FACING FAMINE
Somali Experiences in the Famine of 2011

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Introduction

In 2011–12, Somalia experienced the worst famine of the twenty-first century. Since then, research on the famine has focused almost exclusively on the external response, the reasons for the delay in the international response, and the implications for international humanitarian action in the context of the “global war on terror.” This paper focuses on the internal, Somali response to the famine. How did Somali communities and households cope with the famine of 2011 in the absence of any state-led response—and a significant delay in the international response? What can be learned from these practices to improve our understanding of famine, and of mitigation, response and building resilience to future crises?

While themes of diversification, mobility and flexibility are important to understanding how people coped with the famine, this paper focuses on the factor that seemed to determine whether and how well people survived the famine: social connectedness and the extent of the social networks of affected populations and the ability of these networks to mobilize resources. These factors ultimately determined how well people could cope with the famine. The nature of reciprocity, the resources available within people’s networks, and the collective risks and hazards faced within networks, all determined people’s individual and household outcomes in the famine and are related to the social structures and social hierarchies within Somali society.

This paper briefly reviews the literature on famine “coping strategies” and on “social capital.” Then it presents a synthesis of evidence from research on the famine on a range of coping practices, highlighting the role of social connectedness—the ways in which social connections enabled people to survive, but also put certain groups of people at much greater risk. Finally, the paper discusses the implications of both for theory, policy, and practice.1

Methodology

This paper is based on over 350 narrative interviews on the famine from the perspective of people most affected by it. These narratives come from interviews conducted in the years immediately following the famine (2012–14) inside Somalia (including Bay, Lower and Middle Shabelle, Gedo, Middle Juba, Galgadud and Mudug regions, as well as in Mogadishu) and in the refugee camps in Dollo-Ado, Ethiopia and Dadaab, Kenya. These narratives have been compiled and briefly analyzed in a separate and much longer paper.2 The synthesis here focuses mostly on the question of social connectedness. The analytical process began with identifying the widespread references to the importance of connections (whether for respondents themselves, or as a distinguishing characteristic of others who survived the crisis with fewer losses), and then a more detailed analysis of those linkages, how they operated, and what their ultimate outcomes were. This analysis was informed by a grounded theory approach,3 but the findings were reviewed in light of the anthropological literature on Somali society.

Background on the famine

When the famine was declared on July 20, 2011, an estimated four million people were affected by the overall crisis, with three quarters of a million facing famine conditions. Nearly half a million children were malnourished, with the prevalence of wasting (acute malnutrition) above 50 percent of the under-five population in some areas. Crude mortality rates were above the famine thresholds of two per 10,000 people per day in a number of areas.4 Over 200,000 had been recently displaced inside Somalia and an additional 200,000 had sought refuge in Kenya or Ethiopia.5 The famine resulted in an estimated death toll of 258,000 human lives.6

The famine had multiple causes: it was triggered by drought and a major production failure, by a global spike in the price of food that drastically reduced people’s purchasing power at a time when local production had failed, and by an on-going war. The lack of adequate preventive measures was at least in part because a proscribed group controlled much of the affected area, and counter-terrorism legal restrictions outweighed humanitarian concerns in external policy consideration.7 Both the controlling local authority (Al-Shabaab) and international do-
ners put severe restrictions on humanitarian action that could have prevented or mitigated the crisis—and significantly delayed any actual response. As a result, many affected groups were forced to deal with the worsening crisis almost entirely using their own mechanisms and social networks.

A large-scale crisis had been predicted as early as mid-2010, but little was done to prevent or mitigate the onset of the disaster, which no doubt contributed to the high death toll that the famine exacted. The evidence suggests that the worst of the mortality had already peaked by the time that the famine was declared. The declaration mobilized a large-scale response, and that, combined with the return of the rains, and a rapid reversal in the high cost of food, brought the remaining mortality under control by early 2012. But the response was very late, and the response that was mobilized was only able to reach some of the affected areas due to the combination of Al-Shabaab control and counter-terrorism restrictions put on donor assistance. Different groups drew support from their own business communities, their diasporas, and their own neighbors and kin. This paper briefly analyses these responses after reviewing the existing literature on coping with food security crises, social capital, Somali social structures and social redistribution mechanisms.

Coping and social capital

Coping with famine and acute food insecurity

Research on coping with food security crisis can be traced back to Amartya Sen’s seminal work on famine. Sen noted that rather than an outright shortage of food, people affected by famine suffered a decline in their access to food—“entitlement failure” as he termed it. The suggestion that the process of entitlement failure could be mapped led to considerable research on “coping strategies” or the ways vulnerable households deal with declining access to food, summarized in a landmark paper by Jane Corbett in 1988. Michael Watts suggested a logic to the sequence of specific behaviors based on their severity and reversibility. As food access becomes more constrained, households are more likely to employ less reversible and more severe strategies, attempting to reduce short-term threats to food access and other, current-status outcomes while maintaining the longer-term viability of livelihoods. Frankenberger and Goldstein, drawing not only on the work of Watts and Corbett, but also Alex de Waal and Stephen Devereux suggested that coping behaviors formed a set of patterns that could be monitored in famine situations.

Davies cautioned against extrapolating the interpretation of these behaviors from one context to another: even within the same location, the sequence of coping may differ markedly from one household to another. Nevertheless, a number of coping behaviors have been repeatedly noted in a variety of contexts, ranging from changes in production and consumption practices and changes in labor allocation, to unusual labor practices and migration, the sales of assets such as livestock or even land, and distress migration and the breakup of households.

Other research in the area of coping and adaptation includes work on the intensification of existing strategies, the diversification of activities and migration in search of new opportunities. Intensification strategies are most often observed in areas of high potential, and hence not applicable to much of Somalia. Diversification—referring mostly to the diversification of sources of income and livelihoods—is an important component of strategies in lower potential, more highly vulnerable areas. Ellis defines livelihood diversification as the “process by which [households] construct a diverse portfolio of activities and social support capacities in order to survive and to improve their standard of living.” Diversification strategies include the adoption of new crop or livestock technologies; value-added activities (such as oil pressing on the farms of the producers of oil-seed crops such as sunflowers or groundnuts); and off-farm labor. Diversification is a tried and trusted risk minimization strategy of most smallholder households in low-potential, high-risk areas, but the poorest households are often unable to diversify their income sources.
because they face liquidity or other constraints that better off households do not face. Diversification strategies also involve natural resource extraction (firewood, thatch grass, etc.) when other means of survival for poor people fail.

Migration has long been observed as a livelihood option in both the short term and the long term, depending on labor demand between different areas. McDowell and de Haan note that migration strategies are much more common than presumed, and linkages between sending and receiving communities may be strong and long lasting. As a result of the low cost of telecommunications and transportation, the extent to which some localities and communities are connected, between different countries, through transnational social networks, is such that they can be described as effectively and analytically part of the same “community.” Seasonal migration is also a well-known coping strategy in some risky environments as much for the reason of reducing the number of people to feed during lean seasons as for increasing or diversifying incomes. Remittance income has been repeatedly shown to be a small but significant factor in the incomes of poor rural households. Labor migration to urban areas, and to destinations outside of the country of origin are also a prominent features of livelihood strategies.

Social capital and social connectedness

While the exact origin of the term remains largely unknown, three major sources of empirical work helped to define social capital. Pierre Bourdieu noted three different forms of capital: economic, cultural, and social. According to him, social capital was “an aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of a more or less institutionalized relationships or mutual acquaintance or recognition.” The focus of Bourdieu’s work was the network of social ties that a person could access and the resources that could then flow through them. For Bourdieu, the three forms of capital existed at the individual level and was dependent of an individual’s social attributes, his/her capacity to accumulate these types of capital, and the relevance of these capital to the individual’s context. An individual’s social standing, his/her social position, was critical in Bourdieu’s understanding of capital.

James Coleman on the other hand, asserted that the definition of social capital lies more in the function it is able to perform: “It is not a single entity but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of actors . . . within the structure.” Critics have asserted that this approach was inherently confusing, as Coleman's definition made it difficult to separate the definition of social capital from its functions. For Coleman, social capital was a public good, not just confined as a resource for individuals.

Robert Putnam built on Coleman’s approach to emphasize the public good nature of social capital and defined it as a community-level attribute. According to Putnam, “social capital is the feature of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordination actions.”

Social capital can be further broken down into three dimensions: bonding, bridging, and linking. Bonding social capital refers to bonds between people to whom Putnam refers as “homogenous” community members and involves principles and norms such as trust, reciprocity, and cooperation. These horizontal ties exist between similar individuals and have been associated with some negative aspects of social capital. A strong sense of belonging—to a group, tribe, or nation—can create indifference or even hostility, escalating to deliberate polarization, isolation, or even violence towards non-members. Bridging social capital links members of one group to another across, for example, ethnic or racial lines, geographic boundaries, and language groups. In turn, bridging social capital helps foster connections to external assets and different social/economic identities. These linkages can foster community resilience, drawing on them when local resources are depleted or scarce. Finally, linking social capital refers to “networks of trusting relationships between people who are interacting across explicit, formal, or institutionalized power or authority gradients in society.” Bonding and
Summarizing the literature

Several issues arise from the existing research on coping and social capital that are worth noting. First, the notion of social “capital” suggests something directly fungible that could be counted, saved up, or traded; economic rather than social aspects are usually emphasized. This paper relies on the term social “connectedness”—emphasizing the connections and the way they foster inclusion or exclusion from social networks and the diversity of claims that can be made within networks rather than treating connections as something only as a form of “savings.”

Second, as implied, the tendency is to only portray the positive aspects of social connections or social capital. Much of the literature ignores the way in which “social capital” is used for exclusionary or exploitative purposes, and downplays the extent to which, even within social networks, trust can break down and potential support of social relations can fluctuate over time.

Third, the literature on coping strategies notes specific behaviors such as borrowing money or food, or purchasing food on credit—both of which obviously depend on the social linkages of the household. Indeed, migration strategies, labor-sharing arrangements and risk sharing groups (such as funeral societies) all depend on the social connections of households and individuals. But the research rarely spells out in detail the linkages between social connectedness and coping. And fourth, while the literature on coping notes a hierarchy of behaviors that implies increasing severity (even while noting the context specificity of such hierarchies) there is little recognition in the literature on social capital that the nature of connectedness may vary between “normal” times and times of increasing hardship. The research outlined below notes how this can work both ways; in hard times, social connections may be strengthened, but the functions of social networks may also break down.
Coping with crisis and famine in Somalia

A typology of coping

As will be clear from the review, the term “coping” has come to mean many things: from relatively minor changes in behaviors to distress migration to outright cessation of consumption (which, of course, is not coping at all!). But the term tends to imply that while the situation is bad, people are somehow “getting by.” In the literature, “coping” refers to relatively short-term changes in behavior to deal with a setback—with varying degrees of reversibility in the individual strategies employed; “adapting” refers to longer-term changes to deal with a permanently changed context. These terms correspond to contemporary categories in the contemporary literature on resilience. “Absorptive capacity” is about dealing with short-term setbacks and “bouncing back” to some pre-existing level of well-being or livelihood status (more-or-less synonymous with “coping” in earlier parlance). “Adaptive capacity” is about dealing with longer-term changes, while protecting future livelihood status or capacity (or “adapting” in earlier parlance). Shocks (such as drought, conflict, displacement, or price shocks as described for Somalia in 2011) are the context in which absorptive capacity is analyzed; climate change is often the context for discussing adaptive capacity. A third resilience capacity, “transformative capacity” is about being able to proactively shape that context.

Table 1 depicts a typology of “coping strategies” that respondents described across South Central Somalia in response to the famine of 2011. Broadly speaking, these could be classified as strategies related to diversification (most frequently thought of in terms livelihood strategies or assets, but perhaps more importantly diversification of risk or exposure to hazards); flexibility (which includes mobility in the case of livestock-dependent livelihoods; the ability to move into other sectors of the economy; and the opportunistic exploitation of various means of providing short-term income including credit, extraction of natural resources, depletion of assets, or access to aid) and social connectedness (which generally refers to the strength of an individual or household’s social networks but, in this case, the particular ability to call upon others to help in the event of a crisis or shock). How individual strategies play out, the order in which they are invoked, and the long-term consequences of different strategies vary by social group and geography.

These categories (diversification, flexibility, and connectedness) also have gender dimensions. Changing roles of both women and men, following the political and economic volatility of the last two to three decades, have led to women becoming more active in economic pursuits. This is in part as a result of their dual identities as wives and daughters (belonging to different families through birth and marriage), which enables them to cross clan divides for political, social and economic purposes.

It is also due to the necessity of earning income for the family. Women’s financial contributions as remitters from the diaspora are also contributing to changing perceptions of gender roles. While women traditionally had less mobility, very few women respondents reported limited mobility as a constraint to coping with the famine of 2011. Somalia remains a highly patriarchal society, but gender relations are changing and more complicated than often suggested. Al-Shabaab’s ideological leanings attempted to further constrain the role of women. One of the constant problems women faced during the crisis was gender-based violence, especially in camps for the internally displaced, perpetrated by both Al-Shabaab as well as other militia and youth groups.

Absorptive strategies and the role of social connectedness

Strategies noted in Table 1 are, for the most part, not unique to Somalia. Most of them have been noted previously in highly risk-prone areas of the Horn of Africa. However, in the Somali context, social connectedness and networks play a particularly important role. For much of Somali society, these networks are best understood in terms of the norms of reciprocity and obligation that exist as
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Application/ Severity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diversification</strong></td>
<td>Diversify livelihoods and assets</td>
<td>Individual/ household</td>
<td>Mostly applies in the longer term and a means of reducing risk, not as a means of coping with shocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diversification of risk</td>
<td>Some diversification within clan or larger group</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diversify against drought risk (riverine farming and/or camels)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Have a foot in the urban economy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Flexibility</strong></td>
<td>Physical mobility with livestock</td>
<td>Household</td>
<td>Limited ability to move</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Labor mobility (employment)</td>
<td>Community-level decisions about when to move?</td>
<td>condemned some small-scale livestock holders, but others suffered large losses far from home</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Exploit different opportunities (including humanitarian aid)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outmigration as a last resort</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Social “connectedness”</strong></td>
<td>Forms of mutual support</td>
<td>“Second circle” community level/ clan level</td>
<td>Diaspora remittances stepped up in famine: food, water trucking</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Usual: remittances; unusual: diaspora or urban contacts, etc.</td>
<td>Partly business level</td>
<td>Third circle as “system failure”</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Having “someone to cry to”; three overlapping circles model</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Political power</strong></td>
<td>Access to/control over aid</td>
<td>Household</td>
<td>Gatekeepers from powerful clans in IDP settings</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Crisis asset protection</strong></td>
<td>Sharing food or assets with livestock</td>
<td>Household</td>
<td>Feeding cattle thatch from roofs during drought</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Buying water for livestock</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Timing of livestock sales</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moving livestock in search of grazing and water</td>
<td></td>
<td>Out-migration usually as a last resort</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leaving someone behind to protect land if migrating</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision making about when to sell animals, when to move, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Asset sales or depletion</strong></td>
<td>Sale of livestock</td>
<td>Household</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sale of other productive assets</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land pledging or mortgaging</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Rapid livelihood adaptation</strong></td>
<td>Renting farmland (esp. riverine) to protect animals (access water/fodder)</td>
<td>Household or inter-household</td>
<td>Some of these are “normal” livelihoods for poor people, others are coping strategies in crisis.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sharing lactating animals—move with non-lactating animals</td>
<td>Wage labor in community as form of social reciprocity albeit a form of exchange</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Natural resource extraction: firewood, charcoal, thatch grass</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Search for casual wage employment</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Credit</strong></td>
<td>Use of savings/ borrowing/ debt</td>
<td>Household</td>
<td>Social networks portrayed in positive light; can lead to long-term indebtedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Borrowing/ purchase on credit as one form of social connectedness</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Consumption strategies</strong></td>
<td>Changing diets</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Borrowing food or money</td>
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<td>Rationing strategies</td>
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<td>Going hungry</td>
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part of belonging to a particular clan-based identity group, (although other networks such as agricultural labor groups, friends and other categories of connection may also be important).

**Lineage and social relations**

Somali society is described as a “segmented lineage” structure that subdivides along its constituent branches from generation to generation, and claims a “total Somali genealogy.” As a resource sharing structure, Gardner and El Bushra describe an extended family with members in rural, urban and diaspora locations where income and other resources are shared across long distances to maintain the integrity of the whole family. However, this depiction and structure—and its internal coherence as a resource sharing system—does not apply universally to Somali society.

During the 2011 crisis, respondents shared that they turned to a wide range of relatives which reflected the wide range of family and kin members of the Somali network: respondents referred to brother, sister, son, daughter, cousins, more distant “my husband's cousin,” “paternal aunty,” to more generic terms such as “family” and “clan.” One of the general characteristics of the 2011 disaster was the general process of calling on, or mobilizing, higher levels of the clan and more distant relations to seek assistance.

We went to my paternal auntie’s house. My auntie saw that the children were in bad condition and she quickly gathered the family. The family decided that the children will be divided between three families, two families will take two each and one family will take one and I and my wife would have to support ourselves.

**Having “someone to cry to”**

Numerous respondents repeatedly used the phrase “having someone to cry to” to refer to requesting assistance from someone else, where the person to whom one could cry to would typically, but not only, be a relative—hopefully one based in town or in the diaspora (therefore outside the immediately affected rural economy):

People who have nobody to cry to, that is who don't have kinsmen to help, don't have a son or a daughter in the towns or out of the country to help . . . all such people have no coping capacity. From our case, we were also affected very much in our village but the number of people who died were not many. Because, as Leysan we could not let our clan members die of hunger while we know and have something. The Leysans in Baidoa and even other places were collecting money to help us.

Another respondent, when asked what was the difference between those who could and could not “cope” replied

Having connections, family or otherwise helped.

So if you had a family abroad or who were wealthy, it helped. Also if you knew many people in town and could show skills in selling it helped, like my case.

The widespread recognition of the value of having “someone to cry to”—or having a social network particularly with members outside of the rural economy—is reinforced in part by the extent of the Somali diaspora. One in six Somalis was estimated to be located in the diaspora over ten years ago (either in the East African region, the Middle East or much further afield in North America, Europe and beyond), with financial remittances accounting...
for the largest share of the economy. However, while the strength of Somali social networks and a culture of sharing is renowned, the networks or connectedness between rural, urban and diaspora locations is not distributed equally.

**Remittances and social linkages: Three circles of social obligation**

Remittances from the diaspora have generated plenty of interest from scholars, and indeed have led to the development of a whole industry for transferring money throughout Somalia (the *hawala* system). The evidence on the impact of remittances on food security in the face of extreme crises has been limited. And in any case, the role of diaspora remittances only partially captures the notion of social connectedness. During the famine, parallel, but distinctly different kinds of linkages were invoked to cope with the increasingly difficult circumstances. These kinds of linkages function to varying degrees during less fraught times, but were clearly invoked during the famine. These can best be summarized as three overlapping circles.

The first circle regards immediate kin relations—within the immediate family or among very close relatives. This is where much of the regular remittance activities take place. Quite apart from all other coping activities that might be undertaken, if an individual or household had connections to someone in the diaspora, or even someone employed in the urban sector who was relatively immune to the dynamics of the crisis, then that individual or household was likely to survive the famine regardless of what happened to their own livelihood or assets. They could call upon regular outside assistance. On the other hand, in the absence of such linkages—or if the linkages broke down because the remitting individual or household also faced the same set of risks—then connectedness defaulted to the second circle. The first circle is relatively fixed.

The second circle consists broadly of sub-clan or lineage and community linkages. These linkages overlap with the first circle but also extend well beyond it. Nevertheless, the second circle is also based on “face-to-face” relations—people who actually know and regularly interact with each other or people who are known to each other (they do not have to be in physical proximity given the ubiquity of telephone-based contact). This second circle of connectedness does not necessarily provide a regular, or even reliable, source of income or assistance, but in the face of the rapidly worsening conditions in 2011, there was widespread activation or mobilization of this circle; people were called upon to share what they could of their own resources with other members of this circle.

The second circle would be described in resilience terminology as “community absorptive capacity” and it defines how much of a shock the broader group or network can take before its resource pool collapses. Thus, the “absorptive capacity” of a given household cannot be adequately defined or analyzed without reference to both the first and second circles described here. Even the first circle, which is more obvious and more easily understood, is difficult to measure accurately; the second circle is almost impossible to measure—it might not be invoked until a crisis hits, and some of the other members of the circle may be affected by the same crisis. Thus, while the ability to call on this second circle, and critically, the diversity and depth of resources that flowed in this circle, seemed to be the critical factor in how a household weathered the famine: resources that might flow within this circle rapidly diminished at the local, rural level. In other words, while the structure of the social network might remain the same in a crisis, the resource flow within the network suffered an obvious hit. This in turn depends on the level of diversification of both resources and risk within the second circle. Where most members of the network are in the rural economy and therefore hit by the same shock/s, resources can diminish very quickly.

However, where significant numbers of people and resources are located outside the rural economy, the resources within this second circle may be able to mitigate the shock. And the second circle is about resource-sharing in some manner or other: it could be about *zakat*; it could be about extending credit (from a shopkeeper or a relative/clan mate) when a household cannot pay cash; and it could be about directly sharing money or other resources.
Thus, it is critical to understand who is in and who is out of which circles (even within a clan or lineage-based grouping); the kind of resources circulating in the circle, and how much; and the diversity of resources and linkages. And though it played a critical role in protecting households that did not have regular remittance income, this second circle was already weakened in 2011 by a variety of factors. Al-Shabaab was claiming zakat resources for its own use—meaning that much of the zakat resources in more normal times had already been taken out of the circle. And some wealthier or better-connected people had already moved out of their communities (especially from urban areas) before the crisis because of Al-Shabaab taxation, harassment, or other factors. So this second circle was weakened even before the combination of drought, conflict, and rapid food price inflation hit. At a certain point in the crisis, this second circle collapsed in certain areas and for certain social groups, and when it did, it collapsed suddenly and left little in the way of a safety net. Some groups, especially those who had more diversified social networks also saw this second circle severely stressed and had to mobilize higher levels of the clan.

The third circle was much more distant and was comprised of people that one might not know and where there may or may not have been a common clan identity. Individual-to-individual searching, to try to find someone—no matter how distant—to provide assistance, was heavily reported after about May 2011. This might be a friend, a distant relative or “big people.” However this might also apply to the highest functional levels of the lineage system that were invoked in some cases to organize collective assistance. This happened in the case of the Murasade and the Duduble sub-clans of the Hawiye clan and the Leysan sub-clan of the Rahanweyn, for example, but would have also occurred in many other clans. However, this level of the clan/lineage is rarely invoked; it is most commonly sought only in times of large-scale warfare/conflict. This third circle is less predicated on face-to-face relations, but rather on more distant claims—sometimes to a common clan-based identity, sometimes some other connection. And of course, many people lacked any of these claims.

This circle does not function at all in “normal” times, and only in the face of major conflict or crisis in the case of the clan system. Some individuals and some clans were able to find assistance through this circle, but many were not, and those that were excluded fell into famine. This circle became more evident as the crisis continued. This included a wider sense of Somali solidarity, whereby many diaspora groups were mobilized to contribute to mosques, Somali NGOs, and in some cases invented their own humanitarian projects—but not distributing resources to individuals according to family connections. This may also include a link to humanitarian resources from outside the Somali system, to Western or Islamic funds.

Each of these circles also invokes the issues of mobility and diversification, as well as the resources that flow within each of the circles. Within the first circle, for example (immediate kin), if an individual or household was receiving remittance income, that household or individual was likely to be relatively immune to the worst impacts of the famine—and indeed may have actually benefitted from some of those impacts (asset purchases at low prices). The second circle clearly exists first and foremost to help individuals or households cope with an idiosyncratic shock—which affect only a few member of the network. A covariate shock—or a combination of covariate shocks such as occurred in 2010–11—eventually undermines the viability of the second circle (especially where there is relatively little diversification within the network of the second circle) because the resources that circulate in this circle are finite and could not be replenished because of the worsening general crisis. And these resources are difficult to measure in any way except after the fact.

Analytically, the collapse of the second circle described here signified the onset of famine conditions in 2011. The collapse of this circle was predictable, but not necessarily the timing of its collapse. The collapse was sudden, and in many cases not easily predictable. But this collapse was indicated by individuals or households beginning to assert claims in the third circle. This began in May or early June of 2011 (some six to eight weeks before the formal declaration of famine).
If one were to propose an “emic” definition for the declaration of a famine in Somalia, this would almost certainly be it. However, the collapsing of the second level resulted in the mobilization of the third circle, which for some clans, such as the Murasade, averted a collapse into famine. Illustrations of the different experiences of “coping” in 2011 are provided in the following examples.

**Differing impacts of social connectedness**

The Murasade are one sub-clan of the Hawiye, the Hawiye being the dominant clan-family in Mogadishu and central regions of Somalia. In late 2010 and early 2011, the central regions of Somalia (Mudug and Galgadud, which include the rural territories of the Murasade and other Hawiye sub-clans) were considered to be in a worse humanitarian situation than the areas that ultimately fell into famine conditions. However, the Murasade are a relatively wealthy and diversified sub-clan with significant urban, business, and diaspora populations. Respondents from this clan reported how their pastoral kin moved to urban relatives in the small towns of the central regions as the crisis deepened, being absorbed into their extended families (these would have included people especially in the second circle described above). However these urban relatives reportedly could not manage the demands on their resources and called for further help from their Mogadishu and Nairobi-based relatives as well as more distant diaspora relatives. Respondents in towns in the UK recalled how they organized themselves to raise money when they realized how serious the situation was. In the case of the Murasade, the first and second circles could not contain the deepening crisis and ultimately a clan-wide response was mobilized (the third circle) which arguably halted and reversed further deterioration. A respondent from the UK diaspora stated that:

The clan members in Mogadishu responded well. I know one man who donated US $200,000 in one go. Many others were similar in generosity. The members in Mogadishu also contacted the diaspora members of the clan who in three months collected and sent more than US $1 million. The death rate started reducing and the deaths stopped all together before the rains started. In this case, the second circle had sufficient resources and arguably effected a reversal of the deteriorating situation. Research on another Hawiye sub-clan, the Duduble, identified a similar story and response. The Duduble, also with a significant urban, business and diaspora population, reportedly largely contained the crisis within the first two circles and did not revert to a clan-wide response to the same extent as the Murasade although some major individual donations came in from very rich clan members. This difference is thought to be because most rural households had a strong, direct connection to a relatively wealthy close family or lineage member in Mogadishu, Kenya, or the wider diaspora.

In contrast, the Jiddo, also a pastoral clan, of cattle herders, from Lower Shabelle (falling within the Rahanweyn clan), were not able to respond as above. The Jiddo were known as a relatively wealthy clan among the Rahanweyn, owning large numbers of cattle and living in the lower reaches of the Shabelle River, benefiting from the delta formed at its end. In 2011, the river dried up in these lower reaches, an unprecedented event that ultimately led to very large numbers of cattle being lost. Many Jiddo become destitute: one respondent described the following: “We just kept hoping that it will rain and things will change. Nothing changed and it didn’t rain until the last of my cows died. I had three children then and my wife. We came to Qorioley town. We did not have enough money to pay for the fares to Mogadishu. I had relatives in Qorioley but they were supporting so many other people.”

In this case, a clan with significant cattle wealth did not have enough members or resources outside the rural cattle economy to provide much assistance, and while resources were shared, the situation quickly overwhelmed available resources. A Jiddo elder in the UK explained it in following way: “The Jiddo diaspora community is very small in comparison with other Somali clans. There are 20 in USA, 5 in Australia, 500 –1,000 in Saudi Arabia, 3 in the UK. In addition the Jiddo do not have business or trading culture and hence do not have big businessmen who could support them in hard times.”
Limits of social connectedness

While social connectedness is a critical factor in people’s ability to cope with crisis, various nuances influence the effectiveness of that coping. The Mu-rasade example highlighted above noted a delay in providing assistance. One respondent explained in the following terms:

At first when people were calling me I thought it was the usual calls that I used to receive as people always tell us stories to get money. Then we realized there was a problem later. It took time to mobilize people. It also took time to convince Al-Shabaab to let us help our people. All this contributed to the delay. It is also the case that many nomads put all their efforts in saving their animals and had not much time in soliciting money from relatives until their children were too weak.55

In other words, even being a member of a wealthy, diversified clan does not guarantee the avoidance of extreme suffering in times of crisis and a delayed. Those who send financial remittances suffer a form of “fatigue,” and it can take time to organize kin to respond. This strain on those sending money is recognized within the literature on transnational social relations, and acts to qualify the reification of social ties and North to South remittance flows, that neglect the often precarious financial context of immigrants in their host countries, a condition their own relatives back home often do not fully appreciate.56 In addition, and probably related to the previous point, the quote also alludes to a tension around the trust in or strength of social ties—that people “tell us stories to get money.” This is akin to the notion of “crying wolf.” In other words, trust can weaken within these social networks.57

Social connectedness and marginalized groups

While many of these examples have highlighted the social structures within which Somali clan members can obtain assistance, suggestive of a more institutionalized structure and process, the following example explains how the Somali Bantu (not located within the lineage system), were able to exploit their social connections to manage the situation of 2011. However, these options were much less available for the Bantu and other minorities than for other groups.

In the crisis I was not able to grow anything and most of my family extended family went to the refugee camps in Kenya. I stayed back in Jamaame because my family was small and we thought we could manage . . . [but] we [then] ran out of money and didn’t know what to do. We then decided to go to Kismayo and we went into an IDP camp in Kismayo where we found some temporary and random support. I managed to trace some of my distant relatives in Kismayo and through them I traced my nephew who was in Kenya. We also left the camp and found some relatives we could stay with. My nephew sent us US$100 every month for seven months. During this time I was going back a forth from Jamaame to make sure that my farm was ready for the next season. When we had the first harvest the whole family returned to Jamaame. Some of my extended family are now back but many are still in there.58

Social capital, social exclusion and predation

While the strong sense of belonging, protection and reciprocal obligations within the Somali clan-based system remains a great strength of Somali society in a context of great political and environmental volatility, that strength is arguably the main fracture that fragments society and delineates politics and conflict, with implications for “coping” in times of crisis and famine. The Rahanweyn, like the Somali Bantu, were marginalized from power and resources in government times, resulting in a relatively small urban, business, and diaspora community—less diversified. De Waal refers to the Rahanweyn as second-class citizens within Somali society, with the Somali Bantu described as third class citizens.59

It is no coincidence that the Rahanweyn and the Somali Bantu were the major victims in the famine of 1992 as well as 2011; in 1992 they were caught between, and looted by, the Hawiye and Darod militias who were fighting each other during the civil war (the Rahanweyn and Somali Bantu had few military arms at that time). In 2011 however, historical marginalization and resultant lack of di-
versification meant that, unlike some groups, many of the sub-clans and social groups of the Rahanweyn and Bantu were much less able to contain the deepening crisis within their own wider networks and resources—the second and third circles described previously.

In addition, the majority of IDPs in Mogadishu, the major hub and distribution point for humanitarian resources, were Rahanweyn and Bantu. However, control of the vast majority of the humanitarian resources, from point of entry in Mogadishu to district commissioners, NGO staff and camp managers, belonged to the dominant clan of Mogadishu (the Hawiye). Very significant amounts of these resources were claimed, diverted and/or sold by these various “gate-keepers”—any individual or set of individuals who control access to resources—at the expense of extremely impoverished, often starving, people. The following two quotes, the first from a Somali Bantu person, the second from a Rahanweyn, tell the story:

We reached Mogadishu. For almost ten days we were depending on begging in the streets with our children because there was no aid. It was around late May to early June 2011 that we were taken to one of the Mogadishu IDP camps. They bring food every day but after taking photos the food is taken back from all the people and only 20 percent given to us. Some business people and the owner of the camp plus the NGO staff are taking the food. We can’t complain because they will chase us from the camp. Sometimes the militia are coming at night taking the few things left and raping girls and women.

Some days people tell me that some people were given cards to get rations of food but this was done in the night and they gave these cards to their own clans, friends, and acquaintances. I was not a friend or a member of their clan so we were never given a card but we were okay as long as we got something to eat every day. I stayed in these IDP camps for two years during which I saw many tragedies and acts of crime. We were very hungry most of the time. Many children died of malnutrition and diseases such as cholera. I have seen youths from established communities in Mogadishu come in to the camps almost every night and rob these IDPs of the few things they had and rape woman with impunity.

The exploitation of the famine-displaced, reflects not only outright criminality and corruption (regardless of clan power dynamics), but also demonstrated the way in which clan identities and power differentiate segments of Somali society and work to exclude and deprive certain groups from access to resources, even to the point of starvation. Menkhaus argued that negotiations with such gatekeepers were as important as those with Al-Shabaab in terms of enabling access, and extremely problematic in both cases. This control of aid resources by the dominant resident clan also applies in other displaced contexts and was noted, for example, in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya, during the same study (where Ogaden sub-clans were in control).

In summary, historical processes of marginalization have meant that a long-standing hierarchy within Somali society exists between clan families as well as within them, which today distinguishes those that are more able to contain large-scale (covariate) shocks through their own networked resources from those that are less able to. This underlying vulnerability is exacerbated in times of crisis and humanitarian response, because control of that response is strongly influenced by the more powerful clans (whether individually or collectively).

Discussion: Famine, coping and social connectedness

Several points from this analysis are worth underlining. First, despite a vast literature on both “coping” and “social capital,” relatively little relates social connectedness to coping capacity, except for regular mention of relying on gifts or borrowing as one form of coping. Exploration of the relations that enable or constrain these behaviors has been limited. Second, while the coping literature carefully notes changing dynamics over time such as more and less “extreme” coping strategies, particularly as the severity of a crisis deepens, there is little parallel discussion about the way in which social connections may change over time—or be invoked differently—in response to a worsening crisis. And third,
the literature on social capital tends to emphasize only the positive aspects of social relations—it does not say much about the way in which the same mechanisms can also be invoked towards exclusion and exploitation. The Somalia famine raises critical issues about all of these points.

The coping mechanisms outlined in Table 1 would be broadly familiar in any analysis of livelihood activities in a chronically at-risk or crisis-affected area. In the Somalia case, these emphasize diversification and flexibility as well as social connectedness. Actually, the cases explored here show that diversification and flexibility are characteristics not only of individual or household strategies, but also of social networks, and the more flexible or diversified such networks are—in addition to the wealth of network members—the better the chances of individual members’ survival in and recovery from major shocks like the 2011 famine. But diversification here refers more to diversification of risk than to the usual categories of assets and income streams at the level of both the individual or household and the network. Likewise, flexibility and mobility may appear as individual or household level characteristics, but these are also strongly shaped by social connections. Table 1 also emphasizes political power and the differential access that groups have to formal assistance—or the capture of aid.

Much has been written (and much more has been speculated) regarding the role of the diaspora and remittance income in Somalia, and though it has been exhaustively described, it has been stubbornly difficult to quantify at the household level, and questions have lingered about the way in which remittance dynamics change in response to crises. Remittance income here can refer to either cash or in-kind transfers, and can refer to either domestically or internationally remitted resources. Individual and household respondents noted that membership in these networks tends not to change, and in some cases, even resource flows might remain relatively fixed in a crisis—described above as the “first circle” of social connectedness. Regular remittance income tended to continue as long as the remitter was not subject to the same hazards as the recipient (hence the importance of diversification of risk within the social network), and may well increase as the recipient supports more people. But some social dynamics definitely do change in response to worsening conditions (the “second circle”), and some of these changes may signify the collapse of coping or even the collapse in the ability of existing social networks to support members. In many ways, therefore, this “second circle” as described above is of critical importance to coping and survival. However, some clans were able to effectively mobilize resources within the third circle—at increasingly “distant” levels of the clan.

Thus the factors that strengthen or weaken the second circle are important to understand, and how these factors may differ among different groups. As already emphasized, notions of diversification and flexibility are just as important at the level of the social network as they are at the individual or household level—indeed the former goes a long ways towards defining the latter. Under these conditions, it is really not possible to talk about the characteristics and coping capacity of any individual or household—particularly in the context of a major shock—without understanding the characteristics of the social group or network of the individual or household. This is as important to understanding overall livelihood dynamics as understanding a household’s assets or activities. Some groups were very hard hit by the crisis but were able to cope—or at least survive (as illustrated by the Murasade example); others became destitute and or suffered high levels of mortality (such as the Jiddo example—even though the Jiddo would have been classified as relatively wealthy prior to the crisis).

Much was made of how much time the mobilization of an international response took in the face of worsening conditions in the first half of 2011, but these cases also show that organizing an extraordinary response through social networks also took some time—and that to some degree the extraordinary measures developed only in response to extraordinary levels of suffering. Though some superficial similarities may occur, the three “circles” that emerge from the analysis of several hundred extensive household and key informant interviews from the Somalia famine are not the same as the categories of “bonding, bridging, and link-
ing’ social capital.” The first two circles could be described as a form of “bonding,” but such a label doesn’t really clarify anything about the dynamics. The third circle can also be understood as a form of bonding, through common identity, but at a level that is relatively rarely invoked, such as in war or, in this case, famine. While the second circle may invoke resources from outside the immediate community, both rely on face-to-face relations. Transformational changes in communications and transportation—even from the most remote locations in Somalia to the far corners of the globe—have enabled these linkages and probably blurred any analytically useful distinction between “bonding” and “bridging.” In Somalia today, you might be “closer” to someone in the UK or the Middle East than to someone in the next village: face-to-face relations no longer require physical proximity.

Examples of individuals assisting people from other clans—which might be taken as an example of “bridging”—still relied on face-to-face relations, and simply imply that while “clan” and “sub-clan” are extremely important social categories to understand in Somalia, they do not define the sum total of social relations. Examples of “linking” (trusting relationship across vertical social gradients) are difficult to find in the case examples. Often these relations are more about exclusion and exploitation than about inclusion and mutual coping. Of course, social gradients exist within clans and sub-clans, and sometimes either existing resources or captured aid traversed these gradients. Some groups have been better able to capture external aid just as some groups have a bigger and better educated business community or diaspora—indeed the two often go hand in hand. An example of “linking” social connection—not particularly highlighted in this paper, but certainly part of the overall dynamics of the famine and its response—involves Islamic networks and provided assistance through mosques or local organizations by linking them to external sources of money or material aid.64

More importantly for the understanding of famine coping, the relationship between the first and second circles is temporal and related to the ways in which shocks are managed. In the absence of a crisis, the second circle may be active and one of its primary functions is to respond to idiosyncratic shocks. It is also maintained in ways other than the flow of money or other resources that affect some members of the network but not all of them. It may expand in unusual ways in the face of extraordinary covariate shocks such as those faced in Somalia in 2011. And for some at least, the second circle ultimately collapsed. This in effect amounted to the onset of famine conditions, triggering the widespread stress migration witnessed from May to August of 2011, and the high levels of human mortality. The third circle was invoked in response to the collapse or severe stressing of the second, and even though it may have involved the search for more distant and better-off connections, it does not correspond to the notion of “linking” in the literature.

These “circles” define who is in what network and the temporal way in which different networks are invoked. They do not, in themselves, map resource flows or other elements of what might be considered social capital. That requires additional work, and while relatively straightforward to describe, it is very difficult to quantify. But it is impossible to understand and differentiate between the coping ability of different groups without understanding these dynamics—even if they are only poorly quantified.

And finally, the issue of gatekeepers and aid “capture” do not fit comfortably within the relatively cheery categories of “social capital.” Yet clearly people relied on their social connections and identity and their links with clan militias to gain control over aid—sometimes by “aid baiting” or the use of human famine victims to attract humanitarian assistance with the intent to steal or otherwise exploit that aid for their own benefit—or perhaps the benefit of their own social network. Thus social relations and social connectedness can be as much about exclusion as inclusion; as much about victimization and exploitation as about mutual assistance and coping.

Conclusion and implications

Understanding social connectedness is clearly critical for understanding how different groups coped
with the famine—and with crisis more generally: how badly people were affected by the same levels of shock whether they survived, and whether people were able to recover or were left destitute. This connectedness also takes place alongside other better-studied “coping” activities, such as natural resource extraction and asset sales. But a bigger question lingers about the implications of this analysis for formal policy and practice. In the aftermath of the Somalia famine and a similar though somewhat less severe crisis in the Sahel in 2012, much of the policy discourse around humanitarian action and development intervention among chronically at-risk populations has focused on the notion of building the resilience of households, communities, and institutions so that they themselves are better able to deal with shocks. Hence the question: what actually makes households and communities more resilient? Beyond the resilience agenda, another relevant theme is the trend towards localization of humanitarian response and the emphasis on “providers of first resort,” who are almost by definition people who are close by and who may be affected to some degree by the same crisis. Strengthening the capacity of local communities, local government, and local organizations to respond quickly to shocks is increasingly an important part of the discourse about humanitarian action. The analysis here emphasizes the importance of social connectedness, but whether and how social connectedness can be strengthened by external intervention is not always clear.

It is clearly important to understand these dynamics. But it is equally important to understand that these dynamics have their own logic and rationale—they are not just a local response to external policy, except that the unintended consequence of external policy in 2011 was the lack of any international response, or at least a significant delay in that response. That said, this analysis has a number of important implications for policy and practice. First, many groups were badly affected by the crisis of 2011, but the dynamics analyzed here make it clear that some groups were much better connected and much more able to cope with circumstances. By the same token, however, some groups were much better able to capture formal humanitarian assistance—and indeed this may be part of what enabled them to better withstand the impact of the crisis. This has obvious implications for the targeting of external humanitarian assistance, but when targeting has to overcome powerful social dynamics on the ground, experience indicates that it can be extremely difficult to ensure that the most vulnerable groups actually receive the assistance that is allocated to them. External military intervention to ensure that vulnerable groups received assistance backfired dramatically in 1992. No such external intervention was tried in 2011. Indeed in 2011, the external concern about the dynamics of aid capture revolved around the question of whether diverted assistance would fall into the hands of Al-Shabaab. Internally in Somalia, a different set of concerns around aid-capture and constraints to access was highlighted by Menkhaus and related, not to Al-Shabaab, but to gatekeepers or “black cats.” He noted, “Put another way, Al-Shabaab could be cleared out of much of south Somalia but that would not necessarily guarantee humanitarian access in the event of renewed famine.”

Beyond the issue of targeting, however, is the interpretation of crisis dynamics. As noted, until the time of the famine declaration in July, the situation depicted by the most up to date analysis suggested that the crisis was the worst in Mudug and Galgadud, but then suddenly famine conditions were found to exist in Bay, Bakool, Lower and Middle Shabelle (which previous analysis showed to be affected, but not as badly). Much of the speculation since has centered on the question of “what went wrong?” with the analysis of deteriorating conditions in the latter regions. The analysis here suggests that the missing element may have been the lack of an understanding of the social connections of affected groups in both areas—that in fact affected groups in Mudug and Galgadud were better connected and more able to cope, even though the conditions might have been as bad or worse there in the early months of 2011 than they were farther south. But while such an interpretation is congruent with both the observed current status reports in 2011 and the information on social connectedness as reported here, it is far from confirmed as the explanation.
With regard to strengthening the resilience of local communities, social connections clearly are critical to survival and recovery in the face of repeated or protracted crises. However, one question arising is whether this can be bolstered through externally funded and managed intervention to improve “community absorptive capacity.” In the aftermath of the crisis, attempts are being made to strengthen local early warning, and to build community contingency funds, capitalized by joint investment from external and community sources. These efforts go beyond simply improving livelihoods assets or diversifying income streams, and are attempts to strengthen the role of “responders of first resort.” For the most part it is too early to judge the success of these interventions. The analysis here has important implications about mechanisms to ensure equal access to such resources, and also for the targeting of interventions to improve these capacities. For the most part, however, targeting of interventions is still being managed in such a way as to minimize the likelihood that Al-Shabaab might inadvertently benefit from diverted aid, so in fact many of the areas most affected by the famine are not included in these interventions.

On the other hand, while proactively intervening on the basis of the analysis here may not be straightforward, it is quite clear that any attempt to bolster resilience in Somalia should seek to avoid undermining the strategies on which Somali communities rely. Attempts to isolate Somali money transfer companies from international banking systems (again, in the name of counter-terrorism) self-evidently undermine the resilience of Somali communities where the international transfer of money is an important part of daily life and the response to crisis conditions.67

Measuring social connectedness presents methodological problems. The analysis here was based on two years of fieldwork, mostly conducted after the famine had ended. But this analysis suggests that the way social networks function in extremis is qualitatively different from the way they function under more “normal” circumstances—and the monitoring of these changes could be a very important kind of information for early warning and response. Certainly understanding and predicting the collapse of networks of support is critical. Monitoring the kinds of information presented here is possible but would require rather different monitoring protocols than those currently used. And framing social connectedness dynamics in terms of clans is highly political, and an area that most conventional early warning systems avoid. Solid knowledge about livelihood patterns and geographic locations of different groups can help to depoliticize the analysis, but in situation of rapid population displacement, these can shift quickly.

Nevertheless, understanding the capacity of households and communities to cope with deteriorating circumstances is critical to both analysis of and intervention in future crises. To some degree, this analysis has highlighted both the necessity and the complexity of understanding social connectedness in the Somalia context. To a large degree, this is defined in terms of lineage and clan, but under extreme circumstances may go beyond these categories. The extent to which these connections can be understood and mapped will provide a deeper understanding of resilience in Somalia, and therefore an important component of preventing future famines.
References


Notes

1. Although the literature relies heavily on the term “social capital,” for a variety of reasons we prefer to analyze social networks and social connectedness. For the sake of clarity, we refer to the literature by its own chosen name, but the evidence here tends to reject the notion that the sum total of complex social relations can be boiled down to some kind of “capital.”

2. Majid et al., Narratives of the Somali Famine. Medford: Tufts University, forthcoming


5. Ibid.


9. Numerous factors related to the course of the crisis, including a detailed analysis of the causal and complicating factors; the “early warning/late response” phenomenon; the role of Al-Shabaab and counter-terrorism restrictions in constraining mitigation and response and numerous other issues are outlined in Maxwell and Majid, Famine in Somalia.


17. McDowell and de Haan, “Migration and Sustainable Livelihoods.”


19. Davies, Adaptable Livelihoods.


27. Aldrich, Building Resilience.

28. Ibid.

37. The resilience literature in general, and on Somalia has grown rapidly since the famine. The most important conceptual work on this is, Christopher B. Barrett and Mark A. Constanas, “Toward a Theory of Resilience for International Development Applications,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 111, no. 40 (2014). In terms of programmatic applications, see, Tim Frankenberger et al., “Community Resilience: Conceptual Framework and Measurement Feed the Future Learning Agenda” (Rockville, MD: USAID Feed the Future FEEDBACK Project, 2013).
42. For example, see Corbett, “Famine and Household Coping Strategies.”
44. Field Interview. 2013.
45. Field Interview. 2013.
47. The most complete evidence on this question is mostly for Somaliland. See Laura Hammond et al., “Cash and Compassion: The Role of the Somali Diaspora in Relief, Development and Peace-Building” (Nairobi: UNDP, 2011). Also see Lindley, “The Early Morning Phone Call.”
49. One of our senior researchers described this phenomenon (in his own case) in terms of beginning to receive phone calls from people he didn’t know, asking for assistance. This began in about May 2011.
51. See FSNAU Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) maps for different times throughout the course of 2010–11. Right up until the famine was declared, the depicted conditions are depicted as more severe in Galgadud and Mudug regions than in Bay, Bakool, and Middle and Lower Shabelle regions—the regions that ultimately fell into famine.
52. Field Interview. 2013.
54. It is not only having a diaspora, but where they are located and in what employment status that is important; the Saudi Arabian diaspora mentioned may not be able to raise the same funds as an equivalent number in Europe or the USA for example.
55. Field Interview. 2014.
56. Lindley, “The Early Morning Phone Call.”
58. Field Interview 2013.
61. Field Interview. 2014
64. For details on this, see Maxwell and Majid, *Famine in Somalia*.
65. See for example, much of the preparatory analysis for the World Humanitarian Summit to be held in Istanbul in May 2016.
67. The most flagrant example of this was the pressure from the UK government for Barclay’s Bank to close the account of Dahabshiil (the largest of the money transfer companies) at the same that that it was investing millions of pounds in “resilience” programming in Somalia. BBC 2013: http://www.bbc.com/news/business-23030943