Targeting in Complex Emergencies: South Sudan Country Case Study

Daniel Maxwell and John Burns

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The Authors
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyms</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Annual Needs Assessment</td>
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<td>ANLA</td>
<td>Annual Needs and Livelihood Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBT</td>
<td>Community Based Targeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSAM</td>
<td>FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECW</td>
<td>Enhanced Commitment to Women</td>
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<td>EMOP</td>
<td>Emergency Operations</td>
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<td>FEA</td>
<td>Food Economy Analysis</td>
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<td>FEWSNET</td>
<td>Famine Early Warning Systems Network</td>
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<td>FIC</td>
<td>Feinstein International Center</td>
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<td>GAM</td>
<td>Global Acute Malnutrition</td>
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<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>GOS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
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<td>GOSS</td>
<td>Government of Southern Sudan</td>
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<td>HEA</td>
<td>Household Economy Analysis</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>LAF</td>
<td>Livelihood Analysis Forum</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Congress Party</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>Norwegian people’s Aid</td>
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<td>OLS</td>
<td>Operation Lifeline Sudan</td>
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<td>PRRO</td>
<td>Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation</td>
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<td>RASS</td>
<td>Relief Association of Southern Sudan</td>
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<td>SAM</td>
<td>Severe Acute Malnutrition</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCF (UK)</td>
<td>Save the Children Fund (United Kingdom)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIFSIA</td>
<td>Sudan Integrated Food Security Information for Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPR</td>
<td>Standardized Project Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRRA</td>
<td>Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSRRC</td>
<td>South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (formerly SRRA &amp; RASS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSCSE</td>
<td>Southern Sudan Center for Statistics and Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSU</td>
<td>Technical Support Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>VAM</td>
<td>Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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Executive Summary

The population of Southern Sudan was caught in a civil war from 1983 to 2005. During the war, several major famines led to a massive food aid intervention by the World Food Programme, which continues to the present. During the war, much of this food was delivered to vulnerable people by air drops, with the actual targeting of assistance on the ground left to traditional authorities. The main objective of targeting was to minimize exclusion. In the post-war era, the food aid program is shifting. There is still a general distribution modality for dealing with emergencies, and it has been adapted to accommodate the large flow of returned refugees and displaced people, going home after years or decades of being gone. However, unlike earlier programs, this one is targeted. Other modalities—food for work or education, and nutritional support, are also more targeted. This is making the targeting of food assistance much more administratively managed, and less participatory—contrary to much of the literature which suggests that community-based targeting is more difficult in conflict emergencies than in peace-time (or post-war transitions, as the current situation in Southern Sudan would most aptly be described). This more administrative approach to targeting is the result of GOSS policy—not simply a WFP choice.

This research is one case in a study commissioned by the World Food Programme to investigate the participation of recipient community in the targeting and management of humanitarian food assistance in complex emergencies. The study involved a substantial desk review of existing documentation, and three weeks of field work in February and March 2008. The purpose of the study was to understand the ways in which participatory or community-based approaches to targeting have been attempted, within the definition of community-based targeting suggested by WFP. The study was not an evaluation of targeting methods, although some critical examination of targeting was necessary in order to understand the constraints on community participation.

The study examined community participation through the food aid program cycle, both retrospectively (during the war) and currently. Targeting has been subject to constraints in Southern Sudan by diversion or taxation of food, limited information systems or analytical capacity, logistics, and the speed of donor responses to requests. The impact of targeting is strongly affected by the practice of sharing food aid by recipient communities. Nevertheless, if the WFP definition is used, a fair amount of community-based targeting took place during the war through the Chieftaincy system, which proved sufficiently accountable for the most part to ensure that assistance got to vulnerable people. The main exception to this observation in some cases was internally displaced people, particularly those displaced away from their own traditional leadership. Other mechanisms—relief committees and local administration—did not promote participation as well.

In the post-war era, targeting has become more administrative in nature. But there is little evidence to suggest that a more administrative approach has been successful in reducing targeting error—both inclusion and exclusion. Several examples provide ample evidence to suggest that participatory methods could improve targeting and reduce errors—as well as address some salient protection concerns—where authorities and Chiefs are willing to
promote this approach. But for the most part, the actual recipients have little say over targeting criteria, recipient selection, distribution or the monitoring of food assistance.

Much of the process remains opaque to recipients, who are not aware of their entitlements or the process of determining who is entitled. Even where people are aware of entitlements, there is also little post-distribution monitoring, so it is difficult to assess targeting error—the qualitative evidence gathered from an admittedly small sample in this study suggests that targeting error (both inclusion and exclusion) is significant; there is little agreement over the criteria for targeting some groups and excluding others. With the exception of displacement, there is little understanding on the part of recipient communities of the rationale for these criteria.

Examples were found, however, where greater involvement of the recipients themselves in the targeting of food assistance helped to address all these problems. These examples include both natural disasters (flooding) and conflict (displacement by LRA attacks). Some of them involve traditional leadership, while others are based on the emergence of other leaders from among the ranks of trusted community elders or religious leaders. Virtually all of these examples take into consideration the fact that regardless of the mode of targeting, individuals are going to share food assistance in ways that external agencies do not take into account.

Improved targeting would be promoted by better understanding of culture and context, taking an integrated view of targeting that includes geographic and timing questions, and a willingness to promote the participation of recipient community groups. The study concludes with several recommendations about the ways in which community participation could improve the quality of targeting.
Section I. Background

The war and the current transition
The World Food Programme has been providing humanitarian food assistance to vulnerable communities and groups in Southern Sudan for over twenty years. For most of this time, the Sudanese civil war, fought largely between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Government of Sudan (GoS) was the context of this food assistance program. On January 9, 2005, the war officially ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and a six-year interim period began, with a referendum on Southern self-determination—the choice of independence or to remain an autonomous region in a united Sudan—scheduled for 2011.

The CPA mandated the sharing of national wealth and power between the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM. These provisions include naming the SPLM leader to the office of the First Vice President of the Republic, as well as giving the SPLM limited veto and consultative authority (ICG 2006). The implementation of the CPA has been fraught with challenges. In spite of the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU), many of the reforms mandated by the CPA have yet to be implemented. NCP has retained control of the most influential ministries, such as the defense and energy ministries. The death of SPLM Chairman Dr. John Garang in July 2005 was a significant blow to the SPLM and to the stability of the CPA (ICG 2006).

The SPLM briefly pulled out of the GNU in 2007, amid apparent breakdown and even the threat of renewed fighting, but the status quo ante was quickly reestablished. Nevertheless, skirmishes continue along the border and particularly in contested areas such as Abyei. This makes for an on-going displacement problem—nothing like the scale of the displacement during the war, but a problem nevertheless.

There has been some economic recovery, and substantial population movement (return and resettlement) since 2005. This makes the task for humanitarian agencies one of assisting return, continuing to protect the most vulnerable, and promoting the transition away from emergency response to livelihoods recovery (WFP 2008a - EMOP). The emphasis has turned to supporting returnees, including both “formal” returnees in official programs (run either by UN or the Government), as well as the so-called “spontaneous” returnees. Those in official programs have direct access to services; the “spontaneous” group must be located, registered and verified as returnees before assistance can be provided—a major targeting challenge in 2007 and 2008.

Even by 2006, it was clear that the most food insecure areas were those that were simultaneously most affected by the war and those that were under the strain of supporting large numbers of returnees, such as Northern Bahr al-Ghazal (FEWSNET 2008). Less well-off residents of these areas now have to compete with returnees for work, off-farm products and petty trade, as well as the limited natural resource-based coping strategies and support from relatives.
Returnees still face the challenges of accessing land for agriculture and adapting to rural livelihoods after having been displaced for up to twenty years, often in urban or peri-urban areas, and many prefer to try to settle in towns in the South, ending up on the periphery of urban and market centers where they are better able to find cash income and services, but are less likely to be supported by relatives or residents (Matus 2006). People are without much of their traditional social networks in urban areas and are thus more vulnerable socially, though they have more livelihood opportunities.

The ongoing return and recovery process also has the potential to create tensions and conflict in return areas through increased competition for scarce resources and pressure on already vulnerable communities. Competition for resources is likely to increase due to the numbers of returnees, environmental degradation and expanding commercial investment, and could result in the outbreak of violent conflict (Matus 2006). There continue to be incursions on a small scale by militias or Popular Defense Forces from Kordofan or Southern Darfur into Bahr al-Ghazal and more localized clashes between groups within Southern Sudan in other locations that make ongoing displacement—albeit
it on a much smaller scale than previously—a humanitarian concern. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) tentatively reached an agreement with the Government of Uganda in February 2008 to end their long-running war that had severely affected parts of Southern Sudan, but displacement because of that conflict continued to the present (Ochan, 2008), and it is not yet clear that the conflict is actually over. It is not clear that this problem will be completely removed by the peace agreement with the Government of Uganda. Small-scale or inter-communal conflict continues, sometimes resulting from grievances related to the war itself, sometimes over local resource issues.

There was severe flooding in Upper Nile, Warrap, Northern Bahr al-Ghazal, Lakes and Jonglei states in 2007, resulting in the destruction of houses and crops and causing widespread though temporary displacement. Climatically triggered food insecurity thus remains a problem. Finally, the recent disturbances in Kenya had an almost immediate impact on the availability of critical goods and services in Southern Sudan—particularly fuel but also other commodities, underlining the distance and vulnerability of Southern Sudan’s supply lines. Thus, the context in which relief and recovery activities in Southern Sudan are being conducted remains unstable.

**WFP program**

The World Food Programme (WFP) has been providing assistance to conflict affected communities in Southern Sudan since the launch of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) in 1989. Up until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, the objective of WFP food aid was to save lives, protect nutritional status, and protect community assets. General Food Distribution (GFD) was the defining food aid programming modality during this period. Distributions were conducted in a “hit and run” manner—meaning with little ability to target beyond the geographic area, because WFP staff could spend only a short period of time at sites. Where the security situation permitted, therapeutic and supplementary feeding centers were established by organizations operating both within and outside of the OLS consortium. Some Food for Work (FFW) programming was also implemented during the OLS period, however this was more or less limited to tasks directly related to the distribution of food itself—establishing ‘drop zones’ for air drop food aid deliveries; clearing food aid from the drop zones and reconstituting broken bags; providing security (against looting) at food distributions; payment of Relief Committee members, and construction at WFP sites.

Although food production has increased in Southern Sudan since the signing of the CPA, there is no real “peace dividend” yet in terms of improved food security or significant malnutrition in the prevalence of malnutrition (CARE 2006; Maxwell et al 2006; Tear Fund 2007). Hence there remains the need for a substantial WFP program of food assistance in Southern Sudan, but with a different emphasis from the war years. There is currently an effort to get away from GFD and to work exclusively in more targeted programs (GFD can be and is targeted of course, but the general sense of both WFP staff and GOSS policy makers is that GFD “was free, and was for everyone”). See Table 1 for a summary of current programs.
The evidence of change in food security trends in the post-CPA era is fairly clear. Production trends are improved, markets and road infrastructure are improving. On the other hand, Southern Sudan is a huge place, infrastructure is underdeveloped, and large food deficits remain in some geographic areas—particularly the most vulnerable to drought and flooding, and which have the highest influx of returnees. The levels of vulnerability are likely to increase in the short term as the return of refugees and internally displaced people continues (WFP 2007 - CFSVA; Maxwell et al. 2006).

The main modalities of the WFP operation continue to include GFD, but mainly only for current IDPs or other disaster-affected groups (including groups affected by flooding in late 2007). GFD also includes the returnees program.

The other modality with which this study is concerned is called Food for Recovery (FFR)—a form of Food for Work (FFW), but with less stringent work norms (the match between work done and assistance received). It is intended to send the signal that the days of free food are over, but recognizes that more formal food for work programs requires greater capacity to manage than WFP, its partners or local communities now have. FFR is geographically targeted to areas of highest vulnerability and highest returns. It is considered a “transitional” food aid modality—one that will probably have a relatively short existence.

**Description of programs**

Currently, WFP Southern Sudan has four major categories of modalities of providing food assistance. These include General Food Distribution for emergency-affected populations (IDPs and flood victims) and returnees; Food for Work, (including a new category called Food for Recovery); Food for Education; and support to nutritional programs. These programs are summarized in Table 1. This study was primarily concerned with General Distribution, and to some extent with Food for Recovery (the targeting for these modalities is most applicable to community-based processes).

**General Food Distribution.** Under EMOP 10557.0 the largest caseload in terms of actual numbers of recipients came under the General Food Distribution/Food for Recovery category. Within the policy and programming framework of supporting recovery, this assistance was intended for “the most vulnerable members” of resident (as opposed to returnee) communities. This would include female-headed households, or households without land, livestock, or other income sources. Food for Recovery (FFR) is similar in concept to Food for Work but with less stringent “work norms” and project proposal guidelines. FFR projects are identified by communities and proposals are sent to WFP. These might include the rehabilitation of schools and health centers. In a sense FFR provided a vehicle for moving away from General Food Distribution (World Food Programme 2006 EMOP) as one WFP staff member described it “FFR is a way of weaning people from General Food Distributions without going cold turkey.” In principle vulnerable groups who can’t work can be included in FFR as long as they are included in the proposal. In theory FFR projects are implemented in food insecure areas, as well as in areas supporting large numbers of returnees.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of food intervention</th>
<th>Target group</th>
<th>Number of planned beneficiaries in 2007</th>
<th>Planned Metric Tons in 2007</th>
<th>Actual Metric Tons in 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency IDPs Flood affected</td>
<td>460,000</td>
<td>13,326</td>
<td>12,638</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnee program Returnees (Formal and “spontaneous”)</td>
<td>429,000</td>
<td>25,734</td>
<td>14,884</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Food for recovery Vulnerable groups</td>
<td>129,000</td>
<td>41,828</td>
<td>22,776</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food for Assets Food for Training (Other FFW) Vulnerable groups</td>
<td>5,924</td>
<td>3,167</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School feeding Primary school children in selected areas</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>14,262</td>
<td>8,344</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition and Maternal /Child Health Pregnant and lactating mothers; children under five years</td>
<td>14,873</td>
<td>8,313</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: WFP Southern Sudan

The geographical targeting of FFR in food insecure areas is based on the results from the food security component of the Annual Needs and Livelihoods Assessment (ANLA). According to SSRRC sources, actual participants in FFR projects are selected by the Chiefs in partnership with the SSRRC Boma administrator. The physical nature of FFR activities does mean that some of the most vulnerable members of the community are often unable to participate. Both SSRRC and WFP sources pointed to the existence of a traditional social support networks for the most vulnerable members of a given community. Within the framework of this traditional mechanism, physically challenged people including the blind, deaf, disabled and elderly are supported by caretakers within their communities. The SSRRC indicated that they try to select these caretakers for FFR projects, with the objective of indirectly targeting the most vulnerable people.

Although WFP are trying to phase out General Food Distributions (GFD), these do still take place in response to specific shocks. In the past two years GFD recipients have typically been people displaced by on-going conflict or affected by floods.
Returnee Program. Under the last EMOP the largest category in terms of the actual amount of food aid programmed was food for returnees. Food for returnees is directly targeted to conflict displaced people returning to their areas of origin in Southern Sudan. Connell (2002) estimated that between 1983 and 2002, the civil war displaced as many as four million people. Planning figures for assistance to returnees in 2007 were based on UN country team estimates, and included some 30,000 demobilized soldiers.

From a programming perspective, returnees generally fall into two categories, organized and spontaneous. Organized returnees are registered and verified under an administrative targeting mechanism. Tokens are issued and these are used to identify recipients for assistance. The registration of returnees is done by GOSS, WFP, RRR, UNHCR (for refugee returnees) and NGO partners. Spontaneous returns began in 2006 and made up 70% of the overall returnees that year (WFP 2007 ANLA). More recently, they have made up an estimated 80-85% of returnees. Screening of spontaneous returnees is carried out by the SSRRC in partnership with WFP, NGO partners, RRR, and sometimes UNHCR; at least three agencies have to be present for a verification exercise. This process involves a cross examination of people claiming to be returnees, genuine cases are then registered and issued with assistance tokens. In areas where food for returnees is distributed by non-WFP partners such as Catholic Relief Services (CRS), the verified list of spontaneous returnees will be forwarded to that organization. Typically returnees assisted by WFP will receive a three month reintegration package, based on a hundred percent ration per household member. Under EMOP 10557.0 organized returnees were also entitled to a fifteen day transit ration, and there is some flexibility to review the three month reintegration package depending on what point in the agricultural season people had arrived (WFP 2006 EMOP).

The food assistance, which has been widely availed when returnees can be accurately identified, is only one part of the returnees’ entitlement. Other elements include assistance for re-establishing livelihoods, and housing. It should be noted that, some targeting and timing issues notwithstanding, the food element of the returns package has proceeded more or less according to plan, but the other elements of the “returns package” are lagging far behind. The research team heard numerous complaints that the food, while welcome, was not adequate to help re-establish and re-integrate after a long absence, a point reiterated by a recent analysis of the returns program (Pantuliano et al 2007). The Livelihoods Analysis Forum (LAF) also fears that the emphasis on targeting only returnees could raise tensions between groups and disrupt commodity and labor markets (LAF 2006).

This complaint was also heard by the research team from members of “receiving” communities.

An estimated 358,000 returnees were assisted in 2007, of whom an estimated 286,000 were “spontaneous” returnees. Northern Bahr al-Ghazal and Warrap states received the highest number of returnees (WFP 2008). These figures include both the return of refugees and people displaced internally within Sudan during the war. There is no single estimate of the proportion of spontaneous returnees that actually receive assistance, and hence no estimate of the exclusion error on spontaneous return. WFP staff estimate that 80-85% of returnees fall into the “spontaneous” category. It is assumed that coverage of formal
returnees in terms of food assistance is good. The research team found ample evidence of spontaneous returnees not receiving assistance at all, and many more cases where spontaneous returnees had been registered, but had not yet received any assistance. There were no such complaints among self-identified formal returnees—although the practice of sharing had considerably diluted the impact of the assistance that formal returnees had received.

**Food for Work/Food for Training/Food for Assets.** Although involving demanding work norms and comprehensive proposals, Food for Work (FFW), which includes Food for Training, and Food for Assets, follows similar targeting and implementation principles as FFR. FFW proposals are identified by the community and might include the construction of classrooms and schools or the construction and/or maintenance of feeder (access) roads. In theory FFW is meant to be geographically targeted to areas of food insecurity identified in the ANLA. In reality the main criteria for project selection is the existence and capacity of an implementing agency in an area. In Southern Sudan at present this capacity appears to be fairly limited, which explains the relatively small FFW caseload in 2007. It’s unclear how project participants are selected for FFW activities implemented through the WFP food pipeline.

**Other elements of WFP Program.** Other components of WFP’s program in South Sudan include Food for Education (FFE) and support for nutritional interventions. These programs were not investigated by this study.

**Non-WFP Food Assistance Programs.** Using their own food pipeline, CRS is currently implementing FFW projects in Bor County. Selection of participants is done by the Chiefs and elders. Female participants are generally assigned specific tasks such as water collection, while men are involved in the actual construction activities. CARE International has also been implementing FFW and Cash for Work (CFW) projects in Bor County. One example was a secondary dyke construction project. The project was identified by the community, and no effort was made to target the most vulnerable as each household in the community was included in the project. Each household was responsible for providing labor for a certain section of the dyke, and both the community and CARE were involved in monitoring for quality control. Norwegian People’s Aid has long been a direct implementer of US food aid, outside the OLS framework during the war, and outside the WFP framework in the post-CPA era.

Where a FFW or CFW option was given, the experience of CARE suggests that there was a preference for CFW and that more women and girls participated. The quality of work on the CFW projects was also superior. Key informants indicated that both FFW and CFW often exclude the most vulnerable who are unable to participate due to time, illness or other constraints.

**Targeting food aid in Southern Sudan: Some important issues**
Targeting means ensuring that the required assistance gets to the people who need it, at the time it is needed, in the quantity it is needed and for the period of time it is needed—
and conversely that assistance does not go to other groups or arrives at other times (Barrett and Maxwell 2005). The task of targeting is depicted by Table 2: reaching the genuinely food insecure (Cell 1) and not providing assistance to the genuinely food secure (Cell 4) is successful targeting. Providing assistance to food secure households or individuals (Cell 2) is an inclusion error or leakage error, while not providing assistance to the food insecure is an exclusion or under-coverage error.

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<th>Food insecure</th>
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<tr>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>1. Successful targeting</td>
<td>2. Inclusion error (Leakage)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not Targeted</td>
<td>3. Exclusion error (Under-coverage)</td>
<td>4. Successful targeting</td>
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From Barrett and Maxwell (2005), adapted from Hoddinott (1999)

From a humanitarian point of view, the main concern is about exclusion or under-coverage errors; and from the point of view of resource efficiency and not undermining local markets, inclusion or leakage errors are the biggest concerns. Targeting, broadly speaking, is therefore not only a question of getting assistance to the right people—the “who?” and “how?” questions; but also involves a “where?” question, a “when?" question, a “what?” question, and a “for how long?” question. These will be addressed in the order outlined above.

Several issues related to targeting provide an important backdrop to the empirical results of this study. One significant issue related to targeting is the tendency and historical record on the sharing of food aid by recipients. This practice, which was reportedly widespread during the war and which continues today, tends to make targeting efforts somewhat meaningless, and is often viewed as diluting the impact of food aid programs. A second issue is that of the taxation of food assistance, or its diversion to other users (by authorities, not by recipients). The third issue is political vulnerability, and how it has been shaped over time. Fourth is the expectation, wrought by years of GFD, that food assistance will be provided and that it is intended for everyone (known as “looking to the sky” in local languages—because so much of the food assistance came in the form of air-drops during the OLS period). This issue is related to the notion of dependency, but also to a presumed modality of providing assistance. Getting away from these assumptions comprises as substantial component of current policy. The fifth issue is the information systems on which program information and geographic targeting is based, and which in theory provides the information on which household targeting is based. This includes the related issue of the extent to which nutritional information informs targeting. The sixth and last issue is the timeliness of assistance—the “when?” question—and the extent to which the
timing of food aid delivery contributes to targeting error. All these issues form the “backdrop” to the question of participatory targeting. The following sub-sections address each of these concerns, based on both a historical perspective and on findings from this study.

The sharing and redistribution of food assistance
It has long been observed that in many parts of Southern Sudan, local dynamics tend to undermine the targeting of food aid, because of community redistribution of food to all sections of the population instead of only to those that had been targeted. In her work on the cultural differences between hot and cold climate cultures, Sarah Lanier (2000) draws a distinction between societies, that are structured on “individualism” and those that are “group identity cultures.” The Nilotic groups of Sudan share similar characteristics with the “group identity” cultures described by Lanier. Such groups not only regard food as a collective asset to be shared communally, but from this perspective would probably understand vulnerability in terms of group vulnerability as opposed to individual vulnerability. Harragin and Chol (1998) argue that the practice of “sharing” stems from the egalitarian nature of Dinka society and that food aid is seen as a free resource that should be made available to all. They largely attribute the failure of external targeting strategies to a misunderstanding of Dinka, kinship, lineage, reciprocity obligations and traditional social safety mechanisms. The act of sharing also reinforces kinship networks (unlike targeting, which by definition leave some people out, and is seen to undermine traditional social structures), and removes the stigma that may be attached to being a beneficiary of charity.

Re-distribution not only falls within the framework of the social and hierarchical obligations of Dinka society, but also appears to provide a collective safety net within a given group (Deng, 1999). Although wealthier members of a community are obliged to support those that are worse off, there appears to be a reciprocal commitment attached to this support, particularly in cases where “external” food assistance is provided. In some ways this explains the concept of collective or group vulnerability—“we are all vulnerable”—as opposed to individual or household vulnerability so often mentioned in Bahr al-Ghazal (Harragin and Chol 1998). This does not stem from an ignorance of differences in wealth, but from a belief that everyone has a right to food. Thus the tendency towards sharing has cultural roots, but it was also reinforced by the attempts to target food during the famine in Bahr al-Ghazal in 1998 (Deng 1999), and is fundamentally based on a different view of vulnerability—one that was found repeatedly in this study, both in Dinka and non-Dinka areas. External humanitarian agencies tend to look at vulnerability—particularly in the context of severe food insecurity—as a transitory thing, and focus their attention on current needs. The view of vulnerability expressed to the field team is much longer-term and more based on reciprocity. Hence the sharing of food aid in a crisis might appear to humanitarian agencies as “ration dilution” which reduces the impact of assistance at the level of the targeted individual, but from the point of view of the recipient the sharing of that assistance has strengthened social ties and thus reduced vulnerability in the longer term. It is no coincidence that the 1998 Bahr al-Ghazal famine was named cok dakruai (the famine of breaking relationships) because food became so scarce that reciprocity broke down (Deng 1999).
Sharing and re-distribution in Sudan are part of customary law. It is ultimately a “Chief's responsibility to provide relief against famine, and they will be held accountable for failing to do so” (Deng 1999). Some communities have “hunger courts” and these are a unique part of customary law. An executive Chief has a responsibility to ensure that the poorest members of the community are fed. A vulnerable person has the right to sue their (wealthier) relatives for a cow. If the relative refuses elders in the community will get involved and recall how in the past that person’s father or even grandfather had been helped by the father of the vulnerable relative. If the person still refuses the case can be taken to the level of the executive Chief or even the paramount Chief. Deng (1999) argues that hunger courts are one of the most effective customary re-distribution mechanisms in Dinka society during times of crises. However, in 1998, many traditional re-distribution mechanisms simply failed due to the extent and magnitude of the famine.

The issue of sharing and redistributing relief food has been widely documented in Southern Sudan, and the findings of this study confirm the widespread practice of re-distribution, particularly during the OLS era. WFP distribution and monitoring reports from this period consistently report on the practice of re-distribution of relief food in areas inhabited by the Dinka as well as other ethnic groups; a distribution monitoring report from Kapoeta County in 2007 testifies that food aid is shared among all socio-economic groups and little if any targeting is done. From a sample of twenty-two monitoring reports carried out in Equatoria, Jonglei, Upper Nile and Bahr al-Ghazal between 1997 and 2001, nineteen reported on incidents of redistribution, sharing or the indirect transfer of food aid.

During a focus group with women in Wedweil the participants elaborated on this theme, explaining “during the war all the livestock were, killed we all needed food, we were all vulnerable.” The same focus group participants also reiterated the concept of everyone having an equal right to ‘external’ food, and suggested that an equal sharing of food during a crisis would improve everyone’s chance of survival, and thereby reduce mortality rates. They justified the equal sharing of food with the following story: “There were once three very poor and very hungry women who had only collected wild food to sufficiently feed two of them. One of the women decided to let the others have her share of the food and she died. It’s better that we all have a little and that way we can all survive.”

The same women suggested that during the war, wealthier people were more vulnerable as they had lost their livestock but did not have the knowledge or wild food collection skills that enabled poorer people to survive. Reports from the 1998 famine suggest that “both the rich and the poor were affected, although the poor suffered more than the rich” (Deng 1999). In any case, as Harrigan and Chol (1998) suggest, the redistribution of food reinforces “a system of wealth redistribution which gets people through bad times when there is no aid.”

In some respects the redistribution of food aid makes end-use and impact monitoring difficult and makes household level targeting efforts of general food distribution somewhat moot—a point of particular significance for targeting (Sharp 2006, Matus 2006, Harrigan
2000). As one Sudanese WFP staff member emphasized, “it will never be possible to get around the issue of re-distribution in Sudan.” A senior manager pointed out “it [targeting] is very difficult when you have this ‘share all’ dynamic going on.” This view is echoed by another long-term senior WFP staff member: “People in (Southern) Sudan believe everyone is vulnerable and have the idea that food aid should be shared with everyone.” Sharp (2006) notes that the conditions in Southern Sudan are appropriate for blanket (not targeted) distribution to all households at a critical time rather than distributing small amounts over an extended period to a smaller number of targeted beneficiaries. WFP policy at the global level recognizes the phenomenon of sharing, notes that it is to be expected (WFP 2006).

The tendency towards sharing however does not mean that no one is excluded from food assistance. The SPLM/SRRA/OLS task force (1998) found that certain groups were being consistently marginalized from food distributions, most notably internally displaced people who did not have Chief representation. However, Harragin and Chol (1998) suggested that the displaced are more likely to receive more aid if there is an ethos of distribution to all. Jaspars (2000) suggests that the displaced should be identified and mobilized to select a representative who would then ensure that they were receiving their share of food aid (see case study below). Notwithstanding considerable evidence from this study that the practice of sharing assistance continues today, the issue of exclusion will become more pronounced as food assistance programs move away from general distribution and towards more specifically targeted programs. This is related to political vulnerability (see below). The implications of sharing should be taken into consideration in the practice of targeting.

**Diversion/taxation**

In 1998, South Sudan experienced a severe humanitarian crisis, as a result of displacement following attacks by Kerubino and GoS, as well as drought in many areas, in a context of prolonged civil war. The crisis worsened as a result of denial of access by GoS and thus difficulties in the provision of relief assistance. In practice, distribution along the lines required by WFP would take place in front of WFP monitors, but almost immediately following this, a re-distribution would take place organized by Chiefs and the SRRA. An attempt to introduce relief committees was made in Southern Sudan by WFP in 1995. By 1998, these functioned in parts of South Sudan, whereas in other parts, WFP or other distribution agencies, worked through the Chief system. In both RC and Chief-based systems, residents would be prioritized over displaced populations, and within resident populations, would favor the most powerful clans (most likely these were also the ones represented on the RC). Within the clan, female headed households not taken in by relatives, lone elderly people, and unaccompanied minors would be excluded as people who did not “belong.” Political and military priorities also become particularly important in distribution of aid in complex emergencies. Taxation of food aid is commonly reported in situations of war. In South Sudan, taxation most often took place at the point of redistribution, where a certain amount would be set aside for both army and civil administration. Theft by various armed groups following distribution was also common (SPLM/SRRA/OLS 1998, Jaspars, 1999, WFP 2000).
Duffield et al note that “wars by their nature lead to a scarcity of resources...and opportunities for enrichment, both legitimate and criminal. Soldiers, commanders and politicians have used such opportunities to enrich themselves” (2000: 28). During the war era, OLS and the SRRA came under a considerable criticism for accusations for permitting or supporting the diversion of food aid to the SPLA, though some analysts report little direct empirical evidence to support these claims (Deng, 1999). The OLS task force did however find “a system of voluntary contribution for the maintenance of SPLA forces, locally known as tayeen” (Deng, 1999: 94). The impact of the “tayeen” system on targeting is difficult to determine. The 1998 OLS task force determined that the system had “a negative effect on targeting the needy population who under normal circumstances would be exempted from the “tayeen” obligation” (Deng 1999: 95).

This was to some extent confirmed by evidence from this study. Respondents acknowledged their appreciation of the SPLA. Said one, “we didn’t much mind (being excluded), as the SPLA were fighting the Murahaleen who had killed all our livestock in the first place”. This sentiment is echoed by Duffield et al “ordinary people did not appear to begrudge the SPLA its share—soldiers, they argued, need to eat too, most of them came from the area and were perceived as part of the force that was trying to protect it” (2000: 27). Deng suggests that the SPLA in certain instances not only provided protection, but humanitarian assistance, explaining “the displaced people who came out of Wau in January 1998 were greatly helped with food, shelter and even clothing by SPLA soldiers” (1999:95).

However, the “tayeen system” appears to have diluted the impact of targeting food for the most vulnerable as the “the military would not be the first to starve to death” (SCF, cited by Deng, 1999: 95). Post-distribution monitoring reports dating from that era suggest that in most cases recipients received far less than the intended ration although this was mostly attributed to redistribution. But these reports indicate both exclusion and inclusion error. The issue of “sharing” and the issue of “taxation” seem very similar in the Southern Sudan case, but they are actually separate issues, with separate implications for targeting and the participation of the community in targeting. But both need to be understood in their own right and both make external criteria for targeting difficult to implement.

**Political vulnerability**

There are a number of reasons why neither the Chief or relief committee systems functioned in such a way as to ensure that the most vulnerable populations received food aid. First is that the extreme severity of the crisis, combined with very limited food aid resources, little access and disputed population figures, would have made it impossible to target households using any method. Second, the Chief is responsible for collecting taxes, including for the military and civil administration, and for maintaining social cohesion within the group. This directly conflicts with responsibilities for targeting the most vulnerable. Third, the reason why the powerful received more is linked to the nature of the different social and political institutions within Dinka society. The Chief is responsible for a geographical area where a group of unrelated people has grazing rights. The basic resource sharing unit, however, is the extended family and beyond that the clan or lineage, headed by a Gol leader. The Chief, of course, belongs to a certain clan, and in times of resource
sarcity his main responsibility will be to his own clan. This effectively means that if the Chief makes decisions about targeting, proportionately more food aid will go to members of his clan, which is likely to be the most powerful one.

Even where RCs were in place, the authority of the Chiefs, and of the SRRA, essentially remained greater than that of the RC. People with key positions in the SRRA and on the RCs usually belonged to the most powerful clans, and thus were often closely related to the Chief (Harragin 1998, Jaspars 1999). At the same time, not all clans could be represented on the relief committee (there were more than the number of relief committee members). One year later, when the crisis was less severe, the same problems continued to occur.

WFP itself concluded that the distribution system had been based on an idealistic notion of community and lack of attention had been paid to existing social and cultural realities (WFP 2000). A Task Force, consisting of SPLM, SRRA, UN and NGOs concluded that the system of distribution through relief committees was not effective (SPLM/SRRA/OLS 1999). The subsequent suggestion to work through Gol leaders was an attempt to put responsibility for targeting at the smallest, most localized level, to address this issue.

**General distribution and “looking to the sky...”**

There is a widespread sense among policy makers in Southern Sudan (both within WFP and the GOSS) that it is time to make a clean break with past ways of dealing with food assistance. During the war, food was made available by general distribution (i.e., it was given away freely); it was mostly not targeted (i.e., it was for everyone); and while there was perhaps more funding for monitoring and evaluation than now, food aid was still seen as being largely unaccounted for (Duffield et al. 2000). This scenario adds up to a sense that food aid has made people dependent, that people look at it as a free good to be shared by all, and as something they have a right to receive. The comments of many government policy makers reflect this view, particularly within the Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC), but also in local civil administration and even among traditional leaders. In WFP, this programming mode is now referred so as the “OLS mentality” and staff dating back to that era are now being redeployed elsewhere. Several government respondents referred to the effect of this kind of programming as “looking to the sky” for food—with both an implied “miraculous” connotation in terms of food appearing, but also with the obvious connotation of waiting for WFP air-drops.

The fact that whenever an assessment team or a distribution team goes to the field and is immediately met by crowds two to three times larger than expected is taken by some WFP and SSRRC staff as evidence that people have become dependent on this kind of free food, and that steps must be taken to address this dependency, and direct people back to their own resources for survival.

The issue of food aid dependency has been investigated extensively elsewhere (Abdulai, Barrett and Hoddinott 2005; Harvey and Lind 2005), and is not the purpose of this research. However, the general consensus is that emergency food aid has consistently been too little and too late for anyone to significantly alter their own food access strategies. Duffield et al. (2000) suggest that the same arguments apply to Sudan, that relief deliveries
are too unreliable and inadequate to create dependency. Aggregated figures for the whole of Sudan indicate that from 1992 to 1998, relief food contributed less than eight percent of the annual food requirement of each targeted recipient. The observations of the research team on this study tend to confirm the observation that food aid does not cause dependency at the individual or household level. For example, some IDPs interviewed had missed registration exercises aimed at their groups because they were too busy trying to collect natural resources to sell in order to survive, or rations were being divided among returnee households because so many “spontaneous” returnees were being excluded. This is not to belittle the significance of the exclusion, but it does indicate that people were pursuing whatever coping strategies were available to them, not just waiting for food aid.

While there is little doubt that significant inclusion error resulted from the food distribution practices of the OLS period, there is inadequate evidence to support the “dependency hypothesis” in post-war Southern Sudan, and a fair amount of evidence to argue against it. There is also inadequate evidence from this study to conclude that exclusion error is the bigger policy concern in the current context (though it clearly was during the war and for good reason). There are other valid reasons for wanting to move beyond the modalities of the OLS period, but equal care should be taken to keep the focus of food assistance focused on the issue of vulnerability, rather than on the assumed problem of dependency.

Information systems and analysis
Several elements make up the humanitarian information system in Southern Sudan, but several critical components are missing. This section briefly discusses each.¹

Food security information systems. The food security information system in Sudan has undergone a significant transformation in recent years, including the introduction—and not yet full implementation—of a nation-wide system (SIFSIA). There has been a good deal of controversy over the question of the information system in place, the quality of information produced, the frameworks in which the information is analyzed, and the linkage of the information to operational decision-making.

A Technical Support Unit (TSU) to Operation Lifeline Sudan based in Lokichoggio was phased out in 2002-2003 after eight years of service. From 1994 until it was phased out, WFP used the Food Economy Approach (FEA) as the framework for vulnerability analysis. Since then assessments using variations of FEA and the Household Economy Approach (HEA) have provided the basis for geographical targeting at the County level in Southern Sudan. HEA was a useful tool for understanding the household economy, but was less well adapted to incorporate the issue of political vulnerability described above. The TSU was eventually replaced by the Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping Unit (VAM). An Annual Needs Assessment (ANA—or now referred to as the Annual Needs and Livelihoods Assessment) has been the main means of gathering information about vulnerability, which is used for both the geographic targeting of assistance and to provide criteria for household

¹ The following sections on information systems, nutritional surveillance, and the timing of food aid deliveries, draw heavily on Maxwell et al. (2006).
targeting. Over the years, the ANA/ANLA process has been criticized for over-estimation of needs (FAO/WFP 2004). The ANLA is a one-off exercise conducted late in the year—and is unable to provide year-round monitoring. Other criticisms of the information system include the lack of a nutritional surveillance system, even though nutritional status is the main impact measure implied in the EMOP.

Additionally, there is no consensus about the period of the year when food aid needs are the greatest; a sense that food aid appeals have grown out of proportion to real needs; and a disagreement over shortfalls in production and need between WFP and its critics (Livelihoods Analysis Forum 2006, Sharp 2006). These same critics note that current information systems don’t adequately take non-food requirements into consideration.

**Nutritional surveillance.** The objective of EMOPs in Southern Sudan has long been to reduce (or contain) malnutrition at levels below 15% of children under the age of five years. This continues to be the case after the cessation of conflict. However, two observations make it impossible to judge the impact of food aid programs on the prevalence of malnutrition in Southern Sudan. The first is that there is no monitoring mechanism to measure the prevalence of global acute malnutrition (GAM) in the affected area. The only measures of malnutrition result from one-off nutrition assessments by NGOs. The second issue is that there is considerable controversy over the causes of the persistently high prevalence of GAM.

The prevalence of malnutrition has remained well above the levels targeted by the EMOP, and well above standards of international acceptability (CARE 2006; Maxwell et al. 2006). Despite numerous suggestions, no nutritional surveillance system has been set up in Southern Sudan.
The prevalence data from single-site studies have been aggregated by year and month, to attempt to chart trends by CARE (2006) and Maxwell et al. (2006) using data from the Livelihoods Analysis Forum. The trends shown in Figure 1 aggregate the results of 110 individual nutrition surveys between 1998 and mid 2006 conducted in the Western Flood Plains Livelihood Zone (SSCSE 2007)—one of the areas hardest hit by the malnutrition crisis during the war.

The trends here are indicative of data elsewhere, though the prevalence is somewhat higher. Malnutrition appears to spike in April/May, which does not correspond to what is widely believed to be the peak of the hunger season, which is generally thought to peak in July/August. There is another spike in September, which may be related to the hungry season. Several possible explanations for this have been posited (CARE 2006, Sharp 2006), but none has been validated. This puzzle has implications for the timing of food assistance, but also for the provision of other assistance, and has implications for targeting practices.

**Timeliness of delivery**

To put more light on this, the data for food deliveries to Southern Sudan for various years are depicted, by month, in Figure 2. These data reflect trends on the analysis of food insecurity, the assessment of needs, the planned and actual delivery of food, and the

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2 This kind of data aggregation clearly violates methodological good practice, but it is the only way to try to see annual “trends” on a calendar basis, given the absence of any other trend data. For a full explanation of the aggregations methods and a discussion of the methodological dangers, see Maxwell et al. (2006).
timing of the distribution. The local seasonal calendar in Southern Sudan varies somewhat, but in general the period from May/June through August/September (depending on location) is considered the “hungry season” with rains beginning in late April/ May, and with the rains ending by September/October.

**Figure 2. Food Aid to Southern Sudan, 1998-2007 (Metric Tons/Month)**

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Data Source: WFP Sudan
The “green” harvest begins in September, with the main harvest from October to December. The rains coincide with the hungry season; the times of highest agricultural labor requirements are the late dry season and early rainy season (Muchomba and Sharp 2006).

The priority months for the provision of food are from May through September, but Figure 2 indicates this is when the proportion of planned distributions are the lowest. With improved ability to pre-position, this has been improving in recent years. There is some controversy over whether the rainy season is the appropriate time to concentrate food deliveries, given that the highest prevalence of GAM tends to occur at the end of the dry season.

The other trend evident in Figure 2 is that planned distribution levels are often exceeded late in the year after the rains and transportation becomes easier. But this coincides with the main harvest, and is widely known to be the worst time of the year to have excess food aid distributed. An internal WFP report in early 2004 (WFP Special Report 2004) brought this problem to light, and indeed the performance on this particular point in this particular
year improved. Thus both inclusion and exclusion errors occur as a result of the timing of food aid deliveries. There are many reasons for this—the difficulty of transportation during the rains, poor road infrastructure, local conflict, etc. not to mention the distances that food has to travel to reach Southern Sudan in the first place, and difficulty in coordinating the timing of donor grants and shipments.

Many cases were noted during the study of targeting error resulting from delayed provision of assistance. For example, people from Rumaker (and elsewhere as reported by MSF) had been displaced in the Malualkon area of Aweil East for nearly three months, but with a few exceptions have not received any assistance. When people need assistance, they need it quickly before their nutritional status has deteriorated. Many other examples of delayed assistance were noted, both historically and in the interviews conducted for this research.

Conclusions
Several points should be highlighted from this discussion. First, the sharing of food assistance is a widespread practice, embodying both a cultural norm and a different perspective of vulnerability. But it makes external targeting of specific elements of vulnerability difficult. Second, diversion of food assistance was not uncommon during the war, and a few incidents of this were noted even in the post war period. But in Southern Sudan, there is often a fine line between “sharing” and “diversion.” Third, there is a strong sense at the policy level—both within GOSS and WFP—of the need to get away from the “OLS mentality” including the notion of free food, food assistance being for everyone. The research team didn’t necessarily endorse this view, but it was quite evident in many interviews. Fourth, there is little specific monitoring of livelihoods and almost no post-distribution monitoring, so there is no way of knowing whether people are divesting themselves to protect what remains of food security in years of under-coverage. Fifth, there are limited mechanisms for monitoring the intended and unintended effects of food aid—particularly the effects on grain markets. WFP does monitor four major grain markets, but local markets could be affected by over-runs in deliveries (expected to dampen prices) and by local purchase (expected to drive prices up). And sixth, there is a clear gap between appeals and actual amount received (see section on timing and targeting of food aid). This is underscored by the observation in the WFP 2004 Special Report that donors don’t believe the needs assessment figures. From 2002 to the present the average proportion of assessed needs met by donors has run between 60-70%, whereas up to 2001, the figure was in the 90-100% range (Maxwell et al 2006). All these factors shape the context within which household level targeting occurs, and which therefore constrain or enable both administrative and participatory elements of targeting. The next section presents evidence about these issues.
Section II. Operational Aspects of Targeting

Description of targeting practice over time

Targeting practices (or Targeting, Registration and Verification practices, to use WFP’s current description) have varied over the past twenty years. A brief timeline is provided in Figure 3.

The OLS era. For practical reasons, elements of Community Based Targeting (CBT) were applied during the OLS period, and sometimes referred to as the Community Distribution System. WFP did not have sufficient presence or capacity to directly target vulnerable households, so targeting at this level was overseen by Chiefs. Interviews with traditional leaders indicated that the process of allocating food to different leaders involved some level of negotiation. However the guiding principle seemed to have been based on equal distribution, taking into account the number of people under each leader’s representation. It was suggested that consideration might be given to a Sub-Chief/Gol Leader whose people were considered to be more vulnerable than others. For example a larger food allocation might be given to a Sub-Chief/Gol Leader from an area that had recently been affected by conflict or floods.

Typically distributions were conducted by WFP teams and SRRA/RASS counterparts, although in reality it was unclear how much influence WFP had over targeting at the
distribution level. In 1994 WFP introduced Relief Committees, intending to inject a measure of community management into targeting. These were set up so that women members outnumbered men. WFP assumed that these committees would be more effective in targeting the vulnerable than the Chiefs (Duffield et al 2000). The evidence from this study suggests that Relief Committees had little influence over targeting decisions at the community level—their task was more about overseeing distribution (with some important exceptions—see below). During the OLS era it would appear as though household targeting for GFD was more or less done by Sub-Chiefs/Gol Leaders, with some assistance from other members of the community. The extent of this assistance probably varied depending on the location and the context.

**Current Era.** Since the signing of the CPA in 2005, the WFP’s program in Southern Sudan changed from an emphasis on emergency response towards an integrated recovery strategy aimed at strengthening livelihoods and reducing vulnerability to shocks (WFP 2006 EMOP). The objectives of WFP food assistance in Southern Sudan were:

- Save the lives of people affected by conflict experiencing food insecurity;
- Protect livelihoods and restore the assets of vulnerable communities, returnees, refugees, demobilized ex-combatants, and internally displaced people;
- Improve nutritional status of targeted populations, with a special focus on adolescent girls and women; and
- Support access to education, with a particular focus on education for girls.

The targeting criteria for food assistance recipients under this strategy were largely determined by the specific types of programming interventions being implemented by WFP. These included General Food Distribution (GFD) under the title of Food for Recovery (FFR), Food for Returnees, School Feeding, Institutional Feeding, Food for Work (FFW), Food for Training (FFT) and Food for Assets (FFA). The EMOP was designed to facilitate a transition from an emergency to a Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO).

**Stakeholder analysis**

There are numerous stakeholders involved in targeting in Southern Sudan. Table 3 lists the different stakeholders, describes their role, and gives a ranking of their importance, based on the views of the research team and the respondents interviewed. The roles and importance of various stakeholders have changed since the end of the war, so questions about the influence of each were asked for both periods. The ranking of stakeholder influence in Table 3 was carried out by the full research team, based on numerous interviews about both the OLS era and the current era. It is only intended to be broadly indicative of stakeholder influence—it is not based on an “objective” measure.

The role of the Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC, known as SRRA during the war) is paramount in both periods, and respondents generally felt it was the single most important institution involved with the question of targeting. WFP is also closely involved, through SSRRC with the entire assessment/ targeting/ implementation/
monitoring cycle. During the war, the Chiefs or traditional leaders played a crucial role in targeting at the local level. Their role has diminished somewhat in the post-CPA era, but they are still an important stakeholder. During the war, SSRRC represented the influence of the SPLM in the humanitarian effort generally, and in targeting specifically. Since the end of the war, policy directives are now more likely to come from the Office of the President, or from line ministries, particularly the Ministry of Agriculture. Through their general policies, donors play an indirect role in targeting—and occasionally may play a more direct role, albeit with agencies that are not WFP implementing partners. State, County and Payam administrators play a key role in registration and oversight, in collaboration with local traditional authorities. During the war, OLS itself played a role in targeting, through information sharing and coordination, and of course, the Government of Sudan (Khartoum) indirectly played a role in geographic targeting through making some places inaccessible. The role of actual recipients has varied. At some points during the war, some recipient groups were involved in the actual targeting of assistance through Relief Committees or other mechanisms (see below), although the main role of the RCs was not targeting \textit{per se}, but oversight of other components of distribution or helping with the airdrops. Recipient communities are represented mainly through their leadership. However, the actual end use of food assistance is a critically affected by recipient community behavior in terms of the sharing of food between targeted and non-targeted households and individuals (see below).

WFP and various agencies of the GOSS including the Ministry of Agriculture, the SSRRC and the newly formed Sudan Integrated Food Security Information and Action system (SIFSIA) conduct the Annual Needs and Livelihoods Assessment, which forms the basis of geographic targeting and the setting of household vulnerability criteria. There is actually very little formal early warning carried out—a gap that SIFSIA is intended to fill. SSRRC is engaged in monitoring at the local level, which serves as early warning currently. SSRRC works in close collaboration with WFP to identify vulnerable areas and groups, and is involved in assessment, the development of targeting criteria, and the development of lists of recipients. SSRRC carries out the initial registration of recipients and forward the initial list to WFP. WFP is also involved in assessment and early warning, and once SSRRC has carried out the initial registration, WFP leads an inter-agency team to carry out verification of the recipient list. Verification takes place in different ways, but usually involves SSRRC, the inter-agency team, local administrators and traditional authorities. Members of the affected community are also sometimes included. The verified list is then forwarded to whoever carries out the distribution—sometimes WFP, sometimes a WFP partners, and in some cases, an agency running its own pipeline (i.e., not a WFP partner). This process is depicted in the stakeholder Map in Figure 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Influencing targeting practices</th>
<th>Influenced by targeting</th>
<th>Rank in Influence</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feinstein International Center</td>
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Although in theory there should be post-distribution monitoring to follow up on the usage and impact of the assistance, all stakeholders interviewed agreed that there is very little post-distribution monitoring carried out in the current context—in fact probably less than at some points during the war.
Figure 4. Stakeholder map of targeting practice in Southern Sudan (post-CPA era)
Assessment practices and impact on targeting

Information for the geographical and temporal targeting of food aid in Southern Sudan is derived from a variety of food security assessments. The most important of these is the Annual Needs and Livelihoods Assessment (ANLA) carried out by WFP, FAO, MoA, SSRRC, LAF, SSCSE, and NGOs. The food security component of the ANLA uses a combined household economy and household survey approach to estimate food deficits at the household level. This is done by quantifying the number of kilocalories derived from cereals against a standard minimum daily cereal requirement. Extrapolations across similar agro-ecological zones and demographic (socio-economic) profiles are then used to estimate monthly food deficits at the State and County level. The assessment also looks at other vulnerability factors and coping mechanisms and estimates the number of expected returnees. The analysis for the ANLA is done by WFP-VAM, FEWS, LAF and SSRRC. The results from the ANLA are triangulated with the findings from the annual Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM), and discussed with different stakeholders at the State level. The WFP program unit then uses the figures on projected food deficits and number of returnees to calculate the food aid requirement for a given area.

The annual Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM) lead by FAO, WFP and Government partners, forecasts national level cereal supplies by estimating cereal production, imports and exports. The potential cereal deficit is then calculated by factoring in opening stocks carried over from the previous year, and by estimating cereal utilization and post harvest losses. The ANLA & CFSAM are essentially used for overall planning and allocation of resources at the County level.

Interagency Rapid Needs Assessments (RNA) are periodically carried out in response to reports of events such as insecurity or flooding which may cause vulnerability in a specific area. These reports may come from a variety of sources including the SSRRC and NGOs. These assessments look at water, health, education and food security. The WFP VAM unit participates in these exercises focusing only on food security. This component of the assessment investigates the causes of food insecurity and involves key informant and household interviews using random sampling. Observations of granaries and household food deficits are estimated using kilocalorie quantification. LAF livelihoods baseline profiles are used as part of the analysis. Depending on the type of shock VAM might use socio-economic breakdowns to refine the targeting to specific wealth groups. The overall food deficit is then calculated by multiplying the household deficit by the estimated number of people affected. These estimates might be based on secondary sources, or collected from local authorities. In cases of insecurity related displacement—UNMIS tries to estimate the number of displaced.

During the OLS period a similar approach to geographical targeting was applied with the Annual Needs Assessment (predecessor of the ANLA) and Rapid Needs Assessments (RNA) being the main tools for assessing food insecure communities. These assessments also used HEA as the analytical framework for measuring food insecurity, although the quantification of household food access was not limited to cereals but included...
contributions from all other identifiable food sources. Like the ANLA, the ANA estimated monthly food deficits at the County level for food aid programming planning purposes. During this period the primary focus of these assessments was to quantify a food aid response. Over time some superficial nutrition and livelihood data was included (FAO, 2003). The ANA also served as a planning tool for food security monitoring and area specific assessments.

During the OLS era rapid needs assessments were used to update the findings from the ANA in areas of concern. The methodology was similar to the ANA using HEA but applied to a shorter timeframe (FAO, 2003). More comprehensive Food Security Monitoring Assessments were also carried out during this period. These monitoring assessments used the same methodology as the ANA but again applied to a shorter time frame and smaller geographical area (county or sub-county level). The overall objective of both the RNA's and the Food Security Monitoring Assessments was to refine the geographical and temporal targeting projections from the ANA report.

The majority of the existing (electronic) reports of these monitoring assessments appear to be from the period of and shortly after the 1998 famine when there probably would have been more resources available for data collection exercises.

Targeting methods
In terms of targeting actual households or individuals, at least three main kinds of targeting methods were noted by this study. Administrative methods were described under the stakeholder analysis section above. These are mainly those being followed under the current, targeted food assistance programs. “Hit and run” methods of targeting were often relied on during the OLS era, though they were never formally named this—this term tends to be slang used by WFP staff who remember that era. This method involved mainly identifying airstrips and trying to provide as close to the amount of assessed need for the population assumed to be in that area. Targeting was intended to be universal (blanket coverage), but this wasn’t possible to ensure, given staffing and security constraints. WFP knew that there would be significant taxation or redistribution after humanitarian agency staff left the area. Lastly, there are some participatory or community-based methods that have been used. These include relying on the Chieftaincy system or local traditional authorities, but several other possibilities were noted during the research (described in greater detail in the Section on Participatory Targeting below).

Monitoring and evaluation (PDM)
The findings of the study suggest that very little Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) of WFP assistance is being done in Southern Sudan at the moment. WFP Southern Sudan is in the process of revising its M&E strategy. The new strategy utilizes a results-based management model for monitoring and evaluation, which emphasizes the measurement of process and outcome indicators. The design, training and field testing of the new strategy have more or less been completed and the new system should be operational by the end of 2008.
In the past, WFP carried out both distribution and post-distribution monitoring of GFD in order to monitor the delivery, targeting, and utilization of the assistance. Between 1997 and 2002, where the security situation allowed, distribution monitoring was a standard requirement. Interviews with staff from that era indicated that Post-Distribution Monitoring (PDM) exercises were also frequently carried out one to two months after the actual distribution. Distribution Monitoring (DM) reports would document information on the ration sizes and number and profile of food recipients. Sometimes DM and PDM data collection was merged by collecting information on the utilization and impact during a subsequent distribution.

PDM data would include how much food was received, how much was brought home and how it was utilized in terms of what percentage was consumed, shared, taxed, and so on. This data might be collected using a proportional piling exercise. Using proxy and real indicators of wealth, the assessment would look at the socio-economic (vulnerability) status of the recipient households, to get a better understanding of who actually received the food. The information collected would then be compared to the actual distribution figures from the previous distribution monitoring report. A standardized format for both DM and PDM reports was used to facilitate triangulation.

The lack of a currently functioning monitoring and evaluation system makes any current assessment of targeting impact more difficult. Any conclusions in this report on targeting impact are based solely on interviews conducted by members of the research team.

**Conclusions**

Several points should be highlighted from this discussion. First, targeting policies have changed in the post-war period, moving from what respondents referred to as “hit and run” targeting during the war, towards a system based on registration and verification. But “hit and run” targeting included elements of participation, at least at the level of local traditional leadership, and is probably more instructive to the central questions of this research, which is focused more on complex emergencies than on transitions. This issue is taken up in the next section. Second, the importance of the role of local traditional leadership has declined in the post-war period, and the importance of central GOSS policy makers has increased. Third, given the absence of very much effort in post-distribution monitoring, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the impact of food aid or the method of targeting.
Section III. Participatory Aspects of Targeting

Participation

The concepts of “community” and “participation” are particularly difficult to define even in an abstract sense, much less in an operational sense. Even with the emergence of rights-based and community-based approaches to assistance, these terms are seldom defined. Communities are defined in terms of “primary groups”—indigenous institutions that areascriptive, including kinship ties, traditional political institutions and authority structures and territorial networks around the community or village; and “secondary groups” that include social and economic organizations that often involve voluntary membership (Chazan 1992). It is easy for outsiders to oversimplify local community structures when using the term—overlooking local leadership structures, processes, capacities, resourcefulness and culture. This can be further complicated in the context of a complex emergency. Many conceptions overplay either the “moral economy” aspects of community, or the tendency towards “elite capture” of goods and services in a community—emphasizing that perceptions of community may be more informed by the biases of the observer than the actual tendencies of a given community.

Community-based or participatory approaches may have to do with several objectives. One of these is essentially an instrumental means to an end: to save costs; to improve program performance through better in-depth knowledge of the members of the community; or to improve accessibility. On the other hand, these approaches may be an end in themselves: empowering communities; recognizing the right of communities to have a say in decisions that affect their future and well-being; rebuilding social networks that may have been eroded by conflict or crisis.

The WFP policy on participation states that its “assistance programmes are designed and implemented on the basis of broad-based participation in order to ensure that programme participants (including beneficiaries, national and local governments, civil-society organizations and other partners) contribute their knowledge, skills and resources to processes that influence their lives. WFP will use participatory approaches to bring the poorest and marginalized people into its assistance programmes, strengthen their representation in community structures and overcome gender inequalities by creating opportunities for both women’s and men’s voices to be heard. It will do all this while maintaining sufficient flexibility to ensure its programmes’ suitability to local situations and capacities.”3 Hence WFP’s definition tends to include both of the different categories of objectives for participatory approaches. The policy on community-based targeting (see next section) doesn’t specify a view on the nature of “community” as outlined above. Hence this study sought the broadest interpretation of both terms.

Governance mechanisms and Participation

The Chieftaincy system

The system of Chieftaincy or traditional leadership at the local varies somewhat by location in Southern Sudan, but has been relied upon by WFP as a means of pursuing community based or participatory targeting—meaning that in some sense the views of the recipient community are taken into consideration in the targeting process. Hence the traditional Chieftaincy system is one of the mechanisms of governance and participation to review. Given the locations that the research team visited (Northern Bahr al-Ghazal, Jonglei, and Central Equatoria), the emphasis here is on the Dinka Chieftaincy system, but traditional leadership in all parts of the country has been called upon to play the same role.

In the Dinka Chieftaincy system, the highest level is the paramount Chief **Rais** (Arabic, not Dinka) corresponds roughly with the County. He is appointed from among the Executive Chiefs. He (always a man) is sometimes appointed by his peers, sometimes appointed by government, sometimes rotational among Executive Chiefs. The next highest level is the Executive Chief, **Alam Thiet**. A number of Chiefs compete for this office but the choice is determined by voting (queuing). The one with the longest queue wins. The executive Chief administers an area more or less equivalent to a **Payam**. The Chief or **Alam Chol** might control a section of a **Payam**—sometimes a **Boma** or sometimes a larger or smaller area. Chiefs are selected by registering and campaigning (but privately, not public rallies). These Chiefs are also selected by queuing. Eligible voters in such elections include everyone (men and women) who are initiated into adulthood. The sub-Chief or **Mareng**, is sometimes used interchangeably with the Gol leader **Nhom Gol**. Sometimes there is a separate level in between.

Typically a Gol leader oversees 50-100 households, the lowest level (equivalent to a village headman in Central Equatoria). The Gol leader is selected by community consultation—there is no election. The Chief consults with people in the area. People are nominated, a meeting is called and someone is named by the Chief. He is accountable to the Chief. This person often remains in office for life. Sometimes a new Chief can change them. He can be removed by Chief in the event of complaints or discontent from his community. There is another name for a Gol leader—**Beny Wuot**—the person responsible for overseeing cattle camps. This position requires the ability to resolve conflicts over cattle, grazing or water resources, or fights between the youth. **Beny Wuot** has nothing to do with targeting or assistance. The term **Gol leader** applies in Bahr al-Ghazal, and is responsible for people in his community, and accountable to Chiefs above him.

Roles of the Chiefs include dispute settlement, criminal cases, and inheritance (including wife inheritance). If people can’t resolve conflicts satisfactorily, then they may be referred to Chiefs. Chiefs also traditionally oversaw “hunger courts,” which can enforce some degree of resource redistribution within a clan or lineage to ensure the survival of vulnerable households (Deng 1999). Hunger issues begin at the family level. If relatives can’t help the vulnerable household, then go to Gol leader. The Gol leader can force someone to help—maybe a more distant relative. If that doesn’t work he has to report it to the Chief. As the
aims of traditional authorities relate more to maintaining social relationships and community cohesion rather than addressing inequity, the most food insecure people tend to also be the most marginalized and it is the socially and politically elite that benefit the most from community-based distribution (Matus 2006). These courts continue to function today—reference was made to these in a number of interviews.

With regard to protecting vulnerable groups, therefore, the Chieftaincy system has a number of “downwards” accountability mechanisms built into what at first glance may appear to be a hierarchical system. The Chiefs see themselves as something of a counter-balance to civil administration in the affairs of local communities. There is local variation, but the norm seems to be a consultative process of local governance, but no specific mechanism at the community level that serves as a counter-balance to the power of the Chiefs. There are means of bringing complaints against unresponsive or irresponsible Chiefs, but they tend to involve bringing a complaint to the next higher level in the system.

**Civil administration**

Civil administration is arranged hierarchically by geographic area. States are the first internal administrative unit, overseen by a Governor; counties are overseen by a County Commissioner, and Payams by the Payam Administrator. The lowest administrative unit is the Boma. There are also traditional leaders that correspond roughly with the Boma, Payam and in some cases, County (although the traditional leadership structure does not match exactly with the lower levels of the civil administration). Government management of emergency response is the Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC). SSRRC has a national headquarters in Juba, overseen by the National Chairperson; a Director at the state level, Secretary at the County level and a Supervisor at the Payam level. There are enumerators at a more local level.

Civil administration plays a very important role in targeting—as will be noted from Figure 4 and Table 3. SSRRC is now trying to organize a different means of managing food aid, including targeting, to get away from the way things had been done in the past. According to senior policy makers, lack of government oversight capacity was the reason for Relief Committees and the heavy reliance on the Chieftaincy system in the past. But with a more stable situation in the post-CPA era, the management of food aid in general, and targeting in particular, is subject to greater administrative oversight. There is no particular policy on community participation, although there is a strong reliance on the most localized level of traditional leadership. Nevertheless, there is a fairly strong sense in which the actual voice of community members is not heard very much in civil administration. One SSRRC County official commented on the difficulty of verifying IDPs from among the host community, and was asked if those who had been identified as genuine IDPs could be organized to identify others from their place of origin (see Jebel Kujur case study below), but the official responded, “I cannot work on the basis of a statement from an IDP”—implying that he would require an administrative confirmation of status, rather than face-to-face knowledge of people’s origins, even if this meant a significant delay in identification and provision of assistance (the IDPs in this case had been in this location without assistance for over two months). In that case, prevention of inclusion error seemed to be the highest consideration;
in other cases, it seemed to be the opposite. For example, in response to the flooding in late 2007, the official criterion for receiving assistance was being “flood affected,” not “flood displaced.” Nearly everyone in the area was “affected” in some way or another—and resources that were limited in the first place got spread over an enormous number of people—in effect amounting to almost no assistance at all (see Wath Malual case study below).

In the view of WFP and partner staff, the Chiefs retain a good deal of power locally in the new set-up. Even in the absence of a specific policy regarding community participation in food aid targeting, there is nevertheless the expectation that community groups will make themselves heard if they are being excluded.

SSRRC and local civil administration are responsible for the first step of household targeting—developing lists of vulnerable household; and also for verification of these lists although there is an inter-agency team that assists in verification. In much the same way that people reported the means of bringing a complaint against a Chief as going to the next highest level in the hierarchy, so it is also with civil administration. The team however found several examples of the Chiefs reporting having complained to someone higher in the system about lack of responsivenss on the part of civil administration, but having achieved little success or response.

**Participatory (community-based) targeting practices**

WFP’s definition of participatory or community-based targeting is, “Households or beneficiaries are selected with the participation of community members such as traditional or religious leaders, specially constituted food committees equally composed of women and men, or local authorities, on the basis of criteria developed with the participation of the communities.”

From the literature review of community based targeting practices (WFP 2007), a number of practices emerge that define community based targeting (and distribution) more fully. These can be summarized as: community participation (through a relief committee or other representatives) in:

- Assessing food insecurity;
- Setting targeting criteria;
- Overseeing registration and verification processes;
- Oversight of distribution points and distribution; or
- Oversight of monitoring (targeting criteria, food baskets and end use of food).

This section briefly reviews the evidence on various mechanisms of community participation in targeting, looking specifically at the role of the traditional leaders or Chiefs,

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the history of Relief Committees, and other examples of community participation or potential participation in the current era.

The traditional authorities (Chiefs)
Harragin argues that the Chieftaincy/kinship system is a “tried and tested famine survival mechanism” (1998:55) that does a good job of protecting the majority of the population as long as there are sufficient resources to go around. His solution therefore would be to ensure a generous early intervention rather than a targeted late one, and to distribute aid to all lineages in the area fairly according to numbers rather than need. The key is for aid agencies to select the appropriate Chief to represent different groups (e.g. gol or lineage leader to target a lineage, or the sub Chief to target a whole wut containing several lineages). Not only would this distribution system remove the stigma of ‘handouts,’ it also reaffirms the indigenous system of sharing and wealth distribution that sustains people in times of scarcity when there is no aid.

Note that while there may be consultation, it is the Chiefs who have all the decision-making authority. The WFP definition of CBT includes either participatory mechanisms like Relief Committees (introduced from outside) and also working with traditional leaders (indigenous practices). So the examples talked about today would fit into WFP definition except that there was actually little true targeting during the war. The Chief system seems to have worked fairly well to prevent exclusion, but there wasn’t much targeting in the sense of ensuring that some people received and some did not. It is a different story in the post-conflict era.

Harragin (1998) argues that local systems of accountability exist as any abuse of assistance by lineage leaders would be considered an offense against accepted standards of Dinka behavior and tried in local courts. This observation is supported by the findings of Duffield et al. (2000), which state that although local people did not necessarily protest the diversion of food aid to the SPLA, the sale of relief items for personal enrichment has led to the removal of some commanders. The key is to understand the local principles that govern the distribution of aid and to observe the extent to which abuses of aid are reaching local courts (Harragin 1998). Local staff who understand local dynamics but are not directly involved in implementation can play an important monitoring role (Jaspars 2000).

Relief Committees
Relief Committees were introduced in Southern Sudan by WFP and SRRA in 1994, and continued to be used as a mechanism for overseeing targeting and distribution until 1999. Some of this experience has already been described above. With an emphasis on empowering women and attempting to ensure that food aid got to women in the community, the Relief Committees (RCs) were typically made up of seven women and six men. The strong emphasis was placed on women for three reasons: first, to make use of their customary role in managing and storing grain; second, to avoid bias and abuse of power by Chiefs; and third, to enhance the empowerment of women in their communities. The strategy of relying on RCs assumed that including women in decision making about
targeting would increase the likelihood that food would reach those most in need (Taylor et al. 2004).

In practice, the system actually disempowered women and turned some into scapegoats for the inadequate levels of resources reaching vulnerable communities during the famine. Under the RC system in some areas, village groupings would gather on the day of food distribution and elect a representative called the *tieng wai* (woman with a stick) who would select the actual beneficiaries. She would be told the number of households to select, and only that number of women to be targeted from each village. However, most observers agree that the system of relief committees not only failed to reach the most vulnerable, it also made the women involved even more socially vulnerable. The *tieng wai* had no way of assessing the circumstances of the entire village or social unit and was thus unable to base selection on objective criteria of need. The system put all the responsibility or blame for exclusion or inclusion errors on the *tieng wai*, inadvertently placing her in a particularly precarious position. Deng (1999) accounts how this system was quite alien, and undermined the traditional Chieftaincy system in which there were built-in checks. While the structure of Relief Committees appeared to be democratic and gender-balanced, it not only failed to achieve its goals of targeting the needy and promoting women’s empowerment because it imposed external perceptions of gender equity and vulnerability, it also made the women involved the scapegoats for resource inadequacy whereas the responsibility for ensuring that no one starved should have rested with WFP, SRRA and the Chiefs.

Only a small handful of respondents in this study recalled the *tieng wai* system. In fact, among most of the community groups interviewed, there is only limited recollection of the role of RCs during the war. For the most part, that role had little to do with targeting. The main roles recalled by respondents in this study included helping to prepare and manage the drop-zones and distribution centers, serving as a complaint mechanism, and overseeing distribution. Although discredited as a result of the wartime experience with RCs, some WFP Cooperating Partners are now trying to reintroduce RCs again. This is not WFP or SSRRC policy but mainly the initiative of NGOs, and not necessarily for the purpose of overseeing food aid distribution, but rather to help oversee local development initiatives generally. Interviews with at least three NGOs, two of them partners of WFP, indicated this trend.

**Alternative mechanisms**

Although officially the Relief Committee system and the Chieftaincy system are the two mechanisms that have been used to ensure community participation in the targeting process, the research team attempted to find both actual and potential ways in which community groups mobilize themselves to play a role in targeting. Several examples were found, which are presented in the following case studies. The first case study is an example that occurred during the visit of the research team. It involved people from Southern Juba County, currently displaced as a result of several attacks by a faction of the Lord’s Resistance (LRA) during the talks with the Government of Uganda. It illustrates a combination of community self-mobilization, reliance on Chiefs (or electing new leaders in the event that Chiefs get separated from their communities during displacement), and the
role of non-traditional leaders. But it also crucially involves the acceptance of community processes by WFP, SSRRC, and other official stakeholders in the targeting process.

Case Study 1: IDP Community self-organization for targeting and registration at Jebel Kujur

In January and February 2008, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA, or “Orontongtong” in the local language—“those who cut people up”) attacked the Payams of Wanduruba and Katigri in southern Juba County, some 100 miles south of Juba. The first attack in late January resulted in several children being abducted, but little displacement. After a second and third attack in early to mid February, people feared for the safety of their children. The objective of the attacks seemed to be to abduct children and youth between the ages of 10 and 20 years—sixteen youth were abducted in the second attack. Five adult women were also killed. The youth of the Payam counter-attacked and the situation became extremely unsafe. So people fled their villages, going either to the Payam center where they were given some protection by an SPLA detach after the second LRA attack, or to Juba. Eventually over 2,000 people fled to Juba for the safety of the town, even though it was quite a distance from their village. Some came after the second attack in early February, some came after the third attack on February 12.

In Juba, people at first relied on assistance from relatives, but it was clear that they were an additional strain on already limited resources among their own kin, and eventually most of the IDPs converged on a church near Jebel Kujur, that had been constructed for people displaced from their area during the early stages of the SPLA war. Here they reported themselves to the SSRRC and appealed for assistance.

An initial SSRRC registration noted some 450 people displaced from Wanduruba and Katigri in the vicinity of the church at Jebel Kujur, and a joint assessment was organized. This was to be followed by verification and distribution for that many people. Upon verifying individuals, the intent was to issue ration cards and instruct people to proceed directly to receive their distribution (organized to include food and NFIs). However, upon arrival at the site for the verification exercise, it was clear that four to five times that many people had showed up when word got out that WFP was going to distribute food. Many of the IDPs complained that they had been left off the initial registration (they were still in the process of arriving in Juba—indeed, the third attack had occurred just two days prior to the distribution, and only a few of the people displaced by the third attack had arrived in Juba by that point). People were also complaining that many of those lining up to be registered were not displaced—in fact many were people who didn’t even come from the affected area. Eventually it became quite clear that many of those lining up were from Juba, not from Katigri or Wanduruba. Eventually 2,440 people were counted. This number was rejected by the verification team.

SSRRC tried to get people to line up to re-do their initial registration, but the situation became chaotic and the police were called in to maintain order. Eventually the verification and food distribution was suspended; WFP and the verification team left the site without
having distributed any food, leaving SSRRC to re-do the registration list and present it later for verification.

Realizing that the situation was on the verge of getting out of control, and realizing that SSRRC was powerless to distinguish genuine IDPs from other people in the area, one of the partners suggested that the displaced people to form themselves into groups according to the village from which they came. A pastor who had been displaced along with others from the area affected by the LRA attacks helped to organize this effort, and asked each group to locate their village headman if he had also been displaced to Juba. The idea was that people from individual villages knew each other, and could vouch for whether or not they had been displaced by the attacks. There were eleven affected villages from Wanduruba Payam and five from Katigri. Soon the IDPs had organized themselves into 16 groups. Some of the headmen (village assistant Chiefs) were present, some were not. In the case where the village headman had not been displaced to Juba, each group elected a temporary headman, and also elected one woman so that each village would have two representatives—one man and one woman. This group constituted a committee to assist the pastor, who was recognized as a leader from the area but who played mainly a facilitative role. With this committee helping, the SSRRC team was then able to count the people, identifying people genuinely displaced by the LRA attacks. The people were actually staying in various different places—there was no “camp” per se, so people had to be counted and registered while there were all in the same location. By the day following the suspended distribution, all the genuine IDPs had been identified and counted. The total came to 1,632.

SSRRC took the new list back to WFP. WFP staff still had some misgivings about inclusion error, but since the list had been verified by representatives of the IDPs themselves, it was approved, and the distribution of food and non-food items proceeded the same day. Rather than issuing ration cards, WFP relied on the combination of the lists, and the committee constituted of one male and one female leader from each village to verify that the name on the list and person receiving assistance matched. The committee constituted by village representatives, and the SSRRC, noted that there were no complaints about either exclusion or inclusion during the distribution. Recipients subsequently verified that they had received the correct WFP ration for one person for one month. The IDPs also received non-food items from Med Air at the same distribution. The recipients were not told whether there would be any subsequent distributions, but insofar as the situation has not stabilized in their home Payams, they are expecting that the same system will remain in place for a distribution in March. However, none expressed any desire to remain in Juba if the situation improves in their home Payams.

More people continued arriving from the affected areas, and this mechanism continues to be used to identify people displaced by the attacks. Most of these were displaced by the third attack, which took place on February 12th. The events in Juba described above took place on February 14th and 15th. A similar registration process took place on February 27th to identify to the newly arrived. As of the time of the interviews, an additional 518 had arrived, making a total of 2,150 individuals.
A second example regards returnees from Uganda, settling near the boundary of Juba and Magwi Counties in Central Equatoria. This case also involves an element of voluntary action on the part of members of the community who, for various reasons, is recognized as a trusted leader, even though he is neither a Chief nor an elected official.

**Case Study 2. Registration of returnees outside the Chieftaincy structure, Kit One**

The area of Kit had been peaceful under SPLA control for many years during the war, but the area was attached by the LRA in 2001, forcing everyone from the area to leave—most went to Uganda and were accommodated at the refugee camp at Kiryandongo. Since May of 2007, they have been returning—about 1,500 people so far. While there is little problem identifying and serving those who return under the aegis of UNHCR, about one third of returnees so far in this location are “spontaneous” returnees, who do not have identification or registration cards enabling them to receive assistance. These returnees are coping with the surroundings when they come back, but it was perceived as unfair that the organized ones (who also received all the assistance in Uganda) got all the assistance when they came home.

One of the first returnees to the area was tasked by FAO, during an assessment of the area in 2007, to draw up a list of people living there so that they could all be assisted with seeds and tools (the presumption being that all were engaged in agricultural livelihoods). This particular individual had preceded the Chiefs of the area in returning after the security situation permitted, and came to be looked upon as something similar to a Chief, even though he does not hold any title. However, he came to be recognized, not only by FAO but also by both the community and SSRRC/WFP, as the point person for registration of returnees. He has been collecting the names of spontaneous returnees and giving them to SSRRC and WFP. Insofar as he has the blessing of the Chief, and the lists can be cross-checked by standard verification procedures, his lists have come to be accepted by the authorities. He has also been entrusted to receive and oversee distribution of assistance as well. He not only has the lists of returnees themselves, but also the waybills for delivery of assistance, and the records of distribution. He is not a Chief (though he says he was asked if he would accept an appointment as a Chief, which he declined). He has no formal relationship with SSRRC.

There are some ethnic tensions in Kit, unlike many other places visited. There are four communities (Acholi, Madi, Bari, and Loluba—with the majority being either Acholi or Bari) and some difference in view as to which administrative district the community belongs to. This makes for some confusion as to who should serve people in this location. However, there is no pronounced ethnic difference between the “formal” and “spontaneous” returnee groups, and the Chiefs both the two major communities in Kit—Acholi and Bari—accept his lists as genuine, as does SSRRC and WFP.

The spontaneous returnees have not yet received their assistance, but SSRRC confirmed that the lists have been accepted as genuine, and the three-month assistance package would be distributed in March.
A third example is more of a potential case of community engagement in targeting, rather than an actual one. It involves a community seriously affected by the flooding in Northern Bahr al-Ghazal in late 2007. There was limited assistance available for people affected by the floods, but that assistance seemed to be spread among people displaced by the floods, people who were “affected” but not displaced (meaning that perhaps their access was temporarily cut off), and people who appeared to be unaffected. This caused serious complaints from those who lost both their houses and their 2007 crops.

**Case Study 3. Flood response in Wath Malual—the potential for participatory targeting**

Heavy rains in September and October 2007 caused widespread flooding in Northern Bahr al-Ghazal and Warrap States. Food assistance to the flood displaced was a major category of General Food Distribution response in the 2007 program, but the emergency occurred late in the year when stocks were depleted.

One typical case was Wath Malual village. Besides heavy rains, additional flooding was caused by road construction, which blocked the flow of a river. No bridge had been built, only a culvert—as the water rose from the heavy rains, the culvert couldn’t handle the extra water, and the whole area flooded quite rapidly, inundating the crops as they approached maturity, destroying houses and displacing many people.

Given the destruction and the displacement, response to the floods was a high priority of the GOSS. The SSRRC organized a distribution of grain, but each affected household was given only 9 kilograms of grain—less than enough for one week even though some people had lost both their house and their crops. And people complained that many of those displaced by the floods were left out of the distribution, while “many of those lining up to receive food were people we didn’t recognize.” People were told that those whose houses had been destroyed would be compensated, but to date have not received any compensation (the destroyed houses are still in evidence—people don’t want to clear away the wreckage so they can prove the destruction). There was a strong difference in view as to the criterion for targeting those to receive the assistance—those whose crops or houses were destroyed thought that assistance was for “flood-displaced”; others thought the criterion was simply “flood-affected.” But to many it appeared as though a blanket distribution to everyone in the community was organized, but one which nevertheless missed a number of people. There was a subsequent distribution of food that was more limited, but again the targeting criteria weren’t clear to residents of the village.

Some of the exclusion error was a matter of poor information—the date of the registration was not announced. Some people happened to be away when the registration took place, and thus received no assistance. There appeared to have been no verification of the list of names registered to receive assistance—several women
reported that their names were written down on the day of the registration, but when cards were passed out, their names were not called. In short, there was a strong perception of error—both inclusion and exclusion—on the part of the immediate community that was flooded.

To get a sense of the error, a group proportional piling exercise was conducted. However, rather than treating the counters (lalop seeds in this case), to represent proportions, the group took one lalop seed to be one household, which they named, and then put either into “displaced” or “not displaced” piles. This went on until the entire village had been enumerated (99 lalop seeds in all). Forty six households had been displaced, and had been forced to move to protected ground on the other side of the new road (which effectively acted as a levy to keep the flood water out). Fifty three households had not been displaced. Then each group (displaced and not displaced) was further divided according to who had received assistance and who had not. The final piling exercise looked like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Received Assistance</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4. Inclusion and Exclusion at Wath Malual

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Displaced by Floods</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>41.30%</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even the high level of inclusion error shown in Table 4 did include people from outside the immediate village. Much of the food and NFIs went to people unknown to the local villagers. Whether this was inclusion error or just the unannounced consolidation of distribution for several villages is unknown. Little information was made available to Wath Malual residents throughout the exercise. But the perception was that assistance intended for them was going to other people from outside the village (and therefore outside the area affected by this particular flooding event).

The discussion by the group was very animated, but not heated. Many of the displaced-but-excluded group were present; some of those who had been included even though they were not displaced were involved in the discussion—but there didn’t seem to be any particular embarrassment about this. One woman noted that among this group were people who had hosted the displaced people, and “we have to think of them, since they shared the little they had with the people who were displaced.”

Members of the group had different views on the “fair” way to target assistance:
“The fair way would be to first distribute to all those who were displaced and anything remaining should be shared by the others.”
“The problem is that we are not given authority. If food is for this Payam, whoever brings food here decides who should get it, never the community.”
“The only way is to bring the assistance, and call the community”
“The only way to get the right list is to go from house to house and see which ones are destroyed, and then get the owner to swear on the Bible that “this is my house.” (Caused lots of laughter).
“It would be too difficult to discriminate amongst relatives and neighbors in the local community—better to just divide the aid equally.”

Everyone agreed that, unlike during the war when the objective of targeting was to avoid excluding anyone, in this case, too many people were included, without regard for how badly they had been affected, and as a result, everyone got only a little assistance—hardly enough to be of any help at all to those who lost their crops and houses. The Chief (interviewed subsequently) indicated that he tried to prevent people from outside the village being targeted, but claimed he was powerless to do so.

Discussion of the case studies. These cases are far too few to draw any firm conclusions, but several tentative conclusions can be suggested from these cases:

First, there is almost always some tendency towards inclusion error on the part of formal or traditional leaders, because they are responsible to the whole community. Members of various communities noted that relying on the traditional leadership system worked well during the war, when the object was to avoid excluding anyone, but it does not work so well when more targeted interventions are required (in the case of flood victims or current IDPs), or when it is difficult to distinguish between spontaneous returnees and other people in the receiving community.

Second, members of the affected community have a very good idea of what happened and to whom; who is a genuine case for being targeted for assistance and who is not, within their own local communities. This capability seemed to be present across all cases, but the chances of actually acting on the capability seemed to be greater in communities that had been in exile and were exposed to different ideas and perhaps greater education opportunity while there.

Third, if recognized by the authorities, communities could allocate resources for response according to a set of criteria with less error—though it would remain to be seen how contentious this would be. But community-based targeting would only work if actively supported from above (both the traditional leaders and the civil administration), and many people didn’t think this would happen very often, although the examples above show that it does occasionally happen.
Fourth, these cases involved very clear criteria—with more or less yes/no answers to questions regarding eligibility (displaced/non-displaced; returnee/non-returnee). It is less clear what would happen with “fuzzy” criteria—for example, “vulnerability.” There are lots of different criteria listed by both the humanitarian agencies and community groups themselves for vulnerability, and while the lists of criteria showed a fair amount of overlap, few of the criteria had clear, yes/no answers. Taken together, these criteria amount to a vast continuum of status with no clear cut-off point. Under these circumstances, the tendency from focus group interviews seemed to be equal sharing. Even though some were better off that others, there was no clear or non-contentious way to distinguish between them.

Fifth, these cases dealt with small residential village groups who knew each other on a face-to-face basis—that intimate knowledge of each other and each other’s circumstances is what all of these cases rely on. Dealing on a larger scale than this requires a mechanism that people trust. The people from the different villages in Katigri and Wanduruba obviously trusted the pastor to ensure that all village groups “played by the same rules”; the people at Wath Malual didn’t trust SSRRC to enforce the same rules.

Sixth, poor information can cause mistrust in and of itself, and undermine people’s confidence. Spontaneous returnees at Kit were confident that they would receive their assistance, because they knew what they were entitled, and knew that others who had been registered through the same mechanism had received assistance. So even though none of them had received anything, there was little complaint about whether they would. People at Wath Malual received little information about eligibility criteria, about the time and place of registration, and about how many different locations were to be included—hence they distrusted the whole process.

Seventh, when trust “upwards” (i.e., beyond the group that know each other face to face) breaks down, the tendency is to try to include everyone “downwards” (i.e., within your own group). To summarize the tendency of traditional village leadership from these cases and many others, it would be “include downwards, and exclude upwards” (if you can).

Summarizing, then, there would seem to be scope for greater involvement of local community groups in localized targeting, but some constraints have to be addressed. There are discussed in the conclusions.

**The impact of targeting practices on humanitarian protection**

**The OLS era**

In more latter years of the war, one of the objectives of the EMOP became promoting the peace process, and throughout the war period, one of the objectives had always been to prevent stress migration. Various observers have noted that the manipulation of food aid and other relief assistance often directly affected the conflict, through the mechanism of forcing civilian populations to move. There is significant evidence that the way food aid was targeted directly affected migration and displacement. During the war, food aid was used to
both intentionally and inadvertently displace populations. The Government of Sudan was accused of using relief to depopulate certain parts of the south, particularly areas that are rich in oil (Keen 1999). Populations also voluntarily moved away from their locations to places where they could receive food. However, the literature on this subject is mostly about events leading up to the 1998 Bahr al-Ghazal famine. For example, during the 1998 Bahr al-Ghazal famine, for instance, the GOS restricted relief flight access to Ajiep and three nearby airstrips, forcing large numbers of people to congregate at those airstrips waiting for food aid (Duffield et al 2000). ICRC reported that 47,000 people arrived in Wau in May 1998 in response to the availability of relief food—an influx of 1,000-2,000 people per day (ICRC News Releases as found in Rhodes 2002). This concentration of people at food distribution sites had serious implications for increased spread of disease and mortality, particularly given the absence of adequate water and sanitation services.

There were instances when the timely delivery of food aid was able to prevent people from succumbing to stress migration in search of food, and permitted people to stay in their home area instead of being displaced to the north, or as they described it, “surrendering” (Duffield et al. 2000). During the 1987-8 famine in Bahr al-Ghazal, lack of assistance resulted in large-scale migration.

Other impacts of food aid targeting on protection were clearly detrimental, such as distribution points that were raided by militias from Kordofan and Darfur. The SPLM/SRRA/OLS Task Force noted in 1998 that the proportion of food aid provided as tax depended on the community’s need for protection from raids—one of the few times that diversion of assistance has been considered a form of protection. In addition, targeting food aid to one area or group over another can create internal tensions or resentment. Nuer from Ayod, for example, were recruited into militias to raid Dinka areas around Kongor and Bor in part because of a perceived neglect in relief operations in Nuer areas (Keen 1999).

Conversely, food aid did have some positive effects on reducing conflict within communities. The injection of food assistance made people less likely to resort to criminal or violent misappropriation of food. Some may even benefit indirectly when aid is stolen, as the price of food in markets tends to drop. Effective management of food assistance at least has the potential to diminish conflict, and in doing so, to disrupt the activities of those who benefit from conflict (Keen 1999). The historical evidence of the manipulation of food aid, and the undermining of protection objectives, mostly results from the studies in the late 1990s or early 2000s, and as such may not reflect current reality.

The current era
There is less evidence of a clear link between targeting practices and protection in the current, post-CPA era. Physical protection against abuses is less an issue than during the war, and in fact particularly vulnerable groups—such as IDPs who had not yet been verified and therefore were ineligible for assistance, at least in the short term—reported that the local police were protecting them from harm. But they were sleeping in the open for several months, and surviving only by collecting and selling natural resources—mainly grass for mat weaving. In other words, their vulnerability was more related to access to
assistance than protection from gross violations or physical harm. But in this sense, the connection between the targeting policy and protection was a negative one, at least in the short term. In other words, the emphasis of the targeting policy seemed to be placing high priority on avoiding inclusion errors, at the expense of potentially damaging exclusion errors. (Note, however, that this would be generally in line with the new policy about making assistance much more “targeted.”).

Several of WFP’s Cooperating Partners mentioned reinstating Relief Committees, at least in part to help out with situations like this, serving as a complaints mechanism (in addition to other more traditional roles like helping with crowd control at distributions). Few people, including community groups in the affected areas, had heard of these new RCs, however. During the war, the Chiefs would be held accountable for serious errors of exclusion within their area—a view reported not only by the Chiefs themselves, but also by community members and civil administrators. The other area of apparently significant exclusion is with regard to returnees—not only “spontaneous” returnees, but also vulnerable members of receiving communities who may be worse off than many of the returnees. With the somewhat diminished role of the Chiefs in the post-CPA era, it is less clear who is accountable for exclusion. As during the war, being displaced away from one’s traditional leader was a real source of vulnerability—at least where communities and their Chiefs were displaced in the same location, the Chief could assert some claim on behalf of his people.

Including the voice of community groups in targeting practices could potentially strengthen protection, and reduce the harm caused by exclusion error or significant delay in provision of assistance. But this will require a shift in policy, and as noted above, probably a higher prioritization by senior management not only of WFP but also of SSRRC.

**Conclusions**

Several points should be highlighted from this discussion. First, a number of forms of local governance and several alternative mechanisms for targeting were noted in the study. Several of these fit the WFP definition of community-based targeting. Working through local chiefs was the prevalent form during the war, and generally more in line with the notion of community-based targeting. Local administration has been more active since the war, a more administrative approach. Relief committees had a brief and not very exemplary existence during the war. Second, several alternative mechanisms were noted during the study that either did or could potentially do a better job of targeting through a more participatory approach. But for these to work, they require some political space that doesn’t formally exist within current policies, and which sometime happens on the ground and sometimes does not. When managers in the field make space, evidence found here suggests that these mechanisms work better than externally driven mechanisms for improving targeting. Third, none of the mechanisms noted here involved setting the criteria for selecting recipients, only in applying criteria to a given population. And all still involved post-distribution sharing. Fourth, targeting food aid has important implications for protection. Access to food aid was used deliberately by the GOS during the war to coerce the movement of population into or out of certain areas. Post distribution raiding of recipients was a significant risk during the war. In the post-war era, the most salient issue
is simply access to food, particularly by protected groups such as internally displaced people. Evidence given here would suggest that a more participatory form of targeting would help to reduce the protection risks implied in the small-scale displacement that continues to occur because of localized conflict or incursions of militias from Kordofan and Darfur.
Section IV. Conclusions

“Games,” numbers, and getting away from the “OLS mentality”

Surrounding the entire task of targeting in contemporary Southern Sudan—from assessing need, to allocating resources and ensuring that the resources reach the groups that actually need them—is the sense of a “game” in which different players have different incentives, but each is trying to gauge the intentions of the other. This notion of a “game” so pervades the food aid enterprise that it inevitably affected this research: When foreigners show up in a white Toyota vehicle (whether identified as WFP or not), the assumption is clearly made that someone has come to assess “needs” and make recommendations about how and to whom assistance should be provided (and it often took 30-45 minutes of discussion before community groups came to accept that assessments and response recommendations were not the objective of the research team).

This “game” is one in which each party is trying to anticipate and outwit the other: communities and local leaders are suspected by agencies of inflating numbers, and any behavior made will be interpreted in this manner. WFP is expected to complain and be predicted to demand that the number be reduced. A local leader may well veer towards including a few extra beneficiaries from among his own group, while trying to keep others in the same position from doing the same thing. Other agencies may be caught somewhere in the middle. This often boils down into a debate over the number of actual recipients.

However, this haggling over the number of beneficiaries is not really targeting. It involves targeting, because inflated lists almost certainly involve inclusion error. But getting the list down to a “realistic size” (whatever that is) doesn’t necessarily mean that a good job of targeting has been accomplished. This study has turned up some evidence (as yet not conclusive) that community involvement can help target the right people—including the possibility of targeting everyone in some circumstances. But this means working with extremely localized community groups—on the level of the Gol or village. It will almost certainly be impossible for WFP or partner staff to work at that level, because there just is not enough staff, or enough time for the staff/community interaction. So the exact modality of working with communities has yet to be worked out. Further, the question of the objective of community-based targeting is also unresolved—is it simply to do a better job of targeting? Or is it because of an imperative that communities be empowered to make decisions about things that affect them and their future?

In line with the new policy of the Government of Southern Sudan and WFP’s own policy, there is a major effort under way to not only change the nature of food assistance programming, but to change the expectations and incentives associated with the manner in which food assistance was provided during the OLS era. This is based on the presumption that food aid led to dependency during that era, and that people still have the tendency to “look to the sky” for food assistance. The policy is embodied in the move away from free food distributed to everyone, and towards more targeted kinds of programs—with the Returnee Program dominating in the medium term, but with food assistance targeted to vulnerable areas through FFW, FFE, and nutritional support programs in the longer term;
and with GFD reserved mainly to response to transitory problems that may be caused by specific shocks (the floods of 2007 or displacement caused by localized conflict being the two most obvious).

Despite the expectation from the literature to the contrary, the evidence from Southern Sudan suggests that community-based targeting was practiced to a greater extent during the war—primarily through the Chieftaincy system—than during the current, post-conflict era. During the war, the main emphasis was on avoiding exclusion errors, and the Chieftaincy system incorporated sufficient accountability mechanisms to ensure that this occurred within the community, and other incentives or mechanisms had to be relied on to ensure that vulnerable people from outside the community (particularly internally displaced people without Chiefly representation) were not excluded. In the post-CPA era, there is greater emphasis on targeting certain groups, which by definition means including some and excluding others. The Chieftaincy system is less well adapted to these goals, and the targeting of assistance in the post CPA era has, if anything, become more administrative and less community-based in order to achieve this goal.

Conclusions and recommendations of the study
A number of tentative findings are suggested by this study. There is significant (though not necessarily conclusive) evidence of the ability of community groups themselves to do a better job of targeting intended recipients when they are permitted to do so, and when the criteria for such targeting are clear. It is not clear that the “space” for communities to do their own targeting is likely to be created in the short term, and probably less likely that communities will be able to set their own criteria for targeting, even when community groups are called upon to help apply externally generated criteria. Given the nature of this “game,” creating that space will require time and effort. While possible, it is not clear that creating this space is a priority. Senior management of both WFP and SSRRC indicated that improved targeting is high on their list of priorities (including community-based elements of targeting if that improves overall targeting effectiveness). However, at the Sub-Office and local administrative level, it was clear that other demands on limited staff time and capacities is likely to relegate targeting to relatively low-priority status. Given the nature of the observations here about the kind of staff/community interaction required to enhance the capacity for community participation in targeting or other elements of managing food aid and other forms of humanitarian assistance, it seems unlikely that major strides will be made in terms of building community capacity for targeting, unless really prioritized from above.

While in many ways this study was too constrained in terms of time and geographic access to draw firm conclusions, the following findings tends to be verified by the existing literature on targeting in Southern Sudan.

General findings
1. In general, vulnerable groups in communities have relatively little influence over targeting policy. They have some influence over targeting practice through post-distribution sharing of resources, and occasionally through direct engagement in targeting procedures.
When given the opportunity, however, community groups demonstrate that they have the knowledge to improve local targeting significantly. Where criteria are clear (flood displacement, conflict displacement) community groups could play a much stronger role in identifying who should received assistance.

2. There is a general issue about the clarity of targeting criteria. Where criteria are not clearly defined (i.e., general vulnerability, food insecurity) targeting practices have been equally ill-defined. Though the formal participation of community groups in targeting under those circumstances has been limited, there would probably be a tendency towards equal sharing of limited resources. There was a strong tendency from communities during the war towards the general sharing of assistance—a tendency towards general or blanket distribution rather than targeted distribution. Where criteria are more clearly specified (i.e., flood or conflict displacement) administrative targeting is resulting in substantial inclusion and exclusion errors because it isn’t always clear exactly who is affected. Examples were shown here where community involvement improved targeting, because community members knew better who was affected and to what extent—the main way in which community participation was a more effective means to the end of improved targeting.

3. External (WFP, SSRRC, NGO) and internal (community) definitions of vulnerability and who deserves assistance are not the same. The community perspective on who should receive assistance is both longer-term (looking beyond “current vulnerability”) and retrospective (remembering past experience) than is the perspective of SSRRC, WFP and NGOs. Among other things, this results in widespread sharing of food assistance.

4. Where food is genuinely scarce, it will tend to flow first to the more powerful people in the community, with implications for trying to specifically target the most vulnerable. The ethic that food belongs to everyone—perceived to be an impediment to improved targeting—actually helps to ensure that everyone gets something, but “sharing” does not mean “equity.”

5. In general, there is a strong involvement of traditional leaders in selecting beneficiaries (targeting) and overseeing distribution of assistance. This was especially the case during the war, when it served as a reasonable mechanism for preventing exclusion within the community. The role of traditional leaders is somewhat diminished in the post-conflict era.

6. Now that the war is over, the trend is to get the targeting process more “organized,” but this translates into making the system more oriented towards administrative (“top-down”) processes, not more participatory (“bottom-up”) processes, at least in the short term.

7. In general, at the most localized level, there is a strong degree of accountability of traditional leaders to the communities they lead. This ensures that the wishes of the majority are generally served, but it also is intended to ensure that vulnerable people are not left out. The accountability to people outside the community (i.e., displaced) is less well developed. Traditional leaders are fairly powerful in preventing exclusion errors at the level of decision making for which they are responsible, but fairly powerless to prevent inclusion errors from outside their area of control. At almost all levels of leadership observed, there is a tendency towards inclusion “downwards” (include everyone for whom the leader is responsible) and towards exclusion “upwards” (i.e., try to limit the extent to which assistance benefits people under someone else’s leadership)
8. Regardless of leadership mode or level of participation, many vulnerable groups are excluded simply because of the late arrival of resources. This has been the case throughout the war, and continues to be the case in the current era. Late arrival of assistance is a form of under-coverage error, and can also result in inclusion error if food is distributed in the post-harvest season when it is not needed.

9. Many processes observed are not very transparent (for example, little information about entitlements provided to community; not clear when registration or distribution are going to take place) and if people are not literate, they may not know what or how to inquire about this information. Greater transparency and information across the boards would be helpful. People often claim to have no information about what their entitlement is, what day registration is to be held, what day distributions are to be, or how often they are supposed to be.

10. There is very little in the way of post-distribution monitoring—it is therefore very difficult to determine quantitatively the extent of targeting error.

11. There seem to be some fairly serious grievances over targeting, including the exclusion of some groups, particularly:
   - Between targeted and non-targeted groups;
   - Between IDP groups and host communities; and
   - Between returnees and “receiving” communities.

12. This partially because the perception is that returnees or IDPs are not necessarily any worse off than are the receiving or host community members. In some cases, returnees are significantly better off, but are still targeted for assistance whereas “receiving” community members are not, unless there is an accompanying FFR program.

13. During times of conflict, targeting practices directly affect protection; in the post-conflict era, the direct effects are less obvious. Including the voice of community groups in targeting practices could potentially strengthen protection.

Findings on “enabling” and “constraining” factors to participatory targeting
A number of factors were identified that tend to constrain or enable community participation in targeting. Again, due to the limitations of the study described in the Methods Annex, this set of factors is probably suggestive rather than conclusive. These are divided into internal and external factors.

Internal factors
   1. Factors such as higher levels of education, exposure to other places, and the level of development of civil society all contribute to community engagement in targeting—both in having the ideas about how to do it, and in asserting their right to do it.

   2. The legitimacy of authority is very important where traditional leaders represent the community in targeting processes. This includes:
      - Relative autonomy from government—the ability and intent to do what is best for the community.
• Whether elected or appointed by some other community process, the question is about the accountability of leaders, and to whom?
• The level of popular “voice” in traditional governance is an enabling factor
• Fear of speaking out is a constraining factor

3. Cultural factors, including:
• The perception of external aid as something to be shared by all (i.e., not targeted) can be an enabling factor under some circumstances, or a constraint under others, depending on what the targeting imperative is. In the Sudan case, when avoidance of exclusion was the imperative (during the war) this perception was a strong enabling factor. In the post war era, it has probably served to dilute the impact of more assistance more specifically targeted to particular groups.
• A strong cultural tradition of reciprocity can also be an enabling factor or a constraining factor, depending on circumstances. This tends to focus the issue of “vulnerability” in a much longer timeframe than humanitarian agencies are used to thinking. A major question for programmers not deeply familiar with the culture is how to distinguish between reciprocity between relatively wealthier and relatively more impoverished members of a community from exploitation of the poor by wealthier or more powerful groups.

4. The role of facilitating individuals should not be ignored. In both the Kit and Jebel Kujur examples explored above, specific individuals played key roles without their having been appointed or elected to those roles:
• If the circumstances are right, these individuals tend to be self-identifying.
• How such individuals are “managed” by the authorities (traditional leaders, civil administrators, humanitarian agencies) is very important to the kind of role they play.
• The “right circumstances” may have to do with such factors as the extent of the development of civil society organizations and levels of education, but also have to do with the legitimacy of the individual, which in turn has to do with how much the community trust him or her. These are extremely difficult issues for external agency staff to gauge, unless extremely familiar with local dynamics.

5. Monitoring and evaluation can enable management to change targeting strategies or fine-tune approaches much more readily. In this case, however, it is more accurate to say that inadequate monitoring and evaluation (particularly post-distribution monitoring) is a serious constraint to being able to target better. There is little expectation on the part of WFP staff that monitoring and evaluation will improve—in fact there is some expectation that funding will be cut even more—so there is little way to test the relationship between good monitoring and good targeting.

External factors
1. The type of “shock” or causal factors behind the food security crisis may play an important role.
2. It has long been believed that conflict and displacement make community-based processes much more difficult; whereas “natural” shocks such as drought or flooding do not. The evidence in this case indicates that the issue is not so much the type of shock *per se* as it is the loss of leadership and representation: communities are more likely to be separated from their leaders in a violent displacement context than in a “natural” disaster.

3. Policy of national governments and humanitarian agencies plays a very important role

- First, policy will determine the amount of “space” for community participation. A rigid policy environment is not conducive to community participation; a willingness to live with some amount of ambiguity and variation can be conducive.
- Second, policies can put important limits on communities’ ability to target. For example, the current policy context puts the emphasis on targeting returnees. In general, this is probably the correct emphasis in order to encourage the return and reintegration of the millions of people who were displaced during the war. However, not all returnees are vulnerable, and not all receiving community members are adequately well off. There is considerable inclusion of wealthy returnees, and exclusion of receiving community vulnerable people. But no amount of community involvement would change this, because it is GOSS policy.

4. Security and access are influential factors. Contact time with community by program staff is important, and in the absence of adequate security or other constraints, access may be very limited.

**Recommendations on targeting effectiveness and impact**

Although the objectives of the EMOP under which the Southern Sudan program falls are still oriented towards classic humanitarian goals—saving lives, protecting livelihoods, and improving nutritional status are the first three objectives—the apparent current goals of the targeting of food assistance in Southern Sudan are to make food aid more developmental and to get away from the OLS way of doing things. This no doubt partly represents the transition of programs away from one kind of problem and one kind of era, towards a different era. But it makes assessing the effectiveness or impact of targeting difficult, and therefore constrains to some extent recommendations about making the targeting process more inclusive or participatory.

This study has found significant evidence of targeting error at the local level. Cases of returnees, conflict-related IDPs, and flood-affected groups have all turned up evidence of both inclusion and exclusion error. However, this is “error” that probably needs to be put in context, and this study was unable to collect all the necessary information to do that.

The first part of the context of targeting would be to focus on geographic targeting—according to both returnee numbers and other factors causing food insecurity, and ensure that assistance is primarily targeted to those areas—as specifically to affected areas as possible. The second component regards timing. The evidence on the timing of assistance indicates that late delivery and inadequate resource levels are also significant sources of exclusion error and sometimes inclusion error. While resource shortfalls are the classic
reason to try to minimize inclusion error, the evidence in some cases is that the administrative targeting system now being put in place goes to extremes in some cases to prevent inclusion—to the point of risking serious exclusion error (the slow verification of IDPs, for example).

Thus in terms of recommendations at the country level, the priority for reducing targeting error overall would be to focus first on geographic and temporal elements of targeting. The participatory component of targeting takes place more at the household level. Building capacity for household targeting, particularly by community-based methods, will take time, but can clearly help to target specific groups.

In general, the effectiveness of targeting has been diminished when it is reduced to simply answering questions about who requires assistance, and neglecting questions about where these people are, when they require the assistance, how much they require, and for how long? This study certainly did not have the time or resources to fully answer these questions, but in the cases that were examined, evidence of leaving out several of these questions—and the consequences of leaving them out—came to the surface.

It should be recognized that committing one kind of error almost by default means committing the other. Large scale inclusion error, for example as implied by the flood response case study, have inevitably meant under-coverage (or a form of exclusion) for those who were genuinely displaced, or lost their houses and their 2007 crop. Trying too hard to prevent inclusion error, on the other hand, can quickly result in the risk of exclusion, if genuinely vulnerable groups have to wait too long for the verification process before receiving assistance.

Recommendations on participatory or community-based targeting
Both “administrative” and “community-based” targeting will require significant staff time and interaction with communities and leaders to work effectively. The issue is not to decide which is “better” (which implies an either/or choice), but to understand what elements of both can best be applied to help address certain targeting problems. This study was only peripherally focused on administrative targeting, so this section highlights recommendations about community participation in targeting, but does not imply an a priori recommendation that community-based targeting is always the right approach.

Two already-existing factors should be highlighted in terms of community participation in targeting. Through their traditional leadership and through some cultural practices (specifically the sharing of food assistance) communities did have a role in targeting assistance during the war. The practice of redistribution, some of which is spontaneous among households and some of which is organized by local leadership, may appear to dilute the impact of food aid. In other ways the collective insurance provided by this mechanism provides a safety net against inadvertent exclusion error and provides some sort of guarantee against exclusion in future food distributions. Re-distribution within groups will in certain contexts be unavoidable, and for the reasons mentioned is not necessarily to be discouraged; rather it must be understood and “factored in” to targeting
decisions. However, inter-group re-distribution and sharing is less likely, and from a targeting perspective the exclusion of entire groups is a serious concern. The exclusion of IDPs displaced away from their leadership—a major concern during the war—appears to still be a major concern in post-war Southern Sudan.

Evidence from this study suggests that improving the participation of the community in the targeting process could help to speed up response and reduce targeting errors in the post-conflict era as well. Where targeting criteria are clear, but knowledge of who meets the criteria is not clear, several examples have noted the way in which community participation could improve the identification of individuals and households who fit the criteria, and some examples of processes by which this involvement can take place.

Where targeting criteria are not clear—as is the case of targeting general vulnerability—the likely tendency will be towards the sharing of food assistance across the community. This should not necessarily be interpreted as a “bad thing.” Sharing is a phenomenon that can be exploitative—much depends on the quality of local leadership (hence the observations about the legitimacy of leadership in the previous section).

Where community-based approaches to targeting are a priority, it should be noted that local “traditional leadership” (i.e., the Chiefs) can promote this process, but often a different kind of leadership can be discovered, based on other trusted individuals in the community. Overall, a deeper understanding of lineage and community relationships in Southern Sudan is fundamental to a successful targeting strategy. Despite widespread knowledge of the sharing phenomenon, it is still widely ignored in official targeting policy.

Several other things could help as well. These include improved information-sharing and transparency of targeting processes on the part of coordinating and implementing agencies—including WFP, SSRRC, and Cooperating Partners. This would include information about entitlements, dates and times of registration and verification exercises, but also about the way in which Food for Recovery is intended to work, since the latter is now the main modality available to addressing general vulnerability at the community level. It would also include enhanced complaints or feedback mechanisms.

In conclusion, a few suggestions for improving targeting include continuously striving to gain a better understanding of the context; continuously striving to involve all stakeholders; continuously striving to improve the transparency of procedures including awareness of various food aid modalities and their programming possibilities, registration and verification procedures, and exact beneficiary entitlements. To be able to do these things well will require that WFP ensure adequate staff time and capacity.
Research objectives

The Southern Sudan study is one case in a broader research project entitled “Targeting in Complex Emergencies.” The objectives of this research are to:

1. Identify and describe success and failure factors associated with current WFP targeting and distribution approaches in complex emergencies, and what role community dynamics and levels of participation play in these approaches.

2. Identify and analyze the linkage between assessment findings, specific programming objectives, targeting criteria and WFP’s current TCE\(^5\) approaches—with due consideration of the process and elements of CBTD—and how these can be strengthened.

3. Identify a range of pragmatic options for the implementation of participatory targeting and distribution approaches in complex emergencies that achieve programming objectives and are consistent with WFP targeting policy.

4. Propose a framework for determining the suitability, feasibility and effectiveness of implementing participatory targeting methodologies across a range of complex emergency contexts and WFP programming interventions.

Research questions include:

1. How is targeting currently done in the context of complex emergency?

2. What role can CBTD play in ensuring that food assistance reaches those most in need of assistance in complex emergencies?

3. Can CBTD contribute to improved representation of poor, marginalized or excluded groups in a complex emergency?

4. How can a community-based approach to targeting in complex emergencies enhance the potential for protection, and conversely, how does it exacerbate the potential for conflict or fuel existing tensions and conflict?

5. What are the main lessons for general program guidance on the CBTD process in complex emergency situations, including how to match elements of CBTD to specific conditions on the ground?

Research methodology

The research involved a combination of secondary and primary data collection following a protocol established for all the case studies in this project (Feinstein International Center, 2007a).

The research team

The country specific research team consisted of two Tufts researchers who carried out the preparatory work. Upon arrival in Juba, the Tufts team was joined by four others from the WFP Southern Sudan office. Translators were provided by WFP, although at times translation was inadequate (see limitations section).

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\(^5\) See Appendix 2 for WFP’s definition of this term as well.
**Literature review and preparatory work**
Part of the secondary data collection and analysis was carried out before arrival in country by the Tufts research team. Documentation was gathered on the nature and political economy of conflict in Southern Sudan, the history of targeting issues, and food aid modalities. Country-specific secondary data for Southern Sudan was requested from WFP in advance. Any reports actually used are listed in the Reference section.

Also, in preparation for the study, WFP Country Office staff were consulted on the identification of organizations influencing or engaged in, or supporting, targeting of food assistance (or other) for interview. WFP Country office staff were also consulted on the selection of study sites to visit according to the criteria in the study protocol in order to reflect as wide a variety as possible of different contexts. This process was begun six weeks prior to the study and revised upon arrival.

**Field data collection methodology**
An introductory meeting was held in plenary at the start of the visit. The study aims, the independent nature of the researchers and the voluntary and anonymous nature of the participation were communicated directly by the researchers with support from WFP staff allowing time for clarification questions from the community. A team of six researchers—two from the Feinstein International Center and four from WFP, spent nearly three weeks in the field in February and March 2008. Interviews were conducted in seven different locations in Southern Sudan (see Table 5) with 39 key informants and 25 focus groups in the different locations. These interviews relied on a semi-structured protocol, with the same initial questions for respondents, but with ample latitude for exploring in depth, issues arising in the course of the discussion. The key informants included WFP staff, GOSS officials, partner and non-partner NGO officials, state and local civil authorities, and traditional authorities and community leaders. These included:

**WFP Southern Sudan country office staff**
- Introductory meeting country office
- Meeting with Coordinator’s office, VAM, Program, Security, Sub-offices

**GOSS**
- Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (National, State, County and Payam level)
- Ministry of Agriculture
- Ministry of the Presidency
- State Governors, County Commissioners, Payam Administrators

**Traditional authorities**
- Chiefs (various rank—see report)
- Gol leaders and village headmen

**WFP partners**
Focus groups
Focus group discussions were comprised of leaders, women, men and mixed men’s and women’s groups. All interviews were semi-structured, lasting between one to four hours, and involved as few as five people to as many as twenty or thirty people. Interviews were held in open spaces—usually under the shade of a tree since most interviews were conducted during the middle of the day due to transport and security constraints—and it was often impossible to restrict inclusion in these discussions. In most cases, field visits were organized by WFP staff one or two days before the arrival of the research team. In some cases, there was less time to organize meetings.

Voluntary, informed consent for carrying out the research was obtained verbally during the introductory plenary meeting as laid out in the study protocol, and during each interview or focus group discussion. Great care was taken to ensure those present understood participation in the study would not affect their present entitlement to food assistance from WFP. Participatory appraisal techniques were used to collect some of the data in the interview guides. The following main techniques were used in the communities to complement the semi-structured interview guide. Examples of these are found in the narrative report.

Limitations to the study
Several difficulties were encountered with the field research, which serve to limit the extent to which the findings of this case study can be presented as verified by adequate triangulation, or can be broadly generalized. These are outlined below. But it should be emphasized that the findings of the study should be accepted as tentative findings, because of the constraints encountered.

1. The trip to Sudan had to be postponed because of visa restrictions on US citizens. Though rescheduled within a few weeks, this caused significant upheaval in that it meant three of the senior WFP staff who had intended to be part of the study team could not, in the end, participate.

2. The team member from Rome who is responsible for the fifth study objective (the cost of targeting) was unable to join the team. He handed responsibility for that part of the study over to a senior VAM officer in Southern Sudan, who at the last minute was also not able to join the team. The team collected some of the information requested, but this objective is clearly not well integrated into the report.

3. One important member of the team drawn from WFP Southern Sudan staff had to leave the team suddenly when his father passed away. This was of course unavoidable, but left
one of the research teams without a translator or local informant, and resulted in the loss of several days of valuable team time.

4. Translation was provided by WFP, but this relied on staff who were not trained translators, and were often not neutral interpreters. In some circumstances, this caused significant problems and some data had was dropped. It was not possible to hire translators.

5. The selection of sites for the team to visit was constrained by security and logistical considerations. One of the sites selected had little capacity to support (or even engage with) an external research team, and in some ways, offered little in terms of contrast to situations already researched. One site had to be cancelled after the research began because of deteriorating security, but was replaced with other sites where useful information was gathered. Sites selected by WFP included two Dinka areas, and one are in Equatoria, so the sample was not representative of all of Southern Sudan. Evidence from other areas was drawn upon to the extent possible.

6. It often took quite some amount of discussion with community groups before they became convinced that the visit of the research team had nothing to do with an assessment and would not result in changes to food aid allocations. This no doubt colored the focus group discussions—particularly the first part of them. Data were treated accordingly.

7. Juba is overloaded with external consultants, experts, and advisors, all of whom are trying to see the same limited set of senior policy makers within the GOSS. This restricted access to important informants, and meant a lot of time was devoted to trying to set up appointments or waiting for appointments.

8. None of the old PDM reports mentioned were available from WFP. Some respondents indicated they were in archives in Rumbek or Lokichoggio. Those drawn on for the study were from the personal files of current and former staff, and are not a “representative” sample, although there is no known systematic bias to these reports either. The main point about reports from an earlier era is their very existence, compared to a paucity of such reports currently.

9. As noted above, it was often impossible to restrict group size or participation to the originally intended respondents.

**Selection of study sites**

The selection was done to include as wide a variety of communities as possible including:

- Different kinds of aid targeting, in particular relief modalities and community based methods;
- Different “community” types, different ethnic groups, and different forms of displacement and returnee status, and situations caused by different shocks; and
- Different forms of leadership, governance and targeting experience (such as traditional authorities and Relief Committees).

Table 5 on following page provides a summary of sites and respondents interviewed in each.
Table 5. Targeting in Complex Emergencies—Southern Sudan Study Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communities Visited by Research Team</th>
<th>Interviews with Target Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
<td><strong>Population / Groups</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northern Bahr al-Ghazal State</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nyamlel / Wedweil (Aweil West)</td>
<td>SPLA war-affected</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Vulnerable groups in community</td>
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<tr>
<td>Udhum (Aweil West)</td>
<td>Returnees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madhuany/ Awulich (Aweil Center)</td>
<td>Flood displaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malualkon/ Wanjok (Aweil East)</td>
<td>IDPs displaced by fighting in border area</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Central Equatoria State</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jebel Kujur (Juba County)</td>
<td>IDPs displaced by LRA attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kit - One (Juba/Magwi)</td>
<td>Returnees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jonglei State</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anyidi** (Bor County)</td>
<td>Returnees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** This site had to be partially omitted after a critical member of the team had to drop out of the study due to the death of his father.
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