will need to be done in partnership with those who see organized humanitarianism as the smiley, duplicitous face of globalization as well as those who are themselves part of other non-western humanitarian traditions. The search of the future must be for global values, not just to globalize western values.

The ultimate safety net -- which is one way of seeing humanitarianism -- will not survive unless humanitarians lobby for it globally. Humanitarians, who have often positioned themselves as the adversary of, or the substitutes for, states, will need on occasion to be willing to see states as allies. To one degree or another, still-sovereign states will continue to have a role to play in moderating the worst excesses of economic globalization. NGO commitment to the “humanitarian imperative” should not be interpreted as summarily brushing aside the desirability of cooperation with political authorities at any and all levels.

Traditional divisions between natural and manmade disasters, between relief efforts and development work, between humanitarian action and human rights, between environmental concern and work conditions will seem increasingly threadbare and vacuous. Understanding causality in terms of complex and chaotic systems rather than just linear change will inevitably challenge present-day divisions in the larger human welfare
Humanitarian action, and the agencies engaged in it, will need to be more firmly anchored in the legal obligations of states rather than left to the vagaries of charitable impulses and donations.

Strategic planning for the future will require many new partnerships. Among them will be collaborations with academia, with migrant worker unions, with women’s groups in India and shanty town dwellers in Africa, with NGOs lobbying in Washington and London and at the UN Security Council. In the partnerships of the future, size will not matter; making common cause will be more important than who is paying, and shared information will help hold governments and corporate interests to account. NGOs will need to reassess their role, being less beguiled by the “power” of civil society and their new-found access to those in power and more humbled and determined by their role as catalysis, agents for change and advocates.

The shape of the future

There is growing recognition that emergencies are not aberrant phenomena but reflections of the ways that societies structure themselves and allocate resources. This is already seen in the management of flooding in such places as coastal Bangladesh, but a similar approach may need to be taken to drought-related famine, war, and pandemics. Relief work will increasingly be about “change management” – seeking to prevent and alleviate suffering through changing systems that create or deepen vulnerabilities and lead to suffering. The humanitarian practitioner of the future will be a quintessential change facilitator.

The conflation of environmental degradation, climate change, globalization, and retrenching governments will lead to many more complex and cascading emergencies, especially in the urban environment. Food insecurity as the background to massive transport disasters, as recently witnessed in North Korea; poverty, human rights violations, and, as at Chernobyl, nuclear accidents will become increasingly common. Humanitarian agencies will need to have the skills to work adroitly in such complex and politically charged environments. New “normal” emergencies will emerge. Sea level rise will lead to more flooding of coastal cities. Labor mobility will lead to more transport accidents and urban disasters. Glacial melt will lead to dam bursts and on to more seasonal river flow leading to drought and food insecurity. Agencies will need to look beyond a straight extrapolation from the present to understand these new phenomena.

As described in Chapter 1, the world will have an increasingly mobile population – whether by choice or necessity. Increasingly those forced to be mobile will exist without state protection of their rights, including migrant laborers, traded sex workers, internally displaced minorities, and stateless persons. With many migrants ending up in the cities of the future, it is in this urban environment that humanitarian agencies will increasingly act -- a far more political environment than the present venues of refugee camps and rural famine. Shanty towns and squatter settlements will be where the unacceptable face of globalization is most prominently displayed. HIV/AIDS will reshape the demography of whole populations, as already in Africa. Countries which lose the heart of their labor force and intelligensia will be radically different from their precursors. AIDS orphans will represent an increasingly poignant issue.

Finally, if humanitarianism is largely concentrated today on assistance and the acquisition of essential life-saving commodities, it is likely in the future to be driven by an agenda shaped around protection, peoples rights and their aspiration to benefit from, rather than be exploited by, globalization. In the extreme of the emergency, agencies will be expected to deliver freedom from fear and uncertainty, not just water, food and health care.

How may NGOs go about preparing themselves for these challenges of the future? This report concludes with a series of questions for the jury. Figure 22 frames a series of questions for individual agencies; Figure 23 offers questions for the larger NGO community.
FIGURE 22
An informal checklist for use in strategic planning by individual NGOs

1. To what extent do you consider yourself a “humanitarian” organization? How is that concept understood at the level of agency identity and signature and at the level of activities and expenditures?

2. Do you engage in strategic planning for the future? How many years are in the most recent timeframe? Is this an agency-wide activity or something that engages only certain departments?

3. What relevance, if any, does the analysis of hazards on the horizon have for the planning of agency policies, priorities, and programs? Were the implications of the analysis for agency activities clear, or were there difficulties in making the necessary connections and applications?

4. Who, if anyone, in the organization has the companion responsibility for contextualizing activities at the country level?

5. What is your approach to the choice between (a) inclusive or comprehensive and (b) specialized or sector-specific programming? Between relief and development? How do you see human rights connecting, if at all, with your humanitarian activities? How much has changed in your agency’s emphasis on such choices in the past decade?

6. Whom do you consider to be your constituency? What obligation to you acknowledge, if any, to educate your contributors on humanitarian issues?

7. To what extent are you prepared to tackle sensitive moral and political issues in the exercise of your humanitarian mandate: for example, the needs of people in terrorist settings, of Palestinians, of illegal migrants, of people with HIV/AIDS?

8. As a U.S.-based agency, if that is the case, how do you understand your relationships to the U.S. government, whether as funding source, provider of policy and political context, or direct or indirect point of accountability? How do you regard and interpret your American nationality in crisis countries in which you are engaged?

9. How do you understand advocacy and to what extent is it an integral part of your work? Are your advocacy objectives geared to supporting your operational activities, or do they also address some of the wider hazards discussed in this study? How is the balance of funding within your agency for advocacy in relation to other expenditures determined?

10. There is growing sentiment that operationality in crisis settings should be shared with local actors, if not ceded to them altogether. What is your agency’s view on the roles of local institutions and their implications for international actors? Do you have a strategy for selecting local partners and reinforcing their roles?

11. To what extent does your membership (if you are indeed a member) in an international family of NGOs with ties to different national publics influence your strategic planning, whether in responding to the international political and policy framework or in relating to local actors in crisis countries?
12. How do you see the current competition in the humanitarian marketplace evolving? What are your strategies for dealing with other NGOs and NGO associations, for-profit contractors, and military forces engaged in civic action work?

13. As an established agency with a recognized track record, what provision do you make for reflecting on lessons to be learned and institutionalizing experience in-house? Is the ethos of your agency one that encourages reflection and innovation? What more could you do in that regard?

FIGURE 23
An informal checklist for use in strategic planning by NGOs as a group

1. The foregoing study suggests a typology of NGOs made up of principle-centered, pragmatist, solidarist, and faith-based groups. In planning for a future characterized by ambiguity and change, should the emphasis be on seeking greater cohesion (a) within those groups, (b) between and among those groups, or (c) neither of the above?

2. The apparently growing concentration of activities within a very few agencies has advantages (e.g., improved coordination possibilities, economies of scale, development of professional working relationships) and disadvantages (e.g., a potential lack of healthy competition and innovation). How should these trade-offs be viewed by the NGO community as a whole?

3. The lack of proportionality in the allocation of humanitarian resources globally is not much less of a problem for NGOs than for donor governments. While NGO country allocations themselves suffer from a lack of impartiality, ensuring a more needs-based division of resources would require a new level of coordination and consultation among the normally live-and-let live NGO community. Does the community see this as a problem? If so, what solutions are available?

4. As a result of increased professionalism, agencies are now more disciplined in insisting on workable terms of reference with the host political and donor authorities before launching programs. However, the willingness of NGO “B” to commence or continue operations, stepping into the breach after NGO “A” has opted out, undercuts the impact of the community as a whole. Proselytization by one NGO calls the activities of other faith-based agencies into question. How does the NGO community propose to address these critical issues that go to the health and welfare of the humanitarian enterprise?

5. Other community-wide functions, too, lack the necessary support because of the heterogeneity and anomie of the NGO community. For example, how can the institutional memory of the NGO family be deepened and sharpened? How can the insights of academics and policy research institutes be placed at the disposal of the community as a whole? While individual NGOs form their own links to such expertise, what can be done to ensure the wider ownership of the benefits?

6. The associational revolution mentioned in Chapter 2, where it was compared in importance to no less a phenomenon than the rise of the nation state, refers less to the growth of international NGOs by the hundreds than to the tens of thousands of citizen-based and nation- or local-level institutions of civil society that have proliferated in countries of the global South. While individual international NGOs are making their own connections to such groups, how may the organized NGO community reach out? What provisions can help to encourage mutuality in such relationships?
7. The lack of serious attention to capacity building in humanitarian emergencies is increasingly viewed as scandalous, not only by the concerned international public but by practitioners themselves. While the odd individual NGO may tackle the challenge creatively – and in fact is doing so -- the challenge is fundamentally to the international NGO family as a whole. Given the dangers of continued expatriate domination of the enterprise, what strategies are available to address the need for smaller international footprints and larger southern ownership?

8. This study identifies a number of developments that are beyond the capacity of NGOs to control, but also others over which the NGO subsector has indeed more say. With regard to the suggestion that NGOs as a group exercise more circumspection and discipline in the terms of their engagement in complex emergencies, to what extent should the organized NGO community work to promulgate more concerted approaches to particular crises?
END NOTES

Prologue


2 Samara Aberman, NewsHour Extra. At http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/jan-june01/predictions.html


Urbanization

4 Distinctions between disasters and emergencies are noted in Endnote 22.

5 Paraphrased from BBC broadcast, August 2, 2004.


15 Of course the amount lost in the LDCs means much more as a percentage of GDP and the difficulty of rebuilding infrastructure and livelihoods and also the necessity to take on international debt.

16 This is clear even when one takes into account that in some cases (e.g. Bhuj, Hyderabad, Manjil & Rudbar, Tegucigalpa, Izmit, and Bhubaneshwar), the number of fatalities given refers to the entire region within which
the affected urban center is located. Specific, focused urban morality is still high even if one assumes no more than 10% of deaths occurred in the central place.


18 Ibid.


22 *Emergency* is a situation involving acute risk of deprivation or harm to people, livelihoods, or infrastructure. Such a situation may be revealed by an early warning system, is often the stage when local or national action attempts to cope without international assistance, but it may be the early stage of a disaster or catastrophe, and thus may be considered also synonymous with the term ‘alert’. Thus there are food emergencies, public health emergencies, or alerts. *Disaster* is, by definition, an acute disturbance or deterioration of the conditions of normal life severe enough to call for non-local resources and assistance. Most moderate to large earthquakes and serious flooding are disasters and not merely emergencies (e.g. earthquakes in the Northwestern urban zone of Turkey in 1999 & in the city of Bam, Iran, in 2004; flooding caused by a super cyclone in Orissa, India in 1999). A *catastrophe* is a disaster large enough to cause irreversible harm to an entire society or nation, or region of the world. The Black Death was such an occurrence in 14th Century Europe, as was the Irish Potato Famine in the 19th, the AIDS pandemic in Africa in the 20th & 21st.


27 [http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/3d5c012d64efdf16585256bd60059a9aa?OpenDocument](http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/3d5c012d64efdf16585256bd60059a9aa?OpenDocument)


Migration


33 Nomads are defined are persons without a fixed place of residence who move from one site to another, generally according to well-established patterns of territorial mobility.


35 Global IDP Project, Statistics. [www.idpproject.org](http://www.idpproject.org)


38 In South Africa, refugees are both victims and perpetrators of trafficking. There are reports that refugees from Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Ethiopia, recruit female relatives from their countries of origin through couriers, who deliver the letter of invitation to the female relative and sexually assault her as an initiation in to sex work (See IOM Report cited below).


40 *World Refugee Survey, 2004*.

41 *World Refugee Survey 2004*.


47 For a discussion of this effect, see Tamas, op.cit., 15.


49 Francis Deng, *Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement*, UN OCHA.


**HIV/AIDS**


58 Ibid.

59 At the 15th International AIDS Conference in Bangkok July 11-16, 2004, the issues that hamper efforts to fight AIDS were on full display. There were tensions evident among the various multilateral funds and programs active in the AIDS undertaking. Moreover, instead of complying with the 2001 multilateral agreement to fund a global initiative, The Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, President Bush has launched a high-profile bilateral undertaking. The multilateral and bilateral programs require separate application and implementation processes and contain conflicting standards regarding the use of low-cost generic anti-viral medications.


**Scenario Planning**

61 Many of these are networked through three regional NGOs, La Red (http://www.desenredando.org/) in Latin America, African’s Sustainable Development Council (ASUDEC) (asudec@cenafrin.bf), DiMP/Peri Peri (http://www.egs.uct.ac.za/dimp/ + “Peri Peri links”) in southern Africa, and Duryog Nivaran in South Asia (http://www.adpc.net/duryog/duryog.html). The Gender and Disaster Network (GDU) (http://online.northumbria.ac.uk/geography_research/gdn/) cuts across national borders and its web site gives access to methodological resources. Other organizations and useful links are available from the Asian Disaster Prevention Centre (ADPC) http://www.adpc.aic.ac.th/infores/dis-links.html.


Ambiguity and Change


66 Ibid.


68 2003 World Water Year.

69 A major program to provide access to safe water in rural Bangladesh by drilling bore holes to tap ground water backfired because the water was not tested for arsenic. Many rural Bangladeshis have subsequently been poisoned. See: [http://bicn.com/acic/](http://bicn.com/acic/)


73 Critical perspectives on ’command and control’: [http://online.northumbria.ac.uk/geography_research/dscrn/newsletter/newsletter7and8/summary2.htm](http://online.northumbria.ac.uk/geography_research/dscrn/newsletter/newsletter7and8/summary2.htm) & David Alexander, “From Civil Defense to Civil Protection and Back Again”, *RADIX* 2001 [http://online.northumbria.ac.uk/geography_research/radix/reflections3](http://online.northumbria.ac.uk/geography_research/radix/reflections3).

74 Satterthwaite, asks, rhetorically, whether increased urbanization must necessarily led to more disasters. He answers with an “emphatic no, if good practice in environmental policy and disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness and response is applied within a framework of good urban governance.” Indeed, given these prerequisites, he believes that increased urbanization could help to reduce disaster vulnerability. “Higher population densities mean much lower costs per household and per enterprise to provide clean, piped water, disposal of waste, comprehensive storm and surface water drainage, most forms of health care and education, and emergency services, such as fire-fighting and 24-hour hospital and ambulance services. The concentration of industries reduces unit costs for pollution control, disposal of hazardous wastes, and checks on plant, equipment and occupational health and safety.” See his “Meeting the Challenge of Urban Disasters”, *World Disaster Report 1998*, p. 10. Oxford: Oxford University Press for IFRC.

The International Political and Policy Landscape


77 Information on the European Constitution and EU policy is available at [http://europa.eu.int](http://europa.eu.int)


Ambiguity and Change


85 See humanitarian mapping exercise mentioned in Endnote 82.

86 These issues are discussed more fully in the FIFC exercise mentioned in Endnote 85. The quotation was taken from a comment by one participant.

87 This may be true within a particular context, but internationally there are huge distortions in proportionality, e.g. in the allocations to Iraq vs. DRC.

88 The Crusades and the fall of Constantinople, for example, were seen as epochal events throughout Europe but as minor skirmishes by Arab leaders who were more concerned with persistent threats on their eastern fronts.


93 See Hugo Slim, op. cit.

The Non-Governmental Landscape

94 The most useful single publication is Development Initiatives Global Humanitarian Assistance 2003 (London: Development Initiatives, 2003) and its 2000 predecessor. Also drawn on for this analysis are two companion studies, also prepared with the encouragement of the InterAgency Standing Committee and also available on Reliefweb: Ian Smillie and Larry Minear, The Quality of Money: Donor Behavior in Humanitarian Financing and James Darcy and Charles-Antoine Hoffmann, Measuring Needs: Needs Assessment and Decision-Making in the Humanitarian Sector (London: ODI, 2003). Other ODI and DAC/OECD publications from recent years also offer several additional pieces to the puzzle, including Joanna Macrae, ed., The new humanitarianisms: A review of trends in global humanitarian action (HPG Report 11, April 2002).

95 For a more detailed discussion, see Ian Smillie and Larry Minear, The Charity of Nations: Humanitarian Action in a Calculating World, (Bloomfield CT: Kumarian, 2004), in particular Chapter 8: “Scenes of Riot: The Humanitarian Free-For-All.”
Here methodological problems intrude, inasmuch as some analysts define multilateral assistance not as the amount provided by donor governments to UN agencies, but the amount of such funds provided to UN agencies in non-earmarked fashion. ODI thus finds growing bilateralism not in the proportion of funds entrusted to UN agencies but in the strings attached to such funding.

See the U.S. General Accounting Office report for details of the funding mechanisms, including perceived advantages and disadvantages. Under a grant agreement, the recipient is free to implement an agreed-upon development program without substantial involvement by USAID. Under a cooperative agreement the implementing organization has a significant amount of independence in carrying out its program, but USAID is involved in selected areas deemed essential to meeting program requirements and ensuring achievement of program objectives. These areas include approval of work plans, designation of key positions and approval of key personnel, and approval of monitoring and evaluation plans.

However, the explanatory documents accompanying the FPA, which should have been available by December 2003, are still not ready.


Smillie and Minear, The Charity of Nations, 44.


For further detail, see Marc Sommer, The Dynamics of Coordination, Providence, RI: Watson Institute 2000. Occasional Paper 40 [hwproject.tufts.edu]

See the Good Humanitarian Donorship entry at www.reliefweb.com

In his experience, although the same number of people were donating funds, they were contributing smaller amounts.

See the January 2004 White Paper, “U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century.”


For an elaboration of these and other country experience, see Ian Smillie, Patronage or Partnership? Local Capacity Building in Humanitarian Crises (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian, 2001).


According to a CARE U.S. interviewee, InterAction has collected data to support this trend.

For example, Dan Murphy, “Quick school fixes won few Iraqi hearts,” *Christian Science Monitor*, June 28, 2004.


For an elaboration of these themes, see Smillie-Minear, *The Charity of Nations*.

Although ECHO does not fund the military, ISAF in Afghanistan received small amounts of EC funding through the Rapid Reaction Mechanism.


In 1999, for example, Denmark channeled 29% of its humanitarian assistance through domestic NGOs, and another 3% through international NGOs. France spent 40% through NGOs. (Macrae, 2002) In one year in the UK, from 2000-2001, DFID more than doubled the amount of money it gave to NGOs that was earmarked for humanitarian assistance, from $55 million to $114 million. During the same year, however, the total amount of aid given to NGOs by the UK government shrank by $17 million. (Macrae, 2002).

The figure is from Indianngos.com

Lessons Learned and Pending

A ten-year retrospective on the lessons learned from the Rwandan genocide is in preparation by John Ericksson and John Borton, both of whom were involved in the earlier multi-volume Rwanda evaluation.

For further reference, see the resource mentioned in Endnote 104.

For additional details, see unisdr.org


Implications for the Future


However, there are works that clearly point to the inter-relationship between creating vulnerabilities and future disasters. See, for example, ESCAP, *State of the Environment in Asia and the Pacific*, Bangkok, 1992, regarding encroachment of disaster-prone lands leading to disasters; or WHO, *Concern for Europe’s Tomorrow: Health and the Environment in the WHO European Region*, Geneva, 1995.

Two major exceptions to this general rule are the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, both engaged in extensive studies of the future and their role.

Two major exceptions to this general rule are the International Committee of the Red Cross and the
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, both engaged in extensive studies of the future and their role.


131 From a more general perspective, many of these points can be found in Randolph C. Kent, *Humanitarian Futures: Practical Policy Perspectives*, HPN Network Paper, No.46, Overseas Development Institute, London, April 2004.

132 Ad hocracy offers a good example of an adaptive entity. “Ad hocracies are found in environments that are both complex and dynamic, because these are the ones that require sophisticated innovation, the type of innovation that calls for the cooperative efforts of many different kinds of experts.” See Mintzberg, H., “The Structuring of Organisations.” Asch, D. and Bowman, C., *Readings in Strategic Management*, London: Macmillan Education, 1989.

**Epilogue**

# APPENDIX 1: Acronyms

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>Africa, Caribbean and Pacific States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>Artemisinin Combination Therapy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AID</td>
<td>Agency for International Development (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APGOOD</td>
<td>All-party Parliamentary Group on Overseas Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ART</td>
<td>Antiretroviral Therapy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARV</td>
<td>Antiretroviral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINGO</td>
<td>Big International NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRPM</td>
<td>Bureau of Refugees, Population, and Migration (U.S. State Dept.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Community Foreign and Security Policy (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAD</td>
<td>Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (DFID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMR</td>
<td>Crude Mortality Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DART</td>
<td>Disaster Area Response Team (OFDA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHA</td>
<td>Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESCAP</td>
<td>Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPA</td>
<td>Framework Partnership Agreement (DFID)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPRA</td>
<td>Government Performance and Results Act (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<tr>
<td>HPG</td>
<td>Humanitarian Policy Group (ODI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HPN</td>
<td>Humanitarian Practice Network (ODI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-SMaRT</td>
<td>Humanitarian—Strategic Mapping and Research for Tomorrow (NGO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>InterAgency Standing Committee (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Nongovernmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRSA</td>
<td>Immigration and Refugee Society of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IUCN</td>
<td>World Conservation Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDCs</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCDA</td>
<td>Military and Civil Defense Assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDCs</td>
<td>More Developed Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MST</td>
<td>Landless Workers Movement (Brazil)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEA</td>
<td>Near Earth Asteroid</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (AID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPAs</td>
<td>Partnership Programme Agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARS</td>
<td>Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMART</td>
<td>Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCHS</td>
<td>United Nations Human Settlements Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIJECT</td>
<td>Preloaded, one-time-use syringes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URD</td>
<td>Le groupe Urgence-Rehabilitation-Developpement (NGO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOICE</td>
<td>Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WRI</td>
<td>World Resources Institute</td>
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APPENDIX 3: Key Resources for Future Reference

Environment


Urbanization


**Migration**


Findlay, A.M. and Stewart, E. Skilled Labor migration from Developing Countries:Annotated Bibliography, ILO Geneva 2002.


U.S. Committee for Refugees. *World Refugee Survey* (annually)


**HIV/AIDS**


**The International Political and Policy Landscape**


Hugo Slim, “With or Against? Humanitarian Agencies and Coalition Counter-Insurgency.” (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, July 2004),


**The Non-governmental Landscape**


www.indianngos.com [an Indian NGO consortium]


USAID. “New Partnerships Initiative: NGO Empowerment.” NPI Core Report.


**Lessons Learning**


Young, H. “Ethiopia 2003; the need for institutional change from 'food-first' to a broader public nutrition approach.” London, ODI. (2004 forthcoming)

APPENDIX 4: About the Researchers

Annalies Borrel is an instructor and research fellow in the public nutrition program at the Feinstein International Famine Center at Tufts University. Her most recent field experience was as Senior Adviser to the Ministry of Health in Afghanistan.

Antonio Donini, following retirement in 2003 from a career in the United Nations system, including postings in Geneva, Afghanistan, and New York, is a visiting scholar at the Feinstein International Famine Center.

Karen Jacobsen is an associate professor and director of the Refugee and Forced Migration Program at the Feinstein International Famine Center at Tufts University. She is presently conducting research into the use of micro-credit and other livelihood support mechanisms for refugees and IDPs in and around conflict zones in Africa.

Randolph Kent is a senior research fellow at the International Policy Institute, Kings College, London. Previously he served with the United Nations in various posts dealing with humanitarian crises and works as a consultant to numerous UN and government aid agencies.

Larry Minear co-founded and now directs the Humanitarianism and War Project at the Feinstein International Famine Center. He previously served NGOs in overseas programming and advocacy capacities in the Sudan, Washington, D.C., and New York.

William Moomaw is professor of International Environmental Policy and director of the Center for International Environmental and Resource Policy at The Fletcher School at Tufts University. He serves as a consultant to U.S. government and UN agencies on environmental matters. His research and teaching interests include sustainable development and negotiating strategies for international agreements.

Tasneem Mowjee is a freelance consultant based in London. Her areas of specialization include research on humanitarian aid, NGO-donor relationships, and the European Commission.

Adil Najam is associate professor of international negotiation and diplomacy at The Fletcher School at Tufts University. His research and writing interests include human development and human security; international environmental politics; and NGOs in international development.

Susan Purdin, is senior technical advisor, Reproductive Health at the International Rescue Committee. She is Associate in Clinical Population and Family Health in Columbia University’s Forced Migration and Health Program, teaching courses on program planning, reproductive health and HIV. Her career has focused on public health in the international arena since 1986.

Peter Walker, an environmental scientist by training and formerly an official of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, has directed the Feinstein International Famine Center since September 2002.
Ben Wisner teaches at the London School of Economics and the Benfield Hazard Research Centre, University College London. He is also affiliated with the Environmental Studies Program, Oberlin College. He writes and publishes extensively.